1 00:00:04,780 --> 00:00:14,500 Welcome to the fourth General Philosophy lecture. Today, we're going to be talking a little bit more about induction, but mainly about scepticism. 2 00:00:14,500 --> 00:00:18,700 I'm focussing on induction in connexion with scepticism, 3 00:00:18,700 --> 00:00:28,120 partly because Hume's argument concerning induction is such a vivid and such a highly respected and influential form of scepticism. 4 00:00:28,120 --> 00:00:37,030 But also, as you'll see later, I think it's a particular form of scepticism that cannot be answered in one very influential, 5 00:00:37,030 --> 00:00:42,130 influential way that is very popular today. 6 00:00:42,130 --> 00:00:46,450 Therefore, it faces us with a real quandary what do we do? 7 00:00:46,450 --> 00:00:56,050 And I will be sketching what I consider to be perhaps the best approach to scepticism. 8 00:00:56,050 --> 00:01:09,730 Here we've got Descartes Pascale, who will be making an appearance later David Hume, Karl Popper and Imua. 9 00:01:09,730 --> 00:01:15,250 So we've looked at some of the attempts to justify induction. 10 00:01:15,250 --> 00:01:19,690 That is to give an answer to Hume's sceptical argument. 11 00:01:19,690 --> 00:01:30,400 And one of the methods that I mentioned last time but didn't discuss was the so-called inductive justification of induction. 12 00:01:30,400 --> 00:01:38,950 Now this was originated, I think, by Max Black. He quite influential, he argued that induction can be justified. 13 00:01:38,950 --> 00:01:46,570 Inductively without vicious circularity by distinguishing between an inductive rule and an inductive premise. 14 00:01:46,570 --> 00:01:53,590 So recall that in Hume's argument, Hume focuses on what's commonly called the uniformity principle, 15 00:01:53,590 --> 00:01:56,800 the principle that the future will resemble the past. 16 00:01:56,800 --> 00:02:04,900 And it looks like at least many people have interpreted Hume as thinking of that as a premise or a suppressed premise, 17 00:02:04,900 --> 00:02:09,470 at least implicitly there in any inductive inference. 18 00:02:09,470 --> 00:02:16,550 Maybe we can get round the worry of circularity, if instead we think in terms of an inductive rule, 19 00:02:16,550 --> 00:02:24,430 a rule that takes us from a premise about the past to a conclusion about the future. 20 00:02:24,430 --> 00:02:28,810 Now, I'll be saying a little about that in a moment. 21 00:02:28,810 --> 00:02:35,110 It's this approach is of particular interest to you because in your reading list, there's an article by Van Cleave, 22 00:02:35,110 --> 00:02:42,580 a very interesting and rather difficult article by vanity in which he adopts the inductive justification. 23 00:02:42,580 --> 00:02:50,380 But he also combines it with external ism, which will be a major focus of the second half of this lecture. 24 00:02:50,380 --> 00:03:00,160 One point I just want to make about Van Teves paper, however, is that there is a clear misunderstanding of Hume within it. 25 00:03:00,160 --> 00:03:09,160 He takes it that Hume is a deductive is that when Hume asks for the uniformity principle and says, Where's the basis for that? 26 00:03:09,160 --> 00:03:18,250 That Hume is thinking of inductive inferences as presupposing a uniformity principle on the ground that without such a principle, 27 00:03:18,250 --> 00:03:23,770 an inductive inference would not be valid, would not be deductibility valid. 28 00:03:23,770 --> 00:03:34,690 And I want to point out that that is a mistake. Hume should not be understood as merely saying that inductive inference is on non deductive. 29 00:03:34,690 --> 00:03:41,170 That is that whenever you have an inductive inference, all of the premises could be true. 30 00:03:41,170 --> 00:03:46,870 And yet the conclusion turned out to be false, right? That's a fairly minimal kind of scepticism. 31 00:03:46,870 --> 00:03:54,460 Induction isn't infallible. Well, we all know that. But actually, I think Hume's argument is far more radical. 32 00:03:54,460 --> 00:03:59,020 He's saying, Can you give any reason, whatever? Not just the deductive reasoning. 33 00:03:59,020 --> 00:04:06,430 Any kind of reason for supposing that what's happened in the past is evidently relevant 34 00:04:06,430 --> 00:04:12,220 gives some kind of reliable guidance about what's going to happen in the future. 35 00:04:12,220 --> 00:04:16,780 And recall that in humans argument, he rules out intuition. 36 00:04:16,780 --> 00:04:23,290 He says it's not self-evident. He rules out sensation. You can't tell by looking at objects how they're going to behave. 37 00:04:23,290 --> 00:04:30,220 Think of the atom thought experiment. You can't give a deductive argument for saying that the future will resemble the past. 38 00:04:30,220 --> 00:04:33,670 And nor can you give an inductive argument because that would be circular. 39 00:04:33,670 --> 00:04:39,430 So Hume thinks he's ruled out all possible types of evidence, not just deductive. 40 00:04:39,430 --> 00:04:49,530 So the argument is seriously worrying or potentially seriously worrying if it cannot be defeated. 41 00:04:49,530 --> 00:05:01,870 So Hume is asking, do we have any rational basis, whatever, for taking the observed as relevant evidence about the unobserved? 42 00:05:01,870 --> 00:05:11,350 And if you look at it with that generality, then the difference between an inductive premise and an inductive rule really is beside the point. 43 00:05:11,350 --> 00:05:17,500 That's a fuelling difference. Both of them are treating the past as evidentially relevant to the future. 44 00:05:17,500 --> 00:05:21,760 Hume is asking, What right do we have to do that? 45 00:05:21,760 --> 00:05:30,070 So I don't think the inductive justification stands much chance of refuting him. 46 00:05:30,070 --> 00:05:34,960 A quite different approach, and this is again on your reading list. 47 00:05:34,960 --> 00:05:39,520 Karl Popper argued he actually accepted Hume's argument. 48 00:05:39,520 --> 00:05:44,370 He said, Yeah, Hume's right. There is no justification for induction. 49 00:05:44,370 --> 00:05:54,910 But he argued that we can do without induction, but science can progress perfectly well without any inductive assumption. 50 00:05:54,910 --> 00:06:02,740 So instead of arguing from past to future, saying that such and such as happened in the past, 51 00:06:02,740 --> 00:06:15,490 therefore such and such will probably happen in the future. What we should focus on is making hypotheses, bold conjectures and then refuting them. 52 00:06:15,490 --> 00:06:20,560 So instead of trying to get a conclusion that is justified by the past, 53 00:06:20,560 --> 00:06:28,480 instead we make bold conjectures and then we knock out those that are actually refuted by our experience. 