I'm happy that I've been able to somehow bring all three of these entities in Oxford together.
I've been teaching on the Masters Program of International Human Rights and Cruel Summer School Program.
The course of international criminal law. And I know how difficult it is for Oxford people to talk to Oxford people more or less project.
So I'm happy to act as a force field of convergence for, if nothing else, just for today.
So we are going to be speaking. I'm going to be speaking, as a matter of fact.
And hopefully you'll be speaking afterwards with some questions about the Lubanga case.
But let me give a tiny bit of truth in lending.
I'm using the bank as a pretext to speak about something else.
But first, let's start with Lubanga was the first case at the International Criminal Court.
And as you know now, it concluded in May of 2012, which almost makes it an ancient case.
But since there is no other completed case that led to a conviction, one can still get a little bit of leeway still out of Lubanga.
And Lubanga is still said I was convicted.
He was convicted for conscription and enlistment of child soldiers.
And I'm going to use that term. And I know that the politically correct term is children associated with armed forces or armed groups.
But I'm going to shorthand child soldiers.
He was convicted of enlisting in conscripting child soldiers and also convicted of using children to participate actively in the hostilities.
Now, Mr. Lubanga was the president of the Union of Patriotic Congolese, which is, well, one can say an armed group or a militia or a political group.
But let's say it was a non-state entity.
And as president, during a very short interim period, two or three years, he had to raise their fighting forces.
And for him, a way that he could do that that was expedient and that would have loyal fighters was to enlist and conscript children.
Now, Mr. Lubanga was in charge of this military wing.
He raised the level of combatants.
And at the trial he was convicted and sentenced to 14 years.
And the reactions is that a lot? Is that enough? Is that not enough? The judgement in terms of the sentencing is on appeal at this very moment.
The Lubanga case was important for many reasons, but among those it's the first case that really gives us a decision concerning victims reparations.
And as you know, the International Criminal Court,
very different from the ad hoc tribunals or the special court for Sierra Leone, has victim representation.
There were about 129 victims who testified from their own legal base with their own legal counsel.
About 34 were girls, 93 were boys or had been girls and boys during the time period of this conflict.
And the reparations decisions has been hailed as being a first,
although has been controversial a bit in terms of the actual content of the reparations.
But these child soldiers who came to testify, they had to meet a benchmark of having themselves suffered because of the accused Lubanga.
There were other types of reparations that were more generalised to the community,
but these child soldiers suffered in relationship to acts that the Bonga had committed.
There are also some very important international humanitarian law holdings regarding these crimes.
And let me go over them for you quite briefly. And as I said, I'm setting the scene.
First of all, conscription or enlistment are two different aspects of how children can become part of an armed group.
Conscription is this notion that the child comes up and wants to be part of the group.
And enlistment is somewhere where the child has been enlisted, recruited.
And we all know from our own layperson's life you go to, you know, enlist or enrol in the army.
Conscription is, you know, I'll join in sometime.
We use the word recruitment to kind of cover both of those concepts.
Well, one of the things that the court found and remember, we're talking about persons under 15 years of age because under customary national law and
under the explicit provisions of the Rome Statute and under the additional protocols,
child soldiers are persons who are 15 years of age or younger.
Now, why why cut off in 15 for you historians is a lot of historical reasons that that occurs during last century.
A lot of people left school after the equivalent the United States of eighth grade.
Even today, the Mennonites. Quakers and I, not the Quakers.
I come from outside of Philadelphia, but the Amish are allowed to leave school after eighth grade.
That's considered a reasonable age at which you take on responsibilities of manhood.
And that's slightly where we have this descended concept of 15, and below are children.
After 15, you're an adult. But now international human rights law and criminal law seem to be moving that age toward 18.
For example, the special court for Sierra Leone was allowed to try persons who were children.
The prosecutor took the decision not to under a convention for the rights of the child.
The child is someone up until the age of 18 years old and under the Optional Protocol for the Convention
for the Rights of the Child we're looking at 18 and below would be considered a child soldier.
But right now we're caught in that in-between netherworld.
So when I'm talking about child soldiers today, I'm talking about persons who are 15 years of age or younger.
Okay? So these 15 younger than 15 year old were conscripted or enlisted.
And what the court held was that these were continuous crimes,
meaning that when you're conscripted or when you enlist, the crime doesn't happen that moment and stop.
