1 00:00:00,330 --> 00:00:03,930 Several speakers at this time are speaking about the future. 2 00:00:04,440 --> 00:00:10,930 Several also speak about civil military relations. We also have speakers who cover regions of the world. 3 00:00:11,460 --> 00:00:14,580 In particular, the conflict regions gets sufficient area. 4 00:00:15,720 --> 00:00:22,600 Last week we heard about UN peacekeeping and the deployment of peacekeeping, but this is rather different. 5 00:00:22,620 --> 00:00:27,600 This is a more robust approach to say and in particular looking at the Caucasus. 6 00:00:28,650 --> 00:00:36,930 And it's like I said, if you see if you don't really know, first of all, if you talk to people fully, the Harvard Kennedy School now. 7 00:00:37,320 --> 00:00:42,780 Since 2012, the Islamic school government is very difficult because the list of your great accolades. 8 00:00:42,780 --> 00:00:48,420 But amongst them we should mention that she was originally a soldier. 9 00:00:48,510 --> 00:00:53,910 So she's a soldier scholar and is now a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. 10 00:00:54,060 --> 00:00:58,580 Minorities at Risk Advisory Board, Responsibility Task Force, Carnegie Foundation. 11 00:00:58,620 --> 00:01:03,780 New York is a Fulbright scholarship in Norway, which has been the focus of our day. 12 00:01:04,440 --> 00:01:11,220 And a colleague discovered this reception bridge in Bonn. So this is very much a field of design amongst all of us. 13 00:01:11,430 --> 00:01:14,940 There are no books on this problem of war and religion, 14 00:01:15,870 --> 00:01:20,969 but also about populations and minorities and those who are oppressed wouldn't read the full list 15 00:01:20,970 --> 00:01:25,710 because it would take too long silence to say that this is connected to your most recent article, 16 00:01:25,980 --> 00:01:33,170 The Denial and Punishment of the as if others will affect the success of counterinsurgency with your support, 17 00:01:33,990 --> 00:01:37,300 which you will appear to have during this research. 18 00:01:39,360 --> 00:01:46,679 Monica, thank you so much for coming because this is the living link between Frontex and anyway that we very much people are doing well. 19 00:01:46,680 --> 00:01:48,719 Thank you and thank you for coming. 20 00:01:48,720 --> 00:01:57,450 So as Rob said, this is sort of an ongoing project that I'm doing with a brilliant graduate student at Harvard, Uri Zuckoff, 21 00:01:57,870 --> 00:02:05,549 and we've already published one article in JPR that sort of looks at counterinsurgency and counterinsurgency tactics by states, 22 00:02:05,550 --> 00:02:08,940 in this case Moscow, the Russian government, the Ministry of Defence. 23 00:02:09,240 --> 00:02:13,950 And what is the best way to sort of counterinsurgency given the tactics that they use? 24 00:02:14,430 --> 00:02:17,459 So that first piece has been published. It's out in the Journal of Peace Research. 25 00:02:17,460 --> 00:02:22,410 You can go ahead and read it. And in that piece, we didn't differentiate by insurgent type. 26 00:02:22,410 --> 00:02:28,920 We just assumed that all the insurgents were motivated with the same sorts of ideas and ideologies. 27 00:02:29,280 --> 00:02:35,640 We didn't really differentiate the target sets, what they said that they were doing this paper, we do that. 28 00:02:36,120 --> 00:02:41,099 So we're looking at and we have data that's refined enough to say that was a religiously 29 00:02:41,100 --> 00:02:45,390 inspired operation versus this was more of a nationalist inspired operation. 30 00:02:45,690 --> 00:02:51,960 And I'll get into the data in a second. I don't think this is working, so I'll just put it in the keyboard. 31 00:02:52,410 --> 00:02:58,580 So the central question to this paper is, does the motivations of insurgents matter for how an insurgency involved evolved? 32 00:02:59,040 --> 00:03:07,589 They think about Syria. We have just secular actors, nationalist actors trying to defend against a corrupt state, but we also have Islamists active. 33 00:03:07,590 --> 00:03:13,790 And the question is, is should we be thinking about as a Western community, as outsiders, about targeting them differently? 34 00:03:14,220 --> 00:03:18,540 Mali, you had a case where you had the Tuareg national self-determination movement, 35 00:03:18,960 --> 00:03:22,260 much to their chagrin, aligning themselves with Islamists and regretting it. 36 00:03:23,070 --> 00:03:26,520 And so the key question is we're trying to figure out is, does it matter? 37 00:03:26,520 --> 00:03:31,230 So if you're trying to counter the Mali insurgency, are there particular villages where you go in there? 38 00:03:31,240 --> 00:03:34,010 There's a nationalist insurgency. Do you use different tactics? 39 00:03:34,020 --> 00:03:40,469 If we're talking about force, we're actually using talking about use of force, not necessarily concessions at this point. 40 00:03:40,470 --> 00:03:44,400 And in this case, it makes sense because Moscow actually doesn't give a lot of concessions. 41 00:03:44,400 --> 00:03:48,960 Anybody familiar with how they engage insurgents, particularly in the caucuses, 42 00:03:49,890 --> 00:03:53,640 and then do they respond differently to different kinds of counterinsurgency operations? 43 00:03:53,940 --> 00:04:00,690 And Moscow did make some strategic or tactical differences, depending upon how you define that, sir, do you have particular definitions? 44 00:04:00,690 --> 00:04:04,860 But Moscow does choose when it has an operation with there's a violent episode. 45 00:04:05,130 --> 00:04:08,550 How to counter that? Some cases it does nothing. It lets it pass. 46 00:04:08,820 --> 00:04:11,910 Other cases it goes in and it will cordon off an entire village. 47 00:04:11,910 --> 00:04:14,520 And we talk about that in the first paper as denial. 48 00:04:14,790 --> 00:04:20,309 So they actually set up roadblocks and they do not allow people to the best that they can do that in and out, 49 00:04:20,310 --> 00:04:26,310 because the idea is you isolate the insurgents or they actually have enough intelligence and they have pretty good intelligence, 50 00:04:27,330 --> 00:04:32,549 pretty good intel coming from both sides. And they go in and they pick out somebody. 51 00:04:32,550 --> 00:04:36,390 So they pick out Sir Hugh and they say, you've done perpetrated this operation. 52 00:04:36,690 --> 00:04:43,560 They threatened this family. In that case, they're actually punishing an individual or a set of individuals that they know is part of a cell. 53 00:04:43,860 --> 00:04:49,020 And Moscow knows this, and you can actually choose which operation is going to do some cases. 54 00:04:49,590 --> 00:04:56,160 Its decision is constrained by the forces on the ground, how close it is to a federal base or whether it's close to a police base. 55 00:04:56,460 --> 00:05:02,530 We do. This is a very deep. Complicated statistical analysis. 56 00:05:02,530 --> 00:05:09,770 We actually have data on all of that. So, Rob, I'll do the books for you just to explain how I came to this. 57 00:05:10,100 --> 00:05:15,380 So this is three of my books. Would you explain where I came from and why I got to this topic? 58 00:05:15,710 --> 00:05:20,750 So my first book was on The Geography of Ethnic Violence. And you can see here this is a map of the Caucasus. 59 00:05:20,750 --> 00:05:24,800 And in that book I was concerned about under what conditions is ethnic conflict? 60 00:05:24,830 --> 00:05:29,050 So you have a society riven by ethnic cleavages. When will you get violence? 61 00:05:29,060 --> 00:05:33,740 And so there I did a statistical analysis of all ethnic groups worldwide, 62 00:05:34,130 --> 00:05:39,860 looked at their settlement patterns and their relationships to the central government to try and figure out, 63 00:05:39,860 --> 00:05:41,870 does it matter whether they're urban or rural? 