54 00:06:28,480 --> 00:06:36,420 So this is deductive logic, not inductive. Now illustrate that now. 55 00:06:36,420 --> 00:06:43,770 So suppose we've got various theories about AIDS, so some of these are BS, some as a CS or might be. 56 00:06:43,770 --> 00:06:48,210 And here are our various theories. The theory at the top says always are BS. 57 00:06:48,210 --> 00:06:55,920 The next one says, is alternate between BS and CS, and you can see there are various other possible theories that. 58 00:06:55,920 --> 00:07:03,390 OK. So let's suppose we observe the first a A1 turns out to be a B. 59 00:07:03,390 --> 00:07:09,720 Well, that knocks out Theory six, Theory six said it was going to be a sea, it's turned out to be a B. 60 00:07:09,720 --> 00:07:17,790 That theory was wrong. So assuming we can trust our observations, Theory six has been seductively refuted. 61 00:07:17,790 --> 00:07:24,600 This isn't a matter of induction. Right? It said a one would be a C, but in fact one was a B. 62 00:07:24,600 --> 00:07:28,950 So the theory is knocked out deductive Lee. OK. 63 00:07:28,950 --> 00:07:34,500 What about a two? Well, that's a B as well, so that knocks out theories two, four and five. 64 00:07:34,500 --> 00:07:46,510 We're now only left with two theories one and three. And as you might expect, a three turns out to be A to B, A B as well, which knocks out Theory C. 65 00:07:46,510 --> 00:07:53,830 So we started out with six possible theories and our observations have eliminated five of them. 66 00:07:53,830 --> 00:07:59,650 There's only one of them left fine. So, according to Popper, science can work in this way. 67 00:07:59,650 --> 00:08:04,690 We make bold conjectures, knock out the ones that are refuted by experience. 68 00:08:04,690 --> 00:08:15,300 And then we go with the ones that are left. And according to Popper, this enables us to do science without any inductive assumption, and hence, 69 00:08:15,300 --> 00:08:21,480 although Popper thinks Hume is correct about induction, that induction has no rational foundation. 70 00:08:21,480 --> 00:08:29,340 We can still do science. Now, I want to suggest things aren't so simple. 71 00:08:29,340 --> 00:08:38,140 Because what we can do. We started off with six theories. What I've done here, I've taken those six theories and I've simply amended them. 72 00:08:38,140 --> 00:08:42,370 We looked at the first three days and they all turned out to be BS. 73 00:08:42,370 --> 00:08:46,240 So five of the theories were wrong in one way or another. 74 00:08:46,240 --> 00:08:55,360 Well, I've just amended them here. I've just changed those theories, so they all now correctly assert that the first three days will be BS. 75 00:08:55,360 --> 00:08:59,680 So we've now got six theories again, six contending theories. 76 00:08:59,680 --> 00:09:06,070 Let's go on now on observe A4, A5 and so on. 77 00:09:06,070 --> 00:09:12,040 Now you're all thinking this is crazy. Surely we should go for theory one. 78 00:09:12,040 --> 00:09:19,750 But I want to suggest to you that the reason you're inclined to go for theory one is precisely that you are thinking inductive inductively. 79 00:09:19,750 --> 00:09:26,710 You are thinking that the fact that A1A two a three were all BS gives us good reason to suppose that the rest will be BS. 80 00:09:26,710 --> 00:09:34,000 But Popper is saying that it's no good. We're not supposed to rely on induction. We're not supposed to assume that the future will resemble the past. 81 00:09:34,000 --> 00:09:38,170 In which case, why can't we just doctor the other theories by correcting them? 82 00:09:38,170 --> 00:09:45,730 Isn't that the rational thing to do when you find your theory is wrong in certain respects, you tweak it. 83 00:09:45,730 --> 00:09:53,190 Now, without induction, it's hard to see why a theories having been refuted in the past. 84 00:09:53,190 --> 00:10:00,510 Gives us reason to suppose that its future predictions won't come out, right? 85 00:10:00,510 --> 00:10:07,440 Now, Poppa says this is ad hoc. Yes, it is ad hoc, in a sense, what we're doing, we're taking those theories. 86 00:10:07,440 --> 00:10:12,390 And in the light of what proved to be wrong about the movie tweaking them. 87 00:10:12,390 --> 00:10:20,040 But unless we believe in some kind of inductive assumption, it's not clear why that's bad. 88 00:10:20,040 --> 00:10:25,500 Now, you might say, well, we should go for the simplest theory, we should go for the theory that predicts all laser bees, 89 00:10:25,500 --> 00:10:32,500 at least in the light of having so far experienced as all being these, because that's the simplest theory. 90 00:10:32,500 --> 00:10:35,910 Yeah, maybe that's quite plausible. 91 00:10:35,910 --> 00:10:43,230 But if you're going to favour simple theories, then obviously induction is pretty simple, you assume that the future will resemble the past. 92 00:10:43,230 --> 00:10:47,490 That is obviously has a certain kind of simplicity. 93 00:10:47,490 --> 00:10:54,150 And if you've got a rational ground for doing that, then you ought to be able to provide some justification of induction. 94 00:10:54,150 --> 00:10:58,050 So Hume's argument wouldn't be successful, after all. 95 00:10:58,050 --> 00:11:07,080 So I suggest that poppers weigh out saying Hume's argument works, but we can get away without induction actually fails. 96 00:11:07,080 --> 00:11:16,290 We still have this problem of trying to justify induction. If we could do that via a preference for simplicity, that would be great. 97 00:11:16,290 --> 00:11:21,180 But it looks like a preference for simplicity may be no more justifiable than 98 00:11:21,180 --> 00:11:33,470 a preference for theories that say the same about the future as the past. 99 00:11:33,470 --> 00:11:42,680 OK, now I'm going to move on to the the last attempt to answer him that we're going to be considering the the pragmatic justification of induction. 100 00:11:42,680 --> 00:11:53,030 But I want to introduce that slightly obliquely by clarifying the difference between an epistemic and a pragmatic justification. 101 00:11:53,030 --> 00:11:59,420 So when we talk about a belief or a theory being epistemic Li justified, 102 00:11:59,420 --> 00:12:07,300 we mean that we have evidence that makes it likely to be true reason to believe it. 103 00:12:07,300 --> 00:12:19,360 But when we talk about pragmatic justification, we're talking about typically action, something that we are doing and we are justified in doing it. 104 00:12:19,360 --> 00:12:27,430 Now, insofar as belief is subject to our control and that could be debated, how far our belief is subject to our control. 105 00:12:27,430 --> 00:12:31,120 It will come back to that a bit later than you might say. 106 00:12:31,120 --> 00:12:37,630 It's reasonable to adopt beliefs, which we have no good epistemic reason to believe. 107 00:12:37,630 --> 00:12:47,080 Now, this is controversial. Many of you would be appalled, perhaps at the idea that you might take on a belief because it enables you to achieve 108 00:12:47,080 --> 00:12:52,570 something rather than because you've actually got an epistemic reason for believing it. 109 00:12:52,570 --> 00:13:02,260 But Blaise Pascal famously gave an argument of exactly this kind, known as Pascal's wager. 110 00:13:02,260 --> 00:13:09,750 So here's how the argument goes We've got two possibilities either God exists or God doesn't exist. 