1 00:00:00,330 --> 00:00:07,710 So the topic today is musical expression. And as with last week, 2 00:00:07,710 --> 00:00:13,410 this raises a number of questions in that category of questions I mentioned 3 00:00:13,410 --> 00:00:18,270 at the beginning as being one of the main types of questions and aesthetics, 4 00:00:18,270 --> 00:00:26,040 namely questions pertaining to the understanding and the appreciation of works of art. 5 00:00:26,040 --> 00:00:34,980 Expression has been fairly important category in aesthetics for at least the past hundred years or so, 6 00:00:34,980 --> 00:00:41,880 and it's been standard to contrast expression since that time with representation. 7 00:00:41,880 --> 00:00:49,110 So pictures on this view of things are representations of what they depict. 8 00:00:49,110 --> 00:00:57,600 Likewise, the sculptures are representations of what they're sculptures of literary works. 9 00:00:57,600 --> 00:01:04,110 I think it's standard to say as well are representational. 10 00:01:04,110 --> 00:01:10,380 But there is another way in which Artworks can relates to things that aren't artworks. 11 00:01:10,380 --> 00:01:17,340 And that is by expressing them, by expressing those things. 12 00:01:17,340 --> 00:01:27,990 And in particular, this has been seen as a particularly important concept for our understanding of music. 13 00:01:27,990 --> 00:01:35,250 Claim is not that representational works of art can't also express things, but that non-representational works of art. 14 00:01:35,250 --> 00:01:46,950 Like many pieces of music, I stand in a different relation to reality than the relation of representing it. 15 00:01:46,950 --> 00:01:51,630 Now it's an interesting question to what extent works of music can be representational? 16 00:01:51,630 --> 00:01:56,610 So you think about certain works of music like the Flood of the Bumblebee, for example. 17 00:01:56,610 --> 00:02:03,840 You might be inclined to say that those works of instrumental music can be representational. 18 00:02:03,840 --> 00:02:12,810 But for the most part, I think a lot of works of music, it's standard to say at least do not represent things. 19 00:02:12,810 --> 00:02:23,130 Rather, the main way in which they relate to reality, other things is by expressing things. 20 00:02:23,130 --> 00:02:34,560 And so I'd like to begin with a few distinctions that are important to orienting yourself into the debate about musical expression. 21 00:02:34,560 --> 00:02:40,410 One distinction is regarding the scope of what can be expressed. 22 00:02:40,410 --> 00:02:45,090 So we might talk about not just expressing emotions but expressing, say, 23 00:02:45,090 --> 00:02:56,350 the spirit of the age or as well or as a number of writers have suggested, some works of music can express qualities like silkiness. 24 00:02:56,350 --> 00:03:05,070 You can get this in. Nelson Goodman, for example, talks about works of art, expressing heat fragility, things like this. 25 00:03:05,070 --> 00:03:09,780 I'm going to be focussing on the expression of emotion, 26 00:03:09,780 --> 00:03:17,460 mainly because that has been the most central topic in discussions of expression and because it seems 27 00:03:17,460 --> 00:03:24,510 to be one of the least controversial examples of something that can be expressed by works of music. 28 00:03:24,510 --> 00:03:31,410 And the expression of emotion and emotion generally in connexion with music raises a great many difficult questions. 29 00:03:31,410 --> 00:03:38,610 So why we react so powerfully to instrumental works of music in particular, 30 00:03:38,610 --> 00:03:45,740 has puzzled a lot of people why the sound of stringed instruments can cause people to cry. 31 00:03:45,740 --> 00:03:54,180 It is a very standard philosophical puzzle in the philosophy of music. 32 00:03:54,180 --> 00:04:04,050 Likewise, how it's possible for non-representational sounds to relate to reality in this way that we call expressing emotion. 33 00:04:04,050 --> 00:04:14,100 How is it possible for the Ode to Joy to express joy and particularly and do so in such a particularly powerful way? 34 00:04:14,100 --> 00:04:16,350 And when we're talking about the expression of emotion? 35 00:04:16,350 --> 00:04:21,630 Another very important distinction to keep in mind is what I've described in the handout as the 36 00:04:21,630 --> 00:04:28,710 distinction between expressing a kind of emotion and expressing a particular occurrence of that emotion. 37 00:04:28,710 --> 00:04:39,690 So you might want to distinguish between work that expresses sadness and something that expresses my current sadness. 38 00:04:39,690 --> 00:04:51,560 Some people draw this distinction by saying that there's a difference between being expressive of sadness and expressing sadness. 39 00:04:51,560 --> 00:05:00,170 So being expressive of sadness is what I just described as expressing a kind of emotion and expressing sadness in this. 40 00:05:00,170 --> 00:05:13,520 Way of describing it is what I just called expressing a particular occurrence of sadness, such as the sadness somebody is currently feeling. 41 00:05:13,520 --> 00:05:16,610 Now, that's going to be important because as we'll see, 42 00:05:16,610 --> 00:05:26,360 there is a deep question about the relation between expressing kinds of emotions and expressing particular occurrences of them, 43 00:05:26,360 --> 00:05:35,090 whether one should be explained in terms of the other. And the last distinction I'd like to draw is the distinction between theories 44 00:05:35,090 --> 00:05:41,360 of expression and what has come to be known as the expression theory of art. 45 00:05:41,360 --> 00:05:49,100 So early in the 20th century, philosophers and writers such as Benedetto Crochet, 46 00:05:49,100 --> 00:06:02,330 Robin Collingwood and the novelist Tolstoy presented views on arts according to which art is to be defined as expression. 47 00:06:02,330 --> 00:06:09,920 That's not going to be our focus today. Next week, we're going to be discussing definitions of art. 48 00:06:09,920 --> 00:06:20,520 Rather, what I'd like to focus on today is theories of expression, theories of expression. 