So the second essay of Virginia Energy has recently attracted considerable amounts of attention.
It ostensibly develops on account of the origins of the feeling of guilt, which is marked by at least the appearance of tight, consensual behaviours.
The first essay begins with the ladies of the concept of the essay begins with an analysis of the concept of conscience.
Proceeds to an examination of bad conscience and conclude with a view of more bad conscience or guilt itself was an
emphasis throughout the essay on the crucial influence of socialisation on the development of all these phenomena.
Now, there remains much disagreement amongst scholars over the precise structure of
Nietzsche's account and indeed over the precise nature of the feeling of guilt,
which is its purported object.
This object is what I shall call Christian guilt, or the feeling of guilt as it operates and is understood in the Christian morality.
This much we can gather not only from the role played by Christianity in the a cold,
but also from the emphasis he places on the Christian view of countries in the brief review of the second to see your first.
And actually all of this is of course, the first chord on the end of the second enquiry, he writes,
offers the psychology of conscience, which is not, as people may believe, the voice of God in man.
No. In contrast to a widespread line of interpretation, I would argue that Nietzsche's objective is to say, goodness sake, he's not,
at least not all lead and perhaps not primarily to challenge the non naturalistic accord of the feeling of guilt promoted by the Christian último,
namely guilt as a manifestation of the voice of God in man.
But to show that the representation of guilt is not so much an account of the ordinary feeling of guilt that
you can see the diminution of self esteem we experience when we fall short of our own normative expectations,
as it is the product of the exploitation of the human susceptibility to that feeling as an instrument of self directed cruelty.
Christian guilt is therefore not a more emotion responsive to reasons.
But what I shall call then I'll come back to that at the very end of the paper. Irrational passion,
by which I mean a partial to which only a rational being is susceptible because it essentially exploits his responsiveness to reasons and which,
unlike other passions, not only overrides or bypasses, but actually corrupts his responsiveness to reason.
No, I do not mean to suggest, however, that Nietzsche has nothing of particular interest to say about the ordinary feeling of guilt.
On the contrary, his genealogical record of Guild of Christian Guilt presupposes but intriguing view of ordinary guilt,
which differs in important respects from the view of ordinary guilt, which is sanctioned by the Christian group.
And I shall have to consider at least some aspects of it.
So let me begin and I'll start with scholarships, since the feeling of guilt is a species of bad conscience.
Nietzsche begins this investigation with an examination of the concept of conscience.
A concept of conscience typically designates Anita Volpe's the famed voice of conscience, which reminds each of us of our obligations.
Nietzsche rejects the idea that it is the voice of God in man asks Small.
As a matter of empirical fact, such or such a structure could have developed into a human psyche.
In so far as it is a vase reminding us of our obligations and commitments, conscience is what he calls the Wills Memorial.
No, since undertaking an obligation or commitment is like making a promise,
the possession of a memory of the will underwrite what he calls the right to make promises.
We do not have the right to make promises unless we have the ability to keep them.
And this ability requires, of course, that we be reminded of them.
Nietzsche observes that our minds are naturally and dulled with an active forgetfulness.
By virtue of which it disposes of impressions that would otherwise linger in.
And Credle of our consciousness infers that the wind's memory is not part of our not innate natural and dormant,
but constitutes a capacity that has to read to us.
This is a court. This is a second court on the handle.
It is by no means a mere passive inability to be rid of an impression once it has made its impact.
Nor is it just indigestion caused by giving your word on some occasion and.
Finding that you cannot call. Instead, it is an active desire not to let go, but desire to keep all desiring what has been on some occasion desired.
Really?
It is the Wills memorial so that a world of strange new things, circumstances and even acts of will may be placed quite safely between the original.
I will. I shall do. And the actual discharge of the will.
It's locked without breaking this long chain of will.
So by defining this memory of the will, as a matter of keeping or desiring what has been on some occasion desired,
Nietzsche's suggests that it is more that than the memory of the fact that I once desired something.
It is rather a perpetuation of desire itself.
Nietzsche's use of the word desire.
In this context may cause some confusion for a memory of the will is not simply the perpetration of some wish or inclination.
I once had the will to be remembered. Here is an obligation undertaken or a promise made.
I would.
I shall do to define this memory in terms of keeping on desiring is simply to indicate that what is to be perpetuated is the motivation itself,
not the awareness that I was once so motivated in making a promise.
I expressed the intention or the desire in a broad sense to do what I have promised.
The Willa's memory simply is the perpetuation of this desire.
So much for conscience, for not. Nietzsche's enquiry then proceeds to an examination of the concept of indebtedness
because guilt and indebtedness bear a clause etymology called connexion.
The German good word for willed should also means that or indebtedness.
Nietzsche thinks this etymological connexion to suggest a conceptual one and
concludes that we stand to learn much about guilt from an analysis of indebtedness.
Not a feeling of indebtedness arises in the context of contractual relationships,
which are essentially relationships established by promising and so involved the whole apparatus designed to make such promising possible,
particularly the recourse to the infliction of pain. This is number three on the on and off precisely here.
Your rights promises are made precisely here.
The person making the promise has to have a memory made for him.
