So I'd like to start out by thanking again. Peter, not just for inviting people, organising and funding.
I'm really sorry. I don't know that I've ever been to one as large as this, which has run as smoothly as this has.
And the quality of the sessions has been wonderful.
Thank you. Thank you very much.
OK, so I taken the topics of the conference mind nature as an opportunity to reflect on Nietzsche's attacks on dual was my nature,
after all, two of the familiar terms in which the traditional dualism has been stated.
And I think every reader of Nietzsche quickly sees that he's a vigorous opponent of such
dualism and that he insists to the country that might be understood as a part of nature.
So he embraces some version of this. This is most vividly expressed in a famous passage from Sabratha Struggle.
But the awakened one, the one who knows, says Body am I through and through.
And nothing besides. And soul is merely a word for something about the body.
By the way, I haven't. There's an end out there which has a kind of outline of a top rhythm.
Some of the quotations I want to show, though, the issue is much more complex and I got more interesting than it might have seen.
I want to show that on the one hand, Nietzsche's attack on dualism carries him very far, much further than we initially expect.
It carries him indeed to a radical feminism that is, however, very hard to square with this other strong commitments.
And so Nietzsche has repeatedly pulled back from this modernism to duellist abuse at seeming odds with it.
This opens up a great tension, an apparent contradiction in his thinking and poses the question what philosophical means he has for addressing it.
This tension is aligned with certain others. It is thought in particular without advising from his perspective,
as I think examining this issue over monism versus dualism throws helpful light on some of these other basic issues as well.
And let me just insert quickly here. This is a new topic for me.
This is a topic on which my thinking has in many ways not quite crystallised yet.
So I hope you'll bear with me for a certain. And I may be shifting and uncertain character in some of what I have to say.
Now, as I said, I think our first reaction is that he rejects dualism altogether.
Let me start with a sketch of some pretty familiar elements of this critique of dualism and of the view nature offers in its place.
Nature doesn't especially identify this dualism with Descartes. But he clearly has InFocus,
I think a view we ourselves call Cartesian distinguishing immaterial mind a thinking
thing from body defined as entirely as extended thinking and extension matter in mind,
are of such utterly different ontological categories that they support completely different sets of properties.
It's nonsense to suppose that mind could have a weight or a shape, or that matter could have feelings or views.
Nietzsche's attack runs mainly against the mind side of this dualism of balance.
So Antichrist 14 says that Descartes boldly viewed animals as machines.
But we go further and view humans as such, too.
We see consciousness as a symptom of, quote, the relative imperfection of the organism.
Pure spirit is a pure stupidity. When we discount the nervous system and the senses, the mortal shroud.
We miscount nothing more. But really, I think nature rejects both sides of the duality.
There's no merely material body anymore than there is an incorporeal mind.
If he absorbs mind and the body, it is into a body with very different properties than Descartes smatter.
Indeed, each argues that Cartesian extension is something we interpret into the world.
It's not real, much less essential. Instead, he thinks a body as essentially a capacity due to this.
Moreover, he crucially thinks that this capacity as intentional in the sense that it means and aims at things.
So body the one substance there is to has as its most important properties,
not extension for weight or shape, but in attending's that Descartes would have restricted to mine.
Thus, feature promotes against that dualism a mind in nature, not a logical bonus.
Ultimately, there is only one kind of entity, one basically of being an entity.
Everything is of the same sort. I'll call this being Monas.
Each associates this ism and many of the related views will examine with Heraclitus.
So from philosophy and the tragic age of the Greeks, each says that keratitis, quote,
denied the duality of totally diverse worlds, a position which Anex demander had been compelled to assume.
He no longer distinguished a physical world from a metaphysical one.
I'll point out these connexions at various points. These connexions to Eric Heigl's at various points as we go.
So there is one kind of entity, and for it each has one term.
He overwhelmingly prefers life. This is his crucial notion.
I think much more important to him, the nature and also more basic and will to power, which is offered as an hypothesis about life.
Accordingly, we can understand life as capacities that aim.
Or mean everything that is according to nature is such a directness.
However, we also know that values are much more important to nature than facts.
Even more important than very basic, logical facts. So more important than his attack amounts.
A logical dualism is a parallel campaign. He fights against valuated dualism.
And this is going to be the real focus of my talk. Indeed, I think his main objection to being dualism is its service as a prop for value dualism.
People have needed to believe that being is doable and supported their belief that values are doable.
This is why nature cares about Cartesian dualism so much. It's associated with a sickness in our values,
and this sickness is more directly expressed in our tendency towards a value dualism, our faith in opposite values.
This attack of value dualism plays a major role in this thought.
It's not too much to say. I suggest that this rejection is his main reply to morality.
His main motive for replacing moral with aesthetic values, or, to put it another way,
gets his main motive for replacing a morality of good versus evil with values of good versus bad.
This attack on opposite values has been widely noticed,
but it may be more controversial to claim that nature intends to replace it with a modernism about values and others.
I mean this differently than the common. There is a common use of humanism.
But the use that I've been able to find is a view that makes a view that claims that all intrinsic value lies in a single property,
for example, happiness. I need something more radical and I think difficult than that view.
I need instead the claim that everything has the same kind of value or indeed is maybe going a little too far.