49 00:06:20,520 --> 00:06:27,270 Tend to attempts to answer either one or both of the following questions. 50 00:06:27,270 --> 00:06:33,360 So first, what is it for an artwork to express an emotion? 51 00:06:33,360 --> 00:06:50,340 What is it for music to be sad? For example, and the other question is, what is it for us to experience a work of art as expressive of emotion? 52 00:06:50,340 --> 00:06:59,380 What is it for us to experience a piece of music that said. 53 00:06:59,380 --> 00:07:03,970 Now, obviously, these are very closely related questions, 54 00:07:03,970 --> 00:07:09,930 but I think it's important to keep this distinction straight in your mind and when you're reading the material on expression, 55 00:07:09,930 --> 00:07:17,590 the philosophical literature on this, to remind yourself of whether the writer at any given point is trying to answer the first 56 00:07:17,590 --> 00:07:22,960 question about what it is for something for a piece of music to be said or the second question, 57 00:07:22,960 --> 00:07:28,090 what it is for us to experience it. As I said, as I mentioned, not all theory is attempt to answer both. 58 00:07:28,090 --> 00:07:34,650 Some focus on one. Some focus on the other. And some do give answers to both. 59 00:07:34,650 --> 00:07:53,660 OK. Now. Now, it's important to stress there's a really enormous range of theories of expression and aesthetics, particularly at the moment. 60 00:07:53,660 --> 00:08:02,120 And so I've selected a few of the most prominent ones next term in my lectures on metaphore. 61 00:08:02,120 --> 00:08:08,060 I'm going to be discussing some other ones that I won't be discussing today on the back of your handout. 62 00:08:08,060 --> 00:08:12,230 I've given some references to readings that you can take a look at. 63 00:08:12,230 --> 00:08:22,160 And the last two groups of readings are really relevant to theories that I won't be discussing today. 64 00:08:22,160 --> 00:08:27,470 This is this is an area that is very messy. And it's interesting if you talk to people working in this area, 65 00:08:27,470 --> 00:08:31,790 it's one of those unusual areas of philosophy where they're sort of willing to admit that they 66 00:08:31,790 --> 00:08:36,980 really don't know whether any progress has made and how any progress is going to be made. 67 00:08:36,980 --> 00:08:44,840 Some are willing to admit that or to say that. So if you're confused, you're not alone. 68 00:08:44,840 --> 00:08:53,540 So it's worth, I think, beginning with what I've called the clarification theory of expression on the handout. 69 00:08:53,540 --> 00:09:01,940 So this view of expression was presented by Robin Collingwood early in the 20th century. 70 00:09:01,940 --> 00:09:11,810 And Collingwood claims that to express an emotion is to make clear what emotion one is feeling. 71 00:09:11,810 --> 00:09:23,240 So Collingwood observes that we are often burdened by emotions whose nature is unclear to us. 72 00:09:23,240 --> 00:09:32,120 And clarifying what we are feeling removes this sense of burden or this oppressive sense to the emotion. 73 00:09:32,120 --> 00:09:39,450 And that's what Collingwood thinks artists do when they express emotions. 74 00:09:39,450 --> 00:09:45,360 But a further point is that when an artist so in composing something, sculpting something, 75 00:09:45,360 --> 00:09:55,920 painting something, when an artist clarifies their emotion by expressing it, the emotion is transformed. 76 00:09:55,920 --> 00:10:07,170 So it's not a matter, in his view of of the artist finding a medium to fit a pre-existing inchoate emotion. 77 00:10:07,170 --> 00:10:12,210 But in trying to clarify one's inchoate in definite emotions. 78 00:10:12,210 --> 00:10:25,440 One transforms the emotion along the way. And this is an important claim for him because he thinks from this it follows that the 79 00:10:25,440 --> 00:10:38,440 emotion expressed cannot be specified independently of the medium in which it is expressed. 80 00:10:38,440 --> 00:10:43,840 So you can't say what emotion has been expressed without reference to the particular 81 00:10:43,840 --> 00:10:50,590 medium in which it is expressed a particular form that the expression of its took. 82 00:10:50,590 --> 00:11:01,910 And that's because that process of clarifying it transformed it into a distinct emotion. 83 00:11:01,910 --> 00:11:13,010 This is supposed to be a virtue of Collingwood's theory because this is supposed to explain the sense in which form and content are inseparable. 84 00:11:13,010 --> 00:11:21,860 It's often claimed about works of art, that form in which the ideas are presented or the emotions express is not 85 00:11:21,860 --> 00:11:26,810 simply a vehicle that could be easily discarded in favour of some other form, 86 00:11:26,810 --> 00:11:32,210 but that form and content in some sense or other are inseparable united. 87 00:11:32,210 --> 00:11:39,080 And in Collingwood's view, this explains one way in which that is so. 88 00:11:39,080 --> 00:11:52,080 A further implication he draws from this is that unlike the description of emotion, expression makes it clear how the art emotion differs from others. 89 00:11:52,080 --> 00:12:02,550 So, as Collingwood puts it, description generalises. So if you categorise your emotion as sadness, you indicate how it's similar to other emotions. 90 00:12:02,550 --> 00:12:10,770 Put it in the same category as other emotions. Whereas expression individualise is particularise is it? 91 00:12:10,770 --> 00:12:19,680 And that's because of this tie between the emotion expressed and the particular medium in which it is expressed. 92 00:12:19,680 --> 00:12:30,790 The form of expression. And he thinks another thing, that this aspect of history. 93 00:12:30,790 --> 00:12:36,610 One thing, this aspect of this theory explains is why. 94 00:12:36,610 --> 00:12:40,680 Just describing your emotions makes, for example, for bad poetry. 95 00:12:40,680 --> 00:12:45,730 You're saying I am sad today or literal statements of emotion like that. 96 00:12:45,730 --> 00:12:51,220 Collingwood thinks it's pretty theoretically obvious that that's not very satisfactory. 