1 00:00:00,600 --> 00:00:06,660 So today, we're going to be doing the critique of judgement by manual count. 2 00:00:06,660 --> 00:00:11,520 And as I said yesterday, we're going to be continuing this next week. 3 00:00:11,520 --> 00:00:15,840 So it looks like I'm probably going to drop the electron pictorial representation 4 00:00:15,840 --> 00:00:24,560 because you sort of need more than one lecture to cover the critique of judgement. 5 00:00:24,560 --> 00:00:30,390 The critique of judgement is divided into two big parts. One part is about aesthetics. 6 00:00:30,390 --> 00:00:36,300 The other part is basically about the philosophy of science. The first part is called the critique of aesthetic judgement. 7 00:00:36,300 --> 00:00:41,520 The second part of the critique of Talulah Teleological Judgement. 8 00:00:41,520 --> 00:00:47,070 We're not gonna be talking about the critique of teleological judgement, just a critique of aesthetic judgement. 9 00:00:47,070 --> 00:00:52,470 And within the critique of aesthetic judgement, a great number of issues are dealt with. 10 00:00:52,470 --> 00:00:57,540 We're really only gonna be dealing with the sections one to 40. So that's most of it. 11 00:00:57,540 --> 00:00:59,880 That's the sort of central bits. 12 00:00:59,880 --> 00:01:08,340 But there's more to it than that, where he talks about topics like the fine arts and genius, which are interesting in their own right. 13 00:01:08,340 --> 00:01:20,880 But we don't have time to cover that. So if any of you have ever come across Kant before, either in his metaphysics, 14 00:01:20,880 --> 00:01:27,720 victimology, ethics, you'll know that he is a remarkably difficult writer to read. 15 00:01:27,720 --> 00:01:38,640 And there are a couple of reasons for this. And it's actually worth being kind of aware of the things he does that makes him so difficult. 16 00:01:38,640 --> 00:01:44,580 One thing people often have said about Kant, that he's the least precise of the great philosophers, 17 00:01:44,580 --> 00:01:51,300 and this is largely because he tends to use the same word for a whole variety 18 00:01:51,300 --> 00:01:57,150 of very different things that are only linked by a really tenuous similarity. 19 00:01:57,150 --> 00:02:06,630 But without signalling the differences between all the things that he applies the word to and often without seeming to be aware, 20 00:02:06,630 --> 00:02:13,500 actually, that he's using the word in a rather different sense. Over and over again in various places. 21 00:02:13,500 --> 00:02:21,030 So I think it's helpful to remind yourself of that tendency of his when he when you're reading him. 22 00:02:21,030 --> 00:02:27,720 This is connected with another tendency he has, which is a tendency to, as it's often put, 23 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:33,060 make architectonic considerations dominant in his presentation of his philosophy. 24 00:02:33,060 --> 00:02:38,100 That means he wants to create very elegant looking system. 25 00:02:38,100 --> 00:02:47,250 So he's put a lot of work into his table of contents in his various books to make sure that everything is a nice symmetrical groups of three and four. 26 00:02:47,250 --> 00:02:58,200 He really likes groups of three and four in presenting his views and often in order to get that beautiful structure to his thoughts. 27 00:02:58,200 --> 00:03:04,740 He distorts words, uses them in rather strange ways. 28 00:03:04,740 --> 00:03:10,500 But quite apart from that, he also has an enormous amount of his own technical terminology. 29 00:03:10,500 --> 00:03:22,680 And it did. And we're going to discuss some of that. And in addition to that, his views on aesthetics are embedded in his larger philosophy. 30 00:03:22,680 --> 00:03:29,670 They're not incomprehensible entirely without knowledge of his larger philosophy. 31 00:03:29,670 --> 00:03:35,550 More general views on epistemology, metaphysics and philosophy mind. 32 00:03:35,550 --> 00:03:37,890 But it certainly helps to know a bit about that. 33 00:03:37,890 --> 00:03:52,050 So I'm going to begin today by just selecting a very few bits of background information about Kant that I think will be helpful when reading him. 34 00:03:52,050 --> 00:03:55,380 So one of the first things you'll notice when you start the critique of aesthetic 35 00:03:55,380 --> 00:04:03,060 judgement is that he uses this word representation and quite frequently. 36 00:04:03,060 --> 00:04:13,260 And this is, again, one of those technical terms and Kant system is that representations are mental items in his usage. 37 00:04:13,260 --> 00:04:19,740 And there are two main types of representation in his system. The first kind is intuitions. 38 00:04:19,740 --> 00:04:31,110 And the second kind is concepts. And again, the word intuition here has nothing to do with what it normally means in English. 39 00:04:31,110 --> 00:04:34,680 That's the word that's been selected to translate the German word. 40 00:04:34,680 --> 00:04:41,880 He uses intuitions are, with certain, very important exceptions, sense perceptions. 41 00:04:41,880 --> 00:04:47,670 So they're representations of particular objects through the senses. 42 00:04:47,670 --> 00:04:53,730 We don't have to get into the important exceptions here at just this moment. 43 00:04:53,730 --> 00:04:59,860 So for the most part, when he talks about representations in the generic in the critique. 44 00:04:59,860 --> 00:05:04,580 Judgement. He actually has intuitions in mind and intuitions, again, for the most part here. 45 00:05:04,580 --> 00:05:13,190 Our sense, perceptions, representations of particular objects that you encounter and sense perception, 46 00:05:13,190 --> 00:05:22,630 as he puts it, intuitions are representation through which an object is given to us is how he phrases it often. 47 00:05:22,630 --> 00:05:29,960 And the other main kind of representation, which is going to come up a lot in his aesthetics, is the concept. 48 00:05:29,960 --> 00:05:36,800 Now, he's a certain view about the nature of concepts. But he basically means by concept what we mean by concept. 49 00:05:36,800 --> 00:05:41,690 So a general representation as opposed to a particular representation. 50 00:05:41,690 --> 00:05:54,570 So the concept of dog, as opposed to a representation of some particular dog or a sense percent perception of some particular dog. 51 00:05:54,570 --> 00:06:01,770 Nevertheless, for some reason, in the critique of judgement, he usually uses the term representation. 52 00:06:01,770 --> 00:06:06,000 And when he does that, he almost always means a sense perception. 53 00:06:06,000 --> 00:06:10,920 What elsewhere he calls an intuition sometimes uses the word intuition. And the critique of judgement. 54 00:06:10,920 --> 00:06:17,670 But mostly he uses the generic term representation and concepts that other kind of 55 00:06:17,670 --> 00:06:23,820 representation are not the representation through which objects are given to us in experience. 