Today is the reputation of others.
Now I want to begin by saying that sense of control.
This is the really new contribution in the second edition.
Many argue that the first and second editions are really just track of each other.
But the refutation of idealism is a new edition.
It's not only a new edition, but he he takes time in the preface to the second edition to provide a gloss, just this section, which which is pivotal.
So it's a very important part of the argument. Since he takes the time to do this.
Can we agree at the outset that Kaj is not an idealist because there's a secondary who continues to charge him as one of the species of idealism?
He certainly owns up to transcendental idealism, which I get.
But there are no treatises to the effect that combat never really stopped being the Berkeley and etc., etc.
So if he's an idealist, it is as if instead of you have to get to the stern,
which with which he disappears as a result of attribution to that kind of descriptions of that time in
the last week under the the major question which he takes to be the central problem of pure reason,
namely how luxury or synthetic judgements are possible that fall off.
If they were not for your synthetic judgements, the path to scepticism would be to read, to read.
It's only in virtue of an argument that works to the effect that we are able to take the manifold of sensuous intuitions.
All of these things that converge on the organs of sense and produce enough sensations out of which appearances take place.
And these come to represent something.
Come to represent something. This is our mode of receptivity.
This is the basis upon which we have sensibility, the pure intuitions.
Space and time must be there, offering authority for us to be receptive to events in the external world.
So this is going to give rise to sensibility.
But until these sensuous intuitions are partitioned properly, subsumed properly under the pure categories, there is not an understanding.
So by way of receptivity, we are able to perceive things, but it's only by way of the categories that we are able to think things.
It's what renders objects thinkable.
So how about deploying these sensuous resources correctly under the categories?
Well, this is the task of spontaneity. It is guided by principles that he finally throws up his hands and refers to generically as mother wit.
And so we are left with this problem,
since so much of this is done by way of preordained principles over which we certainly have no conscious control.
Does this not itself lead to a kind of scepticism and subjectivity?
And the post-Katrina period is littered with treatises on the subjectivism inherent in course.
First critique. So suppose we take the position that the elements of cognition and the synthesising that
takes place are entirely of our own make and that we can never get out of the box,
we can never know things as they really are. And and we're right back to the claim that the problem of the embarrassment of
philosophy is it still can't establish the existence of an external world.
Now we can begin this with the Jay College famous method of job.
And I really have to take off. But I think Locke is actually the brains behind much of this discussion with a lot of Barkley figures
that counterpoints to direct in book to chapter page blocks essay concerning the human understanding.
BLOCK treats us to his distinction between primary and secondary qualities.
I want to read you some passages from that because continue as blog sites more frequent.
This is from book to chapter eight. We find this in Section eight.
Our ideas on the qualities of bodies whatsoever, the mind perceives in itself, or as the immediate objects of perception for our understanding.
That little idea of the power to produce an idea in our mind I call quality of the subject we're in.
That power is just previously in seven.
Ideas in the mind are no more the likeness of something existing without us.
Then the names that stand for them are the likeness of our ideas, which we have upon hearing they are out to excite in us.
So he is declaring that the ideas have no more likeness to that of which they are ideas than the names we have a sense of.
But then. Glass as a now.
It's like this. Please. Now the distinction between primary and secondary colleges.
Is thus considered dead. Bodies are first.
Such as are utterly inseparable from the body.
It must stay so ever in a big and such as in all the alterations and changes in sufferers, all the force can be used to polish.
It constantly keeps these of properties of body keeps under all conditions of alteration.
Take a grain of wheat, he says. Divided into two halves, each part still has become the primary qualities.
One is, each part still has a solidity extension, finger and mobility divide.
And again, it retains still the same qualities.
These I call original all primary qualities, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas in us,
namely the simple idea as to what solidity, extended vigour, motion or rest and number.
So his young friends of Newton need not worry about the Newtonian world talks about which is finger extension, motion and so forth.
So those are things to which we have possibly direct access sweetly.
We see those things. We experience those things. US. They are secondary qualities of bodies,
such qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but the power to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities,
i.e. by the both figurative texture and motion of their insensible parts there for particular parts to see and what comes under this setting colours,
sound, taste, etc. These are secondary qualities.
Well, my goodness. So one can't fathom.
Why would Thomas read looks of this? He refers to Locke's position.
