1 00:00:00,180 --> 00:00:06,620 So I hosting commander. But what I'm here to do is to offer you again so the practitioners you much, 2 00:00:07,300 --> 00:00:14,160 much more Scalia an academic but focusing on the theory of deterrence and as it applies to modern conflicts today. 3 00:00:14,550 --> 00:00:21,720 Part of the reason why is because functional topics like those are really at the heart of current debates of what to do with countries like Russia. 4 00:00:22,200 --> 00:00:29,430 And a lot of times when you get into them, what you find is most of policy thinking is very much scenario based or wargame based, 5 00:00:29,760 --> 00:00:36,809 but it really lacks a lot of foundational understanding and underpinnings, either in international politics or in cross-cutting functional fields. 6 00:00:36,810 --> 00:00:41,250 So it becomes a conversation about what to do with a specific adversary over specific 7 00:00:41,250 --> 00:00:46,470 problem set on a particular issue based a lot on scenarios and simulations of war gaming. 8 00:00:46,620 --> 00:00:49,829 It's not very well grounded and broader thinking, 9 00:00:49,830 --> 00:00:55,350 so that's kind of more of a foundational lecture on deterrence they'll try to make applied to the extent I can. 10 00:00:56,780 --> 00:01:01,019 I am a huge fan of Dr. Strangelove, the film. 11 00:01:01,020 --> 00:01:03,330 I don't know how many of you are familiar, but many are. 12 00:01:03,660 --> 00:01:10,440 I will tell you from my experience in the Department of Defence, the film is not parody, it is a documentary and we made today. 13 00:01:10,710 --> 00:01:17,420 I had these interactions with me and my colleagues and contemporaries and counterparts and they literally go like This movie, okay? 14 00:01:17,730 --> 00:01:21,660 And there are people that are currently featured that are featured in the film as composites, 15 00:01:21,900 --> 00:01:27,150 and you could safely make a movie about other people that are currently prominently featured in our defence establishment, right? 16 00:01:28,830 --> 00:01:35,880 So there'll be a lot of references to it because the topic can be a little bit theoretical and still if you don't do some comedy. 17 00:01:36,240 --> 00:01:38,300 So essence of deterrence, well, 18 00:01:38,700 --> 00:01:46,200 it has some chances to make threats made by one party to convince another party from initiating a desired course of action. 19 00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:53,370 Right. And one side must convince the others not to carry out an intended actions because the cost of would incur are 20 00:01:53,370 --> 00:02:00,120 either too high or the benefits are too low to people that really or foundation to this debate were Herman Cain, 21 00:02:00,210 --> 00:02:04,020 Thomas Schilling, Dr. Strangelove in the film is a composite of these characters, 22 00:02:04,020 --> 00:02:08,550 along with others, probably mostly Herman Kahn rather than Schelling. 23 00:02:08,970 --> 00:02:12,510 And the idea of some of the foundation books that were written at the time. 24 00:02:12,720 --> 00:02:15,090 And this debate repeats and recreates itself in history. 25 00:02:15,090 --> 00:02:20,910 So we now talk about great power, competition and conflict with countries like Russia and China, the triumph of Back in Vogue. 26 00:02:21,180 --> 00:02:26,310 And a lot of people today are very much having the same debates that they were having in the fifties and sixties. 27 00:02:26,550 --> 00:02:31,110 And oftentimes during the day, you'll hear people say, well, I'm a show and guy and I want a Herman Cain guy. 28 00:02:31,350 --> 00:02:35,520 And you basically seeing this, the sort of ideological, 29 00:02:36,240 --> 00:02:42,090 theoretical children of these individuals dominate the policy establishment today, at least in the United States. 30 00:02:42,090 --> 00:02:45,930 Right. I will not speak to the UK in terms, of course, 31 00:02:45,930 --> 00:02:51,239 being front and centre during the nuclear age because the consequences of war and nuclear war between pure nuclear 32 00:02:51,240 --> 00:02:58,410 states was absolutely devastating and eventually nuclear war began to seem as something that was unwinnable. 33 00:03:00,030 --> 00:03:04,050 So security became a lot of conversation about how to engage the right combination of behaviours, 34 00:03:04,410 --> 00:03:08,760 probably communicate to adversaries what you will will not do in order to have them take certain actions. 35 00:03:09,870 --> 00:03:13,589 All right. So, well, you get a theoretical sense of deterrence. 36 00:03:13,590 --> 00:03:19,410 As always, this lecture is going to possibly be sort of a mile wide and deep, 37 00:03:19,770 --> 00:03:23,820 but deterrence effect on the mind of the adversary generated by first promises. 38 00:03:24,150 --> 00:03:30,180 So persuasion of the opponent, the cost of risk of a given course of action they might take are definitely going to outweigh the benefit. 39 00:03:30,930 --> 00:03:36,600 Deterrence is really simple, right? It's important to remember strategy is not the same as convincing a plan. 40 00:03:37,140 --> 00:03:41,760 Convincing that a plan for military victory will succeed. 41 00:03:41,760 --> 00:03:48,420 So deterrence is not a plan for war fighting right to achieve military victory over narrative. 42 00:03:48,450 --> 00:03:53,160 And at the same time, it's principally a psychological interaction with your opponent. 43 00:03:53,370 --> 00:03:55,590 And it's you trying to convince them of something, 44 00:03:55,770 --> 00:04:00,840 a particular intended action that won't succeed or that the costs greatly outweigh the potential benefit. 45 00:04:02,070 --> 00:04:07,560 But deterrence particularly useful. Why? It's particularly useful in scenarios where military victory may not be achievable, 46 00:04:08,130 --> 00:04:12,209 or when defence against an adversary's course of action is not possible. 47 00:04:12,210 --> 00:04:15,990 There are two cases that we agree with you. One, you simply can't. 48 00:04:15,990 --> 00:04:24,210 One, you can't overmatch or dominate or a particular opponent. Right to defence isn't very possible, such as with nuclear weapons, right? 49 00:04:25,080 --> 00:04:30,270 And you simply can't sustain you can't mount an effective potential defence against them. 50 00:04:30,600 --> 00:04:37,290 So how do you deter them against particular course of action? Deterrence is fundamentally a strategy of limited means. 51 00:04:37,290 --> 00:04:45,480 It is based on proportionality. You have to balance the compliance of what your adversary is going to do with the amount of threat you pose to them. 52 00:04:46,620 --> 00:04:54,300 And you also have to assure them this one part where the terms that from a practitioner review perspective, most people get wrong. 53 00:04:54,660 --> 00:04:59,850 So World War II cases where deterrence doesn't work very well is one, it's not proportional or. 54 00:04:59,930 --> 00:05:04,550 Sufficiently reciprocal. The amount of threat is not equal to what you're trying to prevent from doing. 