The title of my papers. Who is the sovereign individual, Nuccio and Freedom Papers should run about 50 minutes.
That should leave us with discussion. So most readers of Nature's on the Genealogy of Morality over the last century, would,
one suspects be astonished to discover the provenance recent scholarship has given to
the enigmatic figure of the sovereign individual who appears just once in Section two?
The second essay geneology and never appears again in the geneology or indeed anywhere else in the corpus.
Yet, according to Keith, answered Pierson, for example, and I quote,
The overriding aim of the genealogy of morals is to show that what kont in the modern
legal tradition of moral and political philosophy and moral political thought simply
take for granted the sovereign individual in possession of a free will and conscience
is in reality the product of a specific historical labour of culture or civilisation.
And quote, If this were really the overriding aim with the geneology,
one would have expected Meachem to be a bit clearer about it and to have more to say about the sovereign individual.
And so Pearson's claim is, to be sure, rather extreme, but his is nonetheless when a reckoning, recognisable continuum with other assessments.
John Richardson, for example, describes Section two of the second essay as, quote,
a dramatic statement of Nietzsche's positive view of freedom for Peter Pollner,
the sovereign individual gives expression to quote,
the constitutive conditions of full fledged autonomous rather than heterogenous self Kenji's states.
The sovereign individual illuminates, quote, genuine agency. The question, what is it to be itself capable of acting?
Indeed. And I quote again, what exactly it is to be a genuine self.
So who is this sovereign individual? The second essay.
And what does he have to do with Nietzsche's conceptions of freewill, freedom or the self?
I shall argue for what would have been at one time a fairly unsurprising view,
namely that first nature denies the people ever act freely and that they are ever morally responsible for anything they do.
Second, that the figure of a sovereign individual in no way supports a denial of this first point.
And third, the nature engages in what Charles Stevenson in his famous 1938 paper on persuasive definitions.
Each engages in what Stevenson would call the persuasive definition of the language of freedom and free will.
Radically revising the content of those concepts,
but in a way that aims to capitalise on their positive, emotive valence and authority for his readers.
More precisely, I am to show that the image of the sovereign individual is in fact consistent with the reading of nature,
has a kind of fatalists which I have defended at length elsewhere.
When the Fatalis reading Nietzsche thinks that persons have certain essential
psychological and physiological traits over which they have no autonomous control,
and which together perhaps with environmental influences like values to determine their life trajectories.
In particular, Nietzsche thinks that the feeling of free will is a bottom and epiphenomenon of a process in which conscious
thoughts that are consistent with and temporarily proximate to succeeding actions are misinterpreted as causal.
When, in fact, both the thoughts and the actions themselves are causally determined by nonconscious, perhaps neuro physical aspects of the person.
The upshot is that our actions are neither cause a soulis nor caused by any conscious state with which we might identify.
And so our actions cannot bear descriptions of responsibility.
That is, description's unjustified praise and blame to show an image of the sovereign individual squares with nature's fatals.
I distinguish in what follows between two different deflationary readings of the past when one such reading,
the figure of the sovereign individual is wholly ironic a mocking of the petite bourgeois who thinks his petty commercial undertakings,
his ability to make promises and remember his debts are the highest fruit of creation.
One another deflation or in reading the sovereign individual does indeed represent an ideal of the self,
one marked by a kind of self mastery foreign to less coherent selves whose momentary impulses pull them this way.
But such a self and itself master is a neat chain in terms of fortuitous natural artefact,
a bit of faith, not an autonomous achievement for which anyone could be responsible.
To associate this ideal of the self with the language of freedom and free will is an exercise in persuasive definition by nature,
a rhetorical skill in which he was often the master. I am inclined to think the second reading.
Probably the second inflationary reading is probably the correct one, though,
the somewhat ridiculously hyperbolic presentation of the sovereign individual to which we return,
we'll make the first reading attractive at some point. But either reading allows us to understand how and why nature fatalists,
an arch sceptic about free will, would have created the figure of the sovereign individual.
So we do well to begin by reminding ourselves of what Nicha actually says about freewill and responsibility
in the many passages from many different books that spanned his entire philosophical career,
that must inform any interpretation of the section on the sovereign individual.
Even if we put to one side human all too human will work of the late 1970s,
in which Nietzsche clearly accepted a straightforwardly incompatible picture in
which the determinism of our universe rules out free will and moral responsibility.