111 00:13:09,750 --> 00:13:17,250 And I'm faced with this decision, shall I believe in God? And let's suppose for the moment that that is up to my choice, 112 00:13:17,250 --> 00:13:26,900 that I would be able to take on a belief in God if I decided that that was a good pragmatic thing to do. 113 00:13:26,900 --> 00:13:35,990 OK, so I've got the choice between believing and not believing. Well, if God exists and I believe, then it's going to have some impact on my life. 114 00:13:35,990 --> 00:13:45,320 You know, I'll be going to church on Sundays, for example, I'll be praying. I'll be living as self-denying life in certain ways. 115 00:13:45,320 --> 00:13:52,770 But on the other hand, when I die, I can look forward to eternal bliss in heaven. 116 00:13:52,770 --> 00:13:57,580 If I believe, but God doesn't exist, then I'm going to have that self-denying life, 117 00:13:57,580 --> 00:14:04,290 not an awful life, but just one in which I give up some of the things that I might otherwise do. 118 00:14:04,290 --> 00:14:11,270 And when I die, that's it. What about if I don't believe? 119 00:14:11,270 --> 00:14:21,640 Well, if I don't believe, maybe I'll have a more enjoyable life? Because I won't be wasting that time on Sunday, I can go down the pub or whatever. 120 00:14:21,640 --> 00:14:32,210 But then when I die, sadly, you're going to have eternal hellfire because God will throw me into the burning pit. 121 00:14:32,210 --> 00:14:37,160 On the other hand, if gold doesn't exist, I'll have my enjoyable life, and then when I die, that's it. 122 00:14:37,160 --> 00:14:39,950 Nothing more. 123 00:14:39,950 --> 00:14:48,020 OK, now, just to make it vivid, suppose we're in the situation where we have examined the arguments for and against the existence of God. 124 00:14:48,020 --> 00:14:57,920 And maybe we've come to the to the conclusion that the chance of God existing is is one in a thousand nought point one percent chance that God exists. 125 00:14:57,920 --> 00:15:06,020 Very likely there is no God. But Pascal's argument says, here we've got a gamble. 126 00:15:06,020 --> 00:15:15,440 OK, we've got a nine hundred and ninety nine chances that God doesn't exist, one chance that he does, but look at the pay offs. 127 00:15:15,440 --> 00:15:23,170 Look at the pay offs. If I if gold does exist in that one thousand chance where gold does exist. 128 00:15:23,170 --> 00:15:31,660 The payoff, if I believe, is plus infinity and the payoff, if I don't, is minus infinity. 129 00:15:31,660 --> 00:15:38,710 Whereas if God doesn't exist, either way, the payoff is maybe plus one and minus one, something like, you know, relatively. 130 00:15:38,710 --> 00:15:41,130 It's a certainly finite amount. 131 00:15:41,130 --> 00:15:52,860 So even if the chances the epistemic chances are against God existing, even if the evidence that I have suggests that God existence is very unlikely, 132 00:15:52,860 --> 00:15:59,820 I'm better off taking the gamble on believing because the payoffs are so large. 133 00:15:59,820 --> 00:16:05,280 So it's like, suppose somebody says. Throw. 134 00:16:05,280 --> 00:16:15,400 Here are two dice. If they both come up sixth, then I'll I'll give you 100 pounds. 135 00:16:15,400 --> 00:16:25,240 And you're thinking and they say you only have to pay five pounds to play this game. 136 00:16:25,240 --> 00:16:26,890 What do you might be a bit tempted by that, 137 00:16:26,890 --> 00:16:35,880 that you shouldn't be OK because the payoff is 20 times the stake and the chance of getting to 60 is the only one in thirty six. 138 00:16:35,880 --> 00:16:42,680 But if they say throw these two dice, if they both come up six, I'll give you a million pounds. 139 00:16:42,680 --> 00:16:55,280 Yes, thank you, I will play that game as often as you like because the payoff is so much greater compared with the the original stake. 140 00:16:55,280 --> 00:16:58,730 If you compare that with the chance of winning and it's the same principle here, 141 00:16:58,730 --> 00:17:08,470 if you've got an infinite payoff, even a small chance of winning makes it worth taking the gamble. 142 00:17:08,470 --> 00:17:17,470 So I mentioned at the beginning that you might be you might question whether it's even possible for somebody to voluntarily take on a belief. 143 00:17:17,470 --> 00:17:22,390 If I've looked at all the arguments and I'm convinced that God is very unlikely, 144 00:17:22,390 --> 00:17:28,270 but then somebody says, Oh, but look, you'd be much better off believing, what am I going to do? 145 00:17:28,270 --> 00:17:34,270 Well, Pascal does actually address that. He says, you spend lots of time reading holy books, lots of spend, 146 00:17:34,270 --> 00:17:43,590 lots of time with other Christians, but you will come to believe and maybe that's plausible. 147 00:17:43,590 --> 00:17:51,930 But you might think this is just dishonest, deciding to believe something because of the payoff, not because you've actually got reason to believe it. 148 00:17:51,930 --> 00:18:05,700 Well, maybe, but when we're addressing scepticism, we're not in the position that Pascal is postulating here in respect of God. 149 00:18:05,700 --> 00:18:10,930 If we're facing scepticism, it might be not that we've got. 150 00:18:10,930 --> 00:18:18,400 A probability is telling us not to believe something, but nevertheless wanting to believe it, if we're facing scepticism, 151 00:18:18,400 --> 00:18:24,700 we might be in a situation where we literally have no evidence either way where we think, Oh, we can't know anything here. 152 00:18:24,700 --> 00:18:26,920 What shall I believe then? 153 00:18:26,920 --> 00:18:34,600 And maybe in that case, it is more reasonable to take a pragmatic line, no scepticism leaves open that anything could be the case. 154 00:18:34,600 --> 00:18:40,270 Well, in that case, I'm going to choose my beliefs by what makes me comfortable. 155 00:18:40,270 --> 00:18:48,390 What makes me get on with my life without worrying and so forth? It's not so obvious that that's an unreasonable thing to do. 156 00:18:48,390 --> 00:18:54,900 And notice, I mentioned the ancient sceptics a bit in the in the first couple of lectures. 157 00:18:54,900 --> 00:19:02,820 They typically saw the aim of scepticism as being a certain kind of tranquillity what they called after Axia. 158 00:19:02,820 --> 00:19:10,440 And you can see how taking this sort of approach to scepticism might indeed leave you with a certain form of tranquillity. 159 00:19:10,440 --> 00:19:19,200 That is, if I can't know anything. Well, I'm just going to get on with my life adopting a comfortable set of beliefs that I can live with, 160 00:19:19,200 --> 00:19:28,100 and I'm going to stop worrying about them because I've realised that there's nothing I can do. 161 00:19:28,100 --> 00:19:33,530 OK, now, having got clear on the difference between epistemic and a pragmatic justification, 162 00:19:33,530 --> 00:19:39,630 let's look briefly at the so-called pragmatic justification of induction. 163 00:19:39,630 --> 00:19:48,480 Now, this is a little bit different in that Reichenbach, who promoted this form of justification. 164 00:19:48,480 --> 00:19:54,090 He wasn't saying we cannot know anything and therefore we just have to gamble. 165 00:19:54,090 --> 00:19:58,810 What he was saying was that induction has a particular merit. 