55 00:05:05,480 --> 00:05:09,080 It's not reciprocal. You're asking them for something they can't give you necessarily. 56 00:05:09,410 --> 00:05:16,310 And third one is there's no assurance involved, which is part of deterrence that you told people if you do this, bad things will happen to you. 57 00:05:16,640 --> 00:05:17,630 But if you don't do it, 58 00:05:17,960 --> 00:05:25,070 I promise I will not do bad things to you just because it's important for other people to understand that there is a cause effect. 59 00:05:25,100 --> 00:05:28,580 But you will not simply punish them because you have the power to do it. All right. 60 00:05:28,610 --> 00:05:36,350 So they must be assured that actually you're deterring them for particular intended action and bad things won't happen with them nonetheless. 61 00:05:37,650 --> 00:05:41,930 You know, and finally, a lot of deterrence is oriented around signalling bargaining. 62 00:05:41,930 --> 00:05:48,229 Right. Which is there are strong challenge in deterrence oriented around how you establish course of credibility. 63 00:05:48,230 --> 00:05:52,310 And particularly as we'll talk later in this lecture, the resolve part, of course, of credibility. 64 00:05:52,640 --> 00:05:56,510 How would you communicate the fact that you have skin in the game, that you're vested in it, 65 00:05:56,560 --> 00:06:03,440 that you have strong interests at stake and that you will actually fight and you'll follow through with what you say you will do. 66 00:06:03,650 --> 00:06:08,390 Even though the entire concept of this, if you're trying to do so, you don't actually have the fight, right? 67 00:06:08,420 --> 00:06:11,990 You tried the tour of the fight from happening. So you have to be as convincing as you can. 68 00:06:12,320 --> 00:06:18,050 And as I assure you, that's not so easy. Important because whenever anybody's trying to prevent anything, they all sound convincing. 69 00:06:18,590 --> 00:06:21,830 Right. So those are for you. 70 00:06:22,430 --> 00:06:25,669 Right. So first part of deterrence in us, 71 00:06:25,670 --> 00:06:34,050 mostly deterrence came about as a formulated discussion where the truth is really about establishing course of credibility of your adversary. 72 00:06:34,100 --> 00:06:41,510 And of course, some credibility was formulated as capabilities plus resolve, time signalling. 73 00:06:41,840 --> 00:06:45,829 So I will tackle what I find to be the much more important part of the deterrence location, 74 00:06:45,830 --> 00:06:50,540 which is the issue of resolve resolves really correlated with interests at stake. 75 00:06:50,540 --> 00:06:54,320 And whoever cares more about the object of contention and theory has higher resolve. 76 00:06:54,770 --> 00:06:57,800 Right. And so what you get is robust capabilities that, you know, 77 00:06:57,860 --> 00:07:02,809 are basically supported by strong resolve or conversely, a high degree of resolve that you may have. 78 00:07:02,810 --> 00:07:06,770 But you have very little capability that you can actually show an adversary 79 00:07:06,800 --> 00:07:10,040 what you can do about it and don't provide necessarily a credible deterrent. 80 00:07:10,490 --> 00:07:19,430 So credibility is really important. The other big challenge is how you communicate to the adversary for both words and actions, right? 81 00:07:19,850 --> 00:07:23,089 So you're basically targeting strategic communication to your audience. 82 00:07:23,090 --> 00:07:24,090 And here's the real challenge. 83 00:07:24,110 --> 00:07:29,990 So in order to make deterrence works, the two kinds of people needs two kinds of people behind closed doors normally fight. 84 00:07:30,800 --> 00:07:35,480 You need subject matter experts for regional us on your adversary. 85 00:07:35,960 --> 00:07:41,660 It's people like me and you, people who are functional and understand strategy and deterrence and compelling, 86 00:07:42,170 --> 00:07:46,680 but normally don't know much about the countries involved with China, with Russia, with Iran, with North Korea. 87 00:07:46,710 --> 00:07:51,110 The same thing. In theory, the theory should work right in practice, not always. 88 00:07:52,310 --> 00:07:56,389 So this is a conversation where people who understand the theory and who are in 89 00:07:56,390 --> 00:08:00,140 charge making policy and people can make policy are almost always journalists, 90 00:08:00,170 --> 00:08:06,350 at least in the US policy community, have to get together with regionals who explain to them the psychology of the adversary so they can 91 00:08:06,350 --> 00:08:10,300 tailor their message and convince them because it's a psychological interaction with the other side. 92 00:08:10,320 --> 00:08:14,330 If you don't know them, you can't determine because how can you possibly tailor your message to signal them? 93 00:08:14,510 --> 00:08:18,890 If you don't know much about them, what's going to work with Russia is probably not going to work necessarily with Iran. 94 00:08:19,010 --> 00:08:24,889 Right. This is the reality. And why knowing that research is very important is because one proportionality. 95 00:08:24,890 --> 00:08:28,850 Well, the first question on the charts is how much do they want it? If they want it a lot. 96 00:08:29,000 --> 00:08:32,239 If you think they want a lot, then you need way more deterrence, right? 97 00:08:32,240 --> 00:08:39,260 Way more course of credibility. Maybe you need to show much more resolve, maybe need much more capability in more policy, more policy debates. 98 00:08:39,260 --> 00:08:44,270 People say, I need more both because there's an attraction, as I say, that, you know, 99 00:08:44,270 --> 00:08:49,070 first of all, policy debates that I've seen in the United States are typically between two camps. 100 00:08:49,760 --> 00:08:54,050 There's people who think we need more. And then there are people who think we need more and more. 101 00:08:54,650 --> 00:08:58,430 And the debate is between the more and the more times to two or three or four. 102 00:08:58,520 --> 00:09:04,520 Right. And and principally, I mean, that's generally more positive because more always has good stakeholders. 103 00:09:04,520 --> 00:09:09,710 And people believe that more is better because they think activity is achievement and nobody's really attracted to us. 104 00:09:11,840 --> 00:09:16,969 So it's important that you take words, actions to communicate the threat, but it does have to be very much adversary specific. 105 00:09:16,970 --> 00:09:21,530 It does not work across all adversaries right next to the base. 106 00:09:21,530 --> 00:09:27,020 Sort of denial versus punishment here. I'm simplifying a bit, but there are principally two strategic modes of deterrence. 107 00:09:27,770 --> 00:09:31,400 One aims to deny the benefits of the actual because they won't succeed. 108 00:09:31,490 --> 00:09:37,100 That's the easiest one, right? And that's deterrence by denial. And you're affecting the calculus of the adversary. 