1 00:00:00,090 --> 00:00:03,690 Comes from the very ambiguity in the word security. 2 00:00:04,530 --> 00:00:07,860 If you think about security, it's a very funny word. 3 00:00:08,460 --> 00:00:12,210 Sometimes it means an objective, notably safety. 4 00:00:12,900 --> 00:00:17,969 And there's a huge literature about whether we are talking about the safety of the nation, 5 00:00:17,970 --> 00:00:22,680 the safety of the individual, safety in the society, the safety of the planet. 6 00:00:23,520 --> 00:00:32,850 And with different recipes for what should be done. And at the same time, in ordinary parlance, it refers to security practices, 7 00:00:33,210 --> 00:00:40,170 whether we're talking about door locks, insurance, police, military forces. 8 00:00:40,560 --> 00:00:50,730 And that spawns a whole lot of different literature, including, for example, the securitisation of high performing security. 9 00:00:51,240 --> 00:00:56,790 I remind you of the importance of the state, which is protecting here. 10 00:00:57,330 --> 00:01:05,069 So if we go back to the military forces analogy by having exercises in the German plane during the Cold War, 11 00:01:05,070 --> 00:01:16,110 it reminded us that a Third World War would be the worst thing that could possibly happen, and therefore we trusted our state to keep it safe. 12 00:01:17,880 --> 00:01:30,000 So what a security culture does is to bring together both objectives and practices more or less harmoniously. 13 00:01:30,690 --> 00:01:35,900 And oh, gosh, I was going to actually read you a definition. 14 00:01:35,910 --> 00:01:44,069 My definition, but then not taking too long to find it, I forgot to get it out. 15 00:01:44,070 --> 00:01:49,220 I wanted to read you a formal definition of how I've defined the security cultures. 16 00:01:49,290 --> 00:01:56,190 It may just mean I think it's just too difficult to find it in my tablet and on a piece of paper. 17 00:01:57,390 --> 00:02:03,990 But basically what it does is it brings together objectives and perhaps it was, but it is quite concrete. 18 00:02:03,990 --> 00:02:10,890 It brings together narratives, tools, apparatuses, infrastructure, 19 00:02:11,280 --> 00:02:21,690 which tend to shape both ways of thinking and ways of doing things and norms about what's right and what's wrong. 20 00:02:22,260 --> 00:02:26,760 Every security culture, for example, has its own set of rules, 21 00:02:27,120 --> 00:02:38,639 and understanding how the narratives and the rules are actually embedded in the practices helps to explain why we go on always doing the same thing. 22 00:02:38,640 --> 00:02:49,680 Why do we always go on having airstrikes against terrorists when actually they're not very effective way of dealing with the problem of terrorism? 23 00:02:50,250 --> 00:02:57,720 And in the case of new wars, why do armed groups go on fighting when they have very little chance of winning? 24 00:02:58,950 --> 00:03:05,069 So how do these persistent ways of doing things keep going? 25 00:03:05,070 --> 00:03:20,370 That's what I'm interested in and what I think it's quite useful just very briefly to distinguish it from a term that's used in strategic studies, 26 00:03:20,700 --> 00:03:22,590 which is strategic culture. 27 00:03:23,550 --> 00:03:36,180 So strategic culture was kind of invented by the RAND Corporation because the Russians didn't act the way that game arising expected them to act. 28 00:03:37,530 --> 00:03:41,580 They expected them to respond to several moves and they didn't. 29 00:03:42,360 --> 00:03:48,270 And so they started to explain it in terms of what they called strategic culture. 30 00:03:49,260 --> 00:03:53,910 And that spawned a huge literature which I won't go into here. 31 00:03:53,940 --> 00:04:02,639 Colin Grey is probably the most famous exponent of strategic culture, but I just want to say it's quite useful to talk about that, 32 00:04:02,640 --> 00:04:07,860 to explain why my concept is different and why is my concept different. 33 00:04:07,890 --> 00:04:11,970 First of all, it's not necessarily military. 34 00:04:12,000 --> 00:04:22,350 I'm interested in security cultures which I've engaged with, engage in, or try to address political violence. 35 00:04:22,680 --> 00:04:33,990 And so some security cultures, maybe more policing or what I call the liberal peace, the UN type peace agreement type security culture. 36 00:04:34,290 --> 00:04:39,750 It's not necessarily a military culture. So that's the first way it changes. 