64 00:05:42,110 --> 00:05:48,050 It turns out urban minorities tend not to rebel if they're part of a broader sort of imperial kind of state. 65 00:05:48,380 --> 00:05:51,530 That's not the case for rural. So you think about the wars of former Yugoslavia. 66 00:05:51,830 --> 00:05:55,170 It's pretty much rural areas that sort of were up for. 67 00:05:56,300 --> 00:06:03,680 But then I did in-depth case studies and actually in that case, there was a situation in which Moscow negotiated, and that was with the Tatars. 68 00:06:03,950 --> 00:06:10,760 Tatarstan was in literally parts when the Soviet Union was dissolved in Kazakhstan, declared that I just want a greater autonomy. 69 00:06:10,940 --> 00:06:15,890 And Moscow was actually willing to negotiate with thousand. And we ended up not having violence there. 70 00:06:16,130 --> 00:06:20,990 Not the case when dealing with the Chechens. Moscow wouldn't even really meet with them at all. 71 00:06:21,110 --> 00:06:25,340 It really put down the line and said, absolutely not. So that was the first book. 72 00:06:25,670 --> 00:06:31,250 Then my second book was looking at Civil War Termination, and there I was interested in how do you get a durable peace? 73 00:06:31,670 --> 00:06:39,380 And again, looking at sort of the force structure and the security sector of a country after war ends, it turns out to be a critical factor. 74 00:06:39,710 --> 00:06:45,290 And unfortunately, if you look at most negotiated settlement, although it may be a part of the negotiated settlement, 75 00:06:45,560 --> 00:06:51,170 DDR, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration are usually always part of it. 76 00:06:51,500 --> 00:06:57,980 But the actual reconstitution, the true security sector reform of the military tends not to happen. 77 00:06:58,280 --> 00:07:01,070 They may be part of the provisions, but then it's not implemented. 78 00:07:01,760 --> 00:07:06,710 And so in that book, I looked at all kinds of civil war settlements from victory for negotiated settlement, 79 00:07:07,040 --> 00:07:12,409 and learned a lot about how different sides think about the use of force within the state and 80 00:07:12,410 --> 00:07:16,130 sort of the commitments that each side needs to make to one another in order to feel secure. 81 00:07:16,310 --> 00:07:24,080 Right. Tonight, sort of key forms of fake ceasefires and stalemates which actually turn out to be more stable than negotiated settlements. 82 00:07:24,470 --> 00:07:30,900 And as military types, you understand why you're less likely to go after somebody if they're armed, whereas a negotiated settlement, 83 00:07:30,920 --> 00:07:35,959 one side usually will disarm or made sort, and the other side is that side to abrogate an agreement, 84 00:07:35,960 --> 00:07:38,540 which is what happened in Sudan when going couldn't. 85 00:07:39,330 --> 00:07:45,910 And then the third book was on the global resurgence of religion, investigating whether indeed there is a global resurgence of religion. 86 00:07:46,350 --> 00:07:48,270 And then sort of what are the dynamics of that? 87 00:07:48,660 --> 00:07:54,600 And in that book we had that the co-author, Dr. Timothy Shaw of Georgetown, Danso, taught at Notre Dame. 88 00:07:55,230 --> 00:08:00,990 And in that book, we have a couple of case studies on civil wars and terrorism. 89 00:08:00,990 --> 00:08:06,240 And what's important and what matters for this topic today is it turns out that religious actors are transnational actors, 90 00:08:06,240 --> 00:08:10,800 do have networks and ties and ideas and institutions that flow across borders, 91 00:08:11,080 --> 00:08:14,850 making it more difficult for states to sort of control what's happening within their borders. 92 00:08:15,300 --> 00:08:18,510 And so going back to my first book, two things. 93 00:08:18,990 --> 00:08:27,300 The first thing is I didn't differentiate ethnicity, meaning that I treated it the way most people or scholars treat it as a one category. 94 00:08:27,570 --> 00:08:33,090 There could be differences in language, differences in race, differences in religion or differences in culture. 95 00:08:33,360 --> 00:08:39,270 I didn't bother to unpack it. I just assumed that their ethnic differences from the centre versus the periphery, that was enough. 96 00:08:39,570 --> 00:08:44,879 And I was irritated me because anybody who knows the point of politics in Chechnya in the first war, 97 00:08:44,880 --> 00:08:48,200 it really was a national self-determination struggle. Right. 98 00:08:48,220 --> 00:08:54,170 But after 96, when they sued for peace in general because of peace, Yeltsin was not very happy about it. 99 00:08:54,300 --> 00:08:57,650 Basically, the Chechens won that war from 96 to 99. 100 00:08:57,660 --> 00:09:01,020 That's when you started seeing religion coming in much more into Chechnya, 101 00:09:01,350 --> 00:09:07,170 in part because it was an anarchic situation and some resources were coming in, ideas were flowing. 102 00:09:07,950 --> 00:09:12,360 And so from 96 to 99, you started seeing religion take on a much greater role. 103 00:09:12,900 --> 00:09:16,980 Well, I wasn't able to explain that because I didn't bother in my first book to unpack that. 104 00:09:17,640 --> 00:09:22,500 I could explain other things, but I couldn't explain that. And so I have always wanted to do that. 105 00:09:22,680 --> 00:09:29,550 And so that's what I'm doing in this research is really trying to understand, do different types of motivations matter for violence? 106 00:09:30,630 --> 00:09:32,370 And I'm talking large scale violence. 107 00:09:32,760 --> 00:09:39,750 And so I've been working on trying to really understand the core difference between an insurgent, a person, a citizen. 108 00:09:39,780 --> 00:09:43,860 Ask me if I were motivated by nationalism. 109 00:09:44,040 --> 00:09:48,390 If I say, you know, I did defend the US Constitution, I raised my hand, I was a patriot. 110 00:09:49,260 --> 00:09:53,340 I wasn't necessarily fighting over American. What does that mean? 111 00:09:53,730 --> 00:09:57,000 What happens is that you're fighting for some sort of imagined community. 112 00:09:57,630 --> 00:10:04,740 There may or may not be blood ties. And the idea is that you are going to sacrifice yourself individually for a group. 113 00:10:06,070 --> 00:10:10,690 And there is no guarantee that we as an individual is going to benefit from that. 114 00:10:10,750 --> 00:10:16,050 It just means that my country, my nation is going to live on as a result of my sacrifice. 115 00:10:16,060 --> 00:10:20,830 That's there. And there's something good about that, about my nation that I'm willing to fight and die for. 116 00:10:21,780 --> 00:10:29,910 Moreover, you tend to be nationalism is within a confined territory, so you tend to be fighting over a particular set of lands or territories. 117 00:10:30,150 --> 00:10:34,710 When you're fighting a long national story, you're thinking about fighting along national lines. 118 00:10:35,190 --> 00:10:40,050 So immortality comes in, right? But it comes in for the group, for the nation. 119 00:10:40,740 --> 00:10:46,680 It's not the case for religious actors. So if you read the work of Mark Juergens Meyer, Jessica Stern, 120 00:10:47,040 --> 00:10:53,250 there really is a sense among some and I'm throwing that these are ideal types and being a very, very new person here. 121 00:10:53,700 --> 00:11:00,780 There is a sense that the person believes if they really are fighting and dying for religious tenets, that they're going to have to somehow be safe. 122 00:11:01,140 --> 00:11:06,360 Go to heaven here, implying that the Abrahamic traditions, Judaism, Islam and Christianity, 123 00:11:06,600 --> 00:11:11,999 where there's a sense of heaven, and it turns out that Judaism actually heaven and salvation don't play a larger role. 124 00:11:12,000 --> 00:11:17,909 But for Islam and for Christians, there is a sense of you're going to go to heaven and that you as an individual, your sacrifice, 125 00:11:17,910 --> 00:11:22,190 if you really believe that you're doing this for God, for some divine purpose, 126 00:11:22,190 --> 00:11:27,630 for some presidential reason, that your individual salvation will be there. 