56 00:06:23,820 --> 00:06:28,800 But as he puts it, the representation through which objects, I thought. 57 00:06:28,800 --> 00:06:35,820 So you see a cow. Your sense perception is an intuition of a particular cow. 58 00:06:35,820 --> 00:06:39,630 You identify it as a cow. You apply the concept of a cow to it. 59 00:06:39,630 --> 00:06:42,460 So you have the thought. This is a cow. 60 00:06:42,460 --> 00:06:52,860 Cooperation of intuitions, representation of this cow with the concept by which you identify what it is, namely the concept of a cow. 61 00:06:52,860 --> 00:07:00,310 That is an example of kind of the way that he sees things working. 62 00:07:00,310 --> 00:07:10,410 OK. So that's representations. The other important term she uses everywhere, totally central is a priori. 63 00:07:10,410 --> 00:07:13,580 And some of you may have come across this elsewhere. 64 00:07:13,580 --> 00:07:22,890 And he calls a lot of different things a priori, various representations or a priori intuitions and concepts. 65 00:07:22,890 --> 00:07:28,020 He thinks there are some a priori intuitions and concepts. 66 00:07:28,020 --> 00:07:36,320 But the key notion of a priori, I think they need to be aware of is not what it means to call them a priori. 67 00:07:36,320 --> 00:07:46,710 Right. But what it means to call knowledge a priori. Right. So a priori knowledge is knowledge that is not justified by experience. 68 00:07:46,710 --> 00:07:51,690 So there's empirical knowledge which is justified by experience. 69 00:07:51,690 --> 00:08:04,680 So the knowledge that it's raining outside you acquire by having a sense experience is justified by having a sense experience. 70 00:08:04,680 --> 00:08:11,430 But it's also quite important for him that we have a priori knowledge, knowledge that's not justified by sense. 71 00:08:11,430 --> 00:08:18,240 Experience and examples include mathematical knowledge. 72 00:08:18,240 --> 00:08:29,130 Certain principles of physics, such as every event has a cause. 73 00:08:29,130 --> 00:08:39,810 Certain principles. As we'll see also a certain claim that aesthetic judgements commit us to. 74 00:08:39,810 --> 00:08:43,200 And that's why it's very important to get a handle on this, 75 00:08:43,200 --> 00:08:50,970 that a priori knowledge or in a prior claim is something that is not justified by experience. 76 00:08:50,970 --> 00:09:02,550 By contrast with empirical knowledge, he thinks there are two marks by which you can identify something as a bit of a priori knowledge. 77 00:09:02,550 --> 00:09:11,730 These are universality and necessity, and these will make their appearance in a big way in the critique of judgement. 78 00:09:11,730 --> 00:09:21,000 So universality just means that if you know that something is always the case without exception, then you can't know it by experience. 79 00:09:21,000 --> 00:09:29,430 So if you know that all bachelors, without exception, are unmarried, that's a prior knowledge reason. 80 00:09:29,430 --> 00:09:33,840 It's a prior knowledge is quite simple. Your experience is limited. 81 00:09:33,840 --> 00:09:44,820 You haven't experienced every bachelor or every event or every group of two and two and verified that they make four. 82 00:09:44,820 --> 00:09:52,330 But if you know it anyway, then you can't know it from experience. 83 00:09:52,330 --> 00:09:58,790 So universality that he takes to be one mark of a priori knowledge. 84 00:09:58,790 --> 00:10:02,930 The other mark, he takes to be a necessity. 85 00:10:02,930 --> 00:10:11,030 So if you know that something must be the case, you can't know that from experience for another simple reason. 86 00:10:11,030 --> 00:10:26,520 Experience only tells you what is the case, doesn't tell you what must be the case. 87 00:10:26,520 --> 00:10:38,370 So those two terms, he says, excuse me, necessity, especially universality, are going to loom large here in the critique of judgement. 88 00:10:38,370 --> 00:10:44,950 So that's just a little bit of background that I think is pretty crucial to understanding what's going on, 89 00:10:44,950 --> 00:10:56,430 what he's doing now in the bits of the critique of aesthetic judgement that we're going to look at cats basic strategy is this. 90 00:10:56,430 --> 00:11:04,710 So first he's going to identify certain features that what he calls aesthetic judgements have. 91 00:11:04,710 --> 00:11:12,760 And this is what he says he's doing in the bith called the analytic of aesthetic judgements. 92 00:11:12,760 --> 00:11:22,780 And then he is going to point out a very, very puzzling feature of aesthetic judgements so characterised. 93 00:11:22,780 --> 00:11:29,500 So once he's characterised aesthetic judgements, he says there's a real problem here that demands explanation. 94 00:11:29,500 --> 00:11:32,440 And we'll get to that at the end of this lecture. 95 00:11:32,440 --> 00:11:40,030 And the principal question of the aesthetic judge of the critique of aesthetic judgement is the attempt to answer that question. 96 00:11:40,030 --> 00:11:45,700 To solve that puzzle that arises from this characterisation of aesthetic judgements 97 00:11:45,700 --> 00:11:50,950 and that he says he's going to provide in the deduction of pure aesthetic judgements. 98 00:11:50,950 --> 00:11:54,310 So there's the analytic and there's the deduction. 99 00:11:54,310 --> 00:12:03,610 Now, I say this is what he says he's going to do, because material relevance to both of these is mix all through the critique of aesthetic judgement. 100 00:12:03,610 --> 00:12:12,520 There's bits that are relevant to the deduction in the analytic and there's bits that are relevant to these analytic repeated in the deduction. 101 00:12:12,520 --> 00:12:23,650 It really seems to have been written in a hurry, actually, a critique of the aesthetic judgement. 102 00:12:23,650 --> 00:12:34,550 Now, as I've tried to illustrate on the little chart on the back of the handout. 103 00:12:34,550 --> 00:12:44,210 When he says aesthetic judgement, he is not only talking about judgements that something as beautiful as you might naturally suppose, 104 00:12:44,210 --> 00:12:52,010 that's boy the way that that term would be used today. But there are at least three kinds of aesthetic judgement for him. 105 00:12:52,010 --> 00:12:57,020 There are what he calls judgements of taste, which are concerned with beauty. 106 00:12:57,020 --> 00:13:04,940 There are judgements of the sublime which he's going to have various things to say about, which we'll discuss next week. 107 00:13:04,940 --> 00:13:13,070 And there are judgements of the agreeable so tasty food, for example. 108 00:13:13,070 --> 00:13:19,850 And what makes these all aesthetic is that they have subjective grounds, as he puts it. 109 00:13:19,850 --> 00:13:28,340 They're based on something about the judge rather than something about the object. 