1
00:00:01,770 --> 00:00:14,130
Ari is a professor of international politics for the University of Oxford and at the Norwegian National Defence University College.

2
00:00:14,640 --> 00:00:19,970
And one of them was Norwegian one, which is still up for. I'm having serious.

3
00:00:20,060 --> 00:00:25,980
I want to show some of your work on European foreign policy and international security policy,

4
00:00:26,520 --> 00:00:31,650
as well as the human rights implications, aspects all but your state secretary.

5
00:00:32,400 --> 00:00:37,680
That is Deputy Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs of Norway. Often we get a minister to speak.

6
00:00:38,400 --> 00:00:45,330
I'm representing the Christian Democratic Party in public government from 97 to 2000.

7
00:00:46,540 --> 00:00:50,280
And you should be aware of the dangers. I know you were probably just woken up.

8
00:00:50,820 --> 00:00:54,000
Yes. You know what this is?

9
00:00:54,210 --> 00:00:58,860
Here it is. They said European countries capability of this willingness and of course,

10
00:00:58,860 --> 00:01:06,890
is also built on European Union security dynamics and national interest to promote recovery.

11
00:01:07,110 --> 00:01:11,899
I would say 100. But yeah, I've heard a few of these people.

12
00:01:11,900 --> 00:01:16,880
Really? Thank you very much.

13
00:01:17,460 --> 00:01:20,540
It's a great pleasure to be here.

14
00:01:20,720 --> 00:01:25,070
And I have sabbatical this term, so I'm here as the changing character.

15
00:01:25,070 --> 00:01:34,670
What program? Trying to work on a new book which has the working title Strategic Effect Europe and the Use of Force.

16
00:01:34,790 --> 00:01:45,170
And that will try to delve into what strategy means today and the effects of strategy that that we ought to have.

17
00:01:45,590 --> 00:01:50,569
And then look at the empirical examples from European use of force.

18
00:01:50,570 --> 00:01:56,690
So it allows me to indulge in my interest for strategic, should one say, rigour,

19
00:01:56,690 --> 00:02:03,139
and then look at the reality of messy politics, which is in the end, what decides.

20
00:02:03,140 --> 00:02:14,480
Perhaps I have led a NATO research program in Oslo and we are now working on a new program on NAITO with Johns Hopkins University,

21
00:02:15,110 --> 00:02:18,080
hopefully also with the Change in Character World Program,

22
00:02:18,800 --> 00:02:32,510
where we will try to tease out what topics for NAITO politics should be and how to go about developing policy ideas and perhaps consensus on that.

23
00:02:33,620 --> 00:02:38,149
I'm hoping the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs will fund it.

24
00:02:38,150 --> 00:02:42,020
They have the first chance and if they want to fund it, the most certainly will.

25
00:02:42,650 --> 00:02:51,020
So there's a chance for foreign policy. Now, what we try to do is in this book, because my co-editor I have a co-editor who is the Swede,

26
00:02:51,170 --> 00:02:54,980
which is always recommendable, because they do all the work on the footnotes.

27
00:02:55,130 --> 00:02:59,240
They are very, very meticulous and very structured.

28
00:02:59,330 --> 00:03:08,590
So I can do the sort of high flying thinking, and they do all the details which are very necessary for an academic work among the Pentagon.

29
00:03:08,720 --> 00:03:13,340
And he is with the Norwegian Defence University as well.

30
00:03:14,210 --> 00:03:23,120
And we asked experts from eight NATO countries to write chapters, not all native countries from Britain, the leading ones,

31
00:03:23,360 --> 00:03:33,559
Spain, Poland, the not so leading ones, but still have great power countries that want to be counted too small.

32
00:03:33,560 --> 00:03:40,760
Western states, Denmark, Norway to another Central European small state, Hungary.

33
00:03:42,140 --> 00:03:52,010
We asked the authors from these states to analyse whether their states have both military capability and political will to use it.

34
00:03:52,880 --> 00:03:57,500
Now, this is very imprecise in a way. It's difficult to herd cats.

35
00:03:57,620 --> 00:04:03,769
Difficult to get academics to to address the same kinds of issues rigorously.

36
00:04:03,770 --> 00:04:10,820
But we have tried and we have a generic part here written where we have a very interesting chapter by Christopher Coker,

37
00:04:12,290 --> 00:04:20,240
pessimistic chapter on the lack of a culture for war, so to speak, in Europe, the peace culture.

38
00:04:20,600 --> 00:04:27,890
Soft power. This enormous cultural change that probably matters a lot.

39
00:04:29,360 --> 00:04:39,140
And the former chief of defence of Norway, general set of business written on the sort of move race to the bottom of tech,

40
00:04:39,700 --> 00:04:48,290
technology or military equipment that many states are now approaching the level of critical mass for their equipment.

41
00:04:48,800 --> 00:04:57,920
So it doesn't do you any good to have two tanks, if that's all you can afford, or two submarines, you have to have at least six or ten or whatever.

42
00:04:58,340 --> 00:05:01,729
So when you get to this point of critical mass,

43
00:05:01,730 --> 00:05:12,440
then there's now a threat that small and medium sized European states will then stand without real military capacity almost all of a sudden,

44
00:05:12,680 --> 00:05:23,210
because this is not a linear program, it's a it's a sort of state which you reach and which politicians are not interested in discussing that much.

45
00:05:23,870 --> 00:05:31,610
So the generic part of this book is perhaps even more interesting than the country chapters.

46
00:05:31,970 --> 00:05:35,030
So I will hand it around for you to just kind of glance at.

47
00:05:35,840 --> 00:05:41,660
I saw that it's in this library. So library use only, unfortunately.

48
00:05:42,230 --> 00:05:52,820
And now let me try to analyse both the findings and the assumptions that we have for this analysis.

49
00:05:53,930 --> 00:05:58,579
And this is just what Americans would say, a first cut, so to speak.

50
00:05:58,580 --> 00:06:06,980
It's a first attempt to be systematic in the analysis of will and capability,

51
00:06:07,190 --> 00:06:14,210
because there are many, many variables that are important to to discuss in much greater detail.

52
00:06:15,610 --> 00:06:21,490
If we look at Europe and we say, what are the assumptions of the use of force today?

53
00:06:22,060 --> 00:06:35,300
What are they essentially? They are that we deal with limited war or the limited use of force for national interest,

54
00:06:35,660 --> 00:06:44,510
or rather for most European states to stop something that is getting too bad to stop something from happening.

55
00:06:44,870 --> 00:06:49,530
A typical Kosovo. Maybe Libya situation.

56
00:06:50,010 --> 00:06:57,810
Some things are too intolerable. So we have immediately a connection to humanitarian intervention, human rights, human security.

57
00:06:59,110 --> 00:07:03,020
So European states do not use force. To.

58
00:07:05,280 --> 00:07:10,170
To promote the national interest aggressively, which is also forbidden in the U.N. pact.

59
00:07:11,590 --> 00:07:18,040
But in a way they have a realistic view at the same time.

60
00:07:18,790 --> 00:07:30,430
There is a growing realism in the use of force realism understood as traditional security policy geopolitics in Europe.

61
00:07:30,700 --> 00:07:38,380
I was just perusing the level of law, the defence security, which came out now the 29th of April.

