1 00:00:06,700 --> 00:00:13,210 Welcome to the eighth and final lecture on David Hume's treatise Book one. 2 00:00:13,210 --> 00:00:22,660 And we're going to be looking particularly at the very final section of book one of the treaties where Hume goes through a sceptical crisis. 3 00:00:22,660 --> 00:00:33,450 But to explain the significance of that crisis, we need to look back at some earlier material. 4 00:00:33,450 --> 00:00:42,360 OK, just to remind you where we were last time we looked at treaties, one for one and one for two. 5 00:00:42,360 --> 00:00:47,550 Scepticism with regard to reason and scepticism with regard to the senses. 6 00:00:47,550 --> 00:00:58,380 And we found that both our beliefs that we achieve through reasoning and also our beliefs in external body seem to be, 7 00:00:58,380 --> 00:01:01,570 according to Hume, seriously problematic. 8 00:01:01,570 --> 00:01:09,790 In both cases, we're unable actually to maintain scepticism, but it's not because we have good arguments against it, 9 00:01:09,790 --> 00:01:19,690 it's just that we cannot psychologically prevent ourselves having the appropriate beliefs in treaties one for three of the ancient philosophy. 10 00:01:19,690 --> 00:01:27,730 He went on to ridicule Aristotelian us for following their imagination like children and poets. 11 00:01:27,730 --> 00:01:32,290 But he noticed a problem that he has in his own philosophy that is, 12 00:01:32,290 --> 00:01:43,720 his own scientific method seems to be based on the imagination because induction he is analysed as being reliant utterly on custom, 13 00:01:43,720 --> 00:01:45,760 which is a principle of the imagination. 14 00:01:45,760 --> 00:01:54,910 So it looks like he may be being unfair in attacking the ancient philosophers for basing their philosophy on the imagination and treaties, 15 00:01:54,910 --> 00:01:59,500 one for, for one, the beginning of the section of the modern philosophy. 16 00:01:59,500 --> 00:02:07,900 He sketches a justification a defence which distinguishes between two categories of imaginative principles. 17 00:02:07,900 --> 00:02:13,620 So we'll see quite a lot on that in what follows. 18 00:02:13,620 --> 00:02:21,780 In is one for four of the modern philosophy, the rest of that he identifies various further problems with the belief in body. 19 00:02:21,780 --> 00:02:28,890 Then he goes on in one for five to six to discuss the image reality of the soul and of personal identity. 20 00:02:28,890 --> 00:02:33,300 Those sections, though humans often thought of as a sceptic about personal identity. 21 00:02:33,300 --> 00:02:40,860 He himself doesn't actually see those sections as seriously problematic from a sceptical point of view 22 00:02:40,860 --> 00:02:47,910 in the way that one for one and one or two other problems do emerge in the appendix to the treatise. 23 00:02:47,910 --> 00:03:00,600 But that's not our concern here. OK, now let's have a look at the development of humans notion of the imagination through treaties, but one, 24 00:03:00,600 --> 00:03:11,890 part three and one part four, because this is plays a very important role in the final section of but one that we're about to look at. 25 00:03:11,890 --> 00:03:18,040 So back in lecture two, we saw how Hume is an empiricist. 26 00:03:18,040 --> 00:03:23,890 He puts a lot of focus on the coffee principle. He sees that as a development of Locke's empiricism. 27 00:03:23,890 --> 00:03:31,480 All of our ideas, all of the the material of our thought is copied from sensational feeling. 28 00:03:31,480 --> 00:03:37,990 So all of our thought is, so to speak, imagistic again, not just visual images, 29 00:03:37,990 --> 00:03:45,420 but essentially all of our thoughts involves replay of sensations or feelings. 30 00:03:45,420 --> 00:03:50,640 Now it follows then that the imagination, as traditionally conceived, 31 00:03:50,640 --> 00:03:56,850 is going to be the locus of our thinking because the imagination that is the faculty that 32 00:03:56,850 --> 00:04:03,450 represents to us imagistic ideas is going to be the faculty that replace all of our ideas. 33 00:04:03,450 --> 00:04:13,900 So it's not surprising that the imagination becomes a very crucial faculty for whom. 34 00:04:13,900 --> 00:04:17,920 But understanding what he means by the imagination can be quite puzzling. 35 00:04:17,920 --> 00:04:24,880 At the beginning, when he starts out, it looks relatively clear the imagination is opposed to reason. 36 00:04:24,880 --> 00:04:27,160 Despite what I've said about on his principles, 37 00:04:27,160 --> 00:04:35,800 imagination becoming the locus of all of our thinking when he presents his famous discussions of induction in the external world, 38 00:04:35,800 --> 00:04:43,330 it looks very much as though the imagination is a rival faculty to reason. 39 00:04:43,330 --> 00:04:49,400 So we get these famous quotations. The next question is whether experience produces the idea. 40 00:04:49,400 --> 00:04:54,760 That's the idea that comes from inductive inference by means of the understanding or imagination. 41 00:04:54,760 --> 00:04:59,950 Whether we are determined by reason to make the transition or by some Association 42 00:04:59,950 --> 00:05:05,050 of Perceptions and Association is here taken to be an imaginative process, 43 00:05:05,050 --> 00:05:13,240 a process of the imagination. And it's clearly a rival to getting that idea. 44 00:05:13,240 --> 00:05:16,140 That inference from reason. 45 00:05:16,140 --> 00:05:24,270 Again, with the external world, the subject of our present enquiry is concerning the causes which induce us to believe in the existence of body. 46 00:05:24,270 --> 00:05:33,390 We'll consider it, whether it be the sense reason or the imagination that produces the opinion of a continued or distinct existence. 47 00:05:33,390 --> 00:05:40,380 Now, moreover, within both of these discussions, the imagination comes in when reason has failed. 48 00:05:40,380 --> 00:05:46,770 Reason is unable to justify inference from past to future the uniformity principle. 49 00:05:46,770 --> 00:05:56,490 And it's at that point that custom comes in as an alternative explanation. A reason is completely unable to justify our belief in body. 50 00:05:56,490 --> 00:06:01,780 And again, it's the imagination that comes in to fill that gap. 51 00:06:01,780 --> 00:06:09,550 So we get an apparent distinction here in these discussions, which commonly taken for granted in discussions of whom, you know, 52 00:06:09,550 --> 00:06:18,790 he's he's seeing these beliefs as arising from the imagination is seen as a sceptical move by these beliefs cannot be justified by reason. 53 00:06:18,790 --> 00:06:28,580 Instead, they have an imaginative explanation, which is not an intellectually respectable explanation. 54 00:06:28,580 --> 00:06:34,130 However, I want to draw attention to the fact that there's a massive distinction in Hume's treatment, 55 00:06:34,130 --> 00:06:38,720 in his attitude between induction and the belief in body. 56 00:06:38,720 --> 00:06:44,180 He consistently treats the belief in body as being rationally questionable. 57 00:06:44,180 --> 00:06:47,840 It involves fictions, falsehood, denial and delusion and so on. 58 00:06:47,840 --> 00:06:54,710 If you go back, I say slide six forty five and seven eight to 13, that's lecture six, slide 45. 59 00:06:54,710 --> 00:07:07,980 Lecture seven eight 13. And there you will see that he he is criticising the belief in body as being seriously faulty in all sorts of ways. 60 00:07:07,980 --> 00:07:11,850 But he treats induction with far more respect. 