109 00:09:37,100 --> 00:09:38,989 But basically tell them you won't succeed in your plan. 110 00:09:38,990 --> 00:09:44,810 You won't be able to invade or take the territory you want when those punishment, which is basically raises prohibitive cost. 111 00:09:44,950 --> 00:09:47,990 So you may succeed, but I'm going to pull such punishing costs. 112 00:09:48,440 --> 00:09:52,180 The rule of thumb for how much you want to trust me, you're not going to win enough, right? 113 00:09:52,430 --> 00:09:57,770 That ultimately the costs will be prohibitive to dissuade you from wanting to take on the sanction. 114 00:09:58,940 --> 00:10:05,710 They are not exclusive. Brochures are meetings where they are complimentary. One example would be, let's say, flexible response, 115 00:10:05,720 --> 00:10:11,990 nuclear strategy that's taken on by new professional companies where you combine both basically a graduate strategy, 116 00:10:11,990 --> 00:10:16,220 reporting strategy or even around the now and a part of your strategies oriented around punishment. 117 00:10:16,430 --> 00:10:19,850 Why? Well, you have conventional forces, let's say, for denial. 118 00:10:19,850 --> 00:10:23,660 The adversary may not succeed. And you integrate that with tactical nuclear weapons. 119 00:10:24,020 --> 00:10:27,590 And then your strategic nuclear arsenal is about punishment, right? 120 00:10:27,620 --> 00:10:31,040 Retaliation. So you have two pieces of the puzzle right there. 121 00:10:31,280 --> 00:10:34,450 One is you reduce the likelihood that the adversary will succeed in a military attack. 122 00:10:34,700 --> 00:10:39,590 The other ones, you have a very credible threat of just, you know, mass retaliation and tremendous punishment. 123 00:10:40,490 --> 00:10:49,110 No points for effort. So I have a lot argument with colleagues who say, well, we need to do more is always put more and more of people and ideas. 124 00:10:49,130 --> 00:10:53,690 We need more. Deterrence is why will deterrence not good enough? 125 00:10:53,690 --> 00:10:57,170 We need a little bit some action. We need robust deterrence and robust year deterrence. 126 00:10:57,530 --> 00:10:59,089 That, for the record, is not a thing. 127 00:10:59,090 --> 00:11:06,230 There's not what I call robust your deterrence or any other, though the term the term does not give a lot of good points for effort. 128 00:11:06,260 --> 00:11:13,120 Here's a good example. There's a set of people, this Maginot Line construction of the war to that that would be good deterrence by denial. 129 00:11:13,130 --> 00:11:17,600 Very stable thinking. Right. But this great line of German fortifications. 130 00:11:17,960 --> 00:11:21,080 So people did not build their side of the line. Right. 131 00:11:21,800 --> 00:11:24,950 They may be belligerent. Okay. So the front line doesn't build. 132 00:11:25,420 --> 00:11:31,910 So now when you look at it, the terms of the give points for effort, so it either works or it doesn't. 133 00:11:32,510 --> 00:11:36,040 And as I'll show you, it's incredibly difficult to prove when it's working, 134 00:11:36,710 --> 00:11:43,490 but it's a lot easier to show when you're intended to deter your adversary from invading from a particular vector of attack. 135 00:11:43,880 --> 00:11:51,730 And that does not succeed. Right. We've got my fair share. 136 00:11:52,000 --> 00:11:56,860 So let's talk about nuclear versus conventional. So first, rules of conflict between nuclear, 137 00:11:56,860 --> 00:12:02,880 conventional or nuclear deterrence kind of dominate a lot of deterrence theory up until the end of the Cold War. 138 00:12:02,890 --> 00:12:07,840 You'll find most of the time when we spend our discussions on today is conventional deterrence. 139 00:12:08,220 --> 00:12:11,680 Well, nuclear deterrence might be a little bit back and forth by the end of this month, 140 00:12:11,680 --> 00:12:18,649 when U.S. nuclear posture and ballistic missile defence review come out and we discuss we get more into the conversation on modernisation, 141 00:12:18,650 --> 00:12:23,200 new arsenal. But most of the conversation for the last 25 years has been about conventional deterrence. 142 00:12:25,000 --> 00:12:30,010 So nuclear deterrence intrinsically based on deterrence by punishment worldwide, 143 00:12:30,010 --> 00:12:35,169 because we just don't have the technology to deny another adversary strategic nuclear arsenal attack. 144 00:12:35,170 --> 00:12:42,520 Right. So strategic nuclear deterrence is all around punishment, getting a survivable nuclear deterrent that can retaliate. 145 00:12:42,640 --> 00:12:44,710 It's not about denial, camp denial. 146 00:12:46,700 --> 00:12:52,450 And the only area where nuclear weapons were used in denial of strategy is tactical nuclear weapons as part of conventional war fighting. 147 00:12:52,450 --> 00:12:58,780 Right. Where you basically say we're going to fire nuclear weapons at you in a conventional conflict, literally for battlefield employment. 148 00:12:59,800 --> 00:13:03,940 Well, nuclear turns really highly credible, preventing nuclear conflict between nuclear powers. 149 00:13:04,870 --> 00:13:09,580 This type of deterrence might prevent commercial conflict to the extent where there are strong escalation anxiety, 150 00:13:10,120 --> 00:13:13,370 but it's very limited when there's mutually assured destruction. 151 00:13:13,390 --> 00:13:22,260 So the question is how well does nuclear deterrence, deterrence by punishment deter regular conventional conflicts between peers? 152 00:13:22,300 --> 00:13:22,690 Well, 153 00:13:23,230 --> 00:13:30,460 if it's between United States and Soviet Union and you have very strong anxiety that any conventional conflict will rapidly weaken nuclear escalation. 154 00:13:30,790 --> 00:13:34,090 It does a pretty good job most of the time. Right. 155 00:13:34,480 --> 00:13:41,770 Although you will have crises, that's pretty well. How well does it deter other activities? 156 00:13:41,890 --> 00:13:44,680 Not necessarily all that well. 157 00:13:44,680 --> 00:13:54,309 And it has pretty limited deterrence value for things beyond the general conflict when there's mutually assured destruction. 158 00:13:54,310 --> 00:14:01,730 Why? Well, look, if you have really good, good strategy oriented around punishment, um, 159 00:14:02,530 --> 00:14:09,669 its effectiveness really begins to diminish if the person you're applying it to also has really good strategy in the round punishing you, 160 00:14:09,670 --> 00:14:13,180 meaning they're just incredible. And that the cross you can impose on them. 161 00:14:13,390 --> 00:14:18,190 They can impose very similar costs onto you. And there you start to run into problems, right? 162 00:14:18,200 --> 00:14:27,660 So it's much more effective against people who you can threaten various types of asymmetric escalation, but they cannot retaliate against you in time. 163 00:14:28,210 --> 00:14:38,470 Um, here is sort of outlined probably, you know, in our conversation today, but strategic nuclear deterrence is still for sale on punishment. 164 00:14:38,890 --> 00:14:45,640 Tactical nuclear weapons. To the extent that some countries have an actual battlefield strategy around them, a more effort towards denial, 165 00:14:46,030 --> 00:14:51,430 some about tactical nuclear weapons are left over, don't really clearly have an appointment doctrine. 