Precisely. Here we can guess it's a repository of hard, cruel,
painful things that are in order to inspire confidence that the promise of repayment will be honoured.
In order to give a guarantee of the solemnity and sanctity of his promise.
And in order to etch the duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience to pass on something to the creditor by
means of the contrast of the contract in case he does not face something which is to persist and control his body,
his wife, his freedom of luck. No contractual relationship is established between two parties when one the debtor promises
to repay the other creditor in some fashion for something such as a monetary loan,
some kind of service that the creditor agrees to provide.
If the debtor fails to keep his promise and repay it, is that in kind?
Are these liable to some form of court and court punishment? But Neidjie emphasises that punishment in this context is very red.
At any rate, a practise that looks like punishment by inflicting pain on the delinquent debtor is not an expression of disapproval.
More or otherwise, it involves no judgement on the part of either party that the delinquent that or has acted in an evil or reprehensible way,
which makes him deserving of that punishment. It is, Merrilee, but now alternative form of repayment by the debtor for the debt he contracted.
She observes that far and away the preferred form of alternative compensation in cases of delinquency is the infliction of pain.
The compensation, he writes, consists in a warrant for a title to prove it.
And he marvels at the strangeness of this idea. This is before, which I'm not going to read.
It turns out that two strange features in this conception of punishment.
First, there's this idea that every injury, the loss of possessions of a loved one and the like as its equivalent, specify a bowling ball of pleasure.
The other strange feature of cruelty is the idea that sport to make someone suffer is pleasure in its highest form.
Well,
the contract show that Nishino first to explain the latter strange feature of cruelty is that it's pleasurable because it gratifies the will to power.
Though I've argued elsewhere that the window bar is the desire to engage in the activity of confronting and overcoming resistance,
cruelty, making someone suffer. He's a party public manifestation of the will to bar in the following way.
The prospect of suffering necessarily creates resistance in its intended victim,
which the cruel individual simply overcomes by managing to make his victim suffer.
So when the chief knows that this is a quote through punishment of the tender, the creature takes part in the rights of the Masters.
He indicates that what the Predator enjoys is not the suffering of the Dederer as such,
but the overcoming of the resistance which the prospect of this suffering is bound to arouse into theatre by the very fact that he is made to suffer.
Now, it is crucial to note that original contractual relationships,
when he she I'm not relationships of trust between individuals who already possess the right to make promises.
This is why the individual who contracted that court has to have a memory made for it through the threat of court.
Hard, cruel, painful things. The purpose of which is to put extra duty and obligation of repayment into his conscience.
So the original Deborah's motivation for keeping his promises is the dread of the predator is poor.
He does not consider that his words or standing is at stake in the keeping of his promises,
and therefore he does not regard his failure to do so as wrongdoing.
And this punishment is deserved.
The fear of the unpleasant consequences of his promise breaking, which constitutes the original feeling of indebtedness,
is therefore not a feeling of guilt precisely because it does not involve a diminishment in his self-esteem.
So Nietzsche observes that if a delinquent debtor does not already feel guilty for his indebtedness,
the punishment exacted cannot arouse such a feeling. For two reasons.
The first, of course, is that he chasey others. So the debtor sees that, you know, what he did is being done to him.
And so as being able to him was a good conscience. So, you know, we disapproved of.
Which means that he cannot as niching, which is regarded as reprehensible as such.
But second, he could not regard punishment as anything more than a stroke of bad luck or the unfortunate consequence of miscalculation.
This is No. Number five on your hand out,
which recently part of it for me and you are wrong with the words overtaken by punishment have felt something has gone unexpectedly wrong here.
Not I hope not to have done that.
They submitted to punishment as you submit to illness or misfortune or death, if in those days there was any criticism of the deed.
It came from intelligence.
We must certainly see the actual effect of punishment primarily in the sharpening of intelligence, in the lengthening of the memory.
We will to be more cautious, less trusting, to go about things more circumspectly.
Fenelon. So the crucial implication of this view is that gilds kind of consist of a fear of punishment,
or if the effect of punishment Kellert arouse the feeling of guilt in those who do not already regard what
they did is wrong and can only make them more cautious and circumspect in continuing to do what they did,
then the prospect of punishment will not arouse guilt feelings either,
and will amount to nothing more than the apprehension of the unpleasant consequences of further impudence or miscalculation.
The one way to bring all this contrast is to point out that if a delinquent debtor
came to believe that he has gotten away with it and will escape punishment,
no pangs of conscience would remain.
By contrast, if he felt guilty, the conviction that he would escape punishment for his wrongdoing would not make him feel any less guilt.
And so guilt cannot be a fear of punishment. So not a bad conscience.
NUJ describes the origin of bad conscience in the following terms. Not a great read, but two fairly long passages because they are very important.
The first is this. I wrote on bad conscience as a serious illness.
Which man was forced to succumb by the pressure of the most fundamental of over changes which he experienced
that change whereby he finally found himself imprisoned within the confines of society and peace?
It must have been no different for this SMI. Unable, happy the other feet to the wilderness war, the wandering life, an adventure.
Then it was good to see animals where they were when they were forced to either be could become land animals or perish.
At one go, all instincts become devalued and suspended.
They felt they were clumsy and performing the simplest task they did on.