110 00:13:28,340 --> 00:13:45,470 In each of these cases, as it happens, it's a feeling based on a feeling rather than a property of the object. 111 00:13:45,470 --> 00:14:03,680 So what I'd like to focus on today is a few features of judgements of taste, judgements concerned with beauty and putting these features together. 112 00:14:03,680 --> 00:14:14,060 We'll set up the problem that he wants to solve and the deduction as next week we will discuss that problem. 113 00:14:14,060 --> 00:14:20,390 Characterise it at greater length and go through Kant solution. 114 00:14:20,390 --> 00:14:32,030 And hopefully we'll also go through the analytic of the Cymbeline next week discussing the features that judgements of the sublime have. 115 00:14:32,030 --> 00:14:38,840 As it happens, he thinks that it's really judgements of taste that pose this problem, requiring a separate solution. 116 00:14:38,840 --> 00:14:49,290 So that's really going to be the focus judgements of the sublime. He thinks don't require a separate deduction for reasons we can discuss next week. 117 00:14:49,290 --> 00:14:57,830 OK. So this week is going to be focussed on these key features of the analytic of the beautiful, whose focus is judgements of taste. 118 00:14:57,830 --> 00:15:04,200 So the first feature of judgements of taste. And it's not a tautology given the way he uses the word aesthetic. 119 00:15:04,200 --> 00:15:09,380 It's not trivially true, I should say, is that judgements of taste are aesthetic. 120 00:15:09,380 --> 00:15:24,430 That means judgements of taste are based on pleasure. That's because, rather, judgements of taste are based on pleasure. 121 00:15:24,430 --> 00:15:37,300 Now, as we discussed with him, a very common view and can't doesn't even argue for it, that beauty is not a property of the beautiful object. 122 00:15:37,300 --> 00:15:43,030 Hume gave some argument for it, as we saw, Kent is happy to take it for granted. 123 00:15:43,030 --> 00:15:46,210 Beauty is not a property of the beautiful object. 124 00:15:46,210 --> 00:15:53,410 When we judge something to be beautiful, it's not because we've perceived a property called beauty in the object. 125 00:15:53,410 --> 00:16:01,150 It is on the basis of a feeling the object give us gives us a feeling of pleasure. 126 00:16:01,150 --> 00:16:09,040 And it's for that reason that judgements of taste are aesthetic judgements, they have, as he puts it, subjective grounds. 127 00:16:09,040 --> 00:16:16,180 They're not based on something in the object that makes them different from what he calls variously logical judgements, 128 00:16:16,180 --> 00:16:30,380 theoretical judgements which do attribute a property to the object. 129 00:16:30,380 --> 00:16:44,480 Now, it's worth taking a look at Section 36 here to give yourself a bit of an idea of how Kant imagines this relation between judgement and pleasure. 130 00:16:44,480 --> 00:16:51,700 And I think it's a good example of that stretching of words that he's so notorious for. 131 00:16:51,700 --> 00:16:58,100 So the way he puts it there is that in a logical judgement, when you attribute a property to a thing, 132 00:16:58,100 --> 00:17:09,500 you connect your perception of the particular thing to a concept that you classify the thing under our concept of a property that you attribute to it. 133 00:17:09,500 --> 00:17:16,520 So use this word connect to describe the relation between perceptions and concepts. 134 00:17:16,520 --> 00:17:21,170 And then he says. And then the only difference in aesthetic judgements or, you know, the only difference, 135 00:17:21,170 --> 00:17:28,760 but is that you instead of connecting a concept to your perception, you connect a feeling to your perception. 136 00:17:28,760 --> 00:17:35,750 Now, this is just typical of care to imply that it's the just the very same relation between precept as holds, 137 00:17:35,750 --> 00:17:44,510 between perceptions and concepts in logical judgements as holds between perceptions and feelings. 138 00:17:44,510 --> 00:17:49,910 This is what you sort of have to deal with when reading him is that's just not transparent at all. 139 00:17:49,910 --> 00:17:56,390 This doesn't sound remotely plausible that it's the same relation as there is between concepts and perceptions, 140 00:17:56,390 --> 00:18:02,480 whatever that is, whatever that relation is, as there is between feelings and perceptions. 141 00:18:02,480 --> 00:18:09,740 So but that's how he's picturing it. You have your perception. You connect a concept to it when you attribute a property. 142 00:18:09,740 --> 00:18:16,490 And in the case of judgements of tastes, you have your perception and you connect a feeling to it. 143 00:18:16,490 --> 00:18:24,500 Use of the same word connect makes it sound like the same relation. Strange to think that they would be okay. 144 00:18:24,500 --> 00:18:29,630 That's just sort of by the by second key point. 145 00:18:29,630 --> 00:18:36,860 And I think it is worth distinguishing this from. The first one is that not only judgements are judgements of taste based on pleasure. 146 00:18:36,860 --> 00:18:43,070 They're not based on concepts. So this I don't think you can. 147 00:18:43,070 --> 00:18:54,140 I don't think I would be too much representation to say that. The second point is that judgements of taste are based only on pleasure. 148 00:18:54,140 --> 00:19:01,580 So it's not as though they're based in part on pleasure and in part on something else, but only on pleasure. 149 00:19:01,580 --> 00:19:09,890 Now, what does this mean to say that a judgement is based on a concept or to deny it? 150 00:19:09,890 --> 00:19:11,450 Well, I think we have to go back to. 151 00:19:11,450 --> 00:19:23,360 From before is that we do not make this judgement based on applying a concept of a property or of a kind of thing to what we see. 152 00:19:23,360 --> 00:19:30,740 So we don't in particular judge that something is beautiful on the basis of having 153 00:19:30,740 --> 00:19:38,060 applied the concept of squareness or shapelessness or possessing unity and variety. 154 00:19:38,060 --> 00:19:44,820 All these sorts of candidates have been offered as tests for what makes something beautiful. 155 00:19:44,820 --> 00:19:50,060 A judgement of taste is not based on any prior application of a concept. 156 00:19:50,060 --> 00:19:56,120 So not only is there no such concept as beauty, but when you judge that something's beautiful, 157 00:19:56,120 --> 00:20:00,350 you don't make that judgement based on applying any other concept at all. 158 00:20:00,350 --> 00:20:13,770 It's only based on the feeling of pleasure. Now, he makes a lot of claims about judgements and about the pleasure they're based on. 159 00:20:13,770 --> 00:20:21,060 And he makes very similar claims about both the judgement and the pleasure it's based on. 160 00:20:21,060 --> 00:20:24,740 And you can understand why if there's this intimate connexion between the two. 161 00:20:24,740 --> 00:20:35,400 But I think that's basically his argument for all the considerations he advances in support of the view that judgements aren't based on concepts. 