1 00:00:00,670 --> 00:00:08,350 Imported actresses will be known to many of you simply because these last two terms you know how to pursue positive change. 2 00:00:08,350 --> 00:00:09,460 Your courage will progress. 3 00:00:09,910 --> 00:00:18,730 He was a serving officer in the Royal Air Force who has just taken up a new job you'll need somebody with to group in precise time for him. 4 00:00:19,150 --> 00:00:26,700 I'm headquarters to group chief. Chief Air Engineer effort to for training and evaluation. 5 00:00:26,710 --> 00:00:30,520 It's great. It's off the tongue. It tells you everything you need to know. 6 00:00:30,800 --> 00:00:31,720 [INAUDIBLE] get better of sight. 7 00:00:31,720 --> 00:00:41,230 And that's why all the questions are going to be clear about what you speak about today is what he was working on over the last few terms, 8 00:00:41,240 --> 00:00:44,320 which is going to be published in our studies. 9 00:00:45,010 --> 00:00:48,250 And the title, as you can see, is The Deception of Victory. 10 00:00:48,590 --> 00:00:52,000 Our war is won or Lost in the Mind of the Observer. 11 00:00:53,260 --> 00:00:57,160 Thanks to you. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. 12 00:00:59,150 --> 00:01:05,800 As you said, what I'm going to talk about today is the perception of victory, how war is won or lost in the mind of the observer. 13 00:01:06,160 --> 00:01:11,890 The more astute of you may have noticed that it's a slightly different subtitle than that advertised on the poster, 14 00:01:12,580 --> 00:01:20,860 but be assured that I will be going on to Israel's recent experiences of winning and losing the narrative, and we'll come to that in my scope. 15 00:01:22,750 --> 00:01:27,100 So I'm going to start with a quotation from Winston Churchill, 16 00:01:27,370 --> 00:01:34,630 which he made on the 13th of May 1940, and this was from his blood, toil, tears and sweat speech. 17 00:01:35,830 --> 00:01:39,760 You ask, What is our aim? I can answer with one word. 18 00:01:40,000 --> 00:01:50,920 It is victory. And what Churchill did in a very eloquent turn of phrase was try and distil an unfathomably complex series of events, 19 00:01:50,920 --> 00:01:56,590 the Second World War, into a binary outcome of victory or defeat. 20 00:01:57,310 --> 00:02:03,550 And this is a very human trait. This is something that we like to do, no matter how ambiguous the outcome of war. 21 00:02:03,790 --> 00:02:07,720 We like to assure ourselves of who has won and who has lost. 22 00:02:07,960 --> 00:02:15,280 Who is the victor and who is the vanquished? And the Second World War is an example of a relatively decisive outcome. 23 00:02:16,280 --> 00:02:20,650 But what about those conflicts where the outcome isn't quite as decisive? 24 00:02:21,820 --> 00:02:25,720 And how do we measure victory? After all, war is not sport. 25 00:02:26,050 --> 00:02:31,300 There is no scoreboard. There is no referee. There are frequently no rules. 26 00:02:31,720 --> 00:02:36,250 And quite often the antagonists claim for very different spoils. 27 00:02:38,620 --> 00:02:43,750 So how do we determine cognitively which side has been victorious? 28 00:02:45,130 --> 00:02:54,160 Now we're going to the present day. Many of our leaders would have us believe that victory is anachronistic, that it's a relic of a bygone age. 29 00:02:54,370 --> 00:03:01,420 And actually it's more important now to focus on tangible outcomes rather than something as outmoded as victory. 30 00:03:02,620 --> 00:03:10,419 And recently, David Cameron has been accused of trying to redefine what victory means in order to 31 00:03:10,420 --> 00:03:15,610 ameliorate what has been described to some as a complete and utter disaster in Afghanistan. 32 00:03:17,500 --> 00:03:22,420 Now, despite what our leaders today would want us to think, victory resonates. 33 00:03:22,420 --> 00:03:34,000 The idea of victory is important to people, and it is a very powerful way for people to make sense of the complex situation. 34 00:03:34,360 --> 00:03:39,910 So it's still important. People will continue to use terms such as victory and defeat. 35 00:03:41,260 --> 00:03:49,540 But how is it determined? How do people decide how two groups of observers decide which side has won and lost in war? 36 00:03:49,810 --> 00:03:54,370 And how does one group's perception become the dominant perception? 37 00:03:56,110 --> 00:04:02,560 We're not helped in the theory of war and warfare wasn't very vague terminology. 38 00:04:03,310 --> 00:04:12,370 So we often read words such as victory, success to win, and conversely, defeat to lose and failure or vanquished. 39 00:04:13,180 --> 00:04:19,630 Now, many writers will use these words interchangeably without defining what they mean by any of them. 40 00:04:19,810 --> 00:04:28,270 Other writers will use them to me, something different things, but again will not define what they mean by their use of the terminology. 41 00:04:30,520 --> 00:04:34,180 Also, even when writers define what they mean by victory, 42 00:04:35,200 --> 00:04:40,300 they actually often find something which doesn't according to the popular perception of the outcome. 43 00:04:41,020 --> 00:04:45,250 So a writer will argue that such and such as won in someone say war, 44 00:04:45,820 --> 00:04:52,030 but actually that is meaningless because the popular perception is the converse outcome. 45 00:04:53,560 --> 00:05:00,490 What is clear is after every conflict, a dominant perception tends to ensue. 46 00:05:01,270 --> 00:05:05,350 And even when it Reuters a revisionist and they argue against perception, 47 00:05:05,680 --> 00:05:12,700 they often do so in the knowledge and stating that they are arguing against the dominant perception. 48 00:05:13,060 --> 00:05:16,120 And in so doing, they actually reinforce the dominant perception. 49 00:05:18,400 --> 00:05:25,450 So for the purposes of this talk, I'm going to refer to the dominant perception of the outcome of war as the perceived outcome. 50 00:05:27,280 --> 00:05:34,270 What's also clear is I hope to demonstrate in my seminar is that this perceived outcome is important in matters, 51 00:05:34,640 --> 00:05:40,030 is not just public opinion because it actually has the power to influence downstream events. 52 00:05:40,870 --> 00:05:47,560 And I'm hoping to demonstrate that the perceived outcome has the power to influence tangible reality, 53 00:05:47,740 --> 00:05:53,140 perhaps as much, if not more so than objective reality. 54 00:05:56,880 --> 00:06:04,480 So the scope of this talk is in two parts. The first part is in terms of what does it mean to win in war? 55 00:06:05,220 --> 00:06:08,400 And I'm going to use the four levels of war, which I'll describe. 