166 00:14:51,920 --> 00:14:55,330 Non-strategic nuclear weapons are kind of interesting. 167 00:14:56,620 --> 00:15:04,839 Russia has a fairly capable arsenal that's a news department and divides its weapons into really three kinds of weapons tactical, 168 00:15:04,840 --> 00:15:08,860 tactical, operational, non-strategic and strategic. Right and non-strategic weapons. 169 00:15:08,860 --> 00:15:13,210 If you want to think about what that is, there are things probably between 520 500 kilometres. 170 00:15:13,570 --> 00:15:16,990 And these are weapons that are flawed and improve deterrence in conflict. 171 00:15:16,990 --> 00:15:23,830 Role deterrence in conflict is really escalation control, which is because people sometimes have a false dichotomy. 172 00:15:23,830 --> 00:15:27,340 They think, right, in terms of working, there's no war worth art. Deterrence has failed. 173 00:15:27,640 --> 00:15:35,049 No, not true. Deterrence can manage escalation in conflict, either horizontal or vertical. 174 00:15:35,050 --> 00:15:39,010 You can re-establish deterrence once possibilities break out. So the war could be limited. 175 00:15:39,100 --> 00:15:42,940 It can be limited in duration, it could be limited intensity and give you a limited geography. 176 00:15:43,180 --> 00:15:47,740 There's many ways in conflict to actually bound the nature of the war, 177 00:15:48,520 --> 00:15:54,190 and there are different capabilities that you can develop and apply and say, that's really going to be the role of these capabilities. 178 00:15:54,190 --> 00:15:58,750 Right. I would I would like the bound of conflict. I would like to see if I can use them to control escalation. 179 00:16:00,670 --> 00:16:03,730 So there's one potential use today for non-strategic nuclear weapons. 180 00:16:05,200 --> 00:16:09,909 So the essence of modern debate today with countries like Russia and others is whether 181 00:16:09,910 --> 00:16:14,710 denial or punishment is the best strategy when it comes to conventional deterrence. 182 00:16:14,950 --> 00:16:22,510 And almost all bolshie establishments really prefer denial because at the last show you later they have a very rather negative view of punishment, 183 00:16:23,890 --> 00:16:28,540 i.e. punishment is a great strategy for nuclear deterrence, but people don't really like it for conventional deterrence. 184 00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:34,060 All right, Joe, versus immediate, this is fairly straightforward. 185 00:16:34,060 --> 00:16:42,370 So, Joe, deterrence is basically governed by a relationship between you and another adversary where you both have robust forces capabilities, 186 00:16:42,370 --> 00:16:48,520 but you don't expect any sort of immediate attack, meaning you don't believe that there is an impending attack or you're not a threatened state. 187 00:16:48,940 --> 00:16:56,060 You need deterrence. These are cases where one side mobilise or both sides mobilise and there is a genuine threat planning attack. 188 00:16:56,210 --> 00:17:00,470 And then there's a question of whether or not you can deter in that particular crisis scenario. 189 00:17:01,370 --> 00:17:11,780 There's a big difference between a near term where you actually perceive that the other side does intend an attack or considering it, 190 00:17:12,170 --> 00:17:15,440 versus what is our normal state of life, which is general deterrence. 191 00:17:15,440 --> 00:17:20,120 We have nuclear weapons. They have nuclear weapons. Neither one of us thinks that tomorrow we're going to wake up and launch an attack on each other. 192 00:17:21,950 --> 00:17:26,990 What are cases like that? Well, let's say zap a 2017 that just happened in September. 193 00:17:27,420 --> 00:17:30,680 A fairly straightforward strategic plan by Russia, not very large. 194 00:17:30,990 --> 00:17:36,640 The United States does a brigade rotation through the area of operations. 195 00:17:36,650 --> 00:17:44,240 The United States decided to pause rotation out of the brigade that was being replaced at the same time as it introduced the second one. 196 00:17:44,480 --> 00:17:47,090 So they were both there for that exercise. Why? 197 00:17:47,690 --> 00:17:56,299 Well, because for whatever reason, undoubtedly as anxious people out of the world and reflected that in the United States, 198 00:17:56,300 --> 00:18:03,800 somebody thought that having two brigades there at the same time pause for several weeks would have better 199 00:18:03,800 --> 00:18:11,180 credibility on the deterrence scale in the event that there was any sort of mal intent on behalf of Russia. 200 00:18:11,210 --> 00:18:11,660 That's right. 201 00:18:11,900 --> 00:18:18,920 And that was clearly it's wishful thinking from general deterrence to the countries conducting a very large strategic operational exercise. 202 00:18:19,580 --> 00:18:23,330 We understand their capabilities. We're not 100% certain of their intent. 203 00:18:23,570 --> 00:18:31,040 So we want to increase our immediate deterrence. Now, the word to the effect of, you know, my personal opinion is if you're a nuclear state, 204 00:18:31,040 --> 00:18:34,990 is willing to go to war, would you and roll over one brigade? Believe me, they're willing to roll over to brigade. 205 00:18:35,300 --> 00:18:39,230 Just trust me. Okay. But what we're saying, there's no such thing as robust. Your deterrence, right? 206 00:18:39,590 --> 00:18:42,970 It just. It. Trust me, they're willing to go to war with a pure nuclear power. 207 00:18:42,980 --> 00:18:47,240 The difference in their decision making will not be between two one brigade in two months, for sure. 208 00:18:47,570 --> 00:18:53,630 But that being said, I'm just giving you a case from just a few months ago to illustrate central versus extended. 209 00:18:54,950 --> 00:19:00,160 This is really at the heart of modern deterrence for doing what people do not like punishment, and that's the heart of problems and deterrence. 210 00:19:00,170 --> 00:19:06,020 So there's one country, the most ideal, that has the largest external deterrence network in the world. 211 00:19:06,020 --> 00:19:09,590 It's painted in blue. These are all countries to which we extend deterrence. 212 00:19:09,830 --> 00:19:14,270 Okay. And I congratulate you if you're on this list, because it means that in theory, 213 00:19:14,270 --> 00:19:19,510 we have committed to trading New York for whatever capital it is you hail from or any other one of your cities. 214 00:19:19,520 --> 00:19:24,890 Right. The real question comes into to whether or not we would actually do it if it came to it. 215 00:19:25,580 --> 00:19:29,840 And therein lies the challenge. So central or direct deterrence? Very credible. 216 00:19:30,400 --> 00:19:33,110 Everybody's credible in the fact that if you attack them, they'll fight back. 217 00:19:33,470 --> 00:19:38,270 If you have nuclear weapons or other long range offensive weapon, you're very credible in the fact that you're fighting to defend yourself. 