1 00:00:10,130 --> 00:00:15,680 Okay. Let's now move on to Hume's theory of relations. 2 00:00:19,110 --> 00:00:25,050 Now this is another area where understanding humans potentially quite difficult and complex. 3 00:00:26,680 --> 00:00:32,320 Right at the beginning of the treatise in book one, Part one, Section five, 4 00:00:32,770 --> 00:00:38,350 we get a discussion of relations and you might well wonder what on earth is going on there. 5 00:00:39,280 --> 00:00:45,280 We've seen that. HUME starts off talking about association and how that gives rise to complex ideas. 6 00:00:45,670 --> 00:00:49,150 And then he sets out to give this taxonomy of the complex ideas. 7 00:00:50,650 --> 00:00:53,980 And then in the very next section, he says, Well, let's start with relations. 8 00:00:54,310 --> 00:01:02,950 Here are the different kinds of relations. And you might wonder, is this just boring taxonomy or is there something else going on? 9 00:01:03,760 --> 00:01:07,000 Well, as I'll explain to you now, there's quite a lot more going on. 10 00:01:10,910 --> 00:01:19,670 To understand this, let's go back to John Locke. John Locke, as so often is the source of things that feed into humans philosophy. 11 00:01:21,060 --> 00:01:28,020 So recall that what John Locke was trying to do was explain how all our ideas could be explained as arriving from experience. 12 00:01:29,050 --> 00:01:36,850 And one of the things he wanted to do, particularly in in book two of his essay concerning human understanding, 13 00:01:37,180 --> 00:01:41,350 was to go through all the various ideas showing how they could arise from experience. 14 00:01:42,310 --> 00:01:45,490 So Locke was very much in the business of taxonomy quizzing. 15 00:01:46,540 --> 00:01:52,810 Listing all the various ideas we have, showing how they can all be explained as arising from experience. 16 00:01:54,240 --> 00:02:00,690 So if you look through Locke, you'll see that he draws a distinction between different categories of relation. 17 00:02:01,950 --> 00:02:05,640 What he's trying to do is look at all the various types of relation that there are. 18 00:02:06,630 --> 00:02:09,690 Well, there's cause and effect relations. Relations of time. 19 00:02:10,080 --> 00:02:14,130 Relations of place and extension. Identity and diversity. 20 00:02:14,910 --> 00:02:16,760 What he calls proportional relations. 21 00:02:18,270 --> 00:02:26,010 Proportional relations, by the way, include both what HUME calls degrees in quality and proportions in quantity or number. 22 00:02:26,550 --> 00:02:30,030 So it's kind of mathematical relations, broadly speaking. 23 00:02:34,650 --> 00:02:42,600 He then says that there are lots of other types of relation in the infinite other relations, 24 00:02:43,470 --> 00:02:48,840 for example, that are natural relations, such as father and son, brothers, countrymen. 25 00:02:49,770 --> 00:02:57,150 Just noticed, by the way, for future reference, when HUME talks about a natural relation, he doesn't mean what Locke means. 26 00:02:57,760 --> 00:03:09,000 Okay. When HUME talks about a natural relation, he just means an associative relation that when we think of one thing as related to another, 27 00:03:09,570 --> 00:03:14,040 it's because the idea of one of them naturally leads our thought to the idea of the other. 28 00:03:14,730 --> 00:03:21,360 Because they resemble each other, because they're close by, they're contiguous, or because one causes the other, or is the cause of it. 29 00:03:22,110 --> 00:03:29,790 Okay. That's what he means by natural relation. What Locke means by a natural relation is more or less a blood relation. 30 00:03:32,460 --> 00:03:39,810 And then the institute, you know, voluntary relations, general citizen, patron and client, constable, dictator. 31 00:03:39,930 --> 00:03:46,500 These are instituted relations. Relations that come from social relations or politics, etc. 32 00:03:48,260 --> 00:03:51,900 And there are various moral relations. Okay. 33 00:03:56,450 --> 00:04:02,480 Now let's think about Hume's taxonomy of relations in relation to locks. 34 00:04:04,930 --> 00:04:11,050 Well. HUME has a relation called Contra Riot, where Locke has diversity. 35 00:04:12,880 --> 00:04:18,070 That seems to be something like a way of bringing negation into the whole picture. 36 00:04:20,630 --> 00:04:24,110 Locke talks about agreement or disagreement of ideas. 37 00:04:25,250 --> 00:04:33,200 HUME talks about resemblance, and we'll see that he thinks that resemblance enters into every relation. 