1 00:00:01,300 --> 00:00:13,000 I'm very. I mean, if you guys already know her handbook that I hear in public practice and international relations, etcetera, 2 00:00:13,250 --> 00:00:23,870 Merton, Associate Fellow of the Oxford Institute of Ethics and Law of Conflict Detail here and still from Cambridge. 3 00:00:24,220 --> 00:00:25,940 I would say so that qualifies. 4 00:00:26,780 --> 00:00:33,590 And of course, originally from Germany, because, you know, we'll be interested to know about her background there as well. 5 00:00:33,920 --> 00:00:42,470 We had a great conversation at lunch about that and her research has focussed on a number of areas and the two things she's working on that moment, 6 00:00:43,070 --> 00:00:44,799 but I'm not going to steal from you, 7 00:00:44,800 --> 00:00:49,760 let you make sure we are aware of those things at the very end because I was time she was going to particularly the new 8 00:00:49,760 --> 00:00:55,880 book which we're waiting for with bated breath and I hope we'll see the light and make sure that they publish that soon. 9 00:00:56,780 --> 00:01:03,620 So anyway, thank you. Thank you. Thank you, Rob, for that kind introduction and for the opportunity to speak in this forum. 10 00:01:03,920 --> 00:01:10,100 So this isn't actually a book yet. It's my dphil, which I defended in September 2011 and which I'm still turning into a book. 11 00:01:10,310 --> 00:01:13,070 This project was originally inspired on a puzzle. 12 00:01:13,070 --> 00:01:21,380 There's a certain type of international armed conflict that is increasingly legalised, and it is mostly the coalition Western coalitions, 13 00:01:21,650 --> 00:01:26,420 often under the leadership of the US intervening in third world countries and these highly legalised 14 00:01:26,420 --> 00:01:32,960 armed conflicts nevertheless engender more rather than less moral outrage and public criticism. 15 00:01:34,670 --> 00:01:43,340 While basically every US military intervention since the 1991 Gulf War has been hailed as the most legalised war in the history of mankind. 16 00:01:43,670 --> 00:01:50,420 These same wars has all have always also inspired, vociferous criticism regarding the humanitarian implications. 17 00:01:51,110 --> 00:01:53,749 This sort of dichotomous commentary, I think, 18 00:01:53,750 --> 00:01:59,180 reached a peak over the last couple of years with the US tightening its rules of engagement for air strikes in 19 00:01:59,180 --> 00:02:04,280 Afghanistan a number of times until they were actually much stricter than the law would require them to be. 20 00:02:04,580 --> 00:02:11,600 Yet these measures failed to quell public disaffection and the continuous protest by the international community. 21 00:02:12,320 --> 00:02:23,090 So there are these incidents of moral condemnation and commendation for comprehensive legalisation is obviously there are multiple, 22 00:02:23,570 --> 00:02:24,620 multiple reasons for that. 23 00:02:24,620 --> 00:02:31,510 It is a complex question, but I think it raises one question with some urgency, which is can international law be effective in war? 24 00:02:31,520 --> 00:02:35,240 Can it actually meaningful restraint? States actions during armed conflict. 25 00:02:36,620 --> 00:02:42,440 The existence of international law and the compliance of states with international law specific in the context of armed conflict, 26 00:02:42,650 --> 00:02:47,270 is still somewhat of a surprise to scholars in international law and strategic studies, 27 00:02:47,270 --> 00:02:49,309 and even actually to international lawyers, 28 00:02:49,310 --> 00:02:54,799 because war is in some ways the realist ideal type of anarchical international relations where the survival 29 00:02:54,800 --> 00:03:00,440 of the state is on the line and security is a zero sum game and common ground is hard to come by. 30 00:03:00,710 --> 00:03:09,440 So in some ways, our most immediate reaction to seeing that law has penetrated that realm of international relations was surprise. 31 00:03:09,440 --> 00:03:14,179 And as a result, a lot of the time in public commentary, as well as in academic discussions, 32 00:03:14,180 --> 00:03:17,450 effectiveness of international law is equated with recourse to it. 33 00:03:17,780 --> 00:03:20,989 International law is being called upon in decision making. 34 00:03:20,990 --> 00:03:30,200 Hence it must be effective. But I think, not least in light of this dichotomous commentary with continuous moral outrage by legalised war, 35 00:03:30,200 --> 00:03:34,850 I think we have to ask the question differently. Effectiveness must mean more than just recourse to law. 36 00:03:35,180 --> 00:03:38,120 And what I think it must mean is we have to ask where the law actually makes a 37 00:03:38,120 --> 00:03:42,320 difference in warfare and whether the difference amounts to a normative improvement. 38 00:03:43,160 --> 00:03:50,870 And in order to shed light on that question, I asked three specific questions one theoretical, one empirical and one normative. 39 00:03:50,990 --> 00:03:55,309 The first question is can international law actually make a difference for behaviour 40 00:03:55,310 --> 00:03:58,550 and more specifically for the definition of a legitimate target of attack? 41 00:03:59,030 --> 00:04:06,139 It is necessary to ask this question because states create international law and international law addresses states. 42 00:04:06,140 --> 00:04:12,020 And for that, because of that, there's this lingering suspicion that international law merely reflects state interest. 43 00:04:12,350 --> 00:04:17,450 So international law endorses how states want to act anyway, and as a result, it doesn't really make a difference. 44 00:04:17,930 --> 00:04:22,610 I would mostly bracket my sort of theoretical inquiry into that question. 45 00:04:22,910 --> 00:04:27,380 I answer the question affirmatively that international law can make a difference for behaviour, 46 00:04:27,650 --> 00:04:30,590 and that is mostly because at the level of the individual, 47 00:04:30,590 --> 00:04:37,670 the individual cognitive and motivational processes of decision making are influenced by whether or not a matter results to a law or not. 48 00:04:38,120 --> 00:04:42,559 But since this is a question that is about international law in general and not specific to war, 49 00:04:42,560 --> 00:04:45,920 I won't talk about this very much in the context of today. 50 00:04:46,640 --> 00:04:50,299 The empirical question I then ask is Does international law actually make a 51 00:04:50,300 --> 00:04:54,470 difference specifically in US air warfare definition of legitimate targets? 52 00:04:54,830 --> 00:04:59,930 And I answer that question affirmatively as well. International law is what I call behaviourally relevant. 53 00:04:59,940 --> 00:05:03,320 It makes a difference. I then put that difference. 