37 00:04:40,140 --> 00:04:44,280 Secondly, and this is probably more important, it's not national. 38 00:04:44,880 --> 00:04:51,900 Instead of being about the way in which military culture is imbued with national characteristics. 39 00:04:52,410 --> 00:04:55,830 It's about a way of doing culture. 40 00:04:56,100 --> 00:04:59,100 So if you think about cultures as having boundaries, 41 00:04:59,700 --> 00:05:09,379 then you can think that the man in the Pentagon usually is a and has more in common with the man 42 00:05:09,380 --> 00:05:16,140 in the Russian Ministry of Defence than he does with the peacekeeper or the humanitarian work. 43 00:05:17,550 --> 00:05:29,250 And so it's about ways of doing things rather than about it's a functional definition of culture rather than a national definition of culture. 44 00:05:30,060 --> 00:05:38,940 And the final difference, although not all strategic culture, serious concern with the difference is that for me, cultures constructed. 45 00:05:39,720 --> 00:05:47,070 So what's interesting about the concept of culture is how gets reproduced and how it's constantly changing. 46 00:05:47,550 --> 00:05:53,010 Whereas the old strategic culture theatre has tended to be a bit essentialist. 47 00:05:53,670 --> 00:05:59,540 So they would say, Well, Britain has a navy because it's surrounded by sea and it's always having. 48 00:06:00,480 --> 00:06:06,690 So that's a cultural explanation as to why Britain put so much emphasis on the Navy. 49 00:06:07,230 --> 00:06:16,020 Whereas this kind of explanation, we would have to understand how is it that you get in a constructivist approach? 50 00:06:16,020 --> 00:06:24,480 How is it that you somehow choose some traditions and not others, and which traditions do you choose to reproduce? 51 00:06:25,320 --> 00:06:32,160 And in the book, I define four cultures and I discuss each of them, and I talk about their genealogy, 52 00:06:32,160 --> 00:06:37,650 their history, how they evolved to become what they are that compete on today's landscape. 53 00:06:38,070 --> 00:06:43,500 And my point really is that whereas we tend to think, whereas in the Cold War, 54 00:06:43,500 --> 00:06:50,940 we actually had a single geopolitical security culture, that was the Cold War culture, 55 00:06:50,940 --> 00:07:00,690 and everybody sort of agreed that the level of military spending and the number of military forces was a kind of measure indicator of how much power. 56 00:07:01,470 --> 00:07:12,780 And because everyone shared that culture and there was a set of beliefs that underpinned the role of military force if it was a rather stable system. 57 00:07:13,020 --> 00:07:17,250 And that helped you identify the hierarchy of states. 58 00:07:17,880 --> 00:07:29,940 And instead today, I think we have for I broadly define them, but they overlap and change competing cultures and my culture's geopolitics, 59 00:07:29,940 --> 00:07:34,920 which is the heritage of the Cold War, which still dominates defence budgets, 60 00:07:35,580 --> 00:07:43,090 new wars, the war on terror, and the Liberal piece which is the US and the EU. 61 00:07:43,620 --> 00:07:49,200 The EU and each of these cultures are deeply embedded in forms of political authority. 62 00:07:49,560 --> 00:07:56,580 So geopolitics is very much about the nation state, about blogs, about great powers. 63 00:07:58,080 --> 00:08:01,590 The war on terror is very much about US exceptionalism, 64 00:08:01,600 --> 00:08:07,259 although other countries are following the liberal pieces about the emergence 65 00:08:07,260 --> 00:08:13,320 of international institutions and how they how they legitimise themselves. 66 00:08:13,740 --> 00:08:21,450 And new wars, which I'm going to talk about, is very much about what in the literature is referred to as hybrid authority, 67 00:08:21,450 --> 00:08:26,220 new types of formal and informal local authorities. 68 00:08:27,630 --> 00:08:33,020 So that's broadly my introduction to what I mean by security campuses. 69 00:08:33,030 --> 00:08:40,020 And now I just want to explain a little bit about new wars as a culture. 70 00:08:41,220 --> 00:08:48,360 So that's the next thing I'm going to do. And in terms of the genealogy, I think if I want. 71 00:08:48,500 --> 00:08:52,700 To say that New Orleans is the culture involved. 72 00:08:52,700 --> 00:09:01,130 It's a form of irregular warfare and irregular warfare being only defined when regular ones were defined. 