Many people in this room already know about us because he is a member of our Research Fellows Group, The Training at War Program.
He will speak on searching for flexible forces.
The Lithuanian civil intelligence perspective and there is a number of interesting conversations trying to compare Lithuania historically,
certainly through the Soviet era with today and what a small country is learning
from outside but also have internalised as they develop even here today.
His lecture this one in the course of two terms here.
But he has been a friend of the program, I'd say, before that.
And there's a kind of loyalty or conferences. I never if it was great,
I'd love to give you the platform to speak I'm sorry of the travel disruption of not removing the rule is but you will get high quality between stuff.
Okay so thank you.
It's a real privilege to be here and to deliver my paper and to share some my initial thoughts about some research projects which I'm doing right now.
And this presentation is kind of part of my ongoing production fellowship Back Can Rufina and I am commissioned to write a book.
I have one more year left about development and military thought since 1990.
So what we did after regained our independence,
after the collapse of the Soviet Union and basically what I'm interested in how we are a small country with a small armed forces,
6000 overall with all services included and reservists and regulars.
What we how we're thinking about what does war, how we thinking how we have to fight wars, what what future conflicts will be,
how that thinking affects our military planning and military structure, training, equipment, procurement, etc.
And basically, I'm looking at how much we are borrowing and avoiding copying Western ideas,
British, Scandinavians, ones, Americans, and how much we invest in our own.
And I would have to say we almost 95% are copying and maybe 5% something we inventing or inventing from our historical past,
especially the special force area, because we have our kind of history of military resistance against Soviet Union in late forties, early fifties,
and our Special Forces are something learning from that experience,
and especially with tactical level decisions and sharing in line with the British and Latin American Special Forces,
because they know how to how to hide tracks in the snow, in the forest, etc.
This kind of practical, practical things, which we were successful because almost ten years we were fighting back Soviet soldiers in our forests,
out in the mountains, deserts, wherever. So but basically when talking about regular armed forces, land forces, air or Navy,
we are just borrowing or copying or sometimes are just and leaving this restaurant, especially on British concepts.
And my background is political science and political science,
but there's a requirement that you have to approach to your project with some kind of problem,
because at first I was just interesting and curious what we're thinking.
But when my supervisors and say, What is your problem? I was to first think about it.
And one of the angles which I decided to take it was a civil military relations perspective.
Let's see. And how is reflection and consideration about concepts, about war is affecting our civil military relations.
And when I talk about human relations, my final point is definition of power.
Because I see so much through relations as a relationship of power to see who will be in charge of what.
And I have a problem with that because of power. As you know, it's I was at a war as it occurred,
as democracy and freedom is a very the word concepts you there's so many definitions that you just me lost in all the definitions I
never want to use the word truths or British mythologies definition like a man when he talks about two coexisting definitions of power,
despotic infrastructure and despotic power is its power over society.
Infrastructural power is truth aside. All basically say despotic power is ontological.
It's about institutions and infrastructural powers.
It epistemological, it's about discourse, it's about socialisation of concepts, it's about controlling your behaviour.
Even then you don't don't know that. I don't understand that.
How is controlled propaganda for example. So and then I took this perspective and I looked in civil military relations, old writings.
I see very clear picture. The mainstream tradition started with Huntington.
The Alawites continue to go Moscow's bulk.
Now fewer arms ship. They all talk about despotic power.
How to do what? How to arrange institutional framework.
Legislative framework. Conceptual framework. To take away or not permit military to take power.
Central power to govern. How to be the power or more, let's say more.
Whereas with not only that, but still just keep away.
Military from the central power is despotic. But then I look in contemporary discussions also there would have discussions about
militarisation of was now a very popular concept multi-month military and entertainment.
And it's even simple question about discipline, how it spreads over how to say we are controlling someone without even his understanding of notice.
And in this way, despotic power cannot explain because it's not institutions.