162 00:20:35,400 --> 00:20:40,260 Is the view that the pleasure they're based on is not itself based on concepts. 163 00:20:40,260 --> 00:20:46,800 So pleasure and beauty is not based on concepts. Judgements of taste are based on pleasure and beauty. 164 00:20:46,800 --> 00:20:55,980 And that's supposed to support the idea that judgements of taste are not based on grounded on concepts. 165 00:20:55,980 --> 00:21:06,840 So as he puts it, or what this amounts to is that you don't get the pleasure in the beautiful from having 166 00:21:06,840 --> 00:21:13,500 identified it as having a certain property or belonging to such and such a kind. 167 00:21:13,500 --> 00:21:18,330 And again, it's worth quoting the way he is imagining it. Pleasure. 168 00:21:18,330 --> 00:21:25,950 And beautiful objects instead, as he puts it immediately, coupled with the representation through which the object is give it. 169 00:21:25,950 --> 00:21:30,300 That is, it's immediately coupled with an intuition, in his terminology, 170 00:21:30,300 --> 00:21:37,500 a sense perception, not the representation through which it is thought, namely our concept. 171 00:21:37,500 --> 00:21:44,130 So you're not pleased at it because you've identified it as shapely, square, 172 00:21:44,130 --> 00:21:51,120 colourful, etc. You are pleased merely because you have the perception of this thing, 173 00:21:51,120 --> 00:21:58,340 not because you've identified it as possessing any particular property or belonging to any particular kind. 174 00:21:58,340 --> 00:22:09,210 And in fact, he says, even if you know what kind of thing it is to make a judgement of taste, you've got to leave that knowledge aside. 175 00:22:09,210 --> 00:22:21,520 So not base it on what you know. So in his example, a botanist who knows that a flower is the reproductive organ of a plant. 176 00:22:21,520 --> 00:22:25,780 Doesn't make his judgements about whether the flower is beautiful. 177 00:22:25,780 --> 00:22:41,690 Based on that knowledge, his pleasure in the flower does not arise because he's identified it as the reproductive organ of a plant. 178 00:22:41,690 --> 00:22:51,540 Not because he's applied the concept of reproductive organ to the plant. 179 00:22:51,540 --> 00:23:00,020 So it is difficult to overemphasise how important this claim is for his view. 180 00:23:00,020 --> 00:23:06,990 The judgements of pleasure, judgements of taste are based on pleasure and not on concepts. 181 00:23:06,990 --> 00:23:14,850 Because I think that a huge number of other things he says, and it's not always transparent that they're connected to this claim in this way. 182 00:23:14,850 --> 00:23:23,160 But I think a huge number of claims he makes are actually more or less derived from this one claim that judgements of taste based on pleasure, 183 00:23:23,160 --> 00:23:33,090 not based on concepts. And I'll get to those in a minute, 184 00:23:33,090 --> 00:23:42,120 but to give you a sense of what more of what it would mean for pleasure to be based on concepts or for judgements to be based on concepts, 185 00:23:42,120 --> 00:23:48,900 he contrasts judgements of taste with pleasure and beauty, I should say, with pleasure in the good. 186 00:23:48,900 --> 00:23:56,470 On the one hand. And pleasure in the agreeable. On the other. 187 00:23:56,470 --> 00:24:03,880 So he says that to judge something, to be good. So a good knife, for example, not his example. 188 00:24:03,880 --> 00:24:08,560 You have to know whether it is what it's supposed to be. 189 00:24:08,560 --> 00:24:16,790 So whether it's an effective cutting implement, for example. 190 00:24:16,790 --> 00:24:24,470 So to judge something good, you have to apply the concept of what it's intended to be cutting implement, 191 00:24:24,470 --> 00:24:30,830 for example, before you can judge it to be good. 192 00:24:30,830 --> 00:24:40,010 If it is what it's intended to be, then it's good of its kind. 193 00:24:40,010 --> 00:24:53,550 And so if you take pleasure in its being good of its kind, your pleasure is in this sense based on the concept you apply to it. 194 00:24:53,550 --> 00:25:02,850 That's an example of what it would be for pleasure to be based on concepts. And that's exactly not what pleasure and beauty is like. 195 00:25:02,850 --> 00:25:06,030 It's not as a result of having applied concepts to it. 196 00:25:06,030 --> 00:25:12,060 And again, remember, with the botanist, it's fine if you do know what it is and what it's meant to be. 197 00:25:12,060 --> 00:25:19,530 It's just not that your pleasure is based on it. It's not that your pleasure is based on that knowledge in the way that your pleasure in a good knife, 198 00:25:19,530 --> 00:25:27,110 admiration of a good knife would be based on having applied a concept to it. 199 00:25:27,110 --> 00:25:36,140 So this freedom from concept makes it different from pleasure in the good, does make it similar to pleasure in what he calls the agreeable. 200 00:25:36,140 --> 00:25:46,400 So as he puts it, so to judge something agreeable, such as spicy food or even something like health, the agreeableness of health, 201 00:25:46,400 --> 00:25:55,670 we need only consider whether it pleases or at least does not pain our senses when we experience it. 202 00:25:55,670 --> 00:26:04,420 You don't need to recognise some property of spicy food in this view. 203 00:26:04,420 --> 00:26:11,540 Categorise it as a certain type of food in order to find it agreeable. 204 00:26:11,540 --> 00:26:20,640 You just taste it and discern whether it pleases your senses. 205 00:26:20,640 --> 00:26:24,840 By contrast, he says, if you were to judge whether spicy food is good for you, 206 00:26:24,840 --> 00:26:31,740 you would have to apply concepts, namely the concepts of the consequences that it has for you. 207 00:26:31,740 --> 00:26:33,840 Maybe it makes you unhealthy. 208 00:26:33,840 --> 00:26:42,840 And you, while judging the spicy food very agreeable, you might judge that it is not good because the concept, what you recognise is true. 209 00:26:42,840 --> 00:26:51,900 It entails that it's not good for you. 210 00:26:51,900 --> 00:27:03,030 OK. So this key claim, judgement of taste and pleasure and beauty, not based on concepts, is something that he gets a lot of traction out of. 211 00:27:03,030 --> 00:27:09,610 And this is typical of camps to try and base a lot of conclusions on a very slender basis. 212 00:27:09,610 --> 00:27:18,190 So first conclusion may not sound all that striking, but it is important in terms of at least understanding his view. 213 00:27:18,190 --> 00:27:23,560 Is this claim that judgements of taste are singular judgements? 