127 00:11:28,100 --> 00:11:33,360 So you believe that it's not the case. The other thing is that attachment to a particular territory. 128 00:11:33,360 --> 00:11:34,589 We know that there's Jerusalem. 129 00:11:34,590 --> 00:11:40,440 I've done a lot of work in Jerusalem, but the idea of when you're part of a religious community, that's different from a national community. 130 00:11:40,800 --> 00:11:44,850 Is that a true definition of a church is where your fellow members are? 131 00:11:45,240 --> 00:11:48,540 So the Catholic Church is actually global? Yes. 132 00:11:48,540 --> 00:11:53,490 There's Rome. Yes, there things that people say. But the real church is really where your members are. 133 00:11:54,300 --> 00:12:00,230 And so the attachment to a particular land or circumscribed land is broader than it is for nations. 134 00:12:00,230 --> 00:12:07,860 So you don't have this sort of self-contained. And we your united prophesies that this matters for how expansive a given fight 135 00:12:07,860 --> 00:12:12,900 is if you're countering religious insurgents versus nationalists or insurgents. 136 00:12:13,680 --> 00:12:21,630 So nationalist, we argue, would tend to be or tend to more readily look like defensive localised fights within a circumscribed territory. 137 00:12:21,900 --> 00:12:27,120 And anybody who's looked in the history of Europe, we can we will pick on the Hungarians and Hungarians here. 138 00:12:27,690 --> 00:12:33,890 You know, when the Hungarians pull out a map, they are always going to have a map that's the most expansive back to the 17th and 18th centuries. 139 00:12:33,900 --> 00:12:41,010 They don't go to the 20th century. And it's because nationals are trying that they have a sense of what the land is, but it's still sort of located. 140 00:12:41,010 --> 00:12:46,020 There's still a focal point about what constitutes the Hungarian homeland and most nations. 141 00:12:46,020 --> 00:12:51,810 There's a couple of exceptions. The Roma don't have a homeland, but we know about them precisely because they're an exception. 142 00:12:53,840 --> 00:12:57,010 So why Islamist insurgents are not picking on Islam. 143 00:12:57,020 --> 00:13:01,399 And in fact, I've written another whole book in an article on why I think it's Islam. 144 00:13:01,400 --> 00:13:05,990 I think it's where Muslim societies are in their sort of political development trajectory. 145 00:13:05,990 --> 00:13:11,209 And we can I can give you that whole argument about because Christianity back in the 40, 146 00:13:11,210 --> 00:13:16,040 50, 60 to 70 centuries was politicised and instrumentalized for political reasons. 147 00:13:16,040 --> 00:13:21,109 And we just seem to be in a phase or a historical period right now where Muslim societies 148 00:13:21,110 --> 00:13:25,310 are trying to figure out what the proper role of religion is within their societies. 149 00:13:25,940 --> 00:13:29,089 And there are some interpretations that are more extremist. 150 00:13:29,090 --> 00:13:35,510 And we can talk about sort of the reinterpretation of jihad, like YouTube and the idea that it's no longer an internal struggle, 151 00:13:35,690 --> 00:13:41,830 but external struggle and individuals wrong has an individual responsibility to go out and defend their who. 152 00:13:42,500 --> 00:13:51,880 So I've done a lot of work on civil wars and it turns out that most civil wars, upwards of three quarters, if you look at religiously inspired, 153 00:13:51,900 --> 00:13:53,420 religiously based civil wars, 154 00:13:53,750 --> 00:13:59,239 and that's where the combatants actually identify with the different faiths within the war or the fighting over religion. 155 00:13:59,240 --> 00:14:02,300 So you could stand there was a fight after the Soviet Union collapsed. 156 00:14:02,540 --> 00:14:06,580 Whether it was going to be a Sharia law, actually, Sharia law was going to be the main rule of the land. 157 00:14:07,100 --> 00:14:12,890 Whereas the war, the former Yugoslavia, it's still debated among scholars the degree to which religion was central. 158 00:14:13,610 --> 00:14:17,690 I think most scholars, if you had to really weigh in, just sort of a meta analysis, 159 00:14:18,230 --> 00:14:24,740 there's a sense it was more much more peripheral than it was, let's say, in Afghanistan or in the Yucatan. 160 00:14:25,880 --> 00:14:34,280 But if you so so there's peripheral and central. If you look at both types, nine out of ten of them involve Islam as one of the combatants, one side. 161 00:14:35,150 --> 00:14:45,440 And then two thirds of them are the ones where it's between sort of Muslims and Christians involved as Muslims as one side. 162 00:14:46,040 --> 00:14:53,359 And then if you look at terrorism, we know this itself. Muhammad has probably done the definitive study on this, broadly speaking, final piece, 163 00:14:53,360 --> 00:14:57,410 done the work on the suicide terrorism all about denies religion with anything to do with it. 164 00:14:57,830 --> 00:15:01,190 You know, a number of discussion point ones about it. 165 00:15:01,880 --> 00:15:09,740 If you look at it since 1981, most of the suicide terrorism episodes that we've witnessed, it is people who are inspired by Salafi jihadism. 166 00:15:10,010 --> 00:15:17,719 So this idea that you have an obligation to defend against outsiders, not only infidels, but apostates people, 167 00:15:17,720 --> 00:15:27,500 do you think that fellow Muslims who don't accept your interpretation of scripture and then if you look at jihadi suicide missions, 168 00:15:28,130 --> 00:15:33,890 most of them are committed by Islamists of the Salafi variant. 169 00:15:34,670 --> 00:15:41,480 So types of religious violence are just like we didn't really differentiating aggregate different kinds of ethnicity and ethnic violence. 170 00:15:41,870 --> 00:15:47,330 We didn't we were a little sloppy. Still is a field that feels like accumulation of knowledge we're getting there. 171 00:15:47,720 --> 00:15:52,850 Thomas Hegghammer, I think, was the first person to differentiate different kinds of religious violence to get our head around it. 172 00:15:53,300 --> 00:15:58,430 So there's the nationalist separatist. So this would be Chechnya after 99, right, 173 00:15:58,820 --> 00:16:05,690 where you really had people sort of trying to split off because they some of the Chechens felt as if they needed to be separate from Moscow. 174 00:16:06,110 --> 00:16:13,370 Then you have the pan religious. Some of the Chechens of Bucyrus would be sort of the national separatist, the more moderate era. 175 00:16:13,550 --> 00:16:17,900 It would be a more he's a pan jihadist after pictures of these guys, 176 00:16:18,200 --> 00:16:24,470 a pampered artist who thinks that all the Caucasus should be part of a caliphate that extends this arc across. 177 00:16:24,920 --> 00:16:28,150 And then there's a revolutionary. I see these guys as vigilantes. 178 00:16:28,160 --> 00:16:33,380 So these are the guys in the street, the kind of guys who are throwing acid in young women's faces. 179 00:16:33,650 --> 00:16:37,400 They're trying to correct behaviour, they're social, they're vigilantes. 