And you can measure if you take both political sense perspective. So it's not you can use statistics or interviews or institutional knowledge,
is it not help total you need this infrastructural power across what you have to do content analysis, discursive analysis, conceptual history.
So when I look from this perspective, I see that in some ways you have to use this to different understandings of power.
And I would say it's it's too overwhelming. Despotic power understanding can still move through literature.
And we're not talking about the other part of the power and control.
And why is this important coming back to say why power is important to say what?
What is a tool of power and what does it feel to civil military relations?
And for me, I am almost, quote, Professor Strong, and I agree with you that for me,
so much relations, first of all, is about strategy and about fighting.
And on the after that is about civilian control over military because as Peter Fuerte told,
is a dilemma or paradox of civil military relations at first will create armed forces to defend ourselves.
And the second step is that we start in the framing of this institution, but the first step is to have a wild blue institution which could fight.
And later on we are trying to manage and find ways how to control.
So now the question is and say how we fight, how we discuss it about.
So for me, reflection about war, let's see how we fight all of these strategy strategies about I think to recognise,
understand this complexity of nature of war differences between nature and character of war and different ways of war.
So if you don't have this discussion, it's kind of like logic, my writing now.
So if you don't have a discussion about this conceptual issues, we don't have a good understanding of strategy and this way you don't have a strategy.
We have problems with our civil military relations.
So in use way reflection or discussions inside the military and between militant and civilians is kind of I
would say why to if you want to have a good proper civil military relations and going through the thing in case.
Well so what is important when you're talking about despotic power is about institutions.
So within the I would say like all central eastern European countries, after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
we just copied very fast the Western institutions, legislative party government.
So let's see, all different agencies and our members in the European Union force us to adapt all this law package.
And the thing is kind of a record breaker in the European Union because we just adapt everything where the European Union policies,
especially Brussels and in many cases we just at that directive in our legislative system and only have to ask questions why, why?
Why didn't we discuss it more widely? Let's see, maybe we needed some adaptations were our so.
So we are very fast to pick up all of this framework, all of this show.
But the question is what about the contents they all it's going to political stance
German is what about the quality of democracy quality of civil military relations.
So to say we have an institutional framework. It's not so it's a very good everything is done by British American example with British advisers.
What worked I think ten years ago within a healthy,
reciprocal institutional framework of civil military relations now goes for me is a question and why.
The question is what we do inside of that framework I was discussing and how we discuss discussing what kind of quality discussions exist.
And then I see lots of lots of problems.
One of them just I I'll I'll be back 20 years back into my some memory so I will share some Mr. Wine things.
Years ago I was teenage boy in my native town.
Some were provincial Lithuania and I decided to improve my reading skills in English.
And I just went to public library. I was searched, I was getting into history, I was looking a book about history in English, and I found it.
It was just a part of the youth revolution. And I have to say it enchanted me and it still enchants me.
So if you want to understand my worldview into academia,
into military thrillers that you just from Parker or if you going to political science Charles Tilly
or Michael Mann that I see that military is not only destructive but also as a productive power,
creative power. Let's say me as a child through surf wars made states takes me to war.
And I think it is all critique. I, I think this argument still stands.
And sometimes we are talking too much about destructive power of states, especially Muslim countries,
not, not maybe what is happening outside the Western world with this drug for punches, glasses.
I came to university and they found two things one positive and then very negative positive that I found that tradition, both good science,
that which complements Parker's interpretations, that is as a central, still a disciplined and digger, at least in his earlier writings.
Michael Mann, Charles Doolittle, Scorpio, all of them they've discussed we're discussing about how mutually is important as a subject.
If you want to understand how Western countries were formed and developed, the negative perspective is that this tradition,
both historical and theological books, is very marginalised in mainstream political science and social science in general.
It's kept on the margins in many cases is just there's a lot of atoms just to destroy it, just to abolish chairs and faculties, to criticise,
not to publish some papers, etc. is maybe because Charles still to a couple of different parties where so prominent scholars,
they just manage to find the five.