It's not an act. The crime continues until you become 15 and therefore you're no longer a child or until you are no longer part of the armed group.
Irrespective of how you leave or disengage yourself or due to death, your crime stops at death and you might die before you reach the age of 15.
So conscription analysts are continuing crimes.
They're not one off crimes.
Hold that notion. The other thing that the court found is that children cannot consent.
Cannot consent to be enlisted or conscripted is no contradiction.
You just said conscription was when you joined voluntarily.
Well, the court held that a child is psychologically too immature to consent to either conscription or enlistment.
And were they psychologically immature about about death?
They really can't conceive of what it is to die and what it is to cause other persons to die.
In this psychological immaturity, the court says, means that consent is just it's evidentiary going to be present, but it's legally it's irrelevant.
So therefore, Mr. Obama could not say, well, he consented, she she agreed to be a soldier.
Okay. And then the last thing I'd like to tell you in terms of the legal holdings was that used to participate actively.
We have really three different crimes, but two different crimes.
Conscription and enlistment or the use of children participate actively in hostilities and used to participate actively in hostilities.
Doesn't presuppose that you've been enlisted or recruited.
You can just spontaneously be used to participate actively in hostilities, and that in itself is a crime.
Okay, so there are three crimes and the chamber used a sliding scale of finding out whether your participation was direct or indirect.
Did your participation put you directly in the way of harm or was it indirect participation and therefore you were not directly in the way of harm?
And the harm I'm talking about is what is the harm from the opposing or the enemy side being able to be targeted,
being a military objective as opposed to being a civilian object.
I'm speaking to all people here. Right.
So when the court is looking about active participation, placing children, using them, they did an indirect or direct type of test.
So those are some of them, I think interesting holdings and very notable holdings in a longer case.
Now, let me tell you some of the things that were not in the Alabama case.
One of the things not in Alabama case was sexual violence. Oh, yes, there was evidence of sexual violence.
It was just battering out.
Almost every other child soldier who got up spoke about sexual violence, but it had not been charged, had not been legally characterised.
He was not taken into consideration. So therefore,
sexual violence was not part of the deliberation to find out factually or legally to determine whether someone had been conscripted or enlisted.
We didn't say, oh, this person was sexually violent. That is evidence of conscription or enlistment.
Sexual violence was not part of the observations or the holding to find out whether that was part of an ongoing nature of any of these crimes.
Sexual violence was not used in the determination of whether a child had been used to participate actively in hostilities directly or indirectly.
Well, how would this come up? I think if any of you read the Lubanga case,
you'll see that there's a vociferous dissent in particularly talking about girls who were in the Army who were used as sexual predators.
You know, I don't think you may recall these inverted commas.
Right. Were they not being used to participate?
Was this actively being used participate? Was this direct harm or indirect harm?
So the other thing about the Lubanga case is that had originally been charged as an international armed conflict,
but the judges decided that they were going to classify or characterise a conflict as a non international armed conflict,
i.e. are common article three internal armed conflict.
So there you have in very broad strokes.
Lubanga had a bit of his holdings. But I'd like to talk about the absence of Lubanga, the absence of sexual violence evidence.
And I think that in this absence, that was really the source of an outcry when the charging first came down.
But as I said afterwards, when the judge video Benita from Costa Rica led her dissent,
I find this absence of the charges to be some were revelatory and allows us to take a little bit of a hypothetical,
not leap, but what I would call an exploration the absence of sexual violence.
But also if we could re-imagine Lubanga as an international armed conflict and not a non international armed conflict.
The question that a jury we need to raise is in the dissent becomes quite pertinent.
She says, How could you not take sexual violence into account when you're measuring whether the
children were harmed directly or indirectly because of the spirit of the Rome Statute?
It's about. Protecting civilians, children, women, and anyone who has an access to war crimes against humanity.
Protecting them. Are we only concerned about protection from the other side, them not being targeted?
Or should we be concerned about them being protected from their own side?
She asks us in some ways to look at what I call the Andy Warhol, you know, negative portraits.
You know, what does that blue stripe really mean? And Sophia Loren face, you know, or Jackie Onassis face.
And it is that opposite that's going to reveal something. I think that's quite telling.
If we look at international armed conflict, it makes us say that the feminist critique of international law is very present,
because the feminist critique makes us look at questions of gender what happens to girls, women, boys and men?