97 00:12:51,220 --> 00:12:55,720 And this explains why that's merely describing rather than expressing. 98 00:12:55,720 --> 00:13:04,800 That's categorising and generalising rather than individualising and particular rousing. 99 00:13:04,800 --> 00:13:09,780 Now, there's a lot of controversy. 100 00:13:09,780 --> 00:13:15,450 Well, love objections, I should say, about Collingwood's views. 101 00:13:15,450 --> 00:13:25,920 One question obviously that immediately arises about this is in what sense is the artist discovering the nature of the original indefinite emotion? 102 00:13:25,920 --> 00:13:34,940 If that emotion is actually transformed into something different in the course of it's being expressed? 103 00:13:34,940 --> 00:13:38,930 It seems like if we're clear about anything, we're clear about the new emotion, 104 00:13:38,930 --> 00:13:47,100 that the indefinite emotion has been transformed into rather than the original one. 105 00:13:47,100 --> 00:13:56,520 But another concern is that it would seem to follow from Collingwood's view that, for example, 106 00:13:56,520 --> 00:14:07,570 music could not be sad unless it was produced by somebody clarifying a sadness that they were feeling. 107 00:14:07,570 --> 00:14:14,830 And that just seems wrong. We wouldn't say, OK, well, that piece of music is not sad if we were to discover that it was not produced by 108 00:14:14,830 --> 00:14:21,700 somebody clarifying an indefinite feeling of sadness that they'd been feeling. 109 00:14:21,700 --> 00:14:25,810 Now, of course, one way in which you might try and repair this is to say, well, 110 00:14:25,810 --> 00:14:35,740 calling was just presenting a theory of what it is to express particular occurrences of emotions rather than kinds of emotion. 111 00:14:35,740 --> 00:14:41,830 But it's not clear for me, to me, at least from reading Collingwood's text, whether that's consistent with what he says. 112 00:14:41,830 --> 00:14:51,190 He says he's setting out to explain what people are talking about when they talk about arts being associated with expression. 113 00:14:51,190 --> 00:15:00,920 So he pitches it in certain ways that I don't think leave this way of getting off the hook available to him. 114 00:15:00,920 --> 00:15:09,310 OK. Now, I think another natural view, if you ask somebody what it is for a piece of music to be sad. 115 00:15:09,310 --> 00:15:17,500 One answer I think you're likely to get is that what it is for a piece of music to be sad is for it's to make people sad, 116 00:15:17,500 --> 00:15:26,770 to be such as to make people cry or otherwise feel something related to sadness. 117 00:15:26,770 --> 00:15:32,590 And variations on this view are what are known as arousal, theories of expression. 118 00:15:32,590 --> 00:15:38,200 And these are often just mentioned just to be knocked down again. 119 00:15:38,200 --> 00:15:50,580 So the kind of crudest version of it, the emotion expressed by a piece of music is just the emotion that it arouses in its listeners. 120 00:15:50,580 --> 00:15:58,500 And sort of textbook objection to this is, well, you can get something that expresses grief but doesn't cause us to feel grief. 121 00:15:58,500 --> 00:16:12,470 It might cause us to feel tender hearted or sympathetic in response to it rather than actually feeling grief. 122 00:16:12,470 --> 00:16:20,390 A recent defence of the arousal theory tries to get around these problems that's offered by Derek Travers, 123 00:16:20,390 --> 00:16:24,730 and I've given the reference to his book on the back of the hand out there. 124 00:16:24,730 --> 00:16:31,570 And I'll just describe his theory in brief before moving on to the next part. 125 00:16:31,570 --> 00:16:43,690 So according to the Travaris, a more plausible version of the arousal theory is to say not that the emotion expressed is the emotion that it arouses, 126 00:16:43,690 --> 00:16:51,610 but rather that we ought to distinguish, as is standard in the philosophy of emotion between emotions and feelings. 127 00:16:51,610 --> 00:17:02,140 So feelings are just one component of emotions. Another component is a representational component, such as a thought or belief. 128 00:17:02,140 --> 00:17:07,070 So fear, for example, is an emotion involving a representation of danger. 129 00:17:07,070 --> 00:17:17,350 So maybe the belief that you're in danger and a feeling in response to that represents a danger. 130 00:17:17,350 --> 00:17:30,640 And so in my travels, this view, a work of art, expresses an emotion e if it arouses a feeling in a qualified listener under normal conditions, 131 00:17:30,640 --> 00:17:40,500 and that feeling is an aspect of an appropriate reaction to a person expressing E! 132 00:17:40,500 --> 00:17:49,210 So in the case of the grief example that I mentioned just now. 133 00:17:49,210 --> 00:17:56,050 Part of what makes it the case on the Travaris is a view that a work of art expresses grief is that its such as to arouse 134 00:17:56,050 --> 00:18:07,900 in a qualified listener a feeling that would be part of an appropriate reaction to real expression of grief in a person. 135 00:18:07,900 --> 00:18:20,560 So tender heartedness might be an example that you point to the feelings of the listener, namely the qualified listener, rather than their emotions. 136 00:18:20,560 --> 00:18:30,250 And you ask, are those feelings part of what would be an appropriate reaction to a Real-Life expression of that emotion? 137 00:18:30,250 --> 00:18:40,870 And on this version of the arousal theory that gets around. According to the Travaris, many of the standard objections to it. 138 00:18:40,870 --> 00:18:47,890 However, I think it's fair to say at the moment, 139 00:18:47,890 --> 00:18:57,160 one of the largest families of theories of expression are what we might describe as resemblance, theories of expression. 140 00:18:57,160 --> 00:19:02,380 There's a number of forms. This can take, as I indicated there, on the handout. 141 00:19:02,380 --> 00:19:15,340 According to one of them, for work to express that emotion is for it to resemble that emotion itself in various respects. 