Evidence of nature's scepticism about freedom and responsibility remains plentiful.
In his mature corpus of the eighteen eighties, thus at the start of the decade in DAYBREAK, he writes in Section 128.
Do I have to add that the wise edifice was right, that we really are not responsible for our dreams.
But just as little for our waking life. And that the doctrine of freedom with will as human pride and feeling of power for its father and mother.
So belief and freedom with wills to be explained by the ulterior motivations we have for accepting it, not by its reality.
We are as little responsible for what we do in real life as what we do in our dreams.
It is hard to imagine a embracing denial of freedom and responsibility. The same themes are sounded in one of his very last books, The Antichrist.
This is from Section 14. Formerly man was given a free will as his dowry from a higher order.
Today we have taken his will away altogether in the sense that we no longer admit the will.
As a faculty, the old word will now serves only to denote a result in a kind of individual reaction,
which follows necessarily upon a number of partly contradictory, partly harmonious stimuli.
The will no longer acts or moves denial of the causality of the will or more precisely, what we experience, as will,
is central to Nietzsche scepticism about free will and also explains why he frequently denies unfree will as well.
What we experience, as Will, does not in fact cause our actions.
So the causal determination or freedom of this word is irrelevant.
In DAYBREAK, he writes this a section 124.
We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the son steps out of its room and then says, I will.
That the sun shall rise and at hand we cannot stop a wheel and says, I will.
That it shall roll. And at him, he was thrown down in wrestling and says, Here I lie.
I will lie here. But what, laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any differently?
Whenever we employ the expression, I will. If the faculty at the will no longer acts or moves as the Antichrist passage puts.
If it is no longer causal, then there remains no conceptual space for the compatible.
This idea that the right kind of causal determination, the will is compatible with responsibility for our actions.
If a through script puts it thought is one thing, the deed is another.
And the image of the deed still another. The wheel of causality does not roll between.
Which is a pithy statement of the point of the DAYBREAK passage I just quoted.
Then there is no room for more responsibility.
I may well identify with my thoughts or my will, but if they cannot cause my actions, how can I possibly be responsible?
In the central discussion of free will and responsibility in the geneology Nature, right?
For just as common people separate the Lightwood from its flesh and take the latter to be a deed,
something performed by a subject for like so popular morality also separates strength from the expressions of strength,
as if there were an indifferent substrate behind the strong person which had the freedom to manifest strength or not.
But there is no such substrate. The suppressed, typically glowing aspects of revenge and hate exploit this belief in a subject or substrate.
And basically even a uphold no other belief or ardently than this one that the strong are free to be weak.
And the birds of prey are free to be lambs. They thereby gain for themselves the right to hold the bird of prey accountable.
The weak need the belief in a neutral subject with free choice, out of an instinct of self-preservation,
self affirmation in which every lie is sanctified at Section 13.
The first test of the will. That was denied as the faculty and the other passages is now here.
I take it up the substrate that stands behind the act and chooses to perform it or not.
But there is no such faculty, whether we call it will or substrate, choosing to manifest strength or weakness.
There just is the doing no doer who bears the responsibility for the discussion
of the four great errors in the twilight of the Idols is to the same effect.
As he concludes that chapter closed today. We no longer have any pity for the concept of free will.
We know only too well what it really is the fallacy of all theologians artifices aimed at making mankind responsible.
In their sense, the doctrine of the will has been invented essentially for the purpose of punishment.
That is because one wanted to peak guilt. So once again, denial at the will is a causal factor,
which is the central argument of this chapter of Twilight is juxtaposed with a psychological
explanation for why people would nonetheless be motivated to believe in freedom and responsibility.
Once we abandon this error free will. That's what Nietzsche calls it.
It should in turn, abandon the reactive concepts whose intelligibility depends on concepts like guilt.
Zaara, through Straw well describes the required revision to our thinking about freedom and responsibility that results.
This is from the section on Pale Criminal Enemy. You shall say, but not below.
Singing we shall say, but not scoundrel. Fool, you shall say. But not a sinner.
The abandoned concepts that a villain, scoundrel and sinner are all ones that require freedom and responsibility that would licence blame.
While the substitute concepts aname, singing fool merely describe a person's condition or character without supposing anything
about the agent's responsibility for being in that condition or having that character.