But then overall if you look, let's say major trends in social theories, that is liberalism, Marxism and constructivism.
And what unites all of them is, is a negative perspective towards war and military.
So talking in practice, war studies is not practical, is not necessary discipline.
It's a waste of money. Maybe better spend money for anthropology or political economy or political physiology or security studies, but not war study.
So I know that this sounds a bit maybe few much black, not white or some in the middle.
But I would say when I attending conferences, I knew the soldiers, knew the historians.
Sometimes I think they just don't understand how minor important they are for dominant scholars and trance in major western universities.
The military studies is not popular. Why I'm talking about it is so then within a corporate, everything from western world.
Then it became independent. Also the educational system, the framework, how we teach, what we teach, what kind of theories.
So the same thing in case war studies is just almost nonexistent discipline.
So I spent 15 years now in university and from 24 as a living as independent.
And I haven't I took a college position so very high at my university,
so I know more or less how social science exists, what kind of problems, bureaucratic or political is in within it.
And you want to pursue this point, the social sciences and within and so so basically it's the domination is political economy,
political sociology, strategic studies, security studies.
And because of members of the European Union, European studies, which again, basically it is public policy and political economy.
So if you want to do something about something about military studies, that is a problem in Lithuania.
I was lucky because my supervisor in my for my undergrad uses Massachusetts and D was a dean of political philosophy,
were Fania the respectable professor and he is a former Soviet Union officer.
So he just I don't know, maybe because of his military legacy, he understood maybe the need of some military studies.
So he just was kind of shield for me, at least for some years.
And they managed to fight back on my own, in my faculty, in university.
But in all history that is. See, for the last 15 years, people who graduated from the scene in universities are trained.
We don't have experts in military studies. So we then were talking about the reflection civilian side can provide only a few people in bureaucracy.
Bureaucracy or in academia or in journalist era could comment about ongoing military missions and about some conceptual issues.
So basically I know that say when we finally decide to send soldiers somewhere outside Lithuania,
there are two people who will always ask for command.
I they're asking me because I almost don't own the one who is doing proper pure military studies.
And my colleague and a journalist, that's all two people who could comment something about military,
who think the problem is in this case, I forced to be expert in all issues.
So in someone I was discussing about Syria right now, I was discussing Central African Republic because we're sending soldiers.
So in spring blast, I was talking about Somalia.
So everybody will thing is going to have to have some comments and now it's very shallow and I don't like that.
But. And but that is the situation. So to say. I'm talking about reflection from civilian side.
We don't have a lot of people to provide. And the problem is one young country.
So we have some experts.
But they went the civil service, the minister of Defence Intelligence Services, and they can write, they can come and they became bureaucrats.
That's all. And they just decided to be bureaucrats. They made a good career.
Some of them were the ambassadors, etc., but like them authorising and they forgot the skills of research.
Another is our particular geopolitical situation because of Russia and this will cyber and energy sector control.
We are investing a lot of intellectual power into questions of energy security and cybersecurity, which has among the smaller elements.
When you talk about proper military discussion, so to say, my colleagues or my age now writing more about energy security and cybersecurity.
That and that is our understanding. Security is our military is very small part of all that.
When we move from civilian side into military side, the picture is maybe even more gloomy, and that is the sea.
In this case, I would be kind of brutal, but frank about the fainting case.
So we have, again, this additional framework. It seems quite okay.
We have six journalists, newspapers, which is written by people working in a system of defence for let's say,
but basically based basically by civilians, not military officers, military citizens, but still and they are published by weekly.
What really bothers me see there is some literature and there is some reflection.
And I go deeper in this writings and it's easy to do for me all along the research because during this 24 years,
the size of publication is still manageable to read it. Every single justice canon, it's not so much.
And so what topics are dominant?
History, German history and experience?
The Second World War. Not First World War, not Soviet baby because of our Soviet legacy, but Germans and Second World War fighting our insurgency,
fighting resistance, fighting against Soviets, as is mentioned, late forties, early fifties.