Everything has the same value and furniture.
That value is good. So the idea valuable is value voters and I suggest is that everything is good.
So values are discrepant kinds. They aren't opposite or indeed ultimately different from one another.
Now, initially, this doesn't seem like an appealing or even a coherent position, nor something that we might recognise in nature yet.
I think it's one of the views that he holds, dearest. It finds expression in many places in different degrees of completeness.
And I want to remind you of this value Mon ISM's ultimate form, where it's expressed in several of his most famous ideas.
All of them are entangled with one another, as these quotes were shown. These views are saying yes.
Turtle return, I'm more floppy and the die Nicaea. So first Nature most prides himself as someone who says yes.
He says yes to everything, even what seems most unsatisfactory in or about life, both his own life and life in general.
He commands or indeed preaches this attitude to us. This is our ancestors identity to be the ultimate yes.
Sayer quote, the opposite of a no same spirit. That's from Mecca.
And each often presents himself so in gay science two seven six.
He presents this as his New Year's ambition as a New Year's resolution.
I want to learn more and more how to see what is necessary in things as what is beautiful in them.
Thus, I will I will be one of those who make things beautiful.
And then there's a sentence about on 40. I do not want to accuse.
I do not even want to accuse the accusers. Looking away.
Be my only negation and all in all. And on the whole, someday I want only to be a yes sayer.
Now I agree with Bernard in his recent book on the importance of this.
Bernard says that, quote, Nature regards the affirmation of life as his defining philosophical achievement.
So I take the paper to explore as a word that at least one radical form, that this affirmation of life takes a second set of passages of concern.
Of course, the thought of eternal return gets entangled with this, saying yes,
so echa homo won't get the full reference introduces a total return as the highest possible formula of affirmation.
One's ability to embrace eternal return is telling precisely because it shows that one can say yes to everything,
even the most repellent features of life. So the thought of eternal return serves are the stre as, quote,
one more reason for himself to be the eternal yes to all things the incredible boundless.
Yes, saying a menacing third set of passages concern more thought to one example again from echa homo.
Both a formula for greatness in a human being is off or phonte.
That one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not an all eternity, not merely bare what is necessary, but love.
And then fourthly, the die. Nicaea also of course, involves this.
Yes. Saying passage from God to power.
Forty one quote a diet Nicaea an affirmation of the world as it is without subtraction, exception or selection.
The highest state a philosopher can attain to stand in a die I see in relationship to existence.
My formula for this is of our 40 and then go to PowerGen 52.
No, it says that in the nine ICN state quote, being is counted as wholly enough to justify even a monstrous amount of suffering.
Now, it might be doubted, though, that this saying yes, even saying yes to everything,
really involves a value of moaners that is saying that each thing is good.
So Miten, Nietzsche's point instead, B, that the sum or totality of life is good.
Not that every single instance of it is. So like his idea B, that there are a lot of bad things in the totality.
But that they're outweighed by the good things. So the affirmation as a word applies to the totality, but is not distributed down to each member.
All of the individual entities in this case, the affirmation would be only a yes to the song.
And often it seems that that's what Eesha is indeed saying.
It seems that he's judging the aggregate and that he's not inclined in some passages to say that the weak or the sick or the herd,
like, for example, are good. But I'm going to argue that neutral means,
at least at these moments when he thinks ultimate thoughts about eternal return and so on, that we must say yes to each thing.
That is, we have to recognise each thing as good. So the affirmation, I'm going to say, is also at least yes to each.
We've seen that willing a turtle return requires saying yes to even the most repellent parts or aspects of life.
The drama of South Australia, in fact, hinges on the difficulty of this last step, too.
Will the recurrence of even the most loathsome Zarit history marks how it is easy to turn eternal return into a mire song.
Pretty dirty song. It's also translated depicting the cyclical character of everything beautifully.
What's hard is to think this thought with respect to what one dislikes the most in Zaara destroys case,
the small man to the tawdry in, I think himself and in others.
The challenge is not just to say yes to a world that contains this, I suggest, but to say yes to this particular detested thing itself.
Also notice in this regard how low develops the indispensability of the small and the sick in nature himself.
He loves even this about himself.
This distribution of intrinsic value down to every individual bit of life is buttressed by nature's metaphysical claim that everything is essential.
Nothing in the world and all its history could be different without everything being different in as much as everything is essential.
To say yes to anything requires saying yes to everything.
This is a passage from Sara Strub. Did you ever say yes to a single joy?
All my friends. Then you said yes to all well as well. All things are chained together, entwined in love.
If you ever wanted one time, a second time, if you ever said you please me happiness.
Quick moment. Then you wanted it all back. Nevertheless, I think even this isn't as strong as nature sometimes makes the point,
for it still allows that many things could be good only instrumentally, only because they are necessary for other things that are good.
It allows that although we say yes to each thing,
we say yes to some of these things only because they are a means to necessary for other things that are intrinsically good.
But I claim to each up at least sometimes wants the point to be that they are also good intrinsically.
That is good in their own right for for themselves. So I suggest the affirmation of these sometimes is even stronger.
It's a yes to each for itself. So it's not enough to value the weak for the use they serve to the strong or to the economy of the whole.
We must somehow value weakness for itself.
