1 00:00:23,620 --> 00:00:33,750 OK. Well, this is my first show in Egypt, and I think your intelligence service to begin with fixing claims first. 2 00:00:33,750 --> 00:00:42,250 There's no persisting in unity yourself. Second, there's no fundamental, real distinct object on the one hand and their properties on the other. 3 00:00:42,250 --> 00:00:49,830 Third, there's no fundamental or real secret within the base. He will place all properties of things in common, properties of things. 4 00:00:49,830 --> 00:00:57,620 Fourth, no fundamental real distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and the processes and then the other. 5 00:00:57,620 --> 00:01:05,480 This reality isn't truly divisible into causes. In fact, six objects aren't governed by laws of nature. 6 00:01:05,480 --> 00:01:11,150 Ontologically distinct from them. But I think the same is central to metaphor, which is metaphysics. 7 00:01:11,150 --> 00:01:12,870 He also holds seven. 8 00:01:12,870 --> 00:01:23,510 There's no freewill as ordinarily understood, although I wouldn't say much about this and that nothing can ever happen otherwise that it does. 9 00:01:23,510 --> 00:01:31,850 And that's a position which is often called determinism, although the name isn't apt to Nietzsche's Kenneth. 10 00:01:31,850 --> 00:01:38,050 Finally, at the moment, it seems to me that he inclines towards the ancient but also very modern view. 11 00:01:38,050 --> 00:01:44,060 So there's a fundamental, non-trivial sense in which reality is one. 12 00:01:44,060 --> 00:01:51,100 And towards what seems to me to be the most plausible, though difficult, view of the nature of reality that is the heart, 13 00:01:51,100 --> 00:01:58,040 the really hard nosed modernist view, which is the Spinoza Magalia and receiving an end in Ternium and white. 14 00:01:58,040 --> 00:02:01,760 How do you do that? This is number 10 on my list. 15 00:02:01,760 --> 00:02:10,460 Reality is suffused with. Even if it doesn't consist of mentality in some formal sense and it seems correct to attribute tend to them. 16 00:02:10,460 --> 00:02:16,410 If only because he famously holds the lead, but that everything is world power. 17 00:02:16,410 --> 00:02:25,970 Because to say this is already to endorse ten in some form, to say that everything is in some respect mental. 18 00:02:25,970 --> 00:02:29,620 I know just a matter of craft. That is false. 19 00:02:29,620 --> 00:02:34,640 Considered or conceived of it somehow. Went away. 20 00:02:34,640 --> 00:02:40,040 So I think we have the core of not just metaphysics. And I'm going to put aside and let. 21 00:02:40,040 --> 00:02:44,180 I'm neither, for example, points out that Nietzsche doesn't mention love. When he surveys, it won't work. 22 00:02:44,180 --> 00:02:54,880 And I know of one to 10. I think the first seven negative claims are certainly true and that the final three positive category probably true, 23 00:02:54,880 --> 00:03:01,880 which is known as perspective based, who's sceptical about truth, a word which he likes to put an inverted commas. 24 00:03:01,880 --> 00:03:08,750 And about our project in metaphysics. And he has a rich variety of valid purposes in expressing himself in this way. 25 00:03:08,750 --> 00:03:13,110 But it's not seriously doubt that he isn't as mature thought prepared. 26 00:03:13,110 --> 00:03:19,730 So all of what age at least he doesn't think his views on these matters are wholly true in inverted commas 27 00:03:19,730 --> 00:03:26,320 or true only from the perspective of some dry facts on cluster drives or not really about what he calls, 28 00:03:26,320 --> 00:03:34,540 I quote, true being of things that in themselves are things. And I'm happy to leave the detailed defence of this last point to others. 29 00:03:34,540 --> 00:03:41,400 Jill Richardson, for one and this talk I want to focus on two six inches endorsement of one. 30 00:03:41,400 --> 00:03:45,500 The view is that there's no persisting unitary self, I think needs no argument. 31 00:03:45,500 --> 00:03:51,620 And it's deeply bound up with the endorsement of true crime. No, this is separatist, not a free will. 32 00:03:51,620 --> 00:03:56,210 The argument age is pretty, pretty tangled up with three sticks. 