1
00:00:01,300 --> 00:00:04,750
So. I know.

2
00:00:12,720 --> 00:00:21,720
Okay. So let's try and go a bit deeper, understanding what's going on in Hume's discussion of causation.

3
00:00:26,180 --> 00:00:33,620
And I'm going to mention here a, uh, if you like, a competing view which has been quite popular in recent years.

4
00:00:33,620 --> 00:00:44,960
In the last 20 years or so, there's been quite a fashion known as the new HUME and the new humans, notably John Wright, Edward Craig Galen Strawson.

5
00:00:46,010 --> 00:00:53,060
They want to say that HUME believes in a kind of causation that goes beyond the two definitions.

6
00:00:54,020 --> 00:01:02,720
As I've been explaining. HUME, I take it that these two definitions are intended to capture all that we can legitimately mean by causation.

7
00:01:03,980 --> 00:01:09,890
But according to the new humans, there's something more. And HUME believes that there's something more in objects.

8
00:01:12,740 --> 00:01:22,670
Incidentally, Peter Cale is also somewhat in the new human camp, though he takes a rather more agnostic line on whether he actually is a believer.

9
00:01:22,680 --> 00:01:27,230
That's why I haven't mentioned him here, but there are quite a few others as well.

10
00:01:27,240 --> 00:01:30,710
Donna Livingston and Janet Broughton.

11
00:01:31,220 --> 00:01:37,190
It's been quite a trend in recent years towards interpreting HUME in such a way

12
00:01:37,190 --> 00:01:43,490
that his two definitions are not really intended to specify what causation is,

13
00:01:44,180 --> 00:01:51,209
but rather something like all that we can know of it. Now the main argument, I think,

14
00:01:51,210 --> 00:02:02,670
that has pushed people in this direction to suggest that HUME thinks there is something more to causation than is in his two definitions is to do,

15
00:02:02,670 --> 00:02:07,140
I think, with the extent to which HUME is committed to causal science.

16
00:02:08,040 --> 00:02:16,890
So the assumption has been that if HUME is a real believer in causation, then he must be a believer in real causes.

17
00:02:17,370 --> 00:02:21,630
And real causes we all know are more than his two definitions.

18
00:02:22,470 --> 00:02:28,200
I think that's wrong. I think HUME does think that a real cause is just what his two definitions say.

19
00:02:28,650 --> 00:02:29,970
But I'll argue for that shortly.

20
00:02:31,590 --> 00:02:39,930
If you come across the term sceptical realism that's often used for this point of view realism because the claim is that

21
00:02:39,930 --> 00:02:48,450
there is something to causation going beyond the two definitions typically described in terms of a priori inference,

22
00:02:48,450 --> 00:02:51,930
the thought is this when a cause is be.

23
00:02:53,350 --> 00:02:56,950
A has some property. We have no grasp of it at all.

24
00:02:57,430 --> 00:03:04,870
We, we have no impression of this property, but we suppose that there is some property in a which is such that if we knew of it,

25
00:03:05,140 --> 00:03:08,900
we would be able to infer that B would follow a priori.

26
00:03:10,320 --> 00:03:13,320
That's what a real cause is, a real necessity.

27
00:03:13,600 --> 00:03:18,690
It's a kind of logical necessity in there. But it's beyond our grasp.

28
00:03:21,880 --> 00:03:26,910
So it's sceptical realism because it's realist about that kind of necessity,

29
00:03:26,920 --> 00:03:33,460
but sceptical in the sense that it denies that we have any real grasp of what that kind of thing would be.

30
00:03:37,220 --> 00:03:46,370
So what I want to do now is, first of all, make clear that there is something to the case that the new humans have put in,

31
00:03:46,370 --> 00:03:50,990
that one ought to recognise that HUME is very much committed to causation.

32
00:03:51,810 --> 00:03:54,860
In other words, the impetus behind that view, I think,

33
00:03:54,870 --> 00:04:03,270
is absolutely correct and has provided a useful corrective to those who are inclined to say, Well, HUME isn't really a believer in causation.