And Descartes position on Aristotle's position boxes, positions every position as quote, the ideal theory, the ideal theory,
which says it's a theory according to which we have no contact with the objects in the external world directly,
but only by way of some sort of mental representation.
So that the only thing we can talk about is the meaning of the body or the contents of our own minds and not the external world.
Reid says Early on in my philosophical career, I tended to side with Berkeley on these matters.
Then, having stepped into a dirty kettle and banged my head frequently against a signpost,
I reluctantly came to the conclusion that there really are objects in the external world.
Very much like what I see them. Locke and Johnson Company have generated something, Reed says, which is true.
This is what's a gradient. If the ideal theory is true.
I lay my hands across my lips and become skeletal.
So Reid is going to defend a direct realism against this kind of culture as comparably agitated coastal candidates agitated.
You get the genesis of a particular reason, and Reid gets agitated that some one process worth taking on a different subject.
It's better that the telegraph. So.
What counts is two forms of scepticism arising from this tradition.
The scepticism espoused by Descartes espoused by Bach as de jure 74.
He identifies each piece clearly. What those have in common sense can't quote is the theory which declares the existence of objects
in space outside us to be merely doubtful and if demonstrable or to be false and impossible.
The former is the problematic idealism of Descartes, the latter of the dogmatic idealism,
borderline Descartes, separate things like the good dreams, but is not sure.
He frets at Berkeley, of course, to collapse the whole notion of an independently subsisting material world,
a mind independent material world, as similarly impossible.
How many of you agree with the government? No, it wasn't.
All right, let's do it then, Chris. Come on. So you think that there was a mind independent physical reality?
Physical reality, a material reality.
You know, something that makes a sound when you hit it has an odour, is visible, a yellow square.
If you use a strip of you, regardless of physical reality of all in principle, sensible properties.
There'd be something left over. What might that be?
But it's something. To which there is no attending.
Sense of mind. Something be held by no consciousness anywhere.
And nonetheless, you are prepared with the kind of epistemic fundamentalism to say, notwithstanding to the contrary,
that no mind in the imaginable cut across everything, just any aspect of this entity.
I declare without war. Nonetheless, it exists.
Oh, stop. Should be. But so far, we simply wants to end the dialogue between the pilots and.
I was a friend of. Of reason, and I listen to this material.
He simply wants to make clear to the people that, don't worry about this argument.
There are still carpets and bottles and computers carrying cases.
And so. What there isn't is a mind independent, a totally mind independent, independently existing material world.
Rather everything with real existence subsists in the attending line in some attending mind.
S. S per capita. To be is to be perceived.
Well. So the tallest mountain didn't exist when someone was there to pursue it.
How about the backside of the moon before the Apollo? Etc., etc.
Berkeley has a very capable philosopher, optics specialist, world class mathematician.
So again, it's not like they were with the network. So he people just ask questions that sort.
And on the general question, what is the archaeological status of last which no human perception has experienced or even could experience?
If it is to be to future status, it must be because it is held in some sunlight.
And what this report which says of course it is eternally held in the mind that they.
Oh, sorry about that. But your little sun, Sir Charles.
He became a bishop, having bishop unemployed. And he was later bishop because he was doing that.
As he said, it used to be terrorists.
I'm sure about. Well,
Berkeley famously dissolved the distinction between Locke's primary and
secondary qualities on the grounds that all experience is mediated accordingly.
He reached the conclusion that the notion of a mind, an independent material world, was simply incoherent.
Thus, to be is perceived.
And that's the triumphant motto of author.
Berkeley decided that what we needed was a new kind of university.
He came to America to raise money and is going to build a college and computer.
And his first child was actually born in Rhode Island.
And I've got a house there. It's a wonderful place if you ever get a chance to visit with a lot of like a bundle up to go next social.
Yes I think on of the stuff.
Had a tour guide who was trying to tell me that Farley had an interest in optics.
I was very appreciative. Now consider Descartes conclusions, which he reaches in his meditations.
He knows from experience that the effects he feels are not limited to life.
He says in the third meditation, but he will feel heat whether he wants to or not from this.
But his sensations and ideas out to them from sources other than himself.
So he is prepared to accept that. But this comes from a source of a lifetime.