142 00:19:15,340 --> 00:19:30,510 So in Carol Pratts well known slogan, music sounds as emotions feel. 143 00:19:30,510 --> 00:19:43,030 And Malcolm Budd has recently defended a version of this view in his book, Values of Art, and on Bud's version of this view. 144 00:19:43,030 --> 00:19:47,410 I should say he describes this as the basic and minimal concept of expression. 145 00:19:47,410 --> 00:19:54,550 He doesn't think that we should regard expression as an entirely unitary phenomenon. 146 00:19:54,550 --> 00:19:59,950 But he thinks this is one of the most basic aspects of this phenomenon. 147 00:19:59,950 --> 00:20:10,960 This resemblance to emotion. And specifically, he argues that for a piece of music to be expressive of an emotion is for its to be correct to hear it 148 00:20:10,960 --> 00:20:20,110 as sounding like the way that emotion feels or as experienced or for a full appreciation of the music. 149 00:20:20,110 --> 00:20:36,170 To require this. And so naturally, natural question is, well, how is it possible for a piece of music to resemble a feeling, 150 00:20:36,170 --> 00:20:48,970 to resemble an emotion in respect of the feeling? Well, Bud begins by indicating a number of the kinds of feelings that can be components of emotions. 151 00:20:48,970 --> 00:20:54,010 So a number of the examples he gives are felt to desire and aversion. 152 00:20:54,010 --> 00:21:01,330 This is a feeling that is a component of such emotions as envy, disgust, shame. 153 00:21:01,330 --> 00:21:13,060 So, too, a feeling of distress in an emotion like fear or grief, feeling of pleasure and emotions like joy, amusement or pride. 154 00:21:13,060 --> 00:21:22,600 And, of course, displeasure as well, especially the frustration of desire in emotions such as anger. 155 00:21:22,600 --> 00:21:27,250 So bearing in mind the kinds of feelings that are components of emotions, 156 00:21:27,250 --> 00:21:38,320 but says there's a natural correspondence between certain aspects of music and the feeling component of emotions. 157 00:21:38,320 --> 00:21:41,170 For example, often in a piece of music, 158 00:21:41,170 --> 00:21:51,190 there'll be a transition from sounds that require a kind of resolution to sounds that don't require a kind of resolution. 159 00:21:51,190 --> 00:22:04,090 This, but says is resemblance resembles the way in which there are in our mental life transitions from states of desire to states of satisfaction, 160 00:22:04,090 --> 00:22:14,530 or again, from states of tension to states of release and emotions that are characterised by feelings like this or emotional experiences that 161 00:22:14,530 --> 00:22:24,400 are characterised by transitions of such feelings can be expressed by pieces of music that have these sound properties of this kind. 162 00:22:24,400 --> 00:22:34,120 Another example he gives in filling out theory is two points to pitch rises in pitch. 163 00:22:34,120 --> 00:22:37,780 Falling melodies. This sort of thing. 164 00:22:37,780 --> 00:22:51,320 And he, like a number of authors on this topic, has argued that the dimension of pitch is like the vertical dimension of space. 165 00:22:51,320 --> 00:22:58,130 And therefore, there is a resemblance between successions of notes, of different pitch, 166 00:22:58,130 --> 00:23:09,410 duration and emphasis and upwards and downwards movements of various magnitudes or speeds. 167 00:23:09,410 --> 00:23:21,710 And what this makes possible is a resemblance between changes of pitch and feelings of movement that are intrinsic to certain emotions, 168 00:23:21,710 --> 00:23:29,380 such as acute anxiety, the feeling of the body trembling. For example. 169 00:23:29,380 --> 00:23:40,150 So changes the pitch. Another way in which sounds can resemble emotions in respect of the feeling, component of the emotion. 170 00:23:40,150 --> 00:23:46,600 So to strength of musical pulse or a degree of musical movement, 171 00:23:46,600 --> 00:24:00,780 on the one hand betokens a certain level of energy and therefore can resemble the felt energy in certain kinds of emotion. 172 00:24:00,780 --> 00:24:06,990 This is the sort of picture he has in mind to make this resemblance theory plausible. 173 00:24:06,990 --> 00:24:13,050 But apart from the examples he gives and the filling out of the picture, 174 00:24:13,050 --> 00:24:21,150 one thing a number of things he thinks count in favour of it are what it explains various mysterious aspects of our experience of music. 175 00:24:21,150 --> 00:24:23,100 He takes to be explained by this view. 176 00:24:23,100 --> 00:24:32,610 So one thing is that explains how it's possible to hear music as expressive of different emotions at one and the same time. 177 00:24:32,610 --> 00:24:44,180 Explain this, because it's possible for the same piece of music to resemble different emotions at one in the same time in respect of their feeling. 178 00:24:44,180 --> 00:24:52,820 And likewise, it explains what's true and the thought that in music we directly perceive the inner life of an emotion. 179 00:24:52,820 --> 00:24:57,210 So it's not a sort of inferential thing in our experience of music. 180 00:24:57,210 --> 00:25:05,820 We're tempted at least to say that we directly experience on emotion. 181 00:25:05,820 --> 00:25:07,950 And this is explained by the fact that, well, 182 00:25:07,950 --> 00:25:17,810 expressiveness is a function of resemblance to a feeling rather than to a manifestation of a feeling in, say, behaviour or facial expression. 183 00:25:17,810 --> 00:25:22,080 It accounts for this directness component. 184 00:25:22,080 --> 00:25:31,680 And likewise, he thinks it explains why there are great limitations actually on music's capacity to express emotions. 185 00:25:31,680 --> 00:25:40,680 So we tend to use actually rather general terms when we describe the kinds of emotions that a passage expresses. 186 00:25:40,680 --> 00:25:49,760 So joy, melancholy grief, things like this. 187 00:25:49,760 --> 00:25:58,730 It's an interesting question, how specific an emotion or an experience could a piece of music express something like disappointment? 