34
00:04:03,900 --> 00:04:07,830
He clearly is a believer in causation. And he's a believer in causal science.

35
00:04:09,440 --> 00:04:13,910
So for particular points, I'm going to go through here.

36
00:04:14,660 --> 00:04:18,740
First of all, HUME says that causation is the basis of all empirical inference.

37
00:04:19,800 --> 00:04:22,890
He proposes rules by which to judge of causes and effects.

38
00:04:23,790 --> 00:04:28,980
He talks of secret powers. And he advocates a search for hidden causes.

39
00:04:29,280 --> 00:04:32,400
So let's go through those quickly. Okay.

40
00:04:32,460 --> 00:04:36,840
So first of all, in the argument concerning induction.

41
00:04:37,440 --> 00:04:38,550
Absolutely clear.

42
00:04:38,730 --> 00:04:45,750
The only connection or relation of objects which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses is that of cause and effect,

43
00:04:47,010 --> 00:04:51,240
perhaps even more clearly in the inquiry. So he's considered view.

44
00:04:52,200 --> 00:04:56,280
All reasonings concerning matter of fact seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect.

45
00:04:57,220 --> 00:05:03,910
So if HUME thinks we ever can infer anything beyond what we immediately perceive.

46
00:05:04,270 --> 00:05:14,870
It's got to be on the basis of causation. Immediately after the section on the idea of necessary connection in one 315.

47
00:05:14,890 --> 00:05:18,370
It's called Rules by Which to Judge of causes and effects.

48
00:05:19,370 --> 00:05:25,730
We get this? Since therefore it is possible for all objects to become causes or effects to each other.

49
00:05:26,150 --> 00:05:31,100
It may be proper to fix some general rules by which we may know when they really also.

50
00:05:32,740 --> 00:05:36,280
Now, that seems strange if you think he isn't a believer in causation.

51
00:05:36,850 --> 00:05:42,040
He's just given these two definitions of cause. Terms of constant conjunction and inference.

52
00:05:43,520 --> 00:05:49,880
And now he's saying, well, let us sort out some rules by which we can judge when things really are causes and effects.

53
00:05:50,120 --> 00:05:56,510
The problem is that what we experience in nature often involves compounded causes and compounded effects.

54
00:05:56,720 --> 00:06:00,950
Separating out exactly what's the cause of what can be quite difficult.

55
00:06:02,060 --> 00:06:07,100
So he gives some rules in this section designed to facilitate that.

56
00:06:07,850 --> 00:06:13,430
Again, it's hardly the sort of thing you do if you don't believe that causal reasoning makes any sense.

57
00:06:16,490 --> 00:06:20,930
In the inquiry, particularly, HUME talks about secret powers.

58
00:06:21,740 --> 00:06:28,730
And I think these quotations are the sorts of things that make people most inclined to go towards new humanism.

59
00:06:29,780 --> 00:06:36,620
He talks about the secret powers of bodies, those powers and principles on which the influence of objects entirely depends.

60
00:06:37,310 --> 00:06:44,210
That kind of thing. He seems to talk as though he thinks that powers and forces are genuine things in objects.

61
00:06:44,960 --> 00:06:48,980
How does that square with his analysis of causation?

62
00:06:52,510 --> 00:07:01,240
Now. He clearly thinks that necessity or power is an essential component of the idea of a cause.

63
00:07:02,110 --> 00:07:08,200
And he says this repeatedly, According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation.

64
00:07:09,460 --> 00:07:13,600
And I mentioned two other passages from the treatise there, which say the same kind of thing.

65
00:07:14,440 --> 00:07:24,070
Again, in the inquiry, necessity may be defined two ways conformable to the two definitions, of course, of which it makes an essential part.

66
00:07:25,850 --> 00:07:33,960
So. There's no way that you can say that HUME is a believer in causation, but not say that he's a believer in necessity.