Now, as we'll see, one main argument he makes is that weakness, for example, is not just causally necessary for certain goods,
but essential or logically necessary in such a way that it is a constituent element of those goods.
Now, notice that even that still leaves these things goodness dependent on an argument from the goodness of the more encompassing things.
And I don't think the media is always content even with that.
It's not clear that weakness would be intrinsically good in this case, where it's good as an element in a larger situation.
So look it w will to power two nine three. Nothing that happened at all can be in itself reprehensible for what should not want to eliminate it,
for everything is so bound up with everything else that to want to exclude something means to exclude everything.
A reprehensible action means of reprehensive world. At sometimes the point is that everything, at least everything alive is in it by itself,
wholly and in some sense of equal value as our illustrious animals put it.
The centre is everywhere. That seems to me to articulate the idea that everything is of equal value.
Now these ideas. Bring nature into harmony with certain mysticism and Pantha isms, Heraclitus passage, the God.
Day, night. Winter summer war. Peace, satiety, hunger and philosophy.
The tragic age of the Greeks says about Heraclitus. Before the gods fire gays.
Not a prop of injustice remains in the world for all around him and for each year to the views associated with the day of vacation of all life.
It's not just good, but holy wield power. 1005, says the children.
Howard, quote, did not understand how to deify the will.
He failed to grasp that there can be an infinite variety of ways of being different.
Even a being God's will to power 10 50 says the not at the nine ICN means, quote,
the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies and calls good.
Even the most terrible and questionable qualities of life and to power tend to be too, says the Duyen ICN.
Is the record of religious affirmation of life like whole and not denied or in part.
Now, one way to put the puzzle behind eventually going to come back to is mysticism is commonly promote on non willing or selflessness.
So how can this value Moate ism that I'm attributing to nature be consistent with in nature, with the promotion of willing and selfishness?
Now, as mysticism as must be, this is both very hard to spell out and very hard to adhere to.
It's difficult to state this value cronyism ism in a way that seems coherent.
It seems to issue in various contradictions. Does saying that everything is good and so denying opposite values mean that nothing is bad?
Or if we say that some things are bad? How is this consistent with also saying yes to that?
And don't values need to come with opposites? To say that X is good requires some.
Supposing that something else is, by contrast, bad, it seems.
What sense can there be in saying that everything is good?
It seems that each home must be equal to a value dualism by the very need to make judgements, pro and con.
This difficulty is compounded if we take the view to be that everything is not just good but equally good.
Centre is everywhere for this case. Not only can we distinguish some is good and others is bad, but we can't even make distinctions.
A monk. Yes, right. But we can't even make distinctions amongst the good.
We can't frank the good. We can't make up for the loss of the contrast turned bad by shifting to the idea.
That's good.
This makes it harder to see how the all affirming stance is consistent with valuing at all, since valuing, it seems, involves making distinctions.
Moreover, further complication. Some bits of life are themselves cases of say no.
So when we say yes to everything, it seems we are also saying yes to say no.
This calls into question in what sense nature can be commending to us saying yes rather than saying no.
Isn't he in effect saying sorry? Isn't he in effect saying yes to saying yes, but saying no to saying no?
Hence not universally affirming after all. So there are these various puzzles, I think, that are wrapped up in this idea.
Moreover, Nietzsche will be the first to say that living requires not just saying yes, but also saying no.
Sometimes he seems to make this very point in reply to the most ideas that we just looked at.
So we'll to power three, three,
three to desire that something should be different from what it is means to desire that everything should be different.
It involves a condemnatory critique of the whole. But life itself is such a desire.
So life involves desiring the desiring is itself a wanting to be other.
That is strictly a rejecting of the whole life indeed requires us not just to say no, but even to hate and fight against somethings.
As Nietzsche himself obviously did. And so to say, a very emphatic and vehement no.
Indeed, when the diet Nicene instance loves destruction, it loves the most violently practical way of saying no.
So how can that Baule humanism be liveable or even coherent?
Once nature makes value, monism require so very much as he does in those thoughts about universal affirmation.
He sets a lower standard. For a value dualism, which it's very difficult then for him to avoid falling into.
Now, Nietzsche himself is well aware of the apparent discrepancy between his claimed
identity as the ultimate yes sayer and his constant devastating attacks and critiques.
Hello. I obey my and I see a nature which does not know how to separate.
Doing no from saying yes. Nature more acutely and aggressively than any of us wants to bring out evaluative differences and distinctions.
Ways that some things fail and fall short of ways they might and should be.
Indeed, one of these, as noted, this is very attack on value dualism.
But this makes him prone to certain value judgements.
That's after all. Moreover, the need to say no.
So it radically overriding or suspending the mode ism in his values leads Egypt to temper it.
I suggest in his ontology as well, he's pulled towards a by frication of organisms or persons who are drives into two opposite kinds,
reflecting their sharply different intrinsic value. Everything is life.
Indeed, but life comes in two antithetical kinds.
One of which has lost part of what is essential to life. It not only takes a position against life,
it's a. like it falls away from the full nature of life and nature especially tends to view mine or reason in particular.
In this way. So then he reproduces, started out with the seeming dualism of mind in nature.
I'm suggesting now is that he replaces he, as it were, repeats this dualism in some of his thoughts in the value added realm.