56 00:06:08,940 --> 00:06:19,020 You know, trying to send whether objective success, any one of those four levels generally engendered this perception of victory. 57 00:06:19,050 --> 00:06:26,310 So whether we can win or whether we can identify causality between objective success and the ensuing perception, 58 00:06:27,870 --> 00:06:32,610 I'll then talk you through my proposed model to try and rationalise the outcome of war, 59 00:06:32,850 --> 00:06:39,390 to try and rationalise the linkage, if you like, between a perceived outcome and the objective outcome. 60 00:06:40,590 --> 00:06:47,010 And then I'll move on to part two with my comparative case study. And this is where I'm going to talk about the Second Lebanon War and the Gaza War. 61 00:06:47,340 --> 00:06:50,970 And the reason I've chosen those two wars is because they're relatively contemporary. 62 00:06:51,540 --> 00:07:02,129 They both occurred within the last ten years. They both involved Israel as the one, the main antagonists, and they both involve similar antagonists. 63 00:07:02,130 --> 00:07:05,310 They both involve non-state actors, Hamas and Hezbollah. 64 00:07:06,150 --> 00:07:11,100 And obviously, they occurred in a similar geopolitical environment. 65 00:07:11,460 --> 00:07:19,590 So I'm using those to compare because they are very similar in terms of many of the the underlying metrics. 66 00:07:20,250 --> 00:07:25,350 What's also very important about these conflicts is they have very different perceived outcomes. 67 00:07:25,800 --> 00:07:32,490 The Second Lebanon War was perceived or has been perceived as someone argue, a catastrophic fate for Israel. 68 00:07:33,180 --> 00:07:41,910 But there are different views. And the Gaza war generally is perceived by commentators as being a great success or a victory for Israel. 69 00:07:42,390 --> 00:07:45,750 And I'm going to show it despite those perceived outcomes. 70 00:07:45,960 --> 00:07:55,020 Objective reality indicates that the strategic reality after those two conflicts was largely comparable. 71 00:07:55,230 --> 00:07:59,010 You could actually argue that it was more favourable after the Second Lebanon War. 72 00:07:59,280 --> 00:08:08,249 So there's a dichotomy there. And I'll go on to talk about Israel's varying approaches during those two wars. 73 00:08:08,250 --> 00:08:18,570 And I'm hoping to describe to you how Israel engendered a perception of victory following the Gaza war 74 00:08:18,870 --> 00:08:25,050 and how their approach conspired to engender a perception of failure after the Second Lebanon War. 75 00:08:26,610 --> 00:08:29,730 So firstly, what does it mean to win in war? 76 00:08:29,970 --> 00:08:35,190 Well, I'm going to go back to our foremost theorist of war and warfare, Kabul conflict. 77 00:08:35,850 --> 00:08:43,560 And he said quite unambiguously that victory was the preservation of one's own fighting force and the destruction of the enemies. 78 00:08:43,780 --> 00:08:48,030 That's very clear. It's unambiguous. Now, you know, the discussion needed. 79 00:08:48,480 --> 00:08:51,960 And obviously, if he was right, that would be the end of my seminar. 80 00:08:52,230 --> 00:09:03,840 But I don't think it is right now because actually the chances in the wars of today and tomorrow of an antagonist being destroyed are very low. 81 00:09:04,710 --> 00:09:08,070 Israel could destroy Hamas. They couldn't destroy Hezbollah. 82 00:09:08,490 --> 00:09:12,840 The coalition forces today cannot destroy al-Qaida because these groups are 83 00:09:12,840 --> 00:09:16,920 based on an idea that power derives from an idea which cannot be destroyed. 84 00:09:17,790 --> 00:09:22,050 And so we have to look for some other definition of victory. 85 00:09:23,670 --> 00:09:30,690 Also in the wars of today and tomorrow are antagonists are very unlikely to acquiesce to their own fate. 86 00:09:31,080 --> 00:09:35,010 Hamas and Hezbollah, they didn't surrender either. 87 00:09:35,100 --> 00:09:44,550 Will not surrender. The Taliban will not surrender. These organisations wish to claim their own victory no matter what the objective outcome is, 88 00:09:45,000 --> 00:09:51,000 because it's important for them to have to for their supporters to view them as being successful. 89 00:09:51,750 --> 00:09:56,850 So we can't rely on a Nanga antagonist surrendering in many of the wars of today. 90 00:09:57,750 --> 00:10:01,710 Also, no transnational body is able willing to arbitrate. 91 00:10:02,220 --> 00:10:08,730 We have bodies such as the UN. However, they do not arbitrate between who is won or lost in war. 92 00:10:11,670 --> 00:10:19,830 So as we can see, victory in the conflicts of today and tomorrow is the immutable, divisive and very subjective. 93 00:10:21,810 --> 00:10:27,900 So how do groups of observers decide which side in war has been victorious? 94 00:10:28,410 --> 00:10:33,600 We can't rely on transactional bodies to tell us. We can't rely on antagonists themselves to tell us. 95 00:10:34,200 --> 00:10:38,520 Then we have to make our own minds up. And this is exactly what observers do. 96 00:10:38,760 --> 00:10:44,130 They make their own minds up based on what they see, what they hear, and what they read. 97 00:10:45,750 --> 00:10:56,100 So surely you would think that the perceived outcome, people's perceptions of who wins and loses in war, are based on some form of objective success. 98 00:10:56,460 --> 00:11:04,290 Clearly, you would think that if an antagonist views being successful objectively, ergo they will be viewed as the victor. 99 00:11:04,470 --> 00:11:09,330 However, history is replete with examples where this is not the case. 100 00:11:09,780 --> 00:11:15,870 So I'm going to look at four levels of war, which is the structure that we usually use to evaluate war. 101 00:11:16,320 --> 00:11:22,170 And I'm going to see I'm going to demonstrate that actually you can achieve success objectively at any one 102 00:11:22,170 --> 00:11:28,680 of these levels of war and yet still be perceived as having lost or having been defeated or having failed. 103 00:11:29,850 --> 00:11:33,910 So I'm going to start with a tactical level of war. This is really the lowest level of war. 104 00:11:33,930 --> 00:11:39,480 This is war on the ground. I'm going to use the definition which has been supplied by British Defence Doctrine 105 00:11:40,320 --> 00:11:45,450 and British Defence Doctrine defines the tactical level of war as where formations, 106 00:11:45,450 --> 00:11:51,450 units and individuals confront an opponent or situation with in the joint operational area. 107 00:11:51,840 --> 00:12:03,570 So this is very much about the physicality of fighting. This is where troops, airmen and maritime components fight physically. 