61 00:07:11,850 --> 00:07:19,530 So even though he has shown that induction is based on custom, which he treats as a principle of the imagination, 62 00:07:19,530 --> 00:07:25,850 nevertheless, custom is not subject to anything like the vilification that the belief in body is. 63 00:07:25,850 --> 00:07:29,000 Now he's most explicit in the abstract and first enquiry. 64 00:07:29,000 --> 00:07:38,380 It is not there for reason, which is the guide of life, but custom custom then is the great guide of human life. 65 00:07:38,380 --> 00:07:49,390 And subsequently, in the treaties, he goes on to treat inference, customary inference, inductive inference as a bona fide operation of reason. 66 00:07:49,390 --> 00:07:55,660 So here are citations from Slide 16 from lecture three. 67 00:07:55,660 --> 00:08:06,280 You'll see that he is consistently treating inference by induction based on custom as an operation of reason. 68 00:08:06,280 --> 00:08:12,460 Right? Take two three three three, for example. Reason is nothing but the discovery of cause and effect relations. 69 00:08:12,460 --> 00:08:19,150 He's saying discovery of cause and effect relations, which of course we do by custom, by induction. 70 00:08:19,150 --> 00:08:29,940 It's the paradigm of what reason is doing right. Reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, discovers the connexion of causes and effects. 71 00:08:29,940 --> 00:08:34,170 OK, now what then is going on here. 72 00:08:34,170 --> 00:08:39,690 We seem to start off with a distinction between reason and imagination, 73 00:08:39,690 --> 00:08:47,800 where imagination is is a catchall for principles that are rationally defective. 74 00:08:47,800 --> 00:08:56,650 But on the other hand, having shown that inductive inference is relies crucially on custom a principle of the imagination, 75 00:08:56,650 --> 00:09:09,380 apparently Hume carries on treating it as respectable. Well, I want to point out some passages from a book one, part three and later one, 76 00:09:09,380 --> 00:09:20,070 part four, where we see the distinction between reason and the imagination blurring. 77 00:09:20,070 --> 00:09:27,540 So first of all, going back to lecture five, slide 12, we saw him. 78 00:09:27,540 --> 00:09:34,590 I didn't discuss it in detail there, but he points out that there are issues to do with general rules. 79 00:09:34,590 --> 00:09:37,050 You may remember the discussion of prejudice, 80 00:09:37,050 --> 00:09:46,110 the idea that you meet a dull Irishman and you draw the conclusion that an Irishman cannot have wit nor a Frenchman solidity, apparently. 81 00:09:46,110 --> 00:09:51,410 And Hume points out that these sorts of prejudices are unjustified. 82 00:09:51,410 --> 00:09:56,330 And in order to deal with such prejudices, we form higher order general rules. 83 00:09:56,330 --> 00:10:03,730 For example, the general rule not to form prejudices on the basis of just one or two cases. 84 00:10:03,730 --> 00:10:09,190 The general rule is attributed to our judgement as being more extensive and constant. 85 00:10:09,190 --> 00:10:14,980 The exception to the imagination as being more capricious and uncertain. 86 00:10:14,980 --> 00:10:17,230 So he's saying there are two kinds of general rules, 87 00:10:17,230 --> 00:10:22,900 there's prejudicial general rules where we jump to a general rule on the basis of an extremely hasty 88 00:10:22,900 --> 00:10:30,280 generalisation and humans saying we attribute that to the imagination because it's capricious and uncertain. 89 00:10:30,280 --> 00:10:35,650 Where is the more extensive general rules, the ones that we get by reflecting more? 90 00:10:35,650 --> 00:10:39,910 We attribute those to the judgement. 91 00:10:39,910 --> 00:10:51,740 Now judgement seems to be just another word for reason or the understanding, as I discussed in lecture three. 92 00:10:51,740 --> 00:10:56,480 Another somewhat similar case is in Treatise one, three nine. 93 00:10:56,480 --> 00:11:03,640 So here this goes back to lecture five slide four. 94 00:11:03,640 --> 00:11:07,450 So bear in mind, custom is supposedly a principle of the imagination. 95 00:11:07,450 --> 00:11:13,350 He has explained inductive inferences as based on custom. 96 00:11:13,350 --> 00:11:21,690 And now in one, three nine, he's explaining why custom has the effect on this, that he does. 97 00:11:21,690 --> 00:11:27,610 Why is it that custom succeeds in giving us belief? 98 00:11:27,610 --> 00:11:35,560 And the answer is that when we do a customary inference, there's a sort of thick city to what we infer, it's not random, it's not arbitrary. 99 00:11:35,560 --> 00:11:40,270 We see a followed by B again and again and again. We see a is a particular place and time. 100 00:11:40,270 --> 00:11:45,760 We infer B at that same place in time. So that is not arbitrary. 101 00:11:45,760 --> 00:11:54,790 It's got false and settled order. So of course, these are just beliefs when I form an inductive belief. 102 00:11:54,790 --> 00:11:59,830 So it is just an idea. All this and everything else, which I believe are nothing but ideas, 103 00:11:59,830 --> 00:12:04,900 though by their false and settled order arising from custom and the relation of cause and effect, 104 00:12:04,900 --> 00:12:11,080 they distinguish themselves from the other ideas which are merely the offspring of the imagination. 105 00:12:11,080 --> 00:12:21,190 So the difference between custom and just the fanciful play of the imagination is that custom has this force and settled order. 106 00:12:21,190 --> 00:12:29,380 Now you can see in that sentence that there is a tension. He's trying to distinguish between the things that are right, 107 00:12:29,380 --> 00:12:35,740 the ideas that arise from custom and those that are merely the offspring of the imagination. 108 00:12:35,740 --> 00:12:41,380 But hang on a moment, come on your principles. Custom is a principle of the imagination. 109 00:12:41,380 --> 00:12:47,360 So ideas that arise from custom are merely the offspring of the imagination. 110 00:12:47,360 --> 00:12:57,610 Oh, dear, says Hume, I realise I've used the word imagination in two different senses here. 111 00:12:57,610 --> 00:13:08,290 Well, what Hume did at the end of the section, and this is, I think you're not easy to miss. 112 00:13:08,290 --> 00:13:15,520 The clue is this phrase offspring of the imagination. It only occurs twice in humans entire philosophical corpus. 113 00:13:15,520 --> 00:13:23,370 One of the instances I've just quoted the other instance is in a footnote that occurs at the end of the section. 114 00:13:23,370 --> 00:13:33,540 Why did you put it at the end of the section in order to make it easier to insert, he had to edit the text in order to make space for this footnote. 115 00:13:33,540 --> 00:13:37,650 And he had to have a special sheet of council leaf printed, 116 00:13:37,650 --> 00:13:42,750 which was circulated with the second volume of the treaty so that the people who 117 00:13:42,750 --> 00:13:49,440 purchased it could take this this leaf and stick it in in place of the original. 118 00:13:49,440 --> 00:13:58,670 OK, so this was a footnote that Hume had specially printed and inserted while the treatise was going through the press. 119 00:13:58,670 --> 00:14:05,120 Here is the footnote Azaro sent to all probable reasonings is founded on the vivacity of ideas. 120 00:14:05,120 --> 00:14:13,390 It resembles many of those witnesses and prejudices which are rejected under the appropriate character of being the offspring of the imagination. 121 00:14:13,390 --> 00:14:14,320 By this expression, 122 00:14:14,320 --> 00:14:26,480 it appears that the word imagination is commonly used in two different senses and in the following reasonings I've often fallen into this ambiguity. 123 00:14:26,480 --> 00:14:34,730 When I oppose the imagination to the memory, I mean the faculty by which we form our fainter ideas when I oppose it to reason, 124 00:14:34,730 --> 00:14:41,620 I mean the same faculty, excluding only our demonstrative improbable reasonings. 