He reproduces a version of the mind nature dualism, after all, by making that mind a principle contrary to life.
So he bifurcates into active, reactive, healthy, sick, weak, strong, as if they are distinct kinds of persons or organisms.
Of course, we find this tendency of leeches to bifurcates in many other places as well, you know,
beginning with the Apollonian diet and ICN distinction, also in the Master Spacestation and so on.
OK. Now, in many cases, in many such cases,
he uses by Frication to express a kind of fervour or even fury that's comparable to the moral denunciations he criticises.
This doonas tendency is most active where nature offers its values most truly, which is in the Antichrist longboat.
I think I've read it. It's from Antichrist 18, condemning the Christian idea of God.
The problem, man, is to explain how nature can be at once.
The person who says yes to life in general and in each particular, and the one who is relentlessly and harshly naked in most of his appraiser's.
And what's a value most and a value duellist?
Now, I think a first reaction to my sketch of this problem is that his real allegiance is to neither Bonas nor dualism,
and that we should really see him as a pluralist with respect to being or what is.
We remark his emphasis on the great diversity of different kinds of life and persons and social and historical settings.
Similarly, with respect to values, Nietzsche thinks that the value of people comes in a great hierarchy of degrees.
All the steps of the ladder he so often imagines.
However, I think these pluralism is about being in value are really consistent with his MÔN isms here.
The great diversity of forms of life are, after all, all forms of life.
The one fundamental kind of thing there is.
And similarly, I'll try to show for the great hierarchy or ladder of values, they are all ways of having the goodness that belongs to life.
So the pluralism by itself, I think, doesn't pose a threat to my account.
Features Monas. However, the pluralism may be associated with another doctrine that raises greater problems.
And this is Nietzsche's so-called perspective ism.
Sometimes it seems he gives authority concerning being concerning values to all, or at least to a great plurality of perspectives.
He makes being an value person. But Tibo. It seems we might take him to exemplify this perspective ism in his own
freewheeling way of articulating a great scatter of perspectives all by himself.
So he sometimes expresses phoniest sympathy sentiments, other times duellist, other times pluralist.
But the last the suggestion. Maybe is also the view of the pluralists is also the view that he holds at the metal level.
And so there's a kind of perspective of pluralism which embeds mon ism and dualism within it.
Now, for these and other reasons, it may well seem that there isn't a serious question here as to whether each is an honest or to do.
But I want to persuade you that these are indeed two powerful tendencies or inclinations
in one or the other of which finds expression in most of his most famous views.
I'm not going to skip the section which which I compact's on the topic of the conference and discuss the being monism teeth to this kind of nature.
And I'm going to turn to I want to focus now on one famous way that each of states his value modernism as an attack on opposite values.
The most prominent locus for this is his critique of metaphysics and beyond good and evil, too.
There's a famous passage for the fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in opposite values and the ongoing evil tooth.
It goes on to say that no one may doubt first whether there are any opposites at all.
Moreover, it's possible that both what constitutes the value of these good and revered things is
precisely that they are insidiously related to a related tie to an involved with these wicked,
seemingly opposite things. Maybe even one with them.
In essence, this line of thought is developed in many other places, both later and beyond, good and evil and elsewhere.
So beyond good and evil 47 quote The dominion of morals.
It believed in opposite moral values and saw read interpreted these opposites into the text and the facts.
Zaara thus draw the historical zah at this try. Nature's conception was in the adventure of the good evil opposition of the value dualism.
And so the spokes are history is the story of his recantation of vandalism.
This is a point that we find Meachem making from very early on.
I read a passage from human to human, the very first section of it, which I am going to skip over.
I think it's clear that this rejection of opposite values is part of the complaint against the values of good versus evil.
The kind of values he often calls just slave morality and sometimes just morality.
I think it's clear this rejection of opposite values that that part of his
criticism of these values is directed against what they value their content,
but that some of it is also directed against how they value these contents.
And that formal part of his criticism of good, evil morality part is against the way good and evil polarises or bifurcates the world.
So when each offers his own valuations of things healthy or sick, as strong or weak, as high or low, I'm going to sum these as simply good and bad.
He presumably means those contrasts not as opposite values.
So I think we can take it that the sense in which nature denies that values are opposite is a key to the sense in which he rejects valuing dualism.
Hence to the way he's a value focussed. So just what does he mean by his denial of homosexuality?
It seems a natural and obvious distinction in Nietzsche's voice. But what does a really consistent.
What is it to have one's values as opposites? In what sense are good and evil meant as opposites?
But each his own values of good. Bad. Not now.
Not surprisingly, analysis shows. I think, that nature means a variety of things.
In his critiques of opposite values, in the various passages in which he treats this theme, I want to try to organise some of this variety.
I'm going to arrange it from weakest to strongest,
starting with the more obvious in ordinary things he means and building to the more radical and difficult.
These weaker points, I think, are, as it were, the steps by which he tries to help us and himself up to the ultimate lesson.
And we when we get to the most radical sense, we will have arrived back at the strong value voters in my survey before.
And I'm then going to return to the question how each can consistently or accurately hold it now before proceeding to this catwalk.
I need to make a few background orienting points I want to set.
Aside, a couple of special issues that cut against the grain of the census that I'll distinguish.