108 00:12:05,320 --> 00:12:10,630 And this is very closely related to the operational level of war, which I'm going to look at at the same time. 109 00:12:10,870 --> 00:12:15,760 And that's defined as the level at which campaigns are planned, conducted and sustained. 110 00:12:15,970 --> 00:12:18,520 So, again, is the the military contribution. 111 00:12:19,390 --> 00:12:29,020 Now, you would think that the secret fighting force, the chiefs, the most favourable outcome would be deemed as having been victorious in war. 112 00:12:29,290 --> 00:12:39,280 However, Colin Grey in his book Another Bloody Century, exhorts us to remember Indochina, recall Vietnam and do not forget Algeria, 113 00:12:39,760 --> 00:12:47,270 where in all three cases the United States and France were very clearly successful at the tactical 114 00:12:47,270 --> 00:12:52,450 and operational levels of war and yet have very clearly been deemed as having been defeated. 115 00:12:54,480 --> 00:13:05,160 These have all been perceived as defeats, despite the United States winning almost every engagement from an objective point of view in Vietnam. 116 00:13:05,760 --> 00:13:10,830 So clearly, success lies somewhere else within the four levels of war. 117 00:13:11,100 --> 00:13:19,200 Clearly, in order to be viewed as the victim, in order to be viewed as being successful, we have to look for objective success elsewhere. 118 00:13:19,770 --> 00:13:25,920 So let's move up and let's have a look at the military strategic level of war. 119 00:13:26,490 --> 00:13:31,560 Now, British Defence Doctrine defines this as the military contribution, 120 00:13:31,860 --> 00:13:36,240 as part of an integrated approach to the achievement of national policy goals. 121 00:13:36,510 --> 00:13:43,740 So this is looking at all levels of government power, and it's looking at the military contribution to those levers. 122 00:13:45,240 --> 00:13:56,250 So surely if our military were an antagonist, were to achieve objective success at military strategic level war and achieve their military ends. 123 00:13:56,490 --> 00:14:02,280 Surely then they would be perceived as having succeeded or having been victorious in war. 124 00:14:02,700 --> 00:14:08,550 But again, this is simply not the case. And history gives us plenty of examples where this is so. 125 00:14:09,030 --> 00:14:11,250 Most recently in war in Afghanistan, 126 00:14:12,810 --> 00:14:19,830 we can see that the military contribution from a military strategic point of view was actually phenomenally successful. 127 00:14:20,820 --> 00:14:28,260 The military objective initially was to topple the Taliban so that Afghanistan would be no safe haven for al Qaeda. 128 00:14:28,590 --> 00:14:31,500 And this was achieved in short order. 129 00:14:31,920 --> 00:14:42,030 In fact, by November 2001, the Taliban, having fought their last stand, if you like, in Kandahar, were toppled from power. 130 00:14:42,210 --> 00:14:48,960 They constituted no authority within Afghanistan. 131 00:14:49,300 --> 00:14:56,910 And shortly thereafter, in December, al Qaeda fought its last main battle within Tora Bora, back at Tora Bora. 132 00:14:57,600 --> 00:15:08,310 So by the end of 2001, the Taliban and al Qaeda effectively either been disrupted or removed from Afghanistan. 133 00:15:09,390 --> 00:15:16,290 And it was only after that point, after an interim administration had been set up and effectively coalition 134 00:15:16,290 --> 00:15:22,440 forces were supporting another constituted authority that an insurgency began. 135 00:15:22,680 --> 00:15:32,400 And ever since late 2001, after which Taliban and al Qaeda were suppressed in 2003, the insurgency began. 136 00:15:32,850 --> 00:15:39,720 And it's really 2003 onwards way for the insurgency rather than war in the classical sense. 137 00:15:40,170 --> 00:15:45,090 So actually, from a military strategic point of view, it's been very successful in Afghanistan, 138 00:15:45,480 --> 00:15:49,230 certainly in achieving the initial military objectives. 139 00:15:50,880 --> 00:15:59,730 But despite that, the war in Afghanistan is likely to be perceived, I would argue, as a failure for the coalition forces. 140 00:16:00,090 --> 00:16:05,090 Now, we can see here from recent texts on the subject which certainly reinforce that view. 141 00:16:05,100 --> 00:16:06,900 So we've got losing small wars. 142 00:16:07,410 --> 00:16:17,730 The British military failure in Iraq and Afghanistan and war against the Taliban, which holds the subtitle Why it All Went Wrong in Afghanistan. 143 00:16:18,270 --> 00:16:26,040 Not Did it go wrong in Afghanistan? Why it went wrong, obviously insinuating that we all agree that it has indeed gone wrong. 144 00:16:27,630 --> 00:16:36,060 So we can see the success of the military strategic level of war again, does not necessarily engender a perception of victory. 145 00:16:37,620 --> 00:16:41,220 So let's look a little higher. Let's look at the highest level of war. 146 00:16:41,580 --> 00:16:49,710 Let's look at the grand strategic level of war. And it certainly makes sense that if you were to achieve your political ends, 147 00:16:49,920 --> 00:16:55,890 your political goals, then surely you would be deemed as having achieved success in war. 148 00:16:56,940 --> 00:17:06,360 And British Defence Doctrine defines this at the level at which national resources are allocated to achieve government policy goals. 149 00:17:06,900 --> 00:17:07,320 And of course, 150 00:17:07,320 --> 00:17:15,900 conflicts have said who himself said the war is a continuation of policy by the means we never go to war simply to destroy our opponents. 151 00:17:16,080 --> 00:17:23,100 We go towards achieve something political. And surely you would argue that were we to achieve those political ends, 152 00:17:23,460 --> 00:17:29,970 we would be perceived as having been successful no matter what the military, the tactical, the operational outcomes were. 153 00:17:31,140 --> 00:17:41,040 But again, history provides us with examples whereby success at the grand strategic level of war still does not engender a perception of victory. 154 00:17:41,340 --> 00:17:45,510 And a good example is the Russo-Japanese War of 1980 495. 155 00:17:46,230 --> 00:17:53,700 Here, Japan fought a modern European army and navy in the form of. 156 00:17:53,790 --> 00:18:01,170 Imperial Russia and Japan have only recently modernised among European lines and were very much considered to be the underdog. 