214 00:27:23,560 --> 00:27:35,140 So I've said that pleasure and beauty is pleasure and intuition and intuition is a representation of a particular item. 215 00:27:35,140 --> 00:27:42,760 Again, the pleasure is not based on concepts. It's based on an intuition, which is a representation of a particular item. 216 00:27:42,760 --> 00:27:48,490 So the judgement based on that pleasure is going to be a judgement about some 217 00:27:48,490 --> 00:27:57,190 particular item as opposed to a generalisation about all items of that kind. 218 00:27:57,190 --> 00:28:05,170 To give you an example, this tulip is beautiful would be an example of a judgement of taste. 219 00:28:05,170 --> 00:28:11,070 All tulips are beautiful, is not a judgement of taste. In his view, that's a generalisation. 220 00:28:11,070 --> 00:28:16,770 That's not about any particular tulip. 221 00:28:16,770 --> 00:28:26,880 So that's a really important thing to observe here that I don't think people often enough take note of is that in Kant's vocabulary, 222 00:28:26,880 --> 00:28:33,630 a judgement of taste is not just any judgement in which you call something beautiful. 223 00:28:33,630 --> 00:28:46,110 It's got to have the right basis. So the judgement that all tulips are beautiful is not based on the immediate presentation to you of all tulips. 224 00:28:46,110 --> 00:28:54,930 And the pleasure you get from that, in a sense, perception, rather, it's based on previous judgements of taste. 225 00:28:54,930 --> 00:28:59,490 So the judgement, this tulips, beautiful, that tulips, beautiful cetera, et cetera, et cetera. 226 00:28:59,490 --> 00:29:07,830 Therefore, all tulips are beautiful. So it's based on it's not based on the immediate intuition of tulips. 227 00:29:07,830 --> 00:29:16,470 It's based on prior judgements of taste. But the fact that it's based on judgements of tastes does not make it a judgement of taste. 228 00:29:16,470 --> 00:29:26,250 He says even the judgement all tulips are beautiful is a logical or theoretical judgement, not a judgement of taste. 229 00:29:26,250 --> 00:29:32,730 That's really important to understand because he's not saying it's not possible to do that, but to make judgements like that. 230 00:29:32,730 --> 00:29:37,410 He's just saying they're not judgements of taste. They are logical judgements. 231 00:29:37,410 --> 00:29:51,080 They're talking about beauty, but they're still not judgements of taste. OK. 232 00:29:51,080 --> 00:29:54,200 So that's one point. 233 00:29:54,200 --> 00:30:06,170 Second point, he thinks and this is directed against Hume, I think, and a lot of other people is the judgements of taste cannot be proven by argument. 234 00:30:06,170 --> 00:30:16,430 So yesterday we discussed a bit about how Hume has that quaint passage in which he describes or 235 00:30:16,430 --> 00:30:24,650 assumes at least the possibility of convincing somebody by general principles that they lack taste 236 00:30:24,650 --> 00:30:32,120 about a certain object that some object they didn't like is beautiful by showing them that it 237 00:30:32,120 --> 00:30:37,370 has the properties that general principles have identified as the properties of the beautiful, 238 00:30:37,370 --> 00:30:43,370 i.e. properties that please everyone. In other cases and that please the guy you're arguing with in this case. 239 00:30:43,370 --> 00:30:50,720 And if you show him that the case he doesn't like has those properties, then Hume says you'd have to agree with us. 240 00:30:50,720 --> 00:30:56,360 OK. I was wrong. It actually is beautiful. Kant is totally opposed to that procedure. 241 00:30:56,360 --> 00:31:09,500 That's not the way it works at all. So he said what it what would it be to provide an argument to the effect that something is beautiful? 242 00:31:09,500 --> 00:31:17,630 What would it be to support that judgement of taste? Through an argument? Well, it would have to take the form of the following. 243 00:31:17,630 --> 00:31:27,170 Everything with certain property, p. So Kirby Naess or Squareness or Unity in Variety is beautiful. 244 00:31:27,170 --> 00:31:32,270 First premise. Everything with this property is beautiful. 245 00:31:32,270 --> 00:31:42,380 Second premise, this object in front of us has this property squareness, cravenness, unity and variety, whatever. 246 00:31:42,380 --> 00:31:50,030 Therefore, conclusion. This object is beautiful. I think a lot of people, 247 00:31:50,030 --> 00:31:55,580 when they start to studies that kind of hope that this is what is that stations talk 248 00:31:55,580 --> 00:32:02,600 about trying to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of something being beautiful. 249 00:32:02,600 --> 00:32:09,160 They don't really anymore. And it's may have something to do with Kant's influence here. 250 00:32:09,160 --> 00:32:13,790 Is this not possible procedure? Various people have tried it. 251 00:32:13,790 --> 00:32:18,350 So you hear about things like the golden ratio and things that like this that have been proposed 252 00:32:18,350 --> 00:32:24,020 over the years as something that all beautiful objects have in common but can't think. 253 00:32:24,020 --> 00:32:27,890 This is not how you demonstrate a judgement of taste. 254 00:32:27,890 --> 00:32:34,850 And again, for the quite simple reason that to do this would be to base your judgement of tastes on concepts, 255 00:32:34,850 --> 00:32:43,490 namely the concept of whatever property you identified as necessary or sufficient, necessary and sufficient for beauty. 256 00:32:43,490 --> 00:32:53,750 The concept of unity and variety, concept of the golden ratio concept of whatever was identified in the principle. 257 00:32:53,750 --> 00:33:00,050 But if judgements of taste aren't based on concepts and are only based on pleasure, then you can't do that. 258 00:33:00,050 --> 00:33:06,080 And there are no laws of taste where that means something that can function as the first 259 00:33:06,080 --> 00:33:15,850 premise of an argument that supports a judgement of taste proves the judgement of taste. 260 00:33:15,850 --> 00:33:26,140 Furthermore, and this has also caused a lot of controversy, is that judgements of taste can't be supported by other people's judgements of taste. 261 00:33:26,140 --> 00:33:34,030 So the fact that all the experts say that the thing is beautiful provides no support whatsoever for a judgement of taste. 262 00:33:34,030 --> 00:33:41,890 And again, I can't help but think that this is a dig at him. I don't know if people know whether can't read the standard of taste. 263 00:33:41,890 --> 00:33:51,160 He certainly read the essay The Sceptic. But there are various points that he's addressing, ideas that are certainly quite explicit in him. 264 00:33:51,160 --> 00:33:55,330 Maybe they were just around in the general atmosphere at the time. 265 00:33:55,330 --> 00:34:06,590 But Hume and others who think that the judgements even of very qualified judges support the judgement of taste are wrong. 