Then there is a lot of discussions about particular weapons systems, about all of the thing and very all of the historical past,
because now within in 15, 15, 15, 16 century was a big country and cell from Eastern Europe and say we were really good in fighting.
We were fighting against Germany, against the Russians, against with against against Tatars.
And I would say 75% were tourists, 25% were were defeated.
But so and that is very important for our identity is ethnicity.
So our military, even inside the military, they're spending a lot of time and money just to discuss about this far,
far away past times and maybe some legacy for contemporary needs.
But I would say sometimes it's kind of artificial, but that is so.
Well, but what am I looking say for articles about contemporary missions living and then of the same needs or some reflections about new concept like,
I don't know, first generation warfare coin, new war debate, all its base operations.
I found mine. Maybe I found ten articles in in the timeframe of 24 years about all of this.
Subjects in military journals for me is a very clear indicator of level, of reflection,
of always discussions are actually for me is an indicator that we not are discussing at all.
I would say this when we have our own peer field within and there was more discussions about mission of Afghanistan, about priorities.
But you know, that is more, I would say. Mm. A solid year but not let's say, let's say a.
What does Putin what is the transition mission? What we're doing here is he's again brought a frame of coin.
What is happening in that era is see what is within an input.
There was kind of minor discussions about that. Moreover, we were before Afghanistan, we were in Iraq, we were in Bosnia and Kosovo.
We don't have not only official histories, but we don't have even a booklet about each of these missions.
So if I want to know to find out and see what the fans were doing in Bosnia and Kosovo and to see what they learned,
what lessons learned for all the issues, operation and tactical, even political, international cooperation.
And no, I don't have any with the shovel that I know, the officers with Serbs.
I can't I mean, go and interview them, but I see.
But if I want to do something for my students, for example, there is nothing.
We don't have a tradition of our police official used to write them in military.
Well, it's it's it's a good a bad thing to tell this official history is maybe another question.
But let's see what we have a tradition to put something on the paper for future generations to know what is it,
what we did, what was good, what was wrong, and the same now as Afghanistan.
We came back from Afghanistan. 80 years big operation.
The biggest operation for the Finnish, I think for the foreseeable future will be the biggest.
There is not any discussions that said to start writing something about semi-official about what we learned in that.
So there is a problems in this level. I took another step.
I go to official documents and special doctrinal level and to look and say, look for reflection in this area.
So we have our first doctrine in 2010, military doctrine.
Then we have a military doctrine operations in 2011.
And last year we publish a military training doctrine. Well, the fact that we have a doctrine is kind of step forward.
Now, I don't know when I will come back to within after staying here.
And also what I will do are lots of interviews.
So the first question will be I will ask people why we have this doctrine for this particular day is it was because of neither requirement,
because, you know,
we need a member and we must have checklist of some all these documents like strategies, field manuals, doctrines, etc., always some kind of inside.
Right. But from that, what I see in the wider discussions or it's nothing is because it never exists.
I think it's wasn't some drive from junior officers to do something to to put something in the doctrine.
When they read doctrines, they are heavily borrowed from British ones.
Our military doctrine 2010 is a crude translation of British military doctrine.
28th First Edition. The structure of the text is the same.
The concepts are the same. The two main concepts which are still so important for British and for opinions, mission,
command and manoeuvres approach that is essence of doctrine in thing and what they read, at least in official documents in Britain.
Also, the question is maybe Britain is discussing more inside said what does it mean is proper,
not proper and within again I then I will start to look at name is approach.
What is it? Did we discuss something in our papers, articles, debates?
Even inside the Parliament? When you have oversight committees which have to permit, publishes, document, nothing.
So I do not know actually what we think.
What is manoeuvres and brush opinions except what is written in doctrine and the same as mission command.
I have to go deeper. I have to talk with officers who wrote his doctrines.
I have to go maybe to look into the few manuals and training programs.
But right now I would say that we wrote these things without any public discussion before and after that there was no reaction.