67
00:07:34,440 --> 00:07:39,180
Here he is saying necessity is an absolutely essential part of causation.

68
00:07:39,990 --> 00:07:48,010
So if causal reasoning is the foundation of all, our reasoning concerning matter of fact and necessity is an essential part of our notion of cause.

69
00:07:49,870 --> 00:07:54,850
It looks like. Q must in some sense, take necessity seriously?

70
00:07:57,640 --> 00:07:59,950
He also advocates a search for hidden causes.

71
00:08:00,400 --> 00:08:07,690
So here's a passage which is in the treatise, but it's actually copied more or less exactly in the inquiry in section eight.

72
00:08:09,190 --> 00:08:19,420
And here he's saying that the layman may find that things act erratically and just says, oh, sometimes the causes work, sometimes they don't.

73
00:08:20,140 --> 00:08:21,880
But philosophers who know better.

74
00:08:22,180 --> 00:08:30,250
In other words, natural scientists try to find underlying hidden causes, which will explain why things work on some occasions and not on others.

75
00:08:31,400 --> 00:08:33,020
And lo and behold, they're successful.

76
00:08:33,590 --> 00:08:41,840
Normally when they do that, they do actually find the hidden explanation that they're looking for in terms of other causes.

77
00:08:46,370 --> 00:08:51,940
Okay. So those are the sorts of points that can be made.

78
00:08:52,360 --> 00:08:57,880
And I think they're very strong points to show that HUME is a serious believer in causation.

79
00:08:58,390 --> 00:09:06,270
Somebody who wants to say he's just rejecting the notion of cause or indeed rejecting the notion of causal necessity, I think is simply wrong.

80
00:09:08,370 --> 00:09:12,750
What I want to challenge is the presumption that this implies causal realism.

81
00:09:12,990 --> 00:09:15,990
In any sense, that goes beyond his two definitions.

82
00:09:16,290 --> 00:09:24,840
I do not think it does. So here are three points that can be made to substantiate that.

83
00:09:25,890 --> 00:09:34,030
First of all, I'm going to say a little bit about Berkeley. Um, then I'm going to talk a bit about the argument.

84
00:09:34,030 --> 00:09:37,330
I'm just going to review the argument that we've already seen in detail.

85
00:09:38,230 --> 00:09:42,400
And then I'm going to show you a footnote, which I think is also rather significant.

86
00:09:43,540 --> 00:09:48,700
So first of all, Berkeley. So Berkeley famously is an instrumentalist.

87
00:09:49,970 --> 00:09:54,770
Remember, he thinks that objects in the world have no causal power.

88
00:09:54,780 --> 00:10:00,499
Whatever. When we see one billiard ball hitting another and the other one moving, actually what's happening?

89
00:10:00,500 --> 00:10:07,520
What's really happening there is that God is creating impressions in our mind as of billiard balls.

90
00:10:08,600 --> 00:10:17,150
Moreover, God is carefully orchestrating it so that the apparent motion of the billiard balls all fits in beautifully with Newtonian mechanics.

91
00:10:19,310 --> 00:10:31,370
And Berkeley says it's absolutely fine in those circumstances to do science, to talk about physical objects as causes to assign powers.

92
00:10:32,330 --> 00:10:39,260
Things like, you know, the gravitational force proportional to the mass and inversely proportional to the square of the distance.

93
00:10:39,440 --> 00:10:46,580
There's really no such thing as gravitational force. There's really just God pulling all the strings, making sure things work in a certain way.

94
00:10:47,330 --> 00:10:49,870
But doing all the mechanics is absolutely fine.

95
00:10:49,880 --> 00:10:58,640
We can do science, even though what we're identifying as forces in objects are not really forces in objects.

96
00:11:00,290 --> 00:11:02,150
Now, if Berkeley can do it. HUME Can do it.

97
00:11:03,150 --> 00:11:10,620
And the passage here, which is taken from the first inquiry, though there are some of the words in the production to the treaties.