33 00:03:56,210 --> 00:04:01,730 I will talk about it a bit, but I want to read essentially a set to make one point now, 34 00:04:01,730 --> 00:04:08,180 which is that the reason the name determinism is inappropriate in each case is that although he makes 35 00:04:08,180 --> 00:04:15,060 free use of the motion to power because he purges the thesis that nothing can ever happen otherwise. 36 00:04:15,060 --> 00:04:21,890 It does of the notion of compulsion, the notion of necessity understood as some kind of compulsion. 37 00:04:21,890 --> 00:04:31,960 He treats it rather. And in my view, most deeply as a as a kind of tautology in a way that we can perhaps picture first by thinking of lightning, 38 00:04:31,960 --> 00:04:39,290 his causeless universe in which every true statement about anything is now that truth and then perhaps again, 39 00:04:39,290 --> 00:04:45,860 indirectly, of the food I mentioned, list block universe of relativity theory. 40 00:04:45,860 --> 00:04:52,040 What about nine? I'm just going through someone saying a few things about these people getting on to the main issue. 41 00:04:52,040 --> 00:04:56,030 The view that in some sense always won. But I don't want to insist on this, Masaomi. 42 00:04:56,030 --> 00:05:02,540 Irony that Nietzsche's criticisms of the two mystical cutting tendencies and the 43 00:05:02,540 --> 00:05:08,840 matching atavistic tendencies of human thought and language tend in this direction. 44 00:05:08,840 --> 00:05:14,690 Thinking, he says, takes apart what is really one. And this is one of his most constant themes. 45 00:05:14,690 --> 00:05:20,840 It's live. Less clear, perhaps on a subject for another time that he's a an all out monas. 46 00:05:20,840 --> 00:05:23,530 I mean, a thing this. Stockholders. 47 00:05:23,530 --> 00:05:33,420 But it's so in line with commonalties that as many injured philosophers and many modern physicists and cosmologists who hold that, 48 00:05:33,420 --> 00:05:43,340 there is the final analysis. Only one thing, that space time, which is itself an object to concrete. 49 00:05:43,340 --> 00:05:45,500 We'll meet his views, have a fine ancestry. 50 00:05:45,500 --> 00:05:51,740 They are, in a sense, traditional, and they're strongly in accord, as I've always said, as much in present day physics. 51 00:05:51,740 --> 00:06:00,020 The main elements found in our clients in the Buddha and some of the work of the Buddhist near contemporary Plato in early modern times, 52 00:06:00,020 --> 00:06:07,700 they connect strongly with the of lightness, at least, and more recently with Whitehead and the later Russell, amongst others. 53 00:06:07,700 --> 00:06:14,170 Many more Connexions can be made, some of which I'll indicate. But I'm not particularly concerned with the questions of influence. 54 00:06:14,170 --> 00:06:22,230 There are fundamental points on which nature agrees with Descartes, and this is a point that pleases me stress. 55 00:06:22,230 --> 00:06:29,580 Descartes is a great genius, misunderstood, and also at which I agree with law and human can't Tripplehorn. 56 00:06:29,580 --> 00:06:38,560 None of this is surprising. Truth tends to occur independently to different thinkers and to force its way out. 57 00:06:38,560 --> 00:06:46,400 Matt, I'm quoting William James, who says that metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly. 58 00:06:46,400 --> 00:06:53,060 And no one is more obstinate to nature. It seems to me the fact that he has this completely uncanny nose for truth, 59 00:06:53,060 --> 00:07:01,320 which seems to extend beyond the psychological to physical events, is bewildering to me. 60 00:07:01,320 --> 00:07:04,040 And some of this, I think, came up earlier to do it. 61 00:07:04,040 --> 00:07:13,410 The panel session that I attended where Connexions were made between just thought pleasant physics, but not all of you again. 62 00:07:13,410 --> 00:07:15,950 Anyway, my cousin died just to give a brief explanation. 