It makes us look at the very foundations and structures of international humanitarian law and ask certain questions.
And generally we need to was asking really from her point of view.
But I think we can say from a theoretical feminist critique of international monitoring law, what is your law for if it's not to protect humans?
Well, let's let's say this way, because we know really Hayley or other from his critique who told us that feminism take a break right now.
She says, Well, feminist theory is kind of like all broken up.
We can only give maybe a partial critique and we have some very imperfect and partial insights.
Hilary Charlesworth has been telling us that, look, we feminist serious, we like to talk, but we're basically talking with ourselves.
Either no one else is listening or no one else is interested in our conversation.
And that's why today I'm very happy that I have three different entities that aren't necessarily feminists,
because I'd like to broaden this conversation about the very structural foundations of international monitoring law,
looking at it from a feminist lens. And that's why I call this speech beyond gender, beyond gender with the child soldiers.
So now that the truce is up, what am I here to talk about?
I'm here to question. Under international armed conflict.
Is our abiding paradigm, meaning that a war crime has to be committed by one party against the soldiers or
nationals of another party with the presumption that they have a different nationality.
I mean, that's what war crimes are about, right? Geneva one, two, three, four.
One state has reciprocal obligations to the other states in terms of protected persons.
And where does a child combatant fall within this realm of protection?
Well, when you look at it quite closely, this reciprocity from Geneva does already have a couple little cracks in it.
Remember, when we go from the 1949 conventions to the additional protocols in 1977,
we're already willing to say, okay, international armed conflict is not always international armed conflict.
Okay, we will allow and colonialism wars of colonial struggles for allowing wars of liberation wars against apartheid.
These can all now be considered under the rules of international armed conflict.
And technically,
those wars could have a war crime committed by a party against a national or a person who is from their same citizen group or national group.
How how how you say how do you do colonialism? Let's take the easy, not easy example of Algeria.
The Algerian war, France fought against Algerian citizenships, but part of the Algerian citizenry,
such as the Algerian Jews, have been declared French citizens.
But war crimes could have been committed against them because,
a it was a colonial war and we weren't going to make the type distinction of the other, the enemy being from a different state.
And the same holds true holds true if there is a war in terms of apartheid.
Apartheid usually happens within one state. So this paradigm of war crimes are always against the enemy.
National already has a little bit of lessening a little bit, as I would call cracks or zeroes.
But the issue I want to bring up is slightly different.
It's not your Tadic issue where you have wars that could be internationalised,
meaning that Serbia has been effectively controlling Serb scope and has internationalised servicemen's war against Bosnia.
Then you could say all this the Serbs,
the Bosnian Serbs are really not from the same nationality as the Bosnians because they've been internationalised by Serbia.
My case is a little bit harder and some, I think, a bit more compelling.
I'm talking about child soldiers who ostensibly come from the same side as the armed group for which they're fighting or which they're apart.
And the fundamental question becomes, what happens when you commit a crime against a child soldier from your own side, a war crime, not just a crime.
Okay. Now, let's just walk the child soldier back, because at this point, we have to admit at least two things.
Under international law, armed conflict, that child soldier is a combatant.
Under international armed conflict, there might be some varying differences. And non-international armed conflict is a child soldier fighter?
Is everyone a fighter, a non fighter, a civilian under non-international armed conflict.
But under international conflict, it's fairly clear that the child soldier on set recruited, meaning conscripted or enlisted or a combatant.
And proof of that is that therefore they come under Geneva one.
I mean, if they're, you know, wounded or sick on land, I don't know what you mean, child soldiers who are out at sea.
But I think Robert was bringing up over lunch about pirates, young pirates who might be child soldiers, depending on the configuration.
So maybe Geneva two could apply to them the shipwrecked.
We might have child soldiers sort of shipwrecked. And certainly child soldiers can become prisoners of war with all of the rights and
duties that a state who's holding them would bow if they did become a prisoner of war.
And child soldiers might maybe only be used in hostilities who aren't really soldiers could come under the fourth convention.
So their protection is very classical, very common, protected under 1 to 3 or four as combatants.
Now, does that give leeway for them being protected against their own side?
Now it is possible that you could say that.
Well. Well, you think it's incongruous?
They don't need to be protected against their own side because that's what you have the military code for.