38 00:04:33,320 --> 00:04:36,740 He doesn't actually explain why, and it's somewhat mysterious, to be frank. 39 00:04:37,460 --> 00:04:45,680 So when you read Treatise 115 and you see this thing about resemblance coming into every relation, and you might think That's rather strange. 40 00:04:45,770 --> 00:04:52,370 How is that? Well, it's not well explained, and it's not clear what role HUME takes it to play. 41 00:04:53,820 --> 00:05:01,690 But it is quite intriguing. The lock talks about agreement and disagreement of ideas in very much the same way. 42 00:05:01,710 --> 00:05:07,980 Locke's agreement seems to be a general sort of logical glue rather than anything more specific. 43 00:05:08,880 --> 00:05:14,010 So there's quite a similarity between what HUME says about resemblance and what Lock says about agreement. 44 00:05:16,660 --> 00:05:20,440 Locke doesn't treat resemblance as a single type. 45 00:05:21,770 --> 00:05:27,440 He recognises all sorts of different kinds of resemblance and talks about them as different relations. 46 00:05:28,010 --> 00:05:31,130 So countrymen, those who are born in the same country. 47 00:05:31,220 --> 00:05:36,620 That's a kind of resemblance. And there are myriad resemblances. 48 00:05:37,770 --> 00:05:41,970 Whereas HUME wants to reduce them all to one general relation of resemblance. 49 00:05:44,100 --> 00:05:49,440 Now look at these two passages. Now, these are quite well known passages in HUME Scholarship for the following reason. 50 00:05:50,100 --> 00:06:01,290 Norman Kent Smith, very famous HUME scholar, wrote a major book in 1941, one of the few early 20th century works that still worth reading on HUME. 51 00:06:02,640 --> 00:06:06,360 Kemp Smith famously made a speculation about Hume's philosophy. 52 00:06:07,450 --> 00:06:13,660 Kent Smith wanted to say that Hume's philosophy is driven primarily by the moral theory. 53 00:06:14,500 --> 00:06:21,520 He saw HUME as influenced by Hutcheson. Hutcheson wanted to say that morality is ultimately derived from feeling. 54 00:06:23,200 --> 00:06:27,239 From sympathy. From our fellow feeling towards other people. 55 00:06:27,240 --> 00:06:35,700 That's where it comes from. And Kim Smith wanted to say that HUME took over that insight and wanted to apply it to his philosophy generally. 56 00:06:36,300 --> 00:06:44,440 So when we when we make an inductive inference, for example, HUME says things that imply that that's somewhat different. 57 00:06:44,460 --> 00:06:49,420 Somewhat similar to feeling we see in a followed by a B again and again and again. 58 00:06:49,770 --> 00:06:52,830 See, I again, we feel that if he's going to follow. 59 00:06:53,760 --> 00:07:00,270 So there's actually quite a big structural similarity between what HUME says about induction and what he says about morality. 60 00:07:01,690 --> 00:07:07,360 Kemp Smith speculated that it was actually the theory of morality that was driving the philosophy 61 00:07:07,960 --> 00:07:13,690 and that HUME had worked on Book three of the Treatise on Morals before he wrote Book one. 62 00:07:15,340 --> 00:07:19,659 Now as evidence for that, Kemp Smith gave these examples. 63 00:07:19,660 --> 00:07:24,760 He said notice when he wants to give examples of causal relations. 64 00:07:25,930 --> 00:07:30,130 He gives relations that are morally pertinent. There we are. 65 00:07:30,520 --> 00:07:34,870 That gives evidence that what's really driving Hume's philosophy is the moral theory. 66 00:07:36,240 --> 00:07:42,930 Well, it's an interesting speculation. It's not particularly popular these days because for all sorts of reasons, 67 00:07:43,060 --> 00:07:48,510 it just doesn't seem to hold up as a theory of the order in which things were done. 68 00:07:50,080 --> 00:07:53,830 But what I want to suggest is that there's a more interesting explanation. 69 00:07:54,400 --> 00:08:00,460 I mean, it is an intriguing fact that when HUME wants to give examples of causal relations, he doesn't give billiard balls. 70 00:08:00,580 --> 00:08:06,150 He gives moral relations. But suppose you look at these in the light of Locke's taxonomy. 71 00:08:06,270 --> 00:08:10,049 Remember, Locke had this proliferation of relations, 72 00:08:10,050 --> 00:08:16,440 including a whole load of what he called natural relations, blood relations, and instituted relations. 73 00:08:17,420 --> 00:08:21,380 And here is HUME saying all the relations of blood depend upon cause and effect. 