62
00:07:39,240 --> 00:07:45,900
And the French clearly state that they will secure, stabilise the remains of Europe,

63
00:07:46,170 --> 00:07:53,950
particularly the Maghreb, the Sahel area, and that they will deter, etc.

64
00:07:53,970 --> 00:08:00,300
So it's a geopolitical strategic analysis at the beginning of that which broke.

65
00:08:01,280 --> 00:08:12,050
So. But the use of force is limited and may be used in extreme cases ultimate sale for humanitarian reasons.

66
00:08:13,250 --> 00:08:17,630
But mostly today we don't speak about state to state war.

67
00:08:18,470 --> 00:08:28,520
So it is not Churchillian times no place for Churchillian rhetoric, difficult to engage publics about the use of force.

68
00:08:28,520 --> 00:08:32,720
They have no experience anymore, usually no conscription.

69
00:08:33,110 --> 00:08:36,889
We have retained it. We conscript 10% of the young people.

70
00:08:36,890 --> 00:08:39,760
About. So there's more of a link.

71
00:08:40,330 --> 00:08:51,790
But we study your British Covenant for clues to how to deal with this problem of people not supporting Afghanistan or Libya as a political cause,

72
00:08:52,240 --> 00:08:58,960
but the need to support the soldier or the military profession and the risks of the profession.

73
00:09:00,310 --> 00:09:07,410
So that's why we say that military cultures, the fact that you have an understanding of in society,

74
00:09:07,450 --> 00:09:18,220
general understanding that the military man or woman is in a very different profession, which entails risks of giving one's own life and taking life.

75
00:09:19,330 --> 00:09:22,680
That war and peace are different in so many ways.

76
00:09:22,690 --> 00:09:30,220
But there are that there's a sphere of war or military sphere which is very, very different from civilian life.

77
00:09:31,150 --> 00:09:40,450
States that have this are much more able to use force today than states that lack it, and many states lack it.

78
00:09:42,360 --> 00:09:46,810
So this is and there are interesting empirical examples of this.

79
00:09:46,830 --> 00:09:55,560
Norway has had, I should say, peacekeeping has been the sort of label for the use of force since World War Two.

80
00:09:57,000 --> 00:10:00,270
I mean, the Cold War was on an abstract, systemic level.

81
00:10:00,540 --> 00:10:03,180
The use of force was UN operations.

82
00:10:03,960 --> 00:10:17,400
When they became sharp operations Bosnia, Kosovo, Libya, Afghanistan and so on, the politicians were very slow to recognise this and very unwilling.

83
00:10:17,400 --> 00:10:25,620
So they would label this peacekeeping Afghanistan as sort of kind of peacekeeping, doing good for the people in Afghanistan.

84
00:10:26,670 --> 00:10:32,220
The same you would find in in the German discourse, national discourse to an extreme extent.

85
00:10:32,490 --> 00:10:42,060
Germany is the sort of the big but the example we could always point to and see the most extreme kind of peace rhetoric.

86
00:10:43,080 --> 00:10:50,300
And then one looks to Britain and there is defending the national interest in Helmand and so on.

87
00:10:50,310 --> 00:10:52,920
So you talk about war, the Americans talk about war.

88
00:10:53,650 --> 00:11:00,690
Germans talked about peace in Afghanistan, peacekeeping, keeping, the Norwegians transited from doing good,

89
00:11:00,690 --> 00:11:07,020
developing Afghanistan and so on, to acknowledging war, fighting going on.

90
00:11:07,800 --> 00:11:13,260
Never calling it a war because of the legal implications, but saying there is war fighting.

91
00:11:13,470 --> 00:11:21,960
And I was very active in this debate in Norway from the academic standpoint, the free standpoint of criticising the government.

92
00:11:22,440 --> 00:11:31,140
And at one point I wrote in the paper that the Minister of Defence does not laud the sharpshooter.

93
00:11:31,440 --> 00:11:39,599
He aims on behalf of the Government. He shoots on behalf of the government and he hits successfully on behalf of the government.

94
00:11:39,600 --> 00:11:43,170
And the government is not pleased because she, the Minister,

95
00:11:43,470 --> 00:11:51,900
refused to acknowledge this activity at all and said that we are not we don't celebrate military victory.

96
00:11:51,900 --> 00:11:56,330
We have no military tradition. So we find a change.

97
00:11:56,340 --> 00:12:01,080
Afghanistan has been a great lesson for some countries in Europe in this regard.

98
00:12:01,380 --> 00:12:07,470
Also, I should mention that Denmark is a country that turned from having a pacifistic

99
00:12:07,920 --> 00:12:16,470
footnote quality to its major policy in the eighties into becoming a very sort of,

100
00:12:16,510 --> 00:12:22,090
say, forward leaning country in NATO from 1990 onwards.

101
00:12:22,110 --> 00:12:28,770
It has switched or changed its peace culture into a military culture very

102
00:12:29,280 --> 00:12:35,160
consciously by the help or the instigation of two government ministers at the time.

103
00:12:35,520 --> 00:12:42,540
So this is an example that military or teaching cultures are not constant features of the country.

104
00:12:42,540 --> 00:12:48,960
They changed and they may be changed by ultra events or by domestic politicians.

105
00:12:49,080 --> 00:12:57,090
And now, of course, on this focus, the Danish section of nature, something you would never have become,

106
00:12:57,090 --> 00:13:02,430
hadn't Denmark, we being in Helmand and everywhere where the Americans wanted to go.

107
00:13:03,280 --> 00:13:09,040
So this is the background and then we have the nature.

108
00:13:09,040 --> 00:13:18,939
Of course, this is all about the US, almost all about the US, very much about the US pays 77%, 77% of total NATO's cost.

109
00:13:18,940 --> 00:13:24,670
The budget today is American. So Europe as a total is 23%.

110
00:13:24,970 --> 00:13:29,740
Very, very sure. Let's say unacceptable burden sharing.

111
00:13:30,860 --> 00:13:36,169
And burden sharing today, unlike in the Cold War, is not about spending on defence,

112
00:13:36,170 --> 00:13:45,110
it's not the magical percentage of the GDP, but it is about risk winning relevant military capability.

113
00:13:45,530 --> 00:13:49,350
So if you have large mobilisation armies, they do not really count.

114
00:13:49,370 --> 00:13:56,059
They are rather useless because they are maybe useless in a total war against the Soviet Union.

115
00:13:56,060 --> 00:14:02,330
But that was times gone by. So who has the willingness to take risk?

116
00:14:02,630 --> 00:14:11,870
Who has relevant capacity? Meaning expeditionary forces that are professional in every sense.

117
00:14:12,290 --> 00:14:18,620
And you know that European defence structures have undergone a tremendous change,

118
00:14:19,040 --> 00:14:28,260
but slow change after the Cold War from mobilised forces, large standing armies, reservists to expeditionary.

119
00:14:28,280 --> 00:14:31,820
And some countries have changed little Finland.

120
00:14:32,330 --> 00:14:35,540
They have the latest, the bicycle model for the infantry.

121
00:14:36,800 --> 00:14:40,350
But the French are good fighters, of course, but they wait for the Russians.

122
00:14:40,370 --> 00:14:43,760
Still, the Germans are very slow.

