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But no oak tree is one for two.

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Scepticism with regard to the senses is a fantastically complex section.

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It's complex, difficult, confusing.

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Jonathan Bennett cites it as proving why HUME is such a great philosopher.

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He says this one section.

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The way in which HUME keeps control over such a complicated argument elevates him amongst above other philosophers of the period,

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even though it's a deeply problematic section.

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What I'm going to try to do is take you fairly quickly through the section showing you the highlights and the general geography of it,

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how it's laid out. I'm not going to be going into detail in all of the arguments.

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But we'll be looking seeing enough of the shape of it to make an assessment next time of how it fits into the overall picture of human scepticism.

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So he starts out a very famous passage.

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We may well ask what causes induce us to believe in the existence of body.

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But tis in vain to ask whether there be body or not.

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That is a point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings.

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So again, we seem to get naturalism coming in as a response to potential scepticism.

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He's saying, let's not even ask whether there are physical things, whether there is an external world.

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That's something we just have to take for granted. We just naturally believe that.

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And whatever the arguments may say, we're not going to be able to doubt that.

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So the question is what brings about that belief?

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But by the end of the section, you get a very different impression.

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Having gone through his arguments, he says, Well, I begun with promising that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses.

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But to tell you the truth, I'm not feeling that way now.

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I feel myself at present of a quite contrary sentiment and the more inclined to repose no faith at all in my senses or rather imagination,

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than to place in it such an implicit confidence. So this is part of what's very confusing about this section.

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He starts out saying, I'm going to take the existence of body, in other words,

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external objects for granted and just ask what causes us to believe in them.

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But the conclusions he gets on the way throw such doubt on that belief that by the end of it,

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when he thinks about it, he's very much inclined to doubt the existence of body.

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So you can see the question whether HUME actually believes in the external world is quite a tricky one.

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He starts off saying, We all believe it. We can't help it.

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He ends up saying, Actually, if you look at it from a philosophical point of view, maybe it's completely groundless and incoherent.

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Well, he starts out, at any rate, pretty systematically.

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He analyses the belief in body into two components one of them continued existence of objects, and one of them distinct existence of objects.

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So suppose I look at the table. I look away.

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I look back. I suppose that the table has continued to exist even while I wasn't perceiving it.

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On the other hand, I also believe the table to exist distinctly from my perceptions is independent of my perceptions.

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A separate thing. Moreover, it's external to me.

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So those are different aspects of the belief in body.

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But HUME argues that pretty much they all go together. Now the big question is where does our belief in the continued and distinct existence of body?

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Where does it come from? Which faculty is responsible?

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Now, you may remember a long time ago, we looked at Hume's theory of faculties,

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and we'll be coming back to that next week because it's pretty crucial.

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In several of his arguments. We've looked particularly at the argument concerning induction.

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Now this argument, also his argument about the basis of morality.

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It turns on the identification of which faculty is responsible for the particular type of belief.

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And HUME clearly takes major consequences to follow from that.

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Here, what he asks is,

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is it the senses or is it reason or is it the imagination that's responsible for the belief in continued and distinct existence of body?

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And notice also he says something interesting here.

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These are the only questions that are intelligible on the present subject for us to the notion of external existence.

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When taken for something specifically different from perceptions, we have already shown its absurdity.

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Now he's referring back here to a section that we looked at some time ago.

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Treat is 1 to 6 on the idea of existence and the idea of external existence.

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And that was where he was applying his copy principle and saying that in in a sense,

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the only ideas we can form of external objects are derived from our impressions.

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So if we try to make sense of external objects as something specifically different from perceptions,

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different in kind from perceptions, we can't where is it we're trapped within.

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What our impressions give us. We have no ideas but deriving from those, and that is a theme that will recur again.

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So does the belief in continued and distinct existence of body derive from the senses?

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No. And that may seem paradoxical.

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After all, the section is cold of scepticism with regard to the senses.