74 00:08:22,070 --> 00:08:27,479 Right. So all blood relations are actually causal relations. The relation of cause and effect. 75 00:08:27,480 --> 00:08:32,280 We may observe to be the source of all the relations of interest and duty by which men 76 00:08:32,280 --> 00:08:37,050 influence each other in society and are placed in the ties of government and subordination. 77 00:08:38,220 --> 00:08:42,690 Okay, so all Locke's instituted relations are causal relations to. 78 00:08:45,850 --> 00:08:52,150 So what I'm suggesting is this. HUME got hold of Locke's taxonomy of relations. 79 00:08:53,350 --> 00:08:57,970 Where LOC had a proliferation of relations of similarity. 80 00:08:58,570 --> 00:09:06,200 HUME puts them all under the heading of resemblance. Well, Locke had blood relations and instituted relations lock. 81 00:09:06,650 --> 00:09:16,880 HUME puts them all under the heading of causation. And as a result, he's able to reduce all of Locke's proliferation of relations to seven categories. 82 00:09:18,050 --> 00:09:22,340 And they're in Treatise 115. He spells out these categories. 83 00:09:23,380 --> 00:09:27,400 So he says all the types of relation there are what he calls philosophical relations, 84 00:09:27,400 --> 00:09:33,940 that is relations as considered by philosophers a resemblance, cause and effect, space and time identity. 85 00:09:34,090 --> 00:09:38,020 Contrasting proportions in quantity. Degrees in quality. 86 00:09:40,070 --> 00:09:40,460 Okay. 87 00:09:40,730 --> 00:09:53,300 So so far what I've argued is that what HUME is doing here is taking Locke's taxonomy and shrinking it, reducing it to seven categories of relation. 88 00:09:54,200 --> 00:10:02,660 Why? What's going on here? Well, his motivation doesn't become clear until book one, part three. 89 00:10:04,210 --> 00:10:09,340 But one part through right at the beginning, he draws a distinction between two different categories of relation. 90 00:10:11,490 --> 00:10:14,160 These are commonly called constant relations in constant. 91 00:10:14,490 --> 00:10:21,030 That's a term he does talk use once apparently referring to this distinction so it's it's worth using that term. 92 00:10:22,690 --> 00:10:27,220 On the one hand, you've got relations that depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together. 93 00:10:27,670 --> 00:10:32,740 So resemblance contour 80 degrees in quality proportions in quantity or number. 94 00:10:34,360 --> 00:10:39,460 So the claim there is that if you take two things and compare them together. 95 00:10:41,860 --> 00:10:49,450 These relations between them, their resemblance or their contrary royalty or degrees in quality or proportions in quantity or number. 96 00:10:49,750 --> 00:10:52,780 Those will depend purely on the things you're comparing together. 97 00:10:54,290 --> 00:11:00,050 On the other hand, there are three inconstant relations. Identity relations of time and place. 98 00:11:00,080 --> 00:11:04,140 Cause and effect. Now, the last two of those are fairly straightforward, right? 99 00:11:04,160 --> 00:11:07,520 Time and place. Yes, of course. Take one thing. Take another thing. 100 00:11:08,150 --> 00:11:12,440 They could remain the same things and yet be in different relations of time and place. 101 00:11:13,790 --> 00:11:18,170 Causation. Cause and effect. Well, we can think of anything causing anything. 102 00:11:19,250 --> 00:11:26,149 So whatever. And we might be. Take those ideas. You could have those very same ideas and have one thing causing another. 103 00:11:26,150 --> 00:11:31,530 Or not causing. It wouldn't change their identity. But what about the notion of identity? 104 00:11:31,530 --> 00:11:33,990 That's a bit of a strange one to put here, you might think. 105 00:11:34,260 --> 00:11:39,810 How come how is it suppose that that relation can be changed without any change in the ideas? 106 00:11:40,020 --> 00:11:45,210 Well, HUME is here talking about identity over time. 107 00:11:46,110 --> 00:11:49,410 So think of coming across something today. 108 00:11:50,430 --> 00:11:54,000 And then coming across something next week and wondering whether they're the same thing. 109 00:11:54,530 --> 00:12:00,149 And the thought would be that you can perceive the thing now and have your idea of that thing next week. 110 00:12:00,150 --> 00:12:02,690 You can perceive the other thing and have your idea of that. 111 00:12:03,240 --> 00:12:08,280 And you can speculate whether they are or are not the same thing without actually changing those ideas. 