1 00:00:01,820 --> 00:00:06,799 Thanks very much. And hello, everyone, and welcome to The Talk. 2 00:00:06,800 --> 00:00:15,580 Thank you very much for having me here. And. This is a project that I'm working with, the King's College London. 3 00:00:15,820 --> 00:00:19,570 I'm trying to reconceptualize the conflict, the contemporary conflict in Somalia. 4 00:00:19,990 --> 00:00:28,490 And. Thank. 5 00:00:30,040 --> 00:00:34,570 Yeah. This presentation is pretty the more historical. 6 00:00:35,830 --> 00:00:40,900 And it starts with the 1980s, in the 1990 and 1990, in the early 1990s, 7 00:00:41,200 --> 00:00:46,170 during the peak of the conflict in Somalia, when the conflict become more and more. 8 00:00:46,540 --> 00:00:52,510 But I would be able, during the discussion of question and answer, to answer the questions about al-Shabab contemporary conflict in Somalia. 9 00:00:53,640 --> 00:00:58,020 And let me start the armed conflict with your own clan. 10 00:00:58,020 --> 00:01:03,450 Tribal or ethnic bases have been a kind of fugitive on the African continent over the years. 11 00:01:03,720 --> 00:01:10,890 Reclamation with one aspect of violence has resulted in an incomplete picture, since it obscures the other forms of violence. 12 00:01:11,370 --> 00:01:21,810 In a famous study in 2001, Nicholas Burns curiously enquired What ethnic and ethnic civil wars have the same causes? 13 00:01:22,990 --> 00:01:26,410 Unquote. Without engaging directly with Somalis. 14 00:01:26,650 --> 00:01:35,530 Two years later, in 2003, Stathis Calvert thought he had left with proper answers to the phenomena and came to the 15 00:01:35,530 --> 00:01:40,959 conclusion that political violence is not the same as personal violence or any other violence, 16 00:01:40,960 --> 00:01:48,410 for that matter. So exploring the case of the military regime of General Mohammed Siad Barre in Somalia from 1969 to 1991 17 00:01:48,890 --> 00:01:54,680 reveals that both cleavages and in some balance theories made potential analysis for the Somali case. 18 00:01:55,370 --> 00:02:00,740 Political violence, carried out in the name of clan but investigated by state authorities, 19 00:02:01,010 --> 00:02:05,090 was part of the everyday politics in Somalia during the military regime. 20 00:02:06,420 --> 00:02:11,999 But how to? The two different dynamics I negotiated with in everyday realities has been a 21 00:02:12,000 --> 00:02:15,710 challenge to Scotland in sustaining the conflict in Somalia for many years. 22 00:02:15,720 --> 00:02:19,680 This phenomenon has perplexed, even if not baffling, political scientist, 23 00:02:19,680 --> 00:02:27,000 armed bandits and and those who are trying to establish Somali society and state, both theoretician and practitioner. 24 00:02:28,260 --> 00:02:35,900 This mainly because and this is not the violence unleashed by the shadow regime of civilian rule. 25 00:02:36,090 --> 00:02:42,030 It is reign and the clan convulsions that followed it after 1991 is all within 26 00:02:42,030 --> 00:02:47,100 the same intersecting lines of what I call group to call it bloated boundaries. 27 00:02:48,440 --> 00:02:56,280 Violence, whether orchestrated by the state or initiated by a nanny state or extended state actors, is conceived as singular in Somalia. 28 00:02:56,300 --> 00:03:01,460 Such are the two cases. Related observers on the Somali case insist the affirmative. 29 00:03:02,210 --> 00:03:05,540 But however, violence is not as simple as it seems on the surface. 30 00:03:05,780 --> 00:03:13,549 But rather a more complicated case. A closer examination, one that draws from the context on the fieldwork show, 31 00:03:13,550 --> 00:03:20,970 is that the political of the political violence in Somalia lies in the clear underlining dichotomy of both and cases. 32 00:03:21,410 --> 00:03:28,760 It is often difficult to dissect the difference between violence carried out by the state authorities and one conducted by a client or even a subclan. 33 00:03:29,390 --> 00:03:31,220 Failing to distinguish between the two. 34 00:03:31,520 --> 00:03:40,640 Many scholars conceptualise in the state violence as a clan war or clone wars, which promoted the critical conflicts and conundrums in Somalia, 35 00:03:41,780 --> 00:03:47,390 would be both two conceptual challenges one distinguishing the violence from societal violence. 36 00:03:47,600 --> 00:03:53,840 Second, recognising the former from the other, overlooking the structural and institutional approach to the violence. 37 00:03:54,530 --> 00:03:58,549 The scholars who are looking at the Somali conflict debate scant attention to how the 38 00:03:58,550 --> 00:04:03,500 Seattle regime shaped and transformed the traditional warrior tendency of Somali clans. 39 00:04:03,680 --> 00:04:11,959 Historically, clan violence is only possible when the state fails to be a neutral actor, becomes part of the violence or completely collapses. 40 00:04:11,960 --> 00:04:16,460 Doesn't happen. In 1991, Somalia. On one related to the reality on the ground. 41 00:04:16,970 --> 00:04:21,920 That is when animosity between clan is ignited. It leads to an unending, everyday violence. 