They have their familiar guide anymore. For this new unknown world, those regulating impulses which unconsciously led them to safety,
the poor things were reduced to relying on thinking inference, action and the connecting, of course, these effects.
Now, it's very important to notice right away that Nietzsche's conception of the state of nature
prior to socialisation is not as it is for from the helpless and dreadful state of individuals,
ill or solitary life in nature. Nietzsche is presumption individual.
By contrast, he is happily adapted to the wilderness.
Nietzsche, therefore, assumes that it must have taken an act of violence to tearing away from this happily adopted state.
And they attribute this initial act of violence to a small group of strong individuals,
some pack of Bronn beasts of free, a conqueror and master race.
As you can see, who are bent on exercising their way too far in the court shaping of a population
which had up till now been unrestrained and shapeless into a fixed form.
No. What they choose most interested in here is one party or the effect of this forced socialisation,
namely a change in division in the individual's relationship to his instincts.
As he puts it, at one vote, all its things become of where devaluated and suspended.
Not a very INSTINCT'S or regular regulating impulses which were once reliable guides to safety,
become the new social conditions of existence and come to be seen as dangerous liabilities.
I can no longer trust that the pursuit of an impulse I feel in a given circumstance will be in my best interest,
and I must instead rely on thinking Ference calculation and the connecting, of course, was effect.
Now, this first programme, followed by surprise, by socialisation,
that the audience things could no longer be trusted is compounded by another which Nietzsche describes as follows.
This is number seven.
Meanwhile, he says, all these things have not suddenly ceased to make their demands, but it was difficult and seldom possible to give in to them.
They mainly had to seek you. And as it were, underground gratifications, audience things which are not discharged outwardly turn inwards.
This is what I call the internalisation of man. All those instincts of the wild, free moving man were turned backwards against man himself.
Animosity, cruelty to pleasure of pursuing, raiding, changing and destroying all this pitted against a person who had such instincts.
That is the origin of bad conscience. So the origin of bad conscience lies in what Nietzsche calls the internalisation of man.
I've already noted one aspect of this process of improvisation the emergence of what Nietzsche calls this really dismal thing called reflection,
by which the old instincts become objects of reflective awareness. So you can imagine that the picture goes like this prior to forced socialisation.
The individual's point of view is directed outward is instinct's frame.
This point of view, but down off its focus since he's happy.
The other put it to life in the wilderness. He never has to reflect on the whole question.
Things and when they are frustrated as they are born to be from time to time, is prone to think that the problem is with the autoworker.
Always his calculations about not with those instincts themselves and the conditions of force authorisation.
By contrast, the frustration of the old INS things become systematic and this forms a reorientation of the individual's point of view, which is No.
It'd been worth his olding things become objects of reflective awareness and criticisms.
After all, they would be appropriate not to be trusted anymore.
They seemed to shade the point of view from which he thinks about all anybody needs the
world and becomes object and become objects to which is thought and evaluation are directed.
No, the remarkable effect which captures Nietzsche's attention is that this internalisation of man does not
simply consist of such a reflective reorientation of his point of view toward the inner world of existence.
It also involves what he calls a declaration of war against the old its things or a devaluation of them.
So it's no doubt true that given Nietzsche's superstition of an original state of happy adaptation,
the individual could only be induced to reflect on his instincts when they become problems or liabilities as they are.
Because in conditions in which they're pursued has become a source of systematic torment and frustration.
But it remains to be seen why their frustration actually prom's a condemnation of these old INS things themselves.
Robert. And of the new external conditions that make their satisfaction impossible.
And the explanation of this remarkable fact, according to the chief, is that,
quote, the all these things are not suddenly seised to make their demands,
but since they can no longer be discharged outwardly, they turn inwards off against themselves.
No Sane says, I know that Nietzsche singles old cruelty as a party maddigan spens of the instinct for freedom.
He describes bad conscience as, quote, cruelty turned against itself.
No, it's true that Nietzsche sometimes describes bad conscience as cruelty,
the individual directed against himself, but the means against himself insofar as he harbours cruel impulses.
So in other words, bad conscience is not any kind of instinctual deprivation, but only not talk of the instincts of freedom.
So this is a quote. This is an export of hate. He makes it to the instant of freedom forcibly made later.
The instinct of freedom forced back, repressed incarcerating was in itself and finally able to discharge and Ilija itself only against itself.
That and that alone is bad conscience in its beginnings.
No suggests suggest two ways of explaining why the instinct of freedom can discharge itself only against itself in this manner.
First, since the conditions of forced cauterisation the instinct needs Borst to be suppressed and to be discharged.
It makes good economic sense to borrow a floating phrase to make its own suppression on occasion for discharge.
Second, Nichi also suggests that under conditions of forced socialisation,
the indiscriminate suppression of by the individual of any or all of its sense things could well
threaten the coherence and survival of the social organisation and is therefore actively inhibited.
I mean, you need some instinctual modification or you need some instinct to operate well to make life.
So Sargents no bad conscience.
It's obviously an unpleasant feeling.
Nietzsche notes that we speak of the Panopto the sting of conscience and the individual with a bad conscience feels bad.