266 00:34:06,590 --> 00:34:11,080 And once again, this is because judgements of taste are based only on pleasure, 267 00:34:11,080 --> 00:34:17,230 not on concepts, not on anything else, not on the concept of being liked by the true critics. 268 00:34:17,230 --> 00:34:25,300 For example. Now, it's often, I think, 269 00:34:25,300 --> 00:34:36,400 missed in this is he does say something that sounds like he's allowing that you 270 00:34:36,400 --> 00:34:42,190 can make a logical judgement of beauty based on what other people have liked. 271 00:34:42,190 --> 00:34:46,990 So just like that generalisation about tulips that we discussed, 272 00:34:46,990 --> 00:34:54,850 the fact that the true critics are lots of qualified judges have regarded something as beautiful, 273 00:34:54,850 --> 00:35:02,680 does provide some support for the conclusion that it's beautiful. But to draw that conclusion is not to make a judgement of taste. 274 00:35:02,680 --> 00:35:08,230 Again, this despite the fact that it's a conclusion about the things, beauty, 275 00:35:08,230 --> 00:35:17,080 judgements of taste, very special class of judgements about things, beauty. 276 00:35:17,080 --> 00:35:24,990 So these are various points about the nature of the judgement. How can be supported further conclusion he draws? 277 00:35:24,990 --> 00:35:32,320 Beauty is not a kind of perfection. And the reason he says this is because earlier in the century, 278 00:35:32,320 --> 00:35:41,470 a lot of rationalist philosophers such as Christian Volf and a number of others held that when we perceive beauty, 279 00:35:41,470 --> 00:35:49,060 we are sort of dimly or obscurely perceiving perfection, the perfection of an object. 280 00:35:49,060 --> 00:35:57,980 I think perfection of an object, perfection at least. 281 00:35:57,980 --> 00:36:00,140 And Kant says this is not right. 282 00:36:00,140 --> 00:36:10,420 Beauty cannot be a kind of perfection argument, being that in order to judge that something is perfect or has is perfect in some respects, 283 00:36:10,420 --> 00:36:25,820 we have to know what kind of thing the object is and what its perfect purposes in order to see if it fulfils that purpose perfectly. 284 00:36:25,820 --> 00:36:36,740 So we have to apply the concept of what kind of thing it is and what its purpose is, and that, as we'll be familiar by now. 285 00:36:36,740 --> 00:36:42,080 You can't do the judgement of taste. You cannot base judgement of taste on concepts. 286 00:36:42,080 --> 00:36:49,370 You do have to base a judgement of perfection on concepts. Therefore, judgements of taste can't be judgements of perfection. 287 00:36:49,370 --> 00:37:09,150 Therefore, beauty can't be perfection. And the last conclusion that I think he draws from this is that beauty cannot be defined, 288 00:37:09,150 --> 00:37:17,160 at least if you're using concepts of the kinds of properties. Thing has got to have in order to be beautiful. 289 00:37:17,160 --> 00:37:22,980 So this is a generalisation of the point about perfection. 290 00:37:22,980 --> 00:37:28,770 And the implication seems to be that if it could be defined using concepts of properties, the thing has got to have to be beautiful. 291 00:37:28,770 --> 00:37:33,630 Then you could make a judgement of taste using or you would be making judgements of taste 292 00:37:33,630 --> 00:37:42,690 using concepts of what properties the thing has got to have in order to be beautiful. 293 00:37:42,690 --> 00:37:48,060 Now, he does say it can't be defined by means of concepts. 294 00:37:48,060 --> 00:37:56,700 And I am assuming here he means by means of concepts of properties the thing has to have in order to be beautiful. 295 00:37:56,700 --> 00:38:06,600 The reason I say that is that there are several points in the critique of judgement where he presents what he calls a definition of beauty. 296 00:38:06,600 --> 00:38:12,660 So unless he's contradicting himself, which is a distinct possibility a lot of the time with Kant. 297 00:38:12,660 --> 00:38:17,700 What I think we have to assume here is that it's using concepts of this particular kind, 298 00:38:17,700 --> 00:38:23,760 concepts of properties or of kinds to which the object must belong in order to be beautiful, 299 00:38:23,760 --> 00:38:31,500 a definition that implies concepts of that kind can't be found. 300 00:38:31,500 --> 00:38:39,990 So there's great ambition that many people have had over the years, defining beauty in these kinds of terms can't be done. 301 00:38:39,990 --> 00:38:50,490 Now, of course, he says this does not mean that we cannot get empirical evidence of what works or what forms of things. 302 00:38:50,490 --> 00:38:53,640 People of all ages or nations find beautiful. 303 00:38:53,640 --> 00:39:04,550 And this, again, I think has got to be some sort of reference to him or at least people with obviously at least people with that kind of view. 304 00:39:04,550 --> 00:39:17,060 But no such evidence can be used to make a judgement of tastes because it's only based on pleasure. 305 00:39:17,060 --> 00:39:24,750 OK. Now, having said all this. He then proceeded to make a distinction that seems inconsistent with it. 306 00:39:24,750 --> 00:39:31,830 He then distinguishes between what he calls free beauty and dependent beauty. 307 00:39:31,830 --> 00:39:42,660 Now, dependent beauty, as he puts it, presupposes a concept of what the object should be. 308 00:39:42,660 --> 00:39:49,560 So, for example, beautiful people, men, women, children, beautiful warriors. 309 00:39:49,560 --> 00:39:57,300 So he had apparently read about some warriors in New Zealand who painted their bodies in various warlike ways. 310 00:39:57,300 --> 00:40:07,080 Beautiful horses, beautiful buildings. The beauty of these objects tends to be what he calls dependent beauty, 311 00:40:07,080 --> 00:40:13,740 because these objects are formed in such a way as to match their function, what they're supposed to be. 312 00:40:13,740 --> 00:40:20,580 So warriors are painted in scary ways. Horses are beautiful. 313 00:40:20,580 --> 00:40:26,430 The beauty of a horse is in virtue of properties that make it do what a horse is supposed to do. 314 00:40:26,430 --> 00:40:43,460 Go fast, whatever. And as he puts it, such objects combine are such such objects combined, both beauty and goodness in them. 315 00:40:43,460 --> 00:40:48,900 Remember, the goodness of a thing has to do with what it's supposed to be. 316 00:40:48,900 --> 00:40:56,810 And these objects have a form matching what they're supposed to be. That's dependent beauty. 317 00:40:56,810 --> 00:41:04,650 But free beauty is not like that. It's not base doesn't presuppose concept. 318 00:41:04,650 --> 00:41:07,110 Now, obviously, that seems to pose a problem. 