218 00:19:38,280 --> 00:19:43,099 Right. Britain and France and Europe are very credible in that they have a central nuclear deterrent of 219 00:19:43,100 --> 00:19:50,920 theirs and they usually reflect some extended deterrence and have a lot of fundamental problems. 220 00:19:50,930 --> 00:19:56,300 Right. And what is external deterrence? Well, then deterrence of deterring attack on a third party. 221 00:19:57,800 --> 00:20:01,760 But it's not inherently credible. It has to be made credible. 222 00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:05,450 And the real challenge to external deterrence is how to make it credible. 223 00:20:05,450 --> 00:20:08,600 It's pretty complicated and not that easy to manage. 224 00:20:10,460 --> 00:20:15,830 Look, ultimately, extended deterrence is in the nuclear realm. 225 00:20:16,310 --> 00:20:18,740 It's about trying to make the incredible credible. 226 00:20:18,750 --> 00:20:24,280 How do you convince somebody that you'd be willing not only to just fight for a third party, but you'd be willing to commit suicide for this? 227 00:20:24,290 --> 00:20:28,880 Very hard. It's incredibly hard to convince anybody that you commit suicide on behalf of a third person. 228 00:20:29,060 --> 00:20:32,120 That's issue one on the conventional side of things. 229 00:20:32,570 --> 00:20:36,320 The big challenge on extending the terms has always been unresolved. 230 00:20:36,350 --> 00:20:43,580 You may have capabilities, but. But it's a constant struggle to demonstrate that you have interests at stake, 231 00:20:43,940 --> 00:20:53,060 that you have the political resolve to actually go and fight on behalf in a sort of general historical case of extended deterrence. 232 00:20:53,510 --> 00:21:02,030 One has not done very well. Is most of the conflicts that you see what you might consider to be a potential break down deterrence? 233 00:21:02,030 --> 00:21:06,650 I think almost two thirds come from breakdowns of extend deterrence rather than central deterrence between powers. 234 00:21:07,730 --> 00:21:18,170 And I'll get into maybe the nuances of that Q&A to some extent, deterrence, punishment, which historically works a lot less effectively than denial. 235 00:21:18,200 --> 00:21:21,170 Why? Because if you're if you're posture towards punishment, 236 00:21:21,320 --> 00:21:26,510 it's just very difficult to convince your adversary that you would actually be willing to commit to the conflict. 237 00:21:26,510 --> 00:21:28,940 Right. It is very hard to build and establish their resolve. 238 00:21:29,120 --> 00:21:38,180 It's much easier if you're there with your forces and have different policy communities like the much simpler answer of well, well, the Maginot Line. 239 00:21:38,210 --> 00:21:42,860 Right. Or just put put brigades there and will line them up or go along the border and they'll be denial. 240 00:21:43,130 --> 00:21:46,250 We'll do that in Korea and we'll do that in the Baltics and we'll do it elsewhere. 241 00:21:46,280 --> 00:21:49,790 Wherever there's a problem, we'll put the forces and will help solve. 242 00:21:49,850 --> 00:21:55,250 The credibility from this, of course, is overly simplistic, because I will assure you that even if you have a lot of capabilities, 243 00:21:56,090 --> 00:21:58,310 actually a resolve is still much more important to establish. 244 00:21:58,610 --> 00:22:04,100 And there are plenty historical cases where people had really good conventional deterrence by denial. 245 00:22:04,580 --> 00:22:11,420 I think we're discussing that some other section, and I really command people to look at Foreign Affairs article, 246 00:22:11,420 --> 00:22:18,979 I think September issue 2017 by Stephen Cochran, one of our great historians on Soviet Union, called One Face Hitler. 247 00:22:18,980 --> 00:22:21,830 First of all, it's a brilliant read. Just in general. It's just a great article. 248 00:22:22,100 --> 00:22:29,389 But second, towards the end of our will, it gives us something interesting to our discussion here, which was looking back in history. 249 00:22:29,390 --> 00:22:35,240 For that particular case, it's very easy to understand why France or the U.K. couldn't deter Germany from being born. 250 00:22:36,110 --> 00:22:40,880 Which was why could the Soviet Union not deter Germany from invading the Soviet Union in 1941? 251 00:22:41,720 --> 00:22:48,650 So Soviet Union had like easily 170 divisions through Germany, 200 forward position. 252 00:22:49,300 --> 00:22:54,170 It had a tremendous material advantage in armour and they had a tremendous quality advantage, 253 00:22:54,650 --> 00:22:57,740 and they did a lot to signal the extent of US capability. 254 00:22:57,740 --> 00:23:03,830 Why the Soviet Union invited lots of German officers to inspect its military formations so they could see what they had to convince them, 255 00:23:04,010 --> 00:23:07,490 how much stuff they had, what the stuff could do, etc., etc. 256 00:23:07,970 --> 00:23:15,260 It was a big question. So having had all the forces they could possibly need to effect conventional deterrence by the night against Germany, 257 00:23:15,560 --> 00:23:21,530 they did not succeed in dissuading Germany from attacking them in 1941 really fast in case of World War II. 258 00:23:22,910 --> 00:23:27,560 So it really came through an issue of resolve capabilities didn't do it. 259 00:23:28,010 --> 00:23:33,500 Stalin became trapped in his own decision making cycle and path dependent. 260 00:23:35,600 --> 00:23:39,140 He was desperate to avoid a conflict with Germany, 261 00:23:39,560 --> 00:23:46,010 and he got trapped in a set of decisions that signalled very clearly to Hitler that he was desperate to avoid a war. 262 00:23:46,460 --> 00:23:55,640 And then when he received indications that he had gone from general deterrence and potentially even needed, 263 00:23:55,640 --> 00:24:00,050 the Turks received indications that Germany was very likely to attack. 264 00:24:00,560 --> 00:24:07,040 He then got trapped and then he believed that anything he would do to try to further bolster his coercive credibility, 265 00:24:07,310 --> 00:24:11,330 capabilities and resolve would actually lead to the outbreak of the conflict. 266 00:24:11,330 --> 00:24:15,020 Meaning if he made certain moves, they would be perceived as escalatory. 267 00:24:15,020 --> 00:24:19,910 It would be used by Germany as the causes for the war, which we know they ultimately declared. 268 00:24:20,660 --> 00:24:23,510 And so he got trapped in really trying to avoid the conflict. 269 00:24:23,510 --> 00:24:29,540 And then when the time came to take certain steps that may or may not have succeeded in re-establishing deterrence, 270 00:24:29,540 --> 00:24:33,740 but at the very least would give him a much stronger fighting chance in the very various of the war. 271 00:24:33,920 --> 00:24:37,040 He didn't want to do them. He didn't wanna do them because he was told the term. 272 00:24:37,280 --> 00:24:41,180 He was afraid that that would be used as the German justification for invasion. 