42 00:04:22,700 --> 00:04:28,519 As a result, the fissures violences might have been averted had the military regime employed different 43 00:04:28,520 --> 00:04:32,570 meanings other than violence to deal with the descent in clans from the first place. 44 00:04:33,740 --> 00:04:38,149 New ways of conceptualising African armed conflicts are indeed necessary to capture the 45 00:04:38,150 --> 00:04:42,080 nuances of what's going on or what has gone wrong in Africa since the post-colonial period. 46 00:04:42,770 --> 00:04:49,760 James Ferguson called for the need to advance the new conceptual categories and employ new methodological tools in African studies, 47 00:04:50,450 --> 00:04:56,510 famously appealing in their classic African works to the urgent need of rethinking African politics. 48 00:04:56,930 --> 00:05:02,060 But to balance the lost found the two types of armed conflict in contemporary Africa. 49 00:05:02,390 --> 00:05:09,290 That is the political and the criminal. The former is portrayed as a straightforward struggle for power without consent. 50 00:05:09,470 --> 00:05:13,010 There are legitimate by a significant proportion of the. 51 00:05:14,240 --> 00:05:19,850 While the latter has been termed not political legitimate out of the outcome of the private greed of the war makers. 52 00:05:20,480 --> 00:05:24,469 The limitation is of the academic exercise of African works outside the Somali 53 00:05:24,470 --> 00:05:28,370 context demonstrates that this premise was not always the case in Africa. 54 00:05:28,640 --> 00:05:35,480 If one is to take seriously about Antony, Gideon is a case study on how street violence and violence intersected. 55 00:05:35,780 --> 00:05:40,819 Then the example of Somalia is both useful and instructive. How one come apart. 56 00:05:40,820 --> 00:05:44,380 The popular binary violences remain is about the moronic, 57 00:05:44,600 --> 00:05:51,530 despite the fact that clan conflicts have never morphed into massive crime compulsions until the fall of the state in 1981. 58 00:05:52,100 --> 00:05:55,940 In Somalia, these important aspects raised two set of questions. 59 00:05:56,940 --> 00:06:03,450 That's street violence have a distinctive character more or less infeasible than for fatal violence in this case, clan complex. 60 00:06:04,260 --> 00:06:07,860 If so, what is what it should be? What are the characteristics? 61 00:06:08,520 --> 00:06:11,760 Character is the causes and the consequence of this in beauty wars. 62 00:06:12,300 --> 00:06:13,800 Let us try to look at these answers. 63 00:06:13,800 --> 00:06:22,500 In the Somali conflict, Somali society, especially for those adhering to the pastoral lifestyle, have had a history of incremental wars. 64 00:06:22,830 --> 00:06:29,670 Throughout the early colonial ethnographers both British and Italian German reported 65 00:06:29,850 --> 00:06:33,740 with much its way in ways of a culture of violence in the pre-colonial family society. 66 00:06:34,650 --> 00:06:39,600 However, the contemporary ongoing conflict began on 21st October 1969, 67 00:06:39,960 --> 00:06:44,250 when the military regime came to power with the platform of a bloodless coup d'etat. 68 00:06:44,940 --> 00:06:48,509 Open the Somali politics. 69 00:06:48,510 --> 00:06:53,940 Become violence same as violence had become politics before the post-colonial in the 1960s, 70 00:06:53,940 --> 00:06:58,200 Somalia was born as a democratic state from the UN trusteeship in 1960. 71 00:06:59,310 --> 00:07:03,870 But after the military regime, this was and the politics all the politics become violence. 72 00:07:03,870 --> 00:07:11,910 It was intensified as as the military regime fought the mysterious 1977 war with Mengistu Hailemariam as the regime in neighbouring Ethiopia. 73 00:07:12,630 --> 00:07:19,680 And this war is now an internationally Ogaden war and was part of the Cold War dynamics in the 1970s. 74 00:07:20,190 --> 00:07:26,370 From Durban there emerged a series of political determinants and dynamics played through a state 75 00:07:26,370 --> 00:07:33,780 structure and violence because the military regime was not as powerful as it was in the 1970 civil war. 76 00:07:35,220 --> 00:07:41,040 And Democrats have just begun to conceal their weaknesses with brutality against any individual 77 00:07:41,040 --> 00:07:46,200 or client who commits or moves a challenge to the illegitimacy of the military regime. 78 00:07:46,950 --> 00:07:53,940 State violence has been sanctioned ever since as a way to subdue the dissent in groups trying to topple the regime, 79 00:07:54,540 --> 00:08:00,300 using the traditional clan system to anchor themselves within the sociopolitical framework of the rule. 80 00:08:01,260 --> 00:08:07,440 The military authorities began to rule with the similar methods through which colonial rule had ruled. 81 00:08:07,950 --> 00:08:09,450 That is, ruling by subjugation. 82 00:08:09,990 --> 00:08:16,770 The bullet cessation, not to mention economic ization as well as the institutionalisation of clan of violence, become a reality. 83 00:08:17,780 --> 00:08:22,549 The place to begin exploring this violence is the political given and granted claim 84 00:08:22,550 --> 00:08:28,520 notions that normalised the state violence they state or just treated colonised waters. 85 00:08:29,590 --> 00:08:31,120 We're in the military regime. 