188 00:25:58,730 --> 00:26:07,840 For example, doesn't immediately spring to mind how a piece of music might express that. 189 00:26:07,840 --> 00:26:09,770 But regardless of where we draw the line, 190 00:26:09,770 --> 00:26:20,840 there does seem to be a certain limitation on the extent to which music can express the full specificity, the rich variety of emotions. 191 00:26:20,840 --> 00:26:29,420 And Bud thinks that his view helps to explain that, because in his view, it's a resemblance to the feeling component of the emotion, 192 00:26:29,420 --> 00:26:41,150 not a resemblance to, say, the content of the belief or thought associated with the emotion constitutive of the emotion or the content of the desire. 193 00:26:41,150 --> 00:26:50,540 If a desire is a constituent of the emotion, it can only resemble it in certain respects, in the respect of its feeling. 194 00:26:50,540 --> 00:27:00,680 And that explains why its capacity to express is limited in the ways that have been observed. 195 00:27:00,680 --> 00:27:05,410 OK. So now a number of objections have been raised. Bud's view as well. 196 00:27:05,410 --> 00:27:20,280 Of course, Roger Scruton adapting an objection that Nelson Goodman originally made to resemblance theories of pictorial representation. 197 00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:28,960 Says while music resembles a great many other things more than it resembles emotions. 198 00:27:28,960 --> 00:27:37,660 And the implication seems to be, as it is in Goodmans analagous objection, why then doesn't express those? 199 00:27:37,660 --> 00:27:44,740 Why then doesn't it express those other things? 200 00:27:44,740 --> 00:27:57,340 Now, I think Bud has an answer to this, although it might well need to be filled out, so it just raises another question, namely that on his view, 201 00:27:57,340 --> 00:28:09,430 the view is not just that it expresses something in virtue of resembling a feeling, but because it's correct to hear it as resembling a feeling. 202 00:28:09,430 --> 00:28:13,810 So I think he can give that as an answer to this objection. 203 00:28:13,810 --> 00:28:23,510 But of course, that then does raise the question what makes it correct to hear it as resembling a feeling? 204 00:28:23,510 --> 00:28:32,510 So you might want further clarification of that, Scruton also raises another point, 205 00:28:32,510 --> 00:28:47,630 and that is that expression is a kind of success in art, successful expression, something that makes artworks aesthetically valuable. 206 00:28:47,630 --> 00:28:56,690 And so preceding it is to become, as he puts it, aesthetically affected by the work of art. 207 00:28:56,690 --> 00:29:05,750 And this doesn't seem to be the case for perceiving resemblances between sounds and feelings. 208 00:29:05,750 --> 00:29:17,380 You could observe that. I guess there is a resemblance point of likeness between this piece of music and some feeling, but not care. 209 00:29:17,380 --> 00:29:24,310 It might not be interesting. You might not be affected or be involved with it. 210 00:29:24,310 --> 00:29:30,230 That, Scruton thinks, is a big problem for any such theory of expression. 211 00:29:30,230 --> 00:29:38,390 If it's possible to perceive the property they've identified with expressiveness without feeling aesthetically involved with it, 212 00:29:38,390 --> 00:29:49,060 then that counts against the claim very strongly that they've identified a property that's identical with expressiveness. 213 00:29:49,060 --> 00:30:00,880 OK. Well, one transition or one variation on these resemblance there is is to say was not a resemblance to the emotion itself, 214 00:30:00,880 --> 00:30:13,150 but to other kinds of manifestation of this emotion, in particular vocal or behavioural manifestations or expressions of this emotion in people. 215 00:30:13,150 --> 00:30:25,180 There's something attractive about the idea that we should tie what it is for music to be expressive, to what it is for behaviour to express emotions. 216 00:30:25,180 --> 00:30:35,080 And that is a theory of that kind is part of Peter Kibbitz theory of musical expression. 217 00:30:35,080 --> 00:30:39,790 And so, in Kinney's view, at least in many cases, 218 00:30:39,790 --> 00:30:48,780 for music to be expressive of sadness is for the music to resemble behavioural expressions of sadness. 219 00:30:48,780 --> 00:30:59,220 And and this is an important qualification for us to be strongly inclined to hear the music as a kind of behaviour. 220 00:30:59,220 --> 00:31:06,270 And I'll explain why he adds that qualification. In a moment. 221 00:31:06,270 --> 00:31:13,330 But first of all. OK, well, we want to know what kinds of resemblance can there be between music on the one 222 00:31:13,330 --> 00:31:20,500 hand and behavioural or vocal expressions of emotion in human beings on the other? 223 00:31:20,500 --> 00:31:27,070 Well, you points, amongst other things, to the example of rhythm. So rhythm on Kibbie gives. 224 00:31:27,070 --> 00:31:36,130 You can enable music to be expressive of emotions by resembling the speed of movements that express those emotions. 225 00:31:36,130 --> 00:31:44,050 So fast moving rhythm can express excitement, excited emotions. 226 00:31:44,050 --> 00:31:56,770 And that's in virtue of a resemblance between the speed of the rhythm and the speed of certain kinds of behavioural expressions of excitement, 227 00:31:56,770 --> 00:32:04,500 movements in particular. Rhythm seems to be one example on give his view. 228 00:32:04,500 --> 00:32:11,460 Another example is, again, the rising and falling of pitch. 229 00:32:11,460 --> 00:32:14,040 So as we saw with Bud, 230 00:32:14,040 --> 00:32:26,160 Kivi also appeals to the notion that increases in pitch and decrease and falling of pitch betoken an increase or decrease in energy. 231 00:32:26,160 --> 00:32:33,780 And this makes them like movements in which energy is required to raise your limbs. 232 00:32:33,780 --> 00:32:38,820 Or conversely, if you have droopy shoulders, posture, 233 00:32:38,820 --> 00:32:51,180 hanging your head low in an expression of sadness that involves less energy, letting the gravity sort of work on you. 234 00:32:51,180 --> 00:33:02,150 And that's why these sort of falling melodies can be expressive of sadness on Kevin's view, in many cases at least. 