157 00:18:02,520 --> 00:18:09,660 However, European powers were surprised and somewhat horrified when Japan was successful. 158 00:18:09,870 --> 00:18:14,520 From an objective point of view. Both the tactical level and the operational level of level of war, 159 00:18:14,880 --> 00:18:23,070 and also from a military strategic point of view and indeed from a grand strategic point of view, Japan actually achieved its war aims. 160 00:18:24,060 --> 00:18:28,620 It exceeded what it originally hoped in many ways to extract from it here. 161 00:18:28,620 --> 00:18:32,490 Russia. Russia withdrew from Manchuria. 162 00:18:32,940 --> 00:18:42,810 They ceded Port Stanley to Japan, and also Russia recognised that Korea lay within the Japanese sphere of influence. 163 00:18:44,310 --> 00:18:48,090 Now, this, you would argue, is a great outcome for Japan. 164 00:18:48,720 --> 00:19:00,270 However, it wasn't to be the case in Japan itself, and in fact, all levels of Japanese society were extremely discontent, contented with this outcome. 165 00:19:01,830 --> 00:19:06,300 So much so that there was rioting in many major cities in Japan, including Tokyo. 166 00:19:06,810 --> 00:19:09,450 And there was even a march on the Imperial Palace itself. 167 00:19:11,280 --> 00:19:22,200 The reason for this malcontent was that it was perceived by Japanese society that the cost paid by Japan during the war was 168 00:19:22,200 --> 00:19:32,280 so great that it wasn't properly recompensed by Russia in terms of financial reparations and territorial acquisitions. 169 00:19:33,030 --> 00:19:37,380 So in effect, in Japan, Japanese people felt it had been shortchanged. 170 00:19:37,680 --> 00:19:44,760 They felt as though they'd been condemned to victory. And it was it felt like a defeat for many Japanese people. 171 00:19:46,140 --> 00:19:51,870 In fact, in Yokohama, it was said that only two people celebrated victory and they were both Frenchmen. 172 00:19:53,490 --> 00:19:55,050 Well, this is about the French. I'm not sure. 173 00:19:57,810 --> 00:20:04,530 So here we can see, even at the grand strategic level of war, even when you achieve what you set out to achieve, 174 00:20:05,070 --> 00:20:10,110 you don't necessarily engender a perception of victory amongst some groups of observers. 175 00:20:12,120 --> 00:20:16,020 So where does that leave us? We've been through every level of war, 176 00:20:16,200 --> 00:20:25,770 and we can see from historical examples that success at any one of those levels of war does not necessarily result in a perception of having won, 177 00:20:26,190 --> 00:20:32,340 at least by some groups of observers. And we can see, certainly in the case of the recent Japanese war, 178 00:20:32,880 --> 00:20:43,170 but that perception is hugely important because that perception in that case resulted in civil breakdown. 179 00:20:45,160 --> 00:20:49,960 So what then does engender perception of victory? 180 00:20:51,880 --> 00:21:01,150 And this is what I'm hoping to answer now. So clearly we've seen from our historical examples that there is a military outcome. 181 00:21:02,710 --> 00:21:12,970 We can aggregate objectively the military success or failure into an objective understanding of what military outcome is. 182 00:21:13,210 --> 00:21:18,790 And it's logical to view that in terms of success or failure because it is objective. 183 00:21:19,450 --> 00:21:25,930 So we know that there is a military outcome, but we know that this on its own doesn't engender a perception of success. 184 00:21:26,710 --> 00:21:31,090 We know also that there is a strategic outcome. There is achievement of national policy goals. 185 00:21:31,450 --> 00:21:37,210 And again, this can be achieved without necessarily achieving a positive military outcome or vice versa. 186 00:21:37,990 --> 00:21:45,250 So that, again, is a separate outcome. And it's logical to imagine that in terms of failure or success, 187 00:21:45,850 --> 00:21:50,260 because it can be measured both on the objective in terms of national policy goals and their achievement. 188 00:21:51,280 --> 00:21:56,590 However, we can see from historical examples that there is another element of that is perceived outcome. 189 00:21:59,860 --> 00:22:06,580 And whilst it's clear that this perceived outcome will be based upon the military outcome and the strategic outcome, 190 00:22:06,760 --> 00:22:14,200 we can see that there's something else. It's a function of something else, and we're not sure exactly what that is. 191 00:22:15,100 --> 00:22:26,890 What is clear also is that actually it's not those three outcomes that matter so much as the benefits or perhaps the disadvantages, but they engender. 192 00:22:27,850 --> 00:22:33,100 So we've seen in some historical examples that you can achieve a positive military outcome, 193 00:22:33,580 --> 00:22:38,620 you can achieve a positive strategic outcome by actually in terms of the overall benefits. 194 00:22:38,890 --> 00:22:43,390 They have been trumped in the case of the Russo-Japanese War by the perceived outcome. 195 00:22:44,530 --> 00:22:49,060 So we need to view the outcomes in terms of the benefits that they provide. 196 00:22:50,350 --> 00:22:56,470 But what is this question mark? What is this other factor that informs the perceived outcome? 197 00:22:57,190 --> 00:23:02,680 And I'm going to argue that the perceived outcome is not just a function of what is achieved, 198 00:23:03,700 --> 00:23:07,840 but perhaps more importantly, how is it how it is achieved. 199 00:23:08,590 --> 00:23:14,320 The actual approach taken by the military force, which is engaged in war. 200 00:23:16,630 --> 00:23:21,940 And as my examples, I'm going to use the Second Lebanon War and the Gaza War. 201 00:23:22,870 --> 00:23:31,209 So in 2006, the Lebanon War was a 34 day conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, 202 00:23:31,210 --> 00:23:35,800 which is characterised by certainly the United States and Israel as a terrorist organisation. 203 00:23:37,090 --> 00:23:42,820 And it was precipitated by the kidnap of two IDF soldiers. 204 00:23:43,990 --> 00:23:50,620 This was a cross-border raid by Hezbollah forces and it also resulted in the death of three 205 00:23:50,620 --> 00:23:59,710 Israeli personnel and a further five deaths when a botched rescue operation was was attempted. 206 00:24:01,930 --> 00:24:07,640 Now, this war has been considered to be in some ways a national catastrophe. 207 00:24:07,660 --> 00:24:13,780 In fact, the leaders of Shin Bet and Mossad described it as such, and they described it as a national catastrophe. 