Not because he's all these things I know denied satisfaction. He feels bad for having them in the first place.
But if you think about one can feel bad for having certain instincts in all sorts of ways.
Let me give you some examples. The individual forced into suspecting might regret having more instincts,
which by now being denied satisfaction, have become a source of perpetual torment.
Or the individual who subscribes to Shobana was conception of happiness in terms of peace and contentment.
We'll deplore as Claudine's things because he deplores having any instincts at all,
since their presence proves to be the main obstacle to his happiness.
He feels bad about having them much in the way the prisoner who aspires to freedom feels bad of all these shackles.
Finally, the Christian deplores his court instance because it believes that having them diminishes his worth as a person.
He feels bad about having them in the way the sinner feels bad about this sinful proclivities.
Clearly, the devaluation of INSTINCT'S in the first two cases is going to be prudential.
Cruellest things make one unable to achieve happiness, whereas in the last case it is more calling's.
Things make one deserving of happiness, not the individuals more regrets.
What he probers his instincts on prudential rules by recognising in them obstacles to his happiness is not motivated by self directed cruelty.
His purpose in condemning his instincts is not to make himself suffer.
No, it is true that like the shopworn orien ascetic you by deliberately and systematically deny is insisting satisfaction.
But it is to the end of liberating himself from them. By becoming indifferent to the suffering caused by their frustration.
In this case you will see the war in wages against his instincts, not as only a means to his eventual liberation.
When the Wardi individual wages against his instincts is motivated by self directed cruelty.
By contrast, it becomes an act he denies is instant satisfaction.
Not in order to liberate himself from them, but in order to enjoy the very suffering their frustration causes which might incidentally,
perversely enough, require way to keep them alive in life.
No. Still, there remains a difference between the deliberate, masochistic frustration of one's cruel impulses.
What Nietzsche calls anymore bad conscience and the combination of those impulses as evil,
which makes one feel guilty for having them all more bad conscience changing the direction of cruelty to.
Putting it in words does not necessarily take the fall profit, more condemnation of it.
So although the feeling of guilt may well be a form of bad conscience, it is self directed to be manifested as more self reproach.
And that is, as a man of conscience, has not yet supplied nobody's guilt.
OK, so now let's turn to the phenomenon which she calls the body's Asian indebtedness,
but acknowledges that these enquiries into indebtedness and contractual obligation have so far ignored the modernisation of these concepts.
It's not a question.
And this is an important question on which commentators are deeply divided, concerns the nature of this, quote unquote, modernisation.
This is where going to take a stab. That, too, there are two ways of looking at it is it's on the one hand,
the process whereby the nonwar concepts of indebtedness and contractual obligation become the moral concept of guilt.
But. Oh, is it a different process whereby the concepts of guilt and obligation already
understood in a generic more science and in into service of the aims of morality?
Understood. Now, in a specific sense, namely, yes. Slave auditing or as Brian libraries called, body it a pejorative sense.
Let's see. Dick Cheney finds democratisation of the world should the fleet, which are ambiguous between the more preborn and the standard.
He defines it as port. This is on your handheld.
This is an important port. This system, Ranaan, is the way they are pushed back in to conscience,
more precisely the way bad conscience is woven together with the concept of God, or it is their relegation to bad conscience.
There's this definition is less than ideal. Be clear. It suggests that demoralised feeling of guilt.
Results from the combination of indebtedness with bad conscience.
Or more precisely, of the use of indebtedness as an instrument of self directed cruelty.
And it also suggests that the possibility of a moralised feeling of guilt requires not just the notion of indebtedness, but of indebtedness.
Scott, I always would consider briefly two contrasting lines of interpretation of dispossession that are formed into the church.
The fundamental premise of the first interpretation is that the feeling of indebtedness is not yet a feeling of guilt,
but becomes sold through its association with bad conscience and which records or much else history.
But of course, this is a view that has been defended by others as well, such as Aaron Ridley and others.
So it's not just me supporting, quote, failing to pay one's.
That's by no means decreases once, but worth as a person simply because there's no point of view from which ones of all worth as a person is assessed.
The implication of this passage is the feeling of guilt is the feeling of
indebtedness when one's worth as a person is at stake in the repayment of the debt.
The failure to repay my.
That concerns me only because of the unpleasant consequences my delinquency might bring upon me, and not because it decreases my worth as a person.
My failure to fulfil a contractual obligation with a role is a feeling of guilt.
Only if I take this obligation, due process or special character.
It is an obligation in the one of which my worth as a person is somehow at stake.
And to give it a name, I propose to quoting it categorical obligation in order to distinguish it from the
purely prudential obligation involved in three more contractual relationships.
Nietzsche and remarks that when my failure to repay my debt is the consequence of negligence or miscalculation,
I may criticise myself for my improvements on my competence.
But feeling incompetent, stupid or small, even if I believe that I have no one to blame for it but myself is not yet feeling guilty.
Only my worth as a competent, professional, capable agent is at stake.
Not my worth as a person for my prudence matters to me.
Only if the determinate answer it enables me to realise matter to me in the first place.
Of course, I mean under certain circumstances, deplore my opponents,
not just because of the unpleasant consequences it brings upon me, but also because of what it tells about me as a person.