166 00:19:58,810 --> 00:20:04,720 We might not know whether induction will lead us to true beliefs. 167 00:20:04,720 --> 00:20:13,380 But he gave an argument for saying that if any method at all will lead us to true beliefs, induction will. 168 00:20:13,380 --> 00:20:19,330 So we've got good grounds for using induction because it's our best bet. 169 00:20:19,330 --> 00:20:26,170 So he's giving epistemic grounds for thinking that induction is our best bet. 170 00:20:26,170 --> 00:20:38,170 Even if we can't give an epistemic ground for saying that induction will work, it looks like we've still got pragmatic reason for going with it. 171 00:20:38,170 --> 00:20:46,540 So the way Reichenbach framed this was, let's suppose that there is some rule and we want to discover what the correct rule is. 172 00:20:46,540 --> 00:20:52,130 So the rule might be, for example, that 61 per cent of A's are. 173 00:20:52,130 --> 00:21:04,670 And then you can imagine different ways of inferring from the past, drawing conclusions about the likely proportion of aliens that are these. 174 00:21:04,670 --> 00:21:15,920 And what Reichenbach aims to show is that doing this inductively, just inferring the same for the future as you have observed in the past. 175 00:21:15,920 --> 00:21:22,670 That will reach the correct proportion, if any rule will. 176 00:21:22,670 --> 00:21:26,000 But I want to suggest there's a fundamental problem here. 177 00:21:26,000 --> 00:21:33,080 There's a problem with the way that Reichenbach has framed the whole discussion because when he says, 178 00:21:33,080 --> 00:21:38,240 let's try and find a rule, you know, X percent of AIDS are BS. 179 00:21:38,240 --> 00:21:42,950 He is implicitly looking for a role that is consistent over time. 180 00:21:42,950 --> 00:21:50,930 So he's actually framed it in such a way that induction is built into his assumptions. 181 00:21:50,930 --> 00:21:57,880 So I think he's taking it for granted. He's taking induction for granted in his framing of the problem. 182 00:21:57,880 --> 00:22:04,570 And there's another perhaps more fundamental issue about a pragmatic justification of induction. 183 00:22:04,570 --> 00:22:14,320 Think of what Hume says about induction. Does Hume say we should stop reasoning inductively, having come out with his sceptical argument? 184 00:22:14,320 --> 00:22:21,980 No, he doesn't. Indeed, he doesn't think stopping reasoning inductively is even an option for us. 185 00:22:21,980 --> 00:22:30,560 If I see a followed by B again and again and again, and then I see a, I just find myself expecting a B, 186 00:22:30,560 --> 00:22:38,930 whether I like it or not, belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. 187 00:22:38,930 --> 00:22:43,850 It is an operation of the soul when we are so situated as unavoidable as to feel 188 00:22:43,850 --> 00:22:48,950 the passion of love when we receive benefits or hatred when we meet with injuries. 189 00:22:48,950 --> 00:22:52,280 All these operations are a species of natural instincts, 190 00:22:52,280 --> 00:23:00,460 which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent. 191 00:23:00,460 --> 00:23:07,930 So think back to the second lecture, we are evolved beings, our faculties have evolved from those of animals. 192 00:23:07,930 --> 00:23:16,240 We naturally react in certain ways and if we see one thing followed by another again and again and again, we see the one, we expect the other. 193 00:23:16,240 --> 00:23:20,590 That's it. That's the way we work. We can't help it. 194 00:23:20,590 --> 00:23:27,000 Now, if humans write that we really can't help it, then what is the point of a pragmatic justification? 195 00:23:27,000 --> 00:23:31,540 Isn't that the ultimate pragmatic justification? I can't help it. 196 00:23:31,540 --> 00:23:39,230 If you can't help it, then you don't need any other justification. 197 00:23:39,230 --> 00:23:44,150 Of course, this all this is all likely still to feel somewhat unsatisfactory. 198 00:23:44,150 --> 00:23:50,660 We yearn for some epistemic justification for our fundamental method of inference. 199 00:23:50,660 --> 00:23:56,760 But so far, we haven't been able to find one. 200 00:23:56,760 --> 00:24:05,010 So let's now transition to another way of looking at sceptical concerns and focussing less on our 201 00:24:05,010 --> 00:24:12,450 attempts to justify our own reasoning and looking more from an outside an external perspective. 202 00:24:12,450 --> 00:24:25,100 So now we're going to move from the intern list approach, which has dominated our discussion so far to look at external ism. 203 00:24:25,100 --> 00:24:36,980 So internal, its justification that is justifying our faculties through our own thinking might well seem to be utterly hopeless. 204 00:24:36,980 --> 00:24:41,780 Recall what Hume says about Descartes in enquiry twelve point three. 205 00:24:41,780 --> 00:24:44,840 Just says if you start out doubting your own faculties, 206 00:24:44,840 --> 00:24:50,180 then you've had it because the only way you could possibly justify your faculties is by using your faculties. 207 00:24:50,180 --> 00:24:55,770 And if your diffident of those, then you've got nothing to use. 208 00:24:55,770 --> 00:25:01,440 But let's suppose we give up on that, we give up on trying to justify our own faculties, 209 00:25:01,440 --> 00:25:10,110 but just consider the different situation of a creature which does in fact have reliable faculties, 210 00:25:10,110 --> 00:25:15,480 whether or not it's able to prove that and the creature which does not have reliable faculties. 211 00:25:15,480 --> 00:25:20,340 Surely the former is in a better epistemic situation than the latter. 212 00:25:20,340 --> 00:25:31,780 There is a relevant difference between having reliable faculties as opposed to unreliable faculties, even if you can't prove which one you have. 213 00:25:31,780 --> 00:25:40,300 Animals, for example, are animals, many of them have excellent faculties, think of a dog's nose, it's great cognitive faculty. 214 00:25:40,300 --> 00:25:45,340 The dog can discover all sorts of things using smell. 215 00:25:45,340 --> 00:25:49,750 But the dog can't justify the claim that it has a reliable nose. 216 00:25:49,750 --> 00:25:53,710 You know, it may or may not have one, but if it has one, it can't prove it. 217 00:25:53,710 --> 00:25:59,690 Does that mean that the dog is in a worse epistemic situation? Well, arguably not. 218 00:25:59,690 --> 00:26:07,400 So this leads us to external ism. So an external list account of justification or knowledge, 219 00:26:07,400 --> 00:26:20,720 an external list account focuses on the actual connexion between our beliefs and the truth, not on our ability to prove that connexion. 220 00:26:20,720 --> 00:26:28,820 So reliable ism is a very common form of external ism, basically, we say that somebody is justified externally, 221 00:26:28,820 --> 00:26:38,660 stickley in having a belief if there is a reliable connexion between their belief and their truth, irrespective of whether they're able to prove it. 222 00:26:38,660 --> 00:26:45,170 So where is the internal list like? Descartes says, I'm going to start doubting everything, all my senses and everything, 223 00:26:45,170 --> 00:26:50,630 unless I can prove them to be reliable from an external perspective. 