54 00:05:03,720 --> 00:05:07,110 To a normative evaluation. Is the difference a normative improvement? 55 00:05:07,440 --> 00:05:17,760 And I answer the question negatively. Hence, the conclusion of partial effectiveness of law in war law is not normatively successful. 56 00:05:18,060 --> 00:05:25,950 I should probably specify that by that I don't mean that more would be normatively preferable or better if there was no law, 57 00:05:25,950 --> 00:05:33,400 if belligerence did not at all recur to law. What I'm basically meaning by saying it's not normatively successful is that law could do better in war. 58 00:05:33,420 --> 00:05:36,690 It could regulate war in a way that is normatively preferable. 59 00:05:36,690 --> 00:05:43,620 And I hope this will become clear over the course of the talk. Obviously, I can't make this argument in its entirety today. 60 00:05:43,620 --> 00:05:51,300 So in the talk I will focus on making three points, sort of by way of theoretical, 61 00:05:51,390 --> 00:05:57,030 the introduction I will outline what I perceive as the vision or the logic according 62 00:05:57,030 --> 00:06:02,220 to which positive international law forces that conduct a war ought to be waged, 63 00:06:02,550 --> 00:06:12,420 which I call the logic of sufficiency. I would then talk about my empirical findings and explain that the legalisation of U.S. air warfare 64 00:06:12,420 --> 00:06:17,249 has coincided and actually law has encouraged the rise of an alternative logic of warfare, 65 00:06:17,250 --> 00:06:19,050 which I call the logic of efficiency. 66 00:06:19,740 --> 00:06:27,690 And I will then compare these two logics and argue that sufficiency is normatively superior to efficiency, hence the lack of normative success. 67 00:06:29,040 --> 00:06:32,820 Let me start with the theoretical and the legal part. As everyone probably knows, 68 00:06:33,120 --> 00:06:39,569 law as well as conventional just war theory relies on two main principles to define exactly the target of attack the 69 00:06:39,570 --> 00:06:44,639 principle of distinction which prohibits to ever deliberately and directly target what is defined as civilians, 70 00:06:44,640 --> 00:06:52,020 either persons or objects. And the principle of proportionality, which is not in the law in this form, but basically in its origin, 71 00:06:52,020 --> 00:06:59,190 says that the side effects of legitimate military operations should not be disproportionate to the military advantages achieved. 72 00:06:59,550 --> 00:07:05,310 I will focus on distinction today because I'm specifically interested in how law proposes to the limit war to the limit, 73 00:07:05,310 --> 00:07:09,270 the sphere of legitimate military engagement from the rest of society. 74 00:07:09,750 --> 00:07:17,460 So how is distinction enshrined in positive law? Article 52 Paragraph two of the first additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions 75 00:07:17,850 --> 00:07:22,830 embodies the definition of a military objective as far as objects are concerned, 76 00:07:23,130 --> 00:07:29,760 which is what I will focus on. And it certainly gives us two criteria for defining an object that is a military objective. 77 00:07:29,760 --> 00:07:36,840 It has to make an effective contribution to military action, and its engagement has to yield a definite military advantage. 78 00:07:37,530 --> 00:07:41,490 Most commentators nowadays think that this actually logically presupposes rather. 79 00:07:41,670 --> 00:07:50,520 So you only get a military advantage out of an engagement because if the object made a contribution to the enemy's military action in the first place. 80 00:07:51,390 --> 00:07:58,100 But what do these two mean? How does the law hence propose we should delimit legitimate from illegitimate objects of attack 81 00:07:58,860 --> 00:08:03,990 that two interpretive controversies that plague this definition of a military objective? 82 00:08:04,440 --> 00:08:10,920 And the first is about the degree of nexus between an object and the military activity of the enemy, 83 00:08:11,190 --> 00:08:14,760 and hence between the attack and the resulting military advantage. 84 00:08:15,240 --> 00:08:22,680 The US interpretation is that the military advantage arises from the engagement of objects that contribute to an opposing states ability to wage war. 85 00:08:22,710 --> 00:08:26,550 This is taken from a doctrinal document of U.S. doctrine. 86 00:08:27,060 --> 00:08:34,620 Basically, this is incredibly broad definition. Almost anything can be construed as contributing to a state's ability to wage war, 87 00:08:34,620 --> 00:08:39,440 its morale, its civilian leadership, its infrastructure, its industry. 88 00:08:39,470 --> 00:08:44,100 Specifically, if we consider that states tend to streamline their activities when they are in war. 89 00:08:44,400 --> 00:08:48,660 Basically putting everything to use in the context of the military activity. 90 00:08:49,500 --> 00:08:55,440 This interpretation stands in stark contrast to the International Committee of the Red Cross's take on 91 00:08:55,440 --> 00:09:00,329 what military advantage means and the degree of nexus that an object has to have to military action. 92 00:09:00,330 --> 00:09:08,280 Basically, that it can only be can only consist in ground gate and the light annihilating or weakening the enemy armed forces. 93 00:09:08,730 --> 00:09:11,820 So this is a very restricted definition. 94 00:09:12,120 --> 00:09:16,500 A military advantage is really an erosion of actual military capability. 95 00:09:18,000 --> 00:09:24,360 The second interpretive controversy concerns the frame of reference for for the definition of an advantage. 96 00:09:25,410 --> 00:09:31,800 Again, the ICRC cautions and says an attack as a whole is a finite event, not to be confused with an entire war. 97 00:09:32,250 --> 00:09:39,150 So basically it tells us there has to be a limited piece of military action out of which we want to gain an advantage. 98 00:09:39,390 --> 00:09:44,310 We can't talk about the entire war and what we might might be advantageous in light of winning the war. 99 00:09:45,090 --> 00:09:46,919 The US interpretation, on the other hand, 100 00:09:46,920 --> 00:09:54,360 is that and this is not actually just the US that has this interpretation that military advantage is not restricted to tactical gains, 101 00:09:54,360 --> 00:10:00,300 but listening to the full context of war strategy besides being grammatically somewhat confusing. 102 00:10:01,020 --> 00:10:04,329 The implication of this is that basically the. Framework. 103 00:10:04,330 --> 00:10:13,600 The frame of reference for defining what counts as progress. What counts as an advantage can be so broad as to include what war is ultimately about. 104 00:10:13,780 --> 00:10:18,100 And not only since Clausewitz, we know that wars are always about politics, right? 