In this case, moreover, I regard being prudent, if only implicitly, a categorical obligation.
No, it's important to note because this sort of confusion was needed in its prewar form.
The feeling of indebtedness can already be pushed back into the bad conscience and used as an instrument of self directed cruelty.
So I could imagine that harbouring cruel impulses as I do,
is a breach of contract and torture myself with thoughts of terrific punishments for harbouring them.
But if the feeling of indebtedness produces no diminution in the delinquent that self-esteem,
it is hard to see how it could be marshalled to produce more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt.
No research acknowledges this difficulty and goes on to suggest that Christianity proposes or provides a solution for it.
By introducing the notion of indebtedness towards God, which this is,
research again turns it into a deep sense of fear, complete failure with respect to what one is.
First and more foremost, they mean God's creature.
No, the problem is this is that there is if, as research argues, the feeling of indebtedness itself by no means decreases one's voice as a person.
It's very hard to see Paul making it indebtedness towards God would have this effect.
You think that this is to affect self esteem? It must be in virtue of its character and his indebtedness, not in virtue of who one is indebted to.
It must be being a delinquent that her head is such that decree's is what's worth as a person.
But in that case, the feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt, and indebtedness towards God would only intensified a feeling of.
There might be ways to improve research proposal in an attempt to circumvent this difficulty.
So, for instance, you might think that God expects us,
the Christian God expects us not only to follow his commandments, but also to treat them as ethical obligations.
That might be weird. But besides very uncertain prospects of success to required emendations would involve Davisson the addition of essential details,
such as what I just mentioned, which neither research nor any change for the better take the pain to specify.
So there's difficulty with Bush's proposal invites an alternative line of interpretation,
according to which the feeling of indebtedness would involve, prior to its modernisation,
a genuine commitment to the categorical Obree authority of the obligation,
as one has often taken such and such that the failure to discharge these obligations would cause a decrease in one's worth.
As a person of this view, which is proposed by Simon Me.
The feeling of indebtedness would already be a feeling of guilt. And I quote me.
This is no, I've never heard of the debtor creditor relationship successfully models.
It is only because it already contains the latter's key principles issue, namely of personal accountability,
which he specifies as being a strong sense that one's obligations are justified.
I take it Simon may not agree with me on this, but I should categorically justify this examination.
The chief advantage of this proposal is that by taking the feeling of indebtedness to involve a decrease in one's worth as a person,
it manages to explain how pushing back indebtedness into bad conscience will produce a distinctively more bad conscience or a feeling of guilt,
more bad conscience, as we call it, self directed cruelty manifested under the guise of more self reproach or recourse of one's self as a person.
Self directed cruelty could assume disguise by representing an individual's
continuing to harbour Cronin's things as the violation of a contractual obligation.
Given that such a function of such a violation decreases your first nor the obvious problem we are left to,
his Bybee's proposal is that if the feeling of indebtedness is already a feeling of guilt,
it becomes unclear what the warren zation of the concepts of guilt and duty could accomplish.
May himself suggest that the amortisation of guilt is called defined by the idea that one's human nature is essentially either dischargeable guilty.
Evans defective. No, I think there's a suggestion there and I want to develop.
We may differ on this suggestion by recalling first. This is important.
Tree is not always noted that the tree emphasises the fact.
What's that? As a consequence of their Mornese ation?
The concepts of guilt and duty become the exclusive property of bad conscience.
This indicates that more lies, guilt and duty can only evoke a diminished self-esteem in the age.
Who experiences that? And of course, it's easy to see how the association of bad conscience because the concept of God,
particularly the notion of indebtedness towards God, could achieve this.
The notion of indebtedness towards God is in effect a notion of an inexplicable guilt.
And the contractual obligation that cannot be fulfilled,
therefore represents a normative standard for duty that is designed only to leave man Port Power property conference of his own absolute unworthiness.
So let me not develop this interpretation of demoralisation of guilt. According to the interpretation I'm proposing.
You need change takes the Christian representation of guilt to be not a party to a cold of the ordinary feeling of guilt,
but a perversion of the human susceptibility to that feeling. This, in turn, supposes that he has a account of this ordinary feeding of guilt.
And I believe that he does and that the so-called differs in significant respects from vehicle that is officially sanctioned by the Christian outlook.
In particular, Nietzsche argues that the ordinary feeling of guilt is not an innate disposition
whose explanation requires the invocation of non-natural entities such as God.
It is, on the contrary, an acquired disposition which they robs under the causal pressure of Rajani natural forces.
He's on a comet. This is important.
Begins with the surmise that a susceptibility to the feeling of guilt emerges from the original legal practise of making contrast contracts.
This is number twelve in this sphere of legal obligations that we find a breeding role of the more conceptual world of guild.
Conscience. Duty. Sacred duty.
Since NUJ insists that the origin feeling of indebtedness is not tantamount to the feeling of guilt, we must ask Hald or not.
It could emerge from the form of the ways in which she understands it.
Feeling is being indebted in a way that decreases once more.
Is this a person which requires explanation is therefore what one source as a person
amounts to and how it could have come to be at stake in the fulfilment of one's contract?
Contractual obligations called the need for contractual relationships motivates the enterprise.