That's what you have internal discipline for. If their own side does something to them, then you know what will turn and find out.
But would we call that infraction? But that's we're going to rule far and saying that's a war crime.
I think so. Yeah. Stop right there, Petty. You know, let's stop this.
But then you would say, do you mean the very fact that their situation is recognised as illegal under international law?
The fact that they've been conscripted, they've been enlisted, they're very in situ illegality now prevents any other illegality occurring
from them from the same side that has given them or made them in situ illegal.
Your perpetrator can only one crime upon you, and that's conscripting or enlisting you or abusing you in hostilities.
And after that, your perpetrator is no longer a perpetrator of the same category.
Well, in the special court for Sierra Leone, the prosecution versus CSA, the court said yes.
Yeah, that's that's exactly right. That's what we're saying. It said that it would be inappropriate.
It would be a re conceptualisation of the fundamental principle of international monitoring law
to make the perpetrator guilty of other crimes against child soldiers other than conscription,
enlistment and use. And I ask you just to take maybe 2 seconds and think a bit about the types of
crimes that the perpetrator could perpetrate under this continued illegality.
If child soldiers stay for a day, five years, ten years.
And the crime configuration that I want to talk about is the sexual violence.
Just to give us a window on what type of illegality could we be talking about?
Illegality, this it's recognised that says as a war crime.
And I put forward that the sexual violence that occurs with child soldiers is at this
point in time something that we have not fully or completely explored or been aware of.
And I would propose two systems that I see operating in child soldiers.
Many people seem to be aware that girls are often used to be in quotes, and I hate this linguistic camouflage.
Bush wives has nothing to do with being a wife.
It doesn't matter. The foliage that you were around that girls are often enslaved and part of their enslavement is continual sexual access.
And many of those girls stay with the armed group and have children.
So we have some forced populations, forced breeding going on.
Many of these girls are susceptible to early abortions, spontaneous abortions, death by birth.
They're susceptible even if they do not complete births, miscarriages, fistulas, in other words, maiming of their intestinal organs.
And they are under a continual related psychological strain of just being a young child, having a child, I mean, susceptible to rape.
How this often works within girl children in the West Africa scenario is that they
are picked up and picked out not just by the soldiers but by the boy soldiers.
They go to girls who they know who are easier to follow them.
And after in the beginning, they're kept in some type of sexual pool,
kind of like the secretarial pool from the Madmen movies or Mad Men TV shows we
watch and the man gets to go by and pick out with secretarial work on this project.
So for men in the armed groups that don't have a Bush wife, they often pick these girls out of the pool for sexual assault,
and then the girls are put back in the pool for the next sexual assault.
And if they're, in quotes, lucky in inverted commas, again for survival sex,
they might hope to want to be attached to one male in a group and hopefully the male that has the most power,
which means that they'll become more exclusively that males property and slavery
is exercising the powers of ownership over someone and not have to be raped,
gang raped, forced pregnancies by other men.
Often when militias who are comrades, they will share this pool of women among them, and often this pool of young girls.
I shouldn't say women. Young girls will be used to reward, but also to punish soldiers who have not performed duties.
And that's the girl sign. But feminism want to make us look at a gender lens.
What about the boys? What about the sexual violence in the boys?
Well, obviously, boys are raped.
Boys are forced to perform fellatio, but even more vicious than that.
Young boys quickly learn that they are in a male dominated group that has a
sexual hierarchy and they look and see how does this sexual hierarchy perform?
The top people in the sexual hierarchy can have their own Bush wife and children.
The lower people in the sexual hierarchy, the lower boys don't even have access to the sexual secretarial pool.
And if you want to in any way engage in survivor sexual acts or techniques or conduct as a perpetrator or as a sexual assault victims that survivor,
you as a boy better learn those codes right away. You better learn how to rape when you're on mission and bring women back to the pool grove.
You need to show your skills, whether it be killing or looting, so that you can start to have access to the pool,
that you can inflict sexual harm in order to make your masculinity go up and therefore possibly have access to more girls.
And as your military rank goes up and your sexual prowess goes up.
It's every wolf and it's interlinked until you can have your own Bush wife or set of wives and children.
So that's the harm I'm talking about coming from the same side.
So that goes back to the question. The fact that you were in an illegal situation of having been enlisted and conscripted, therefore,
is stop any other legality that the perpetrator thinks of you and that in situ situation canal do in terms of other forms
and I view sexual violence as an example but it could be killing other forms of maiming or any of the other war crimes.