105 00:10:18,700 --> 00:10:22,060 States do not end up in war unless they have a political goal in war. 106 00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:29,620 So the danger of that interpretation, when we actually see the results of that in contemporary US air warfare, as I will argue later, 107 00:10:29,620 --> 00:10:37,330 is that there's a short, ever shorter line of thinking between the overall political goals of a war and specific targeting choices. 108 00:10:37,810 --> 00:10:44,860 And let me give you an example that is not actually related to U.S., but Israel's intervention in the Gaza Strip in late 2008. 109 00:10:45,580 --> 00:10:50,500 Israel famously targeted the police academy during a graduation ceremony. 110 00:10:51,280 --> 00:11:00,810 So if you consider the goal of the intervention to be stopping Hamas from launching rockets into Israel, then that seems somewhat strange. 111 00:11:01,270 --> 00:11:06,880 It's not entirely clear how the military what military advantage should arise from an attack on the police academy. 112 00:11:07,330 --> 00:11:10,360 But if you use the broader political goal of this intervention, 113 00:11:10,360 --> 00:11:15,819 the sort of strategic context of Israel wanting to loosen Hamas grip on the Gaza Strip, 114 00:11:15,820 --> 00:11:24,129 undermine it politically, then it makes perfect sense to attack the structures of the political fabric of Hamas. 115 00:11:24,130 --> 00:11:25,390 Hold on the Gaza Strip. 116 00:11:28,870 --> 00:11:36,850 Basically, I argue that the first edition of protocol gives us a clue as to which one of those interpretations is the correct one. 117 00:11:37,180 --> 00:11:43,390 I concede that the textual interpretation of the of Article 52 is open ended. 118 00:11:43,690 --> 00:11:46,840 However, if we put the provision in the systematic context, 119 00:11:47,140 --> 00:11:54,760 the law actually settles the matter in favour of a high degree of nexus and a narrow frame of reference for interpreting military advantage. 120 00:11:55,180 --> 00:12:02,980 And the reason is that the first additional protocol is the first international treaty to actually regulate the conduct of hostilities as such, 121 00:12:03,250 --> 00:12:07,630 in light of the prohibition of the use of force, by implication. 122 00:12:08,530 --> 00:12:16,930 There is it doesn't rest on a virtual list of how you stop legitimate political goals that one may pursue with force. 123 00:12:17,500 --> 00:12:18,040 Basically, 124 00:12:18,040 --> 00:12:25,610 it rests on the independence of questions of conduct from resort and the independence of what we can judge for use in dialogue from use up bellum. 125 00:12:27,090 --> 00:12:34,169 As a result, a law that attempts to regulate behaviour in war without reference to the reasons for state's 126 00:12:34,170 --> 00:12:42,990 fight must rely on a generic concept of generic military victory that applies across wars, 127 00:12:43,020 --> 00:12:48,569 no matter their political and moral concept. And it is that concept of generic military victory. 128 00:12:48,570 --> 00:12:54,360 I argue that is the broadest possible frame of reference for interpreting military advantage. 129 00:12:54,900 --> 00:13:00,450 Because in turn, if you think if we do not actually delimit the frame of reference in that way, 130 00:13:00,450 --> 00:13:05,939 we would not be able to devise how to act in war without reference to the either 131 00:13:05,940 --> 00:13:10,890 political reasons why we are in war or the moral goals that we think we are defending. 132 00:13:11,220 --> 00:13:16,890 But it is uncontroversial that the first edition of protocol applies as the preamble 133 00:13:16,890 --> 00:13:21,270 states in all circumstances and without adverse distinction based on the nature, 134 00:13:21,360 --> 00:13:27,780 origin of the conflict, and most importantly, on the causes espoused by or attributed by the parties to the conflict. 135 00:13:29,550 --> 00:13:35,820 Another argument backing up this interpretation in favour of a narrow frame of reference in the high degree of Nexis. 136 00:13:36,180 --> 00:13:41,640 Is that what an international humanitarian law actually balances to contradict conflict and goals? 137 00:13:42,000 --> 00:13:48,300 It is neither about just rendering war as humane as possible, nor is it about letting military pragmatism run wild. 138 00:13:48,330 --> 00:13:53,640 It is about striking a balance between imperatives that often point in opposite opposing directions in war. 139 00:13:54,360 --> 00:13:59,670 While we don't actually know what it means to strike a balance between humanitarian and military concerns, 140 00:14:00,630 --> 00:14:08,700 if we didn't specify that the frame of reference for military advantage would need to be a generic military victory, 141 00:14:08,700 --> 00:14:15,000 then states would actually have the ability to simply follow their military, their interests, their military imperatives, 142 00:14:15,600 --> 00:14:23,370 because, in effect, whatever they could define, whatever they define as their goal would determine what is a military objective. 143 00:14:23,550 --> 00:14:29,820 So if they wanted to attack a specific object, they could just redefine their military objectives and hence be able to do so. 144 00:14:33,320 --> 00:14:42,379 So basically I believe that as a result, I does not allow the frame of reference to expand as far as political goals of war, 145 00:14:42,380 --> 00:14:46,720 and it insists on a very high degree of nexus between an object and the military, 146 00:14:46,730 --> 00:14:50,300 the competition among militaries for that object to be a military objective. 147 00:14:51,290 --> 00:14:59,840 And I argue that out of these interpretations, we can draw up a logic according to which h l wants or thinks war ought to be waged, 148 00:15:00,230 --> 00:15:03,110 and it rests on two commands addressed to belligerents. 149 00:15:03,110 --> 00:15:10,760 And the first is to sharply distinguish between objects and persons that are closely related to the competition among military and everything else. 150 00:15:11,180 --> 00:15:19,310 Everything else is immune from attack. And the second is to sequence the use of force from the achievement of political goals. 151 00:15:19,340 --> 00:15:26,360 So while in war, violent, the conduct of hostilities and belligerents have to bracket their political or moral goals and 152 00:15:26,360 --> 00:15:31,460 only refer to the military victory when devising how to act and who to injure and who to target. 153 00:15:31,790 --> 00:15:35,089 And only once we have achieved what we have achieved. 154 00:15:35,090 --> 00:15:38,960 Military Victory. You can then translate that into your political goals. 155 00:15:38,990 --> 00:15:44,030 So what I call sequencing, you have to sequence the use of force from the pursuit of politics. 