As you might recall of reading on Unevolved was the right to make promises, always a conscience.
And this, which he observes. But this is a quote, is precisely what constitutes the long history of the origins of responsibility.
So the position of the commission of a conscience, according to the chief, is what makes me a responsible agent.
Now it is crucial to understand what Nietzsche means.
My responsibility.
This complex calling someone responsible might first denote the fact that he is free and as the chief would say, could have done otherwise.
So that his action is computable to him rather than merely to some part of him or to some even told to get her external to me.
But in the second place, cording someone responsible might also referred to the fact that he can be trusted or relied upon,
that he is someone who truly has the right to make promises because his word, once given is good and secure.
Knowledge chain is interested primarily in the second sense of responsibility.
A responsible agent is one who can be trusted or relied upon because the individual who has become fully responsible in this sense,
the sovereign individual. So I go back to the early part of the essay because it provides a clue to the issues of common feelings.
We get any more precise understanding of the character of the Sangrail individual by examining the process to which he he's produced.
Nietzsche came claims that conscience, all the winner's memory is spread through pain, which he does the most powerful eight mnemonics.
It is the prospect of the pain incurred for breaking one's promises, but ensures the perpetuation of the motivation to keep them.
However, it is crucial to note that the fear of pain plays a memory and they role in the development of conscience,
but is not constructive for the fear of pain, which initially motivates the individual to control doors.
A morgue is intervening desires and emotions that conflict with his promise keeping
can eventually become replaced by one Bitchier describes as a feeling of power,
of freedom. The frustration of conflicting intervening desire is another to fulfil the promise is, of course,
itself a source of pain and the individual who learns to overcome this pain in this manner.
That is to say, learns to overcome the resistance that is opposed by those conflicting desires.
Couples to derive can come to derive a feeling of power and freedom from this overkilling.
It is at the end of this process when the feeling of freedom in part has replaced a
feel of pain as the motivation for from escaping that we find a sovereign individual,
quote unquote, 13 Ridolfi part of it.
The Freeman deposits are of a durable, unbreakable will, thus has his own standard of value in the possession of sexual viewing.
Others from his own standpoint, he respects or despises. He confers an honour when he places his trust, gives his word,
is something which can be relied on because he is strong enough to remain upright in the face of mishap or even in the face of fate.
The proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility,
the awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny has penetrated him to the depths and becomes an instinct is dominant.
This suffering cause it is conscience.
So the conscience of the sovereign individual is not, quote, an actual awareness of power and freedom.
The driving force, in other words, behind the conscience of the sovereign individual is not the feel of pain,
but the enjoyment of the feeling of power. Well,
nature doesn't explain why an agent becomes responsible only when the feeding
of part is substituted for the few of pain in motivating its promiscuity.
But to me, my wife wrote the following signals. Not first of all, that we don't call responsible anyone on whom we can depend.
To do what he has promised to do. For instance,
we will not just judge trustworthy or responsible manager who keeps his promises only because he fears the unpleasant consequences of breaking them.
And one possible motivation for attitude is in this case is the recognition that
the Ajram does not care about keeping his promises as such and would break them
the moment the unpleasant consequences of we would be either avoidable or all
outweighed by the pleasures for the sake of which he would break his promises. This suggests that we consider an agent trustworthy or responsible.
Only if he finds some positive satisfaction in promise, keeping as such an agent who derives a feeding of part of freedom from his promise keeping.
Thereby find some positive satisfactory it gratifies is willing to part.
But of course, the pleasure derived from satisfying the root bar could conceivably still be outweighed by the pleasure afforded
by the gratification of other stronger impulses solely chingo crude's that we consider truly responsible.
Of summary. Only the individual in whom the instinct for freedom to Winterbourne has become, as he puts it, the dominant.
It's No. And this is a move that is unmotivated for the cheap but very important to second nature.
Goals must take significant step further. Probably escaping and the self mastery it requires is a source not only of pleasure,
but also as if instead of proper self-esteem, the possession of a durable,
reliable RIL is for the sobering individual, a standard of thought in terms of which determines what is respectable, honourable or contemptible.
Being responsible, being responsible is therefore not just a pleasant state in which is desirable,
is ready for it is a standing or status in which defining Davonte with power of freedom is instantiated.
Being responsible makes him honourable and worthy of respect.
The notion of responsibility pawsey be framed, not the concept of personal kaputt as a standing that warrants respect.
Niching appears to suppose that it is so enduring legal framework which constitutes the
conceptual breeding ground for the feeling of guilt and his concept of responsibility.
Understood as the ability to govern one's behaviour in accordance with obligations
or commitments bears a close resemblance to the notion of rationality,
which has long been thought to distinguish human beings from animals and indeed say,
as Nietzsche constitutes man's sense of superiority over the animals,
not on the view of attributing to Nietzsche that one is the right to make promises becomes, quote, the problem organisational.
If a privilege or evidence of state or suspending the breaking of a promise will in and of
itself decrees once worth as a person in the way that's characteristic of ordinary guild,
since it puts the individual standing as a responsible agent into question.
No. There's one feature of the ordinary conception of guilt that I think this particular cold eliminates,
and it's a feature that intrigues Nietzsche greatly himself, and it's the connexion between guilt and punishment.