98
00:11:10,620 --> 00:11:16,050
As I've noted there, that passage is very reminiscent of the Barkley and passage.

99
00:11:16,950 --> 00:11:24,870
He's saying that science is a matter of resolving the particular effects that we observe into a few general causes.

100
00:11:24,990 --> 00:11:31,830
It's all about systematised action, and that notion of science can go perfectly well for an instrumentalist.

101
00:11:36,100 --> 00:11:45,070
We've looked at the argument of one 314, and I just want to draw attention to some points concerning that argument.

102
00:11:45,700 --> 00:11:52,690
First of all, it's structured entirely around the copy principle. HUME sets out to find the impression from which the idea is derived.

103
00:11:53,710 --> 00:11:58,580
That's why one 314 is set up as it is.

104
00:11:58,600 --> 00:12:04,000
It's entirely a quest for an impression which will generate the idea.

105
00:12:05,140 --> 00:12:10,630
Moreover, he's absolutely clear that the copy principle is a tool for deciding questions of meaning.

106
00:12:11,110 --> 00:12:17,380
And I've given one passage there, just example, one from the treatise, one from the abstract, one from the inquiry.

107
00:12:20,540 --> 00:12:26,720
Moreover, he says that that's what he's doing, that he's trying to find out what causal terms mean,

108
00:12:27,470 --> 00:12:31,340
and again, quotations from the treatise, the abstract and the inquiry.

109
00:12:33,550 --> 00:12:39,040
When he identifies the impression of necessary connection and he observes that it's a subjective impression.

110
00:12:39,040 --> 00:12:41,500
It's in the mind, as it were, rather than objects.

111
00:12:42,370 --> 00:12:51,610
He explicitly draws the apparently anti realist implication when he says necessity is something that's in the mind, not in objects.

112
00:12:52,570 --> 00:12:55,240
That's entirely consistent with what he's been doing.

113
00:12:56,170 --> 00:13:00,670
He's looking for the impression that's going to explain the meaning of the idea of necessary connection.

114
00:13:01,870 --> 00:13:09,100
He finds it. It's in minds, not in objects. And he draws the conclusion that necessity means something that's in minds, not in objects.

115
00:13:11,210 --> 00:13:18,800
And then he gives two definitions of calls which incorporate precisely that anti realist perspective.

116
00:13:19,860 --> 00:13:26,880
Notice anti realist in terms of denying the existence of anything beyond the two definitions.

117
00:13:29,020 --> 00:13:37,180
So the whole structure of Hume's argument seems precisely designed to deny that there is anything beyond the two definitions.

118
00:13:38,170 --> 00:13:40,120
When we talk about necessity or power.

119
00:13:42,900 --> 00:13:50,070
What about those passages in the inquiry where HUME talks about powers in objects that may seem a little bit puzzling?

120
00:13:52,090 --> 00:13:55,329
Well, claims Lord Keynes.

121
00:13:55,330 --> 00:14:06,069
Henry HUME, who was a distant cousin of Hume's actually, and something of a mentor of his when he started off at Edinburgh University in 1751,

122
00:14:06,070 --> 00:14:13,510
came published essays on the principles of morality in natural religion.

123
00:14:14,970 --> 00:14:19,860
And he quoted Hume's references to powers in the inquiry against him.

124
00:14:20,640 --> 00:14:22,860
So, Keynes said, against HUME.

125
00:14:23,670 --> 00:14:32,160
Look, here you are talking about powers, and yet you are drawing the conclusion that there is no such thing as power in objects.

126
00:14:32,970 --> 00:14:34,170
So you are inconsistent.

127
00:14:36,640 --> 00:14:48,550
Now claims particularly cited the first three sentences of the 16th paragraph of Section four of the inquiry that had been published in 1748.

128
00:14:49,840 --> 00:14:56,290
In the 1750 edition, HUME added a footnote to the following sentence.

129
00:14:57,880 --> 00:15:01,300
The word power is here, used in a loose and popular sense.