73 00:09:02,090 --> 00:09:06,620 So although there are much alien to irregular warfare, 74 00:09:06,920 --> 00:09:15,740 it really came into being in the 17th and 18th century and with the rise of formal states and militaries, the rise of geopolitics. 75 00:09:17,240 --> 00:09:23,540 But I think in a lot of the literature, new wars are said to be civil wars, which I've always rejected, 76 00:09:24,560 --> 00:09:34,820 because I think new wars are a contrast both to inter-state wars and the civil wars of the 17th 86 to the seventies and eighties. 77 00:09:35,240 --> 00:09:46,940 But I think that New Wars evolved very much out of the interplay between revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency. 78 00:09:47,420 --> 00:09:54,350 That's the origin, which was counterinsurgency, largely international and revolutionary warfare. 79 00:09:54,360 --> 00:09:59,000 So there were, if you like, internationalised civil wars. 80 00:09:59,780 --> 00:10:03,830 And actually, I just came back from Colombia and was talking to a nurse about it. 81 00:10:04,160 --> 00:10:08,600 And it's fascinating in the light of the evolution I'm going to talk about, 82 00:10:08,900 --> 00:10:14,120 to think about Colombia in this light, because the Colombian war is the same. 83 00:10:15,110 --> 00:10:23,360 It started as a classic left right civil war, but gradually took on new war characteristics. 84 00:10:25,010 --> 00:10:29,000 So just very briefly, the story of this evolution. 85 00:10:29,660 --> 00:10:37,000 Revolutionary warfare began after the Second World War as a way of getting around concentrations of massive shows. 86 00:10:37,460 --> 00:10:46,820 The revolutionaries knew they could never win if they directly opposed the state because the state was so much stronger, more powerful. 87 00:10:48,080 --> 00:10:52,130 So the only way they could win was politically wrong of the military. 88 00:10:53,180 --> 00:11:00,080 They could win by controlling more and more territory politically. 89 00:11:00,770 --> 00:11:11,540 And so how did they do that? They established safe havens in the border areas, in jungles, on mountaintops, and even in cities, 90 00:11:11,540 --> 00:11:17,360 as was the case in Algeria, where they had the support politically of the local population. 91 00:11:18,170 --> 00:11:24,860 And from there, they carried out attrition attacks on the strategic coast. 92 00:11:25,220 --> 00:11:30,880 And the idea was they would wear down the enemy and eventually they would win politically. 93 00:11:31,400 --> 00:11:36,260 Actually, Mao and the Vietnamese theorist whose name I could never pronounce, 94 00:11:36,740 --> 00:11:45,980 did actually think at the end you would require conventional warfare, as indeed was the case in both the Chinese and Vietnamese wars. 95 00:11:46,910 --> 00:11:50,570 But in general, the idea was that you won politically. 96 00:11:51,290 --> 00:12:02,359 Well, counterinsurgency developed in response to these wars, and you have the experience of the Portuguese in Mozambique, 97 00:12:02,360 --> 00:12:10,010 the British in the that the French and Americans in Indochina, the French in Algeria. 98 00:12:10,610 --> 00:12:21,900 And you always had a division among counterinsurgency theorists between what nowadays is called the enemy century, 99 00:12:21,950 --> 00:12:27,650 more coercive approaches in which you try to kill as many revolutionaries as possible, 100 00:12:28,340 --> 00:12:32,930 and you try to extract information through horrible forms of torture. 101 00:12:33,770 --> 00:12:38,520 And all sorts of techniques were developed in this enemy centric, 102 00:12:38,540 --> 00:12:45,229 including population displacement, so that the people could no longer support the revolutionaries. 103 00:12:45,230 --> 00:12:54,470 They would poison the city for the fish. Mao always said the guerrilla was the fish in the sea and the people in the sea and sieges, 104 00:12:56,840 --> 00:13:03,140 the use of area destruction, weapons to destroy crops and the things that people lived by. 105 00:13:04,370 --> 00:13:11,510 And what pretty Dickensian corporate pseudo governance which you developed in Kenya. 106 00:13:11,900 --> 00:13:21,650 Also the French guerrillas, counterinsurgency theories, troops that had these maps in Algeria, who was sort of fake insurgents. 107 00:13:22,310 --> 00:13:26,570 I won't go into the population. I actually all of these wars. 108 00:13:26,570 --> 00:13:36,110 The other approach was to try to compete through winning hearts and minds, and that was the approach supposedly of Templar in Malaya. 