123
00:14:43,940 --> 00:14:54,500
They are unwilling to become too expeditionary. The latest policy is to have 10,000 soldiers, only out of 170,000 that can be deployed.

124
00:14:56,080 --> 00:15:01,660
In expeditionary operations. So what counts as relevant combat capabilities today?

125
00:15:02,080 --> 00:15:08,320
Special Forces. Intelligence. Advanced equipment.

126
00:15:09,940 --> 00:15:19,570
The professionalisation for going anywhere on the globe within five days to bring all your support with you.

127
00:15:21,370 --> 00:15:26,650
And of course, there's a strong relationship between the political willingness to use force and having it.

128
00:15:26,860 --> 00:15:31,420
So if you only are politically willing, it doesn't do you very good.

129
00:15:31,960 --> 00:15:36,910
You know, you can't be politically willing without delivering for a very long chapter

130
00:15:36,910 --> 00:15:41,710
in Hungary shows this that Hungarians are more than willing to go anywhere.

131
00:15:42,070 --> 00:15:46,000
The Americans are demanding, but they don't have much to offer.

132
00:15:47,040 --> 00:15:59,730
So the chapter on military capability here by General Dyson points out that budgets determine the real sort of nuts and bolts of security and defence.

133
00:16:00,090 --> 00:16:08,130
And Julian in the French has a wonderful quotation where he says States only recognise as much threat as they can afford.

134
00:16:09,270 --> 00:16:14,459
And this is typically in the official white papers and so on.

135
00:16:14,460 --> 00:16:18,960
You get a wonderful chapter on security risks, security threats and risk.

136
00:16:19,440 --> 00:16:25,380
Then you get a chapter on the budget which has nothing to do with the security and risk chapter.

137
00:16:25,710 --> 00:16:29,520
And then you get to the sort of meat of the paper.

138
00:16:30,270 --> 00:16:48,570
So budgets are decreasing. I checked that the military balance 2013 and some European states are decreasing by 16 17% in in nominal terms Slovak,

139
00:16:48,780 --> 00:16:57,660
Spain, Slovenia, Italy, but also countries like Britain and France are cutting their budgets.

140
00:16:58,080 --> 00:17:02,220
Norway has continued its nominal budget because of the oil.

141
00:17:02,640 --> 00:17:06,030
So we are not cutting back. But in real terms, of course we are.

142
00:17:06,360 --> 00:17:12,930
We are losing spending capability because of the cost nature of procurement.

143
00:17:13,470 --> 00:17:21,990
But during the night of shooting in Chicago, Jon Stewart on The Daily Show interviewed Ivo Daalder, the American ambassador.

144
00:17:22,530 --> 00:17:25,780
And the delivery is very, very correct diplomat.

145
00:17:25,800 --> 00:17:31,940
And and Jon Stewart said, so who is who is cutting back on the need to budget?

146
00:17:32,880 --> 00:17:41,340
And I said, well, Norway is, you know, is in fact, increasing slightly.

147
00:17:41,730 --> 00:17:45,120
And then Jon Stewart said, oh, so that's the new big powers.

148
00:17:45,120 --> 00:17:50,969
This is where we're going to talk next. But anyway, we do, which is also few in the world.

149
00:17:50,970 --> 00:17:54,030
We have to say something about ourselves. We have a chance.

150
00:17:54,750 --> 00:18:04,170
So as Christopher Kolker writes so much about in his various books, there is a cultural factor here which is very deep.

151
00:18:04,170 --> 00:18:11,819
And to him, for him, this is the main explanation why Europe is so uninterested in security independence,

152
00:18:11,820 --> 00:18:15,300
ducking it, avoiding it, not wanting to talk about strategy.

153
00:18:15,570 --> 00:18:27,380
It's a cultural factor of soft power, of the European model of the EU and of not having a national patriotism,

154
00:18:27,390 --> 00:18:33,270
not having a nation to defend, not being proud to defend your nation.

155
00:18:33,510 --> 00:18:37,739
And of course, there's a direct link between what you defend officially.

156
00:18:37,740 --> 00:18:40,800
You defend the king and country, queen and country.

157
00:18:41,310 --> 00:18:45,240
You don't defend an abstract EU or U.N. and so on,

158
00:18:45,240 --> 00:18:53,040
although you could make the point that to the noblest thing is to defend the weak and the and the threatened and so on,

159
00:18:53,250 --> 00:19:01,170
so that humanitarian interventions should be, in a way, giving the legitimacy that is perfect for Europeans.

160
00:19:02,410 --> 00:19:06,969
But I think this cultural factor, which is very fascinating to to deal with,

161
00:19:06,970 --> 00:19:13,990
because when you look at when you speak with German politicians or German intellectuals and so on,

162
00:19:14,500 --> 00:19:19,820
they are in a way shocked at the idea of using force.

163
00:19:19,840 --> 00:19:29,590
It is something that is immoral to them to a very deep extent that they they don't they want to avoid the topic altogether.

164
00:19:30,880 --> 00:19:36,610
Whereas when you speak with Brits or French and so on, this is a fact of normal international politics.

165
00:19:37,090 --> 00:19:41,800
So clearly there are significant differences within Europe.

166
00:19:42,660 --> 00:19:48,690
So I don't think we have explored this. Sort of the peace assumption.

167
00:19:48,930 --> 00:19:55,530
But all strategic insight suggests that if you ignore the possibility of war,

168
00:19:55,650 --> 00:20:00,480
of being put under pressure, of being attacked, then you will invite attack.

169
00:20:00,570 --> 00:20:12,930
So see this parcham parabellum. The old adage is very, very true, that if you have some red lines and if you you signal that these are my red lines,

170
00:20:13,350 --> 00:20:18,690
if you show ability to to you stick not only carrot in diplomacy,

171
00:20:18,810 --> 00:20:32,490
having coercive diplomacy as part of your tool, then certainly you will you will be respected, recognised by the Russians, Chinese and so on.

172
00:20:33,880 --> 00:20:36,880
And of course, Home Alone. This is the film.

173
00:20:36,880 --> 00:20:40,060
You know why this little boy is Home Alone?

174
00:20:40,060 --> 00:20:48,370
And he lives in a very tough neighbourhood. He has some tough people trying to break into his house and he deters them.

175
00:20:48,370 --> 00:21:00,670
And he manages the situation. And Europe being now home alone in Naito more and more is in this kind of tough neighbourhood the Caucasus,

176
00:21:01,330 --> 00:21:11,800
the Middle East, Maghreb, Arab Winter, and, of course, perhaps Russian interest in testing.

177
00:21:12,550 --> 00:21:23,560
Well, we are always thinking about this for the Arctic. Will the Russians at some point test our will to resist in a conflict and again, limited war,

178
00:21:23,560 --> 00:21:35,470
meaning the use of force to gain the upper hand in a conflict of interest and a conflict of interest is normal because interests differ among states.

179
00:21:36,190 --> 00:21:47,710
So we have these scenarios of what happens at sea with air power, sea power, not on land, probably in a quick in and quick out.

180
00:21:47,980 --> 00:21:51,070
And we have potential conflicts with Russia.