273 00:24:41,690 --> 00:24:47,839 Right. In Germany. Germany read the Soviet Union incredibly well in 1941, and that's actually, to me, 274 00:24:47,840 --> 00:24:51,800 a much more fascinating case of the outbreak of World War Two than what happened in 1939. 275 00:24:51,860 --> 00:24:52,930 Although we can discuss that, too. 276 00:24:53,300 --> 00:24:59,270 That was much worse than because Sweden had all the men and materiel could possibly want to go to Germany by denial and it didn't work. 277 00:25:00,320 --> 00:25:06,400 Sorry, I kind of harped on this point a bit, but. Okay. 278 00:25:06,440 --> 00:25:17,970 So. Weapons, of course, and capabilities and force structure have a role on how you strategize around deterrence. 279 00:25:20,130 --> 00:25:25,020 One is you define as white flexible tasking around is so early on the strategy of mass retaliation 280 00:25:25,020 --> 00:25:29,129 worked in so far as the United States could retaliate against the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, 281 00:25:29,130 --> 00:25:31,080 but the socioeconomic value against the United States. 282 00:25:31,920 --> 00:25:37,290 So you could credibly have in the terms, by gosh, what strategy were nuclear weapons for an invasion in Europe? 283 00:25:37,380 --> 00:25:44,490 And it would work. And as soon as the Soviet Union developed the credible capability to reach United States with ICBM and whatnot, 284 00:25:44,970 --> 00:25:47,340 that strategy very quickly became incredible, 285 00:25:47,350 --> 00:25:53,730 meaning the deterrence we extended to NATO's European allies wasn't crumbling more because we were basically making the argument the world view, 286 00:25:53,790 --> 00:25:56,850 invade and think. The rest of Germany will trade Washington, D.C. in New York for it. 287 00:25:57,420 --> 00:26:01,290 And the answer to that is that's really easy to say. I'm very sceptical. 288 00:26:01,290 --> 00:26:08,590 You will do it right. And that's where flexible response came about, which was, okay, we did hear the strategy and it was still painful. 289 00:26:09,120 --> 00:26:11,970 These are far from perfect solutions. Right. 290 00:26:12,780 --> 00:26:17,410 KIMBALL To basically say we will have a warfighting fighting strategy of conventional deterrence by the now we 291 00:26:17,430 --> 00:26:22,980 have a nuclear escalation strategy that will also be oriented around denial with tactical nuclear weapons. 292 00:26:23,250 --> 00:26:29,820 And then if the conflict escalates beyond that. Then we will employ strategic nuclear weapons in retaliation. 293 00:26:29,850 --> 00:26:31,170 Right. So it's great you're in here. 294 00:26:32,310 --> 00:26:39,830 And it was a lot of effort was put into making the the first proposal strategic action credible because it wasn't even, for example, 295 00:26:40,650 --> 00:26:46,379 tactical nuclear weapons were intentionally placed in the path of advancing Soviet comes so that that will put needle into a 296 00:26:46,380 --> 00:26:52,920 user to lose that scenario to in some ways increase the likelihood that they would be used very early on in the conflict. 297 00:26:53,070 --> 00:26:57,720 So again, because questions come in to, well, what would you really be the first to use tactical nuclear weapons in the war? 298 00:26:58,170 --> 00:27:03,270 So these are different steps that historically we people have done to use in in setting up their 299 00:27:03,270 --> 00:27:08,250 deterrence strategy in order to try to get credibility where it's not inherently there and. 300 00:27:09,460 --> 00:27:13,780 Some players were very successful in case of France, because when France established a central nuclear deterrent, 301 00:27:13,780 --> 00:27:19,030 they were very credible in the fact that they for sure would use it if the Soviet Union won passage, Germany invaded France. 302 00:27:20,800 --> 00:27:23,860 Good alliance politics. And here is this. 303 00:27:23,860 --> 00:27:31,179 When I hear discussions of it, a lot of times a modern discourse aligned politics is is confused with a deterrence conversation. 304 00:27:31,180 --> 00:27:39,190 In fact, you hear it all the time. Even just recently, NATO's went from a European you're a European reassurance initiative to European deterrence and 305 00:27:39,190 --> 00:27:43,750 I right like you just change the name last year as though you could simply change and say, 306 00:27:43,930 --> 00:27:47,770 okay, we were doing reassurance for allies. Now we're doing deterrence with the same force and capability. 307 00:27:47,950 --> 00:27:54,220 Yeah, that's not at all how it works. Right. So deterrence is principally a conversation with your enemy, your adversary. 308 00:27:54,880 --> 00:27:58,930 Alliance politics is the conversation with the allies, your friends. And they're very two different people. 309 00:27:58,930 --> 00:28:04,839 Right. And they're two different psychological conversations. And the problem you're trying to manage in these issues are very different. 310 00:28:04,840 --> 00:28:09,760 They overlap. I draw a diagram, there's an area of overlap, but it's not like they're completely separate. 311 00:28:10,840 --> 00:28:15,480 There are things that both deter enemies and reassure your allies at the same time. 312 00:28:15,490 --> 00:28:18,430 You can do both for sure. 313 00:28:19,000 --> 00:28:26,080 But it's important, our fear that things that deter don't necessarily assure and things that are sure don't necessarily deter at all. 314 00:28:26,590 --> 00:28:28,480 Right. They're two different things, for example. 315 00:28:30,250 --> 00:28:40,550 But let's let's say a couple of historic cases, introduction of intermediate range weapons in Europe right. 316 00:28:41,290 --> 00:28:46,810 Early. So these might have had a good deterrent effect, 317 00:28:46,930 --> 00:28:52,500 but they created a lot of issues in allied perception and they're worried about being in trap and escalation. 318 00:28:52,520 --> 00:28:59,679 Right. Or where you place your force in them, which forces deployed some like US Marines or units, 319 00:28:59,680 --> 00:29:04,060 let's say in Norway, where if you're in Norway and you're having a conversation during the Cold War, 320 00:29:04,660 --> 00:29:10,720 um, Bosnia, for whatever reason, don't know that Norway border the Soviet Union still borders Russia the entire time of the Cold War. 321 00:29:10,990 --> 00:29:12,880 But nobody had the same way to say, you know, 322 00:29:13,000 --> 00:29:18,550 it'd be really easy for the Soviet Union to invade Natal from Norway and there's nobody there and they just take new territory. 323 00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:22,300 This is a real confusing, though. The Court So what do we do? 324 00:29:22,870 --> 00:29:31,810 Um, in the first sort of first maybe typical, your stance would be as I know the terms by the now I'll put troops over there right, 325 00:29:32,530 --> 00:29:35,679 right on the border with Soviet Union and we go for the punishment. 326 00:29:35,680 --> 00:29:41,409 They can be tripwire troops. Right. And the Norwegian answer might have been, you know, that's a great idea. 327 00:29:41,410 --> 00:29:45,160 Let's get American troops in there. We get skin in the game, will make extend deterrence more credible. 