So first background point, these census that I'll distinguish of having opposite values of value dualism are all ways of thinking about one's values.
They're matters of the status one attributes to them.
Now, it might be argued against this that having opposite values is really for nature, not a matter of how you think or as a word.
cognise your values, but a matter of the emotive force with which you hold them.
So in the receptors, no, there's a special intensity of animosity towards his enemies.
And this strength or ship shape of feeling might be thought to be the really crucial element in the judgement.
Evil nature does indeed emphasise this difference in feeling that the strong birds of prey,
as he once memorably puts it, are a lot more favourably disposed towards those.
They judge bad lambs than a ladder out towards them.
But I think Nietzsche clearly believes that this emotive force is fuelled and justified by certain beliefs about the status of one's values.
Good and evil are meant are thought to be values of a particular kind, not just felt with a certain intensity or from certain ulterior motives.
And Nietzsche's own way of altering the feeling is by altering those beliefs, the senses of having opposite values.
All distinguished. Second, second, background point.
The census of having opposite values that are distinguished are all meant as general points about how any values are held.
So I'm taking them as not directed against and limited to particular value contents.
Now sometimes we'll see when we look at the passages that nature's complaint is not against having opposite values per say,
but against valuing certain particular things as opposites, viewing certain things as an opposite.
It's sometimes that seems to be more a critique of the good evil opposition as it is widely held today.
But these particular things called evil are in fact a better, more valuable than those called good.
So aggressiveness or suffering were taken as evil, but are in fact value.
And the Diane ICANN embraces these in particular. It might be thought, but not other things.
So will power ten forty one. It is part of this by an icy and state to proceed, not merely the necessity of those sides of existence hitherto to deny,
but their desirability and not their desirability merely in relation to the sites hitherto affirmed.
Perhaps as a compliment, a precondition, but for their own sake, as the more powerful,
more fruitful, truer sides of existence in which its will finds clearer expression.
So no evil side about just valuing the good side.
And that seems to open an opposite kind of dualism. And that's, in fact, the way that particular passage goes on.
This is nature very often makes his point against opposite values with respect to good and evil.
We have to consider whether he really would apply the point to his own values.
Would he also say of the things he calls bad or sick or weak or hurt like that?
They are also good. My claim is that he does that evil, that he denies that dualism.
He denies dualism. It affirms a kind of monism also with respect to his own values.
So my suggestion is that we need to separate out from his attacks on the evil, the good evil dichotomy.
Those elements that are directed against or only value balut, given its content, the particular trade signals.
Good. And the problem of value dualism is the question whether it turns out to be mostly a matter of context.
So the Nietzsche's own values are just about as dualistic as equal values.
So the following I'm going to preserve the teacher also means to deny that his good and bad are opposite values,
that his arguments against opposite values militate against taking good and bad.
So as well. OK, now let's proceed now to the things that each a might and sometimes does, I think mean by his attack on having opposite values.
So the first and weakest suggestion is this.
Values. Good and bad don't originate. You aren't somehow rounded different ontological realms.
So good in particular, doesn't Utian from an immaterial substance such as a free and rational soul?
Sometimes the opposite ends of dualistic value seems to lie just in the claim.
These values are grounded in such a dualism.
So NEACH often makes the point that good actions must be explained by the same naturalistic principles that apply to the bad.
In particular, the same aggressive and sensual bodily drives that have long been blamed for bad
behaviour are also the ultimate source of even our most altruistic and saintly acts.
Will power 375000 all the drives and powers that morality praises seem to me to be essentially the same as those names and rejects.
That is our Chief Justice as world power wheel to truth, as a tool of the will to power and wield power to seven.
To quote my purpose, to demonstrate the absolute homogeneity of all events and the application of moral distinctions
has occasioned by perspective to demonstrate how everything praised as moral is identical,
in essence, with everything immoral and was made possible as in every development of morality within moral means.
And Morgan ends. Similarly, he stresses how good and evil traits morph into one another.
Here I have another hepatitis passage. For comparison, Heraclitus says the same.
Living and dead and waking and sleeping and young and old for these transposed are those and those transposed again are these.
So on this reading, this first reading value dualism is defined by its metaphysical postulation of another world.
Nietzsche here cleaves to a literal sense of metaphysics beyond nature.
It's postulating something apart from nature, life.
So this passage from geneology morality, the idea we are fighting about here is the valuation of our life on the part of the ascetic priest.
He relates our life together with that to which it belongs.
Nature, world, the entire sphere of becoming a transit hairiness to an entirely different kind of existence,
which it opposes and excludes, unless perhaps it works in turn against itself to negate itself.
So understood, Nietzsche's critique of value dualism would be straightforward.
There is no such other world. No separate kind of cause will to power 786.
One has invented an antithesis to the motivating forces and believes one has described another kind of force.
One has imagined that premium will be light. That does not exist at all.
According to the valuation that involved the antithesis moral and immoral in general,
one has to say there are only immoral intentions and actions later.
Altruistic actions are only a species of egoistic actions.
So here the value of dualism here, the here, the being here, the being monism is used to refute value dualism with understanding the latter.
As my definition positing being dualism elsewhere, however,
I think it's clear that Meecham doesn't just reduce value dualism to this view that hangs on being dualism,
although being dualism is often used to support value dualism.