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He's asking about sensory beliefs beliefs in the external world.

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How can they not derive from the senses?

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Well, it's clear if you look at this part of Hume's discussion that what he means by the senses is more or less better sources of impressions.

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So we get certain impressions from the senses.

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Can those give us the idea of body?

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Well, he says clearly not. And if I look at the table and look away, I'd no longer got impressions of the table.

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I only get impressions of the table while I'm seeing the table.

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So it's absolutely obvious that I cannot get the idea of continued existence from the bare impressions.

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The same sort of thing goes for distinctness.

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So if our senses do suggest any idea of distinct existences, then it must be due to some fallacy or illusion.

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It can't be that we are taking the deliverance of the senses at face value, because the deliverance of the senses just are what they are.

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An impression is just what it is when you see an impression. There's nothing hidden.

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That's it. So since all actions and sensations of the mind are known to us by consciousness,

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they must appear in every particular what they are, and they must be what they appear.

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The passage goes on. So the sense is, as sources of impressions cannot give us the belief in body.

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Now you might think, hang on a minute. What about externality?

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When I see the table, I see that as external to my physical body.

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Isn't that at least given me by impressions?

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Well, the trouble with that is it takes for granted that I've already managed to identify my body.

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So we get the same problem again. And he goes on and discusses various impressions of the different senses,

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including some discussion of the primary secondary quality distinction that I'm just going to bracket that for now.

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Okay. So the senses are knocked out as a possible source of the idea.

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The belief in continued and distinct existence of body.

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Next we come to reason. Remember it senses reason or the imagination.

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And as so often, HUME is working by elimination, he's eliminating alternatives to the imagination.

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What about reason? Well, children and peasants, they believe in external objects, but they clearly don't do it on the basis of reason.

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Moreover, philosophy informs us that everything which appears to the mind is nothing but a perception and is interrupted and dependent on the mind.

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Whereas the vulgar confounds, perceptions and objects and attributes a distinct, continued existence to the very things they feel or see.

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The sentiment, then, as it is entirely unreasonable, must proceed from some other faculty than the understanding.

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Now. There's a lot in that passage. Notice, first of all, something that will come up repeatedly.

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Who thinks that the ordinary person, the vulgar.

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Confounds perceptions and objects.

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Think of. George Barkley and what he had to say about Locke.

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Um, Locke wanted to say that we we immediately perceive perceptions, impressions in Hume's terms, ideas in law.

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And we suppose that there is some object which is the cause of that impression.

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And that sets up a potential sceptical worry.

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You've got the veil of perception. How do we infer there are objects beyond the impressions?

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Now, Barclay agrees with Locke that the only things we're directly aware of are impressions.

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But Barclay points out that the ordinary man thinks when he sees an apple, he's seeing the apple.

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When he sees a tree, he's seeing the tree. And Berkeley says, Yeah, actually, the common man is right.

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The tree just is an impression. The apple just is an impression.

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A complex impression, of course.

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Now one can think that Berkeley is rather implausible in claiming to take the view of the common man in favour of his in materialism or idealism.

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But HUME seems to be agreeing with Barclay here that what the common man does is assume that when he sees a tree, it's the tree he's seeing.

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It's not any impression. He's got direct acquaintance, as it were, with the tree.

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As I say, that will come up quite a lot. And notice this last sentence.

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Quite significant. I think this sentiment, as it's entirely unreasonable,

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must proceed from some other faculty than the understanding that seems to suggest that something can derive from reason only if it's reasonable.

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That will be significant next time. So much for the vulgar.

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They clearly do not the base their beliefs about the external world on reason.

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What about philosophers? Well, philosophers like John Locke and John Locke is absolutely the the paradigm of the philosophical view here.

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They distinguish between perceptions and objects, as we've seen.

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They think we have impressions of a tree, but there's a real tree, as it were, behind it, causing the impression.