Now when we get back to our international monitoring role paradigm, the answer, of course, is no.
Even though all the sexual assault conduct I've just described certainly has a nexus to an armed conflict.
One of the other jurisdictional elements that we need for war crimes.
So what would I propose in this situation?
Well, I've come to bring a problem and offer possibly a solution. Under the additional protocol one.
Exactly, Article 77 that talks about children during time periods of armed conflict.
And it's under Article 77 one No.
77 two that it talks about the children not to be refrain from being recruited and or not to take part in hostilities.
That's where we get our customary law basis not to conscript enlist children.
Special court for Sierra Leone has recognised that even though there's been some
divergence of opinion and the Rome Statute has expressed that in provisions,
even if it's not part of customary law, those states that have signed the Rome Statute have agreed that this would be the law that we will abide
by and that the conventional wisdom is now that customary law has caught up to the conventional law,
and these are solid war crimes conscription, enlistment use and hostilities, either directly or whatever.
So Article 77 of Additional Protocol one starts off in subsection one and says children shall have special protection.
The party shall protect children, offer them special protection, including indecent assault in all its forms.
Well, if you look at the Vienna Convention and just say let's let's look the plain word, meaning that, what does that mean?
Well, it probably means that the parties shower for children shall offer children special protection.
And that indecent assault of any kind can't be inflicted upon them.
Well, we know what parties mean, particularly under international armed conflict, with a special protection.
Those of you who've looked at that,
I assure you understand that special protection or certain special measures under international law that are given to protected persons,
such as what one can do in terms of regulation, of not being able to have the death penalty be inflicted upon women who are pregnant.
That's a special protection, no adverse discrimination based on sexual health.
So special protections or types of special measures. But what is indecent assault or indecent assault?
I mean, that as a technical term is found in Article 27 of the fourth Geneva Convention that says that talks about
civilians and in particularly talks about when civilians are in the hands of the other power of the other state,
and that women shall be protected against rape, forced prostitution, any form of indecent assault or any other form of indecent assault.
So this other form of indecent indecent assault relates back to rape from forced prostitution or types of illicit sexual conduct.
Oh, where else do we find this notion of indecent assault?
Well, if you look at Article 75 of additional protocol one, it's the fundamental guarantees.
It's kind of like the grave breaches of additional protocol one and under subsection to be of Article 75.
It talks about outrages upon personal dignity, things you cannot commit, including any form of indecent assault.
And once again, if you go to Article 76, right before Article 77, an additional protocol one,
it talks about the special protection for women and again, mentions rape, prostitution or indecent assault.
So plain language meaning of Article 77 as it relates to children must mean that the parties cannot inflict indecent assault upon children.
And then says, as I said before, you have to refrain from recruiting children.
And it says, but in the event that children are used in hostilities,
athletes participate in hostilities and fall into the hands of the other power, the detaining power of the other party.
It says the special protection continues. That the special protection starts once from the hands of the officer, but it continues.
Which makes you say, Well, where did it begin? Began when the children were with the party.
That was even their own side. I would argue.
So if there is under Article 77, under additional protocol one, which is recognised basically as customary law,
that there is a continuation of protection against indecent assault.
Even when that child soldier or that child who participates in hostilities falls into the hands of the detaining power.
Well, you would say, well, basically that doesn't have to really be covered by Article 77,
because you've got the whole Geneva Convention three, you know, and the third Geneva Conventions about prisoners of war.
And if the job is a comfort in the child, falls in the prison and so forth, you just kind of being redundant, aren't you?
Because prisoners of war, of course, are protected from sexual violence inflicted by the other side.
Well, where does that come? Under the Prisoner of War Convention.
Well, it starts in 1929 under Article three, 1929.
There's a big draft in the Geneva Conventions, in particular related to prisoners of war.
And the German delegate suggested that we should add into this 1929 convention that women should be protected,
women should be given all consideration to their sex,
which is kind of like Victorian code language to say that female prisoners of war should not be raped.
Doesn't mean you could break them in. This made it very explicit that female prisoners of war would be given all consideration to their sex.
That became quite interesting when you look into the commentary of the resolution that that meant protection against sexual violence.