He thinks the value dualism has an independent motive and an independent identity.
Then this reference to an other worldly source. Second thing, the second somewhat stronger thing,
that the denial of opposite values might mean values good that are never instantiated purely or completely.
To put the APA point abstractly, no X is ever fully good or fully bad.
But of course there are many different ways of understanding this, depending first on how we understand what replaces X in the claim as nature means.
So first, does the point apply to types of entities or does it apply to particular's?
Isn't, for example, suffering as a kind of human experience that nature claims is not fully bad,
but also good in this case of nature's point might be that there are some cases in which suffering is good and he would allow it to be possible.
Then in other cases it is just bad. So that would be to treat.
You know what it is that is never fully good or fully bad as a type of of of property, or is it rather than suffering?
In each instance, as undergone by a particular organism in some particular situation, is always good as well as bad.
Now, I encourage you to look at Nietzsche's arguments here. Many of them, I think, support only the former claim former we.
For example,
the argument that suffering is essential for growth or creativity seems to apply only to particular kinds of suffering of particular people.
But the latter view, the claim that suffering in each case is always good as well as bad.
That is obviously a much stronger view and much more difficult to argue or accept.
Does nature think that even the bodily suffering of those quite unable to overcome it and to grow through it is also good nevertheless,
although harder to accept?
It seems to me that nature does hold the stronger view, at least in these sort of transcendent moments in which he is a universal yes sayer.
The second question that comes up about this, this way of understanding the denial of opposite values,
what is the range or level of entities that the ex applies to when he says that no ex is ever fully good or bad?
Is it that no person is ever thoroughly good or bad?
That would leave it open. That's some particular acts by a person. Could be thoroughly good or thoroughly bad.
Or does the point apply also to particular acts such as acting from pity or experiences such as a suffering, a particular suffering?
Again, it seems to me if you look at Nietzsche's arguments, I think you'll see that many of them apply only to the weaker point.
But it seems to me he is trying to drive us, steer us towards the stronger point.
He wants the stronger point. He, it seems to me, wants to deny value purity all the way down.
OK. Now why? And then I could actually skip over.
I mean, there's a further number of distinctions about trying to examine what that value purity might how it might be understood,
know whether it's a matter of how the denial of the value of purity might be understood,
whether it's a matter that everything has parts that are good as well as parts that are bad,
whether it's a matter of having aspects that are good at aspects that are bad or
whether it's a matter of having facts that are good as well as effects that are bad.
If there are various ways, it seems to me that the argument gets put by him, skip over this complexity.
Why does nature thing or how does he argue that there is no pure good or bad leaving out a perspective ist argument?
I think there are two main reasons. First is an entity.
The person the drive in act is never completely good or bad because each depends practically on being the other.
In some way.
So will the power, 351 says against what he calls the BGA of the good man who separates off one side of various dualisms and insists on just quote,
what is good unconditioned. One also knows how to be evil.
One is evil because otherwise one would not understand how to be good.
Whence then comes the sickness, an ideological unnaturalness that rejects this doubleness, that teaches that it is a higher thing to be efficient.
On only one side, whence comes the Hema PGA of virtue, the invention of the good man.
This unnaturalness corresponds then to that dualistic conception of a merely good and a merely evil creature.
So the idea is that as a practically speaking, you can only be good if you also have bad traits, may be bad if you also are good at certain ways.
You are a good thief or better yet and only be bad as a thief.
Not sure just how to put that. Let me let me skip that over. Okay. Second second kind of argument.
I think you give nothing. No person drive or act is ever completely good or bad because it inevitably has
opposite effects on different organisms or people due to the immense differences.
The different people in action say effects it will inevitably further some, but inhibit others.
OK. Now, although nature does rule all of these points, I think you would find.
I think you recognise all of these as arguments that he makes in various places, makes all of these points rejecting value purity.
I think this still is at the gist of his point.
And I think we should suspect this when we see how easy it is to agree with most of these planes will readily admit that nobody's perfect.
Perhaps we'll also be happy to apply this even to particular acts or experiences.
Isn't there always at least some tinge of the negative in any action?
Perhaps we'll also agree that things effects are multifarious and that some of them are good, some of them are bad in this way.
This isn't very far from common sense.
It seems quite consistent with ratter ordinary ambition to analyse and sum up the manifold goods and bads of a person or an act.
And so arrive at judgements about its overall goodness or badness.
It doesn't change, as it were, the logic of good and bad themselves.
But only the conception of how they're distributed in the world, distributed in true intermittently, as it were, not concentrated or pure.
So I want to go on now to more radical claims of a claim about the logic of good and bad, rather than about how they happen to show up in the world.
So the third thing that he might mean by the denial about this, about this,
is that values good and bad are scalar or comparative rather than bifurcating or inherent.
So the reasons that I talk about just now for thinking that good and bad must always be co instantiated are causal reasons and some empirical reasons.
But each, I think, also has what you might call conceptual reasons, connecting good and bad by necessity.
The simplest form of such an argument is to call something good requires that there be a bad.
It's contrasted with. So there's something incoherent about hoping for a world in which bad.
The contrast case is eliminated. Again, a quote from Heraclitus.