Any account of what is going on in the passage of the sovereign individual must
show how it is consistent with these pervasive themes in the niching corpus.
So let's turn now to the solemn passage. Nature begins the second essay in the geneology with a characteristically naturalistic
question how to breed an animal which is able to make an honour promise.
The assumptions underlying this question are twofold. First, and most obviously, human beings are certain kinds of animals.
And second, as with other animals. One explains what they do.
For example, promised not by appeal to their exercise of some capacity for autonomous choice decision,
but in terms of the causal mechanisms such as bleeding, acting upon them, which yields certain steady behavioural dispositions.
NEACH identifies two preconditions for the behavioural disposition at issue here, namely promise moving.
First, regularity, behaviour.
And second, reliable, memorable regularity is necessary because a promise maker must be, as each puts it, answerable for his own future.
And one cannot be answerable for a future that is utterly unpredictable.
Memory is essential for the obvious reason that only someone who can remember his promises can possible on two factors
are singled out by nature as formative for the human animal in its development of regular behaviour and a memory.
One equals the morality of custom, and the other is the role of pain in Dumont's with quote,
the help of the morality of custom and the social straitjacket man was made truly predictable.
That's from Section two of the second essay. Nature here alludes to his own earlier discussion in DAYBREAK, which,
drawing on the etymological connexion between Siedlecki morality and Sepak custom advance a plausible hypothesis that custo.
Constituted the first morality that traditional ways of acting played the same role during early human life.
That rarefied and lofty moral codes, rules and principles play today that they provided criteria for moral right and wrong.
In this earlier discussion, however, nation that is DAYBREAK discussion,
Leach's goal was a certain naturalisation of the implausible Quantium account and moral motivation.
As a matter of reference for the more law,
nature proposes instead that it is obedience to tradition and fear of the consequences of deviation from tradition.
That really explains moral motivation. By the time he writes the geneology, Nietzsche is now more interested in the role of custom,
the social straitjacket, as he calls it, in making humans truly predictable.
That is regular in their behaviour. This development eventually yields the individual with a conscience.
The nature refers to variously as a sovereign or autonomous individual.
Here's the crucial facet, which I'm going to quote at some length with the help of the morality of custom in the social straitjacket,
man was made truly predictable. Let us place ourselves, on the other hand, at the end of this immense process where the tree actually bears fruit,
where society and its morality of custom heal what they were simply the means to.
We then find the sovereign individual as the ripest group on its tree, like only to itself.
Having freed itself from the morality of custom and autonomy, autonomous,
super ethical individual because autonomous and ethical are mutually Skip's exclusive.
In short, we find a man with his own independent, durable will who has the right to make a promise and has a proud consciousness quivering in every
muscle of what he has finally achieved and incorporated an actual awareness of power and freedom,
a feeling that man in general has reached completion. This man, who is now free and really does have the right to make a promise.
This master of the free will. This software.
How could he remain ignorant of his superiority over everybody who does not have the right to make a promise or answer for himself?
How much trust, fear and respect he arouses? He merits all three.
And how could he, with his self master, not realise that he has necessarily been given mastery over circumstances,
over nature and over all creatures with a less durable and reliable will the free man.
And now he puts free in quotes. The free man, the possessor of a durable, unbreakable will,
thus has his own standard of value in the possession of such a will, viewing others from his own standpoint standpoint.
He respects or despises, and just as he will necessarily respect his peers, the strong and the reliable, those with the right to give their word.
That is, everyone who makes a promise, makes promises like a sop ponderously,
sell them slowly and is sparing with his trust and confers and honour when he places his trust and gives his word as something
which can be relied on because he is strong enough to remain upright in the face of mishap or even in the face of fate.
So he will necessarily be ready to kick the febrile whippets who make a promise when they have no right
to do so and will save the rod for the liar who breaks his word in the very moment it passes his lips.
The proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility,
the awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his destiny has penetrated into the depths and become an instinct.
His dominant instinct. What will he call his dominant instinct, assuming that he means a word for no doubt about the answer.
This sovereign man calls it is conscious. So let us start at the beginning.
The sovereign individual is said to be the fruit of the long tradition of the morality of custom.
But the tree bears this fruit at the point when the morality of custom is left behind.
This individual is autonomous or super ethical and disciplined in the quite precise sense of being no longer bound by the morality of custom sitting.