Then we got to 1949 and lo and behold, in the first convention and the second convention and back to the third convention.
That phrase is repeated. Under Articles 12, 12 and 13, 14, women should be given all consideration due their sex,
meaning that the opposite party, the opposite power, cannot sexually assault the women.
Okay.
And that's why, you know, I'd love to take all the credit that just like ad hoc tribunals, he made rape a war crime, and I did it in a forensic case.
Rape has been a war crime. I mean, it's one of the oldest.
It's one of the core crimes of war crimes that exist, particularly for the civilian population.
But what's interesting from the 29 conventions of the 49 conventions, it's reiterated that combatants cannot be sexually violated by the other side.
That's that's a big new thing of the 2949 conventions.
But when you look at the commentaries, official ICRC commentaries, you know about what does that phrase really mean?
You would say yes, so that the detaining power can't rape women.
And they've got a special provision that women are supposed to be guarded only by other women.
But when you read what Pictet says, it says, you know what?
Male and female prisoners from the same side are be separated out.
And the detaining power is to ensure that females are not assaulted by prisoners of war from their own side.
They are protected against sexual assault from their own side in the hands of the detaining power.
And I would argue that this precept, this precept under the third convention, which actually dates back to 1929,
when we're really starting to understand combatant vulnerability and humane treatment,
has to be read into Article 77 when we talk about children as combatants falling into the hands of.
Tim Powers at that stage, there's special protection against any form of indecent assault.
That protection stands even in terms of members from their own party or P.O.W. cannot assault.
And. You add that together with Article 77 one, knowing that this protection continues when detained and children have special protection.
I would say that the paradigm of war crimes.
Already allows for a fundamental shift. In particular when we're talking about children and in particular, we talk about child combatants.
And especially when we understand the nature of the sexual violence, any form of indecent assault.
The child combatants can undergo. Well, why hasn't this been written up before?
I mean, if it's so hot, you know, let's try it all out.
Well, I think that these are among the things that a feminist critique of international military law can offer us.
Depending on the doors we enter in and what we see what is before us when we put on a gendered lens.
There are other things that the Lubanga case can offer to us.
As I mentioned before, this ideal of the constant crime when we look at enslavement, when we look at what I hate to call forced marriage,
inhumane treatment, this notion that it's one off, it was done with that 10 seconds.
We never think of torture that the one act or doesn't most physical torture turn into psychological torture.
When we look at this issue of consent and say that a child cannot consent to enlist or conscript because they mentally don't understand death,
we understand that at this time period, international monitoring law and national criminal law, consenting to sexual violence even for a child,
is dependent other than from the Rome Statute on the circumstances in which they find themselves.
We don't say a child that not does not understand gang rapes.
A child does not understand being sexually abused with fistula and many international criminal are up until today,
apart from what might be a future interpretation of the statute, has no age cut off in terms of consent and sexual violence.
The most progressive way we look at it is saying, Oh, let's look at the circumstances in which the person is.
And these are the findings not only from Rwanda, from the ad hoc Yugoslav Tribunal, special court for Sierra Leone.
Possibly the Rome Statute will make us interpret, unable to give genuine consent,
meaning that if you cannot continue and can send a court, that your consent is not genuine, you're unable to give.
It is the equivalent of consent being just irrelevant for the circumstances or for the act that we're talking about.
Well, I would like to close here, but with just a couple of very, very quick reflections,
because there have been a couple of scholars that have looked at some of these issues.
And as a matter of fact, I think Robert Roe from Lancaster has talked about friendly fire.
When you are killed by someone from your own side, not necessarily that that's a war crime, but that harm does come from our own side.
Also, when we talk about and this is from one of the scholars at Nottingham Sanders for Suvi marin who does male sexual
assault that well so does internal non-international armed conflict says that the Geneva Conventions from 1854,
from 1906 to 1929 really were talking about helping the wounded in the sick,
irrespective of the nationality, and that all parties have the same obligations to all wounded and victims.
And so I come back to where are these?
Just a couple of partial imperfect insights.
Is this not the very basis of Geneva humanitarian law?
The humane part is supposed to be about irrespective of the victim, irrespective of the party.
And maybe just the example of children in particularly through a feminist lens, allows us to see what's right in front of us.
To conclude, as Hilary Charlesworth would say, I hope we broaden the conversation because this is one that we should all be happy.
Thank you very much for.