So according to the chain,
the legal backdrop of contractual relationships is also supposed to illuminate the connexion between guilt and punishment of suffering.
And this is before time.
In the same way it was here that the uncanny and perhaps inextricable link up between the ideas of guilt and suffering his first court together,
no doubt to a possible question would be you may ask why. You may ask one.
What hall does the victim of a wrong experience, the punishment of the perpetrator?
Or you may ask Polders forgiveness is his punishment. See some interesting psychology of guilt.
Ambridge focus on the old amount of question. No. What's what's characteristic of it?
Of difficulties. Relationship to his punishment.
Well, first of all, the guilty not only accepts his punishment, which he regards as deserved, but he also welcomes it as a way of expiated his gift.
No, it is very tempting to support, of course, that punishment experience his guilt by providing reparation for his wrongdoing.
But this Revathi view of punishment faces some significant difficulties in the first place.
And this is something that Nietzsche observes himself.
Punishment is often of such a nature, various kinds of suffering, deprivation inflicted upon the perpetrator,
but it can hardly constitute a reparation for the harm done huggin depriving the thief of his freedom,
compensate his victims for the loss of their wealth and ask people to invest.
It was Bernard Madoff who confronted with this programme.
NUJ suggests, as we know, that the suffering of the guilty provides the victim of his own doing a certain pleasure,
the pleasure of cruelty, which compensates him for them for the wrong done to him.
But the deeper difficulty is the report, if you will.
Punishment, however, lies in the supposing show that the guilty welcomes his punishment because he wishes,
before all to repair the particle damage caused by his wrongdoing.
But this is Gabriele Taylor has argued is not the case.
This is a court folktale. Fifty. The important feature of guilt is the thought of the guilty concentrates on herself as the door of the deed,
having brought about what he saw between she has harmed herself. She has put herself in a position where repayment from her is due.
But the part of the payment is not always only.
Incidently, that the more wronged should be right. This is this.
The writing from over Rome may well be the form that the repayment takes.
But from the point of view of the guilty person, this is only a means towards the end that she should be rid of the burden,
that she should be able again to live with herself.
The painfulness of the guilt feelings is therefore explained by the uneasiness of the person concerned.
The person looks and feels herself. What matters to the guilty, in other words, is the fact that by violating her obligations,
she has diminished her standing over words as a person and not primarily please.
The fact that she has caused harm in doing so.
Accordingly, the port of undergoing punishment is to restore that much spending, not to repair any harm she has caused,
even if the punishment provides some premeditation is apparently from ejido and stopped nearly two years ago,
I think helps us to see what punishment could ever assumed this peculiar significance for the guilty.
In his view, remember, the feeling of guilt is a consequence of the breaking of a promise.
No, he observes that even into pre-war legal, proper contractual framework under which the concept of guilt is supposed to emerge.
The breaking of a promise is already wrong in two different respects.
There is what he calls the immediate damage done by the agents breaking of some pretty promise.
And then there is the loss of his standing as a responsible agent who has the right to make promises.
This is part of the fourth never succeed in sentencing.
The major damage done by the offender is what you are talking about.
This is quite apart from this. The moderator is paid Braco, somebody who has broken his contract and his work.
So in this pre-war contractual context, did you suggests the standing loss is simply that of a trustworthy,
reliable promise keeper, which presumably matters to the agent and essentially prudential rights in losing constantly?
He deprived himself of the benefits of contractual relationships, particularly doors that bind him to a community.
The purpose of punishment as this case is not simply to repair the immediate damage he has done,
but to attend to risk to restore his status as a reliable from his keep.
Likewise, in the context of Lorelei's indebtedness,
the wrongdoers violation of his obligation affects his self-esteem by putting his worth as a person into question.
What he won comes from punishment is not the opportunity to repair the immediate damage his transgression has caused,
but an opportunity to restore his standing as a responsible agent. That is to say, not just somebody who is reliable and trustworthy,
contract partner in the eyes of others, but are somebody who is a sovereign individual,
one who masters his desires and emotions and is so able to conduct his life in accordance with the commitments he has undertaken.
So to restore his standing, the promise breaker would have first to accept punishment or regarded as deserved.
Such acceptance would indicate that he recognises the normatively binding character of his contractual obligations.
But he chicos the solemnity and sanctity of this promise. Did indeed acknowledge also that he was wrong and violated.
But this rule, of course, doesn't suffice to quantify him as a responsible agent who has the right to be probably seems to have this right.
He must also have acquired a memory of the world, that is to say,
the ability to maintain his motivation to fulfil his promises regardless of interview.
And even some designs, in other words, the merit to merit to the standing of a responsible agent.
He must not only sincerely believe that he ought to keep his promises, he must also prove capable of doing so.
His ability to endure the punishment would aim to provide precisely such a proof.
Keeping one's promises requires the capacity to withstand the suffering caused by the deliberate frustration of conflicting desires and emotions.
By welcoming and withstanding this punishment, the wrongdoer would seek to demonstrate that he still possesses this capacity.
Contrary to what is present, wrongdoing may suggest this may also be one.