125 00:14:41,620 --> 00:14:52,520 So notice what he's doing here, he's I think it's quite clear that this footnote was prompted by this particular paragraph, the earlier paragraph. 126 00:14:52,520 --> 00:15:02,510 And he's he's spotted that he's implicitly using the imagination in two different senses, in one sense, customers a principle of the imagination. 127 00:15:02,510 --> 00:15:10,640 It's a principle that leads us to form ideas of certain vivacity in response to certain experience. 128 00:15:10,640 --> 00:15:17,660 In another sense, the imagination is a is not respectable. 129 00:15:17,660 --> 00:15:25,400 It is. It is the place where prejudices and imaginative fantasies come from. 130 00:15:25,400 --> 00:15:33,020 So those sorts of things are rejected under the opprobrium character of being the offspring of the imagination. 131 00:15:33,020 --> 00:15:43,520 So there's a there's a sense of the imagination in which it is the faculty of our thinking of our forming ideas that we contrast it to the memory. 132 00:15:43,520 --> 00:15:55,970 But the imagination can also mean that a sort of a lawless form of fancy capricious ideas and custom belongs to the imagination in one sense, 133 00:15:55,970 --> 00:15:59,070 but not in the other. 134 00:15:59,070 --> 00:16:09,000 So it looks like the distinction between reason and the imagination now is not being drawn, as you might think, in terms of parts of the mind. 135 00:16:09,000 --> 00:16:14,880 Right. All of these altered principles operating on ideas in the imagination. 136 00:16:14,880 --> 00:16:21,170 The distinction seems to be being drawn on the basis of how reliable the principles are. 137 00:16:21,170 --> 00:16:28,420 But. And his quotations from Slide 22 of lecture, 138 00:16:28,420 --> 00:16:39,190 three lots of blurring between the reason and between reason and the imagination and the understanding or imagination can draw inferences, 139 00:16:39,190 --> 00:16:43,570 the judgement or rather the imagination, the imagination or understanding, 140 00:16:43,570 --> 00:16:52,770 call it which you please the understanding that is the general and more established principles of the imagination. 141 00:16:52,770 --> 00:16:55,290 So in all of these passages, 142 00:16:55,290 --> 00:17:04,050 it looks as though we've got a distinction between types of principle drawn on the basis of how respectable and reliable they are. 143 00:17:04,050 --> 00:17:13,860 And this last paragraph here one four seven seven seems clearly to be alluding back to the distinction that Hume drew one four four one, 144 00:17:13,860 --> 00:17:22,770 the distinct discussion between the permanent, irresistible and universal principles and those that are changeable, weak and irregular. 145 00:17:22,770 --> 00:17:28,890 This was where Hume was drawing a distinction to justify himself, saying, Look, 146 00:17:28,890 --> 00:17:34,380 I've criticised the ancient philosophers for basing their theories on the imagination. 147 00:17:34,380 --> 00:17:40,440 You might say to me. Hang on whom you based all your philosophy on the imagination to own custom. 148 00:17:40,440 --> 00:17:46,620 Well, in order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, 149 00:17:46,620 --> 00:17:52,740 irresistible and universal, such as the customary transition from causes to effects and from effects to causes. 150 00:17:52,740 --> 00:18:00,430 And the principles which are changeable, weak and irregular, such as those that the ancient philosophers base their philosophy on. 151 00:18:00,430 --> 00:18:06,310 Now, this is controversial, but it seems to me pretty clear that in those earlier passages from Book one, 152 00:18:06,310 --> 00:18:12,850 part three, Hume is alluding to essentially exactly the same distinction as here. 153 00:18:12,850 --> 00:18:18,580 We draw the distinction between judgement and imagination, between different senses of imagination, 154 00:18:18,580 --> 00:18:24,190 between principles that are permanent, irresistible and universal, and those that are changeable, weak and irregular. 155 00:18:24,190 --> 00:18:29,380 In brief between the respectable principles and the disreputable principles, 156 00:18:29,380 --> 00:18:38,700 and we're drawing those distinctions on the basis of how reliable, solid, consistent and so forth they are. 157 00:18:38,700 --> 00:18:46,290 So the distinction between reason and the imagination has to be drawn on the basis of the kinds of principles that govern our thinking, 158 00:18:46,290 --> 00:18:49,140 not in terms of parts of the mind. 159 00:18:49,140 --> 00:18:56,940 Because for whom all of our reasoning takes place in the imagination because the only ideas we have are imagistic ideas. 160 00:18:56,940 --> 00:19:01,440 So the distinction between reason and the imagination can't be drawn in terms of parts of the mind. 161 00:19:01,440 --> 00:19:12,110 It's drawn in terms of the respectability or otherwise of the principles that operate on our ideas within the imagination. 162 00:19:12,110 --> 00:19:17,940 OK. Now this this looks like an important distinction. 163 00:19:17,940 --> 00:19:25,440 When Hume was presenting the argument concerning induction, he doesn't seem to have thought of it as a sceptical argument. 164 00:19:25,440 --> 00:19:28,800 Later on in the abstract and in the enquiry, 165 00:19:28,800 --> 00:19:37,770 he seems clearly to have recognised that it has serious sceptical potential in the treaties, that realisation only came later. 166 00:19:37,770 --> 00:19:48,180 But in the wake of that argument, which, as I've said, implies that all our inductive inferences are founded on custom a principle of the imagination, 167 00:19:48,180 --> 00:19:55,620 it becomes crucial to draw a reliable distinction between those principles that deserve our respect, 168 00:19:55,620 --> 00:20:03,240 which we give the accolade of being reason and those that are not worthy of that respect. 169 00:20:03,240 --> 00:20:11,010 If that distinction fails, then so does Hume's attempt to build a rational science of human nature. 170 00:20:11,010 --> 00:20:22,950 OK. So the crucial point here is that although humour is often thought of as a sceptic about induction, 171 00:20:22,950 --> 00:20:31,960 it is clear that what he is attempting to do in his philosophy is to build an inductive science of human nature. 172 00:20:31,960 --> 00:20:41,080 I'm. Showing that induction is founded on the imagination is not in itself necessarily a sceptical move. 173 00:20:41,080 --> 00:20:50,330 But in order to prevent it being sceptical, he has to be able to justify these principles of the imagination as opposed to others. 174 00:20:50,330 --> 00:20:56,290 Now, in the conclusion of this book, Hume gets into a terrible, sceptical mess. 175 00:20:56,290 --> 00:21:04,260 And the main source of this sceptical mass is precisely the undermining of that attempted distinction. 176 00:21:04,260 --> 00:21:08,220 So I'll go fairly quickly through this, 177 00:21:08,220 --> 00:21:18,010 it's a summary of the sort of main moves that are made in one four seven and then we'll we'll come to the crucial point. 178 00:21:18,010 --> 00:21:25,410 It's a hard section to interpret because it is presented very dynamically. 179 00:21:25,410 --> 00:21:32,220 And very, very much first person, we see him struggling with his sceptical ideas. 180 00:21:32,220 --> 00:21:38,340 We see him expressing despair. Sometimes, you know, where am I or what? 181 00:21:38,340 --> 00:21:41,880 How am I going to escape from these sceptical problems? 182 00:21:41,880 --> 00:21:49,770 And some people interpret the section as being very carefully choreographed as though Hume is in control throughout. 