130
00:15:01,690 --> 00:15:06,580
The more accurate explication of it would give additional evidence to this argument.

131
00:15:06,700 --> 00:15:12,170
See Section seven. So what I think is going on here is this.

132
00:15:13,400 --> 00:15:17,450
Keynes and HUME knew each other well. They swapped manuscripts prior to publication.

133
00:15:17,630 --> 00:15:24,530
In fact, Combs advised HUME not to publish the inquiry because he thought it was too dangerous.

134
00:15:25,040 --> 00:15:30,800
It had anti-religious stuff in it. I think Cain's put this objection to HUME.

135
00:15:31,190 --> 00:15:35,080
He said, Look, you're inconsistent. Look at this paragraph, paragraph 16.

136
00:15:35,180 --> 00:15:42,500
You are referring to hidden powers in objects that's inconsistent with your own conclusion about necessary connection in Section seven.

137
00:15:43,560 --> 00:15:47,700
So he even puts a footnote in and says, When I refer to powers in objects,

138
00:15:47,700 --> 00:15:53,340
bear in mind this has to be interpreted in the light of my discussion of the idea of necessary connection.

139
00:15:53,430 --> 00:16:00,260
That's coming later in Section seven. So actually I think that footnote gives tremendously strong evidence,

140
00:16:01,100 --> 00:16:09,560
given the circumstantial connection between the the point at which claims was criticising him and the point at which the footnote was inserted.

141
00:16:11,210 --> 00:16:18,500
Besides which, I think there's another much simpler explanation for why HUME puts all this stuff about powers in the inquiry.

142
00:16:20,810 --> 00:16:24,380
In the treatise, Hume's idea of causation is actually a pretty crude one.

143
00:16:25,010 --> 00:16:30,350
He puts it nearly all in terms of one object being followed by another A, followed by B,

144
00:16:31,070 --> 00:16:35,600
or if you look at the rules by which to judge of causes and effect, it gets a little bit more complicated.

145
00:16:35,840 --> 00:16:40,370
You know, A is followed by B, but only when C is present and not when D is present.

146
00:16:40,430 --> 00:16:43,960
It's that kind of thing. Now in the inquiry.

147
00:16:43,990 --> 00:16:49,480
HUME has realised that that's not the way scientific causation works.

148
00:16:50,290 --> 00:16:54,940
When you calculate the motion of billiard balls or the motion of planets,

149
00:16:55,390 --> 00:17:01,420
you do not simply do it in terms of one kind of one kind of event, followed by another kind of event.

150
00:17:01,990 --> 00:17:05,620
Rather what you do, you attribute forces to the objects.

151
00:17:06,610 --> 00:17:12,840
For example, gravitational forces between planets, between planets and the sun, between the moon and the earth.

152
00:17:13,970 --> 00:17:20,300
You calculate the overall force and then you predict the motion on the basis of that using the laws of motion.

153
00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:28,250
So he's realised that science works in terms of forces, not in terms of just one event followed by another.

154
00:17:29,360 --> 00:17:32,420
And in the inquiry, that kind of talk is quite prominent.

155
00:17:33,620 --> 00:17:43,010
But it's very striking that he talks about such things twice in footnotes to section seven of the inquiry, that of the idea of necessary connection.

156
00:17:43,880 --> 00:17:51,590
And I think he's precisely making the point there that this sort of talk of forces is entirely consistent with his account of necessary connection.

157
00:17:52,490 --> 00:18:00,020
He's not when he talks about powers and forces, all he means to talk about is uniformity is in the object.

158
00:18:00,590 --> 00:18:04,910
Uniformity is in the events. How they happen. Systematise ation.

159
00:18:05,690 --> 00:18:11,630
Nothing metaphysically deeper than his two definitions can encompass.

160
00:18:16,300 --> 00:18:21,010
Okay. Let's come back to those two definitions. Why two definitions?

161
00:18:22,000 --> 00:18:30,909
One of them is based on regular succession. One of them is based on the mind's tendency to infer a common objection.