180 00:16:37,820 --> 00:16:45,860 And so, again, looking at the data, we're trying to get a sense of if Moscow is facing different kinds of insurgents from a religious cut, 181 00:16:45,860 --> 00:16:51,350 from the religious law, what should they be doing and how should they be thinking about combating them? 182 00:16:53,540 --> 00:16:56,120 So again, sort of back to the introduction, 183 00:16:56,510 --> 00:17:05,659 we think we hypothesise in this paper that the basis of motivation may influence the strategy of the actors and influence their priorities. 184 00:17:05,660 --> 00:17:07,160 So what are they trying to achieve? 185 00:17:07,530 --> 00:17:13,070 Are they going to go after federal structures or are they going to go to a bathhouse where there's wine and drinking? 186 00:17:13,520 --> 00:17:15,229 Right. And so which one are they going to do? 187 00:17:15,230 --> 00:17:23,570 So, national interest, national separatist, they're more likely to attack police stations, government officials, assassinations, that sort of thing. 188 00:17:23,780 --> 00:17:25,520 But if they're more of this vigilante type, 189 00:17:25,730 --> 00:17:33,050 then they're more likely to go after where they see sort of moral corruption happening and attacks like here, 190 00:17:33,320 --> 00:17:41,950 the national cyber attack, Moscow, or anybody that they see as Representative Moscow or a proxy government that they think is sort of helping Moscow. 191 00:17:42,380 --> 00:17:45,650 PAN-ISLAMIC They'll attack Western Muslim transgressors. 192 00:17:45,650 --> 00:17:52,460 And then the revolutionary, the vigilantes will attack fellow Muslims, that they'll go after the apostates rather than the infidels. 193 00:17:53,840 --> 00:18:01,370 So the empirical questions. I'm a barefoot empiricist. I love data and I like data to help me to adjudicate theories and I participate. 194 00:18:01,370 --> 00:18:03,709 So that's why this paper is fun for me, 195 00:18:03,710 --> 00:18:10,430 because we can actually go in and ask these questions and then sort of let the data adjudicate whether you agree with the interpretations. 196 00:18:10,430 --> 00:18:15,620 It's different, but we have a number of empirical questions that we just did not know the answers to. 197 00:18:15,980 --> 00:18:19,400 So one, how fit all does religion shape the insurgency? 198 00:18:19,400 --> 00:18:20,420 What does it look like? 199 00:18:20,750 --> 00:18:29,540 If you can really take and just say this was an insurgent attack that was based in religious motivation, does it look differently than other kinds? 200 00:18:30,230 --> 00:18:36,559 Didn't know that question before we started the research. Do they fight differently from those with more traditional aims? 201 00:18:36,560 --> 00:18:41,480 And here I'm talking about nationalists, what we think of most civil wars or insurgencies. 202 00:18:42,320 --> 00:18:48,620 And then do they again select different types of strategies, targets and respond to different types of incentives? 203 00:18:48,950 --> 00:18:53,329 So are they more likely to respond differently with selective incentives? 204 00:18:53,330 --> 00:18:56,299 So the targeting sort of the punishment strategy, it turns out, 205 00:18:56,300 --> 00:19:03,890 is do not like it versus and but it turns out that selective sense of punishment of nationalists works better. 206 00:19:04,190 --> 00:19:10,520 And I think somehow it carries them better. And then the local global dimension of the fight. 207 00:19:10,880 --> 00:19:17,120 Is it the case that these are local fights that sort of have this overlay for greater legitimacy? 208 00:19:17,960 --> 00:19:23,150 Or is there really sort of a global pattern or global dynamics that are influencing? 209 00:19:23,420 --> 00:19:28,969 And we have some data that show that indeed, actually, among the religious insurgents, 210 00:19:28,970 --> 00:19:34,490 there does seem to be a connection to things happening globally or at least beyond the borders of the caucuses. 211 00:19:35,900 --> 00:19:40,400 So here this is Bob Pape, although this looks like a straw man argument, 212 00:19:40,400 --> 00:19:47,480 I think you guys agree Bob Gates argument is a strong argument, that religion has nothing to do with suicide terrorist campaigns. 213 00:19:47,870 --> 00:19:54,260 And I just don't you know, I think Assad my Hagedorn has written a really beautiful rebuttal, Bob, to say you're right on some. 214 00:19:54,650 --> 00:20:01,970 But the truth is there are many in many cases in which your argument that the religious dimensions are incredibly important for us to understand them. 215 00:20:02,330 --> 00:20:07,370 But the point is, is that Bob's argument is that all violence is local, it's about the local occupier. 216 00:20:07,640 --> 00:20:15,680 And if you remember when he published his first piece in the American Political Science Review, al Qaeda was not even part of the data set from 911. 217 00:20:15,680 --> 00:20:20,360 His involved scratching his head saying, oh, how do you how do I explain that? 218 00:20:20,630 --> 00:20:27,320 And what he ended up saying was that al Qaeda sees all of the Middle East as its homeland, which you could make that argument. 219 00:20:27,500 --> 00:20:36,170 But the problem is there's a lot of al Qaeda affiliates that don't necessarily see the Middle East as as as reminiscent of that. 220 00:20:36,800 --> 00:20:43,910 So this is one argument that's out there in the literature that all politics, all violence is local, all politics is local. 221 00:20:45,230 --> 00:20:46,510 But then there's another argument. 222 00:20:46,510 --> 00:20:52,400 And again, I think Assad has done a really nice job on this, but there are other people Kilcullen sort of marries the two, 223 00:20:52,760 --> 00:20:59,720 saying that there is they say that because there's a local or global sort of connection. 224 00:21:00,050 --> 00:21:03,709 But it's obvious that no, in this modern era, especially after 911. 225 00:21:03,710 --> 00:21:11,540 So what's nice about the piece is going to be through his book is that he says people can see prior to 2000, prior to 1995, 226 00:21:11,900 --> 00:21:19,670 but after 1995, there was a real shift where there seemed to be sort of this global community emerging to fight for global ideals. 227 00:21:20,480 --> 00:21:28,370 And so the idea was that there's a linking of leadership, personnel, resources, ideas across different fights. 228 00:21:28,880 --> 00:21:32,900 And so nobody has really adjudicated these two arguments empirically. 229 00:21:33,110 --> 00:21:37,070 And that's what we're doing is a very simple exercise that we're trying to do. 230 00:21:37,100 --> 00:21:40,700 Who who's more right and who's more wrong? It's not black and white. 231 00:21:41,270 --> 00:21:45,860 We actually in the paper, we end up concluding that Kilcullen is probably more right than both. 232 00:21:46,830 --> 00:21:54,890 And so, again, we're looking at the caucuses, the north caucuses, and pretty much the action happens in Chechnya. 233 00:21:55,130 --> 00:22:01,600 But it does start emanating out after 97, 98 into Dagestan and then Russia. 234 00:22:01,790 --> 00:22:08,719 And now we're actually seeing some of the violence going deeper into the Russian heartland, including in two, by the way, moderate Tatarstan. 235 00:22:08,720 --> 00:22:12,230 We're now starting to see moderate imams being targeted in Tatarstan, 236 00:22:12,230 --> 00:22:17,870 which is sort of it's a very tragic I told you I was going to show you some faces. 237 00:22:18,500 --> 00:22:25,100 So we've had Boris Yeltsin restore peace, swiping power from Gorbachev back in the late 1980s, 238 00:22:25,100 --> 00:22:29,390 early nineties, followed by Vladimir Putin, of course, the current president. 239 00:22:29,880 --> 00:22:35,510 This is do die of who was the first president, who was the first leader of the Chechen independence movement. 