183 00:21:49,770 --> 00:21:57,660 But he's going through these various moves, playing a role and coming out to a satisfactory conclusion in the end. 184 00:21:57,660 --> 00:22:04,650 My own view is that the despair is genuine. I think Section 147 is not very well choreographed. 185 00:22:04,650 --> 00:22:09,750 I suspect that Hume wrote it somewhat in a hurry. He published the treatise in a hurry. 186 00:22:09,750 --> 00:22:18,520 I don't think personally, that he achieved any resolution here, but that's something you can judge for yourselves. 187 00:22:18,520 --> 00:22:28,690 OK, so most of our mental processes have been shown to be dependent on the imagination, depending on the vivacity of ideas. 188 00:22:28,690 --> 00:22:36,090 Trixie's 01:44 has found a manifest contradiction between our causal reasoning and our belief in the independent existence of matter. 189 00:22:36,090 --> 00:22:47,940 OK, we've seen these in earlier lectures. The analysis of causation shows that our thoughts about that are deeply muddled or confused. 190 00:22:47,940 --> 00:22:53,850 We've now seen a number of illusions of the imagination to which we are naturally prone. 191 00:22:53,850 --> 00:22:58,050 And the question is how far we ought to yield to these illusions. 192 00:22:58,050 --> 00:23:08,030 This question is very difficult and reduces us to a very dangerous dilemma, whichever way we answer it. 193 00:23:08,030 --> 00:23:18,310 So. We are bound to accede to some of our of what our imagination prompts us to believe. 194 00:23:18,310 --> 00:23:26,680 The question is, how do we distinguish between things that are worthy of our credence and those that aren't will if on the one hand, 195 00:23:26,680 --> 00:23:33,160 we accept everything that the imagination throws at us if we assent to every trivial suggestion of the fancy? 196 00:23:33,160 --> 00:23:39,820 Remember, the fancy is just another word for the imagination here. Beside that, these suggestions are often contrary to each other. 197 00:23:39,820 --> 00:23:48,650 They lead us into such errors, absurdities and obscurities that we must last become ashamed of our credulity. 198 00:23:48,650 --> 00:23:58,640 Well, OK, it's obviously silly to go along with every trivial suggestion of the fancy, every imaginative leap that we care to make. 199 00:23:58,640 --> 00:24:04,940 Surely we should resolve to reject all the trivial suggestions of the fancy and adhere to the 200 00:24:04,940 --> 00:24:09,870 understanding that is to the general and more established principles of the imagination. 201 00:24:09,870 --> 00:24:13,060 So that's this is exactly the passage quoted earlier. 202 00:24:13,060 --> 00:24:18,890 We're drawing the distinction between the trivial and capricious and the reliable and solid principles. 203 00:24:18,890 --> 00:24:22,870 Let's just go with the reliable and solid principles. 204 00:24:22,870 --> 00:24:30,550 But even this resolution is steadily executed would be dangerous and attended with the most fatal consequences for I've already shown. 205 00:24:30,550 --> 00:24:34,660 And here there's a note to one for one scepticism with regard to reason that the 206 00:24:34,660 --> 00:24:38,530 understanding when it acts alone and according to its most general principles, 207 00:24:38,530 --> 00:24:46,600 entirely subverts itself and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or common life. 208 00:24:46,600 --> 00:24:51,220 We save ourselves from this total scepticism only by means of that singular 209 00:24:51,220 --> 00:24:55,690 and seemingly trivial property of the fancy by which we enter with difficulty 210 00:24:55,690 --> 00:25:00,340 into remote views of things and are not able to accompany with them them with 211 00:25:00,340 --> 00:25:06,140 so sensible an impression as we do those which are more easy and natural. 212 00:25:06,140 --> 00:25:11,390 So here he's going, he's alluding back to treaties one for one, quite explicitly. 213 00:25:11,390 --> 00:25:17,640 Now we covered that in lecture six. Remember, Hume gives this sceptical argument. 214 00:25:17,640 --> 00:25:23,150 He says, Whenever I do even a demonstration, a mathematical demonstration, 215 00:25:23,150 --> 00:25:28,970 I ought to have some small element of doubt because I'm aware that I sometimes make mistakes. 216 00:25:28,970 --> 00:25:35,570 So therefore, my belief in even a mathematical proof is going to generate into probability. 217 00:25:35,570 --> 00:25:42,710 And then having to generate the probability, I have to ask myself, well, how likely is it that I've made a mistake? 218 00:25:42,710 --> 00:25:50,630 And I make an assessment of that. How likely is it that I just made a mistake in assessing my probability of making an error? 219 00:25:50,630 --> 00:25:56,600 And there's another probability assessment. But now I have to assess that probability assessment. 220 00:25:56,600 --> 00:26:02,390 How likely is it that I might have made an error there? And according to him, all these errors multiply. 221 00:26:02,390 --> 00:26:11,270 So we saw that in lecture six. But fortunately, we're not persuaded by this kind of argument because after the first and second decision, 222 00:26:11,270 --> 00:26:17,780 as the action of the mine becomes forced and unnatural. And the idea is faint and obscure, though the principles be the same. 223 00:26:17,780 --> 00:26:24,710 Yet their influence on the imagination weakens. So what saves us from total scepticism? 224 00:26:24,710 --> 00:26:32,570 What saves us from the disastrous result of the argument of one for one is that we are incapable of following it through. 225 00:26:32,570 --> 00:26:38,690 We lose track after the first step or two, and that is what saves us. 226 00:26:38,690 --> 00:26:47,260 But it looks now like we're being saved, not by one of the general established respectable principles of the imagination. 227 00:26:47,260 --> 00:26:57,690 We are being saved by a trivial principle of the imagination, the fact that we cannot follow the argument through. 228 00:26:57,690 --> 00:27:06,000 Well, suppose we try to get round this by just establishing a general maxim that no refined or elaborate reasoning, 229 00:27:06,000 --> 00:27:11,730 the sort of reasoning that bedevils us in one for one is ever to be received. 230 00:27:11,730 --> 00:27:18,120 Well, that's not going to work by this means you cut off entirely all science and philosophy, 231 00:27:18,120 --> 00:27:24,460 you proceed upon one singular quality of the imagination and by a parity of reason must embrace all of them. 232 00:27:24,460 --> 00:27:29,820 So there's an arbitrariness in it and you express brashly contradict yourself, 233 00:27:29,820 --> 00:27:37,660 since this maxim must be built on the preceding reasoning, which will be allowed to be sufficiently refined and metaphysical. 234 00:27:37,660 --> 00:27:44,290 What party, then, should we choose amongst these difficulties if we embrace this principle and condemn all refined reasoning? 235 00:27:44,290 --> 00:27:49,000 In other words, we say it's a good thing that we can't follow refined reasoning because that leads us into scepticism. 236 00:27:49,000 --> 00:27:55,450 So let's reject all refined reasoning. If we do that, we're going to run into the most manifest absurdities. 237 00:27:55,450 --> 00:28:02,250 If we reject it in favour of these reasonings, we subvert entirely the human understanding because of one well. 238 00:28:02,250 --> 00:28:10,080 We have therefore no choice left, but betwixt a false reason and none at all. 239 00:28:10,080 --> 00:28:19,470 Well, I don't know what to do. I can only observe what's commonly done, which is that this difficulty is seldom or never thought of. 240 00:28:19,470 --> 00:28:23,040 Very refined reflections have little or no influence upon us, 241 00:28:23,040 --> 00:28:30,630 and yet we do not and cannot establish it for a rule that they ought not to have any influence, which implies a manifest contradiction. 