And actually Michael to I am wrote and not non of paper about the doctrine even to say this is
already for years I have published but probably with my research will fix at least this era.
And so there is again lack of reflection another indicator even if there are some articles who authors are, for me that's even a reading.
The American Parliament There's Military Review. John Porter Quarterly Journal of American British Army Review on RC Journal was there's
experts arriving civil and also lots of officers acting officers of the and commenting
especially on doctrinal operational level questions so in living in case why is even
articles about military issues is only a small number of officers who are writing so.
So you've been sending a lot of officers to Tavis, Tanya, which is both a defence colleges.
We see lots of this. Tanya also is going to be an officer.
So they have is high command courses basically for major, sometimes even colonels.
And this is how both Defence and Security Review Journal, I check it also and there is I think 14 volumes now of them,
only 12 publications by Lithuanians from these publications, only three are by officers.
Even as the officers who are sent to this college,
they're not writing the papers and published license and science published even more than the senior officers.
Now, the question is why want to do that? Let's say, what is the reason why?
Answer is the two answers is one is solidly this year, especially about secrecy.
And we have to kept everything tight, not to provide, not to give nothing for Russians to read what we think about war,
how we preparing about war, etc. But I it but that is when talking about free democratic country and I said sovereignty.
Say so why British are not afraid? What the Americans are not afraid and they say kind of open we are discussing.
Of course there is some secret issues, but they say discussions about nature war is kind of open.
So let's say why don't we have in the scene and why you can't permit officers to do that?
And again, is someone asking questions?
I will have to clarify. I will come back with my hypothesis is the secrecy of this, the Russian culture.
And it's not only military. If you go to foreign policy or intelligence service.
Oh, we're our agency. It is a kind of secrecy.
Are afraid of conspiracy just to keep tight not provide information is very much alive and it's very Russian actually.
But it's an obstacle, let's say, to have a proper, maybe wider discussion.
Another one is more joyful.
I would say it's concerns our understandable history that Soviet Union collapsed.
We brought back our historical tradition from interwar period, which was rank in tradition.
Fragments of foreign policy that mirrors our overall framework of history was the history of war and diplomacy.
So I say and that that and the health of how to say to keep alive our understanding of the Athenians always was a nation of warriors.
You're all before who were victorious or heroically defeated.
But no one. No, I bad boys and the other guys never.
And so it is. And that is sometimes I talk with some of those movements, said why we need always discussions about what is in our blood.
We know how to fight because look at our history.
Our history is war. So the thing is, genetically and mentally just war is imprinted in our blood.
So to say we don't need to read about war, we don't need to discuss about war.
That is a question of culture. And again, why the discussion about this understandable history instead of inside and into military.
But that is also the era which I will probe more, but that's where I get some answers about my research.
So overall, I would have to say, so to say in military we are doing well,
our military is serving and these fighting and participating missions casualties are minimal.
So maybe we are good soldiers or maybe we just are lucky.
We've got the good regions to take care of this like in Afghanistan, which has less insurgency, less critical situations, etc., maybe.
Well, Americans and British are very good. How to say mentors have been taking care of a lot of things and we don't need to invest in some issues.
But for me to say just to copy and emulate or even sometimes just translate them technically British doctrines,
documents or having discussions, that is a sign of weakness.
So we need more improvement in wisdom because we don't know to see if something is appropriate for British,
maybe is not appropriate for Lithuania because different region, different culture, different traditions and say, did we ask out this question?
Did we try to adapt that to our needs? Or we just use technical translation and adaptation in this framework?
I do not know because I don't see as a discussion. Discussion probably happens inside the military.
Fine, but also discussion must be outside the military and more open debates and all this kind of sounds kind of idealistic.
But I say the United States and Britain, well, you have your own problems.
And I guess you know that politicians are not always following the advice given by military or civilian experts.
But overall, you have this tradition. You have thinktanks.
You have journals. You have.