109 00:13:36,440 --> 00:13:43,580 Although wherever, if you look closely at all of these wars, you always find coercive tactics as well. 110 00:13:44,870 --> 00:13:48,320 So I think a very key moment was the 1980. 111 00:13:49,050 --> 00:13:52,560 With the low intensity conflicts of the 1980s, 112 00:13:52,920 --> 00:14:05,880 what you got was sort of the multiplication of a few like student gangs of fermenting sectarianism was another mechanism used as a form of insurgency. 113 00:14:06,870 --> 00:14:18,839 And, you know, if you're talking about the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, UNITA in Angola, 114 00:14:18,840 --> 00:14:30,360 the paramilitaries in Colombia, they kind of they were local non-state actors who adopted the techniques of counterinsurgency. 115 00:14:30,930 --> 00:14:38,010 And I think it's out of that evolution that comes new wars now, along with that evolution. 116 00:14:38,520 --> 00:14:46,050 There's another element that you have to take into account, which is the changed economic and political circumstances. 117 00:14:47,220 --> 00:14:56,070 These were conflicts fundamentally about whether revolutionaries were opposing colonial or oppressive regimes. 118 00:14:59,030 --> 00:15:09,860 In in the context of the 1980s, you had the opening up of authoritarian regimes, both economically and politically. 119 00:15:10,010 --> 00:15:17,050 And that process of liberalisation created new factors which also contribute to the. 120 00:15:18,170 --> 00:15:25,210 One is the way that the state greatly enriched ends, 121 00:15:26,990 --> 00:15:38,479 whether it was through privatisation or whether it was through access to aid contracts or whether it was through bribery related to all sales. 122 00:15:38,480 --> 00:15:46,310 There were a whole lot of new mechanisms through which some kind of relationship with the state could lead to enrichment. 123 00:15:46,340 --> 00:15:58,610 My colleague Alex, while talks about the political marketplace really to describe the monetisation of clans mystic relations, 124 00:15:58,610 --> 00:16:07,280 most of these authoritarian regimes were based on client relations, but it became literally based on money. 125 00:16:08,150 --> 00:16:16,790 After the 1980s and competing for funds meant competing for access to the state. 126 00:16:17,090 --> 00:16:22,580 And in order to get access to the state, you actually needed the money. 127 00:16:22,880 --> 00:16:28,730 So even if you weren't fundamentally corrupt, you wanted some good program to introduce. 128 00:16:29,150 --> 00:16:36,890 Actually, you needed to have a political budget as part of your bargaining process in the government. 129 00:16:37,370 --> 00:16:44,240 And of course, this was also leading to high unemployment and high inequality in many of these societies. 130 00:16:44,810 --> 00:16:51,530 Along with that, you had political liberalisation and new demands for democracy. 131 00:16:53,150 --> 00:17:07,720 And what you notice is that many of the new rules actually begin as democracy movements, whether you're talking about Ukraine, Bosnia, Syria. 132 00:17:08,390 --> 00:17:20,750 They start as democracy amendments, which are often addressed to these new rich elites, and they get transformed into sectarian conflicts. 133 00:17:22,070 --> 00:17:26,090 And that's part of the new war process, which I'll come to in a moment. 134 00:17:26,570 --> 00:17:28,700 So these are the kind of conditions. 135 00:17:28,700 --> 00:17:43,220 And if I now talk about how did new wounds differ from the civil wars of the 5670s, it'll give you more of an idea of what I'm talking about. 136 00:17:43,880 --> 00:17:53,990 So, first of all, obviously, the goals as I said, the goals of the revolutionaries were social transformation. 137 00:17:54,140 --> 00:17:58,990 They had programs. They wanted to introduce socialist programs. 138 00:17:59,000 --> 00:18:04,460 They wanted to get control of the whole state in order to carry out different policies. 139 00:18:04,970 --> 00:18:13,730 Whereas the goals of the new war actors are very much access to the state because it's access to reform, 140 00:18:14,000 --> 00:18:18,280 and so it's access to the apparatus of the state. 141 00:18:18,290 --> 00:18:24,230 You don't actually need to even control the state. And in fact, you probably benefit from the state being weak. 142 00:18:26,680 --> 00:18:32,030 Secondly, you just. 143 00:18:35,140 --> 00:18:48,940 The actors who were the actors. So the actors in the Civil Wars were basically guerilla revolutionaries who very much regard themselves as soldiers. 