235 00:33:02,150 --> 00:33:08,790 So apart from these examples, what does Kivi offer in support of this claim? 236 00:33:08,790 --> 00:33:20,520 Well, he thinks that it provides a more unified account of expressive phenomena in general, not just in the arts, but in other areas. 237 00:33:20,520 --> 00:33:30,480 So the first point he makes is that sad music is in the way he puts it, expressive of sadness, but does not necessarily express sadness. 238 00:33:30,480 --> 00:33:40,170 So that, again, that distinction between what I put by saying sad music can express a kind of 239 00:33:40,170 --> 00:33:45,870 emotion without necessarily expressing a particular occurrence of that emotion. 240 00:33:45,870 --> 00:33:55,850 Cavey puts it by saying sad music is expressive of sadness without necessarily expressing sadness. 241 00:33:55,850 --> 00:34:06,200 And he says, well, what happens in other cases where we have this, where we have something that is expressive of sadness but doesn't express sadness? 242 00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:15,920 Kivi gives the example of St. Bernard's sad looking face dog's face, as big as we've put it, hangdog expression on it. 243 00:34:15,920 --> 00:34:25,790 And he looks sad. He says it's quite obvious why the St. Bernard's face is expressive of sadness. 244 00:34:25,790 --> 00:34:38,550 Namely, it resembles certain things that express sadness, namely human faces that express sadness. 245 00:34:38,550 --> 00:34:51,280 So St. Bernard. Not necessarily sad and probably not expressing it by his expression ever, but nevertheless it's expressive of sadness. 246 00:34:51,280 --> 00:34:59,550 And that's because of a resemblance to genuine expressions of sadness. 247 00:34:59,550 --> 00:35:09,300 So if music is like that, then we have more unified account of expressive phenomena in general. 248 00:35:09,300 --> 00:35:21,450 However, and this was the important qualification, resemblance to sad gestures, behaviour, so forth, 249 00:35:21,450 --> 00:35:31,440 can't be enough because of the points that I mentioned with reference to Scruton derived from Goodman, 250 00:35:31,440 --> 00:35:39,740 namely, music resembles loads of things that it does not express. 251 00:35:39,740 --> 00:35:52,780 So he says what else is needed is that we're strongly inclined to hear it as a kind of behaviour or as an utterance or as a gesture. 252 00:35:52,780 --> 00:36:05,030 So Kivi says it's a well-established fact that we have a natural tendency to animate things that we see or perceive. 253 00:36:05,030 --> 00:36:09,120 St. Bernard's faith is a good example. Suppose it's already animate. 254 00:36:09,120 --> 00:36:22,460 We're humanising it there. The Kivi gives other examples in which, for example, we might see a spoon as a person or a stick as a snake. 255 00:36:22,460 --> 00:36:29,470 And he says not only is it obvious that we do this, they're quite good, obvious evolutionary advantages to doing this. 256 00:36:29,470 --> 00:36:33,310 If you're just generally inclined to see things as animate, 257 00:36:33,310 --> 00:36:41,040 then that gives you a better chance of getting away from dangerous things that are animate. 258 00:36:41,040 --> 00:36:46,800 In the struggle for survival. So we have this general tendency anyway. 259 00:36:46,800 --> 00:36:52,530 And he thinks there's independent evidence that we also animate our perceptions of music. 260 00:36:52,530 --> 00:37:03,780 So, for example, we describe parts in polyphony as voices or polyphonic compositions as voices. 261 00:37:03,780 --> 00:37:13,740 Themes in music are often called gestures. Fugues are called statements that are answered cetra. 262 00:37:13,740 --> 00:37:20,580 So he thinks his account of expressiveness is of a piece with what we're obviously doing anyway in cases of music, 263 00:37:20,580 --> 00:37:29,310 that we're if we're hearing it as behaviour and it resembles a certain kind of behaviour that expresses an emotion, 264 00:37:29,310 --> 00:37:39,880 then that's what enables it to be expressive of that emotion. 265 00:37:39,880 --> 00:37:47,440 Now, Scruton, again has various objections to theories of this kind and to Kivi in particular, 266 00:37:47,440 --> 00:37:54,220 he attacked some of Kev's examples, such as the stock of movement. 267 00:37:54,220 --> 00:38:01,180 I'm not sure if this is quite a fair criticism of what Kivi says, but scrutinise stresses that you have. 268 00:38:01,180 --> 00:38:12,890 You can't talk about music literally moving. There's no literal resemblance between musical movement and bodily movement. 269 00:38:12,890 --> 00:38:16,720 And part of the reason I don't think that's quite fair is that Kivi stresses the point of 270 00:38:16,720 --> 00:38:24,160 resemblance is the amount of energy manifested in musical movement and in bodily movement. 271 00:38:24,160 --> 00:38:31,850 Point of resemblance is not the movement. That's the energy involved. 272 00:38:31,850 --> 00:38:41,030 But it's worth reading Scruton discussion in his book, The Aesthetics of Music. So on the back of your hand. 273 00:38:41,030 --> 00:38:49,580 OK. So that's Kev's version of Resemblance Theory. Now, he doesn't think this is can explain all expressiveness in music. 274 00:38:49,580 --> 00:38:54,020 He thinks we also have to appeal to conventional associations with emotions. 275 00:38:54,020 --> 00:39:00,890 So he thinks the minor key. For example, it tends to express sad emotions. 276 00:39:00,890 --> 00:39:05,470 And likewise, the major key to express cheerful, positive emotions. 277 00:39:05,470 --> 00:39:12,230 And he doesn't think this can be explained by a resemblance between the minor key and behavioural expressions of emotions. 278 00:39:12,230 --> 00:39:17,330 He thinks here we simply have to appeal to a conventional association that we have 279 00:39:17,330 --> 00:39:24,140 established between certain features of music like the minor key and certain emotions. 280 00:39:24,140 --> 00:39:35,920 And he has an account of how these conventional aspects and these resemblance aspects interact in a piece of music to create expressiveness. 