328 00:29:45,170 --> 00:29:52,840 But they're very worried that, well, while that may be a good deterrent, they would fall into the trap problem, 329 00:29:52,840 --> 00:29:56,740 which is the Soviet Union would then respond and put more forces on the border with Norway, 330 00:29:56,950 --> 00:30:04,959 and that would lead to a negative security outcome and then meaning and and that some that the minus and it would prove 331 00:30:04,960 --> 00:30:12,520 escalatory and they would become a trap because now U.S. troops on Norway's border have a say in what happens in the conflict. 332 00:30:12,520 --> 00:30:16,930 Right. Because they can't predict necessarily what the United States will choose to do with the forces, what the interactions will be. 333 00:30:17,260 --> 00:30:24,159 So basically they said, well, you know, what would some let's it's great Doug your forces for assurance but let's put them somewhere much 334 00:30:24,160 --> 00:30:27,460 further down south of Norway so they're not on the border so we don't suffer from these bombs. 335 00:30:28,210 --> 00:30:34,150 So the two different problems you're trying to solve between alliance politics is that in last politics you're managing entrapment versus abandonment. 336 00:30:34,150 --> 00:30:38,680 And this is constantly the Goldilocks zone between allies that you're trying to balance. 337 00:30:39,130 --> 00:30:44,590 So you've got allies that are fearing abandonment, but you won't come to their aid, won't come to the rescue. 338 00:30:44,980 --> 00:30:49,660 And then there is you, of course, being afraid that your allies will get you into a war that you're trying to avoid. 339 00:30:49,870 --> 00:30:52,930 Right. And they'll engage in reckless behaviours. 340 00:30:53,320 --> 00:30:56,890 And alternatively, when you deploy capabilities that your allies really say, look, 341 00:30:56,900 --> 00:31:01,000 we're going to get these brigades, we'll get these capabilities here to deter your enemy. 342 00:31:01,000 --> 00:31:06,880 I got it worse you give them your allies also begin to be a little worried because now they're entrapped by you. 343 00:31:07,210 --> 00:31:11,770 They're not sure what you will do. Well, you don't look, let's say, for example, it's an Asia Pacific region. 344 00:31:12,280 --> 00:31:17,110 Oh, we're maybe 60%. The United States power projection balanced towards the Asia-Pacific region versus Europe. 345 00:31:17,320 --> 00:31:21,250 Okay. We have forces based in Japan. We have forces based in South Korea. 346 00:31:21,820 --> 00:31:29,260 Um, when your allies who are hosting your forces understand that you might be happily willing to engage in a conflict with a pure adversary, 347 00:31:29,410 --> 00:31:32,680 and that conflict will play out primarily on their territory, on their soil. 348 00:31:33,010 --> 00:31:35,379 They're very worried about being potentially trapped. 349 00:31:35,380 --> 00:31:40,600 Right, because you may well survive the conflict with minimal cost, whereas they assuredly will not. 350 00:31:40,750 --> 00:31:42,750 And that's the same problem the Europeans typically air. 351 00:31:43,360 --> 00:31:55,929 Um, so I typically find that, uh, deterrence is actually a lot simpler than alliance politics, and that assurance is almost a bottomless bucket. 352 00:31:55,930 --> 00:31:59,200 Meaning for your own allies that are very full. 353 00:31:59,440 --> 00:32:04,629 You have to consistently do things to assure them. And what's kind of the difference between these activities, what they look like. 354 00:32:04,630 --> 00:32:08,950 So assurance measures typically start from political. 355 00:32:08,990 --> 00:32:15,170 Statements of assurance and commitments by your political leadership to exercise with your allies, 356 00:32:15,620 --> 00:32:19,070 to forward deployed forces on your allies territory that are already there, 357 00:32:19,520 --> 00:32:24,890 to join forces that are integral under command, meaning yours and their are their in their country forward base. 358 00:32:27,560 --> 00:32:33,920 So that you basically go from all establishing all these states to establishing capability to making it integrated. 359 00:32:34,070 --> 00:32:38,389 And in cases, for example, like your idea, we basically don't do that. 360 00:32:38,390 --> 00:32:46,900 We've checked all the box, all the boxes. So. 361 00:32:48,870 --> 00:32:54,300 Conventional deterrence is really the essence of the debate today. 362 00:32:55,320 --> 00:32:59,090 Denial has a much better track record than punishment. 363 00:32:59,100 --> 00:33:03,120 And in some ways, this little picture illustrates to you why? 364 00:33:04,980 --> 00:33:10,540 Because correlation of interests is much more important than the actual correlation of forces employed. 365 00:33:13,290 --> 00:33:19,630 Why is that reliable? Well, because denial, if you have enough force, will convince your adversary that they can't win what works. 366 00:33:20,100 --> 00:33:30,750 Punishment and punishment is problematic because your adversary decides how much is enough and you don't know how much is enough for them. 367 00:33:31,410 --> 00:33:36,410 This is the biggest challenge. Example Kosovo bombing campaign, right. 368 00:33:36,420 --> 00:33:41,490 In 1999. You don't know. Will you have to bomb Serbia for 30 days, 60 days? 369 00:33:42,030 --> 00:33:46,350 78 days? What is actually the breaking point for them to say? 370 00:33:46,560 --> 00:33:52,710 I've taken so much punishment. They are no longer willing to pursue the thing you're trying to target from pursuing. 371 00:33:53,820 --> 00:33:56,340 And how you write that, how you estimate that. 372 00:33:56,730 --> 00:34:04,380 So it's an unsafe bet where punishment, I think, to me is a much better strategy is in two cases, one where denial is basically unobtainium. 373 00:34:04,650 --> 00:34:09,840 Gee, it's great to have the best, but sometimes, you know, you can't let the best be the enemy of the good. 374 00:34:10,320 --> 00:34:15,719 Right. Two, it's way too expensive to do. And if you were to do it anywhere, you'd be bankrupt as a country, 375 00:34:15,720 --> 00:34:20,430 especially if you're a country that handed out extended term guarantees to that large pool map I showed you. 376 00:34:20,580 --> 00:34:27,600 All right. Three. There could be real problems with the things you would need to do to affect the terms by the now. 377 00:34:27,600 --> 00:34:32,190 Because the terms by then, of course, means a very large military presence on somebody else's borders. 378 00:34:32,200 --> 00:34:36,270 Right. And that can lead to serious security dilemmas and force bidding contests. 379 00:34:38,040 --> 00:34:44,400 So the now the dark side is, of course, if everybody has a denial strategy, it can actually result in a really terrible war. 380 00:34:45,060 --> 00:34:48,690 Right. Because what you get are spiral models, decision making. 