156 00:15:45,260 --> 00:15:51,770 And these two commands rely on two assumptions of sufficiency, which is why I call the logic of sufficient sufficiency. 157 00:15:52,190 --> 00:15:57,139 The first is that actually the engagement of objects that are closely related to the competition 158 00:15:57,140 --> 00:16:03,230 among militaries in a significant number of cases is sufficient for such a competition to proceed. 159 00:16:03,230 --> 00:16:07,040 And one side to win. To achieve generic military victory. 160 00:16:07,580 --> 00:16:15,770 And that generic military victory is in a large number of cases sufficient for states to then achieve their political, legitimate political goals. 161 00:16:17,090 --> 00:16:20,960 Now, that is always very controversial, specifically the second part, 162 00:16:21,230 --> 00:16:26,420 and I think the second sufficiency assumption only actually makes sense based on the 163 00:16:26,420 --> 00:16:32,510 fact that the international order is built on a presumption against the use of force. 164 00:16:32,540 --> 00:16:38,900 If states had the right to use force for the pursuit of political goals, then this would be essentially incoherent. 165 00:16:39,770 --> 00:16:46,700 But because it is not no longer a legitimate tool of statecraft to use force in order to pursue political goals, 166 00:16:47,780 --> 00:16:55,070 international law can actually rule out war as a useful instrument for the achievement of a very wide range of political goals. 167 00:16:55,580 --> 00:17:01,880 And I'm happy to say something about self-defence later, because that obviously being the one exception where states do have a right to use force. 168 00:17:03,410 --> 00:17:06,300 Something similar can be said about the first efficiency assumption. 169 00:17:06,320 --> 00:17:11,690 Obviously there is no eternal canon of objects that you need to be able to engage. 170 00:17:11,930 --> 00:17:17,990 For such a military competition to go forward and for one side to achieve military victory. 171 00:17:18,530 --> 00:17:25,910 This is obviously a set situation and contingent judgement of what is and what is actually sufficient to do so because of that. 172 00:17:26,420 --> 00:17:33,380 Basically what I would interpret that is not so much is assumptions or descriptions of reality, but as normative commands. 173 00:17:33,800 --> 00:17:38,570 What positive international humanitarian law US belligerent to do is to draw such a line 174 00:17:38,570 --> 00:17:43,700 in good faith and to bracket political goals during the combat during combat operations. 175 00:17:46,880 --> 00:17:50,690 So let me move on to the empirical part of the talk. 176 00:17:52,070 --> 00:18:00,080 I this is based on a comparative case study, and I contrast the U.S. air campaigns against North Vietnam, 177 00:18:00,080 --> 00:18:04,280 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from 1965 to 1972. 178 00:18:04,640 --> 00:18:11,750 And they include sort of three discrete air campaigns, the Operation Rolling Thunder and the two linebacker operations. 179 00:18:12,170 --> 00:18:19,140 And I contrast this to Operation Desert Storm, the war against Iraq in 1991 and the war against Iraq in 2003. 180 00:18:19,160 --> 00:18:23,780 Operation Iraqi Freedom. And the selection rests on three criteria. 181 00:18:24,140 --> 00:18:30,380 And the first is the extreme variation in the independent variable, which is the input of law into decision making about targeting. 182 00:18:31,220 --> 00:18:37,400 Basically, law played a negligible role for targeting decisions during the Vietnam War. 183 00:18:37,880 --> 00:18:43,440 However, the Vietnam War paved the way for the legalisation of US combat operations. 184 00:18:43,470 --> 00:18:48,620 It is hence the war that is closest in time to the later legalised combat operations. 185 00:18:48,920 --> 00:18:53,299 So I use it as a baseline case and it is because it is closer in time. 186 00:18:53,300 --> 00:18:59,830 It is more comparable to the wars in Iraq than something like the Korean War or the Second World War would be. 187 00:19:00,530 --> 00:19:09,110 So basically the second criterion being comparability that as many as possible, that other parameters of war are as similar as possible, 188 00:19:09,170 --> 00:19:14,510 but not quite that similar as I would like them to be, but as similar as one could could hope for. 189 00:19:15,200 --> 00:19:23,840 And basically, if you look at the period from 1965 to 2003, there are a number of US major U.S. forces abroad that I don't look at. 190 00:19:24,200 --> 00:19:29,929 And one of the most important exclusion criteria is that I don't look at coalition warfare in which actually 191 00:19:29,930 --> 00:19:35,720 the coalition partners had substantive say over targeting choices such as during Operation Allied Force 192 00:19:37,040 --> 00:19:43,099 because of the extreme variation where we go from no legal in almost no legal input to very comprehensive 193 00:19:43,100 --> 00:19:49,940 legalisation that is supposed to make it as easy as possible to draw out the difference that law makes. 194 00:19:49,940 --> 00:19:55,729 And the other sort of underlying rationale is that in U.S. air warfare, 195 00:19:55,730 --> 00:20:01,520 specifically air warfare in the 21st century is possibly the most legalised warfare that is out there. 196 00:20:01,970 --> 00:20:09,020 So I chose basically the easiest case for law to be effective in terms of extrapolating from my findings. 197 00:20:10,580 --> 00:20:14,960 So the legalisation of use ever for from Vietnam to Iraq. 198 00:20:15,260 --> 00:20:20,870 I basically follow or trace two indicators across these three cases, 199 00:20:20,870 --> 00:20:26,450 and the first is the entrenchment of professional legal opinion in military decision making. 200 00:20:27,560 --> 00:20:38,060 And this is about the increased role in sight is of a judge advocate general court that basically had nothing to say during the Vietnam War almost, 201 00:20:38,060 --> 00:20:43,879 and then increased in size and institutional standing targets. 202 00:20:43,880 --> 00:20:51,770 Elections during Operation Rolling Thunder were made, famously made at the Tuesday luncheons of President Johnson with his advisers. 203 00:20:51,770 --> 00:20:55,490 And the record is quite clear that there were no lawyers present for those luncheons. 204 00:20:56,150 --> 00:21:01,459 The operate line linebacker operations were conducted by the Nixon administration and the 205 00:21:01,460 --> 00:21:06,470 selection of targets shifted out of the White House into the field to military commanders. 206 00:21:06,800 --> 00:21:12,220 However, that did not at all lead to increased legal input because at that point in time, Judge Advocate, general, 207 00:21:12,290 --> 00:21:18,529 judge Advocate General did not actually count among their top to give advice on operational legal matters. 