240 00:22:35,930 --> 00:22:39,169 He was an air force general, secular but pious. He was an Islamist. 241 00:22:39,170 --> 00:22:42,650 He was a muslim who he had faith but kept it private to himself. 242 00:22:43,460 --> 00:22:50,150 He was actually called back or called to Chechnya out of, I think it was Latvia with his unit. 243 00:22:50,150 --> 00:22:53,180 And so we really he had been watching the independence movements in the. 244 00:22:54,290 --> 00:22:57,290 And the Chechen independence movement asked him to lead it. 245 00:22:57,530 --> 00:23:00,650 And so he did end up becoming the leader of the Chechen independence movement. 246 00:23:01,400 --> 00:23:05,050 He ended up getting killed on the battlefield, committed national strike. 247 00:23:05,090 --> 00:23:12,860 He died on the battlefield. Moscow killed him. He was replaced by a sort of more pious man, but still believe that religion should be kept private. 248 00:23:13,190 --> 00:23:17,479 Was not interested in sort of imposing Sharia law throughout Chechnya because remember, 249 00:23:17,480 --> 00:23:20,610 a large portion of the population is still Russian speaking or ethnic Russian. 250 00:23:20,630 --> 00:23:27,980 It wasn't all Chechens. And on top of that, Chechnya, these espouse a particular kind of Islam, which is Sufi and very local. 251 00:23:28,460 --> 00:23:30,100 And so it's very controversial. 252 00:23:30,100 --> 00:23:38,700 And this idea of bringing in a Wahhabi Salafist Islam to a region that actually abides by a tradition, Islamic tradition, that's quite different. 253 00:23:40,010 --> 00:23:40,820 But they tried. 254 00:23:41,480 --> 00:23:49,430 And the guy who sort of initiated it was this guy, CIA, who had ran against McConnell for presidency and lost and was pretty upset about it. 255 00:23:50,270 --> 00:23:54,800 He was not pleased for having to play second fiddle. And so he's the one that sort of really ramped up. 256 00:23:55,220 --> 00:23:59,810 And so I had gone to Moscow and interviewed a lot of people who were associated with him to find 257 00:23:59,810 --> 00:24:04,730 out who was the committed nationalist and to ask the question in sitting in the interim hotel, 258 00:24:04,730 --> 00:24:12,110 which I think is now gone. And so was he a committed nationalist, or was did you really think that religion should be part of the public arena? 259 00:24:12,380 --> 00:24:18,970 And his closest interlocutors could not answer that question. Most of them thought that you probably you did want political power. 260 00:24:18,990 --> 00:24:25,129 He did run for president of Chechnya, but he was also religious and and deeply religious. 261 00:24:25,130 --> 00:24:28,140 And I say that not really understanding what that meant for him. 262 00:24:28,160 --> 00:24:35,020 I can't get in his mind, but it was a question mark. But in any event, he used religion, right? 263 00:24:35,060 --> 00:24:40,430 In one of my articles to talk about opening, why we start opening, we use religion to challenge. 264 00:24:40,430 --> 00:24:47,060 MISHLOVE And the thought of starting screaming to Putin, say, the Islamists, the Wahhabis are coming. 265 00:24:47,450 --> 00:24:52,849 I need your help. And Moscow would not listen similar to what they were doing the early nineties. 266 00:24:52,850 --> 00:24:56,480 They would not negotiate with the Chechens. So what did they do to kill them? 267 00:24:56,810 --> 00:25:00,139 So moderate, right? Killed him. He ends up getting killed. 268 00:25:00,140 --> 00:25:08,210 And so now we're stuck with this guy, Doku Umarov, who is trying to establish an Islamic caliphate across the Caucasus region. 269 00:25:09,200 --> 00:25:10,710 And Umarov really does. 270 00:25:10,760 --> 00:25:19,160 I have an interview about him, but his statements, if you go to the Kept Cause website, you can see clearly that they really do see themselves. 271 00:25:19,460 --> 00:25:23,750 And he is the leader of a global jihadist enterprise. 272 00:25:24,670 --> 00:25:27,940 All right. So why are the North caucuses a diversity of cases? 273 00:25:28,180 --> 00:25:31,990 So we've got multiple republics, multiple regions and lots of data. 274 00:25:32,320 --> 00:25:35,450 Moreover, we have variation across the region in terms of violence. 275 00:25:35,450 --> 00:25:41,410 Some villages are highly implicated. Of course, Grozny is the heart of it all, but some say the heart of it all. 276 00:25:42,280 --> 00:25:46,870 And then we have a variety of geographic socioeconomic factors, levels of unemployment. 277 00:25:47,200 --> 00:25:51,750 One of the most common arguments stuff is these are just men who don't have anything else to do, you know? 278 00:25:51,760 --> 00:25:55,600 So this is an opportunity structure so that they can go and fight. 279 00:25:56,110 --> 00:26:01,720 But we so we can control for that. And then, of course, Moscow has, you know, 280 00:26:01,960 --> 00:26:08,080 perpetrator where develop this narrative that this is sort of the heart or a heart of the global jihadist struggle, 281 00:26:09,790 --> 00:26:13,899 and that what they're fighting is global jihadis. And so we sort of question that. 282 00:26:13,900 --> 00:26:20,710 Is it the case? It might be the case. And actually there's some evidence to that, but it's not as strong as Moscow would have us believe. 283 00:26:21,610 --> 00:26:25,360 And then you have locals and actually, Medvedev, when he came in, 284 00:26:26,400 --> 00:26:31,450 he did actually say that a lot of this is locally driven and he helped develop a lot of Chechen 285 00:26:31,450 --> 00:26:37,660 infrastructure and roads rebuilding it after the the obliteration in 1999 and following. 286 00:26:37,900 --> 00:26:43,210 But the other thing is some people stress the local grievances more so the data. 287 00:26:43,570 --> 00:26:50,440 So this is all episodes of violence is reported from 2000 to 2012 is 31,000 reported episodes. 288 00:26:50,440 --> 00:26:54,580 So you can do a lot of you can play and really run a lot of different controls. 289 00:26:54,940 --> 00:26:58,120 There were 9200 episodes of rebel initiated violence. 290 00:26:58,120 --> 00:27:07,930 So we know that the rebels went in and they bombed the Republican House, but they would go into a federal police checkpoint. 291 00:27:08,380 --> 00:27:15,010 Right. And then the government had taken about 23,000 responses or counter responses or attacks. 292 00:27:15,770 --> 00:27:22,899 It's it's memorial, which is one of the most respected human rights organisations in Russia, 293 00:27:22,900 --> 00:27:28,959 collected all these data and coded them into reports that we then could extract and analyse, 294 00:27:28,960 --> 00:27:32,260 and they always gave the village name, the date, the time. 295 00:27:32,470 --> 00:27:36,880 And what's really striking, we think some of these insurgents really didn't watch too much Hollywood movies, 296 00:27:37,180 --> 00:27:40,510 is they often declare why they're doing what they're doing. 297 00:27:40,840 --> 00:27:46,479 They say why they're doing it. And so we have some reports where they say, you know, you're all sitting here thinking, 298 00:27:46,480 --> 00:27:50,230 why on this glorious afternoon, if we come back again, we're going to do this again. 299 00:27:50,930 --> 00:27:57,729 And so the reports, a good number of the reports, we actually do know why the insurgents are doing what they're doing or they've 300 00:27:57,730 --> 00:28:02,620 been captured and memorial has gotten hold of the jail records for the people. 301 00:28:02,620 --> 00:28:06,699 So the reports have all it's it's the wonderful data set from that perspective is terrible 302 00:28:06,700 --> 00:28:11,120 because the topic but it's a wonderful data set from that perspective and then they're geo coded. 