He is the perfected animal,
the one so perfected by the breeding of the morality of custom that he no longer needs the discipline of Cita to perform his trick, as it were.
What exactly is the trick that this well-trained animal surely it bears,
emphasising that he is described as having one and only one skill he can actually make and keep a promise?
And why can he do that?
Because he can remember that he made it and his behaviour is sufficiently regular and predictable that others will actually act based on his promises.
This might explain why nature gives this self-important animal the so-called.
Individual, a suitably ridiculous and pompous name, he refers to him in the original as the Suvorov Frenchs Varan individual.
A mix of French and perhaps Latin is also obviously a German,
meaning literally something like a sovereign apple, a phrase he never uses again anywhere in the corpus.
And he never uses any alternative formulation of that same phrase anymore is we can
talk about that discussion and the conscience of this self-important creatures.
Nature makes clear consistent, nothing more than the ability to remember his debts.
One might then be tempted to conclude that this whole passage is little more than a
parody of the contemporary bourgeois who thinks that he has achieved something unique,
something individual, just because he is steady enough to make a promise and honour.
Capitalism, as everyone knows, destroys customary practises. Yet after their demise, there remains.
The upright bushwalk can enter a contract and remember his legal obligations, no less.
The modern Bush line short fancies himself the highest fruit of creation simply because he can remember his business deals.
Now, there is admittedly more to this passage than what we've called to attention.
A pull, potentially, too, so far. Indeed, in a recent vigorous challenge to deflation or in readings and passage, including my own in earlier work,
Thomas Miles has argued this is in the most recent international studies in philosophy.
Think it's year 2007. In keeping with tradition, not just came out of consumer,
Thomas Miles has argued that self mastery is central to the image of the sovereign individual and that,
Miles, this self mastery consists of the self affirming conscience that guy.
This is sovereign individual to take on great tasks and fulfil his commitments to them.
Now, as we've already noted, the only great task concretely on offer by nature is that the sovereign individual can make a promise to keep.
This is not nothing, to be sure, but it seems prima fascia hard to square with the overblown rhetoric of Section two, to which Miles calls attention.
For example, read again portion of the passage, the proud realisation of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility.
The awareness of this rare freedom and power over himself and his faith has penetrated into the depths and become an instant.
His dominant is what we call his dominant instinct, assuming that he needs a word for it.
No doubt about the answer to his sovereign man calls it his conscience. But Nicha, as we have already seen, denies.
And not just once. That anyone as quote, freedom and power over himself from his faith than anyone has.
His second essay also claims mastery over circumstances.
The conclusion of the four green arrows from Twilight of the Idols is as clear as any passage in Meech on the subject.
I hope no one gives people their qualities, not God or society's parents or ancestors, not even people themselves.
Nobody is responsible for people existing in the first place or for the state or circumstances or environment they are in.
That means, of course, that the sovereign individual whose privilege of responsibility extends to himself and his faith,
indeed to his circumstances, is delusion. At least if he really believes in this, he may well feel responsible.
But his feeling is on warrant.
Now, that conclusion is, of course, exactly what one should expect from nature's most important discussion of the phenomenon of self mastery.
The trait that Miles emphasises is attributed to the software.
And this is the discussion from DAYBREAK.
The passage from which I have called attention before a striking evidence of nature's fatal in Section one or nine.
Need to canvas is six different ways of combating the vehemence of a draw, for example, by avoiding opportunities for ratification of the drive,
thus weakening over time or by learning to associate painful thoughts with the drive so that its satisfaction no longer has a positive valence.
More significantly, each is also concerned in this passage to answer the question as to the ultimate motive for self master.
And he explains that his followers, and I quote that one, wants to come back.
The vehemence of the drive at all, however, does not stand within our own power,
nor does the choice of any particular method, nor does the success or failure of this method.
What is clearly the case is that if this entire procedure are intellect is only the blind instrument of another drop,
which is a rival of the drive, his vehemence is tormenting us.
While we believe we are complaining about the vehemence of a drive, at bottom, it is one drive which is complaining about the other.
That is to say, for us to become aware that we are suffering from the vehemence of the drive presupposes the existence of a.
Equally vehement or even more vehement drive, and that a struggle is in prospect in which our intellect is going to have to take sides.
Now, even if the intellect must take sides,
there is no suggestion in his past that the intellect determines which side that to the contrary, the intellect is on nature's picture.