242 00:28:30,630 --> 00:28:37,060 What have I said, the reflections, very refined and metaphysical, have little or no influence upon us. 243 00:28:37,060 --> 00:28:43,030 The intense view of these manifold contradictions and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon 244 00:28:43,030 --> 00:28:50,320 me and heated my brain that I'm ready to reject all belief and reasoning and can look upon no opinion, 245 00:28:50,320 --> 00:28:59,110 even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I or what from what causes do I derive my existence and to what condition shall I return? 246 00:28:59,110 --> 00:29:03,820 I'm confounded with all these questions and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable condition 247 00:29:03,820 --> 00:29:11,640 imaginable environs with the deepest darkness and utterly deprived of the use of every member and faculty. 248 00:29:11,640 --> 00:29:19,160 So as I say, we get this this intense first personal distress, which I personally think is genuine, I think. 249 00:29:19,160 --> 00:29:27,950 I mean, if you look, if you take the argument of one four one seriously and Hume clearly does. 250 00:29:27,950 --> 00:29:30,670 It puts you in this position. 251 00:29:30,670 --> 00:29:38,500 If you want to draw a distinction between the capricious and unreliable and on the other hand, the solid and permanent principles of the imagination. 252 00:29:38,500 --> 00:29:44,590 And then you find that following the solid and permanent principles, he's going to lead you to this total scepticism. 253 00:29:44,590 --> 00:29:50,240 What do you do? Well. 254 00:29:50,240 --> 00:29:54,420 Carelessness and inattention. Just as at the end of one, four, two. 255 00:29:54,420 --> 00:29:59,490 Most fortunately, it happens that since Reason is incapable of displaying dispelling these clouds, 256 00:29:59,490 --> 00:30:05,310 nature herself suffices for that purpose and cures me of this philosophical, melancholy and delirium. 257 00:30:05,310 --> 00:30:10,830 I dine. I play a game of backgammon. I converse in a Mary with my friends. 258 00:30:10,830 --> 00:30:19,380 And afterwards, these speculations appear so cold and strained and ridiculous that I cannot find it in my heart to enter into them any farther. 259 00:30:19,380 --> 00:30:31,650 So we get this famous sort of perspective or view of him that while he's in the study thinking through all these problems, he's an intense sceptic. 260 00:30:31,650 --> 00:30:42,220 He leaves the study, goes to have dinner, plays backgammon, drinks and chats with his friends, and all the sceptical worries just disappear. 261 00:30:42,220 --> 00:30:48,100 I may now I must yield to the current of nature in submitting to my senses and understanding. 262 00:30:48,100 --> 00:30:57,430 And in this blind submission, I show most perfectly my sceptical disposition and principles under what obligation do I lie? 263 00:30:57,430 --> 00:31:07,450 Of thinking about sceptical issues all the time? No, I'm just going to show my sceptical disposition by being sceptical of my own doubts, 264 00:31:07,450 --> 00:31:12,950 and I'm going to dine and play backgammon and stop worrying about these things. 265 00:31:12,950 --> 00:31:22,790 Now, this doesn't look like a terribly satisfactory philosophical resolution, to put it mildly. 266 00:31:22,790 --> 00:31:26,660 Other commentators have tried to find a resolution in the text, most notably, 267 00:31:26,660 --> 00:31:33,260 Don Garrett claims to see a resolution in what he calls the title principle. 268 00:31:33,260 --> 00:31:43,770 So humans is in this quandary. He seems to be trying to justify him to himself going on. 269 00:31:43,770 --> 00:31:48,240 Well, when he dines and plays backgammon, he can go on with normal life. 270 00:31:48,240 --> 00:31:51,990 But what's going to bring him back into the study? Because after all, he wants to be a philosopher. 271 00:31:51,990 --> 00:31:56,130 He wants to write book two and three of the treaties which have yet to come. 272 00:31:56,130 --> 00:32:06,300 How is he going to justify that? Well, he's doing this all on sceptical principles, why does he need to justify why not just do where pleasure leads? 273 00:32:06,300 --> 00:32:12,570 If we're philosophers either thought only to be on sceptical principles and from an inclination which we feel 274 00:32:12,570 --> 00:32:18,990 to the employing ourselves after that manner where reason is lively and mixes itself with some propensity, 275 00:32:18,990 --> 00:32:27,370 it ought to be assented to where it does not. It never can have any title to operate upon us. 276 00:32:27,370 --> 00:32:31,960 And that's what Don Garrett's called the title principle. 277 00:32:31,960 --> 00:32:38,260 Personally, I see this as just another move in a continuing narrative. 278 00:32:38,260 --> 00:32:43,180 It's not clear to me that Hume is proposing this as a solution to the quandary. 279 00:32:43,180 --> 00:32:47,650 Don thinks he he is that interesting debate there. 280 00:32:47,650 --> 00:32:59,470 I'm just going to contribute a small amount to that debate. OK, so where reason is lively and mixes itself with some propensity? 281 00:32:59,470 --> 00:33:07,060 It's fine for me to pursue it. Well, I can't forebear having a curiosity to be acquainted with the principles of moral good and evil, 282 00:33:07,060 --> 00:33:13,630 the nature and foundation of government and the cause of those several passions and inclinations which actuate and govern me. 283 00:33:13,630 --> 00:33:21,400 I want to go on and do do the work that I'm going to discuss in treaties, book three and book two on morals and the passions. 284 00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:27,580 I'm just curious. So there is an inclination leading me to employ my reason. 285 00:33:27,580 --> 00:33:31,900 Amazon. I haven't seen any good reason for not going with my inclination. 286 00:33:31,900 --> 00:33:43,710 So that's what I'm going to do. Well, OK, but philosophy is not the only kind of reasoning that's lively and mixes itself with some propensity. 287 00:33:43,710 --> 00:33:48,240 Suspicious, superstitious beliefs are very lively. 288 00:33:48,240 --> 00:33:52,110 They mix with human propensities all too readily assume knows. 289 00:33:52,110 --> 00:33:56,340 I mean, he would like to write the natural history of religion, explaining how we have. 290 00:33:56,340 --> 00:34:01,770 We have very, very drawn towards religious impulses through hopes and fears and so on. 291 00:34:01,770 --> 00:34:12,320 So there's plenty of liveliness and propensity in religion. So why choose philosophy rather than superstition? 292 00:34:12,320 --> 00:34:20,030 We ought only to deliberate concerning the choice of our guide and ought to prefer that which is safest and most agreeable. 293 00:34:20,030 --> 00:34:29,190 And in this respect, I make bold to recommend philosophy and give it the preference to superstition of every kind. 294 00:34:29,190 --> 00:34:34,980 The problem is you may prefer philosophy to superstition. 295 00:34:34,980 --> 00:34:47,860 But how can he justify preferring philosophical investigation of these profound questions over superstitious investigation of these questions? 296 00:34:47,860 --> 00:34:53,540 He may have the propensity to philosophy. Others have the propensity to superstition. 297 00:34:53,540 --> 00:34:58,160 Well, what he does give is what I think is a rather lame observation. 298 00:34:58,160 --> 00:35:03,740 The errors in religion are dangerous. Those in philosophy only ridiculous. 