144 00:18:49,330 --> 00:18:55,299 I was told by someone who was going through the archives of the Red Cross that they found a letter from Che 145 00:18:55,300 --> 00:19:02,590 Guevara asking how he should be treating his prisoners of war according to international humanitarian law. 146 00:19:02,830 --> 00:19:14,890 So they very much regard themselves as an army in warning to the actors in the new rules on networks of mercenaries, warlords, paramilitaries. 147 00:19:15,190 --> 00:19:21,940 But I think there's one very important difference, which William Renan, who writes about war in Africa, draws attention to. 148 00:19:22,840 --> 00:19:24,670 In the fifties and sixties, 149 00:19:25,030 --> 00:19:34,360 some students sitting in the classroom would dream of being a left wing guerrilla and would go to the mountains and stop their movement. 150 00:19:34,390 --> 00:19:38,770 So the revolutionary movements were very much led by young intellectuals. 151 00:19:40,240 --> 00:19:45,490 After 89, those same students wanted to become civil society activists. 152 00:19:46,180 --> 00:19:52,180 They wanted to be support movements for democracy and the warlords. 153 00:19:52,180 --> 00:19:55,870 Rebels very often came out of the government themselves. 154 00:19:56,530 --> 00:20:02,560 They became they were much more war lords. It was a different type of leadership altogether. 155 00:20:02,590 --> 00:20:12,399 They might become a criminal gang. And as mafia types or local warlords, they were the ones who didn't want to lose their positions. 156 00:20:12,400 --> 00:20:24,220 And they often allied with what William Reno calls parochial rebels, vigilante gangs, local, local, armed groups who join in with these networks. 157 00:20:24,580 --> 00:20:33,310 So the actors and of course, they are linked in various ways to global networks, which I can talk about in a minute. 158 00:20:34,660 --> 00:20:38,900 So the actors are different. Thirdly, the narratives are different. 159 00:20:38,920 --> 00:20:41,110 This is where we come sectarianism. 160 00:20:41,710 --> 00:20:51,690 And I think sectarianism was the manipulation of sectarian narratives has been very much a way of dealing with the democracy movement, 161 00:20:51,760 --> 00:20:55,500 as you see it very clearly in the centre. 162 00:20:55,510 --> 00:21:04,419 And we also saw it very clearly in Bosnia that whereas the democracy movements were, they called themselves civic movements, 163 00:21:04,420 --> 00:21:10,750 they called themselves the multi, multi, multi movements, multicultural, multi-religious, multi, linguistic. 164 00:21:11,680 --> 00:21:20,290 And the people who took part in the democracy protests were by and large not the same people who took part in the war. 165 00:21:20,710 --> 00:21:23,710 The war was fought very often by poor, 166 00:21:23,710 --> 00:21:33,430 unemployed young men who were drawn into the Bosnian army of the Croats or so and so saw joining the militia as a source of income, 167 00:21:33,940 --> 00:21:38,200 and also often came from the countryside where the sects were. 168 00:21:39,040 --> 00:21:44,080 The sort of idea of belonging to a particular sect was much stronger than in the towns. 169 00:21:44,710 --> 00:21:49,510 And you see exactly the same thing happening in Syria. 170 00:21:49,570 --> 00:21:53,860 In the demonstrations there were lots of slogans, same in Ukraine. 171 00:21:53,860 --> 00:22:00,940 We are one where anti sectarianism, we believe in a political state. 172 00:22:01,300 --> 00:22:06,100 And then you got these sectarian entrepreneurs and it's very often funded by the 173 00:22:06,100 --> 00:22:12,040 government creating these militia groups who again consisted of poor young men, 174 00:22:12,370 --> 00:22:21,730 often from the countryside. While the protest movement, like the protest movement in Bosnia, turned themselves in to civil society, 175 00:22:22,150 --> 00:22:28,240 they started providing humanitarian aid, negotiating ceasefires, this kind of thing. 176 00:22:29,470 --> 00:22:35,890 And then I think what happens is that sectarianism is constructed through violence. 177 00:22:36,190 --> 00:22:42,759 And this is a very important part of my argument. All of us have multiple identities. 