The mere blind instrument of another drug. Thus, the fact that one masters oneself is not a product of autonomous choice by the person,
but rather the fact that the underlying psychological facts characteristic of that person,
namely which of his various drives happen to be the strongest. There is, as it were, no self in self master.
That is, no conscious or free cell count contributes anything to process.
Self mastery is merely an effect that the interplay of certain drives driver drives over which the conscious self exercises no control.
Though it may, as it were, room for one side or the other.
The conscious self and its body is simply an arena in which the struggle drives as played out.
How they play out determines what he believes, what he values, what he becomes.
But chlor conscious self or agent. The person takes no active part in the process.
To be sure, some higher types of people.
Gerges and Neches, for example, exemplify a unified hierarchy of drys that nature occasionally dubs as examples of freedom in terms of that flow.
But we do not honour Nietzsche's admonition to read and free of moral prejudices.
If we get to try to reconstruct this as a moral ideal of autonomy and responsibility in song,
we can agree with the emphasis of miles on the self and mastery characteristic of the
sovereign individual and still acknowledge that given nature's conception of self mastery,
it is wholly compatible with his denial of freewill and moral responsibility in so many other passengers.
So how is this account of the sovereign individual passage which shows it to be of a piece with his fatalistic
scepticism about freedom and responsibility to be reconciled with what Nietzsche says elsewhere in his work?
When he talks of freedom and freewill,
Pollner suggests that one important positive view and freedom of freedom in nature represents it as a kind of substantive ideal.
And actually, these papers by Pollner, Richardson, James, that I'm referring to our role in the James and made Michon freedoms in Oconomowoc,
which is which is back there for those who are interested. So Pollner suggests one view is as a freedom, as a kind of substantive ideal.
As Pollner describes and I quote,
Freedom is a substantive ideal is what seems to be at stake in many of those remarks where Nietzsche expresses admiration for people who,
as he sees them, have succeeded in integrating an unusually great multiplicity of drives and a value of commitments into a long lasting,
coherent whole. That's Paul Mischaracterisation. I think this is the best reading of what can Jameses recently been argued with as well.
When he speaks of Nietzsche's why? To understand genuine agency and wanting to change, quote,
his preferred readers from being mere conduit points of a vast array of conflicting inherited drives and
to genuinely unify beings as James I take him to the nature's presenting us with an idea of agency,
one involving a kind of unity of the drops. Perhaps the sovereign individual is meant to represent such an ideal as well, albeit a bit taken.
Yet ideal itself does seem to be a recognisably change.
The question, however, naturally arises why this ideal should be associated with freedom or freewill or autonomy?
Why not just say that nature's ideal agent has a certain pattern of coherent Dreiser dispositions?
The pattern to be specified, of course, and leave it at that. Freedom is, after all, a promiscuous concept in ordinary language.
We say that someone just released from prison is a free man,
but we also say that someone who shuns conventional expectations about careers or styles of dress or other social norms is a free spirit.
But being unconstrained by physical limits, as in prison walls or social conventions,
has an expectations about careers or appearance does not race philosophically.
Interesting points about freedom or human agency for nature or for anyone else.
We need much more evidence than an occasional use of the term freedom to conclude that
nature has a philosophically important positive conception of freedom or free will.
Readers of Nature know that the often employs familiar concepts and revisionary more highly deflation than the senses.
Such is ultimately the case with Nietzsche's view of freedom and free will. I agree with James and Pollner that nature sometimes,
though not nearly as often as they think the passages in some detail that Nietzsche sometimes associate the language
of freedom with certain kinds of persons agency psychic economy has a certain kind of coherence or harmony.
But in so doing, he is engaged in what George Stevens and would have called the persue.
Definition of free.
He wants to radically revise the content of freedom while exploiting the positive values that the traditional concept has with his readers.
This is because nature recognises that to really transform the consciousness of his preferred readers,
he must reach them at an emotional, even subconscious level.
And one way to do so is to associate any change in ideals with values in which his readers are already emotionally invested.
And as nature notes in the gay science, values are amongst the most powerful levers in the involved mechanisms of our actions.
Thus, by associating an ideal of the person with the evaluable, he got his emotion laden ideal with freedom and free will,
which his readers will already accept, which increases the likelihood that he can activate the causal levers of at least some of these readers.
That will lead them towards this new idea, which is a cause to realise this new idea.