Scholars and experts who are meeting like here, listening, discussing and trying to decide what does what is better, what is not.
But but in Finland, we don't have a universal national framework. Even Estonia managed to manage to have a think tank for defence issues.
Small country in Lithuania we're not having that and we're not even discussing to have something of an inside neutral academy outside, wherever.
So the question for me is, so we don't have as a reflection and then we don't have as a reflection,
I see the problems to meet with relations and the practical issues.
Very simple. So we sent our soldiers last spring into Somalia.
It was a Atalanta mission. Now we're sending with transport plane and units to Central African and African Republic.
It was just decided somewhere outside of Athena. Then is our request came.
Minister of Defence decided talked to his government presence to get permission from Parliament and everything was done in one weekend.
Decision make no discussion. Is it necessary?
Not necessary. Is it proper units? Maybe other units is maybe better to send it.
So let's say that all discussion with will be happening here.
And any more problem? Bigger maybe or more. All the rest of country.
We don't have it. We just assume that's it. I would say public societies are just cut off is only decision between government and armed
forces to do something and society's not participating because we don't have experts.
But even we even these who are interested in a little bit, not invited on, not to see given permission to participate.
So and even the say inside the military. Well, again, they made a decision, but I don't see it.
I say even they came back from Somalia on we have some couple of officers to Mali for in structural drop we don't have this
attribute what I did in Somalia said what lesson I learned as an officer ceremonies say was international in international steps.
And we don't have even this kind of journal article for cadets academy for civilian students just really even this is not academic code very deeply,
but even that is not existent yet.
It's changing. And I hope it will change because for the last year, two authors has published their memoir about their service in Iraq,
which was How to see or get a very big critique from Minister of Defence.
And there was a lot of attempts not to permit publication.
And this Saturday it will be official presentation of book published about the history of our Special Forces,
written by my colleague, that journalist that it would be.
First, I don't know how to look because special forces, you know, it's like lots of secrecy.
So I don't know what it would be the content of the book,
but that at least is attempts to do something with contemporary issues and that is a bit changing, but it's only one or two years trends.
So let's say for the last 20 to 24 years we have a problem is the reflection so so
summarising probably I would stand to stop that up for me maybe get your reflection.
So when I look into civil relations so I see the problem.
So if you want to talk about proper constructive settlement relations,
it's not only institutional framework but also the content and quality of that content.
If you want us, you have our armed forces. You want to use it for some political reasons.
How you use it, why therefore?
So that is probably where is all this discussion of of strategies happening?
We don't have this intellectual, I would say, tradition from civil and military side, and it's not encouraged to exist.
All this is still is not encouraged. So I say we don't have a reflection.
And I, I think the worst case what may happen, we, we one day when we send soldiers somewhere and meet some tragic who happen and then
then with the strategy of struggle thing that people will start asking questions,
why we're there, why these soldiers, why these units,
why we will fight particular this way and the answers from demand because there was non good good open
discussion even the sea leading some secret stuff inside the military to discuss and to prepare planning.
But this that tradition is not still existing, so to say we are very good in copying institutional framework from Western countries.
We got to, I would say, kind of in bad shape, copying this tradition of discussion and reflection which exists in the same countries,
which provides us an institutional framework. So overall, I would say the same thing.
It's not if, let's say strategies to let's say to understand, recognise the complexity of war.
Nature of war policy is not on the civilian side is which lacks.
As I would say, to discuss, but even more military side.
So from my perspective, from what I see lacks was capacity and is not encouraged to invest, to enlarge his capacity.
To think through what? Why you do that?
Let's see. What is your business? Here it is if you win a war.
So what is worries for you to see how you prepare to fight this existential?
I would say philosophical questions are not very much ask, you know,
an armed forces and that is for me at least is a problem with which problem which is not containable inside the military,
but it has impact outside the military, I would say.
So that is overall my presentation kind of sober, kinda sad, but I would say frank and sometimes we have to be frank and direct to the point.
Well, thank you much indeed.