208 00:21:18,530 --> 00:21:25,400 They were essentially private litigators, but did not were not expected to advise on international humanitarian law. 209 00:21:26,570 --> 00:21:32,810 It is only in 1974 that the Pentagon, in reaction to the public outcry over the Me Lai massacre, 210 00:21:33,140 --> 00:21:40,219 actually tasked with advising on the legality of combat operations and then trains an entirely new 211 00:21:40,220 --> 00:21:47,120 generation of objects that are combat savvy and knowledgeable in international humanitarian law. 212 00:21:48,350 --> 00:21:53,749 350 attacks were then deployed with the troops in Operation Desert Storm, 213 00:21:53,750 --> 00:21:57,960 which was an unprecedented number at the time and amazed a lot of commentators. 214 00:21:58,370 --> 00:22:05,150 Yet this is actually dwarfed by the numbers of lawyers that accompanied the troops 12 years later. 215 00:22:05,390 --> 00:22:18,440 And I have this number somewhere. Yeah, 2200 JAG, 350 civilian attorneys, and 1500 paralegals went with the troops during Operation Iraqi Freedom. 216 00:22:19,070 --> 00:22:22,280 And it's not just the numbers, it is actually also the role that they had. 217 00:22:22,280 --> 00:22:30,769 That changed quite significantly. In my research, I make quite detailed in inquiries into the separate stages of the targeting process from the 218 00:22:30,770 --> 00:22:34,820 early development and intelligence gathering all the way to the execution of an airstrike. 219 00:22:35,180 --> 00:22:38,690 And let me just summarise that basically during Operation Desert Storm, 220 00:22:38,690 --> 00:22:46,819 lawyers were only really involved during what is called the master attack plan, the drawing up of the master attack plan. 221 00:22:46,820 --> 00:22:50,600 And even then it wasn't at all a routine or an institutionalised involvement, 222 00:22:50,600 --> 00:22:54,290 but they basically were just there to be consulted if someone wished to consult them. 223 00:22:54,710 --> 00:22:58,160 So their input was quite haphazard in a way. To the contrary. 224 00:22:58,160 --> 00:23:05,030 During Operation Iraqi Freedom, all these stages from very early intelligence gathering to the execution of the airstrike, 225 00:23:05,300 --> 00:23:12,040 there's a systematic and institutionalised involvement of opinions that goes as far as that. 226 00:23:12,260 --> 00:23:19,250 Jacks are 24 hours in the command centres and they're available to give legal opinions even while the air crew is in the air. 227 00:23:20,840 --> 00:23:29,510 So besides the other passageway of how law could influence targeting decisions is not sort of by a professional opinion, 228 00:23:29,840 --> 00:23:37,070 but by the fact that military decision makers themselves internalise law and perceive a legal obligation as bearing on their behaviour. 229 00:23:37,760 --> 00:23:42,380 And that parameter changes pretty much as radically as the involvement of JECTS. 230 00:23:43,190 --> 00:23:48,950 The documents, basically the records of both the Johnson and the Nixon administration are largely declassified, 231 00:23:48,950 --> 00:23:54,169 and there's really nothing to indicate that either. You know, the political the political decision makers, 232 00:23:54,170 --> 00:24:02,510 nor really the military brass were at all concerned about international law as far as the conduct of operations is concerned, 233 00:24:02,900 --> 00:24:04,670 international law, if it is mentioned at all, 234 00:24:04,670 --> 00:24:11,749 it is always in the context of legitimising the use of force in the first place, and that changes quite radically. 235 00:24:11,750 --> 00:24:19,250 Again, I used interviews to tease out the sense of legal obligation among military decision makers for the both Iraq wars. 236 00:24:19,790 --> 00:24:23,899 And I'm happy to say more later about the questions I asked and the answers I got. 237 00:24:23,900 --> 00:24:32,059 But mostly they can be summarised in the sense that military personnel were aware of the legal obligations in 1991. 238 00:24:32,060 --> 00:24:35,060 It wasn't that they didn't know there was international humanitarian law, 239 00:24:35,390 --> 00:24:44,600 but there was a very general feeling that because of the type of war that the type of warfare that professional U.S. military personnel would wage, 240 00:24:44,930 --> 00:24:49,579 there wasn't really a need to separately consult law because good intentions, 241 00:24:49,580 --> 00:24:56,000 limited wargames technological superiority all meant you weren't really in any danger to break the law in the first place. 242 00:24:56,540 --> 00:25:06,499 That is radically different to veterans of the 23 more war who basically are acutely, legally aware and even eager for legal input. 243 00:25:06,500 --> 00:25:11,750 And they all describe how comprehensively they were trained. And how they don't just have to know the law, 244 00:25:11,750 --> 00:25:15,770 but basically have to internalise that in the sense that if someone makes them up in the middle of the night, 245 00:25:16,100 --> 00:25:21,290 they can not necessarily quote the Geneva Conventions, but the rules of engagement and the special instructions. 246 00:25:23,660 --> 00:25:32,540 So the finding is basically that international law goes from virtual irrelevance to only presence in targeting decision making. 247 00:25:33,800 --> 00:25:36,860 So what was actually hit in these three campaigns? 248 00:25:37,790 --> 00:25:43,850 There are three main trajectories of change. And the first is the increased decreased importance of interdiction operations. 249 00:25:44,360 --> 00:25:52,339 I consulted many different definitions of interdiction and ultimately just made up my own then, which I based on two criteria. 250 00:25:52,340 --> 00:25:59,749 And the one is that the target falls in a certain range of categories, which is essentially military personnel, 251 00:25:59,750 --> 00:26:08,690 military equipment, military transport routes and infrastructure that is used mainly for military purposes. 252 00:26:09,560 --> 00:26:17,270 And the second criterion being the intent or the purpose behind the attack being attrition, the erosion of actual military capabilities. 253 00:26:17,720 --> 00:26:26,300 So during the three campaigns against North Vietnam, about 90% of airstrikes fall in the category of interdiction. 254 00:26:27,080 --> 00:26:33,110 Interdiction then continues to play a role, but it declines during the Operation Desert Storm. 255 00:26:33,140 --> 00:26:36,320 86% of airstrikes fall in that category. 256 00:26:36,590 --> 00:26:42,170 68, if you take out of the equation the Kuwait Theatre of Operations, the airstrikes against Kuwait, 257 00:26:42,590 --> 00:26:46,920 and I can say more about it later, whether or not that makes sense, but it is definitely a decrease. 