224 00:26:50,630 --> 00:27:00,690 We're going to treat someone as justified if their beliefs are reliable, if they're sensory, beliefs are reliable, even if they can't prove it. 225 00:27:00,690 --> 00:27:07,590 And so clearly an animal whose nose or eyes are reliable, you know, imagine the eagle got very fine sight of a dog. 226 00:27:07,590 --> 00:27:13,890 Very fine smell. We will also allow the eagle and the dog to have justified beliefs, 227 00:27:13,890 --> 00:27:22,650 maybe even knowledge on the basis of the reliability of their faculties, even though they can't prove them to be reliable. 228 00:27:22,650 --> 00:27:29,110 So externally, Jim, is particularly popular as applied to perception. 229 00:27:29,110 --> 00:27:35,410 If my eyes do, in fact, give reliable information about external objects, then on the external list account, 230 00:27:35,410 --> 00:27:45,460 what I see can justify my beliefs about the external world and thus yield knowledge even if I cannot prove that my eyes are reliable. 231 00:27:45,460 --> 00:27:55,540 So a dog can know that its master is approaching when it knows correctly tells it that its master is approaching. 232 00:27:55,540 --> 00:28:02,140 The dog can't know that it knows, but nevertheless it can know. 233 00:28:02,140 --> 00:28:09,070 And this actually brings us to one quite powerful argument in favour of external ism, because you might think. 234 00:28:09,070 --> 00:28:16,570 Actually, you know, this is a very inferior kind of knowledge in order to really know something, you've got to be able to know that, you know. 235 00:28:16,570 --> 00:28:26,590 And that's quite tempting. The idea that knowing that P is true requires knowing that, you know that P is true, 236 00:28:26,590 --> 00:28:34,800 but you can probably see that that quickly leads to an infinite regress. If in order to know that p, i have to know that I know that P. 237 00:28:34,800 --> 00:28:39,630 Then in order to know that, I know that I have to know that, I know that, I know that. 238 00:28:39,630 --> 00:28:43,170 And that's going to go on to infinity. 239 00:28:43,170 --> 00:28:55,830 And surely it is not possible for me or anyone else to know that I know that, I know that I know Google Times and that's 10 to 100, that p right? 240 00:28:55,830 --> 00:29:02,770 I simply cannot maintain a belief that complex, let alone have knowledge of it. 241 00:29:02,770 --> 00:29:08,200 So basically insisting that in order to know something, you always have to know that, 242 00:29:08,200 --> 00:29:15,100 you know, is not on and what the external it says is cut that regret at the very first point. 243 00:29:15,100 --> 00:29:21,100 Just don't insist that in order to know anything, in order for the dog to know that its master is nearby, 244 00:29:21,100 --> 00:29:30,420 deny that the dog has to know that it knows it doesn't. It can just know it on the basis of reliable faculties. 245 00:29:30,420 --> 00:29:38,040 Now, another argument that can be used in favouring external ism own external ism wasn't really popular at the time. 246 00:29:38,040 --> 00:29:43,650 Moore was writing External ism came in very much towards the end of the 20th century, 247 00:29:43,650 --> 00:29:53,730 but we can use Moore's argument as a way of motivating an external approach. 248 00:29:53,730 --> 00:29:58,490 So again, this is a paper that's on your reading list. 249 00:29:58,490 --> 00:30:05,180 I mean, it seems like a very crude argument goes like this. OK, I'm going to prove that there's an external world. 250 00:30:05,180 --> 00:30:13,220 In order to prove that there's an external world, all I need to do is prove that there is that there exists at least one external object. 251 00:30:13,220 --> 00:30:19,860 Right? Well, there's one hand. There's another. 252 00:30:19,860 --> 00:30:29,830 If this is a hand. A genuine hand, then there is an external world, therefore, that the external world. 253 00:30:29,830 --> 00:30:34,660 Would Descartes be impressed? Of course not, Descartes would say. But you might be dreaming. 254 00:30:34,660 --> 00:30:41,050 There might be an evil demon and you might think at first sight an argument like this is just pathetic. 255 00:30:41,050 --> 00:30:50,970 Ridiculous. But actually, let's look a little bit deeper and think about the logic of the situation. 256 00:30:50,970 --> 00:31:00,120 So I want to introduce to you two logical rules you've probably come across, at least the first of these, they're given Latin names. 257 00:31:00,120 --> 00:31:11,430 Been around a long time. One of them's called modus phonons, the modus ponant says that if he implies Q and P is true, it follows that Q is true. 258 00:31:11,430 --> 00:31:24,290 Yeah. Very straightforward. The other one mode is, Collins says, that if P implies Q and Q is false, then P is false. 259 00:31:24,290 --> 00:31:29,840 So in one case, we're arguing from truth to truth, from left to right and the other. 260 00:31:29,840 --> 00:31:35,150 We're arguing from falsehood to falsehood, right to left. 261 00:31:35,150 --> 00:31:39,140 And you can probably see those are both logically valid. 262 00:31:39,140 --> 00:31:44,950 OK. I mean, if the truth of P implies the truth of Q. 263 00:31:44,950 --> 00:31:50,030 And cue isn't true, then he can't have been true because if it had been, Q would have had to be true to. 264 00:31:50,030 --> 00:31:59,700 Right, so so the two go together and there's a common saying in philosophy that one person's mode opponents is another person's modus tomlin's. 265 00:31:59,700 --> 00:32:05,670 In other words, you can have two people who agree that P implies Q, but they can argue in different directions, 266 00:32:05,670 --> 00:32:11,820 one person can say, Well, I know P and therefore I'm going to infer Q, and the other person can say, No, you don't. 267 00:32:11,820 --> 00:32:15,810 I know, cuz false. So therefore, PS false. 268 00:32:15,810 --> 00:32:23,160 So it's important to realise that when you prove an implication from P to Q that might not be being used to support Q, 269 00:32:23,160 --> 00:32:30,400 it might be being used to undermine P. So now let's consider the conditional. 270 00:32:30,400 --> 00:32:37,320 That's implicit in Moore's argument. If I know this is a hand, then I know there's an external world. 271 00:32:37,320 --> 00:32:43,730 Moore is saying I do know this is a hand. Therefore, I do know there's an external world. 272 00:32:43,730 --> 00:32:49,100 The sceptic is saying, I don't know that there's an external world. 273 00:32:49,100 --> 00:32:57,760 Therefore, I don't know that this is a hand. And in that situation, you might say, well, you know, here there's a standoff. 274 00:32:57,760 --> 00:33:04,970 But actually, this is this is inviting you to consider, which do you consider more plausible? 275 00:33:04,970 --> 00:33:13,570 P, which is most premise or not, Q, which is the sceptics premise. 