For humans to get all they want is not better. Disease makes health sweet and good.
Hunger, satiety weariness. Blessed quote from nature to power.
Three five one. It takes good and evil for realities that contradict one another.
Not as complimentary value concepts, which would be the truth.
It advises taking the side of the good desires. The good should renounce and oppose the evil down to its ultimate roots.
Yet there, with actually a nice life, which has in all its instincts, both yes and no.
But each, I think, makes us stronger and more interesting point than this.
Good requires bad not just for contrast, but as an element in itself.
Good is always an overcoming of a bad in one that way that nature argues this is with respect to suffering.
And again, I refer to Bernhard's develops this point, I think, very well.
He says that suffering is valued for its own sake because it is metaphysically necessary for creativity,
as overcoming creativity is always an overcoming of suffering.
More generally, it seems to me, we can find this logic in Nietzsche's idea of power.
As a matter of overcoming power is a growth that rises above something it leaves behind as bad.
This can be another organism that incorporates but more essentially, I think it's the inferior earlier condition itself.
Power is precisely the transition from a good, from a bad to a good.
And so depends on both elements. Hence good and bad.
And in an asymmetric relation, Reachin says the latter is presupposed by even contained within the former as what it overcomes.
But that doesn't in the same way contain good is not a dissent from the good nature draws the lesson from this applied not to good bad,
but to pleasure pain that they are therefore not opposites. This is world power.
Six, nine, nine. Pain is something different from pleasure.
I mean to say it is not. Its opposite for unpleasant. And this is now not prose but sort of summary for unplayed here isn't it.
Reading Indian pleasure.
As we see from tickling and sex, which nature thinks are pleasures composed of quote, a certain rhythmic succession of small and pleasurable stimuli.
End quote. But pleasure is not simply contained within pain.
Similarly, Southeaster says that creating requires destroying and quote, thus does the.
People belong to the highest good, but the latter is the creator of this ideas expressed, of course,
in the way nature so commonly thinks of values in terms of the scale or ladder up which we aspire to ascend.
Let's see. I think I'm going to have to skips things.
Yes, I'm going to skip and I'm going to go on to the fourth thing that each home might mean by the dialogue's values.
And that is what I want to say, is that each goes an important step beyond this point that I just made,
which is I'm suggesting a kind of scalar point that there is a lack of value
and that things have value by their relative positions in this latter nature.
Those important step beyond the scalar point, he specifies the common values which fall of these positions are degrees of.
He specifies the common value as good. So he takes the opposite stance.
We might say from and power for whom all life is bad and all quote unquote goods are merely lesser degrees of bad.
So escape from willing is, as it were, it was zero degree of bad for children or the best we can do.
Now, let's say that this is really what the Yes. Say good speech to that.
The common value which there are all of these degrees is good.
To say yes to something is to judge it good and saying yes to everything is to judge everything is good
is to place everything on a scale of values whose common character is that the common value is good now.
So we'll power ten thirty five God conceived as an emancipation from morality,
taking into himself the whole fullness of life's antithesis and its divine torment, redeeming and justifying them.
God is beyond and above the wretched Bofors morality of good and evil.
So Beach's ultimate judgement of things is that they are good.
It seems that when he calls them bad, this must be kind of specification of their goodness.
Their badness is their way of being good. That simply means less good at what they could do.
So well. The bad. Occupy the same scale as the grid.
By contrast, in the good evil morality, the evil are not treated as.
That's good. They don't have a common project with too good. It's not the case in that morality that their goodness is a way of being bad.
It's offering to nurture the goodness of things on the scale is not a way of being bad.
Only the opposite holds. Now, of course, we should ask, what grounds does nature have for this?
Why believe that all bad is a form of good?
Now, from God's eye point of view, why doesn't everything just become a location on this scale at once, both good to an extent and bad to an extent.
Now, in the positiveness period, I think Nietzsche accepts this lesson. So that from an ultimate viewpoint, there aren't a certain sense, no values.
They're just positions on a certain scale. And I have a quote here from human to human.
One one seven, which I'm not going to read. But in his later writings, he throws himself back into value into valuing everything as good.
OK. Now, why? So why do you think that's why do you think that all of the values on this scale.
Good. I think that his his argument is ultimately the role that life plays in constituting all values.
So there are values only by virtue of like value is only in life's value.
Moreover, what life values as good is itself more of itself.
So life as the transcendental condition of all values.
And as the built in aim of all values is the ultimate good.
So what we can say from the broadest perspective, the perspective of life, is that life is good.
Any distinctions we go on to make? We'll speak of only one kind of life.
This will find some life good and other life bad. So beyond.
So, so low. The Monas perspective of life itself. There's a value of pluralism.
There are different goods internally to the different perspectives. But from the transcendent point of view, point of view as a work of life itself.
Life is simply the good. And I suggest that this is a key feature of the good, bad values nature promotes in place of the good evil morality.
It operates with the orienting judgement that life itself in general.
And in every instance is good. And Nietzsche's chief argument against the good, evil,
morality or Christianity or the ascetic ideal is that it operates with ultimately the opposite judgement that life is bad.
Now, there is still a question why this universal gas doesn't collapse the scale of values together and lead to a blanket or monochrome affirmation.