258 00:26:47,000 --> 00:26:55,910 And 75% of airstrikes against during operation, the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom fall in the category of interdiction. 259 00:26:56,780 --> 00:26:59,960 And I'm also happy to say more about how I came up with these numbers later. 260 00:27:00,710 --> 00:27:08,090 So hand-in-hand with this trend goes the emergence of new categories of dual use targets and 261 00:27:08,090 --> 00:27:12,890 an increase of their role in the sort of increase of their share in the overall airstrikes. 262 00:27:13,190 --> 00:27:20,600 Obviously, that has to be the case because these remaining airstrikes have there has to be another function of air power that gains in importance. 263 00:27:21,200 --> 00:27:25,519 Basically dual use targets during the air campaigns against Vietnam are mostly 264 00:27:25,520 --> 00:27:29,719 limited to transport and industry and during what is called Rolling Thunder 52, 265 00:27:29,720 --> 00:27:37,010 which is sort of one little outlier in the bombing of Vietnam, it is also related to oil industry and fossil. 266 00:27:37,430 --> 00:27:43,880 Anything related to energy that is still an interest a target category in Operation Desert Storm. 267 00:27:44,300 --> 00:27:50,810 But in Operation Desert Storm, on top of that, there is a much more systematic effort to neutralise infrastructure, 268 00:27:51,140 --> 00:27:57,050 power plants, water treatment plants, basically the industrial backbone of a society. 269 00:27:58,270 --> 00:28:03,669 In Operation Iraqi Freedom. That is less important, but this time entirely. 270 00:28:03,670 --> 00:28:07,570 New categories of targets emerged, for instance, civilian leaders. 271 00:28:09,040 --> 00:28:15,340 So civilians in inverted commas, to a certain extent, civilian leaders, but also politically, generally, 272 00:28:15,550 --> 00:28:22,810 genuinely civilian political infrastructure like party headquarters as well as media facilities, both state and privately owned. 273 00:28:24,730 --> 00:28:30,790 And that actually points towards the third trend, which is the emergence of target categories or airstrikes, 274 00:28:30,790 --> 00:28:41,270 which there are virtually no direct and have virtually no direct impact on the military capabilities of the enemy actually to a certain extent. 275 00:28:41,290 --> 00:28:49,150 The US attempted to bypass destroying military capabilities in Operation Desert Storm and even more so in Operation Iraqi Freedom. 276 00:28:49,570 --> 00:28:58,600 And there's really no clear connection between targeting privately owned media facilities and the military capabilities of Iraq. 277 00:28:59,500 --> 00:29:04,390 So this is the third trajectory of change. And if we ask what is the common denominator of this? 278 00:29:04,750 --> 00:29:10,989 It is pretty clear that they have there is a loosening of the nexus between objects and the actual military effort of 279 00:29:10,990 --> 00:29:20,770 the enemy and basically the frame of reference changes to the extent that in the later in in Operation Desert Storm, 280 00:29:20,770 --> 00:29:23,620 but even more so in Operation Iraqi Freedom targeting emerges. 281 00:29:23,620 --> 00:29:32,320 That is has come out of a very short line of thinking from the overall political goals and the strategic context of the war to the targeting choice. 282 00:29:32,800 --> 00:29:37,810 I attempted to make this a little more clear in this cable, which was maybe not successful. 283 00:29:38,200 --> 00:29:44,620 But basically what I try to do is based on the documents that I had available to make 284 00:29:44,620 --> 00:29:49,570 the call to change the imagined cause or change that lead to targeting choices. 285 00:29:49,840 --> 00:29:54,490 And there are different ones for all of these three case studies and then count the average number of steps. 286 00:29:55,270 --> 00:30:01,149 And those are longest because the change for the air wars against Vietnam, 287 00:30:01,150 --> 00:30:06,610 even though I counted fully the last causal chain, which is only for the last 11 days, 288 00:30:06,610 --> 00:30:14,169 the so-called Christmas bombing in which the US sort of strayed from the separate articulation of political goals and military goals and, 289 00:30:14,170 --> 00:30:16,480 and its military objective. 290 00:30:17,680 --> 00:30:25,720 During Operation Desert Storm you have this traditional causal chain, but you also have and this is something I maybe have to argue about more later. 291 00:30:26,110 --> 00:30:32,739 You have targets that are inspired not at all by the military goal of ousting Iraq from Kuwait, 292 00:30:32,740 --> 00:30:37,030 but some of the targeting specifically of down to downtown Baghdad can only 293 00:30:37,030 --> 00:30:41,379 basically explain in terms of the current strategic context of the US wielding its 294 00:30:41,380 --> 00:30:48,100 might in a post-Cold War world in which it won't allow to write any state roughshod 295 00:30:48,100 --> 00:30:51,190 over the international order and wants to actually drive the point home. 296 00:30:52,340 --> 00:30:58,700 For Operation Iraqi Freedom. This becomes incredibly complicated because it all stages at all levels of abstraction. 297 00:30:59,030 --> 00:31:02,040 Military and political goals are very tightly enmeshed. 298 00:31:02,060 --> 00:31:07,670 There's almost no separate articulation of political goals at the highest level. 299 00:31:07,820 --> 00:31:17,180 On the other hand, even what is considered to be a list of operational objectives includes things like making making Iraq safe for the Middle East, 300 00:31:17,690 --> 00:31:21,950 promoting democracy and laying the roots for a democratic state. 301 00:31:22,370 --> 00:31:28,700 So basically another thing that's very telling the US doesn't operate with the concept of targeted anymore, 302 00:31:29,030 --> 00:31:35,120 but calls these desired mean points of impact that are based on what they call strategy to task missions. 303 00:31:35,510 --> 00:31:41,270 So it is acknowledged that each of these targeting choices should be as closely 304 00:31:41,270 --> 00:31:45,620 as possible related to the overall political goal in this case of regime change. 305 00:31:46,400 --> 00:31:49,940 So the average number of calls is this has yet again declined. 306 00:31:51,650 --> 00:31:59,510 So if this is a move away from the logic of sufficiency in light of the degree of nexus in the frame of reference what takes its place? 307 00:31:59,570 --> 00:32:04,219 I call it the logic of efficiency because it rejects the commands of distinction 308 00:32:04,220 --> 00:32:08,600 and sequencing exactly to the extent that those are efficiency defying. 309 00:32:09,380 --> 00:32:13,250 So this logic doesn't formally adhere to distinction. 310 00:32:13,340 --> 00:32:15,950 It's not that the US doesn't distinguish anymore at all, 311 00:32:16,460 --> 00:32:23,930 but it basically broadens the loose ends the degree of nexus between objects and the military competition. 