181
00:21:51,400 --> 00:22:04,180
I found a very interesting look yesterday in in the bookstore here, just published by an Oxford man called Russia the West, the Military Intervention.

182
00:22:04,870 --> 00:22:15,190
Right. Alison from St Anthony's. And his conclusion is that Russia Russia remains wedded to the idea of a concept of great powers.

183
00:22:15,640 --> 00:22:27,900
So the notion of international law in Russia is the old notion of great power, not take conciliation, ordering the world among the great powers.

184
00:22:27,910 --> 00:22:31,090
It is not human rights, humanitarian interventions and so on.

185
00:22:31,600 --> 00:22:37,479
And he notes that there is no congruence with the West at all regarding the view of international law.

186
00:22:37,480 --> 00:22:44,650
As we saw, Russia use international law very instrumentally in the intervention in Georgia 2008.

187
00:22:45,250 --> 00:22:51,579
And he says there is a positive view of law, which is very, very clear.

188
00:22:51,580 --> 00:22:57,250
There's no recognition of human rights trumping sovereignty.

189
00:22:57,250 --> 00:23:05,500
And the same is true, of course, for China, which has punished Norway quite a lot and still does over the Nobel Peace Prize.

190
00:23:05,530 --> 00:23:15,070
Do you suppose just to make the point that there is no human rights that overrides that is valid for Chinese citizens?

191
00:23:15,160 --> 00:23:18,670
If you break Chinese law, then you are a lawbreaker and a criminal.

192
00:23:19,510 --> 00:23:23,110
And China Going Global is another title just published.

193
00:23:23,290 --> 00:23:34,420
David Campbell also oxygenos the success and he says by 2020, China is the number two for the US in military spending.

194
00:23:35,380 --> 00:23:43,330
In the end, he says quote, All of China's involvement in global security will be shaped by its own calculations of national interest.

195
00:23:44,020 --> 00:23:52,989
So we are in a world now that is economically multipolar already, but which is rapidly becoming also multiple, not rapidly,

196
00:23:52,990 --> 00:24:02,950
perhaps becoming multipolar gradually, at least because the US is really in a class by itself militarily and will be so for a long time.

197
00:24:03,400 --> 00:24:09,250
But we see that China increases its military budget by about 11% yearly.

198
00:24:09,670 --> 00:24:22,520
Russia is now again flying bombers, sorties in Northern not see the same level of exercises as in the Cold War and also modernising.

199
00:24:22,540 --> 00:24:31,989
So I'm not suggesting that China and Russia will be in a par with us, with the U.S. or NATO's anytime soon.

200
00:24:31,990 --> 00:24:40,210
But we see that the use of force is very much a function of the view of international law,

201
00:24:40,390 --> 00:24:44,380
human rights, the view of sovereignty and national interest.

202
00:24:44,740 --> 00:24:51,160
So we have a model of realpolitik, which is the old, centuries old model of international curse,

203
00:24:51,460 --> 00:25:01,270
which is now cropping up again, which is now making itself visible in the South China Sea, but also in Georgia.

204
00:25:01,720 --> 00:25:07,299
This was the need to expansion to Georgia, as was suggested by the native council,

205
00:25:07,300 --> 00:25:14,920
as was promised almost to Georgia, was seen in Russia as being an invasion into their sphere of interest.

206
00:25:15,160 --> 00:25:22,299
So this term sphere of interest, this is now again relevant and this is where we should be concerned.

207
00:25:22,300 --> 00:25:27,870
These are the things that we are in a way what security and defence is about.

208
00:25:27,880 --> 00:25:31,450
It's the it's the system. It's the rules of the system.

209
00:25:33,160 --> 00:25:37,270
Now, given this, what do the Europeans do?

210
00:25:38,560 --> 00:25:42,580
The US is turning to Asia. The US is cutting its budget.

211
00:25:43,450 --> 00:25:49,930
The US expects the burden sharing to become more equal and that the Europeans will lead.

212
00:25:50,410 --> 00:25:54,670
And we take our point of departure from this. Robert Gates.

213
00:25:54,970 --> 00:26:02,230
Politicians are, of course, more interesting when they leave office, when they have left office, than when they are in office and upon leaving.

214
00:26:02,260 --> 00:26:08,930
Gates said at the NATO last ministerial meeting NATO in June 2011.

215
00:26:09,520 --> 00:26:17,110
He said NATO's is becoming a two tiered alliance between members who specialise in the soft humanitarian development,

216
00:26:17,110 --> 00:26:22,239
peacekeeping and talking tasks and those conducting the hard combat missions

217
00:26:22,240 --> 00:26:26,229
between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burden of alliance,

218
00:26:26,230 --> 00:26:29,980
commitment, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership,

219
00:26:30,250 --> 00:26:35,710
be they security guarantees or headquarter visits, but don't want to share the risks and the costs.

220
00:26:36,490 --> 00:26:41,469
This is an old criticism, but this time it's much more vocal.

221
00:26:41,470 --> 00:26:52,180
It's much more real. There is a real impatience in the US and also a lack of interest in nature.

222
00:26:52,210 --> 00:26:59,560
Frankly, for the Europeans, this is very bad news because we need a US interest.

223
00:26:59,590 --> 00:27:05,650
As Lord is my said. The point of NATO is to keep the Russians out, keep the Germans down.

224
00:27:05,770 --> 00:27:08,830
Which they do themselves. Keep the Americans in.

225
00:27:09,680 --> 00:27:17,330
So this is still the, the, uh, the task of Europeans is to keep the Americans in, to keep them interested.

226
00:27:18,290 --> 00:27:29,029
And they are. I was just in Washington some weeks ago and talked about these topics and the lack of interest in NAITO is miserable in Washington.

227
00:27:29,030 --> 00:27:36,500
One can look at the topics for research, which is very much about nuclear South East Asia.

228
00:27:37,370 --> 00:27:45,919
One can look at meetings about NATO and the ambassadors told me that, yes, frankly, it's very hard to get an American interest in NATO.

229
00:27:45,920 --> 00:27:52,270
And for the best measure of this, according to Barry Posen at MIT here,

230
00:27:52,340 --> 00:27:59,280
is that American officers want to have a real career, do not want to go to NATO job.

231
00:27:59,810 --> 00:28:02,810
So I think that's a good indicator.

232
00:28:03,870 --> 00:28:06,630
Now. What do the Americans do then?

233
00:28:07,800 --> 00:28:18,000
If we look at the literature of why why Europeans contribute to operations, we look at what is called alliance dependence.

234
00:28:18,630 --> 00:28:22,350
Snider In 1984 classical article,

235
00:28:22,350 --> 00:28:28,299
but also other empirical studies that the thesis is that we contribute because the

236
00:28:28,300 --> 00:28:33,960
U.S. asks us to do so and the US will naturally go around with a collection box.

237
00:28:34,710 --> 00:28:37,740
What can you contribute and do some arm twisting.

238
00:28:37,740 --> 00:28:49,100
And I've been in such meetings where our diplomats say point taken and we always contribute, almost always contribute because we always fear Russia.

239
00:28:49,110 --> 00:28:54,540
So we have this geopolitical calculus at the bottom of this sensible calculus.

240
00:28:54,540 --> 00:29:02,129
And I think others contribute because they get a sort of red carpet treatment in Washington.