Yet from a purely descriptive point of view, he might just as well call this new ideal agents uniformly or causally coherent agents.
Not quite as catchy, since his picture really has nothing to do with free at all.
Nietzsche's ideal unified agent is just a kind of natural artefact, one whose drys interact constructively rather than be struck.
But with regard to his rhetorical laven, nature is shrewd. To sometimes describe such natural artefacts as examples of freedom.
Both genes and Paul, like other writers in this genre,
rely on a very small number of passages to support what they claim is nature's positive account of freedom.
I want to examine these passages with some care more in dealing with the second section of the second essay,
the geneology, since I think it will turn out that they do not generally bear the readings.
James and Paul, I want to give them now to be clear again, I'm not denying that H-E Netsch,
a highly valued persons who buy natural fortuity, exhibit the kind of agency picked out.
I take it by James's notion of genuine agency and polynyas notion of full person.
But none of this has anything to do with any concept that the philosophical traditions of labelled freedom or free will.
Well, what better place to start than the twilight of the Idols? Skirmishes of an untimely man, Section 38.
Which nation explicitly titles my conception of freedom? Here's how he introduces and explains that concept.
And I quote, Liberal institutions ceased to be liberal.
As soon as they are retained later on, there are no worse and no more thorough injuries of freedom than liberal institutions.
Their effects are known well enough. They undermine the wealth of power. They level mountain valley and call that morality.
They make men small, cowardly and hedonistic every time it is the herd and another triumphs with liberalism, in other words, herd embolisation.
Now, the introduction to this conception of freedom seems clear.
One undermines freedom by making, quote, men small, cowardly and hedonistic philosophical and religious traditions.
I've had many views of freedom, to be sure, but I am not aware of any in which being big, brave and indifferent to suffering loomed large.
Yet that appears to be the concept of freedom. Nietzsche in books. The passage continues.
The same liberal institutions produce different effects while they are still being fought for.
Then they really promote freedom in a powerful way. On closer inspection, it is war that produces these effects.
The war for liberal institutions. War educates freedom for what is freedom.
That one has the will to assume responsibility for oneself. That one maintains the distance which separates us.
That one becomes more indifferent to difficulties, hardships, privation, even to life itself.
That one is prepared to sacrifice human beings for one's Paulas, not excluding oneself.
Freedom means that the manly instincts which delight in war and victory dominate over other instincts, for example,
over those of happiness, the human being who has become free and much more the spirit who has become free.
Spits on the contemptible type of well-being dreamed up by shopkeepers, Christians, cows, females, Englishmen and other than the free man is a worry.
If my image is clean and we're going to come back to France.
So assuming responsibility for oneself is of course not quite the same thing is actually being responsible for its actions.
The former is an attitude, a disposition, namely that of a warrior.
Find that there is no sense, ordinary philosophical, in which freedom means pleasure in warfare.
The Warriors are, to be sure, usually thought to be big, brave and indifferent to suffering.
This is quite clearly, I think, persuasive definition and sense.
Stephensen identified many decades ago in Section forty, one of the same chapter from Twilight of the Idols.
Nietzsche then describes the, quote, freedom, which I do not mean, namely.
And here's his explanation. It to one. Instance today, the plane for independence or redevelopment for, let's say,
L.A. is pressed most popular by the very people for whom no rains would be too strict.
That is a symptom of decadence. Our modern conception of freedom is one more proof of the degeneration of the instinct.
So in other words, nature renounces one of the colonial connotations of the idea of freedom, namely freedom from constraints.
The point here is obviously of a piece with the concern and beyond the neval.
This is Section one, a game where nature says, and I quote, everything there is or was a freedom.
So people in this dance or masculine assurance on Earth, whether it thinking itself or in ruling or speaking in persuading inartistic,
just as an ethical practises, has only developed by virtue of the tyranny of such arbitrary laws.
Every artist knows how far removed from this feeling of letting go.
Leslie Alé is from his most natural state. The free watering, placing, disposing and shaping in the moment of inspiration.
He knows how strict and subtle wheelbase thousands of laws at this very moment.
Laws that defy conceptual formulation precisely because of their hardness and determiners.
So freedom and nature's sense does not mean freedom from constraint. But it's obviously being subject to hard and determinate laws.
Section 213 of beyond would need continue this line of thought.