86 00:08:31,630 --> 00:08:40,030 One of the boys on 19 and one would vote along clean lines rather than exposing ideological lines renders the conflict very complex and complicated. 87 00:08:41,020 --> 00:08:49,030 Claret bills were useful and served as easy meat tools in political contestation of about so much thought that violence was justified. 88 00:08:49,330 --> 00:08:55,330 And at any level it reached the strong cleansing bond of protection and societal security 89 00:08:55,330 --> 00:08:59,230 ensured that both the victim and the perpetrator should possess the same right. 90 00:09:03,560 --> 00:09:08,660 The Constellation United, the rebels and the loyalists of the regime from both sides of the fence. 91 00:09:08,870 --> 00:09:12,620 One is the military regime collapse in the first realities. 92 00:09:13,060 --> 00:09:19,640 Two, the position of the defender. Would the atrocities and action is committed by the regime. 93 00:09:22,330 --> 00:09:29,530 Destroying. Whole communities and colonies did not exist and are not accurate outside the state parameters, 94 00:09:29,800 --> 00:09:33,640 a factor noted by the participants in armed conflicts and observers alike. 95 00:09:35,340 --> 00:09:40,049 So explaining the political trajectory of violence has proved challenging, even for ethnographers. 96 00:09:40,050 --> 00:09:47,730 Who saw the colonised waters firsthand in the 1990? This does not mean that the conflict was neutral Somali tourism, but it was a factual reality. 97 00:09:47,730 --> 00:09:54,870 Well, before the coming of colonialism in both the Somali colonies began to return to a bitter colonial mode of violent, violent revenge. 98 00:09:56,030 --> 00:10:03,260 Water violence are not always as political as they appear. Armed conflicts become political when political were involved in the process of war. 99 00:10:03,860 --> 00:10:12,440 Violence has lost the connotation of political. In March 1991, as opposed to most of the other leaders, Ali Madi Mohammed and Mohamed Farrah Aidid. 100 00:10:13,710 --> 00:10:17,880 And lost the war over who should have ruled Somalia after the military regime. 101 00:10:18,540 --> 00:10:27,720 She then insisted, making this always what we can. I still have conceptualised long ago in Somalia war making becoming state making from 1991 onwards. 102 00:10:27,780 --> 00:10:31,680 The state making wars shifted from political violence to economic violence. 103 00:10:32,040 --> 00:10:33,119 A bullet out and travel. 104 00:10:33,120 --> 00:10:41,070 A lot has begun to come beat for capturing airport seaport, but not what the presidential palace, as I quoted from the outset. 105 00:10:44,440 --> 00:10:50,049 Comparing and contrasting 1313 cases across the continent may come across its 106 00:10:50,050 --> 00:10:53,380 own ways in which natural resources may impact on civil war and civil wars. 107 00:10:53,800 --> 00:10:59,710 In the Somali case, the natural results were more an incentive to sustain rather than on park on war. 108 00:11:00,640 --> 00:11:07,150 This was mainly because Somali buffers possessed no oil, copper or diamonds, as were evident in Angola, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 109 00:11:07,630 --> 00:11:15,970 In Somalia only, this did become the major resource asset in the result of the state, whoever capturing power would have control of its capital. 110 00:11:16,720 --> 00:11:21,730 As one American diplomat, one is famously declared in 1990. 111 00:11:22,740 --> 00:11:29,910 Quote, The attitude towards the estate itself, it's one of the London soil remain a great treasure just in which you can grow up and everything. 112 00:11:30,120 --> 00:11:33,930 That is the way. And the military regime has run the country through their clans. 113 00:11:34,350 --> 00:11:41,550 Uncle, who is ruling the estate rather than what type of rule is, is still the most important question in contemporary political conflict in Somalia. 114 00:11:42,330 --> 00:11:50,100 Even when the military regime was ousted, the institutions and structures they put in place have to be sold from time to time. 115 00:11:50,340 --> 00:11:55,160 This explains why the notorious state intelligence agency, now known as the NSF, 116 00:11:55,410 --> 00:11:59,400 the National Security Service, was reinstated in contemporary Mogadishu at the moment. 117 00:12:00,390 --> 00:12:06,600 The concept of the state in the minds of the family has always been predated, as it's commonly contemplated with capital. 118 00:12:07,500 --> 00:12:11,190 They stayed is the magic as it must, and behave in a blatant manner in the past. 119 00:12:12,630 --> 00:12:20,130 The observation by the rugby and tribal societies that the state is not a political actor, but a political field is irrelevant in Somalia. 120 00:12:21,360 --> 00:12:26,040 The Somali state and the clan are part of the same story, part of the same political dynamics. 121 00:12:26,460 --> 00:12:28,290 Thrown upon his assent, 122 00:12:28,740 --> 00:12:34,650 the military's strong rule of Siad Barre began with separating the colonists who would support from those who would resist this regime. 