178 00:22:42,760 --> 00:22:47,920 The fact that we belong to West, we're Croat, we're Muslim, 179 00:22:48,490 --> 00:22:58,780 we're Hindu is not usually are most predominant against we're scholars, we're mothers with grandmothers. 180 00:22:59,440 --> 00:23:03,220 We're also we're British, we're whatever. 181 00:23:03,910 --> 00:23:10,690 And it's only when somebody is trying to kill you and you're threatened with death because of who you are, 182 00:23:11,140 --> 00:23:15,340 that sectarianism becomes the most dominant narrative. 183 00:23:15,820 --> 00:23:18,980 And I think that's what's really happening, 184 00:23:19,510 --> 00:23:31,270 is that you start with sectarian killings and gradually people turn to the side that's most likely to protect them, which is people of their own. 185 00:23:31,270 --> 00:23:35,170 And they gradually getting. With sectarian cartoons. 186 00:23:37,630 --> 00:23:41,620 And tactics again. 187 00:23:41,830 --> 00:23:50,920 The big change in a lot of the literature on irregular war is a distinction drawn between guerrillas and terrorists and guerrillas. 188 00:23:51,400 --> 00:23:59,290 Direct attacks on strategic targets, terrorists, direct attack attacks on non-combatants. 189 00:23:59,650 --> 00:24:10,420 New wars are definitely terrorist. New wars gain political control that like the guerrillas, very, very name is political control. 190 00:24:10,960 --> 00:24:19,600 But unlike the guerrillas, they gain their political control by usually by forcible displacement, 191 00:24:19,600 --> 00:24:28,840 by getting rid of anybody who challenges their political control, whether it's civil society groups or people of a different ethnicity. 192 00:24:29,170 --> 00:24:33,370 And forced displacement is the most typical tactic of new wars, 193 00:24:33,760 --> 00:24:45,070 whether it's through whether it's through a whole series of tactics, killing a few people so that other people run away. 194 00:24:46,060 --> 00:24:49,270 Sexual violence, the destruction of cultural heritage. 195 00:24:49,660 --> 00:24:56,110 All of these are the typical tactics of new wars, and I've written a lot about that, so I'm not going to go into it. 196 00:24:56,220 --> 00:25:01,510 But one thing I want to add is about technology, 197 00:25:02,380 --> 00:25:11,170 because there's a lot of discussion about how technology is changing the way of war and how the introduction 198 00:25:11,170 --> 00:25:16,150 of information and communications technology could bring about a revolution in military facts. 199 00:25:16,960 --> 00:25:20,980 And the question is, what about new wars? Are there technologies? 200 00:25:20,980 --> 00:25:25,030 And there definitely are to billion, which is associated with new wars. 201 00:25:25,030 --> 00:25:28,690 And information and communications technologies are very important, 202 00:25:29,170 --> 00:25:39,040 very important in an obvious sense that new wars are fought by news networks that are really held 203 00:25:39,040 --> 00:25:46,419 together by the narrative and that are able to communicate in general through the new technologies, 204 00:25:46,420 --> 00:25:49,660 whether it's mobile phones or social media. 205 00:25:50,050 --> 00:25:54,100 So communication is very crucial for the new networks. 206 00:25:55,120 --> 00:26:02,679 But also there are all kinds of tactics that are copied from war to war, like, for example, 207 00:26:02,680 --> 00:26:13,720 the use of improvised explosive devices news which have improved in lives as new wars learn from each other. 208 00:26:14,110 --> 00:26:20,290 And they do actually make news, even though I tend to call this vernacular high technology, 209 00:26:21,100 --> 00:26:31,390 because it's about using everyday available materials for military purposes, whether it's fertilisers or plastic bottles or whatever. 210 00:26:31,930 --> 00:26:37,260 But they often use very sophisticated triggering devices like mobile phones. 211 00:26:37,270 --> 00:26:45,520 So the new technology gets combined with these everyday and available materials. 212 00:26:45,910 --> 00:27:02,200 And of course the final difference is economic, which is that the civil wars by and large were financed by income from the socialist block. 213 00:27:03,190 --> 00:27:16,719 They got support from China, the Soviet Union and Cuba, and also taxation in the areas that they controlled both of those sources. 214 00:27:16,720 --> 00:27:21,090 Well, the first source dried up after the end of the Cold War. 215 00:27:22,810 --> 00:27:26,500 And the second source, taxation becomes incredibly difficult. 