276 00:33:13,570 --> 00:33:19,510 And maybe it's enough to defeat the sceptic that we probably find P. 277 00:33:19,510 --> 00:33:24,790 I know this is a hand more plausible than not, Q I don't know. 278 00:33:24,790 --> 00:33:32,460 There's an external world. Now, let's suppose we are tempted to go with more here. 279 00:33:32,460 --> 00:33:38,520 We like the idea that we really do indeed know that this is a hand and we prefer 280 00:33:38,520 --> 00:33:44,330 that to the hypothesis that we don't know that there's an external world. 281 00:33:44,330 --> 00:33:49,310 Appealing to external ism could give you a way of making sense of this. 282 00:33:49,310 --> 00:33:56,840 You could say, OK, if we go for external ism about knowledge, then external ism does leave open. 283 00:33:56,840 --> 00:34:07,130 It explains how it could be that I know this is a hand if external ism is correct and my faculties are in fact generally reliable. 284 00:34:07,130 --> 00:34:13,760 I can't prove that they are, you know? For all I know, there could be an evil demon for all I know, I could be dreaming and all that. 285 00:34:13,760 --> 00:34:18,720 But nevertheless, if my faculties are reliable as I believe they are. 286 00:34:18,720 --> 00:34:24,510 Then from an external point of view, I do know that this is a hand. 287 00:34:24,510 --> 00:34:32,070 And that is something that we could maintain to be the case that can be combined with Moore's answer to the sceptic to say, 288 00:34:32,070 --> 00:34:42,390 OK, I can't prove this is a hand. But I do, in fact, think that I do know this is a hand. 289 00:34:42,390 --> 00:34:47,370 So external ism can answer sceptical worries in a way. 290 00:34:47,370 --> 00:34:53,500 So, I mean, if the sceptic is saying it's impossible to have any knowledge. 291 00:34:53,500 --> 00:35:01,480 External ism does provide an answer there. It says no knowledge is possible if my faculties are reliable, then I have knowledge. 292 00:35:01,480 --> 00:35:06,670 For example, is a hand. Therefore knowledge is possible. 293 00:35:06,670 --> 00:35:13,990 Doesn't show I actually have knowledge because the might be an evil demon, in which case I don't actually know it's a hand. 294 00:35:13,990 --> 00:35:19,420 But if my faculties are in fact reliable as I think they are, then I do have knowledge. 295 00:35:19,420 --> 00:35:29,390 So I can't know that I know. But I can say, perhaps I do know the sceptic who is trying to deny any possibility of knowledge is refuted. 296 00:35:29,390 --> 00:35:38,960 But notice that external ism does not refute the sceptic who simply says, I don't think, in fact you do have knowledge. 297 00:35:38,960 --> 00:35:49,920 It may refute the sceptic who says knowledge is impossible. But it doesn't refute the sceptical worry that I might, in fact, be a brain in a VAT. 298 00:35:49,920 --> 00:35:55,080 Or there might be some evil demon deceiving me, and maybe I don't have any knowledge at all. 299 00:35:55,080 --> 00:35:58,950 So external ism doesn't refute scepticism. 300 00:35:58,950 --> 00:36:12,080 You can still be subject to sceptical doubt from the inside, even if you adopt an external position on knowledge and justification. 301 00:36:12,080 --> 00:36:18,380 OK, now let's combine external ism and induction. 302 00:36:18,380 --> 00:36:25,760 As indeed, Van Cleave does, so Van Cleave proposes an external exit approach to the problem of the justification of induction. 303 00:36:25,760 --> 00:36:32,480 We've already seen how external ISM gives quite a plausible account of knowledge in the case of the senses. 304 00:36:32,480 --> 00:36:39,470 Let's now see if it can do the same magic with induction. 305 00:36:39,470 --> 00:36:42,620 So applying external ism to induction, 306 00:36:42,620 --> 00:36:51,920 it suggests that induction can be considered justified from an external point of view if the world is such as to make inductive predictions, 307 00:36:51,920 --> 00:37:00,750 probably true. For example, because the world in fact, behaves consistently over time. 308 00:37:00,750 --> 00:37:10,110 A notice that this potentially gets around Hume's problem because it says, OK, we can't prove this, we can't prove the future will resemble the past. 309 00:37:10,110 --> 00:37:18,570 But if in fact the future will resemble the past, that means the world is such that inductive inferences will be reliable, 310 00:37:18,570 --> 00:37:24,790 then we can treat them as justified and potentially yielding knowledge. 311 00:37:24,790 --> 00:37:38,340 But I want to suggest that there is a. There is a worry here, a specific worry to do with induction, which is not present in the case of sensation. 312 00:37:38,340 --> 00:37:49,560 So the external list about inductive justification claims that if induction is in fact reliable, then inductive inferences can give justified beliefs. 313 00:37:49,560 --> 00:37:56,280 But look at those words is in fact. Is in fact. 314 00:37:56,280 --> 00:38:03,250 Do you mean has been so far? Do you mean will be in the future? 315 00:38:03,250 --> 00:38:13,210 Those are different things. And the inductive sceptic is saying. 316 00:38:13,210 --> 00:38:21,440 Maybe the world hasn't acted uniformly so far. Why suppose it will in the future? 317 00:38:21,440 --> 00:38:27,200 And then the external response just seems to be saying, well, if the world goes on acting in a uniform way, 318 00:38:27,200 --> 00:38:32,090 then you are justified in believing that it will go on acting in a uniform way. 319 00:38:32,090 --> 00:38:40,060 And that seems rather unsatisfactory, it's as though simply the truth of uniformity is sufficient for the justification of uniformity. 320 00:38:40,060 --> 00:38:45,830 Well, sorry, justification of the belief in uniformity. And we. 321 00:38:45,830 --> 00:38:53,150 We're likely to be rather unhappy with that, we think of the the justification of a belief has to be more than just it, to me, a truth. 322 00:38:53,150 --> 00:39:00,160 And in the case of induction, it's not clear that external ism provides a way of satisfying that. 323 00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:02,260 So contrast it with sense perception. 324 00:39:02,260 --> 00:39:12,220 In the case of sense perception, the external list condition that our senses operate so is to give us reliable information about external objects. 325 00:39:12,220 --> 00:39:18,080 So, you know, when I think there's a glass that there really is a glass there. 326 00:39:18,080 --> 00:39:26,340 That's a fact, a fact about my sense is whose endurance over time can potentially underwrite my future perception. 327 00:39:26,340 --> 00:39:33,710 Right. My senses are in fact reliable. I expect that that will continue into the future, that's an inductive inference, 328 00:39:33,710 --> 00:39:39,770 but here we're not questioning induction, we're questioning my senses. And if it will continue into the future, 329 00:39:39,770 --> 00:39:48,680 then my sense is will continue to be reliable and can in fact give me justified belief and knowledge from the external perspective. 330 00:39:48,680 --> 00:39:52,550 But in the case of induction, the external list condition, 331 00:39:52,550 --> 00:40:02,330 the thing that is supposed to underwrite the justification of my inductive beliefs just is that the way things behave will endure over time. 332 00:40:02,330 --> 00:40:13,120 There's no independent fact available. So either way, we just seem to be taking induction for granted. 