303 00:28:11,140 --> 00:28:14,260 So one of the questions we're interested in is the spatial distribution of violence. 304 00:28:14,620 --> 00:28:20,949 And so we know exactly where pinpointing where each villages and we can see a village. 305 00:28:20,950 --> 00:28:29,170 Why had it not violent episode do we see it right next door and visit Rosie or does it go to Village D over there? 306 00:28:29,830 --> 00:28:36,070 And it turns out with the Islamists actually is more likely to go to Village D, whereas for the nationalists, it's more likely to go to the. 307 00:28:37,560 --> 00:28:45,480 So the actors there described or self-described, they say who they are sometimes with terms such as Muslim, Salafist, Mujahideen or Wahhabi. 308 00:28:45,840 --> 00:28:50,970 So again, we're looking for religious inspiration. What do you see you're fighting for? 309 00:28:52,410 --> 00:28:56,649 And then, are there terrorist attacks, hostage taking, kidnapping, firefights, ambushes? 310 00:28:56,650 --> 00:28:59,230 So we're looking at the actions and then the targets. 311 00:28:59,250 --> 00:29:06,379 And so in order for us to have coded as an episode of Islamist violence and how to have one in each of those three categories, 312 00:29:06,380 --> 00:29:10,470 so it's pretty we're pretty confident that we're doing that. 313 00:29:10,470 --> 00:29:17,360 And again, for us, we said if a village experienced one episode of Violence over then has done it, 314 00:29:17,910 --> 00:29:22,110 then in a month, then they were coded as a one in our analysis. 315 00:29:22,680 --> 00:29:28,120 So again, I was telling you about the sauna. It's like I said, I think they watch too much Hollywood TV. 316 00:29:28,950 --> 00:29:37,470 So to say, if we once again learn that drunkenness and debauchery, I mean, it's just great language take place here, we will leave anyone alive. 317 00:29:37,890 --> 00:29:42,930 And so there's sort of warning saying we control the town. This is a social vigilante, a moral vigilante. 318 00:29:43,680 --> 00:29:51,840 And then the group left the sauna without doing any harm. But the next time they come back and they move from a molotov cocktail at the at the sauna. 319 00:29:53,070 --> 00:30:01,740 All right. So the key findings and wrapping it up, although I have some interesting data to show to support each of these key findings, 320 00:30:02,160 --> 00:30:04,650 um, I'm going to run through each one of them. 321 00:30:05,610 --> 00:30:12,150 So it turns out one of the key findings is that this violence overall is really a small proportion of the violence. 322 00:30:12,510 --> 00:30:18,239 If you read the rhetoric coming out of Moscow, erm 97 let's say, 323 00:30:18,240 --> 00:30:23,850 although in 96 they already started issuing concern about is when it's coming into the region, 324 00:30:24,090 --> 00:30:27,990 but at least after 97, 98 you would think that all of the violence is, is in this, 325 00:30:28,350 --> 00:30:34,350 but it varies in range anywhere from about, you know, seven, it matches 90%. 326 00:30:34,350 --> 00:30:41,340 That's the most expansive definition we use. The intermediate is we're pretty confident that we that's actually capturing what we think of. 327 00:30:41,670 --> 00:30:50,610 But it ranges from 3% to 17% of all violence, which means the vast majority of violence in the region is, if you want to think about it, 328 00:30:50,610 --> 00:30:56,490 religiously inspired versus political, national separatist, get off our backs, get out of our territory. 329 00:30:57,270 --> 00:31:01,140 All right. So most of the violence is not religiously inspired. 330 00:31:01,440 --> 00:31:09,810 However, the violence that is religiously inspired is small, but it's increasing and it has been increasing over time and again. 331 00:31:10,050 --> 00:31:17,700 It is there is evidence we have data showing that there are jihadis, outsiders, foreigners coming in, tracking that over time. 332 00:31:17,700 --> 00:31:22,710 But you can see that over time the Islamist violence has been increasing over time. 333 00:31:24,300 --> 00:31:27,450 And then you can see where most of what's happening in lighting in here is terrible. 334 00:31:27,450 --> 00:31:33,510 So you can't really see. But Chechnya gets the bulk of it in terms of the both kinds of violence. 335 00:31:34,560 --> 00:31:38,160 And then the Islamist is more contained in the Dagestan in the Chechen region. 336 00:31:38,460 --> 00:31:43,890 But it has been spreading over time. And this is the number of events of 50, 100, 100, 200. 337 00:31:44,370 --> 00:31:47,430 Um. All right. 338 00:31:47,550 --> 00:31:49,560 Islamist attacks are more indiscriminate. 339 00:31:49,890 --> 00:31:56,130 So one of the hypotheses is that if you really think that you're going to die and then other people are apostates or infidels, 340 00:31:56,400 --> 00:31:59,190 you don't want to die and you don't want to take it out with you. 341 00:32:00,090 --> 00:32:05,760 And so some of my earlier research showed that civilians in religiously inspired civil wars tend to suffer more deaths, 342 00:32:05,760 --> 00:32:09,780 higher civilian casualty counts in religious civil wars. 343 00:32:10,080 --> 00:32:14,110 And we find that here and this is percentage, the 43%. 344 00:32:14,400 --> 00:32:24,660 Let's stick with the intermediate 36% of all Islamist inspired violent attacks kill civilians versus 29%. 345 00:32:24,660 --> 00:32:31,410 And that's statistically significant. So if you're in so what it means to us is, is they're going after softer targets. 346 00:32:31,410 --> 00:32:34,350 They're going after places where there's more civilians, cafes. 347 00:32:34,860 --> 00:32:41,190 So you're sitting there having a nice cup of coffee, espresso with your friends, and somebody comes and you're more likely to be a target. 348 00:32:41,430 --> 00:32:45,239 And Islamist violence, whereas nationalists, there's a sense that they circumscribe it. 349 00:32:45,240 --> 00:32:48,600 They're a little bit more careful about what they're targeting people around them. 350 00:32:49,290 --> 00:32:54,139 It's a tighter circle. And then again, Islamist violence is more deadly. 351 00:32:54,140 --> 00:32:57,230 Another finding from some earlier work I had done in that. 352 00:32:57,500 --> 00:33:02,629 Religiously inspired civil wars are more deadly overall, not just towards civilians, but overall. 353 00:33:02,630 --> 00:33:05,870 And they tend to last longer. They last about a year and a half longer. On average. 354 00:33:05,870 --> 00:33:06,830 This is all averages. 355 00:33:07,370 --> 00:33:19,310 And you can see that religiously inspired attacks really result in fatalities 36% of the time, whereas non-religious only 26% of the time. 356 00:33:19,490 --> 00:33:24,470 So they're more effective. I mean, if their job how is that any more conditional if their job is to kill, 357 00:33:25,040 --> 00:33:31,100 it turns out the Islamists are more effective in doing that and that that follows from sort of the indiscriminate nature they're more likely. 358 00:33:32,720 --> 00:33:37,760 So this is trying to get at the difference between nationalism and being tied to a particular land. 359 00:33:38,330 --> 00:33:49,670 And indeed, if you look, Chechnya has seen 60% of all attacks that we think is conducted by nationalists and 45% by Islamists. 360 00:33:49,970 --> 00:33:53,840 But what's interesting is the majority of Islamist attacks did not take place in Chechnya. 361 00:33:54,440 --> 00:33:59,300 It took in the rest of the region as well has been suffering from Islamist attacks as well. 362 00:34:00,260 --> 00:34:07,340 So Chechnya has bore the brunt of this, which makes sense is where the big push for national self-determination independence took place. 