312 00:32:23,930 --> 00:32:31,790 And based on the broader range of available objects, it can then choose those that promise to most efficiently contribute to victory. 313 00:32:32,510 --> 00:32:37,970 And victory is defined no longer as generic military victory, but as the desired political end state. 314 00:32:38,630 --> 00:32:43,670 So essentially this logic rejects sequencing and it redefines distinction. 315 00:32:44,870 --> 00:32:52,120 And I probably can't say this often enough that I'm not arguing at all that the US has gone back to sort of Second World War terrible thing, 316 00:32:52,160 --> 00:32:59,870 because this logic of efficiency is obviously reminiscent of some of the early sort of air power enthusiasts thought about strategic bombing. 317 00:33:00,440 --> 00:33:06,530 But I have put it here in basically that this would be the logic of efficiency in extreme versus what we see in US. 318 00:33:06,890 --> 00:33:09,530 Warfare is the logic of efficiency in a moderate form. 319 00:33:09,980 --> 00:33:16,850 Both reject the sequencing in the sense that they do not think you should separately articulate military and political goals, 320 00:33:17,180 --> 00:33:25,730 but actually that political goals should enter every decision at whatever low level in combat operations. 321 00:33:26,060 --> 00:33:32,750 But the difference between those two is that strategic bombing doctrine, to a certain extent, rejects distinction. 322 00:33:33,110 --> 00:33:36,889 Whereas the logic of efficiency just redefines it, 323 00:33:36,890 --> 00:33:44,840 and it does so in the within the indeterminacy that the definition of a military objective provides at least this textual interpretation, 324 00:33:44,840 --> 00:33:51,410 as I said at the very beginning. So basically what we have is sort of a change in the penumbra of uncertainty of an indeterminate law, 325 00:33:51,710 --> 00:33:56,270 rather than a rejection of the longstanding legal principle of how to wage war. 326 00:33:57,170 --> 00:34:01,310 But obviously, there's still quite a lot of difference to the logic of efficiency. 327 00:34:03,260 --> 00:34:08,720 So how do I think that? Why do I think that sufficiency is normally normatively preferable to efficiency? 328 00:34:09,050 --> 00:34:14,840 I should say that this is not at all an argument based on any kind of investigation or empirical 329 00:34:14,840 --> 00:34:21,170 claim regarding how much casualties or harm or suffering either of these logics will produce. 330 00:34:21,650 --> 00:34:29,660 For various reasons, it is impossible to make systematic predictions about which logic in which context will make me more or less human suffering. 331 00:34:30,110 --> 00:34:34,999 It's basically the question, you know, are quick wars, sharp and quick and brief, worse, better? 332 00:34:35,000 --> 00:34:42,170 I'm thrown out and distinguished in war is better. But ultimately there's it would be almost irresponsible to make claims about that because we 333 00:34:42,170 --> 00:34:47,930 just can't repeat the same exact war with once with one logic and once with the other one. 334 00:34:48,440 --> 00:34:52,759 It would also, to a certain extent, be dishonest to make that the normative standard, 335 00:34:52,760 --> 00:35:01,310 because neither of the logics actually acknowledges as a goal the absolute minimisation of human suffering or civilian, civilian or other casualties. 336 00:35:01,730 --> 00:35:09,770 Both of the logics attempt to strike a balance between the demands of military, of combat operations and humanitarian imperatives. 337 00:35:10,250 --> 00:35:17,270 But the way they strike a balance is radically different. And what I'm saying here is that the way that the logic of sufficient sufficiency strikes, 338 00:35:17,270 --> 00:35:20,840 the balance is preferable to the way the logic of efficiency does so. 339 00:35:21,530 --> 00:35:30,050 And the first is that the efficiency, the logic of efficiency undermines possibly the most fundamental normative pillar of the international order, 340 00:35:30,350 --> 00:35:34,040 which is that you cannot pursue politics with force. 341 00:35:34,670 --> 00:35:41,090 So a lot of people have said to me, but obviously, if you wage war according to the logic of sufficiency, you also pursue politics with force. 342 00:35:41,090 --> 00:35:45,260 You just have the extra step of having to get generic military victory in between. 343 00:35:46,280 --> 00:35:50,960 But I don't think this is merely in the static problem that I have if you allow basically efficient. 344 00:35:51,910 --> 00:35:55,990 The use of force is an efficient tool for the achievement of political goals. 345 00:35:56,320 --> 00:36:03,910 The logic of sufficiency actually makes winning wars hard and rules more out as an effective instrument 346 00:36:03,910 --> 00:36:09,880 for a whole range of political goals that you cannot simply achieve based on a generic military victory. 347 00:36:10,330 --> 00:36:11,020 So in that sense, 348 00:36:11,020 --> 00:36:19,240 it is much more in line with an international order that is premised on a presumption against the use of force than the logic of efficiency. 349 00:36:20,290 --> 00:36:26,530 The second point is that under the logic of sufficiency, there is a certain amount of predictability in agency. 350 00:36:26,560 --> 00:36:35,320 What sort of objects land on? What sort of side of the distinction line to the contrary, for the logic of efficiency, what will be attacked? 351 00:36:35,320 --> 00:36:41,950 What is a legitimate target is a function of the political goals of a belligerent that is not just in theory open ended, 352 00:36:41,950 --> 00:36:46,719 but it is also in practice much less predictable and much less individuals can do 353 00:36:46,720 --> 00:36:52,120 much less about it as they attempt to go to safe places or preserve their property. 354 00:36:53,110 --> 00:37:00,399 The fourth reason is that what I said earlier, that even though it is in some ways striking a balance, 355 00:37:00,400 --> 00:37:10,300 if you say we get the war over with as quickly as possible, that is a way of attempting to do justice to both humanitarian and military imperatives. 356 00:37:10,720 --> 00:37:16,240 But I think it is radically inferior to the way that the logic of sufficiency strikes the balance, 357 00:37:16,240 --> 00:37:20,500 which is essentially by ring fencing war, by limiting its reach. 