162
00:18:30,910 --> 00:18:34,170
Against whom is that? The two don't seem to coincide. Okay.

163
00:18:34,360 --> 00:18:41,330
You could have a followed by B repeatedly. And reliably without anyone ever knowing of it.

164
00:18:41,870 --> 00:18:47,530
And if nobody knew about it, then nobody would infer B from A so the second definition wouldn't apply.

165
00:18:48,790 --> 00:18:54,880
On the other hand, I might be followed by be quite a lot of the time and somebody observes that.

166
00:18:55,660 --> 00:19:00,160
But it might be that often isn't followed by me as well. But maybe that isn't observed.

167
00:19:00,310 --> 00:19:07,690
So somebody mistakenly infers be from a, in which case it looks like the second definition applies, but not the first.

168
00:19:09,010 --> 00:19:15,670
So there's a problem. We've got two definitions, but they don't seem to be so extensive.

169
00:19:16,180 --> 00:19:21,360
They don't apply to the same things. Now.

170
00:19:21,360 --> 00:19:25,080
I think the way to make sense of the definitions, again, this is controversial.

171
00:19:25,320 --> 00:19:28,500
There are a lot of different discussions of the two definitions.

172
00:19:29,850 --> 00:19:33,330
Different scholars have different views as to how they should be interpreted.

173
00:19:33,600 --> 00:19:37,290
I've got some references on the website. Two things to read about this.

174
00:19:38,370 --> 00:19:46,470
My own view about it is this roughly, I don't think we should think of the definitions as intended to specify necessary and sufficient conditions.

175
00:19:47,880 --> 00:19:53,950
Remember, HUME has a genetic. Understanding of meaning.

176
00:19:54,960 --> 00:20:00,870
In order to understand what necessary connection means, what the idea means, we have to understand where it comes from.

177
00:20:01,110 --> 00:20:08,820
The impression. Now, that's a very different notion of meaning from one that's couched in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions.

178
00:20:10,910 --> 00:20:17,299
So I suggest that what's going on is that the second definition is specifying

179
00:20:17,300 --> 00:20:22,640
sort of something like paradigm conditions in which that impression arises.

180
00:20:23,060 --> 00:20:28,160
When A is followed by B again and again, you see and A you find yourself inferring A B don't you?

181
00:20:29,240 --> 00:20:34,730
There you are. Having found yourself making that inference, you now know what the essence of necessity is.

182
00:20:35,330 --> 00:20:40,910
It's to do with inferring that you from with one thing, following from another consequent reality.

183
00:20:46,190 --> 00:20:54,560
But nothing in Hume's theory requires that having got that idea, you should only apply it to the cases in which it naturally arises.

184
00:20:55,760 --> 00:20:59,450
And I think the point of the first definition and the rules by which to judge, of course,

185
00:20:59,450 --> 00:21:04,880
is in effect is to say, this is how you should systematise the application of that idea.

186
00:21:05,830 --> 00:21:11,560
So you get the idea from the paradigm case where you find yourself drawing that inference.

187
00:21:12,280 --> 00:21:15,520
But then if you're systematic, you apply it elsewhere.

188
00:21:15,640 --> 00:21:22,460
Whenever you find a constant conjunction. Now that makes the two definitions complementary.

189
00:21:22,670 --> 00:21:28,070
They're not conflicting. They're doing different jobs, and I think it makes pretty good sense.

190
00:21:28,790 --> 00:21:34,460
The second definition identifies the idea. The first gives you a criterion for applying it.

191
00:21:36,350 --> 00:21:42,709
Now, interestingly, in the moral inquiry, this is something to which Don Garrett drew attention.

192
00:21:42,710 --> 00:21:52,820
And I think it's very insightful in the moral inquiry, you get two definitions of virtue or personal merit, and they seem to be very similar.

193
00:21:55,460 --> 00:22:01,400
That is the. The relation between them is very similar to the relation between the two definitions of course.