299 00:35:03,740 --> 00:35:06,350 So philosophy is at least harmless. 300 00:35:06,350 --> 00:35:14,810 Where is pursuing superstition as anyone in the 17th and 18th centuries would know, leads to all sorts of terrible dangers? 301 00:35:14,810 --> 00:35:20,510 People go around killing each other because of differences in belief in religion. 302 00:35:20,510 --> 00:35:27,580 But actually, if you think about it, the errors in religion are dangerous, those in philosophy only ridiculous. 303 00:35:27,580 --> 00:35:34,630 That's not a claim that any religious person is going to accept. 304 00:35:34,630 --> 00:35:41,060 And they're going to say that actually the biggest danger in your life is hellfire. 305 00:35:41,060 --> 00:35:45,420 It's being condemned to eternal damnation after your death. 306 00:35:45,420 --> 00:35:52,200 And if you pursue the kind of philosophy that Hume pursues, then actually that's where it's going to lead. 307 00:35:52,200 --> 00:36:00,660 So philosophy of that kind is extremely dangerous. More crucial than anything else is to have to correct religious beliefs. 308 00:36:00,660 --> 00:36:12,460 So what kind of enquiry is safe or unsafe actually is going to be something that Hume and the religious people just fundamentally disagree about? 309 00:36:12,460 --> 00:36:21,280 And if there is no objective recourse, if there's no objective, rational criterion that you can use to distinguish between them, 310 00:36:21,280 --> 00:36:26,630 if it just comes down to preference and inclination, then there's an impulse. 311 00:36:26,630 --> 00:36:35,410 Hugh Hume is not going to find any way of being able to justify his way of going over the religious. 312 00:36:35,410 --> 00:36:42,100 So it seems to me that the title principle saying where reason is lively and mixes itself with some propensity. 313 00:36:42,100 --> 00:36:44,410 Therefore, I'm going to pursue my philosophy. 314 00:36:44,410 --> 00:36:54,070 I think that's utterly hopeless because, as I say, superstitious investigation is just as lively mixes just as much with propensities. 315 00:36:54,070 --> 00:37:00,220 And Hume has robbed himself because of his radical scepticism of any objective 316 00:37:00,220 --> 00:37:10,840 justification for pursuing things in his way rather than the alternatives. 317 00:37:10,840 --> 00:37:15,970 No, I've said views about the last section of book, one of the treaties, one for seven differ. 318 00:37:15,970 --> 00:37:28,660 I think he really is in a rut here. He's really got a terrible, sceptical quandary from which he has no escape, no solution. 319 00:37:28,660 --> 00:37:38,290 I do advise you to read what Don Garrett has to say about the section because he, as I say, takes a radically different view. 320 00:37:38,290 --> 00:37:45,250 Hume does find an answer, but I think the answer he finds is in 1748 when he writes the first enquiry. 321 00:37:45,250 --> 00:37:52,360 And there in section 12 of the first enquiry, it was initially published by the way his philosophical essays concerning human understanding. 322 00:37:52,360 --> 00:37:57,190 It was later renamed Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding there in Section 12. 323 00:37:57,190 --> 00:38:07,840 We get a discussion of scepticism which solves the problems, or at least provides a far more plausible resolution. 324 00:38:07,840 --> 00:38:17,120 Now, I have a hypothesis about this, it is just a speculation. The argument of treaties, one for one, I believe, is a terrible argument. 325 00:38:17,120 --> 00:38:25,040 It is hopeless. And I think Hume himself came to see that it is hopeless. 326 00:38:25,040 --> 00:38:37,710 The crucial paragraph one four one six is where Hume is arguing that when we ask ourselves, what is the probability of our having made an error? 327 00:38:37,710 --> 00:38:43,170 And then we have to ask, what's the probability of making an error in that assessment of probability? 328 00:38:43,170 --> 00:38:49,420 And then what's the probability of making a mistake in that assessment of probability and so on? 329 00:38:49,420 --> 00:38:53,650 The and so on is actually completely hopeless. It is just hand-waving. 330 00:38:53,650 --> 00:39:00,910 And I think anybody who is attempting to spell out Hume's argument has resorted to the same kind of hand-waving. 331 00:39:00,910 --> 00:39:07,590 So my hypothesis is this Hugh came to right to work on what became the enquiry. 332 00:39:07,590 --> 00:39:12,030 He was looking he was trying to spell out his arguments like the argument concerning induction gets 333 00:39:12,030 --> 00:39:18,930 spelled out in far more with far more care and detail in the enquiry than it's been in the treaties. 334 00:39:18,930 --> 00:39:26,250 And when he came to think through the argument of one for one. I suspect that he just came apart in his hands. 335 00:39:26,250 --> 00:39:33,010 He just realised this is a rubbish argument. Can't prove that, I mean, the argument disappears. 336 00:39:33,010 --> 00:39:39,950 But let me explain why it's a hopeless argument. 337 00:39:39,950 --> 00:39:44,640 The case for repeated iteration is completely hopeless. 338 00:39:44,640 --> 00:39:51,570 My credence in my mathematical judgement, I gave the example of solving a quadratic equation when we in lecture six. 339 00:39:51,570 --> 00:39:59,280 So I sold the quadratic equation. I'm convinced that I've got the right answer, but I remember that nineteen, you know, 340 00:39:59,280 --> 00:40:03,670 one time out of 20 in the past five percent of the time, I've made a mistake. 341 00:40:03,670 --> 00:40:11,470 So if somebody asks me to bet on my having got the right answer, I'm going to think of the odds. 342 00:40:11,470 --> 00:40:16,060 19 out of 29, I think I'm 95 per cent likely to get this right. 343 00:40:16,060 --> 00:40:27,100 Not 100 percent because I'm aware that I'm fallible. But that Credence should depend on my experience on humans and principles. 344 00:40:27,100 --> 00:40:29,590 I should be thinking about my past track record. 345 00:40:29,590 --> 00:40:35,290 That's how he motivates if he says that you sometimes made mistakes, so you shouldn't be totally certain. 346 00:40:35,290 --> 00:40:45,460 Alright, fine. So the argument explicitly appeals to the history of the instances of my past judgements. 347 00:40:45,460 --> 00:40:51,310 And no part of Hume's argument expresses scepticism about memory or record taking. 348 00:40:51,310 --> 00:40:56,950 It's not like he's saying you might have recorded wrongly in the past when you've got rotten writing, when you've gone wrong. 349 00:40:56,950 --> 00:41:04,510 You should just look at the history of your rights and wrongs and moderate your judgement accordingly. 350 00:41:04,510 --> 00:41:09,010 That's very plausible. But then how can you motivate iteration? 351 00:41:09,010 --> 00:41:15,640 There's no way of doing it, because the statistics of when I was writing, when I was wrong just remain as they are. 352 00:41:15,640 --> 00:41:20,140 My thinking more about them doesn't change them. 353 00:41:20,140 --> 00:41:26,710 And how good I am, it's iterative, reflexive judgements that is judging the probability of my judging, 354 00:41:26,710 --> 00:41:32,530 the probability of my judging, the probability of my getting something right. I may be absolutely rubbish at that. 355 00:41:32,530 --> 00:41:44,130 Sure. It's not something I've practised. That doesn't mean I'm rubbish judging the statistics of when I got quadratic equations right and wrong. 356 00:41:44,130 --> 00:41:48,420 Moreover, even if there were some good reason in principle to iterate up the levels, 357 00:41:48,420 --> 00:41:54,510 and I've just said I don't think there is, but even if there were doing so is in practise impossible for us. 358 00:41:54,510 --> 00:41:59,830 Hume himself emphasises that he says We can't follow it. We can't keep track. 