281 00:39:35,920 --> 00:39:42,110 But that's all I'll say about the convention. Theories of expressiveness. 282 00:39:42,110 --> 00:39:47,480 The last one that I'd like to take a look at is Gerald Levinson's view. 283 00:39:47,480 --> 00:39:56,990 Levinson essentially says in response to Kivi, you don't need resemblance to account for expressiveness. 284 00:39:56,990 --> 00:40:12,640 All you need is that second part of Carvey's resemblance theory, namely that you can hear it as a piece of behaviour that expresses an emotion. 285 00:40:12,640 --> 00:40:19,210 And more specifically, his in its most recent version. 286 00:40:19,210 --> 00:40:25,840 His view is for a passage of music to be expressive of an emotion is for it's to be readily heard 287 00:40:25,840 --> 00:40:34,000 in its proper context by listener experienced in the genre as an expression of that emotion. 288 00:40:34,000 --> 00:40:40,510 So a bit similar to Hume's account of true critics. 289 00:40:40,510 --> 00:40:51,580 It's done with reference to experienced listeners. Someone who knows about the genre and has a certain level of musical understanding and competence. 290 00:40:51,580 --> 00:40:59,500 It's readily heard by such a person in its proper context as a behavioural expression, a gesture, for example. 291 00:40:59,500 --> 00:41:07,420 Then that's what it is for. It's to be expressive of that kind of emotion. 292 00:41:07,420 --> 00:41:15,580 So he and he has a certain story of what it is to hear something as a gesture, as an expression of an emotion. 293 00:41:15,580 --> 00:41:26,560 He thinks that we have to hear music as gestures and in particular, we have to hear or imagine in the music a persona. 294 00:41:26,560 --> 00:41:32,260 And he says this on the grounds that you can't have expression without an express her. 295 00:41:32,260 --> 00:41:43,420 So if you're going to hear music as expression, you have to imagine at least a very indefinite persona within the music. 296 00:41:43,420 --> 00:41:48,550 And so to the point of saying that you have to hear a gesture in the music is on 297 00:41:48,550 --> 00:41:55,300 the grounds that the primary vehicle of expression is gesture broadly understood. 298 00:41:55,300 --> 00:42:03,700 And so he thinks this view commits us to saying that we're hearing these things in the music or imagining them in the music. 299 00:42:03,700 --> 00:42:06,430 Now, Levinson's argument for this view is rather long, 300 00:42:06,430 --> 00:42:17,050 and it's partly based on an elimination of other theories and on account of the desirable features that theory of expressiveness should have. 301 00:42:17,050 --> 00:42:27,640 And if you're interested in looking at this, the place to look to begin with is his paper musical expressiveness on the back of the hand out there. 302 00:42:27,640 --> 00:42:34,930 One controversial feature of this view, of course, is whether it really gets the experience right. 303 00:42:34,930 --> 00:42:47,410 So the objection is that competent listeners don't seem to at least always be imagining a persona in the music or a gesture in the music. 304 00:42:47,410 --> 00:43:00,730 Seems like Levinson were right. The experience of hearing sadness and music would be a lot different than it is to involve imagining these personas. 305 00:43:00,730 --> 00:43:06,390 Levinson's reply to that. 306 00:43:06,390 --> 00:43:19,320 I'm not sure I entirely follow this, but his replies that one may not always notice or acknowledge what is presupposed by one's hearing or imagining. 307 00:43:19,320 --> 00:43:26,970 So you hear the expression and the music that presupposes a persona. 308 00:43:26,970 --> 00:43:35,280 Since an expression requires and express her. But of course, what's presupposed by what you imagine may not itself be noticed or acknowledge. 309 00:43:35,280 --> 00:43:46,680 So Levinson says, I'd have to think about it a little bit more, but I'm not really sure that works or much more to the point. 310 00:43:46,680 --> 00:43:51,390 I'm not really sure I understand it entirely. 311 00:43:51,390 --> 00:44:04,920 OK, so these this is, I hope, sufficient to give you a flavour of this debate and quite how various are the theories that have been offered. 312 00:44:04,920 --> 00:44:09,720 And as I say, I certainly have not presented an exhaustive account of them. 313 00:44:09,720 --> 00:44:18,750 Other theories worth just mentioning are include Richard Vole Hymes theory of perception as as of expressiveness, 314 00:44:18,750 --> 00:44:28,680 the perception of what he calls correspondences. And I've given references to you there and Goodmans theory and the family of theories that draw on 315 00:44:28,680 --> 00:44:34,520 considerations about the nature of metaphore in order to clarify the nature of expressiveness. 316 00:44:34,520 --> 00:44:39,060 So a claim often made is that when we say the music is sad, we're using a metaphor, 317 00:44:39,060 --> 00:44:46,920 and that if we get clear on what metaphor is involved, then we can get clear on what musical expression involves. 318 00:44:46,920 --> 00:44:51,060 As I say, I'm going to discuss those next term in my lectures on metaphor. 319 00:44:51,060 --> 00:44:59,630 I'm not going to do that here, but I'd like to conclude by discussing a little bit about the value of expression. 320 00:44:59,630 --> 00:45:09,360 So remember, perhaps in the first lecture on Plato, when you're talking about what it is that makes the arts valuable? 321 00:45:09,360 --> 00:45:17,400 One of the alternatives that was mentioned was the possibility that it's the fact that they can express things 322 00:45:17,400 --> 00:45:25,290 that other things can't or can express things in a particularly clear or vivid way that other things cannot. 323 00:45:25,290 --> 00:45:36,720 And this is certainly one thing that has been offered to explain why music is so valuable is to appeal to its expressive power. 324 00:45:36,720 --> 00:45:46,290 Now, Tolstoy, for example, held that music can infect us with the emotion. 