123 00:12:35,130 --> 00:12:43,110 Those clients who had beneficiaries of the ousted post-colonial civilian administration in the 1960s were put into the enemy category, 124 00:12:43,350 --> 00:12:50,220 while the colonists, such as his, who felt marginalised under the 1960s political configuration, were coming on board. 125 00:12:52,630 --> 00:12:55,900 So some clans were kept out and others were kept in. 126 00:12:56,140 --> 00:13:01,870 Soon after, the 1969 coup was suggested, driven to the reconfiguration of state power, 127 00:13:02,650 --> 00:13:09,190 Siad Barre promoted his claim not just to clan but subsub clan forum and clan family to a political family. 128 00:13:09,490 --> 00:13:12,430 And those of the family before the government. For the family. By the family. 129 00:13:13,330 --> 00:13:19,600 After that, the sentences to silence the dissenting views they state become. 130 00:13:20,320 --> 00:13:30,560 And. A tissue with me and all it would distribute to send it to some clients and it might even and it's moulded to others. 131 00:13:30,920 --> 00:13:36,740 Apart from the imposition of it all revolving around client groups loading down immediate client. 132 00:13:37,810 --> 00:13:44,140 She had better form and are only circle a small group of stealing from sitting around sharing the national cake as part of 133 00:13:44,770 --> 00:13:53,840 the politics of the building and using the javelin throw up by concept with approval and budget and extraversion evidence. 134 00:13:53,860 --> 00:13:59,319 They did that as long as the international aid was secured. The regime could sustain the backbone, 135 00:13:59,320 --> 00:14:07,299 and the base of the regime were founded upon the formation and establishment of autocratic institutions controlled by his immediate family members. 136 00:14:07,300 --> 00:14:14,710 And in. This meant that where he got the big fish for himself, he reserved the middle seat for his family and the rest for his subclan. 137 00:14:15,130 --> 00:14:19,330 Now that small fish were allocated to the allied elite from certain subclans or subclans. 138 00:14:20,370 --> 00:14:29,370 As a consequence, it's because of the presence of one single dominant clan that encouraged the political groups to push their clients to revolt. 139 00:14:30,660 --> 00:14:37,680 The military regime benefited from absolute impunity and the men needed to become a gatekeeper between the West and the East. 140 00:14:38,130 --> 00:14:45,000 The Soviets and the United States aligned the first eight years with the Soviets, the rest with the United States and the other Western states. 141 00:14:45,480 --> 00:14:49,830 It should be noted that the years the military regime allied with the US was the worst. 142 00:14:49,830 --> 00:15:00,930 The years of state violence. Some Somali political officers confirm to the American authorities in Mogadishu that U.S. military equipment was used by 143 00:15:00,930 --> 00:15:08,520 their forces to suppress civilian uprisings throughout the 1980s in order to oppress the insurgents against this regime. 144 00:15:09,540 --> 00:15:16,010 And the theatre lounge in. A state terror campaign against the revolt that collapsed. 145 00:15:18,350 --> 00:15:23,290 Assistance can be spearheaded by different political groups who would frame it as kind of struggles. 146 00:15:23,330 --> 00:15:29,660 Internal transition distinct from another consultant. What is all about was also framed and candlestick mastectomies. 147 00:15:30,350 --> 00:15:33,530 Even when the violence was transformed into a societal violence. 148 00:15:33,830 --> 00:15:38,780 But any attempt to shift from the seats of the state to the seats of the society was staved off. 149 00:15:39,170 --> 00:15:41,900 To be Hasan the devastating Avenger, 150 00:15:42,380 --> 00:15:49,790 the state sponsored colonised waters that engulfing the country in early 1991 was something that had long had been imagined on one way or the other. 151 00:15:50,630 --> 00:15:54,140 When the military regime more friendly overthrown in 1991, 152 00:15:54,470 --> 00:15:59,930 the predictable consequence of the enduring dictatorship culminated in a clan on a account of violence. 153 00:16:00,200 --> 00:16:09,979 In other words, the violence delegated the violence to clan for the clan violence and an the strategy before 1990 to suppress the dissenting. 154 00:16:09,980 --> 00:16:16,490 And. This the transformative part of the societal violence was carried out on Clan B throughout the 1990s, 155 00:16:17,180 --> 00:16:27,280 something that was not dissimilar from pre-colonial Somalia. To be sure, this was indicative of the devastation in Africa from Sudan. 156 00:16:27,300 --> 00:16:31,230 Nearly each African country had been affected by a wildfire of water. 157 00:16:31,650 --> 00:16:39,750 Somalis headed to other African than war ridden African states with the experience of going through one conflict after conflict. 158 00:16:40,440 --> 00:16:44,930 In fact, the confusion of the 1990, as opposed to dictatorships and Cold War conflicts. 159 00:16:45,480 --> 00:16:48,000 Though the Somali case was less violent than other conflicts. 160 00:16:51,320 --> 00:16:57,320 Even though the military regime acted as an all inclusive state, it was in reality not a national state. 161 00:16:58,820 --> 00:17:04,640 This created a lot. Enough by bulletins and hit by bulletins as special categories were formulated. 