241
00:29:02,130 --> 00:29:08,010
They get close relations with the president and with Britain and so on.

242
00:29:08,640 --> 00:29:15,660
There are many, many advantages to contribute contributions that are not related just to security.

243
00:29:15,780 --> 00:29:19,769
Denmark is a good example. No natural enemies, nothing to fear.

244
00:29:19,770 --> 00:29:24,509
Denmark has abolished its submarine fleet because it's very costly.

245
00:29:24,510 --> 00:29:29,280
They don't need it. But Denmark has gone expeditionary.

246
00:29:29,580 --> 00:29:33,900
And they do. They they are always in the forefront.

247
00:29:34,530 --> 00:29:37,530
They are almost in the mission field.

248
00:29:37,530 --> 00:29:39,080
Before the mission has started,

249
00:29:39,090 --> 00:29:49,460
they were on the way to Libya before the Sarkozy's planes because they reckon that this is sensible international affairs.

250
00:29:50,350 --> 00:29:54,750
So large dependence. When the U.S. beckons.

251
00:29:55,200 --> 00:30:04,049
And then the great or the most disturbing question of the book is what happens when the U.S. does not beckon, when France does it,

252
00:30:04,050 --> 00:30:12,620
or Britain or French British leadership or perhaps nobody will Europe, European Microstates then contribute to any operations?

253
00:30:13,450 --> 00:30:20,950
Now the empirical research is survey what we know about why about this question.

254
00:30:21,310 --> 00:30:26,050
Prestige is important also in a mission where the UK is.

255
00:30:26,080 --> 00:30:31,540
France will come if France should be in a mission without the UK, the UK will be there.

256
00:30:32,200 --> 00:30:35,570
Both countries want a close relationship with Washington.

257
00:30:35,680 --> 00:30:42,940
France has increasingly developed its relationship, so these reasons are very important.

258
00:30:44,270 --> 00:30:52,640
But then also, of course, national interest. France in in Africa has its own security policy in Africa.

259
00:30:52,700 --> 00:30:58,910
So does Britain. Britain and the Falcons, national interests, Norway and the high north.

260
00:31:00,290 --> 00:31:04,970
We we have a sort of way of saying we wonder what the gap is.

261
00:31:05,180 --> 00:31:09,560
The gap is not this sort of of clothing, summer clothing.

262
00:31:09,860 --> 00:31:13,790
But the gap is Article five. And own operations.

263
00:31:13,800 --> 00:31:19,340
What must we take care of in terms of of threats and risks on our own?

264
00:31:19,970 --> 00:31:22,310
What will become an Article five situation?

265
00:31:22,640 --> 00:31:31,790
This question we have debated for 40 years in the Cold War, really wondering what Article five would would be like, what kind of situation.

266
00:31:32,180 --> 00:31:40,190
And then we got the answer, ten, 12, 11, 2001 that it was the attack on Manhattan was Article five.

267
00:31:40,670 --> 00:31:45,860
So it's the only Article five definition in NATO's history, one that the US said.

268
00:31:46,010 --> 00:31:55,280
Thank you. But no, but it's interesting that the since limited war is the thing, not Article five, but skirmishes,

269
00:31:55,580 --> 00:32:04,730
small incidents planned or unplanned or signalled beforehand or not since this is where the action will be.

270
00:32:05,150 --> 00:32:16,610
It is below Article five, in a way. So this is the interesting thing that Europeans may have to deal with risk and threat on their own.

271
00:32:16,700 --> 00:32:25,250
Much, much more than before, because of the nature of of this that Article five is up there,

272
00:32:25,580 --> 00:32:30,650
and it would take a major situation to diagnose it as Article five.

273
00:32:30,980 --> 00:32:44,460
Turkey, Turkey's relations or problems with Syria now and form and in 2003 with Iraq the same question is it Article four?

274
00:32:44,510 --> 00:32:52,400
Can we have consultations under Article four of the Washington treaty, or is it something that almost involves the others?

275
00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:56,860
And the others are not interested in being involved right now in Washington.

276
00:32:56,870 --> 00:33:09,010
Cameron is talking with press conference from yesterday where Cameron came to Washington with some interest in arming the opposition in Syria.

277
00:33:09,060 --> 00:33:16,640
Now it is considerably toned down to having a peace conference, which is what Obama would like not to get involved.

278
00:33:17,060 --> 00:33:25,250
And Turkey is very disappointed. So you see this, this is the fascinating thing that we don't speak about.

279
00:33:25,250 --> 00:33:32,560
Article five. You speak about Article four. Then there is the factor domestic factors.

280
00:33:32,580 --> 00:33:41,219
This is sort of the most illegitimate factor in determining security and defence policy, because if your public opinion,

281
00:33:41,220 --> 00:33:47,080
if your pressure groups, if your coalition concerns determine whether you contribute or not.

282
00:33:47,430 --> 00:33:51,900
It is bad from the point of view of security and defence policy, certainly.

283
00:33:52,980 --> 00:33:59,400
So the question, does domestic politics trump strategic concerns?

284
00:34:00,120 --> 00:34:06,060
And in a way, when you speak about Article four limited situations.

285
00:34:06,960 --> 00:34:10,170
Yes, they do. Is there a way out of this?

286
00:34:10,350 --> 00:34:14,729
In a way, if there something substantial, we shall fight on the beaches situation.

287
00:34:14,730 --> 00:34:22,080
Then there's no question about what's most important. But if it is, we may go to Syria or Libya or so on.

288
00:34:22,080 --> 00:34:25,710
We don't have to. It's not existentially important to us.

289
00:34:26,250 --> 00:34:32,010
Then, of course, why should this be more important than the Coalition keeping the coalition together?

290
00:34:32,400 --> 00:34:36,480
I cite Sarah Kreps, who has written about ISIS,

291
00:34:37,260 --> 00:34:46,020
saying that the old deal in nature was that all parties supported NAITO no breaking of

292
00:34:46,020 --> 00:34:52,590
ranks as long as they had a tacit understanding that you wouldn't break out and say,

293
00:34:52,980 --> 00:34:56,730
Now I go for elections, I want to get out of Iraq.

294
00:34:57,600 --> 00:34:59,880
This will bring me the electoral victory.

295
00:35:00,360 --> 00:35:08,880
This is what, in a way, what Schroeder did in Germany in 2003 use this Iraq issue, opposition to Iraq in order to get re-elected.

296
00:35:09,480 --> 00:35:18,750
Krieps research shows that Icesave contributors continue to contribute, despite public opinion being below 50% for the operation.

297
00:35:19,350 --> 00:35:24,210
Yet they do so only when countries do not break ranks.

298
00:35:24,570 --> 00:35:35,010
No parties, I mean. But when parties break ranks to gain the benefit of being becoming popular, then it unravels.

299
00:35:35,130 --> 00:35:42,840
So she asks, for how long will NATO countries be able to keep a party agreement,

300
00:35:42,840 --> 00:35:48,120
a tacit agreement that security and defence policy is above the fray of domestic politics.

301
00:35:48,630 --> 00:35:55,830
And we see in empirically no way we can see that the parties disagree more and more on missions.

302
00:35:56,610 --> 00:36:04,590
And there is less and less agreement on where to go. But there is an agreement on the importance of NATO because of the geopolitics.