358 00:37:21,490 --> 00:37:29,410 And I think the the problem is that in reality, in effect, this provides efficiency, 359 00:37:29,410 --> 00:37:35,100 provides an opening for belligerents to ultimately just follow their their military goals, 360 00:37:35,110 --> 00:37:43,030 partly because we don't know how quickly you could possibly ever achieve efficiency and because there is the essentially open ended, 361 00:37:43,180 --> 00:37:49,480 infinite range of political goals that an belligerent might set for themselves at one point in time. 362 00:37:50,140 --> 00:37:54,610 Every in every war one belligerent will realise they are probably going to you to lose. 363 00:37:55,810 --> 00:38:00,250 The logic of efficiency then provides an incentive, even an invitation, 364 00:38:00,250 --> 00:38:05,200 if you consider how high the stakes are for that belligerent to just redefine their goals and 365 00:38:05,200 --> 00:38:09,760 therefore bring entirely new categories of objects within reach of legitimate engagement. 366 00:38:10,450 --> 00:38:17,470 So basically, rather than making war is free in reality at best the danger of drawing them out and escalating them. 367 00:38:18,340 --> 00:38:24,670 The last normative problem with the logic of efficiency only applies for extreme versions of the logic of efficiency 368 00:38:25,000 --> 00:38:31,989 that they basically undermine one of the most widespread and legitimate principles of the regulation of war that is, 369 00:38:31,990 --> 00:38:41,530 non-combatant immunity. All of what I have said so far is about objects and the law that defines the distinguishes between combatants and civilians. 370 00:38:41,860 --> 00:38:45,669 So the law about persons is actually not as indeterminate as the law about objects. 371 00:38:45,670 --> 00:38:51,370 So this is mostly just about objects, but it is an argument that needs to be made in much more detail. 372 00:38:51,370 --> 00:38:55,540 But basically, this is a slippery, slippery slope argument at once. 373 00:38:55,540 --> 00:39:02,830 You start basically undermining the law, drawing a clear and definitive line of distinction between objects. 374 00:39:03,130 --> 00:39:08,770 There is an incentive to do the same for persons specifically because if the 375 00:39:08,770 --> 00:39:13,210 targeting of objects is so open ended as it is under the logic of efficiency, 376 00:39:13,450 --> 00:39:17,380 you're much more likely to produce much more collateral damage in the first place. 377 00:39:20,040 --> 00:39:26,909 I should acknowledge that there are a couple of steps admitted in this argument and I'm happy to elaborate on any one of them in the Q and A. 378 00:39:26,910 --> 00:39:33,420 And the first is that I have actually not shown the connection between legal input and the rise of the logic of efficiency. 379 00:39:33,690 --> 00:39:41,160 All have shown here is a coincidence in time, and I have skipped that because this is ultimately again about the social science, 380 00:39:41,170 --> 00:39:47,670 the the theoretical discussion I have about cognitive and motivation processes and how they change. 381 00:39:47,670 --> 00:39:56,129 And in my work, I try to establish how the specific recourse to this law encourages or contributes 382 00:39:56,130 --> 00:40:01,110 to constituting a meaning of what it means to do the legitimate thing in war, 383 00:40:01,110 --> 00:40:04,340 and that is waging war efficiently. 384 00:40:05,130 --> 00:40:08,940 What I don't argue at all is that international humanitarian law is the only. 385 00:40:09,630 --> 00:40:15,080 The rise of legal input is the only factor in this increased emphasis on efficiency. 386 00:40:15,090 --> 00:40:23,070 Quite the contrary. Actually in place it is possibly necessary as part of a bunch of factors, and one of them is military doctrine. 387 00:40:24,570 --> 00:40:30,209 The rise of doctrines like effects based operations or strategic attack or network network centred attack. 388 00:40:30,210 --> 00:40:36,120 They all have essentially similar currents that they try to make very short line of thinking between 389 00:40:36,120 --> 00:40:42,749 political context and choices in war and the other sort of incentive to be efficient in war. 390 00:40:42,750 --> 00:40:49,950 International public scrutiny, which has risen in in parallel with the legal input military technology, 391 00:40:49,950 --> 00:40:58,019 is relevant in so far as the logic of efficiency is much more dependent on extremely precise targeting than the logic of sufficiency. 392 00:40:58,020 --> 00:41:05,990 So it is in some ways an enabling condition. Could international humanitarian law impose the logic of sufficiency? 393 00:41:06,230 --> 00:41:12,770 This is obviously a necessary argument, if I want to say. Currently, international humanitarian law is not normatively successful. 394 00:41:13,130 --> 00:41:16,250 For that to be true, I have to show that it could actually do better. 395 00:41:16,520 --> 00:41:23,600 But I think this is quite straightforward. It is clear why attackers have an incentive to wage war efficiently. 396 00:41:23,720 --> 00:41:27,920 So in order for law to actually constrain them, 397 00:41:27,920 --> 00:41:32,059 it would just have to be much more determinant regarding the required degree of 398 00:41:32,060 --> 00:41:37,040 nexus and the required frame of reference for the determination of progress in war. 399 00:41:37,280 --> 00:41:41,180 But then there's really no reason why it shouldn't be able to impose the logic of sufficiency. 400 00:41:42,050 --> 00:41:51,020 The last point I want to make here, which goes back to the initial puzzle of legalisation not quelling at all moral outrage about war 401 00:41:51,680 --> 00:41:57,710 is not the logic of sufficiency actually satisfy our moral expectation of legally regulated war? 402 00:41:57,740 --> 00:42:02,320 Would we then have fewer problems with warfare? No, unfortunately, 403 00:42:02,990 --> 00:42:08,840 I argue that the logic of sufficiency still treats the allows the individual to be treated as a 404 00:42:08,840 --> 00:42:15,200 means to an end and allows the victimisation of individuals regardless of their personal status. 405 00:42:15,200 --> 00:42:18,320 That allows the violation of the most basic human right, the right to life. 406 00:42:18,830 --> 00:42:24,770 And basically, what accounts for the increased moral outrage about war and much larger trends that 407 00:42:25,070 --> 00:42:30,260 increasingly expect international law to provide just that to protect the human person, 408 00:42:30,260 --> 00:42:37,490 even in war. And that international law cannot possibly fulfil that goal and definitely not based on the logic of sufficiency. 409 00:42:38,390 --> 00:42:39,230 So just to recap, 410 00:42:39,520 --> 00:42:46,580 I think the international community in law is found to be behaviourally relevant because it encourages the rise of the logic of efficiency, 411 00:42:46,970 --> 00:42:52,100 but because of the logic of sufficient efficiency is normatively inferior to the logic of sufficiency, 412 00:42:52,100 --> 00:42:56,270 I find it not normatively successful and hence only partially effective. 413 00:42:57,110 --> 00:42:57,440 Thank you.