363 00:34:07,850 --> 00:34:11,299 But it is more widespread beyond the broader region. 364 00:34:11,300 --> 00:34:16,030 And the Islamist is is more widespread than the the nationalists. 365 00:34:17,300 --> 00:34:26,180 And then here this is actually looking from you have a village and then we wanted to see where did the next attack occur, how far away. 366 00:34:26,180 --> 00:34:30,770 And it's similar to the data about more expansive for the religious violence. 367 00:34:31,460 --> 00:34:35,240 The Islamist was more expansive, so there was 133 kilometres. 368 00:34:35,240 --> 00:34:41,390 So you imagine going and attacking a liquor store or a police station appearance and this made it clear why they're doing it. 369 00:34:41,750 --> 00:34:47,750 They then drive about 133 km and perpetrate their next attack, whereas the nationalists stay put, 370 00:34:47,900 --> 00:34:53,450 they only go 50 kilometres, 60 kilometres, so an hour away versus 2 hours away. 371 00:34:53,990 --> 00:34:59,240 And again, this one supports the idea that nationalists are more self contained or they stay more self contained. 372 00:35:00,880 --> 00:35:08,410 And then again, this is back to trying to adjudicate Magog Adam from hey, thinking that Colin is writing a secret. 373 00:35:08,440 --> 00:35:14,169 Colin is right and looking at the relationship to mean number of international suicide attacks. 374 00:35:14,170 --> 00:35:17,740 So this is using, um, the, the, um, 375 00:35:19,120 --> 00:35:26,920 the suicide database put together by the US government and tracking it to the violence episodes that we have in our data dataset. 376 00:35:27,340 --> 00:35:35,350 And you can see that the ism is violence more so tracks to global suicide attacks so and so the question is, 377 00:35:35,350 --> 00:35:39,310 is is there a sense of camaraderie when you witness a suicide attack? 378 00:35:39,580 --> 00:35:43,210 But this relationship, you can just see by the numbers, 16% to 40%. 379 00:35:43,450 --> 00:35:45,070 They're not as large as you know. 380 00:35:46,030 --> 00:35:53,800 They're still statistically significant, but there's not a huge relationship there, lending more support to the idea that it's more local. 381 00:35:54,910 --> 00:36:01,299 It's not the case for holidays. I was really shocked that actually this is so tied to the religious calendar. 382 00:36:01,300 --> 00:36:08,200 So Ron has in or has some interesting work really trying to track battles and wars based on what he sees. 383 00:36:08,200 --> 00:36:10,900 His thinking is, is if you're really doing God's divine work, 384 00:36:11,260 --> 00:36:16,329 then you're going to be favoured by God during Rosh Hashanah or, you know, seven days or something. 385 00:36:16,330 --> 00:36:21,600 Right. And so he I think he we sent this paper to said, Monica, did you look at the religious calendar? 386 00:36:22,660 --> 00:36:26,020 Well, here it is. And actually, it's actually pretty tightly connected. 387 00:36:26,350 --> 00:36:33,940 And what's really interesting is that the target based ones, that they're the ones that those are sort of the vigilante guys. 388 00:36:34,520 --> 00:36:36,340 They're the bad guys on the Hawks. 389 00:36:36,590 --> 00:36:41,919 I mean, they go out and there are you know, you could make a secular, very practical argument for why they're doing it. 390 00:36:41,920 --> 00:36:45,129 They're off from work. Right. But I don't know. 391 00:36:45,130 --> 00:36:50,770 I think the idea the fact that it goes from the expanded definition of what constitutes an nuisance all the way down to the 392 00:36:50,770 --> 00:36:58,450 guys that we really think are doing it for the reasons that there's it seems to lend support that the more intense you are, 393 00:36:58,450 --> 00:37:03,820 the more that the religious calendar are you, the more it would be a theology of underpinning what you're doing. 394 00:37:06,120 --> 00:37:10,470 And then this is back to sort of we're looking at this is a really complicated way. 395 00:37:10,740 --> 00:37:14,670 But is it the case that if you go in you attack individuals with intelligence, 396 00:37:15,060 --> 00:37:20,690 which is more effective against, um, know against Islamist than nationals. 397 00:37:20,700 --> 00:37:30,269 And it turns out that it's less effective against nationalists but more effective against Islamists, meaning that the nationalist, 398 00:37:30,270 --> 00:37:35,490 you can cow them more easily, you can actually nationalist, you can fight them more easily, 399 00:37:35,820 --> 00:37:39,120 that you can actually get them to sort of stop the violence. 400 00:37:39,420 --> 00:37:41,190 The Islamist, it's more difficult, 401 00:37:41,430 --> 00:37:46,800 which is good news and bad news because if it is the case that we're seeing and we're seeing more Islamist violence, 402 00:37:47,910 --> 00:37:51,720 the bad news is that governments are going to have a harder time fighting them. 403 00:37:52,320 --> 00:37:56,430 It's worth going in and doing. Selective incentives. 404 00:37:56,640 --> 00:38:00,870 Actually going after Islamist is not as effective a strategy. 405 00:38:02,790 --> 00:38:06,510 So summary one of two and I'm finishing up now. 406 00:38:06,750 --> 00:38:09,959 So it turns out that globally religious belief and practice are on the rise. 407 00:38:09,960 --> 00:38:16,830 There's exceptions Western Europe, but only corners of Western Europe for Danes have no faith at all. 408 00:38:17,120 --> 00:38:23,400 These 11% believe in God today. Um, but beyond sort of you can read the God century, 409 00:38:23,420 --> 00:38:28,320 but we have lots of data on that sense and sort of people who are adhering to 410 00:38:28,530 --> 00:38:32,400 religious traditions is on the rise and also pushing it into the public arena. 411 00:38:33,810 --> 00:38:37,980 And then understanding the conditions under which conflicts would be framed in religious 412 00:38:37,980 --> 00:38:43,320 terms is therefore critical because I have a slide show here that since the 1970s, 413 00:38:43,320 --> 00:38:47,100 the proportion of civil wars that had a religious ten to them has really gone up. 414 00:38:47,710 --> 00:38:55,770 And and so religious wars, they're not only increasing over time, half of all civil wars raging, 415 00:38:55,770 --> 00:39:04,319 although I haven't done a count since for two years I stopped in 210, 2010, then half of all civil wars had a religious turn. 416 00:39:04,320 --> 00:39:08,160 I think it's probably more now with Syria, Mali and Libya. 417 00:39:08,160 --> 00:39:13,200 I mean, where are we with Libya today? And then religious wars are nastiest of all types. 418 00:39:13,200 --> 00:39:18,330 Again, I already told you that they're harder on civilians. They last longer, the harder to terminate. 419 00:39:18,660 --> 00:39:24,210 And by the way, they're more likely to recur. So if even if you get them ended, they're more likely to recur. 420 00:39:26,100 --> 00:39:32,549 And then within that's the broad general finding within the caucuses itself. 421 00:39:32,550 --> 00:39:36,720 Islamist violence is a small share. Overall, this is a really important finding. 422 00:39:36,720 --> 00:39:41,459 I presented this work in Moscow. They don't care. They say they see Islamists everywhere. 423 00:39:41,460 --> 00:39:47,550 But but it really is important because it really is going to call your attention to what we should do to be countering these. 424 00:39:47,850 --> 00:39:50,850 And I would hope just thinking about different kinds of motivations. 