303
00:36:04,920 --> 00:36:16,140
But in other countries where there is no geopolitical sort of structural factor, this disagreement is sort of wide open.

304
00:36:16,200 --> 00:36:22,230
Germany is a case. After 1990, the Germans felt very free to disagree completely.

305
00:36:22,500 --> 00:36:28,320
And now they say in a way we don't we're not interested in defence questions at all.

306
00:36:28,530 --> 00:36:31,680
We're not interested in this field of foreign policy, so to speak.

307
00:36:32,540 --> 00:36:41,549
ISAF is the best case of showing how unequal and unjust the burden sharing has been among allies,

308
00:36:41,550 --> 00:36:47,550
because clearly in an alliance you don't accept that some to take the risk all the time and others do not.

309
00:36:47,910 --> 00:36:52,140
And we saw that Germans took very little risk, although there was fighting in the north.

310
00:36:54,570 --> 00:37:00,810
The Danes went to the south. We went partially in the south, but didn't say so publicly.

311
00:37:00,900 --> 00:37:08,880
Special Forces. They defined the area of operation to Kabul and surroundings and surroundings, plus the rest of the country,

312
00:37:09,690 --> 00:37:16,019
because we have a domestic policy political issue where the left socialists who were in the government,

313
00:37:16,020 --> 00:37:23,850
who are still in the government, opposed to being in the South, opposed being offensive and opposed sending special forces.

314
00:37:24,540 --> 00:37:29,909
So ISAF one sees this spelled out by NATO countries.

315
00:37:29,910 --> 00:37:33,520
Canadian politicians say, we don't accept this.

316
00:37:33,570 --> 00:37:36,060
We die and they pay in a way.

317
00:37:36,630 --> 00:37:46,320
And in Libya, we see the other interesting thing that only some very few contribute in the eyes of all NATO members contributed,

318
00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:56,460
plus a number of others. In Libya, only eight countries contributed and only four of them in very forward combat roles.

319
00:37:57,190 --> 00:38:04,420
Denmark, Norway, being with France, Britain and Belgium, in fact, in doing a lot of sorties,

320
00:38:05,000 --> 00:38:12,610
this was a way for us to say, well, we had some problems in ISA, but we are now good guys in Libya.

321
00:38:13,490 --> 00:38:17,160
So one asks this in the questions.

322
00:38:18,110 --> 00:38:24,530
Uh. What can we say about the results or what do we what can we say here?

323
00:38:25,100 --> 00:38:29,190
The Europeans have historically used force for political ends.

324
00:38:29,210 --> 00:38:35,510
Of course, historically, that's very, very true. The old continent, but also after World War Two.

325
00:38:37,120 --> 00:38:45,999
We all remember the Swiss, French, British venture with Israel, to the dismay of Washington, the Falklands,

326
00:38:46,000 --> 00:38:57,220
Maggie Thatcher, Bosnia, where I think Britain was willing to use ground troops much more so than the U.S.

327
00:38:57,580 --> 00:39:08,530
And also the same was true in Kosovo, but it became an air operation, which, of course, had the strategic effect of being very ineffective.

328
00:39:08,740 --> 00:39:15,250
When you can't use see the policies of Milosevic and his ground movement and you can't bomb him either.

329
00:39:15,640 --> 00:39:21,820
So the complementarity of military tools is very often dispensed with for political reasons.

330
00:39:23,320 --> 00:39:31,480
And now we have the French and the British being more interested in doing something in Syria than the US.

331
00:39:31,930 --> 00:39:41,169
It's a very interesting situation that the French Foreign Minister has talked about the need to at least arm the opposition,

332
00:39:41,170 --> 00:39:44,380
whatever the opposition is. And the same goes for Cameron.

333
00:39:44,860 --> 00:39:50,380
And Libya was a case of French for most French initiatives.

334
00:39:50,620 --> 00:39:53,379
Um, for strategic reasons,

335
00:39:53,380 --> 00:40:02,860
I think to get back in there sort of on the right side of the Arab Spring that followed with being a French British cooperation.

336
00:40:03,820 --> 00:40:11,830
And I think the many, many advised against Cameron's commitment to Libya, but he decided to go.

337
00:40:12,490 --> 00:40:19,389
So in a way we could say is it's an interesting and open question this that you have so many European allies

338
00:40:19,390 --> 00:40:28,780
that are not interested in using force and you have some that are clearly almost taking a lead on Washington,

339
00:40:28,780 --> 00:40:32,050
perhaps with Obama under Obama's policies.

340
00:40:32,710 --> 00:40:46,650
Christopher Coke us. And a very interesting chapter is sort of looking into the historical evolution, cultural factors, the zeitgeist in Europe.

341
00:40:46,650 --> 00:40:59,040
So that's a highly recommendable chapter. General Dyson shows how there must be ability via some kind of defence integration.

342
00:40:59,040 --> 00:41:02,970
And here I would just note that France and Britain are the two most.

343
00:41:03,690 --> 00:41:11,280
They their cooperation on integration is the sort of foremost model today in Europe.

344
00:41:11,520 --> 00:41:19,410
Very little happens. It's a scandalously neglected field because politicians do not want to deal with

345
00:41:19,620 --> 00:41:25,770
the loss of sovereignty that is entailed in some in a radical kind of cooperation,

346
00:41:25,890 --> 00:41:29,760
it being cooperation, albeit niche specialisation.

347
00:41:30,360 --> 00:41:36,180
So this is in a way where the, uh, as we say, the dug is buried.

348
00:41:36,270 --> 00:41:41,460
This is the, this is the sort of Achilles heel that nobody wants to really deal with.

349
00:41:41,610 --> 00:41:45,120
The EU had an attempt at and NATO's that many times.

350
00:41:45,120 --> 00:41:49,770
But nature cannot force anybody to cooperate or integrate.

351
00:41:50,340 --> 00:41:53,549
Can only suggest. So we have some AWACS.

352
00:41:53,550 --> 00:41:56,970
We have transport planes, some common nature projects.

353
00:41:57,330 --> 00:42:04,230
But there are so many plane systems, so many tank systems, so many artillery systems and so on in small European states.

354
00:42:04,910 --> 00:42:10,640
So in a way, this will go very badly unless something is radically done about it.

355
00:42:11,710 --> 00:42:22,600
Nature has no common security strategic vision, despite the concepts, the strategic concepts being sort of diplomatic papers these days.

356
00:42:23,890 --> 00:42:28,180
So Naito is a coalition of the willing and able at any one time.

357
00:42:28,570 --> 00:42:30,610
It's a coalition. It is not.

358
00:42:31,120 --> 00:42:40,410
It's a sort of you dip into it and you use the military command structure, which is unique to naito shock American experts.

359
00:42:41,590 --> 00:42:44,750
He says this time it's serious. It's real.

360
00:42:44,920 --> 00:42:52,660
It's a generational thing. American politicians have no particular link to Europe, not nothing to World War Two anymore.

361
00:42:54,190 --> 00:43:00,969
The cover story When I was in Washington in the last two years, it was interesting.

362
00:43:00,970 --> 00:43:07,150
And also during the Libya operation, the press reported on the cost of the cruise missiles.