112 00:12:11,070 --> 00:12:15,420 Okay. So you've got three, four constant relations. 113 00:12:15,420 --> 00:12:22,720 Three in constant relations. Here is the payoff. 114 00:12:25,020 --> 00:12:34,440 Who wants to argue later in the treaties that certain things cannot be demonstrated, cannot be demonstratively proved, proved with certainty. 115 00:12:34,500 --> 00:12:41,880 Going purely from our ideas. One of them is the causal maxim that every beginning of existence must have a cause. 116 00:12:42,980 --> 00:12:53,090 So that's entreaties. One, three, three. And he argues well since that doesn't include isn't based on in constant on constant relations. 117 00:12:54,220 --> 00:13:00,400 It cannot be demonstrated. Only things that are based on constant relations can be demonstrated. 118 00:13:01,610 --> 00:13:06,890 Again in but one of three of the treaties, the first section of that, when he's talking about morality, 119 00:13:07,400 --> 00:13:10,880 as we've seen, he's going to argue that morality is not founded on reason. 120 00:13:11,540 --> 00:13:16,400 And as part of that, he wants to say that moral distinctions cannot be demonstrated. 121 00:13:17,350 --> 00:13:22,560 So again, he says they can't be demonstrated because they involve inconstant relations. 122 00:13:22,570 --> 00:13:30,390 They're not based purely on constant relations. Now he doesn't actually enunciate this principle as such, 123 00:13:30,990 --> 00:13:37,260 but his use of it in those two passages seems pretty clearly to indicate that this is the thought that's driving him. 124 00:13:38,070 --> 00:13:45,120 We've got these seven relations, seven types of relation. We divide them between those that depend only on the ideas. 125 00:13:45,120 --> 00:13:52,050 Call those constant relations and those which depend on something else, you know, situation in time and place or whatever it might be. 126 00:13:53,820 --> 00:14:02,090 Well, only things that depend on the constant relations can possibly be demonstrated because they're the only things that depend only on the ideas. 127 00:14:02,100 --> 00:14:13,350 Right. Seems plausible. And he uses it, as I say, to to argue that the causal maxim can't be shown to be intuitively true. 128 00:14:13,560 --> 00:14:20,970 Therefore, incidentally, it can't be demonstrated. And that moral relations cannot be demonstrated. 129 00:14:22,630 --> 00:14:28,600 Now. Sadly, that's complete nonsense. It's a great shame, but it just doesn't work. 130 00:14:29,560 --> 00:14:34,300 So let's look at some examples. Every mother is a parent. 131 00:14:36,890 --> 00:14:40,770 That's intuitively true, isn't it? Every mother is a parent. 132 00:14:42,300 --> 00:14:48,120 And yet on Hume's conception, mother is a causal relation. 133 00:14:48,450 --> 00:14:52,740 Indeed, that seems plausible. It's the causal relation. Parent is a causal relation. 134 00:14:53,910 --> 00:14:57,240 So here we have a proposition that involves two causal relations. 135 00:14:57,300 --> 00:15:04,110 It doesn't mean it can't be demonstrated. Or anyone whose paternal grandparents have two sons has an uncle. 136 00:15:10,110 --> 00:15:15,720 Great. If your paternal grandparents have two sons, well, one of them must be your father. 137 00:15:16,440 --> 00:15:20,270 The other one's an uncle. So again, we've got a relation. 138 00:15:21,040 --> 00:15:26,830 We've got a proposition that can be demonstrated, even though it involves causal relations. 139 00:15:29,020 --> 00:15:32,410 And then we've got one I've put one at the top involving identity. 140 00:15:32,770 --> 00:15:36,940 If A equals B and B equal C, then I equals C and transitivity of identity. 141 00:15:38,980 --> 00:15:44,590 Intuitively true. Anything that lies inside a small building lies inside a building. 142 00:15:45,040 --> 00:15:49,680 It involves the relation of contiguity. But nevertheless, it can be demonstrated. 143 00:15:50,630 --> 00:15:53,630 So huge principal in the abstract. 144 00:15:53,630 --> 00:16:01,790 Sounds quite plausible, right? You think? Well, the only way you can demonstrate something a priori is if it involves relations that are constant. 145 00:16:01,910 --> 00:16:07,460 Hmm. That seems about right. But then when you start looking at examples, it falls apart. 146 00:16:08,420 --> 00:16:09,470 What's gone wrong? 147 00:16:11,730 --> 00:16:20,940 Well, I only know of one person in the literature who's actually discussed this, you know, in ways that I think are really illuminating. 