425 00:39:51,120 --> 00:39:55,170 We won't be so lumpen in our approach to trying to combat and combat it. 426 00:39:55,950 --> 00:40:03,690 Most of the difference in sort of the targeting and the outcomes that we're witnessing is a difference in scale, 427 00:40:03,840 --> 00:40:08,940 not kind, which again is very important. And you could think, well, Monica, why did you go through all this work? 428 00:40:09,180 --> 00:40:13,680 Well, we actually didn't know. We really thought that the Islamists were going to be these die hard. 429 00:40:13,680 --> 00:40:17,190 You absolutely can't put them down. There's some truth to that. 430 00:40:18,060 --> 00:40:21,120 But it means that you're probably going to have to go even a little harder. 431 00:40:21,130 --> 00:40:23,280 I hate to say that you were advocating more violence, 432 00:40:23,280 --> 00:40:33,780 but and then Islamist violence does follow suicide trends more closely than nationalist or non Islamist is more geographically dispersed. 433 00:40:33,780 --> 00:40:41,220 I think this is important because in a sense my looking at this sort of the play of what's happened in the Caucasus, 434 00:40:41,460 --> 00:40:47,880 Moscow has sort of in some ways created a more dispersed fight than might have been the case. 435 00:40:48,840 --> 00:40:52,379 And then Islamist violence is less responsive to coercion, 436 00:40:52,380 --> 00:40:57,930 to this sort of selective incentive of going in and pulling somebody out and then, you know, good academic. 437 00:40:57,930 --> 00:41:02,390 But this is really the Caucasus. This data are really tiresome caucuses. 438 00:41:02,490 --> 00:41:05,879 And so I feel confident things about the Caucasus. 439 00:41:05,880 --> 00:41:08,910 We really run the numbers and so does it hold. 440 00:41:09,390 --> 00:41:14,520 And I'd be curious to have a discussion about that. If anybody knows any other wars or conflicts, 441 00:41:15,000 --> 00:41:18,719 are they seeing sort of similar dynamics or do they know of any other studies that can 442 00:41:18,720 --> 00:41:24,030 help us where we're starting to look at Syria and Mali because it's papers under review, 443 00:41:24,070 --> 00:41:30,750 people said, how generalisable is this? I think it is, but I can't say that with any confidence at this point. 444 00:41:31,740 --> 00:41:35,490 All right. Theoretical implications, motivations matter. 445 00:41:35,490 --> 00:41:37,860 And we think that different kinds of bids matter. 446 00:41:37,860 --> 00:41:44,400 So you watch the politics and we think that when religion enters the political arena, it can get very nasty. 447 00:41:45,300 --> 00:41:50,700 And so you try to do that and then you try to control that and tamp down on that. 448 00:41:52,380 --> 00:41:58,140 And then I do think the global aspects of transnational actors, such as religious actors matter. 449 00:41:58,140 --> 00:42:02,400 There's interpretations of texts, and those interpretations flow over Internets. 450 00:42:02,670 --> 00:42:08,700 We know about these sort of Internet ayatollahs and imams that are influencing people thousands of miles away. 451 00:42:09,930 --> 00:42:15,239 And then the north caucuses, successful leads made religious bids besides was successful. 452 00:42:15,240 --> 00:42:23,760 I hate to say it methodic was not now important because this interlocutor in Moscow did not listen and decided that assassination was a better option. 453 00:42:23,760 --> 00:42:28,229 They were wrong. Methodic probably could have ushered in a period of peace in that region. 454 00:42:28,230 --> 00:42:32,850 It was really a lost moment. And so now we're going to probably live another generation. 455 00:42:32,850 --> 00:42:34,620 I mean, the violence is it's subdued. 456 00:42:34,620 --> 00:42:43,440 They've put in place to be more off this young man who's basically a thug and he's put in place a police state and he's got Moscow's backing. 457 00:42:44,280 --> 00:42:52,410 But but there's very little political liberty and sustained peace in the region and then variations and outcomes. 458 00:42:52,890 --> 00:42:55,920 We think this is one of the clear conclusions in our paper. 459 00:42:56,100 --> 00:42:59,730 But again, it's variation and count comes in scale, not in kind. 460 00:42:59,790 --> 00:43:04,590 It's very important that we have to take these different kinds of motivations into account. 461 00:43:05,340 --> 00:43:10,860 Policy implications. I'm at the New School of Government, the Public Schools, so I'm going to talk about the policy implications. 462 00:43:12,360 --> 00:43:18,659 So Islam is disproportionately implicated in violence of all sorts, but most of the violence is directed at apostates. 463 00:43:18,660 --> 00:43:22,559 As a great study done by West Point, try to wag its finger at al Qaeda. 464 00:43:22,560 --> 00:43:28,980 And all its affiliates say that, you know, it is going to indicate you're trying to defend Islam. 465 00:43:29,370 --> 00:43:35,430 The killing of fellow Muslims predominantly, I think, is the findings of that 85% or 90% of the victims. 466 00:43:36,600 --> 00:43:44,309 And then I think that really trying to understand why a conflict escalates and thinking about our models that we use. 467 00:43:44,310 --> 00:43:47,370 The security dilemma, the deterrence model. Spiral models. 468 00:43:47,640 --> 00:43:52,650 Is it fear or is it greed is a combination of both. Why are the actors doing what they're doing? 469 00:43:54,560 --> 00:43:57,680 So not all violence is local, but most of it is. 470 00:43:58,130 --> 00:44:03,020 We actually think, again, that, you know, this is the data showing the global connections. 471 00:44:03,020 --> 00:44:06,259 There are some relationships there, but they're not as strong, I think, 472 00:44:06,260 --> 00:44:12,770 as a staff who would like us to believe that Bob is not completely right, it's weird. 473 00:44:13,700 --> 00:44:17,040 And then we think governments are in a position to contain it, to make things worse. 474 00:44:17,040 --> 00:44:20,450 So strategy matters, counterinsurgency tactics matter. 475 00:44:21,410 --> 00:44:25,160 And then the first paper, turning a blind eye. 476 00:44:25,790 --> 00:44:32,959 You actually do want to contain control borders. And so in the first paper, we do show that having more porous borders, 477 00:44:32,960 --> 00:44:38,420 because it turns out the different republics have different border policies it actually can inflame. 478 00:44:38,420 --> 00:44:43,040 So one of the policy recommendations out of the first paper, which we sort of are seeing in this paper, 479 00:44:43,400 --> 00:44:49,160 is that if you want to sort of close your border and not allow jihadists, why are they there to mark up trouble? 480 00:44:49,340 --> 00:44:55,520 So there we agree with Moscow or actually the republics was individual Republican leaders that decided to do border policy. 481 00:44:56,660 --> 00:45:04,819 And our argument, which we think the data support is that it can only sort of locally the global jihad if there's grievances on the ground. 482 00:45:04,820 --> 00:45:11,090 And, you know, in the case of the caucuses, of course, from the caucuses perspective, they think they'll be fighting a war for 300 years. 483 00:45:11,510 --> 00:45:17,270 Moscow's perspective, they supposed to be fighting for a couple weeks, but this has been ongoing for a long time. 484 00:45:17,270 --> 00:45:22,370 So history, you really have to understand the history and the grievances at play and respect them. 485 00:45:22,760 --> 00:45:26,630 And starting in the nineties, at least we can talk about the modern Russian era. 486 00:45:27,650 --> 00:45:34,610 Moscow just was not interested in listening. Medvedev seemed to be a little bit more sympathetic, but he's not there anymore. 487 00:45:34,610 --> 00:45:38,420 And we've got Putin back, and Putin really does believe in an iron fist. 488 00:45:39,860 --> 00:45:42,660 And so I will end it there. But I think you.