208 00:24:14,050 --> 00:24:17,890 And but Israel suffered a critical defeat. 209 00:24:19,810 --> 00:24:26,770 Furthermore, there was a palpable loss of confidence and pride within Israel after this conflict. 210 00:24:27,220 --> 00:24:29,020 And this resulted in the Winograd Commission, 211 00:24:29,020 --> 00:24:37,060 which was set up in order to understand the mistakes that have been made by the Israeli Defence Forces during that conflict. 212 00:24:38,650 --> 00:24:47,080 Conversely, Hezbollah were lauded as a prototype of a modern hybrid challenger, 213 00:24:47,380 --> 00:24:52,210 and they were elevated to an almost mythical level of military competence by many commentators. 214 00:24:53,650 --> 00:25:06,820 And the secretary general of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, was popularly ordained as the most popular leader since Arab leaders since Nasser. 215 00:25:10,000 --> 00:25:17,590 Just a year and a half later, in 2000, 8th December 2008, Israel again went to war, this time with Hamas, 216 00:25:18,100 --> 00:25:28,180 also characterised by the United States and Israel and Israel as a terrorist organisation, also non-state actor like Hezbollah. 217 00:25:28,210 --> 00:25:31,450 They did have representation within national government, 218 00:25:33,250 --> 00:25:45,610 but this time things were even more difficult for Israel insomuch as whereas Lebanon is sparsely populated in the south undulating rock, 219 00:25:47,080 --> 00:25:52,600 the Gaza Strip is densely populated with the most densely populated urban areas in the world. 220 00:25:53,200 --> 00:26:01,360 And this conflict would take place largely in urbanised areas, extremely complicated, complicated operating environment. 221 00:26:02,890 --> 00:26:12,520 And it was described by Ron Terror, who wrote shortly after the conflict as one big minefield IED traps and tunnels in almost every block. 222 00:26:13,060 --> 00:26:21,280 And based upon Israel's recent experience in Lebanon, and due to this even more complicated operating environment, 223 00:26:21,700 --> 00:26:27,880 many commentators were expecting this to be yet another costly military misadventure for Israel. 224 00:26:29,540 --> 00:26:36,520 Many were expecting failure. But after the 23 day conflict, actually the reverse happened. 225 00:26:37,000 --> 00:26:44,440 And Israel were perceived as being the victors by many and certainly many commentators after the conflict 226 00:26:44,740 --> 00:26:53,200 have referred to Israel and IDF in particular as a paragon of institutional learning and urban warfare. 227 00:26:53,830 --> 00:27:01,750 And many lessons have been attempted to be learned from Israel and the IDF in this conflict. 228 00:27:05,090 --> 00:27:11,330 So we can see the Second Lebanon war has clearly been perceived by many as a failure for Israel and the IDF, 229 00:27:12,200 --> 00:27:16,220 whereas the guys in Gaza will have been perceived as a tremendous success. 230 00:27:17,480 --> 00:27:27,110 But if we look at the objective outcomes, again, there's a question because objective reality does not seem to agree with these perceived outcomes. 231 00:27:28,010 --> 00:27:39,830 So in Lebanon, following the second Lebanese war, the rocket attacks, which preceded the Second Lebanon war, almost entirely cease. 232 00:27:42,090 --> 00:27:47,130 And the northern border of Israel remains relatively quiet to this day. 233 00:27:47,910 --> 00:27:51,930 Furthermore, UN Resolution 1701 was enacted, 234 00:27:52,560 --> 00:28:04,980 which resulted in up to 15,000 UNIFIL personnel being deployed in southern Lebanon up to the tiny river, along with a further 15,000 Lebanese. 235 00:28:05,040 --> 00:28:14,370 Lebanese armed forces personnel in order ostensibly to remove Hezbollah from the area. 236 00:28:16,440 --> 00:28:22,410 Now it could be argued that Hezbollah is still present and still active within southern Lebanon and they haven't been disarmed. 237 00:28:22,620 --> 00:28:28,920 However, the fact is that the northern border of Israel has remained quiet to this day. 238 00:28:30,330 --> 00:28:32,910 Gaza, on the other hand, is very different. 239 00:28:33,630 --> 00:28:41,160 Post-Conflict rocket attacks ceased almost immediately and within three years had increased to pre conflict levels, 240 00:28:42,210 --> 00:28:48,090 and this resulted in a reprisal operation by Israel in terms of Operation Defence. 241 00:28:51,970 --> 00:29:00,670 Moreover, the Gaza war culminated with a unilateral ceasefire and withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza Strip. 242 00:29:02,930 --> 00:29:11,900 So objectively, the strategic outcomes for Israel and two conflicts appear to favour the Second Lebanon War over the Gaza war. 243 00:29:14,000 --> 00:29:18,440 Why then has the perception been contrary to this? 244 00:29:20,960 --> 00:29:24,290 So what I'm going to do is I'm going to look at again the four levels of war. 245 00:29:24,860 --> 00:29:26,750 I'm going to look at Israel's approach, 246 00:29:27,140 --> 00:29:35,870 the IDF approach during the two conflicts to try and understand how they approach may have engendered a perception of victory in 247 00:29:35,870 --> 00:29:44,690 Gaza war and how their approach in the Second Lebanon War may have conspired against them to engender a perception of failure. 248 00:29:46,280 --> 00:29:51,259 So first, in order to understand the grand strategic level of war, 249 00:29:51,260 --> 00:29:57,020 we need to understand what the goals were, what the strategic objectives were for Israel in both conflicts. 250 00:29:57,800 --> 00:30:07,850 So in Lebanon, the key goal, as stated by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, was the return of the hostages. 251 00:30:09,830 --> 00:30:11,450 That was that was key. 252 00:30:12,260 --> 00:30:21,170 Further to that, there was a complete cease fire, expulsion of Hezbollah from the area and a deployment of Lebanese army in all of southern Lebanon. 253 00:30:21,590 --> 00:30:26,990 So extremely, extremely hard to enact objectives. 254 00:30:28,570 --> 00:30:33,730 Conversely, in Gaza, the goals were to strike a direct and hard blow against Hamas, 255 00:30:34,600 --> 00:30:39,700 to increase the deterrent strength of the IDF and to enable an improved and more 256 00:30:39,700 --> 00:30:44,560 stable security situation for residents of southern Israel in the long term. 257 00:30:45,550 --> 00:30:48,660 So we can see the difference in the two goals is very marked, 258 00:30:49,120 --> 00:30:55,570 although they describe similar outcomes in the current of the Lebanon goals were measurable, 259 00:30:56,290 --> 00:31:05,650 they were difficult to achieve, whereas those strategic goals in Gaza were relatively vague and modest. 