148 00:16:20,940 --> 00:16:24,210 And that's Jonathan Bennett. Two works there. 149 00:16:24,930 --> 00:16:29,339 Incidentally, the website will contain links to all these various things. 150 00:16:29,340 --> 00:16:33,360 So if you want to chase them up, you're very welcome to do so. 151 00:16:34,200 --> 00:16:43,020 What Bennett suggests is, is that HUME is essentially confusing two different notions. 152 00:16:44,110 --> 00:16:47,200 And one of them is super vengeance and one of them is Analytic City. 153 00:16:47,950 --> 00:16:55,960 So very roughly, super vengeance is where the relation between two things depends on their individual properties. 154 00:16:57,160 --> 00:17:05,920 If you're given the properties of one thing and another thing, then the relation between them follows as a matter of necessity. 155 00:17:07,600 --> 00:17:18,070 Analysis city is different. That is, if you know about A and B, you're given your ideas of A and B, you can deduce the relation. 156 00:17:18,910 --> 00:17:22,710 You can see that it follows as a matter of the relations between the ideas. 157 00:17:22,720 --> 00:17:29,200 So that's related, if you like, to a prior essity follows from the meanings of the terms. 158 00:17:30,850 --> 00:17:36,460 So I'm using modern terms here for kind of the closest equivalent to what HUME seems to be talking about. 159 00:17:38,020 --> 00:17:45,710 Now, I think Bennett is right that there is this confusion in whom I have an idea of what's gone wrong here. 160 00:17:45,730 --> 00:17:53,440 I think what HUME does is when he's talking about objects or ideas of objects, he gets muddled. 161 00:17:54,250 --> 00:17:59,920 Sometimes he's thinking about the properties of objects. Sometimes he's thinking about the properties of our ideas of objects. 162 00:18:00,490 --> 00:18:05,110 And since he's talking about issues of knowledge, it's very easy to conflate those two. 163 00:18:06,010 --> 00:18:09,800 And I think that's what happens here. He pushes the two together. 164 00:18:09,880 --> 00:18:16,630 He's talking at a very abstract level. He's not anchoring it with examples. 165 00:18:16,990 --> 00:18:25,299 And so he doesn't see the problem. But I think it's important when reading those early parts of the treaties to know that 166 00:18:25,300 --> 00:18:29,470 HUME has this target in mind in order to understand some of what's going on there. 167 00:18:32,380 --> 00:18:40,870 Now very briefly, fortunately, HUME doesn't actually rely very much on this dichotomy only in the two cases that I've mentioned. 168 00:18:41,590 --> 00:18:46,389 Most of the time, his criterion for whether something is demonstrable or not is actually based 169 00:18:46,390 --> 00:18:51,190 on the conceive ability principle of which I've given a couple of quotations 170 00:18:51,190 --> 00:18:57,519 there to form a clear idea of anything is an undeniable argument for its 171 00:18:57,520 --> 00:19:02,300 possibility and is alone a refutation of any pretended demonstration against it. 172 00:19:03,800 --> 00:19:07,430 Whatever we conceive is possible, at least in the metaphysical sense. 173 00:19:07,940 --> 00:19:13,550 But wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible and implies a contradiction. 174 00:19:14,480 --> 00:19:18,940 So notice he's not here distinguishing between constant and inconstant relations. 175 00:19:18,950 --> 00:19:28,490 He's not relying on that at all. He's simply saying the criterion for something being demonstrable is that the opposite is impossible. 176 00:19:29,570 --> 00:19:38,480 And if you can clearly conceive of something that shows it is possible so that the limits, the possible range of what can be demonstrated. 177 00:19:39,200 --> 00:19:42,319 So although I've been rather harsh on Hume's theory of relations, 178 00:19:42,320 --> 00:19:48,470 I've suggested that it's motivated by trying to draw a dichotomy for a reason that just doesn't work. 179 00:19:48,920 --> 00:19:55,069 Fortunately, it doesn't infect too much of Hume's philosophy in the inquiry. 180 00:19:55,070 --> 00:19:58,430 By the way, the dichotomy makes no appearance at all. 181 00:19:58,790 --> 00:20:04,700 He relies on what he's commonly known as Hume's fork, which is clearly based on the conceive ability principle, 182 00:20:05,090 --> 00:20:10,700 the distinction between things that we can conceive and therefore are possible, 183 00:20:11,480 --> 00:20:16,940 and things that we cannot conceive and tend therefore to be impossible.