So. But then dread scepticism probably sets in as we hear Jacobs say, quote, Although these apparently adventitious ideas do not depend on my will.
It does not follow that they must come from things located outside.
There may be some other faculty not yet fully known which produces these ideas without any assistance from external things.
This is just how I've always thought ideas are produced and made when I am dreaming.
So he might be bringing those things or they might be the gift of that evil demon which is going to which
is going to corrupt his understandings and delude him into believing all sorts of things that are not so.
This is what the project was all about. He's trying to find something to counteract the evil demons efforts.
Because even to me, to see even if even if you are the evil demon,
the ability to perpetrate illusory and and imposed delusional state, etc., just to deceive Descartes.
Descartes must be a thinking thing. He declares himself to be an addition to an extended thing, which is an inference to say.
I can prove that. But that he isn't thinking.
There is no doubt. Worry. Not a thinking thing. He couldn't even contemplate the possibility of an extended play.
So the coquito is read, I think was not entirely fair,
but they can't say that a man just believes his own existence is no more fit to be reasoned with than one thinks he's made of.
Glass of DEGROFF didn't set out of hotels and insights because he displayed his own existence.
The fact that the name was not enough, a logical name of establishment existed.
But on epistemological and what kind of a knowledge claim defeats of total scepticism and whatnot,
which claim that defeats of total scepticism is the current capitalist code of.
Later in the same session? Well, so far things are fairly tame.
Now enter a few. She will illustrate the impoverishment of reason in relation to the normal world,
and in so many words make clear that there can be sympathetic propositions known to be true.
All right. Jill dismisses the whole thing. This.
Suppose a person so endowed with the strongest faculties, reason and reflection to be brought into this world.
He would indeed immediately observe a continual succession of objects and one event following another.
But he would not be able to discover anything farther. He would no excursion by any reasoning, be able to reach the idea of cause and effect.
Since the magic of the powers by which all natural operations are performed never appear to the senses.
Such a person without more experience could never employ his conjecture or reasoning concerning any matter of fact,
or be assured of anything beyond what was immediately pressed into his memory.
That his sense. Later in the same section.
Quote, Five lot of argument cannot be proved,
but the perceptions of the mind must be caused by external objects and could not arise
from the energy of the mind itself or from some other cause still unknown to us.
It is acknowledged that, in fact, many of these perceptions arise from anything external as a drainage matter and other diseases.
It's a question of whether the perceptions of the senses being produced by external objects.
But here, experience is and must be entirely silent.
The mind has never anything to present to it but perceptions and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects.
The supposition of such a connection is therefore without any foundation in reasoning.
You're one of the two that. Childress models.
Do you know when he'd go to France? He was such a wonderful conversationalist.
They could, particularly the brilliant women of the French salons, would always want a chat show.
I have great affection for you, not withstanding my disagreement with this place.
First, we share a similar profile.
It's a relatively rare and the unusual force of the silent Frenchman.
You know, they do call like sort of like shield like that.
But the spoke French envies the attention [INAUDIBLE] be getting as.
Instead of the problem, they point to property that showed chattel available slaves.
And they would say. And the world is made of flesh and blood.
But you see the state that human lives, our reasoning and our experiences, and they simply can't establish.
In addition to my research.
The fact of an external world from is about this is not within the ambit of reason its powers and of course it can be stylish,
quite spurious, because all experience and supply are just those perceptions.
Well, the council's going to require two challenges. This.
Hey, he might find himself moving into a kind of idealism because after all,
at the level of the sensuous intuitions we're talking about representations of us access directly to the level of reality to things,
us and them selves they really are. So Carter understands that of the charges after the first critiques, first tradition,
the charge that his argument is that some species of idealism has to be dealt.
He says, look, there's there's a term under which I accept I qualify myself as a transcendental idealist.
And then he says this at a three, six, nine by transcendental idealism.
I need to adopt that appearance and sort of be regarded as being one and all representations all the way, not things of themselves.
And that time and space are therefore only the sensible forms of our intuitions, not the conditions of objects viewed as things ever sounds.
So he's again making the distinction between phenomena and news.
Now, why is Wall constantly being built lest anyone think we have access to things as in themselves, they really are.
Do you see how that lead to to an undefeatable scepticism?
If you claim that the contents of your consciousness just are things as in themselves, they really are.