319 00:41:07,110 --> 00:41:14,700 It's seems to suggest that all of a sudden he's allowing that you can make some judgements of taste based on concepts, 320 00:41:14,700 --> 00:41:19,080 namely judgements of dependent beauty. 321 00:41:19,080 --> 00:41:29,160 And there are various ways people have tried to get him out of this one way, which seems kind of promising, actually, when you read Section 16, 322 00:41:29,160 --> 00:41:42,250 where he makes this distinction is to point out that while what he says is what he says presupposes the concept is the beauty, not the judgement. 323 00:41:42,250 --> 00:41:50,760 And he also makes the point that a church, for example, is the way it is because of the function it has. 324 00:41:50,760 --> 00:41:59,370 So there might be lots of ways of making it beautiful that you can't do to a church because of the function that it has. 325 00:41:59,370 --> 00:42:06,210 So this seems to suggest that it's not the judgement of the things beauty that's based on concepts, 326 00:42:06,210 --> 00:42:18,810 but the things beauty itself takes, the form it does because of someone's concepts, the designer, its concepts of the thing. 327 00:42:18,810 --> 00:42:24,810 That's one way out. So and so on. This view, what we do, we judge beauty and just the same way as before. 328 00:42:24,810 --> 00:42:36,030 Not based on concepts. Just based on pleasure. It's not based on the concept of the function of the church or the function of the horse, etc. 329 00:42:36,030 --> 00:42:44,400 But the horse is the way it is and the church is the way it is because of the function that they have. 330 00:42:44,400 --> 00:42:47,700 That's one way in which people have thoughts. Defend Kant. 331 00:42:47,700 --> 00:42:54,900 And what's misleading here is that it makes it look like these two kinds of judgements of taste when actually it's two kinds of beauty. 332 00:42:54,900 --> 00:43:03,720 And if there's a different kind of evaluation here at all, it's a sort of complex evaluation, 333 00:43:03,720 --> 00:43:12,090 combining a judgement of taste with a judgement about the things goodness or its fitness to function. 334 00:43:12,090 --> 00:43:20,940 So the judgement of taste not based on concepts, but the complex judgement that has a judgement of taste as a component is based on concepts. 335 00:43:20,940 --> 00:43:27,450 That's one way people have thought of avoiding a contradiction here with Kant. 336 00:43:27,450 --> 00:43:36,970 He doesn't really return to this distinction too much at all, actually, if I am right. 337 00:43:36,970 --> 00:43:47,730 And that's one way people have tried to explain why he makes it or how it's consistent with the other stuff that he says. 338 00:43:47,730 --> 00:44:00,460 OK. So, as I say, I really can't stress enough this point about the judgements of taste are aesthetic in no way based and in no way based on concepts. 339 00:44:00,460 --> 00:44:11,080 Next point, which is one of the earliest points he makes in the critique, is that the pleasure judgements of taste are based on is disinterested. 340 00:44:11,080 --> 00:44:19,510 And this would be a hugely influential doctrine. 341 00:44:19,510 --> 00:44:26,800 Now, the English word disinterested is misused a lot. It's often used to mean uninterested. 342 00:44:26,800 --> 00:44:39,210 It actually means something more like impartial. In this context, I can't gives it its own meaning. 343 00:44:39,210 --> 00:44:43,890 So he says that interest is, as he puts it. 344 00:44:43,890 --> 00:44:55,380 Pleasure connected with the representation of the existence of an object, and that arises from a desire for the objects to exist. 345 00:44:55,380 --> 00:45:00,690 So the thought seems to be you desire the object to exist. 346 00:45:00,690 --> 00:45:16,090 You represent an object like that as existing, and that brings you pleasure. 347 00:45:16,090 --> 00:45:30,190 That's not what pleasure and beauty is like, he says and what he says to support that is based on an example of a palace. 348 00:45:30,190 --> 00:45:38,050 And unfortunately, it's muddied a bit by the fact that in this example, it's an example of displeasure or lack of pleasure. 349 00:45:38,050 --> 00:45:49,000 But I think we can sort of see what he means. So he says, if I ask you whether a palace is beautiful and you say, 350 00:45:49,000 --> 00:45:58,840 I don't think there should be palaces with so many people starving or I think palaces are otherwise a waste. 351 00:45:58,840 --> 00:46:07,390 If I had a nice warm home, I wouldn't accept a palace if I could bring one about. 352 00:46:07,390 --> 00:46:13,750 And he says you might rather like Rousseau against the vanity of the great attached to. 353 00:46:13,750 --> 00:46:24,490 That's manifested in palaces. Kent says all this might be very admirable, but it would not answer my question, which was, is the thing beautiful? 354 00:46:24,490 --> 00:46:33,580 And to answer that question, what you've got to consider is not whether you are displeased that such palaces exist, 355 00:46:33,580 --> 00:46:42,130 but whether the mere representation, either perception of the palace pleases you or not, 356 00:46:42,130 --> 00:46:48,190 not whether you are pleased that it exists or whether any desires for that you 357 00:46:48,190 --> 00:46:55,810 have for it to exist leads you to be pleased or displeased that it does exist. 358 00:46:55,810 --> 00:47:04,540 Again, it's worth reminding yourself here of that thing I quoted earlier where he says 359 00:47:04,540 --> 00:47:10,780 question is just whether there's a pleasure coupled with the representation of it. 360 00:47:10,780 --> 00:47:19,000 And I think he also makes the point that if I merely hold it up to my faculty of representation, my senses. 361 00:47:19,000 --> 00:47:32,360 Do I get pleasure from that? Yes or no? That's the thought. Now, actually, there's sort of two ways of reading what he says here. 362 00:47:32,360 --> 00:47:36,740 One seems to be I mean, 363 00:47:36,740 --> 00:47:45,860 one thing he says seems to suggest that you have to be indifferent to the things existence in order to judge whether it's beautiful. 364 00:47:45,860 --> 00:47:56,090 Another way of taking what he says is the more plausible claim that you can't base your pleasure on any desire you have for it to exist or not. 365 00:47:56,090 --> 00:47:59,960 So you can have those desires and still judge whether it's beautiful. 366 00:47:59,960 --> 00:48:10,250 You just can't base your pleasure and therefore your judgement on those desires and any pleasure or displeasure that they give rise to. 367 00:48:10,250 --> 00:48:10,880 But as I say, 368 00:48:10,880 --> 00:48:20,870 there's something he definitely says that makes it sound like you have to remove all desire for its existence to judge whether it's beautiful. 