333 00:40:13,120 --> 00:40:21,990 And I want to flesh out this point. Suppose I feel sceptical worries about induction, right? 334 00:40:21,990 --> 00:40:30,990 I've read him, I think, oh my goodness, this is a worry and somebody comes up and says, Well, don't worry about it, 335 00:40:30,990 --> 00:40:40,570 Peter, because if the world does in fact continue to act uniformly, then you can be said to have known that it will. 336 00:40:40,570 --> 00:40:51,070 Oh, that's no help. If I'm worried about the world acting uniformly to be told, Oh, well, he does act uniformly, no problem. 337 00:40:51,070 --> 00:40:55,510 I'm sorry. The problem is whether it will. That is my worry. 338 00:40:55,510 --> 00:41:00,770 So I'm looking I'm in asking the sceptical question. 339 00:41:00,770 --> 00:41:05,200 I'm looking for more than mere reliability from an external point of view. 340 00:41:05,200 --> 00:41:15,820 I want some kind of first personal, reflective understanding that will give me epistemic assurance of continued uniformity. 341 00:41:15,820 --> 00:41:19,790 So in asking a sceptical worry? 342 00:41:19,790 --> 00:41:31,710 Sorry, in facing a sceptical worry, asking a sceptical question of myself, I'm expressing a worry which is not like anything that a dog could express. 343 00:41:31,710 --> 00:41:44,290 The mere external list reply does not give me the kind of satisfaction that I'm looking for. 344 00:41:44,290 --> 00:41:50,340 OK. So where are we left then in addressing scepticism and I'm going to finish off 345 00:41:50,340 --> 00:41:56,610 by sketching an approach which seems to me to be Hume's considered approach. 346 00:41:56,610 --> 00:42:05,550 And also, I think, a very appropriate way of dealing with the problem. 347 00:42:05,550 --> 00:42:11,130 And Hume is not external. I mean, I don't think anybody in the early modern period, frankly, is externalised. 348 00:42:11,130 --> 00:42:16,980 A lot of people who build on Hume's philosophy these days find external themes there. 349 00:42:16,980 --> 00:42:21,420 So I'm not suggesting that external ism is contrary to the spirit of Hume's philosophy. 350 00:42:21,420 --> 00:42:28,530 On the contrary, I think actually there's plenty of stuff there that you can use to motivate external list approaches. 351 00:42:28,530 --> 00:42:34,260 But I think Hume's ultimate approach to induction is not an external one. 352 00:42:34,260 --> 00:42:39,930 He actually gives away of facing up to sceptical doubts. 353 00:42:39,930 --> 00:42:46,110 And if you like living with them, but without resorting to external ism. 354 00:42:46,110 --> 00:42:54,120 Recall again, his criticism of Descartes. Descartes says we should distrust all our faculties unless we're able to prove them to be reliable. 355 00:42:54,120 --> 00:43:01,260 Hume says that's hopeless because unless you use your faculties, there's no way you could prove them to be reliable. 356 00:43:01,260 --> 00:43:05,370 So you put yourself in a pit with no means of escape. 357 00:43:05,370 --> 00:43:12,300 And he suggests that a better approach to scepticism rather than antecedent scepticism is consequent scepticism. 358 00:43:12,300 --> 00:43:17,190 So instead of starting out sceptical and trying to prove our faculties reliable, 359 00:43:17,190 --> 00:43:24,030 instead, what we're going to do is trust our faculties until they prove us false. 360 00:43:24,030 --> 00:43:29,190 So there is another species of scepticism consequent to science and enquiry when 361 00:43:29,190 --> 00:43:32,970 men are supposed to have discovered either the absolute salaciousness of their 362 00:43:32,970 --> 00:43:37,830 mental faculties or their own fitness to reach any fixed determination in all 363 00:43:37,830 --> 00:43:43,070 those curious subjects of speculation about which they're commonly employed. 364 00:43:43,070 --> 00:43:49,310 So don't start off sceptical, become sceptical if you encounter problems. 365 00:43:49,310 --> 00:43:54,560 Start off trusting your faculties. 366 00:43:54,560 --> 00:44:01,250 Another issue that I want to bring in here that is obviously related to what we were talking about earlier in terms of the pragmatic justification. 367 00:44:01,250 --> 00:44:08,060 It's commonly called the ethics of belief, and I think Descartes and Hume give a very clear contrast here. 368 00:44:08,060 --> 00:44:18,290 So Descartes, when he starts out, he says, we we should withhold assent to anything that we don't know with total certainty. 369 00:44:18,290 --> 00:44:27,070 So we don't believe things by default. We adopt the sceptical hypothesis until we can actually justify our beliefs. 370 00:44:27,070 --> 00:44:31,960 Hume says, actually, we cannot help believing things. 371 00:44:31,960 --> 00:44:39,700 Belief is typically involuntary if you see a followed by B again and again and you see and you just find yourself expecting a B. 372 00:44:39,700 --> 00:44:45,400 You can't do anything about it and therefore you're not doing anything wrong in believing it. 373 00:44:45,400 --> 00:44:53,220 You couldn't help it. And notice that views on scepticism and ethics belief are likely to be related, 374 00:44:53,220 --> 00:45:01,010 someone who thinks that scepticism can be refuted is quite likely to think that it's a duty on us to refute it. 375 00:45:01,010 --> 00:45:06,770 If on the other hand, you think scepticism can't be refuted, then you're not likely to think that that is a duty. 376 00:45:06,770 --> 00:45:12,680 So we've got a nexus of issues here about scepticism, about justification, about belief, 377 00:45:12,680 --> 00:45:23,840 about the voluntariness or not of believing that are closely tied together. 378 00:45:23,840 --> 00:45:31,590 OK. So. I've suggested that humans response involves rejecting antecedent scepticism. 379 00:45:31,590 --> 00:45:35,430 We shouldn't start out doubting our faculties, we can't do that anyway. 380 00:45:35,430 --> 00:45:41,900 It's not subject to our choice. Instead, what we should do is shift the burden of proof. 381 00:45:41,900 --> 00:45:49,760 We should start off trusting our faculties, trusting our perception, trusting our inductive tendencies. 382 00:45:49,760 --> 00:45:59,690 Until the sceptic gives us a reason for scepticism. So it's not up to us to justify our faculties, it's up to the sceptic, 383 00:45:59,690 --> 00:46:06,410 and the sceptic, of course, could be ourselves thinking through sceptical arguments. 384 00:46:06,410 --> 00:46:15,160 But until we've encountered a reason for distrusting our faculties, we should trust them. 385 00:46:15,160 --> 00:46:24,130 And now you might say, but hang on, hasn't Hume himself given a reason for distrusting induction, didn't he, 386 00:46:24,130 --> 00:46:34,270 in section four of the enquiry spell out powerful arguments suggesting that we cannot justify induction? 387 00:46:34,270 --> 00:46:42,200 We cannot trust our inductive tendencies? Doesn't that give us good reason for scepticism? 