325 00:45:46,290 --> 00:46:00,330 I think that's the term he uses. It can cause us to feel the emotion that it expresses and by expressing feelings that are worth having. 326 00:46:00,330 --> 00:46:04,440 And to the extent that they're worth having, then the expressiveness is valuable. 327 00:46:04,440 --> 00:46:19,330 So that's why expressive music can be valuable music. It's because it can cause us to have experiences that are valuable experiences to have. 328 00:46:19,330 --> 00:46:29,670 Now, Bud, who has a particularly subtle discussion of the value of expressiveness in values of art. 329 00:46:29,670 --> 00:46:37,710 It says that, well, at least on Tolstoy's view, it seems like it's possible to get the valuable feeling without the work of art. 330 00:46:37,710 --> 00:46:46,170 Because on Tolstoy's view, the artist felt at first created a medium in which to transmit it. 331 00:46:46,170 --> 00:46:51,120 And then ideally, the audience then felt it. 332 00:46:51,120 --> 00:47:00,210 But if it's possible to have the valuable feeling without the work of art, then explaining art's value in these terms implies that, 333 00:47:00,210 --> 00:47:05,880 at least in principle, if not in practise, the work of art is dispensable. 334 00:47:05,880 --> 00:47:12,210 The work of art is just an instrument to producing this feeling. 335 00:47:12,210 --> 00:47:24,780 But moreover. In principle instrument because you could get the valuable feeling without the work of art and on Budd's view, 336 00:47:24,780 --> 00:47:36,150 any adequate account of the value of works of art like pieces of music ought not to imply that if we could get that experience in some other way, 337 00:47:36,150 --> 00:47:45,870 then we could get rid of the work of art and get it in the other way that we'd have no special reason to experience that work of art. 338 00:47:45,870 --> 00:47:52,380 And it does seem that Tolstoy's version of the expression theory has that implication. 339 00:47:52,380 --> 00:47:58,980 Another possibility is the specificity with which works of art can express emotions. 340 00:47:58,980 --> 00:48:06,720 So sometimes in the literature on this, there's a passage from a letter by the composer Felix Mendelssohn, 341 00:48:06,720 --> 00:48:18,930 in which he talks about pieces of music expressing feelings that are too definite for other things to express. 342 00:48:18,930 --> 00:48:23,970 Music can express feelings of highly specific kinds. 343 00:48:23,970 --> 00:48:31,380 And part of the motivation for this is just the thought that, well, there is a sense in which two works of art can express the same feeling. 344 00:48:31,380 --> 00:48:40,650 Namely, they can both express sadness or melancholy. But these are, as I mentioned earlier, very, very general kinds. 345 00:48:40,650 --> 00:48:50,080 It's not possible for two works to express the very same specific kind of sadness that the other does. 346 00:48:50,080 --> 00:49:02,670 It would be very implausible to think so. The argument goes that the very same specific kind of sadness in one work could be expressed in another. 347 00:49:02,670 --> 00:49:13,010 And some people add, furthermore, works of music can express things that language cannot, at least non poetic language cannot. 348 00:49:13,010 --> 00:49:18,990 Now, Budd's comment on this is that at least if you, 349 00:49:18,990 --> 00:49:24,000 by his account of resemblance at as the basis of expressiveness and resemblance 350 00:49:24,000 --> 00:49:29,460 in particular to feeling abundant of emotion as the basis of his expressiveness, 351 00:49:29,460 --> 00:49:38,880 then it doesn't seem to follow that two works of art, or even to be plausible, the two works of art can't express the same specific kind of emotions. 352 00:49:38,880 --> 00:49:50,160 So not all aspects of a work of art are relevant to its resembling or cause it to resemble a on emotion or the emotion that it expresses. 353 00:49:50,160 --> 00:49:55,890 So you might play a different work with a different instrument, 354 00:49:55,890 --> 00:50:02,160 but you might have the kinds of resemblances that Budd's points out, even with, say, a different instrument, a different vehicle. 355 00:50:02,160 --> 00:50:09,090 Otherwise, the falling and rising of pitch, for example, Bud's own view. 356 00:50:09,090 --> 00:50:18,420 This is the third one on the handout. Is that part of the reason why expressiveness is valuable when it's valuable? 357 00:50:18,420 --> 00:50:28,530 Is that music of that kind can enable us to experience either imaginatively or really the emotional states that it expresses in a peculiarly vivid, 358 00:50:28,530 --> 00:50:32,400 satisfying and poignant form. 359 00:50:32,400 --> 00:50:44,840 And what and what he means by that is in first place, we can use the music to imagine emotions much more vividly than we would be able to unaided. 360 00:50:44,840 --> 00:50:49,290 So if we let our imaginings of the emotion be guided by the music, for example, 361 00:50:49,290 --> 00:50:58,680 if we imagine the music itself as an emotion developing in various ways, then our imaginings can be much more vivid than they otherwise could be. 362 00:50:58,680 --> 00:51:06,450 And so to music can present satisfying resolutions of emotional transitions. 363 00:51:06,450 --> 00:51:13,770 Things like this can create a kind of intelligible drama as it develops. 364 00:51:13,770 --> 00:51:22,980 And this can be very satisfying to have these aspects resolved in a satisfying way. 365 00:51:22,980 --> 00:51:30,450 And interestingly, he also mentions that he also argues that we can explain the value of expressiveness, 366 00:51:30,450 --> 00:51:43,800 in part by reference to the value of community. So the listener is realisation that the music experienced, that the emotion experienced, rather, 367 00:51:43,800 --> 00:51:52,350 is not his alone, but is open to others, and indeed that this emotion has been made available by someone else. 368 00:51:52,350 --> 00:52:03,720 Namely, the composer encourages a sense of community that our own private imaginings would lack. 369 00:52:03,720 --> 00:52:09,830 And this is one main reason on his view. Why expression is valuable. 370 00:52:09,830 --> 00:52:16,000 Thank you so much.