It is not untypical of the wrongdoer who seeks to restore his responsible starting to find merit compensation for the particular wrong.
He has done insufficient and to insist on overcompensation what might look like
excessive punishment in order to provide a firmer proof of his responsibility.
So it's not always the case. So let me go through.
Let me come to the dispute. The time to which I handed it to beginning to get christner.
Guilty, Chief. In fact, this is a rational.
In the interpretation I propose proposing year genial neches years of Christian guilt exposes it as a rational,
partially rational passions are passions to which only a rational being is susceptible because they essentially exploit his responsiveness to reasons.
I cannot like any other passion over rational portions of themselves responsive to such reasons.
But this is important.
It is a distinctive trait of rational passions that their gratification requires at least the appearance of reason responsiveness.
It follows that, whereas ordinary passions typically would only override or bypass reason.
The value McMeel pretends to be responsive to recent Russian abortions who need such qualities will often end up corrupting responsiveness to reason.
Give me an example. Example Nietzsche quite lost.
The narcissistic penchant for thinking weathervanes is an instance of irrational passion to be susceptible to such a passion,
to narcissism, to be responsive to norms and to serve self-assessment reconfirm.
But in order to ensure its own gratification, his partner might also medium to correct these norms so as to ensure a favourable self-assessment.
But what I want to suggest is that the Christian skilled is another instance of
irrational passion passions which it is the passion for thinking ill of oneself,
all as the chief would say, to support the will, to find oneself, to find find himself guilty and condemned his article three feet.
Nietzsche argues that Christian guilt operates was normative expectations that
have been distorted by his passion for self debasement as he conceives of it.
Guilt, Christian guilt is indebtedness towards God,
which is the most extreme development of a particular form of indebtedness or indebtedness to the ancestors.
The individual is justified in feeling it that it only if he believes that God, the ancestors,
has in fact delivered the goods for the possession of which he feels indebted to.
You know, the distinctive feature of Christian guilt is that it is an experiment.
It is next to a law because God's gift itself is of such transcendence and holiness
that it cannot be paid off by finite animals are a finite animal being such as we are.
As Nietzsche indicates, the problem is not just that that's cannot be paid off, but that guilt is an experience.
That is to say, it's not just that a Christian cannot compensate God, but that he cannot reclaim is standing as a responsible agent.
Indeed, in so far as he was never able to fulfil his obligations to God, he could never even claim that standing in the first place.
No. Here's the thing. If Christian guilt was responsive to the normative logic of indebtedness,
we wouldn't expect a loss in a loss of belief in the existence of far of God to result in a loss of guilt.
As Nietzsche puts it, this is number 18 we should be justified in.
Did you think his normal probability that from the unstoppable decline in the face of the Christian God,
there is even not a considerable decline in the consciousness of guilt?
But Nietzsche observes, this is precisely not what happens each year.
The facts diverge from this in a terrible way, with the bodies ation of the concepts, guilt and duty and their relegation to bad conscience.
We have in reality, an attempt to reverse the direction of the development I have described, or at least to halt its movement.
Now the prospect for once and for payment is to be for a cause.
This, of course, leads Nietzsche to surmise that what is at work in Christian guilt is not answerability to existing norms of self-assessment,
but the correction of self directed cruelty. Quote,
You will already have guessed what has really gone on with all this behind all this that will determine to
oneself that suppressed cruelty of animal man who has been frighting back into himself and given little life.
We have here a sort of madness of the willing showing itself in mental cruelty,
which is a part of man's will to find himself guilty and condemned without hope of reprieve,
his will to think of himself as punished without the punishment ever measuring up to the crime.
This will to set up an ideal of God in order to be palpably convinced of his own absolute worthlessness in the face of this psycho.
It is not, in other words, because he happens to believe in a transcendent God to whom he owes more than he can repay.
The Depression feels guilty. It is wrong to, because of his will, to find himself guilty that he believes in such a God.
So in the judge's view that Christianity did not invent the ordinary concept of guilt.
But under the sway of. Anymore, bad conscience transformed it into a perfect instrument of self directed cruelty.
By introducing the notion of guilt towards God, put this man of bad conscience that she writes has seised on religious precepts in
order to provide the self-torture with its most horrific hardness and sharpness,
guilt towards God. This all becomes an instrument of torture.
No, it is self directed cruelty in the first place.
In so far as it is precisely in virtue of harbouring animal instinct such as cruelty, that man fails to fulfil his obligation towards a holy God.
Quote, In God, he seises upon the ultimate antithesis.
He confined to his real and irredeemable demotes things. He reinterprets these selfsame animal instincts as guilt before God.
And it is also a perfect form of self directed cruelty insofar as it represents guilt as it experienced prior to its Christian reinterpretation.
The distinctive feeding of diminished self esteem experienced by the guilty could
only be an imperfect instrument of self-torture because guilt could always,
in principle, be expiated. One only had to undergo punishment to restore one's voice as a person once it is conceivable,
conceived as inexplicable guilt towards God by the loss of words.
As a person becomes absolute, a loss which nothing can redeem short of radical self-denial, short or repudiation of one's animal nature.
Which of course leads us to the acetic aspiration for aspiration to a quite different kind of existence.
This, of course, is a story for another time.