And I quote again, artists are the ones who know only too well that their feeling of freedom to finesse and authority of creation,
formation and control only reaches its apex when they have stopped doing anything voluntarily and instead do everything necessary.
In short, they know that inside themselves a necessity. And quote, freedom of the will have become one.
Notice that freedom of the will is placed in quotes by nature himself in this passage.
It's not, after all, real freedom with Will, since it involves nothing voluntary. That's what he tells us.
Only action which is necessary actions bound businesses in the earlier passage by far walls.
These passages resonate in turn with the famous Section 335 of the gay signs, which appears to suggest that people can create themselves.
Here is the bit of the passage emphasised by Homer and Myles in their exposition of nature's positive conception of freedom.
And I quote, We want to become we are human beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves was to create themselves.
Yet this passage then continues as follows. And this is the continuation on which most scholars are less silent.
But I am always full. Here it is.
To that end of creating ourselves, we must become the best learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and necessary in the world.
We must become physicists in order to be creators. In this sense, while hitherto all valuations and ideals have been based on ignorance of physics.
Therefore, along with physics. So creation in this sense is a very special sense,
deep for presupposes the discovery of what is lawful and necessary as revealed by the physical sciences.
And this, of course, recalls the earlier theme about the acquittals of freedom in assessing in context.
Nature has in mind becomes clearer for the preceding part of Section 335.
He explains that while the particular cause of any action is in demonstrable, we do know that values are,
quote, amongst the most powerful levers in the involved mechanisms of our action.
Thus, the task for the sciences is to discover the laws of cause and effect governing particular values and particular actions.
A more refined version of the task that nature later calls for in the note at the end of the first essay of the geneology,
namely for the human sciences to examine the effects of different kinds of
valuations on the good of the majority and the good the minority puts it there.
So what textual evidence of nature's putative positive view of freedom remains?
Section 348 of the gay science, which equates freedom with a will, with freedom, from the need for certainty, the need that drives people,
Nietzsche says, to faith and fanaticism obviously tells us nothing about agency or freewill, but is a wholly revisionary usage of concept.
There is, in addition to openly provisionary counter of freedom in the first chapter beyond Neval, according to which, quote, freedom of the will.
Suppose that is the word for the multifaceted state of pleasure. One commands and at the same time identifies himself.
The accomplished act will as such.
He enjoys the triumph of the resistance's, but thinks of himself that it was his will alone that truly overcame the resistance.
Now, as I've argued elsewhere, the analysis of the will and freedom in this chapter is fully of a piece with.
That is the first chapter of Nonlegal is fully of a piece with his general denial of freewill and moral responsibility.
That leaves them with just two passages in the published corpus that interpreters of his positive theory of freedom points towards in one passage,
Section 10 of the third essay,
the geneology in which nature considers how the ascetic ideal validates the conditions under which philosophers can flourish.
He concludes by noting that even in the modern world, the obstacles to being a philosopher remain great.
I quote, Is there even now enough prai daring, courage, self-confidence.
Will the spirit will to take responsibility? Freedom in the middle.
Puts in italics for the philosopher on earth to be really possible.
His passing reference, the freedom of read of Wills revealing since it makes clear that nature views it as
interchangeable with this positions of character like pride and courage and self-confidence,
all traits one can possess without being responsible for having me with, in short, having development in any way free.
That brings us to perhaps the most interesting chain passage mentioned.
Freedom from Chapter eight of the Twilight of the Ideas, a passage unhurt.
If Bears quoted at some length. This is Section 49, Gert's not a German event, but a European war.
A magnificent attempt to overcome the 18th century by returning to nature,
by coming towards the naturalists of the Renaissance, a type of self overcoming on the part of that century.
He made use of history, science, antiquity and Spinoza, too.
But above all, he's making some practical activity. He did not remove himself from life.
He put himself squarely in the middle of it. He did not. Disparity took as much as he could want himself to himself in himself.
What he wanted was totality. He fought against the separation of reasoned sensibility.
Feeling will preached in the most forbiddingly scholastic way by Con Gerges Antipov.
He disciplined himself the whole mess. He created himself in the middle of an age inclined to unreality.
Gerta was a convinced real's. He said yes to everything relating to him.
His greatest experience was that of the most real thing that went by the name of Napoleon.
Gerta conceived of a strong, highly educated, self respecting human being skilled in all things physical and able to keep himself in cheque.