162 00:17:07,000 --> 00:17:11,230 To rephrase differently. The client is on the centre and the colonies of the periphery. 163 00:17:13,480 --> 00:17:21,880 Simkin in his book Faces of the Enemy argues that the enemy has often no one single face to be confronted with the absence of such a recognisable, 164 00:17:22,090 --> 00:17:29,830 the military ready made civilians belonging to the armed groups as its enemy throughout the 1970s, up to early 1990. 165 00:17:29,860 --> 00:17:37,209 It was a government policy that in order to survive in a pool of dissent in armed movements, the regime had to beat the veritable colonist. 166 00:17:37,210 --> 00:17:43,360 Those who are aligning with the regime against the enemy, those who are hostile to the regime, to counter the armed groups, 167 00:17:43,360 --> 00:17:49,999 the regime army, the favourable climate against the disfavour, which in turn set out to arm themselves, 168 00:17:50,000 --> 00:17:57,970 to defend themselves from the hostile regime and its supporters by way of clear political delineation between both and claims 169 00:17:58,360 --> 00:18:04,720 that the regime military officers would have given orders to summarily executed members of those who were opposed to the regime. 170 00:18:05,080 --> 00:18:08,920 This was a complete transformation of violence and dissent as described by the 171 00:18:08,920 --> 00:18:13,479 human rights organisations after sanctioned collapse toward the Somali state, 172 00:18:13,480 --> 00:18:19,540 similar to the relatively understate ceased to be an important element about but remained a significant bone of contention. 173 00:18:20,480 --> 00:18:24,770 The intersection between the estate and clan came to be based on one off dialectical relationship. 174 00:18:25,930 --> 00:18:30,520 The political exclusion asserted to represent Bush and the political opponents to set the 175 00:18:30,520 --> 00:18:35,890 stage for the current convulsions of 1991 after the military regime's fall and flight. 176 00:18:36,460 --> 00:18:39,730 As long as exclusion was institutionalised during the reign, 177 00:18:40,090 --> 00:18:46,960 the elites from and allied with the military regime would take whatever the military ruler had allocated them, 178 00:18:47,650 --> 00:18:51,100 which meant zoom in political opposition without completely let alone abortion. 179 00:18:51,970 --> 00:18:57,370 Those who proved to be dissenting or tried to challenge the status quo had to endure the wrath of the regime. 180 00:18:58,030 --> 00:19:05,500 When one clan group denied the other the right to share with the state resorts, as well as the right to exist under a rule of exclusion and exclusion. 181 00:19:05,800 --> 00:19:11,890 The result as illogical for using cleavers and the societal violence as a strategy to resist state violence. 182 00:19:12,970 --> 00:19:18,129 The alternative with that as guaranteed political beliefs tended to display their muscle was to go 183 00:19:18,130 --> 00:19:24,220 warfront and attack the regime from outside as one by the first elements of the Somali Salvation Front, 184 00:19:24,220 --> 00:19:27,610 as if let the Somali Salvation Democratic Front is there. 185 00:19:28,450 --> 00:19:35,440 Soon afterwards, many other armed opposition groups more powerful than the SDF. 186 00:19:36,460 --> 00:19:39,670 Elements were later drawn in. The Seattle regime came to the fore. 187 00:19:40,790 --> 00:19:49,790 The most powerful of these armed groups was the Somali Salvation National Movement in the North, which held from another powerful front in the south. 188 00:19:49,820 --> 00:19:57,770 The United Somali Congress to topple the military regime. The formation of this military movement was later used as a means for political ends. 189 00:19:58,220 --> 00:20:03,710 Rather than liberating those group which were felt oppressed and excluded from the power. 190 00:20:04,340 --> 00:20:09,800 The political and economic marginalisation spawned serious grievances that came to clash with greediness. 191 00:20:10,580 --> 00:20:14,000 The class of grievance with greed led Somalia to the uncivil war in the first place. 192 00:20:16,180 --> 00:20:19,840 However, two choices were open to allies in Somalia, 193 00:20:20,360 --> 00:20:27,010 whether to accept the status quo or to resist the military regime that was oppressing them longer before making it one. 194 00:20:30,500 --> 00:20:34,549 According to the Niccolo Machiavelli armies, 195 00:20:34,550 --> 00:20:39,950 which two types of war to attain goals and engaged what is larger primarily because of the expansionist 196 00:20:39,950 --> 00:20:45,740 ideals and other hidden ambitions of the ruler to expand and maintain his dominance over the revolution. 197 00:20:46,070 --> 00:20:52,910 The second one the most detrimental, arguably far reaching, is when an entire population fights against another. 198 00:20:53,240 --> 00:21:02,420 The typology of reason for all against all both types of war were what accurate during and bossed the military period. 