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But HUME comes out with an argument. Actually, the argument appears later where he says that.

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That's in 142 47. It's quite a significant argument.

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It's repeated in the inquiry. And what he basically says is, look, the only kind of argument that we've got that will assure us of any matter of fact,

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beyond the evidence of our memory and senses, is an inductive argument, a causal argument.

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We've seen that in one, three, six.

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But establishing a causal connection means you have to be acquainted with both halves, both the cause and the effect.

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You have to see followed by B again and again. And then when you see an AA, you can infer a b.

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But if the only thing we're ever acquainted with is the perception, never the external object directly, then we cannot establish that causal link.

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So actually, even if we adopt the philosophical view, the lockean view, we cannot justify by reason the belief in the external world.

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So the belief must arise from the imagination. It doesn't arise from the senses.

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It doesn't derives from reason.

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So let's try and explain how the belief in the external world, the belief in continued and distinct existence of body, arises from the imagination.

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And this takes up most of the rest of the section.

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Well, first of all, he identifies constancy and coherence as the key characteristics of the perceptions that lead us to have the belief.

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So constancy. I look at the table. I look away.

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I look back. The impression I get is very similar, nearly identical to the one I had before.

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So they return upon me without the least alteration.

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And we'll see that.

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HUME thinks that when that happens, when we see one, you get one impression, and then a little bit later we get another one that's almost identical.

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We tend to run them together and think of them as the same impression.

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They're not. But we make that mistake. Coherent perceptions are a bit different.

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Coherent perceptions are where we get used to patterns.

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So for example, I look at a fire blazing away.

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And then I get used to the fact that after an hour or two it will have died down.

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So another day I look at the fire, I look away.

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Or maybe I leave the room and I come back to the room and there is the fire and it's died down in the usual way.

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So that's not constancy. It's not that the impression of the fire is just like it was when I left the room.

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But it's coherent in that there's a pattern,

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a regular pattern to the appearance of the impressions and huge gestures towards what we call inference to the best explanation.

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I mean, it's a shame he didn't take this further, really.

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We've seen that he used this argument that the only way we can infer to something beyond the memory and senses is by causation, by induction.

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And the only way we can establish a causal link is by seeing A and B.

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It's a shame he didn't think further about inference to the best explanation because that gives an

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alternative and he comes tantalisingly close to it in this passage where he's talking about coherence.

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Okay. Now, a great deal of this section is devoted to explaining how the vulgar view remember,

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that's the view that identifies objects with perceptions, how that comes about.

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And I'm going to jump over most of that. But I want to draw your attention to this passage, which summarises the account.

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When we've been accustomed to observe a constancy in certain impressions and have found that the perception of the sun or ocean,

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for instance, returns upon us after an absence or annihilation with like parts and in a like order, as it at its first appearance.

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We are not apt to regard these interrupted perceptions as different, which they really are.

155
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But on the contrary, consider them individually the same upon account of their resemblance.

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So I say. I look at the table. I look away. I look back. I get a very similar impression, and I am apt to confound those impressions.

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I think of them as the same impression because they're so similar.

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But as this interruption of their existence is contrary to their perfect identity and

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makes us regard the first impression as annihilated and the second as newly created.

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So when I think about it, I realise that I turned away that that first impression disappeared and when I turned back, the second one appeared.

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That was a new impression. Oh, dear. There's a conflict. We find ourselves somewhat at a loss and are involved in a kind of contradiction.

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In order to free ourselves. From this difficulty, we disguise as much as possible the interruption,

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or rather remove it entirely by supposing that these interrupted perceptions are connected by a real existence of which we are insensible.

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This supposition or idea of continued existence acquires a force and vivacity from the memory of

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these broken impressions and from that propensity which they give us to suppose them the same.

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And the very essence of belief consists in the force and vivacity of the conception.

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Okay. It's a very nice potted account of what he's going to go on to explain.