Then you live in a world exhausted by ideas because that's one of the contents of consciousness.
Ah. So there would be no distinction whatsoever between an actual external world and the conscious representation of that world,
because in consciousness it wouldn't be a representation, it would be things as in themselves, they really are.
So companies are aware of the fact that once you argue for access to nominal reality,
ironically you fall into the scepticism that probably is more severe than even Barclays shills and takes.
My notes, I say, after all, if there were no distinction possible between building a fund, between an entity is in itself, it really is.
And the representation of that entity, it would be Barclays.
I think this probably would be the last. Now that the external world is in fact represented,
threat does raise a question as to what has to be in place for there to be representations of the first instance, all the history of us.
All perceptual representations of our spatial temporal.
And as we watch space, time is given in the way of ensuring steadily we get back to the transcendental aesthetics.
So we know that that for a section of it.
So it must be or a framework of such that the organisms that grant us sensibility package the input in a
characteristic way packaged in a way that the stimuli themselves can say time is not in the stimulus,
space stimulus. Now remember Dawlish in college is technically used for there to be knowledge.
There must be both sensibility and understanding. So what cannot, in principle and direct to experience, cannot in principle be.
No. He states clearly how his views of transcendentalist to be understood with respect to transcendental ideas as it extends its influence.
This quote over all that follows. Not every kind of knowledge of oration be called transcendental,
but only that by which we know that and know how certain representations can be, can be employed or possible, surely a priori.
So again, if you want transcendental understood as an enabling condition, unnecessary state of affairs,
if something else is to take place, if there is to be experience necessarily, there must be walked,
there must be a mode of sensibility, etc. If there is to be understanding,
there must be a categorical framework in which the products of of experience are properly deployed and organised.
But of course, if appearances are the only source of the content of perception,
we find ourselves embracing some sort of idealism in virtue of the governor at 36 and 12.
How does leaving himself so open to such an interpretation?
He has come sounding very much like an idealist, and I don't mean a transcendental idealist.
Teach a class that nature, in the material sense is no quote by means of the Constitution of our sensibility,
according to which it is in its own way, affected by objects which are themselves unknown to it and totally distinct from the appearance.
The list begins to sound somewhat, partly, and you can see why why his critics will charge.
I was. I charge him with a kind of psychologist.
Since this begins to sound as not quite as powerful as cognitive psychology, I don't think it's quite that power.
But it does begin to sound a bit like. You know, cognitive psychology one of.
We've got.
Schematic drawings of census leading to a short term memory recall to long term memory going to the amygdala generating that was like today.
If they were large, I might be tempted to draw things like that because of this passion for categories of categories.
Well, he's got to refute the idea of Descartes and Berkeley and show that transcendental idealism has nothing in common with those.
And that's the task. Reputation. Idealism.
It's a dense argument, to say the least, has given rise to a vast secondary literature that show that Stephen Isaac contributed to it.
Don't worry, part of and tried to save me from the charge that there are gaps in this argument.
I've a recent article titled Cuts Seamless Refutation of just how confident my conclusions are reached.
This. Correspondent. The core question is how best to explain?
Can't see this. How do we explain the startling agreement between the perceptual cognitive representations and the things external to ourselves?
Or, as I've said a couple of times in these lectures. How do we explain getting to the moon and back that?
Do you see, this is not just some sort of reasonable correlation between.
Yes, we have as to the external world and what the external world may be that is somewhat like.
This is an extraordinary journey from Earth to moon and back based on calculations and equations and rocketry and radar and so, so.
So you might say in classical terms, since we did that, what are the necessary preconditions?
What's the transcendental argument according to which you can go to the moon and come back?
And the transcendental argument is there must be a fundamental and objective agreement between the
pure conception of the understanding as we have subsumed the data of sense under these categories.
And. The validity of our representations of the external world that match its world valid.
The achievements would be matter. That's saying that we've done that.
Something must be there for us. But how do we establish the reality of things outside of ourselves in the first instance?
Suppose the whole space program is a kind of dream.
There are still people who think that the whole thing was done on a Hollywood sound launcher, but nobody actually ever did go.
And there were people who believed things like that. But if you.
Hi. Well, to establish the reality of things outside ourselves, Khan says he will turn idealism.