199 00:21:02,690 --> 00:21:05,780 The June period. This means that from the perspective of conflict that is, 200 00:21:06,230 --> 00:21:13,400 the contemporary Somalia armed conflicts have intersected both Trinitarian and interior minutes and measures in multiple ways. 201 00:21:15,710 --> 00:21:20,600 In the post military regime, no clan commanded the most substantial forms of military machine, 202 00:21:21,200 --> 00:21:26,840 such as fighter jets, as was the case during the military regime and the mosque. 203 00:21:27,380 --> 00:21:32,000 And because of the military regime instructed on legacies, localised wars were not conventional. 204 00:21:33,310 --> 00:21:36,570 Masaka is on the basis of economic constructs by the military regime. 205 00:21:36,610 --> 00:21:39,999 Degenerated into the race which is debated. 206 00:21:40,000 --> 00:21:47,740 Therefore, the expulsion of Mogadishu, the capital. Indeed the driving forces behind it, the explosive clan cataclysm, is when an abuse of power, 207 00:21:48,100 --> 00:21:54,390 autocratic, exploitation of state resource as well as a drive in in region particularly. 208 00:21:56,420 --> 00:22:00,590 The distinction of this sponsored violence as a wholesale terror and the current 209 00:22:00,620 --> 00:22:05,450 violence as a retail terror developed by Noam Chomsky and Edward Hellman, 210 00:22:05,720 --> 00:22:10,520 was to add to the Somali conflict. On 26th September 1975, 211 00:22:11,000 --> 00:22:18,800 the French intelligence newsletter Africa Confidential published a classified document signed by the military regime in August of that year, 212 00:22:19,190 --> 00:22:23,090 ordering the punishment of certain groups in the central regions in Somalia. 213 00:22:23,780 --> 00:22:30,020 The document itself was not clear and the purpose of such undertaking, but it revealed that people in the capital were conscious. 214 00:22:31,260 --> 00:22:37,950 Of what would follow after the convene of central regions, what is what Africa Confidential wrote in 1975? 215 00:22:38,340 --> 00:22:45,360 There are now rumours in Mogadishu that the plan of other regions would follow opposition to the regime in Hargeisa district, 216 00:22:45,360 --> 00:22:48,569 forming which Somaliland in the north would put next in line. 217 00:22:48,570 --> 00:22:54,270 But Hargeisa would be a much tougher nut to crack with many supporters of the military regime itself. 218 00:22:55,690 --> 00:23:01,749 A decade later, in 1984, another intelligence report made this gloomy picture of what Somalia is now 219 00:23:01,750 --> 00:23:07,000 bitterly divided into line with each clan armed to the teeth fending for itself. 220 00:23:08,500 --> 00:23:16,390 This clearly indicates and indicates that what happened in 1998 was not the cause of violence, but the continuation of state violence. 221 00:23:16,900 --> 00:23:20,560 But put it differently. It was not a cause, but a consequence. 222 00:23:21,130 --> 00:23:26,800 It state supported clan was encouraged to defend the regime from a societal subordinate clan. 223 00:23:27,430 --> 00:23:36,370 This explains why some refugees were targeted as played the crucial role and participated in the state funded convenience of an invasion against. 224 00:23:37,640 --> 00:23:40,130 Civic groups in Mogadishu, in the capital, another. 225 00:23:40,760 --> 00:23:51,020 These refugees were from Ethiopia after the 1977 war and the regime tried to and implicate them in the war against those who resisted the regime. 226 00:23:52,010 --> 00:23:59,900 The reason why the violence moved from the capital city to the southern Somalia was in a lot of the because and not the military regime had moved. 227 00:24:00,680 --> 00:24:04,100 They stayed power to their clan bases after the fall. 228 00:24:07,580 --> 00:24:13,129 Indeed, the role of the state sponsor of violence should not be equated with crime motivated reprisal. 229 00:24:13,130 --> 00:24:20,300 It's accurate in both militarily in Somalia, the political culture of the military regime and the various ways of violence. 230 00:24:20,310 --> 00:24:27,080 Canada was quoted dividend that there is a link between a cause such as a cold winter and a consequence such as increasingly, 231 00:24:28,070 --> 00:24:36,020 as one Somali elder puts it, quote, If a car had a collision with another car, for whom is going to be responsible, unquote. 232 00:24:37,150 --> 00:24:43,340 The reply to the crucial question that the driver must be held accountable because these policies are made and re made by the driver. 233 00:24:43,610 --> 00:24:47,420 It's a matter of determining factor considered in how the driver with the state of the will. 234 00:24:48,170 --> 00:24:55,070 There's no doubt that over two decades the driver of that estate was the military leaders who drove somebody to the wrong direction. 235 00:24:58,780 --> 00:25:02,470 Victims of state violence are often challenged with violent competitions. 236 00:25:02,860 --> 00:25:04,089 Not only is it important, 237 00:25:04,090 --> 00:25:11,320 but imperative to underline the distinction between systematically structural and symbolic violence carried out as a campaign of state terror. 238 00:25:11,710 --> 00:25:14,560 Which one is more detrimental and leave lasting consequence? 