216 00:27:27,010 --> 00:27:33,580 And in the context of economic liberalisation, tax revenues to the state dropped dramatically. 217 00:27:34,360 --> 00:27:44,230 Public spending drops. And in the context where control is maintained through maintaining disorder, it's terribly difficult to raise taxes. 218 00:27:44,890 --> 00:27:48,070 So what are the new sources of income? 219 00:27:48,070 --> 00:27:57,580 Of course there are external donors and this is very obvious in Syria where you're getting external private donors very often from the Gulf. 220 00:27:58,630 --> 00:28:07,030 But you multiply that money by all sorts of domestic economic activities which are linked to violence. 221 00:28:07,360 --> 00:28:17,500 So it could be very obvious activities like loot, extortion at checkpoints, hostage taking. 222 00:28:18,280 --> 00:28:29,560 It can also be smuggling. And most wars have their own characteristic commodity that struggled, that smuggled drugs for Colombia or Afghanistan. 223 00:28:30,340 --> 00:28:33,670 Oil and antiquities in Iraq and Syria. 224 00:28:35,260 --> 00:28:43,739 Diamonds and. In Angola so that when you bring all these characteristics together, 225 00:28:43,740 --> 00:28:49,590 what you get is the establishment of what I might call we might call hybrid authority 226 00:28:49,590 --> 00:28:57,000 local authorities based on armed groups whose authority depends on perpetual disorder. 227 00:28:59,190 --> 00:29:04,850 And it's reproduced through the incentives to the armed groups. 228 00:29:04,860 --> 00:29:12,210 The reason why the armed groups go on fighting, even though they can't win, is because they actually benefit from the violence. 229 00:29:12,600 --> 00:29:17,780 And they benefit from the violence either politically because it helps them to promote 230 00:29:17,790 --> 00:29:23,759 a sectarian narrative which most people don't accept outside the conditions of fear. 231 00:29:23,760 --> 00:29:33,270 Some people may do, and they benefit economically because after a while the economic activities become an end to the incentives. 232 00:29:34,140 --> 00:29:37,709 And I think you saw these changes in the Colombia case, 233 00:29:37,710 --> 00:29:49,080 both in terms of the nature of the revolutionary leadership and in terms of the economic sources that funded 234 00:29:50,370 --> 00:29:57,230 the wars and in terms of the change in tactics which became much more violent and civilian once said. 235 00:29:58,660 --> 00:30:03,090 So let me just I should really end very soon, shouldn't I? 236 00:30:03,420 --> 00:30:11,790 I wanted to say a little bit about how new wars are changing, and I'll do that in a headline. 237 00:30:13,170 --> 00:30:20,070 So I think what I was interested in my book was how it interacts with the other security cultures. 238 00:30:20,100 --> 00:30:25,229 And one one thing I've developed is the idea of hybrid peace, 239 00:30:25,230 --> 00:30:30,780 which is not exactly the same as that developed by Oliver Richmond and Wigginton, although it's not inconsistent, 240 00:30:31,260 --> 00:30:38,610 which is what happens when you impose liberal peace, i.e. an international top down international peace agreement, 241 00:30:38,850 --> 00:30:43,560 just the sort of thing in that study with new wars. 242 00:30:43,680 --> 00:30:48,960 And what you get is a kind of entrenchment of the culture with less violence. 243 00:30:49,740 --> 00:30:50,460 They manage. 244 00:30:50,820 --> 00:31:01,890 In a way, the international community is guaranteeing hybrid authority and local levels, which allows them to continue their predatory activities. 245 00:31:03,000 --> 00:31:06,270 So that time I could expand on that. 246 00:31:06,720 --> 00:31:14,640 But Bosnia is the perfect case. Then you can talk about hybrid war, which I think is both Ukraine and Syria, 247 00:31:14,640 --> 00:31:23,580 where you get either the geopolitics or the war on terror, intervening to greatly exacerbate violence and the level of casualties. 248 00:31:24,690 --> 00:31:25,880 And I won't go into that. 249 00:31:25,890 --> 00:31:35,150 And then the final one is the is the combination of the war on terror within the wars, which was typical of Iraq and Afghanistan, 250 00:31:35,150 --> 00:31:40,740 and in my view, which is probably quite controversial, it actually produces jihadism. 251 00:31:41,520 --> 00:31:49,950 So I see ISIS is actually a product of what was effectively a new war in Iraq superimposed on the war on terror. 