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He divides his account into four separate chunks the principle of individuation.

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That is the way in which similarity leads us to identify things, how resemblance leads us to attribute identity to interrupted perceptions.

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Why we unite interrupted perceptions by supposing a continued existence.

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And then, as we saw, explaining how how that fiction,

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the fiction of an external object that we built up in this way by supposing that the

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some some unseen perception that somehow unites the things that we're trying to unite,

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even though that we see that they're different, that fiction.

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How can that constitute a belief? How can it derive the requisite force and vivacity?

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Note, incidentally, when you're reading this, it can be a bit confusing over quite a large chunk of this section for about 15 or 16 paragraphs.

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He adopts the policy of referring to objects and perceptions indifferently.

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If you like speaking with the vulgar, adopting the vulgar assumption, and that can be a bit confusing.

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I also think it's rather problematic because Hume's account of the vulgar belief is not based on reason,

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it's based on the imagination, it's not based on the idea that the vulgar are, as it were, consciously reasoning the thing out.

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It's rather some kind of scientific explanation of what's going on in their heads that seduces them into various errors.

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So there's no reason why we should expect the explanation to be at the cognitive or rational level.

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It could well be sub cognitive to explain why people think as they do.

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We don't expect cognitive psychologists to be using the same language that we understand.

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So there's something a bit puzzling about humans doing this, and you might find that the discussion is a little bit slippery for that reason.

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Once he's explained how the Vulcan view arises, HUME explains how there are various faults with it.

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It involves fallacies and fictions. We can see that it's false.

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We can see that our perceptions and objects are clearly different because if you press an eye, you begin to see double.

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If you see double. It becomes clear to us that at least some of the perceptions are not identical with

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objects because we do not think that the objects double up when we press the eye.

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And since all our perceptions are caused in a broadly similar way, it implies that none of them are identical with object.

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So actually the vulgar view is rather trivially false.

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Philosophers of course realise this, philosophers realise that the vulgar view is false.

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So John Locke, for example, doesn't want to identify perceptions and objects.

195
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But the problem is that philosophers are so seduced by the imagination to believe in

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the continued and distinct existence of objects because they've acquired that belief.

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In the vulgar way they are, after all human beings.

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They've been seduced in the same way that we all are into thinking that there are continued in existence, distinct existences.

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So they're reluctant to give that up. But when they realise that perceptions and objects are different, they invent a new kind of object.

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They say, Oh, there's another kind of object besides perceptions, and they continue to exist even though our perceptions are interrupted.

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So we get a double existence theory. However, HUME wants to say this theory has no primary recommendation either to reason or the imagination.

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You can't actually argue in favour of it rationally.

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Four. Because of what we said earlier about you can't get a causal link going, but nor does it have a primary appeal to the imagination.

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The reason why people get to that belief is because they start with the imagination, pushing them towards the vulgar belief.

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They see that the vulgar belief is wrong, and then they invent the philosophical belief as a way of reconciling the contradictions.

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These various paragraphs that I've listed here, I'm simply pointing out what HUME is doing.

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In those paragraphs. He's partly recapitulating what he said, partly pointing out implications of his argument.

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And here is the despairing conclusion.

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I cannot conceive how such trivial qualities of the fancy conducted by such false suppositions can ever lead to any solid and rational system.

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So now we've reached the point that I mentioned right at the beginning.

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He started off saying we're going to take for granted that body exists.

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And now at the end of the section, he's saying, well, to tell the truth, having gone through all that, seems to me they don't.

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The solution? Well, we just have to stop thinking about it while we are concentrating on the arguments.

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We will realise that the belief in the existence of body is deeply problematic.

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But if we stop thinking about it famously, we die and or go and play a game of backgammon.

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We forget about all these problems and we restore our belief in external objects and go on in the same vulgar way.

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So next time we'll be looking at how all this fits together within humans.

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Response to scepticism. Thank you.