363
00:43:07,180 --> 00:43:10,990
Today we shot ten cruise missiles. The price tag is this.

364
00:43:11,260 --> 00:43:21,280
I've never seen that before. So the sort of cost consciousness and the, you know, naito the NAITO literature, which is often very poor,

365
00:43:21,520 --> 00:43:29,200
very academic, I mean, analytically, very poor because it's very opinionated, sort of this expert thing stuff and so on.

366
00:43:29,770 --> 00:43:34,239
It talks about crisis. So you have 60 years of literature about crisis.

367
00:43:34,240 --> 00:43:40,510
And Henry Kissinger has the record of predicting crisis every decade of these 60 years.

368
00:43:41,110 --> 00:43:50,800
So, you know, you find crises and crises. But if you look at the variables that are at play now, it's it's different from the usual crisis.

369
00:43:51,190 --> 00:43:56,580
Cry wolf. In Britain, you have the foreign policy prerogative.

370
00:43:56,910 --> 00:44:01,130
That means that the head of state can decide, not the head of state.

371
00:44:01,140 --> 00:44:09,390
She is not doing that. But the Prime Minister Government decides on the use of force without having to get the okay of Parliament.

372
00:44:10,740 --> 00:44:14,250
You have global power status wants to retain.

373
00:44:14,250 --> 00:44:19,500
It must integrate more with France, probably.

374
00:44:20,040 --> 00:44:31,090
Uh, I, I don't have time to go into the details, but, you know, Britain is always about Trumps written in a very Franco English style chapter.

375
00:44:31,110 --> 00:44:32,400
So you might enjoy that.

376
00:44:33,280 --> 00:44:45,690
Uh, France is perhaps the country that has the most consistent strategic thinking, and I would just recommend the level of law for its analysis.

377
00:44:45,960 --> 00:44:50,040
It's, you know, they are really serious about nuclear deterrence.

378
00:44:50,340 --> 00:45:00,230
They say we will shoot first. You know, if you if you misunderstand our national red lines, we will hit a light nuclear doses at you.

379
00:45:00,960 --> 00:45:05,550
I mean, they are they are really extremely serious about nuclear deterrence.

380
00:45:06,520 --> 00:45:14,020
And they say we must be responsible for parts of Africa because it's in our interest.

381
00:45:14,020 --> 00:45:17,230
And in Mali, operation is an example of exactly this policy.

382
00:45:17,950 --> 00:45:23,920
It's a unilateral French with some British NATO there after a while.

383
00:45:24,550 --> 00:45:27,500
So this is interesting because France has been the odd man out.

384
00:45:27,520 --> 00:45:35,590
Of course, after the Gauls 66 withdrawal from the military command, but will now with Hollande stay in the military command.

385
00:45:36,550 --> 00:45:45,580
And the employer here writes that what we will do is to be nice and good, sort of be in NATO's work with the Americans and,

386
00:45:45,580 --> 00:45:52,740
of course, with the British, although we think the British are now sort of on a slippery slope regarding the EU and Europe.

387
00:45:52,750 --> 00:46:01,660
So we are waiting to see what they decide and we will right wait for the right moment to relaunch a European common security policy.

388
00:46:02,380 --> 00:46:06,160
So that's the very consistent thinking. It is the goal.

389
00:46:07,780 --> 00:46:16,269
And there's a continuity because ideology doesn't matter when they have the system they have of installation of the armed forces,

390
00:46:16,270 --> 00:46:22,410
strategic thinking, the ground they call recruitment to the state and defence industry.

391
00:46:22,420 --> 00:46:28,270
They have a sort of walled strategic setup.

392
00:46:28,600 --> 00:46:34,690
So ideology is what people think and so on. Doesn't really get to them, doesn't matter.

393
00:46:34,990 --> 00:46:39,880
And I would say also that the use of force is incredibly popular in France.

394
00:46:40,150 --> 00:46:43,840
76% supported the Mali and supports the Mali mission.

395
00:46:44,230 --> 00:46:51,700
You know, so Hollande discovers that he can get popular by not by cutting, not by taxing the rich as a good socialist,

396
00:46:51,700 --> 00:47:01,029
but by using force like a socialist usually would want to do Germany, Belgium instead, who has now a professorship in Australia.

397
00:47:01,030 --> 00:47:05,590
So he's safely on the Down Under. He can say what he wants.

398
00:47:06,640 --> 00:47:15,880
Very good analysis of Germany, of course, being the cultural factor, being still very, very important part of stroke.

399
00:47:15,910 --> 00:47:21,510
When he was Defence Minister, I asked him about why are you so sort of cowardly there?

400
00:47:21,520 --> 00:47:25,900
Why aren't you doing more in Afghanistan? Why aren't you in combat operations?

401
00:47:26,080 --> 00:47:31,150
And he said, Well, we did World War Two, so, you know, we have to make amends.

402
00:47:31,210 --> 00:47:36,640
He was still using this world war to excuse 70 years after.

403
00:47:37,150 --> 00:47:43,390
And my son, who was a combat soldier in the in the north and the quick reaction force in the north,

404
00:47:43,780 --> 00:47:50,080
he had to they were out saving Germans in Kunduz when they were attacked because they would never get out of the country.

405
00:47:50,740 --> 00:47:54,819
So Germany has sort of from a soldier's point of view,

406
00:47:54,820 --> 00:48:00,550
it's despicable in a way what they offer the soldiers in terms of recognition or lack of recognition.

407
00:48:01,600 --> 00:48:12,020
But it is the economic giant in Europe. So in nitro, it has to you know, something has to happen to make the Germans do more.

408
00:48:12,350 --> 00:48:17,389
If NATO's going to be viable in Europe, that's the one point.

409
00:48:17,390 --> 00:48:23,990
And the other point that Sam makes is that Germany has now come of age and talks about national interest.

410
00:48:24,880 --> 00:48:33,890
But so they are in a way able to say, we're not interested in the national interest of and we're not interested in the security and defence.

411
00:48:33,890 --> 00:48:38,610
Thank you. We are interested in economic policy. So we want to be a great economic power.

412
00:48:38,630 --> 00:48:43,880
We are not going to lead in nature. We don't want to get embroiled in anything in Africa.

413
00:48:45,050 --> 00:48:46,790
We have chosen a different path.

414
00:48:47,360 --> 00:48:55,880
This is really a very interesting post-modern view of foreign and security policy, very consistent with soft power thinking.

415
00:48:57,140 --> 00:49:00,260
And Libya is, you know, a good example of this.

416
00:49:00,470 --> 00:49:09,920
Germany abstained with Russia and China on the resolution, giving all necessary means the power to use force in Libya.

417
00:49:10,220 --> 00:49:15,110
So why would they abstain when they could have just gone with it and not contributed much?

418
00:49:16,460 --> 00:49:18,860
There is some disagreement on the interpretation of this,

419
00:49:18,860 --> 00:49:28,820
but the effect is really that Germany said we we take a completely different course than that of the US, U.K., France and the others in.

420
00:49:29,240 --> 00:49:34,970
We don't care much about NATO's solidarity at all. Spain pacifistic?

421
00:49:35,420 --> 00:49:43,340
Very much so. The legacy of NATO's negative view of the military arsenal was very ideologically

422
00:49:43,790 --> 00:49:47,690
interested in being close to Washington and therefore was in the Iraq war.