359 00:41:59,830 --> 00:42:06,820 So how can it possibly be an obligation of reason to iterate? And again. 360 00:42:06,820 --> 00:42:12,310 If we do iterate according to who it ends with all our belief dissolving. 361 00:42:12,310 --> 00:42:18,070 How can that be a rational way to go? If somebody says to me, Look, you really ought to iterate your judgements, and if you do, 362 00:42:18,070 --> 00:42:23,740 you'll stop having any confidence at all in your ability to solve quadratic equations. 363 00:42:23,740 --> 00:42:27,520 But that's a lunatic. Look 19 out of 20 times in the past. 364 00:42:27,520 --> 00:42:34,420 I've got him right. How can it possibly be rational for me to follow some procedure, which I find it very difficult to do anyway? 365 00:42:34,420 --> 00:42:45,430 And if I do follow it, it's going to lead me to have a belief, which is completely at variance with the history of my success. 366 00:42:45,430 --> 00:42:51,520 Though on humans, on conception of reason, reflexive checking can only make sense if it makes me better, 367 00:42:51,520 --> 00:42:58,310 if it's warranted by experience, it leads me to better judgement. But it doesn't. 368 00:42:58,310 --> 00:43:08,410 OK, now let's suppose I'm right that Hume, when he came to spell out the argument, realised that it simply can't be spelled out, right? 369 00:43:08,410 --> 00:43:13,390 As I said, people have tried to do this, but scholars who have defended him on this argument, 370 00:43:13,390 --> 00:43:20,050 in my view, have never actually spelled out how the argument is supposed to work. 371 00:43:20,050 --> 00:43:26,140 They sketch some thought that, oh, he must be thinking along these lines and then it works, you know? 372 00:43:26,140 --> 00:43:34,420 But whenever they come to the crucial point, the and so on comes in that as though somehow the iteration just takes care of itself. 373 00:43:34,420 --> 00:43:43,460 And I deny that it does. I do not think that Hume's argument can plausibly be spelled out in one fell well. 374 00:43:43,460 --> 00:43:50,390 Now, I've said that in the enquiry, it's not like you reject this argument, it just never comes up. 375 00:43:50,390 --> 00:43:56,390 But I suspect that reflecting on the argument of one for one might have led Hume 376 00:43:56,390 --> 00:44:00,860 to the comments that he makes about antecedent scepticism can't prove this, 377 00:44:00,860 --> 00:44:07,190 but it seems plausible. Take a look at an enquiry 12 three. 378 00:44:07,190 --> 00:44:18,080 So this is Hume's discussion of antecedent scepticism. That is where you start out with a sceptical view, not because you've encountered problems, 379 00:44:18,080 --> 00:44:23,490 but because you demand that your faculties be justified before you start relying on them. 380 00:44:23,490 --> 00:44:30,360 There's a species of scepticism antecedent to all study and philosophy, which is much inculcated by Descartes and others. 381 00:44:30,360 --> 00:44:35,130 It recommends universal doubt of our very faculties of whose veracity say they we 382 00:44:35,130 --> 00:44:39,450 must assure ourselves by a chain of reasoning deduced from some original principle, 383 00:44:39,450 --> 00:44:46,500 which cannot possibly be fallacious. But neither is there any such original principle which has a prerogative above others. 384 00:44:46,500 --> 00:44:55,050 Or if there were, could we advance a step beyond it? But by the use of those very faculties of which we're supposed to be already diffident? 385 00:44:55,050 --> 00:45:03,810 The Cartesian doubt, therefore, where it's ever possible to be attained by any human creature as it plainly is not would be entirely incurable. 386 00:45:03,810 --> 00:45:09,600 So you cannot you simply cannot demand the justification of your reason before you start 387 00:45:09,600 --> 00:45:15,960 using your reason because your reason is the only tool you've got to justify your reason. 388 00:45:15,960 --> 00:45:25,410 So what's the appropriate reaction? Will the appropriate reaction is to start off trusting your reason by default until you encounter problems? 389 00:45:25,410 --> 00:45:35,030 Don't start off with the impossible demand of justifying your reason a priori I take for granted the faculty of reason that you have. 390 00:45:35,030 --> 00:45:41,390 Until and unless you find that you encounter awful problems. 391 00:45:41,390 --> 00:45:45,170 So what we get is what the enquiry calls consequent scepticism. 392 00:45:45,170 --> 00:45:50,630 Effectively, what we're doing, we're putting the onus on the sceptic to highlight a problem in our reason. 393 00:45:50,630 --> 00:45:59,610 Rather than saying, as Descartes sometimes seems to say to the sceptic, If I can't defeat you, Mr. Sceptic, you win. 394 00:45:59,610 --> 00:46:06,630 What Hume is saying, no. I'm going to start by default, trusting my reason it's up to you, Mr. Sceptic, to show that I'm wrong. 395 00:46:06,630 --> 00:46:11,100 The onus is on you, not on me. 396 00:46:11,100 --> 00:46:20,850 Now, it seems to me that humans Hume applies this strategy, not only in the case of a demonstrative reason and so forth, 397 00:46:20,850 --> 00:46:28,980 as we see there with his discussion of antecedent scepticism. It seems to me that there's also a very similar strategy with induction. 398 00:46:28,980 --> 00:46:34,260 Now we know Hume's argument concerning induction. The famous argument comes in section four of the enquiry. 399 00:46:34,260 --> 00:46:39,960 But what's unique in the enquiry is that in section 12, paragraphs 22 and 23, 400 00:46:39,960 --> 00:46:47,370 Hume himself responds to the sceptic, who is putting forward his sceptical arguments concerning induction. 401 00:46:47,370 --> 00:47:00,520 We don't get that in the treaties. And the the response to the sceptic is along the lines of I don't see why I should go with your doubts. 402 00:47:00,520 --> 00:47:05,650 You haven't given me a reason for giving up induction. 403 00:47:05,650 --> 00:47:15,070 So it may seem that the sceptic has ample matter of triumph while he justly insists on my own argument from enquiry section four. 404 00:47:15,070 --> 00:47:21,340 That's the argument that that's being summarised there. 405 00:47:21,340 --> 00:47:27,070 But my aunt, my reply to the sceptics, says Hume. 406 00:47:27,070 --> 00:47:34,540 What are you trying to achieve by this argument? You surely can't expect that I'm going to give up all inference. 407 00:47:34,540 --> 00:47:43,120 You must acknowledge if you will acknowledge anything that all human life must perish where your principles universally and steadily to prevail. 408 00:47:43,120 --> 00:47:51,190 It's true. So fatal event is very little to be dreaded. Human nature is always too strong for principle, but. 409 00:47:51,190 --> 00:47:57,670 The sceptic is trying. It has brought up this argument, this the argument concerning induction, 410 00:47:57,670 --> 00:48:01,870 saying You've got no reason for supposing that the future will resemble the past. 411 00:48:01,870 --> 00:48:07,150 You can't justify this in any any way. You don't believe in that. 412 00:48:07,150 --> 00:48:15,200 And humans say, no, I don't see why I should give up belief. Why should I? Because as far as I can see if I did, I'd simply die. 413 00:48:15,200 --> 00:48:23,330 Now, the sceptic must acknowledge if he will acknowledge anything, but if I follow his scepticism, it's going to lead to disaster. 414 00:48:23,330 --> 00:48:28,880 Notice the sceptic might not acknowledge anything the sceptic might say, Oh, I have no idea what would happen. 415 00:48:28,880 --> 00:48:31,550 I can't make any prediction about the unobserved. 