252 00:31:51,080 --> 00:31:57,450 And we could and I sort of speculate in the book about whether this represents yet a new culture, 253 00:31:57,870 --> 00:32:03,750 because I'd sister rather different from other new world groups. 254 00:32:03,960 --> 00:32:12,930 But I won't talk about that now. I just want to conclude by saying something about what is the utility of a country's approach? 255 00:32:13,200 --> 00:32:17,490 Why is it worth doing? Well, in a very obvious sense, 256 00:32:17,850 --> 00:32:29,250 it's an alternative to the contest approach in which the only answer is either winning or losing or imposing a top down political agreement. 257 00:32:30,810 --> 00:32:33,780 But also, I think once you see it as a culture, 258 00:32:34,470 --> 00:32:45,990 you can identify contradictions and dilemmas and irritants in the culture that might offer you different pathways for getting out of the culture. 259 00:32:47,190 --> 00:32:52,649 So for example, if we think about new wars, I mean, 260 00:32:52,650 --> 00:33:02,130 I think one of the contradictions arises from the fact that they are integrated and we can't insulate ourselves from them, 261 00:33:02,520 --> 00:33:06,930 whether it's refugees, whether it's terrorism, 262 00:33:07,800 --> 00:33:10,800 or whether it's things like London property prices, 263 00:33:11,160 --> 00:33:18,600 which have risen so dramatically because it's breeding money in so many of the 264 00:33:18,600 --> 00:33:23,520 most expensive houses in London and New Orleans and the Russian oligarchs. 265 00:33:25,320 --> 00:33:36,210 And so these cut these kinds of effects on our own society to force us to think not just to treat them as something over there, but force us to think. 266 00:33:38,170 --> 00:33:52,090 A second way in, which is that actually predatory activities have limits in the sense that predatory activities are unproductive. 267 00:33:52,870 --> 00:33:59,350 So once you've taken the assets of one particular area and you can't do it again and you have to move on. 268 00:34:00,070 --> 00:34:04,780 And so there are limits to how long you can sustain predatory activities. 269 00:34:05,290 --> 00:34:12,970 And that may mean that you have to shift to more productive activities, which then would shift the incentives. 270 00:34:13,990 --> 00:34:18,370 And the third is just public awareness that I think was terribly important in 271 00:34:18,370 --> 00:34:26,650 understanding why the march of violence in Iraq in the leg in 2008 to 9 came to an end. 272 00:34:28,330 --> 00:34:34,000 And public weariness, I think, is also linked to what I might call irritants in the culture. 273 00:34:34,690 --> 00:34:39,490 And what do I mean by irritants? Well, I mean the heritage of those democratic movements, 274 00:34:39,880 --> 00:34:50,620 the civil society groups who are often the first to be targeted and who often get weak as a result of me was nevertheless what you find. 275 00:34:50,980 --> 00:34:59,500 All of these wars. A key characteristic, in a way, is that it's very fragmented and very decentralised, 276 00:34:59,830 --> 00:35:06,130 and it's always possible to find alternative places where the war has hardly touched. 277 00:35:07,210 --> 00:35:13,600 And there may be reasons for this. It may be that local people have negotiated ceasefires. 278 00:35:14,020 --> 00:35:21,660 It's extraordinary how many ceasefires have been negotiated in Syria, according to one count, 44 in the last year alone. 279 00:35:22,870 --> 00:35:30,429 It may be because, particularly in times, people are absolutely desperate for clean water, 280 00:35:30,430 --> 00:35:37,420 electricity, fuel, and they have to negotiate military agreements to reach that. 281 00:35:38,950 --> 00:35:43,120 It may be just local people who are worried about the education of their children. 282 00:35:43,120 --> 00:35:48,700 There are all kinds of elements of what I call civic civilians that are to be found in 283 00:35:49,100 --> 00:35:55,150 was always but we never focus on them because we always focus on the violent events. 284 00:35:55,870 --> 00:36:05,020 I'm actually trying to think about and trying to map things might be an alternative way of trying to develop alternative cultures. 285 00:36:05,320 --> 00:36:10,899 And so I think the interesting thing about the cultural approach is that it gives you a 286 00:36:10,900 --> 00:36:18,580 whole different take on how you navigate away from traditional approaches to contests.