423
00:49:48,140 --> 00:49:55,580
And as you know, probably one of the cases where we can trace a terrorist website to a sort of a course

424
00:49:55,580 --> 00:50:01,580
of action was when the Spaniards and the Brits had elections at the same time.

425
00:50:02,000 --> 00:50:08,989
And the Islamist website central in that sort of neck of the woods suggested

426
00:50:08,990 --> 00:50:14,450
that somebody should attack in either one of the countries to get the election,

427
00:50:14,450 --> 00:50:17,300
to get the socialist elections elected in Spain.

428
00:50:17,900 --> 00:50:24,890
And they said you should probably choose Spain because if the socialists get in, they will retreat from Iraq.

429
00:50:25,490 --> 00:50:29,390
And as you know, the Madrid attacks came a week before the elections.

430
00:50:29,810 --> 00:50:38,300
Zapatero was elected and immediately the troops from Spain were drawn back from Iraq.

431
00:50:38,900 --> 00:50:49,360
But nowadays, Spain is an enormous crisis. But it's interesting that this former great power has such a negative view of of the military.

432
00:50:49,790 --> 00:50:55,610
CONAN On the other hand, it's very willing and very proud of its military tradition,

433
00:50:56,810 --> 00:51:02,270
but it follows very much the U.S. So it was not interested in being in Libya

434
00:51:02,270 --> 00:51:09,319
at point that was publicly criticised by Gates then some lesser countries,

435
00:51:09,320 --> 00:51:17,120
perhaps three small ones, Hungary. Uh, all also motivated by the fear of Russia.

436
00:51:17,660 --> 00:51:21,830
Geopolitics like Poland, like Norway, like the Baltics.

437
00:51:23,280 --> 00:51:29,040
Not much to contribute, although they had a party in Ibiza the days I explained.

438
00:51:29,820 --> 00:51:35,520
Very, very eager to be close to the US. Way usually the same.

439
00:51:35,910 --> 00:51:41,760
So it's sort of the old Mateo sort of thinking.

440
00:51:42,830 --> 00:51:53,180
The findings, uh, countries where there is a military culture which makes it much easier to deploy in non-essential war, so to speak.

441
00:51:53,630 --> 00:51:56,660
France, U.K., Denmark. Norway.

442
00:51:56,810 --> 00:51:59,930
Not in Germany, not in Spain. Not in Italy.

443
00:52:01,190 --> 00:52:06,620
Of course, one could study this in much greater detail where there is a lack of such a culture.

444
00:52:06,980 --> 00:52:13,030
Politics matters in terms of ideology. Socialism as a negative to the use of force.

445
00:52:13,040 --> 00:52:17,340
Conservative parties are not. And so on negative to us.

446
00:52:17,990 --> 00:52:22,040
So you can see that governments colours will matter.

447
00:52:24,520 --> 00:52:30,700
And then the key question, what happens when the US is not going to lead and called for contributions?

448
00:52:32,110 --> 00:52:39,550
Will it be this? If you look at the deployments and operations after 99, it's been events driven.

449
00:52:40,330 --> 00:52:44,290
I mean, it's all been events driven. Nobody had planned for Kosovo.

450
00:52:44,410 --> 00:52:50,920
Was now Libya or Libya perhaps is an exception Afghanistan.

451
00:52:51,790 --> 00:53:01,630
So if Europe is going to make sense in security and defence policy, it has to rediscover the logic of strategy.

452
00:53:01,990 --> 00:53:09,310
And that means deterrence, deterring against being put under pressure, being manipulated, being influenced.

453
00:53:10,330 --> 00:53:17,530
That's probably what deterrence means today to say this will not be tolerated.

454
00:53:17,860 --> 00:53:27,940
Also in terms of massacres. So, you know, if you have impunity in civil wars, you can kill 70,000 like in Libya.

455
00:53:28,090 --> 00:53:36,140
Nobody cares if you have this old fashioned realism as the only red line in a way that you have to have a national interest.

456
00:53:36,190 --> 00:53:45,370
Then we are back to a very sort of undesirable world, I think, where European values cannot, cannot have any future.

457
00:53:45,520 --> 00:53:54,639
If you don't want to defend this emphasis on humanitarian law, human rights, human dignity, all of the should one say,

458
00:53:54,640 --> 00:54:01,090
the ideological ideas we have and hold on to very strongly if you don't want to defend them,

459
00:54:01,510 --> 00:54:07,000
then they will be done in by power politics when others are more powerful.

460
00:54:07,480 --> 00:54:14,110
So deterrence, which is I hope to try to do better than right about now, is really important.

461
00:54:14,380 --> 00:54:22,450
And one hasn't really started to think about it. And the same is also coercion, the will to coerce effectively.

462
00:54:22,660 --> 00:54:27,380
And that, as you know, there's a rather good literature on this.

463
00:54:27,430 --> 00:54:31,450
There's an unusable, enormous literature on deterrence from the Cold War,

464
00:54:31,900 --> 00:54:36,850
because nuclear deterrence is not what it's about anymore, at least not in the Western world.

465
00:54:36,970 --> 00:54:40,970
But. Coercion is extremely important.

466
00:54:41,120 --> 00:54:50,780
That's a small attitude. Coercion. Thank God, you know, not many key folks, but it shows the empirical things show that it fails.

467
00:54:50,790 --> 00:54:55,670
Somebody said 36% of cases were successful when Europeans coerced.

468
00:54:56,210 --> 00:55:04,520
And you can just logically deduce that the credibility of the threat is the key to any coercion.

469
00:55:04,730 --> 00:55:12,380
If you if you're threatened and you don't do anything, then you lose face and credibility as that's you.

470
00:55:12,680 --> 00:55:14,149
This is the, by the way,

471
00:55:14,150 --> 00:55:25,420
an American who because this is Obama in the Caribbean and he says this is Syria and this is Assad with nerve gas and says, do not cross.

472
00:55:25,430 --> 00:55:30,530
This is the first red line. Do really not cross this red line.

473
00:55:30,890 --> 00:55:36,110
And the third one is do really, really not cross. This is where we also have not.

474
00:55:37,220 --> 00:55:45,470
So it's interesting economist in the latest issue says that the foreign policy of Obama is really a lot of wishful thinking.

475
00:55:47,030 --> 00:55:55,790
And in light of Syria, Obama looks guilty of overconfidence and of arrogantly believing that by being cleverer than Mr. Bush,

476
00:55:56,090 --> 00:56:01,610
he could avoid traps, the traps that plagued him or the dilemmas that plagued him.

477
00:56:02,480 --> 00:56:09,630
Uh, but in terms of leadership in both thinking and doing practice, uh,

478
00:56:09,920 --> 00:56:15,530
there is only one possibility in Europe, and that's the French British cooperation.

479
00:56:16,100 --> 00:56:22,760
And I mentioned this labour law, which is very promising, and they don't cut as much as feared.

480
00:56:23,960 --> 00:56:30,020
And now, in a way. The paradoxical situation.

481
00:56:31,130 --> 00:56:42,820
That perhaps. France and Britain are the ones that show a sort of willingness to to deal with the unpleasantness of hard power.