416 00:48:31,550 --> 00:48:38,780 Any prediction about the unobserved is just as good or bad as any other, so I can't draw any conclusion about what would happen. 417 00:48:38,780 --> 00:48:42,770 But in that case, you can simply say, Well, why should I take your advice? 418 00:48:42,770 --> 00:48:47,930 You don't have any advice to offer. So I'm going to carry on doing induction. 419 00:48:47,930 --> 00:48:58,760 I can't help it anyway, but I can live with it because I've got no good reason for following what you say. 420 00:48:58,760 --> 00:49:02,150 Inductive belief, indeed, is a species of natural instinct, 421 00:49:02,150 --> 00:49:07,700 which no reasoning or process of the thought or understanding is able either to produce or to prevent. 422 00:49:07,700 --> 00:49:12,950 Just as in the treatise, we get this appeal to the inevitability of human nature. 423 00:49:12,950 --> 00:49:21,860 We cannot help doing it. But in the enquiry, I think there is a we actually have a rational response to the sceptic. 424 00:49:21,860 --> 00:49:30,050 It's not just saying if I followed the sceptical arguments, the logic of the sceptical arguments, I would have no belief at all. 425 00:49:30,050 --> 00:49:34,320 The only thing that stops me having no belief is human nature. 426 00:49:34,320 --> 00:49:41,910 Human Stead is saying actually sceptic, you have not given me a reason for giving up my beliefs. 427 00:49:41,910 --> 00:49:45,420 I cannot justify the belief that the future will resemble the past. 428 00:49:45,420 --> 00:49:51,090 But I can't help believing it, and I've not been given any reason for relinquishing that belief. 429 00:49:51,090 --> 00:49:56,550 So the the the change in the onus of proof is quite significant here. 430 00:49:56,550 --> 00:50:04,560 In the end, the Peroni and arguments can have no other tendency than to show the whimsical condition of mankind who must act and reason believe, 431 00:50:04,560 --> 00:50:08,910 though they are not able by their most diligent enquiry to satisfy themselves concerning the 432 00:50:08,910 --> 00:50:14,430 foundation of these operations or to remove the objections that may be raised against them. 433 00:50:14,430 --> 00:50:23,380 But that can lead us to beneficial effects, as we'll see. But notice he's not saying the sceptical arguments are completely pointless. 434 00:50:23,380 --> 00:50:32,880 They show that we are in this whimsical condition where we have to take the way we think for granted in a way that's not surprising. 435 00:50:32,880 --> 00:50:39,270 Why would you expect that our most fundamental methods of reasoning should be ones that somehow we can justify by other means? 436 00:50:39,270 --> 00:50:49,330 How could we possibly do it if their most fundamental methods of reasoning? And the only arguments can have a good effect. 437 00:50:49,330 --> 00:50:55,300 They can make us more modest if we can't justify our most fundamental methods of reasoning. 438 00:50:55,300 --> 00:51:01,540 It's likely to make us less arrogant about what humanity a human reason can achieve. 439 00:51:01,540 --> 00:51:10,390 It also is likely to make us more likely to limit our enquiries to such subjects, as are best adapted to the narrow capacity of human understanding. 440 00:51:10,390 --> 00:51:15,670 If we can't even explain or make sense of our most fundamental methods of reasoning, 441 00:51:15,670 --> 00:51:22,870 if we can't justify even the belief that the future will resemble the past, what chance have we are working out? 442 00:51:22,870 --> 00:51:38,050 The origin and destiny of worlds? Now, notice that all of this is although it may seem sceptical, it does not in any way undermine science if we can, 443 00:51:38,050 --> 00:51:43,240 if we are justified in hanging on to that basic belief that the future will resemble the past. 444 00:51:43,240 --> 00:51:48,310 Why? Because we can't help it and because the sceptics given us no good reason to relinquish it. 445 00:51:48,310 --> 00:51:52,310 I mean, it's the only principle on which we can draw any conclusions about the world. 446 00:51:52,310 --> 00:52:04,330 There's a good enough reason to hanging. Hang onto it. Notice, this means that we can then appeal to induction for a sort of virtuous bootstrapping, 447 00:52:04,330 --> 00:52:13,840 our basic inductive instinct can itself lead to refinement of our inductive beliefs because we find by 448 00:52:13,840 --> 00:52:20,210 experience that refining our beliefs through science and so forth actually leads to better results. 449 00:52:20,210 --> 00:52:26,510 We do actually find that the world is uniform, so we start off with this basic assumption of uniformity. 450 00:52:26,510 --> 00:52:31,580 But then when we do it more and more systematically, what we call science. 451 00:52:31,580 --> 00:52:40,040 Lo and behold, we find it works. We are able to explore all sorts of interesting consequences with technology and so on. 452 00:52:40,040 --> 00:52:48,960 And it works. So we get a kind of virtuous bootstrapping. And now we've got an answer to superstition. 453 00:52:48,960 --> 00:52:58,030 Because actually, superstition doesn't work. The arguments that are used in favour of superstition turn out to violate the norms 454 00:52:58,030 --> 00:53:04,570 of good inductive reasoning of the sort which leads us to scientific success. 455 00:53:04,570 --> 00:53:10,100 And. So I've just sketched there some of the ways in which in the enquiry, 456 00:53:10,100 --> 00:53:14,980 Hume gets a resolution, he is not simply left with this standoff that we're getting. 457 00:53:14,980 --> 00:53:20,500 1:47 Where Hume seems to be saying, I prefer science, I prefer philosophy. 458 00:53:20,500 --> 00:53:29,570 You prefer superstition. Can't give any good reason. Now he can, because the superstitious person is constantly appealing to induction. 459 00:53:29,570 --> 00:53:36,500 Just like the rest of us, the superstitious person who argues in favour of miracles is appealing to induction there, 460 00:53:36,500 --> 00:53:44,210 saying, Look, people normally tell the truth. They said that a miracle would occur did occur, therefore we should believe them. 461 00:53:44,210 --> 00:53:45,950 That's an inductive inference. 462 00:53:45,950 --> 00:53:53,210 And Hume brings the norms of induction to bear and says, actually, if you apply these properly, you won't believe in the miracle. 463 00:53:53,210 --> 00:53:57,140 We're not going to discuss that at length. I think there are problems with Hume's argument, 464 00:53:57,140 --> 00:54:05,120 but it seems clear what he's doing to apply inductive norms to show that actually does not lead in the direction of superstition. 465 00:54:05,120 --> 00:54:10,700 So he can start from the basic thing that is common to all humanity that we take 466 00:54:10,700 --> 00:54:14,450 for granted that the future will resemble the past and we cannot help doing that. 467 00:54:14,450 --> 00:54:22,890 But he now can apply that as a lever in favour of systematic inductive science and against superstition. 468 00:54:22,890 --> 00:54:30,990 In the first enquiry, several sources of radical, sceptical doubt dropped, I mentioned the argument of one for one, it disappears. 469 00:54:30,990 --> 00:54:37,380 We no longer have the problems about identity over time. The severability principle disappears. 470 00:54:37,380 --> 00:54:45,960 We no longer have scepticism about personal identity, and we do therefore seem to have a coherent way of defending inductive science. 471 00:54:45,960 --> 00:54:51,210 What the treatise called the general are more established properties of the imagination, 472 00:54:51,210 --> 00:54:55,650 but now without all the problems that bedevil us in the treaties. 473 00:54:55,650 --> 00:55:01,418 Thank you very much.