194
00:22:03,320 --> 00:22:10,160
So personal merit consists all together in the possession of mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person, himself or to others.

195
00:22:11,330 --> 00:22:13,220
And then he refers back to that as a definition.

196
00:22:14,720 --> 00:22:22,460
My hypothesis defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to a spectator, the pleasing sentiment of approbation.

197
00:22:24,140 --> 00:22:25,220
Now. How do we square that?

198
00:22:26,410 --> 00:22:35,320
But what Kim is doing here, and it's very clear from his discussion he's saying that moral ideas arise from a particular kind of impression,

199
00:22:36,220 --> 00:22:40,240
the impression of a generalised moral approval.

200
00:22:42,430 --> 00:22:47,290
Now, unless you've actually felt that unless you've experienced moral approval,

201
00:22:47,500 --> 00:22:51,340
you won't even know what people are talking about when they express it.

202
00:22:57,620 --> 00:23:02,010
I'm sorry this thing is. Can I stop it? Right.

203
00:23:02,080 --> 00:23:05,560
Thank you. Shall I just stop?

204
00:23:07,400 --> 00:23:16,070
So unless you've experienced that impression of moral approval, you won't even know what people mean when they talk about it.

205
00:23:17,520 --> 00:23:25,140
But once you've got that impression and hence got the idea, you can then examine the occasions that prompted.

206
00:23:25,890 --> 00:23:31,560
And if you do that in a systematic way, if you look at how people apply the notion of moral approval,

207
00:23:32,340 --> 00:23:40,770
you'll find that there is a system to it that we standardly apply it in cases where people have qualities that are useful or agreeable,

208
00:23:40,770 --> 00:23:49,540
either to themselves or to others. So that is the analysis of personal merit or virtue that HUME gives.

209
00:23:50,640 --> 00:23:52,820
And then he actually applies it critically.

210
00:23:52,830 --> 00:24:02,820
He says, look at the monkish virtues in celibacy, mortification, self-denial, humility, fasting, solitude, all these sorts of things.

211
00:24:02,880 --> 00:24:05,250
And he says, actually, these aren't virtues.

212
00:24:05,610 --> 00:24:11,490
They've been described as virtues, but they're not because they're not useful or agreeable to oneself or others.

213
00:24:12,630 --> 00:24:17,130
So it's a similar kind of things with the discussion of causation.

214
00:24:18,030 --> 00:24:23,460
You get an idea, either the idea of personal merit or the idea of one thing following from another.

215
00:24:24,540 --> 00:24:32,850
But then you systematise the application of it so that you draw up general rules about when is the right time to apply it.

216
00:24:33,630 --> 00:24:36,360
And that corresponds to the first definition in each case.

217
00:24:40,260 --> 00:24:48,150
Now notice that that understanding does tell strongly in the direction of a fairly traditional understanding of HUME,

218
00:24:48,960 --> 00:24:53,520
and he realised in the sense of denying anything beyond the two definitions.

219
00:24:54,120 --> 00:25:00,030
We're reading, in a sense, reading necessity into the world rather than reading it off the world,

220
00:25:00,420 --> 00:25:05,640
just as in a sense we read moral virtue into things rather than reading it off them.

221
00:25:06,420 --> 00:25:10,680
That doesn't mean that we're irrational in doing that. It doesn't mean we're making a mistake.

222
00:25:11,640 --> 00:25:18,580
But the crucial point is it's our system authorisation of the application of the idea that's doing the work here.

223
00:25:18,600 --> 00:25:22,830
It's not that we're getting better at observing moral virtue in the world.

224
00:25:23,310 --> 00:25:26,400
We're getting better at applying that concept to the world.

225
00:25:27,750 --> 00:25:34,050
So it's in which by applying the concept in this way,

226
00:25:34,290 --> 00:25:41,130
we raise a new creation by gilding or staining natural objects with the colours borrowed from internal sentiment.

227
00:25:41,340 --> 00:25:49,860
HUME There is talking about morality, but something not far from that seems to be going on in the case of causation.