239 00:25:14,950 --> 00:25:21,910 The state violence and the violence they the is always more advanced and more determined to win a war that the United Colonies, 240 00:25:22,330 --> 00:25:25,660 who could hardly combine all the resources needed to which any nation can be. 241 00:25:26,800 --> 00:25:32,830 As one interviewee observed, no clown had the capacity to conduct organised terror after 19 and one, 242 00:25:33,250 --> 00:25:39,670 destruction on a massive scale could hardly be undertaken without the resources drawn from the state coffers. 243 00:25:40,390 --> 00:25:44,620 Only the state was capable of fulfilling such a colossal, arduous activity. 244 00:25:45,010 --> 00:25:50,700 In other words, only the state has the means and the mechanism to unleash massive destruction on a proportional, 245 00:25:51,340 --> 00:25:55,540 as evidenced in Rwanda, Burundi and even Yugoslavia and Germany. 246 00:25:56,050 --> 00:25:56,770 In this respect, 247 00:25:57,100 --> 00:26:04,450 the state sponsored violence law and the military regime in Somalia could not be managed with clan convulsions between rival calamities in 1991. 248 00:26:05,080 --> 00:26:09,250 The result of the state violence proved that those colonies, oppressed under the military regime, 249 00:26:09,670 --> 00:26:14,140 could not be convinced today to share power with those or president. 250 00:26:17,570 --> 00:26:25,520 Violence in Somalia has taken performance and conclusion one to carry it out on a state level and another on clan with the state 251 00:26:25,520 --> 00:26:31,340 violence and the clan or communal violence are not clearly differentiated and eliminated in the existing academic literature. 252 00:26:33,280 --> 00:26:37,420 Differentiation between the two cases has not been tried. 253 00:26:38,730 --> 00:26:41,940 Even the finest thoroughbreds used most recently by Lincoln, 254 00:26:41,940 --> 00:26:47,430 really would utilise the geographic information system, the tools and its statistical methods. 255 00:26:50,150 --> 00:26:54,920 From empirical observation, this kid violence and the violence are different in scope and in extent. 256 00:26:55,430 --> 00:27:00,380 It's important to use electronic and synchronic evidence to negotiate the distinction between the two. 257 00:27:00,860 --> 00:27:08,360 Which one is more enduring? Either one can be real, as both could draw upon outside intervention and phenomena that warrants further research. 258 00:27:09,550 --> 00:27:13,930 In every way they state terror is distinct from clown violence. 259 00:27:14,470 --> 00:27:19,630 During the military regime, the historicity of the political conflicts and political rivalries created by 260 00:27:19,750 --> 00:27:23,710 state were made more complicated than the way they have often been simplified. 261 00:27:25,650 --> 00:27:32,220 The military regime in Somalia was, in a way a replica of what William Brennan call it, the shadowy state with regard to Leone and Liberia. 262 00:27:36,340 --> 00:27:41,670 Whereas the state violence. Can be termed as one sided violence. 263 00:27:41,720 --> 00:27:48,590 The societal violence falls into the category of what can be called the other violence, which is to say it has not term like state violence. 264 00:27:49,130 --> 00:27:52,400 The other less obvious quote is the state violence characterised here as political 265 00:27:52,400 --> 00:27:57,560 violence and violence conceptualised as public violence for peace or societal violence. 266 00:27:57,920 --> 00:28:03,710 For it is substate myth or statism has always been shorter and less lethal. 267 00:28:04,070 --> 00:28:08,900 And the public violence, I'll quote it, as a consequence of the brutal policies pursued by the state. 268 00:28:10,370 --> 00:28:18,260 As we can see in Somalia. As a result, any violence should be best defined as should best be conceptualised to the extent of the outcome, 269 00:28:18,530 --> 00:28:23,840 not the form of the conflict as collective violence and convulsions, or if not simply clan war. 270 00:28:24,590 --> 00:28:29,210 So even though it's distinctive both in made for methods and objectives, 271 00:28:29,570 --> 00:28:36,080 what separates the state violence from the associated violence is not merely the political ambiguities about on the part of the state, 272 00:28:36,470 --> 00:28:43,550 but also the organisation and the resources to conduct a more detrimental destruction than anything else but in another way. 273 00:28:43,850 --> 00:28:49,880 Whereas the territories of the state violence is shaped by a rigid determination to ensure the monopoly of violence. 274 00:28:50,360 --> 00:28:56,060 The perpetrators of public violence are conscious of the fact that one day they would hand over their weapons of the state. 275 00:28:57,530 --> 00:29:02,690 The street violence and the societal violence that has always been interwoven as one single variable. 276 00:29:06,210 --> 00:29:14,010 I like the state is born from one. The convulsions in the most military regime in Somalia were not based on one single variable, 277 00:29:14,280 --> 00:29:18,320 but many conflicts with many actors, each having its own variations. 278 00:29:19,230 --> 00:29:23,100 This resonates with what can be described as a war within a war. 279 00:29:23,220 --> 00:29:27,270 By the war we ended the war and conflicts are open ended episodes. 