All idealism is against themselves.
And he sets out to establish that the very possibility of self-awareness taken out of his own inner sense requires an awareness of the external world.
That is to say, it is only by way of what is out of place.
It is only by way of our access to what is outside ourselves that we are able to establish that inner life of conscious experience.
That's what he means by turning idealism against themselves, as he says.
Be to 74, he says.
That in a sense, requires an awareness, by the way, of ourselves.
No. They see the argument as it's developed. Funds can't sing this.
Listen carefully. No justice. What is conscious of one's existence as determined in time.
You're conscious of your existence as determined in time, but all determination of time presupposes something permanent and perception.
Determined to hear its new translation of the German Shepherd and stated German has a very wide extension.
It instruments. It is used to refer to establishing something as certain or as definite two sets
to fix something in place to render something firm as imperfect of the shortage.
Polite firm is. Determined probably the word I would have chosen.
I would say one is conscious and one's existence as set or fixed in time.
What is conscious upon existence of one's existence as fixed in time.
But all of this presupposes something permanent in perception.
That is, look, a parade of successive states of consciousness presupposes something static in relation to which other items are time.
There is interest. The stationary nature of this world, the role of the spatial framework against which local things vary in time.
So Tom variation presupposes a static background or a permanent background that a permanent background is provided by the pure intuition of space.
So absent the spatial framework, you could not have that sequence of events in inner space, which just is the march of conscious events.
The permanent casting within the conscious recipient for that very consciousness for its
own success on stage to exist requires something permanent that is external to itself,
only through a perception of an objective thing outside.
So can I be conscious of an enduring self possessed of success in their states?
Conroy concludes that self-consciousness requires perceptual awareness of objects external to little.
So this is the counter to an idealist claim that the mind has direct access only to its own internal states and processes.
You say what the idealist is claiming is that all of my epistemic claims are tied to the array of experiences in my own lived context.
I asked to establish that that very, very,
very conscious by that very possessed set of inter-state experiences cannot exist except insofar as there is a permanent external.
Constituting the background for it. That could in principle be an idealised mind, but it could not be anything.
For blacks, the conditions necessary for social justice.
And this is so because self-consciousness requires conditions whereby the mind's full operations can be determined in time.
You will see this much more clearly when we get to the question of the unity of perception and control of self.
Okada's clear on this when he says for and what we in Thailand saw, namely myself as an appearance of innocence.
Everything is in continual flux and there is nothing abiding except if we mess up, express ourselves the earth, he says, as it hangs, creating love.
But this fight is about an intellectualised subject, something of an index that merely locates the place continually in flux.
So what does he conclude? He says. A B to 75.
This is a reputation idealism section, he says.
The mere but empirically determined consciousness of my own existence.
Proves the existence of objects in space outside.
It's from the fact that I have a conscious in life,
but that there must be an external reality that constitutes the framework of
permanence action which I could not be a successful time determined by force of mind.
Well, there's still a hint of subjectivism here, and it's only when we return to the treatment of the pure intuitions that this
unwanted subjectivity gives way to what is a priori universal and necessary.
He says this as early as the two.
We shall understand by offering Ori knowledge, not knowledge independent of this or that experience,
but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience.
Opposed to what is inaccurate, which is knowledge possible only a posteriori and that is only by way of experience.
But experience never confers on its judgement's true or strict universality.
If a judgement is born with strict universality that is in such a manner that no exception is allowed as possible.
Then it is not to experience, but as valid.
Absolutely primary. And he takes his argument against idealism to reach that degree of necessity and universality.
Do you say this? This time determined?
Internal life of the mind. It's not unique to Jack or Jill.
This these constitute the necessary conditions for there to be successive states of mind as such necessary and universal,
therefore not the gift of experience. So in the end, this comes some sort of idealist.
This is a question that has spawned a substantial secondary literature.
I can tell you, as far as I can tell, no end in sight.
As long as. He fills required dissertation dissertations.
There will be additional work. Count as an idealist sure of that in all the work of college is not a tidy list.
Probably two or 300 count could be an idealist with a certain set of descriptions.
Oliver is an idealist, but it's over his explicit objections.
He was at pains to trace the rationale that would find, as he put it, even for good for degrading Baathist to mere solution.
Couch like Reid would have none of.
That's.