Who could dare to allow himself the entire expanse and wealth of Naturaliste who was strong enough for this freedom.
A spirit like this, who has become Creed's fans in the middle of the world with a cheerful and trusting
fatalism in the belief that everything is redeemed and affirmed in the hope.
He does not the game anymore, but a belief like this is the highest of all possible beliefs.
I have presented with the name Dionysius. There are two striking motifs in this passage.
First, the emphasis on an ideal of naturalism and realism, which is explicitly associated with hope.
And secondly, the equation of commitment to this ideal with freedom, but also an attitude of fatalism and ultimately by a nice.
So how are we to understand these motifs and their relation to the job?
The immediately preceding section of Twilights Section forty eight, in fact, concerns Napoleon and his quote, high three.
Even terrible nature and not indeed Napoleon is declared by nature to be a piece of return to nature,
as I understand exactly the return, which also attributes to gurt.
If we understand the sense in which Napoleon returns to nature and exemplifies the natural,
we will understand something about the meaning of freedom in the following section.
Now, Napoleon's return to nature in Section forty eight is explicitly contrasted with Roussos conception of man's natural state,
which nature deems the idealistic fantasies of a rabbit, meaning in particular, their doctrines of quality.
No poison is more poisonous than this as nature and Section forty eight concludes that, quote,
Only one person perceives it this event of the 18th century correctly with disgust, namely guardian.
Since this freedom for witchcraft, it is strong enough,
is equated with the entire expanse of wealth and wealth of naturalness, of which Napoleon is the exemplar.
It would seem to follow that the freedom of adverted is in part an acceptance of the reality of the natural inequality
between people and a renunciation of the ME and illusions about what persons are like in a truly natural state.
But guard. This kind of freedom is becoming free, as nature puts it is also explicitly equated with an attitude of, quote,
cheering and trusting fatalism, which in turn is equated with the Dionysian attitude that is clearly recognisable as our mere.
That is acceptance and affirmation. The way things really are, rather than falling prey to the fantasies of the idealist and rabble rolled into one.
We move. So to be free in this sense, then, is to be free of the wish that reality being other than it is, that is unequal, terrible and cruel.
Napoleon himself, because what it is not, however, to be a free agent, is conceived by con or human response.
As I can tell by any other major figure in the philosophical tradition, nature would rather persuade select readers to the fatalism of a girth,
my coopting the language of freedom itself to commend to them an attitude that is premised on its denial,
on the most profound sense of denial, the Enlightenment ideal.
That man from free will and their rational capacities can all be kamik like the liberal.
I do idea that defined marriage is Creegan the free man is a war or that to be free is to be big, brave and indifferent to suffering.
This key passage from Twilight persuasively redefines freedom in the service of the chain value.
In this case, a liberal idea that to be truly fee free is to be not just reconciled to, but to affirm the essential inequality of a person's.
So to conclude, if Meacher really says so little, that suggests he holds out the hope of a freedom or free will.
That would be recognisable to the philosophical tradition or common sense.
If his scepticism about freedom and responsibility is so resolute when he actually says about freedom and free will is often so clearly revisionist,
so plainly an exercise in persuasive definition that needs to exploit his readers antecedent prejudices on behalf of very different chain ideals.
Even quite the liberal ideals. Then how are we to explain the recent scholarly consensus?
That is what it is with which we began.
It is, I fear, a manifestation of default against which nature often railed on which we have seen so many times before in the nature literature,
in hiders transformation reach into the last metaphysical philosopher.
Calvin's rendering him of him as a harmless secular humanist in the Hey, Mrs.
Defanging of him is in his statuses. In each case, I think the aim is to make each a less appalling, to be delicate modern readers than he really is.
Furniture does not believe in freedom or responsibility. He does not think the exercise any meaningful control over our lives.
He does not think that is revisionary sense of freedom.
The long, protracted will, as he puts it in the passage of the sovereign individual, is reaching just anyone that anyone could choose to have.
Indeed, the important passage from Twilight with which we concluded freedom is rather clearly invoked on behalf of beaches,
a liberal vision of the inescapable reality of human equality.
The resistance that these points and the recent scholarly literature, I conclude,
reflects the continuing malign influence of moralising ratings, Meecham,
of the failure to remember what he says about his conception of Renaissance virtue,
namely that we understand it, that we should understand it and in moral line, freedom.
Thank you.