Can nature really reconcile,
harmonise this universal yes to the idea of a comparative scale and its determination of one direction or relation as bad?
How can we affirm universally yet still say no?
How can that be a degree of good? We know that Egypt is extremely ready to say no.
His work is not a universal yes. Say. And in fact, he explicitly rejects up like an affirmation.
Certain passages. I have a quotation from Sir of those dropped three above, which I won't read.
So the question is, how can you just say yes to life, not just in the aggregate, but also in every individual, but also go on to say no?
That is disvalue evaluate his bad. So many things. How can he consistently disvalue anything?
This is what I want to address. In the last section, which I'm going to have to skate through very quickly.
OK. So my suggestion is that each has two strategies for responding to this problem.
The problem, how he cannot once affirm everything as good.
Yet on the other hand, a value of two distinctions and say no to many particular things.
Now, a first so first possible answer is this.
The teacher simply passes back and forth in these different passages between two perspectives.
On the one hand, a transcendental perspective that sees life has ultimate value.
Secondly, a perspective within life, his own perspective. The disvalue is many kinds of life.
So another passage from Heraclitus, a famous passage. I guess it's not supposed to be Heraclitus, his words, but an approximation for God.
All things are beautiful. No value when we occupy the transcendent perspective.
But then we throw ourselves back into life and into the internal.
Yes and no value required for living. OK.
Now I have passages to show that he does, in fact, think of that transcendent perspective as a perspective.
And that he thinks of a sometimes describes it as a temporary perspective. OK.
So one way to accommodate dualism is to say that the moment is certain, yet the monism is offered from God's eye super.
Her perspective, I would position the dualism is offered from within Nietzsche's personal view.
But as it stands,
I think we have to notice that this reading of nature performs a by frication of his position into two views that don't affect one another.
The transcendental. Yes, saying approves of the within life, saying no.
But it doesn't affect how we say no or what we say no to.
So it is in this respect at least photios it turns a wheel in the transcendental essay doesn't affect the way in which we sing within life.
Surely that can't be so. Nature surely wants to improve the ways that we judge.
Yes and no. Within life by virtue of that honest insight.
Now I think there are resources to begin to answer that challenge already within the perspective, try to position itself to really go fast here.
But for now, you can say that even though the divine perspective doesn't can't determine within like any particular values for us,
it can affect how we hold those values. It can demand that we hold them just as our values.
That is, recognising their perspectival status, recognising their containment within a divine value in all of life.
So we go back into differential valuing in a way that preserves in a certain sense that transcend transcendentally inside.
In particular, we don't take values to come from some other world. We sometimes somehow hold the back of our minds the recognition that these values
are just powers and that the values of others we oppose are also equally valid,
the expressions of life and pro life. So it was Arthus drove three above.
But he has discovered himself who can say this is by good and evil?
OK. And we might think, by contrast,
that the key point in holding opposite values is the refusal to step into the other viewpoint, the rejection of it altogether.
I think there's a lot in favour of this perspective.
First, as a resolution of the tension that I'm trying to bring out, but I think of nature often has a strong position.
Nature often wants to draw from the transcendent affirmative perspective.
He wants to draw not just, as it were, a way of having values.
He wants to draw particular value content's conclusions about what we should value within life.
And in order to get these value contents out of the value Mohsin, nature needs to specify in life as well to power.
This lets him specify an ultimate point to life. An essential aim in its valuing.
And this lets the moaners of deliver a value content that can be then be used as a standard in evaluating particular cases of life.
So now particular values are not just my point of view.
And the only virtue is not just recognising that status. Now values can be judged by how well they serve life's ultimate end, which is power.
Life as well to power can be graded by the goal of power.
Does a particular organism wield power effectively? What degree of power does a particular organism achieve?
So the individual each of is able to take the point of view of life and make differential values differential judgements on its behalf.
OK. Now.
OK, so the last question I have, and I'm sorry I'm going over the last point that I have, is that Miccio taking this strong position,
using this way of drawing out of the value monas, that God's eye perspective, particular value to conclusions.
He does this in a way which strongly reintroduces bifurcating values.
He does this in a way.
See, the suggestion is one could do it in such a way that one gets that simply the kind of scalar values that I was talking about before.
But that's not how nature often those are not often teaching extracts values
from the value mechanism which have this or bifurcating and duellist character.
And that is expressed in this argumentative locale in Nietzsche's accusation that some life is anti life.
I think it's very telling that his arguments often take this form. This is where his duellist urge gets its place.
Closest to my heart, I think, of his system. He claims that not just that there are some people who are stronger than others, you know, relatively.
He claims that some individuals are sick in the sense that they are directed contrary to the essential end of life.
Moreover, he claims that some people are so sick that they are actually anti life.
So the ascetic ideal is hostile to life. And this is, I think, the way in which he puts the, as it were,
the lesson that he extracts from the value of wisdom when he is most, as it were, value was to bifurcating.
So, for example, I get home 047 But Christianity is criminality, par excellence.
The crime against life. This is the only morality that has been taught so far.
The morality of unselfish demonstrates a will to the end. It negates life as the most basic level.
OK. I have I have a last section which is going to show how even this value dualism,
which has some at times extracts from a value mechanism, is itself sort of reconciled or harmonised with the monism.