381 00:34:48,690 --> 00:34:55,200 That is, if everybody gets together and they make the best rational choices that are designed to avoid war, 382 00:34:55,200 --> 00:35:02,820 and everybody says Muslim, in order to make sure that I am secure or to maximise my security, I just need three divisions here. 383 00:35:03,450 --> 00:35:10,290 All right. And that other side sees your three division and says, okay, just to be safe from my end, I also need deterrence by denial. 384 00:35:10,290 --> 00:35:12,810 And I'm going need four divisions on my side of that border. 385 00:35:13,200 --> 00:35:19,950 And you will look back on and your people will have the the key bureaucrat guarding whether we should have more divisions or way more divisions. 386 00:35:20,340 --> 00:35:24,150 And maybe you all decide that you need five now or you need eight or ten, 387 00:35:24,600 --> 00:35:29,639 and we'll keep going and you'll result in a security dilemma and result in a force building contest. 388 00:35:29,640 --> 00:35:37,170 Right. And it will be the consequence of very rational, judicious steps taken to achieve security, at the very least. 389 00:35:37,800 --> 00:35:43,280 Example That's how we stack forces throughout the Cold War, right across across central Germany. 390 00:35:43,290 --> 00:35:45,180 Right. Which we build, build, build, build, build, build, build. 391 00:35:45,480 --> 00:35:51,030 Until we have millions of men under arms and millions of men behind them in ready for mobilisation. 392 00:35:51,030 --> 00:35:57,419 Right. So if I show you the four stacks where that's the classical result of just the force bending contest, and you can get those. 393 00:35:57,420 --> 00:36:05,190 You can make this happen literally anywhere. Prospect theory I had here is basically that, look, principally decision makers, 394 00:36:05,190 --> 00:36:09,030 international affairs are much more willing to take risks to avert what they 395 00:36:09,030 --> 00:36:13,050 perceive are losses rather than take risk to pursue opportunities and gains. 396 00:36:13,290 --> 00:36:17,339 And so we'll have to live with the challenge of conventional deterrence. 397 00:36:17,340 --> 00:36:26,550 By denial is when we create a security dilemma, countries are willing to take much greater risk not to live in a permanent state of insecurity. 398 00:36:27,030 --> 00:36:33,780 If you put them to a decision whether or not option one for them is to live with a large amount of your forces on their borders. 399 00:36:34,290 --> 00:36:38,520 So they're always insecure because you have the capability. They don't know you're in focus. 400 00:36:38,820 --> 00:36:42,690 Your leadership changes, your time can change relations, can change your capabilities. 401 00:36:42,690 --> 00:36:51,300 The write up they may choose to take risks to create a crisis, to avert a Cuban missile crisis, as an example. 402 00:36:51,360 --> 00:36:54,630 All right. So you'd like to deploy Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces and Cuba, right? 403 00:36:55,080 --> 00:36:59,910 I'm not willing to live with 5 minutes worth of north four flight time of missile from Cuba. 404 00:36:59,920 --> 00:37:07,590 I will take the risk of an of a crisis that will lead to a nuclear escalation rather than live in a permanent state of insecurity. 405 00:37:08,370 --> 00:37:14,280 And there are other cases historically, it doesn't always happen, but countries are much more wary about taking these sort of risk. 406 00:37:16,720 --> 00:37:20,310 Right. So. 407 00:37:20,370 --> 00:37:22,920 And here I'll just beat up to wrap up these last few slides. 408 00:37:23,160 --> 00:37:28,800 So messaging and signalling for credibility is one of the biggest challenges, which is everybody tries to sound credible. 409 00:37:29,070 --> 00:37:36,629 How you actually do it to be effective? Well, you need both political messaging where you make claims, commitments, whatnot, 410 00:37:36,630 --> 00:37:43,080 so that going back on them would craft political consequences for your leadership, both in international and domestic politics. 411 00:37:43,860 --> 00:37:49,380 The other one is you take things to basically build up your horde, your chips in chorus of credibility in the game. 412 00:37:49,620 --> 00:37:51,029 You show that you're ready for war. 413 00:37:51,030 --> 00:37:57,389 The Iraqi willing to accept casualties, loss of Russia, for example, dozens with all sorts of domestic readiness, exercise, 414 00:37:57,390 --> 00:38:03,450 mobilisation exercises and civil defence exercise to demonstrate that actually they are preparing for a general total war. 415 00:38:03,600 --> 00:38:05,700 They are willing to accept casualties and losses. 416 00:38:05,910 --> 00:38:10,980 And there's all sorts of people involved in these processes in government that are actually planning for them. 417 00:38:11,880 --> 00:38:16,350 And then in a crisis, you basically you're engaging in a game of competitive risk taking. 418 00:38:16,350 --> 00:38:20,400 So you eliminate some of your own options intentionally to make yourself seem more credible. 419 00:38:20,530 --> 00:38:24,089 But is it is less likely that you will turn away down the path? 420 00:38:24,090 --> 00:38:27,180 You've taken an escalation because you burn your own bridges behind you. 421 00:38:28,170 --> 00:38:32,580 So basically, the ramp up deterrence ultimately is the question around course of credibility, 422 00:38:32,760 --> 00:38:39,270 which is how how would you establish the credibility both with your capabilities, 423 00:38:39,270 --> 00:38:42,990 but mostly with the amount of resolve that you're able to signal to your adversaries? 424 00:38:43,230 --> 00:38:51,150 Alliance politics tend to be, by and large, a quest for assurance how you assure your allies because they always want more and a lot of your allies. 425 00:38:51,480 --> 00:38:55,500 The tricky thing you'll have, Bob, and close allies are sneaky. 426 00:38:56,400 --> 00:38:58,470 At some point they feel assured already. 427 00:38:59,190 --> 00:39:08,400 But because structurally they have an incentive to extract security benefits from their all powerful patron, they will keep not being assured. 428 00:39:08,970 --> 00:39:12,430 Okay. And every year they will come to you for more assurance. 429 00:39:12,870 --> 00:39:18,300 All right. Even though they were assured some time ago. But they will keep come back and say, you know, I'm still very scared. 430 00:39:18,870 --> 00:39:22,810 Last year I needed naval battlegroups. This year I need pack three. 431 00:39:22,830 --> 00:39:26,520 And next year, I'm going to come up with something else I need. And the year after that, I'll be something else. 432 00:39:26,880 --> 00:39:31,560 You know why? Because everyone likes free stuff. Who doesn't like free things? 433 00:39:31,560 --> 00:39:38,370 The security guarantees from the patron. And I can get you in and trap you more in their commitment to my own security guarantees. 434 00:39:38,370 --> 00:39:44,820 Right. So this is why the alliance politics to me is a perpetual quest to get assurance, right? 435 00:39:45,240 --> 00:39:48,600 Okay. Andrew, what about myself? Too much of my time. 436 00:39:49,490 --> 00:39:52,440 I mean, I didn't want to use Ashley Pilgrim.