260 00:31:07,240 --> 00:31:10,390 And what Israel did, perhaps unknowingly, 261 00:31:10,750 --> 00:31:20,700 is set the voiceover bar so high for success in the Second Lebanon War that they were bound to fall far short of that. 262 00:31:21,370 --> 00:31:30,040 And indeed, the Prime Minister had actually set an objective which was impossible to achieve because the two hostages were likely to be already dead. 263 00:31:30,370 --> 00:31:34,510 And if they weren't already dead at that point, they certainly were soon after. 264 00:31:36,490 --> 00:31:39,850 Conversely, with Gaza, the goals have set very modestly. 265 00:31:40,150 --> 00:31:44,380 They were set such that they could be exceeded relatively easily. 266 00:31:45,400 --> 00:31:51,180 So it didn't really matter what the outcomes were. The two wars when measured against each other. 267 00:31:51,820 --> 00:31:56,710 It mattered how they were measured against the stated objectives at the outset of the conflict. 268 00:32:00,860 --> 00:32:09,679 So as we can see in Lebanon, the goals were unrealistic and they sowed the seeds of defeat right from the outset because they were unrealistic, 269 00:32:09,680 --> 00:32:20,090 because they were unobtainable. The Israeli Defence Forces, they chose a vacillating strategic policy. 270 00:32:22,110 --> 00:32:30,240 Vainly chasing these objectives. And indeed, they experienced diminishing returns as the war ground on. 271 00:32:30,510 --> 00:32:39,450 And mounting casualties. Also, their ongoing lack of fulfilment precluded the IDF from ending the war on its own terms. 272 00:32:41,590 --> 00:32:50,200 And resulted in accusations of being bogged down in Lebanon, just as the IDF had been bogged down in Lebanon in the first Lebanese war. 273 00:32:52,900 --> 00:32:57,190 Whereas in Gaza, the objectives were modest and easily exceeded. 274 00:32:58,120 --> 00:33:05,950 And what's more, their early fulfilment enabled a cessation of hostilities at a time of Israel's own choosing. 275 00:33:12,240 --> 00:33:16,040 You lost the boat. It's on your screen, isn't it? 276 00:33:16,680 --> 00:33:19,050 It's on here. Okay, so I'll go on without it. 277 00:33:20,880 --> 00:33:32,580 So the unilateral cease fire fostered the view that victory had already been achieved rather than having to wait for a UN intervention. 278 00:33:33,210 --> 00:33:40,050 And of course, the IDF could not be accused of being bogged down in Gaza as they had been accused of in Lebanon. 279 00:33:42,330 --> 00:33:46,890 So that set the scene. So let's look at the military strategic level of war. 280 00:33:48,180 --> 00:33:55,230 Well, Lebanon being saddled with these improbable aims, chose this vacillating military strategy. 281 00:33:55,530 --> 00:34:02,100 They had to keep changing their approach during the war and as the war went on, in order to chase these unattainable goals. 282 00:34:03,030 --> 00:34:09,990 And this was exacerbated by a poor choice of operational Monaco in the Second Lebanon War. 283 00:34:10,530 --> 00:34:13,560 The operation was entitled Change of Direction. 284 00:34:14,940 --> 00:34:25,710 And what's more, this operation, change of Direction was succeeded by operation change of direction two, three, three, four, five, 4 to 11. 285 00:34:26,400 --> 00:34:34,050 So it was the intent, I believe, of the Operations Directorate to give an operational name, 286 00:34:34,500 --> 00:34:43,770 which conveyed the notion that Israel would change the direction of the politics in the region for its own benefit. 287 00:34:43,920 --> 00:34:46,410 However, the opposite was true. 288 00:34:46,560 --> 00:34:55,110 Actually, what happened was it conveyed the notion that the IDF, their strategy was changing direction and indeed to change direction 11 times. 289 00:34:56,910 --> 00:35:01,830 What's more, because the IDF were chasing these improbable aims, they had to improvise. 290 00:35:02,220 --> 00:35:07,770 An improvisation introduced risk, and the risk increased casualties. 291 00:35:08,610 --> 00:35:14,520 And the result ultimately was the IDF appeared to be shambolic and incoherent. 292 00:35:15,570 --> 00:35:21,580 And that's certainly the view that's been taken by many, many military commentators in Gaza. 293 00:35:21,600 --> 00:35:29,640 However, being unencumbered by these unobtainable objectives, the IDF was able to enact a set piece operation, 294 00:35:30,000 --> 00:35:35,190 a well rehearsed operation which reduced the requirement for improvisation, 295 00:35:35,790 --> 00:35:44,490 thus reducing the requirement or the the existence of risk, thus reducing the number of casualties. 296 00:35:45,900 --> 00:35:51,000 And to the military observers. They appeared competent and unified. 297 00:35:51,390 --> 00:35:56,610 And of course, that's exactly what they were, because they were working to a very well rehearsed plan. 298 00:35:59,370 --> 00:36:07,050 So moving down to the operational level of war, what was the operational approach of the IDF during the Lebanon War? 299 00:36:08,100 --> 00:36:13,320 Well, firstly, it started with a massive aerial bombardment, an initial air campaign. 300 00:36:13,870 --> 00:36:23,300 Now, this air campaign was intended to be decisive because the chief of staff for the IDF was a man. 301 00:36:24,720 --> 00:36:32,190 He was Lieutenant General Banuelos, the first airman to take the post at all, chief of general staff. 302 00:36:33,210 --> 00:36:44,310 And it was his belief in air power and his belief in the fact space operations that he could end the war through the use of that power. 303 00:36:46,230 --> 00:36:51,990 Now, it transpired that this wasn't the case and as the air campaign wound on rocket attacks 304 00:36:51,990 --> 00:36:57,600 from Israel were maintained and in fact ultimately increased right throughout the world. 305 00:36:58,560 --> 00:37:03,990 So clearly, that campaign wasn't working when it didn't work, when it didn't achieve decision. 306 00:37:04,860 --> 00:37:16,740 The second phase was enacted and these were piecemeal operations by land to effectively capture strongholds of Hezbollah, 307 00:37:17,310 --> 00:37:21,120 and they were largely aimed at being symbolic. 308 00:37:22,440 --> 00:37:27,360 So rather than capturing ground, rather than maintaining a presence within southern Lebanon, 309 00:37:29,130 --> 00:37:33,180 they enacted these very costly raids on Hezbollah strongholds. 310 00:37:35,980 --> 00:37:41,050 Finally there was at the end of the Second Lebanon War, I pushed to the Litani River. 