280 00:29:27,630 --> 00:29:31,470 But when they that exercise but it later become part of the conflict, 281 00:29:32,070 --> 00:29:36,900 fighting with the favourable kind of gains that is before the war have to turn itself into colonised war. 282 00:29:37,940 --> 00:29:46,220 So colonised outside of the state's purview, the military regime introduced the state violence into the regional Somali clan warrior system. 283 00:29:48,900 --> 00:29:53,879 In a comparative study looking at the global level, argued that political violence, in other words, 284 00:29:53,880 --> 00:29:59,310 dictator, resulted in casualties four times more than the interstate and uncivil war. 285 00:30:00,360 --> 00:30:01,759 Aside from the political aspect, 286 00:30:01,760 --> 00:30:10,170 the conflict of resources previously based on water but contemporary over the state border in Somalia and economic result component. 287 00:30:11,120 --> 00:30:16,490 Would that have long been and still is, a central feature of the continued armed conflicts in Somalia? 288 00:30:16,850 --> 00:30:20,000 In retrospect, the Somali pastoral claims have long before with each other. 289 00:30:20,150 --> 00:30:30,080 But when the state apparatus that was supposed to be in battle become part of the colonised wars, the consequence culminated in the 1991 convulsions. 290 00:30:30,650 --> 00:30:37,820 Acted on the constraints imposed on them by the state. Some clan militias fought against the others on behalf of the regime. 291 00:30:38,210 --> 00:30:39,470 Others defending the regime. 292 00:30:40,250 --> 00:30:47,930 This evidence contradicts that the armed conflicts in Africa are not the retreat from modernity, as Ali so forcefully argued. 293 00:30:50,510 --> 00:30:52,970 The Somali state under the grip of the military regime. 294 00:30:53,960 --> 00:31:00,770 Was not the security guaranteed for a populated territory, rather, is guarantee the security of certain communities to the detriment of others. 295 00:31:01,850 --> 00:31:10,870 Between. But later and parasitic, while remaining oppressive unexploited, it triggered clients to set difficult scores on each other. 296 00:31:12,400 --> 00:31:20,170 After the downfall of the 1991 highlight of the regime oppressing pastoralist colonists who were culturally more 297 00:31:20,170 --> 00:31:26,260 violent than agricultural colonies in the South was like locking a cat in a small room and then beating it. 298 00:31:26,770 --> 00:31:30,280 Most certainly the cattle would fight back fiercely and ferociously. 299 00:31:30,940 --> 00:31:34,540 In the introduction to violence and belonging like this, 300 00:31:35,110 --> 00:31:41,290 do someone is a very legitimate question on why the complicity of the state is absent in popular accounts of political violence, 301 00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:44,950 underscoring the responsibility of the ruling political authorities. 302 00:31:46,240 --> 00:31:50,560 She presents her case by augmenting empirical evidence gathered from Turkana in Kenya. 303 00:31:50,800 --> 00:31:57,340 Heritage sites are useful for the Somali case. Similarly, the military regime in Somalia was characterised by unleashing terror, 304 00:31:57,340 --> 00:32:04,450 using violence to inflict can guilty and fit as a method of political intimidation and regulation to sustain power. 305 00:32:05,140 --> 00:32:08,920 No one can accurately estimate the toll of this, but we do it and in the name of the state. 306 00:32:09,310 --> 00:32:14,530 From 1969 up to 1991, during the during the reign of the military regime. 307 00:32:15,010 --> 00:32:22,630 But it is nonetheless estimated that nearly 150,000 people were killed on the orders and supervision of the state authorities during that period. 308 00:32:23,050 --> 00:32:29,860 At least 100 people were either or killed every year from 1972 up to 1977, after which the war weakened. 309 00:32:31,120 --> 00:32:34,780 The number of people lost their lives after 1969 up to now is terrible. 310 00:32:35,500 --> 00:32:41,470 300,000 died in the aftermath of the siege, Mohammad Abdullah's rebellion in the 1920s. 311 00:32:41,740 --> 00:32:49,780 During the war, like a group, an armed group like al-Shabab in the 1920s, fought against the British colonial rule. 312 00:32:50,470 --> 00:32:53,770 But as hundreds killed in the campaign against them. 313 00:32:54,430 --> 00:33:01,660 The good contemporary news is that violence in Somalia comes to secondary and global data on security issues over the last two years, 314 00:33:02,170 --> 00:33:07,390 thanks in part to the decline of al-Shabab and Mujahideen, although they have been recently the tiny back to the fold. 315 00:33:08,470 --> 00:33:14,170 And thanks also to the renewed water fronts in other parts of the world, though it remained on top for many years. 316 00:33:14,170 --> 00:33:17,799 Somalia was not replaced by Syria. South Sudan. Honduras. 317 00:33:17,800 --> 00:33:26,740 Venezuela. Swaziland. El Salvador. Afghanistan. And the iPhone application has most violent countries in the world. 318 00:33:27,010 --> 00:33:31,220 What is obvious in those countries is still the state violence, something that created a left. 319 00:33:31,300 --> 00:33:35,170 An unprecedented level of violence in Somalia and.