369 00:48:20,870 --> 00:48:34,460 And that sort of claim is what a lot of people have attacked. And it does sound like he's saying that at one point. 370 00:48:34,460 --> 00:48:44,060 OK. So this is also something that makes pleasure and beauty different from other kinds of pleasure. 371 00:48:44,060 --> 00:48:51,230 So pleasuring the agreeable, again, the spicy food is based on a desire for it to exist. 372 00:48:51,230 --> 00:48:56,720 So it's based on a desire for food, an instinct we have for food. 373 00:48:56,720 --> 00:49:06,470 Likewise, he says, although he doesn't say much more about it than assert it is that pleasure in the good is also interested. 374 00:49:06,470 --> 00:49:13,230 And the thought seems to be that you cannot take pleasure in things goodness without desiring that thing to exist. 375 00:49:13,230 --> 00:49:25,440 Seems plausible enough. OK. 376 00:49:25,440 --> 00:49:29,550 So that's the rather obscure in some ways and on some readings, 377 00:49:29,550 --> 00:49:40,650 controversial doctrine of disinterest oddness now draws one enormously important conclusion from this. 378 00:49:40,650 --> 00:49:47,130 And I'm going to conclude with this and return to a start of the next lecture, because it's really, really important. 379 00:49:47,130 --> 00:49:58,200 And it's the thing that poses the big problem, that it's the main project of the critique to solve. 380 00:49:58,200 --> 00:50:05,280 So a consequence of this, he thinks, is that when you judge something to be beautiful, 381 00:50:05,280 --> 00:50:20,320 you are committed to the claim that everyone else ought to agree with you. 382 00:50:20,320 --> 00:50:27,920 This, he says. Gives judgements of taste. 383 00:50:27,920 --> 00:50:42,370 That quality of universality that we talked about at the very start, which was one of the marks of a priori a priori knowledge, a priori judgements. 384 00:50:42,370 --> 00:50:47,770 That's not quite clear whether this is something that's implied by what you say or whether it's the content of what you say. 385 00:50:47,770 --> 00:50:55,290 He doesn't really make those distinctions very clearly. But what's at least clear is that when you judge something to BBB excuse me, 386 00:50:55,290 --> 00:51:00,990 to be beautiful, you are committed to this view that everyone else ought to agree with. 387 00:51:00,990 --> 00:51:08,340 You ought to agree with you that the thing is beautiful and he provides some 388 00:51:08,340 --> 00:51:12,090 argument for this and he thinks he can derive it from the point about disinterest, 389 00:51:12,090 --> 00:51:18,690 rudeness. And I'll just sort of read out how I've reconstructed this. 390 00:51:18,690 --> 00:51:23,220 It's the first claim seems to be that if you're aware that your pleasure is disinterested, 391 00:51:23,220 --> 00:51:41,560 then you're aware of no source of your pleasure that might be unique to you, such as a desire for something that others might not share. 392 00:51:41,560 --> 00:51:50,440 Second point seems to be, if you're aware of no source of your pleasure, that might be unique to you. 393 00:51:50,440 --> 00:52:02,560 Then you must believe that its source is something about you that you share with everyone. 394 00:52:02,560 --> 00:52:11,220 And third premise seems to be that if you are aware that its source is something about you that you share with everyone, 395 00:52:11,220 --> 00:52:17,840 then you will believe that everyone else ought to agree with your judgement of taste based on that pleasure. 396 00:52:17,840 --> 00:52:28,010 Whose source is some factor about you that you share with everyone? 397 00:52:28,010 --> 00:52:36,780 That's how he gets universality from disinterest, sadness, namely how he gets the claim that everyone ought to agree with you, 398 00:52:36,780 --> 00:52:42,020 and because it's an everyone statement, it's universal as universality. 399 00:52:42,020 --> 00:52:48,260 From the point about the central sickness and loads of ways, that's a terrible argument. 400 00:52:48,260 --> 00:52:51,370 But we're going to leave that aside for the moment. 401 00:52:51,370 --> 00:53:00,080 The somewhat more plausible thing and the thing that people tend to point to who think he's onto something here occurs in his further discussion, 402 00:53:00,080 --> 00:53:05,210 contrasting agreeableness with beauty. 403 00:53:05,210 --> 00:53:15,290 And this is simply the point and the observation that we argue with people over judgements of taste, but not over judgements of the agreeable. 404 00:53:15,290 --> 00:53:19,450 So we blame people who disagree with us. Remember, this was a point. 405 00:53:19,450 --> 00:53:29,840 Hume was really stressing. He thinks judgements over spicy food, things like this, 406 00:53:29,840 --> 00:53:43,550 do not give rise to these arguments would not make sense to blame people for disagreeing that the food is tasty or disgusting, things like that. 407 00:53:43,550 --> 00:53:50,180 That's the claim. And that's supposed to show that when we judge something beautiful. 408 00:53:50,180 --> 00:53:56,510 By contrast with agreeable, we are committing ourselves to the claim that everyone else ought to agree with us. 409 00:53:56,510 --> 00:54:05,970 Otherwise, these arguments, this blame wouldn't make sense. 410 00:54:05,970 --> 00:54:12,600 When something is agreeable, we're happy to qualify it and say it's agreeable to me, though, not to you, I grant. 411 00:54:12,600 --> 00:54:19,110 He says we don't qualify. Beauty in this way. We don't say, well, it's beautiful to me. 412 00:54:19,110 --> 00:54:23,010 That would not make sense. He thinks so. 413 00:54:23,010 --> 00:54:29,280 This point about universality, as I say, credibly important for what he's doing here. 414 00:54:29,280 --> 00:54:35,970 It poses a very strange problem, which I'll elaborate on a bit more next week. 415 00:54:35,970 --> 00:54:42,690 But the thought is that since judgements of taste are based just on your own feeling of pleasure and nothing else, 416 00:54:42,690 --> 00:54:50,310 not the observation that other people are pleased with it or any proof, because proofs of the things beauty are not possible. 417 00:54:50,310 --> 00:54:56,940 Arguments proving that it's beautiful are not possible. And yet you think everybody else ought to agree. 418 00:54:56,940 --> 00:55:02,230 A question arises is by what? Right. Can you expect that? 419 00:55:02,230 --> 00:55:10,320 By what. Right. Can you demand that of other people? And he's well aware that this is very strange. 420 00:55:10,320 --> 00:55:15,340 But this is a very strange feature of judgements of taste, demanding explanation. 421 00:55:15,340 --> 00:55:24,150 He doesn't just assert that you have the right to do this. He tries to show that you have the right to expect other people to agree. 422 00:55:24,150 --> 00:55:29,570 And next week, we'll get into that. Along with the analytic of the sublime. 423 00:55:29,570 --> 00:55:36,665 Thank you.