388 00:46:42,200 --> 00:46:50,210 And here we come to what is Hume's ultimate answer for which, by the way, you need to look in section 12 of the enquiry, 389 00:46:50,210 --> 00:46:56,750 which I've referred to a number of times, particularly paragraphs 22 and 23, and there what Hume does. 390 00:46:56,750 --> 00:47:04,790 He actually takes the argument that he's put in enquiry section four, and he puts that argument in the mouth of a sceptic. 391 00:47:04,790 --> 00:47:14,270 And then Hume himself appears arguing against the sceptic, and we do get a resolution. 392 00:47:14,270 --> 00:47:21,890 OK, so what is our epistemic situation if humans right? And I've spent some time going through various responses to Hume's argument? 393 00:47:21,890 --> 00:47:26,420 I genuinely believe that there is no successful response to Hume's argument. 394 00:47:26,420 --> 00:47:35,240 OK. That's a reason for focussing on eduction. Here we have a sceptical argument which I happen to believe and many others do too has no answer. 395 00:47:35,240 --> 00:47:39,920 Nobody's managed to give an answer to who. 396 00:47:39,920 --> 00:47:48,190 So ultimately, our situation is we cannot help making inductive inferences, not try yourself, pick up a stone. 397 00:47:48,190 --> 00:47:52,660 Hold it above the ground. Convince yourself that you've got no reason, whatever, 398 00:47:52,660 --> 00:47:57,730 for supposing that just because stones in the past have fallen that this stone is going to fall. 399 00:47:57,730 --> 00:48:03,010 Try to stop yourself believing that when you let go, the stone will fall. 400 00:48:03,010 --> 00:48:12,800 Bet you can't. I can't. OK, so we can't help making inductive inferences, we can't find any epistemological justification for induction. 401 00:48:12,800 --> 00:48:21,170 But also, and this is the important point in relation to the previous slides, we can't see any intrinsic flaw in such inference. 402 00:48:21,170 --> 00:48:27,680 It's not like the sceptic has said I've got good reason for supposing that the future won't resemble the past. 403 00:48:27,680 --> 00:48:35,090 It's just that we've got no reason for supposing that it will. What's the appropriate reaction? 404 00:48:35,090 --> 00:48:41,990 Well, Descartes and the Peroni and sceptic and notice they are on the same side here. 405 00:48:41,990 --> 00:48:52,830 Both Descartes and the extreme sceptic. Their approach to the ethics of belief is, well, if you can't prove it, you shouldn't believe it. 406 00:48:52,830 --> 00:48:58,880 But they can't give us an argument for not believing it. 407 00:48:58,880 --> 00:49:01,420 And if you miss right? 408 00:49:01,420 --> 00:49:10,900 If if it's true, that induction is irresistible, if what I said about dropping the stone is true, even if Descartes, even if the Peroni and sceptic, 409 00:49:10,900 --> 00:49:22,890 even the Peroni and sceptic when he looks at the stone about to be let go of even he can't help believing that the stone will fall. 410 00:49:22,890 --> 00:49:32,370 Then. Going with their principal on the ethics of belief seems a very strange thing to do. 411 00:49:32,370 --> 00:49:37,560 Only and cannot expect that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind. 412 00:49:37,560 --> 00:49:42,000 Or if it had that its influence would be beneficial to society. 413 00:49:42,000 --> 00:49:48,570 On the contrary, he must acknowledge if he will acknowledge anything that all human life must perish. 414 00:49:48,570 --> 00:49:53,070 Were his principles universally and steadily to prevail all discourse, 415 00:49:53,070 --> 00:49:57,660 all action would immediately cease and men remain in a total lethargy till the 416 00:49:57,660 --> 00:50:04,330 necessities of nature unsatisfied put an end to their miserable existence. 417 00:50:04,330 --> 00:50:09,790 If you really go through life not believing that falling off a precipice is dangerous or 418 00:50:09,790 --> 00:50:16,790 that crashing into chariots is dangerous or not believing that that bread will nourish you. 419 00:50:16,790 --> 00:50:18,770 You're going to die. 420 00:50:18,770 --> 00:50:26,690 Can't prove that, but I do believe it, and you probably believe it too, because you irresistibly believe that the future will resemble the past. 421 00:50:26,690 --> 00:50:36,400 If you miss right? OK, so a notice that if if he will acknowledge anything, I think that's quite important here. 422 00:50:36,400 --> 00:50:46,030 If the sceptic just says, I can't tell you anything at all about the future, I know nothing, whatever, OK, you can't give me any advice then, can you? 423 00:50:46,030 --> 00:50:51,960 If you acknowledge nothing, you can't give me advice over what I should do. 424 00:50:51,960 --> 00:50:57,030 And I find my own instincts being to believe that the future will resemble the past. 425 00:50:57,030 --> 00:51:05,240 You, Mr. sceptic, have not given me any reason for doubting that other than the fact that I can't justify it. 426 00:51:05,240 --> 00:51:12,590 So we end up appreciating the whimsical condition of mankind who must act and reason and believe, 427 00:51:12,590 --> 00:51:17,270 though they are not able by their most diligent enquiry to satisfy themselves concerning the 428 00:51:17,270 --> 00:51:23,060 foundation of these operations or to remove the objections which may be raised against them. 429 00:51:23,060 --> 00:51:29,600 It's a whimsical condition because we are left with our inductive tendencies. 430 00:51:29,600 --> 00:51:36,860 We cannot justify them. We can't provide any ultimate reason for expecting that the future will resemble the past. 431 00:51:36,860 --> 00:51:43,880 We can't help doing it and we can't see any reason why we should stop doing it. 432 00:51:43,880 --> 00:51:54,350 So we're in a kind of whimsical condition because we just find ourselves forced by nature to act in a certain way to think in a certain way. 433 00:51:54,350 --> 00:51:59,780 We would love to have some epistemic justification for it. 434 00:51:59,780 --> 00:52:05,960 But sorry, we can't have one. So let's just learn to live with that. 435 00:52:05,960 --> 00:52:12,560 And I've suggested again, that can lead us with a certain Aitarak, a certain tranquillity, 436 00:52:12,560 --> 00:52:20,240 a bit like, you know, when you're rushing, you want to get to a meeting in London, let's say. 437 00:52:20,240 --> 00:52:25,310 And it's a real rush, and you end up at the train station. 438 00:52:25,310 --> 00:52:31,850 And then you discover that all the trains to London have been cancelled. You can't make it to the meeting. 439 00:52:31,850 --> 00:52:35,210 Now, part of you might be a little bit frustrated. 440 00:52:35,210 --> 00:52:44,480 But part of you might feel some relief and you think, oh, no point in struggling about that, I just can't go. 441 00:52:44,480 --> 00:52:49,190 End of story. And maybe the same is true of scepticism. 442 00:52:49,190 --> 00:52:55,340 We struggle to refute it. But then maybe ultimately we find we can't. 443 00:52:55,340 --> 00:53:02,810 Well, let's just live with that. The sceptic has not given us a reason for stopping doing induction, 444 00:53:02,810 --> 00:53:14,030 doing science and all the rest just shown that a certain kind of justification that we would have liked to have had is beyond us. 445 00:53:14,030 --> 00:53:17,205 Thank you.