311 00:37:41,350 --> 00:37:48,070 There was this acknowledgement by the chief of staff that the military strategy wasn't working. 312 00:37:49,210 --> 00:37:56,080 Now, unfortunately, this push to the Litani was largely nugatory and in fact aborted because by that point, 313 00:37:56,560 --> 00:38:01,450 the UN Resolution 1701 had already been agreed and it was yet to come into force. 314 00:38:01,960 --> 00:38:09,430 But consequently, the push to the time in the final phase of the conflict was ultimately superfluous. 315 00:38:11,260 --> 00:38:17,290 Furthermore, the reserves were called up a full nine days after the commencement of hostilities, 316 00:38:17,830 --> 00:38:26,410 and the perception of this engendered was that things were going badly wrong, things were going so wrong that we needed to call up the reserves. 317 00:38:27,910 --> 00:38:33,430 So if we look at what happened in the Gaza war, we can see that the approach taken was very different. 318 00:38:34,450 --> 00:38:41,410 Firstly, there was an initial air campaign. It was extremely similar to the initial air campaign in the Second Lebanon War. 319 00:38:41,890 --> 00:38:46,450 It was very successful in many ways, as was the initial air campaign in south Lebanon. 320 00:38:46,810 --> 00:38:52,360 The difference was it was always framed as being the first phase in a phase operation. 321 00:38:54,550 --> 00:38:58,990 It was never touted as being decisive, and because of this framing, 322 00:38:59,290 --> 00:39:06,760 it was viewed as being successful because it set the scene for a joint operation thereafter. 323 00:39:07,840 --> 00:39:18,610 So after this initial air campaign, which was deemed to be phase one of Operation Cast Lead, was deemed to be those deemed to be very successful. 324 00:39:18,610 --> 00:39:25,540 And following that, there was a concerted push deep into territory in Gaza and the IDF. 325 00:39:27,310 --> 00:39:38,260 They were holding territory. So rather than enacting these piecemeal operations to to make symbolic gestures, they actually held ground. 326 00:39:40,150 --> 00:39:43,870 And then after the second phase, there was intended to be a third phase. 327 00:39:44,080 --> 00:39:54,910 But the third phase, a push deep into Gaza City itself, was never enacted because by this point the very modest objectives had already been satisfied. 328 00:39:55,750 --> 00:40:03,190 And the IDF could announce a unilateral ceasefire which conveyed the perception that victory had already been achieved. 329 00:40:04,960 --> 00:40:13,060 And right throughout the Gaza war, some very clear communiques were released by Israel explaining where they were in the operation. 330 00:40:13,330 --> 00:40:15,640 There was a phase one or is a phase two. 331 00:40:16,840 --> 00:40:26,470 So it was always conveying it was always framing the idea where they were in the operation and also the operational name itself, Operation Cast Lead. 332 00:40:26,980 --> 00:40:30,190 Very different to Operation Change of Direction. Cast Lead. 333 00:40:30,190 --> 00:40:38,590 Cast in Lead. It conveyed the notion that the strategy itself, rather than being vacillating, was set. 334 00:40:40,200 --> 00:40:45,420 And was immovable and rather than cast led one, two, three, four. 335 00:40:45,540 --> 00:40:53,550 It was cast by phase one. Cast of phase two, conveying this impression that the plan was working, that there was no need to change it. 336 00:40:55,260 --> 00:40:58,920 And also the reserves the reserves were called up at the commencement of hostilities. 337 00:40:59,850 --> 00:41:03,690 So it would preclude any perception that things were going wrong. 338 00:41:04,680 --> 00:41:09,750 It was always conveyed that it was part of the plan and that it would that should they be needed. 339 00:41:11,610 --> 00:41:16,590 So we can see how this perception might be fermented in the minds of the observers. 340 00:41:16,920 --> 00:41:24,629 This perception which fostered the view that the IDF were shambolic and come here in the Second Lebanon War but were competent, 341 00:41:24,630 --> 00:41:30,510 incoherent in the Gaza War and moving down to the tactical approach. 342 00:41:31,230 --> 00:41:39,360 Well, firstly, in Lebanon, it's been argued the IDF were poorly equipped, poorly trained and have become accustomed to counterinsurgency operations. 343 00:41:42,010 --> 00:41:47,950 And furthermore, they're accused of using relatively conventional tactics, techniques and procedures. 344 00:41:49,060 --> 00:41:55,510 And because of this, there was this perception they'd lost their fighting edge that they were being outthought, if you like, by Hezbollah. 345 00:41:58,030 --> 00:42:01,780 And what's more, they were accused of using grossly disproportionate force. 346 00:42:03,220 --> 00:42:12,010 In Gaza, however, this set piece operation I've described resulted in high levels of perceived competency and efficiency. 347 00:42:12,550 --> 00:42:19,960 And what's more, IDF used a raft of novel equipment normal procedures, normal techniques. 348 00:42:20,890 --> 00:42:29,320 And this fostered a view that they were at the cutting edge of fighting and they used equipment such as armoured bulldozers, 349 00:42:29,470 --> 00:42:34,960 remote controlled on bulldozers in Fort Casper that demonised and blackened. 350 00:42:35,500 --> 00:42:43,930 They used gimbal mounted cameras in spheres which could be thrown into buildings so that you could understand the layout inside the building. 351 00:42:44,230 --> 00:42:54,550 They used shoulder mounted wall breaching munitions and the list goes on and it's unclear how much objective effect this equipment had, 352 00:42:54,730 --> 00:42:57,670 but it certainly had the effect of those who were observing the war, 353 00:42:57,940 --> 00:43:05,350 believing the IDF were the superior fighting force, and in fact they were even likened to James Bond. 354 00:43:05,620 --> 00:43:10,390 Such was the advancement of their equipment and this equipment. 355 00:43:10,720 --> 00:43:14,230 It acted as a lightning rod of positive perceptions. 356 00:43:15,070 --> 00:43:19,750 It gave those military observers something to hold on to, something to talk about and report on. 357 00:43:19,870 --> 00:43:29,460 It was interesting. And also in the Gaza War, IDF appeared to be determined to engage the enemy. 358 00:43:29,640 --> 00:43:34,170 Despite the despite a complex environment, they clearly demonstrated resolve. 359 00:43:36,960 --> 00:43:42,870 And in Gaza, the IDF went to very visible efforts to minimise civilian casualties. 360 00:43:43,940 --> 00:43:52,440 They dropped innumerable leaflets warning those people who lived in Gaza City itself that there was going to be impending military action. 361 00:43:52,710 --> 00:44:00,510 They dropped low yield munitions on houses as a warning shot, if you like, before dropping high yield munitions. 362 00:44:01,500 --> 00:44:07,650 And they even telephoned occupants of buildings to warn them that building was going to be potentially attacked. 363 00:44:09,120 --> 00:44:12,060 They were still accused of using grossly disproportionate force. 364 00:44:12,210 --> 00:44:18,240 However, but there were these visible efforts made in order to try and ameliorate that. 365 00:44:21,730 --> 00:44:29,110 And then onto information operations. So we've been through the four levels of war, but also in the two conflicts, 366 00:44:29,110 --> 00:44:34,870 there was a very different approach to information and the management of information and the narrative. 367 00:44:36,460 --> 00:44:40,600 In the Lebanon war, there was what you could describe as information incontinence. 368 00:44:41,290 --> 00:44:44,620 There was a new information environment. There were smartphones. 369 00:44:45,670 --> 00:44:48,670 There was mobile phones. There was bloggers. 370 00:44:49,150 --> 00:44:53,380 There was the Internet was YouTube. All of these things were were new and hadn't been considered. 371 00:44:53,890 --> 00:44:58,060 And there was a dearth of policy on those aspects. 372 00:44:58,240 --> 00:45:04,390 And because of that dearth of policy, there was a cascade of information coming out from IDF soldiers, 373 00:45:04,780 --> 00:45:10,510 from civilians who lived in the area, from obviously the media itself. 374 00:45:11,350 --> 00:45:14,710 And Israel was overwhelmed by the Hezbollah narrative. 375 00:45:15,160 --> 00:45:19,420 Hezbollah being relatively adept at using these new forms of media. 376 00:45:21,220 --> 00:45:33,520 And to make matters worse, Israel had an inconsistent message, the message being in Hebrew, Hezbollah, that hasbara was inconsistent. 377 00:45:34,030 --> 00:45:38,740 So there was different information coming from different departments. The narrative was confused. 378 00:45:39,340 --> 00:45:45,330 The rationale for war was, in some cases, ambiguous, and the aims were sometimes ambiguous. 379 00:45:46,690 --> 00:45:49,510 And as can be expected, there was very critical press coverage. 380 00:45:51,920 --> 00:45:56,510 Whereas in Gaza, the media and the IDF soldiers themselves were very tightly controlled. 381 00:45:56,810 --> 00:46:02,360 Media was banned from Gaza largely. IDF personnel were banned from using mobile phones. 382 00:46:02,690 --> 00:46:10,310 And the Directorate of National Information was created to purify the message, to provide a narrative that was unified and consistent. 383 00:46:11,420 --> 00:46:14,570 And Israel were very become very adept at using new media. 384 00:46:15,380 --> 00:46:19,040 They blocked they had YouTube channels. 385 00:46:19,370 --> 00:46:24,500 That YouTube channel, in fact, became the most popular watched YouTube channel of the time. 386 00:46:25,700 --> 00:46:35,390 And they bypassed traditional media going straight to those people who they were trying to convince of their aims, which was the public directly. 387 00:46:36,860 --> 00:46:42,350 And because of this, our total domination over the information domain and really Hamas were on the back foot. 388 00:46:43,430 --> 00:46:49,820 There was, however, still critical press coverage, possibly because the press had been removed from the area. 389 00:46:51,170 --> 00:46:56,300 So what were the outcomes? Well, if we look at the three outcomes from a military point of view, 390 00:46:56,870 --> 00:47:03,529 I would argue that Israel were more successful in Gaza than in Lebanon as they inflicted comparable 391 00:47:03,530 --> 00:47:12,410 losses on enemy material capability personnel in a short time span and with fewer casualties. 392 00:47:12,800 --> 00:47:20,780 However, from a strategic point of view, the outcome, I would argue, is that Israel were more successful in Lebanon than they were in Gaza, 393 00:47:21,140 --> 00:47:31,040 as the political result following Lebanon was clearly more favourable objectively than that following Gaza. 394 00:47:32,300 --> 00:47:39,440 But finally, the perceived outcome. Well, I would have to argue that Israel were, in fact, victorious. 395 00:47:39,800 --> 00:47:43,670 If you want to use that word in the Gaza war and defeated in Lebanon, 396 00:47:43,760 --> 00:47:52,160 precisely because this reflects the dominant perception and because the notions of victory and defeat are social constructs, 397 00:47:53,750 --> 00:47:55,220 it can only be argued this way. 398 00:47:56,660 --> 00:48:05,720 And of course, it's perverse to talk of military victory in a conflict if actually the dominant perception is the opposite to that. 399 00:48:08,090 --> 00:48:19,460 So of those three outcomes in each war, which is the most beneficial, and I think it's only that can be answered by Israeli media themselves. 400 00:48:20,180 --> 00:48:24,500 Is it more beneficial to achieve your strategic objectives but being viewed as having lost, 401 00:48:25,400 --> 00:48:31,100 or is it more beneficial to have not achieved your strategic objectives but having been perceived a winner? 402 00:48:32,540 --> 00:48:39,920 It's open for debate. So in summary, history will always seek a victim. 403 00:48:40,940 --> 00:48:44,120 People will always want to know and understand who won in war. 404 00:48:44,430 --> 00:48:50,750 It's not simply enough for people to weigh up the various outcomes and come to an informed conclusion. 405 00:48:50,900 --> 00:48:57,550 They want that binary outcome. And also it's clear that the perceived outcome does influence downstream events. 406 00:48:57,560 --> 00:49:03,590 It does affect reality perhaps as much even more so than the objective outcomes. 407 00:49:05,770 --> 00:49:10,480 And as we've seen, the perceived outcome is not simply a function of the military and strategic outcome. 408 00:49:11,530 --> 00:49:18,670 It's influenced by something else as well. And I would argue, based upon Israel's experiences in Lebanon and Gaza, 409 00:49:19,000 --> 00:49:26,500 that its influence to a great degree by the approach taken rather than the tangible outcomes. 410 00:49:28,000 --> 00:49:30,850 So how not just what you do, but how you do it? 411 00:49:34,040 --> 00:49:44,510 And also hopefully I've demonstrated that certainly in the case of the Gaza war, the approach can actually trump the outcomes. 412 00:49:48,020 --> 00:49:52,520 So thank you very much for your attention. And I'll now take.