63 00:07:15,950 --> 00:07:23,480 Part of what I take to be the right view about the fundamental nature of reality with some special reference to Nietzsche. 64 00:07:23,480 --> 00:07:28,490 So I'd be amazed and worried if there were anything new. What I have to say about Nietzsche. 65 00:07:28,490 --> 00:07:35,170 I simply want to provide a certain view of reality with one distinguished reference point amongst others. 66 00:07:35,170 --> 00:07:41,480 I'm going to use the late notebook's freely even mandery good quotations from the word mutuel published in The Sun. 67 00:07:41,480 --> 00:07:48,920 So I also see this paper containing slots for supporting causations to be supplied by others. 68 00:07:48,920 --> 00:07:53,960 So that's the first thing to do. Reality as it is, as it is in itself. 69 00:07:53,960 --> 00:07:59,000 That's the first thing to do when it comes to a discussion reaches metaphysics and it shouldn't be unnecessary. 70 00:07:59,000 --> 00:08:03,680 But philosophy is, of course, a cesspit of misunderstanding. 71 00:08:03,680 --> 00:08:11,600 One of the things the first is to do is to note that agent isn't sceptical about the notion of reality as it is in itself. 72 00:08:11,600 --> 00:08:16,120 This is hardly surprising because such scepticism is incoherent. 73 00:08:16,120 --> 00:08:26,500 It's incoherent because on the hand of one to be is necessarily to be a certain way at any given time to be somehow or other. 74 00:08:26,500 --> 00:08:31,480 And to the way that being is at any given time just is the way it is self. 75 00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:37,220 And if you don't like the reality of time, you can just drop the words at any given time. 76 00:08:37,220 --> 00:08:42,980 Someone might say that the point fails Nietzsche's case because he holds that being is becoming. 77 00:08:42,980 --> 00:08:48,560 But obviously, that's no good. Reality is a certain way as it is in itself, whatever the nature reality is. 78 00:08:48,560 --> 00:08:53,330 So if reality is coming and I have no objection to his terminology, 79 00:08:53,330 --> 00:08:59,300 although I get to avoid it for the most part because it has ancient and tangled roots. 80 00:08:59,300 --> 00:09:09,110 So if reality is coming, then that's the way reality is in itself. And there is, of course, a certain way becoming a reality isn't as it is in itself. 81 00:09:09,110 --> 00:09:16,730 I'm going to skip a few points objections based on the misunderstanding of quantum mechanics. 82 00:09:16,730 --> 00:09:26,000 Another possible objection is the teacher writes that I quote, There is no truth and they quoted in what can be thought of must surely be a fiction. 83 00:09:26,000 --> 00:09:30,750 The first one to make a reply to that, of course, is that there's no tension between holding the. 84 00:09:30,750 --> 00:09:38,480 Does it determine the truth about how things are themselves? And scepticism about our ability to know what it is. 85 00:09:38,480 --> 00:09:44,750 Second, it's true that need to constantly stress is the point that ordinary human thought or language 86 00:09:44,750 --> 00:09:50,780 is profoundly adequate when it comes to the attempt to try to express the nature of reality. 87 00:09:50,780 --> 00:09:59,540 Given thought and language is in part essentially constituted by force structures fictionalisation zobel errors about that reality. 88 00:09:59,540 --> 00:10:06,740 Still, each and every before. Meadowland thinks that there's anything insuperable difficulty using language that builds 89 00:10:06,740 --> 00:10:14,300 in such areas to express truth about those very errors or indeed truth of other kinds. 90 00:10:14,300 --> 00:10:18,680 So we have to weigh remarks which seem to express global scepticism about the possibility 91 00:10:18,680 --> 00:10:23,600 of expressing the truth about anything against the vast mass of the rest of his work, 92 00:10:23,600 --> 00:10:30,590 which is everywhere premised on the assumption that it is possible to express the truth about things. 93 00:10:30,590 --> 00:10:38,330 After all, the vast body of his work consists almost entirely of truth claims of this sort. 94 00:10:38,330 --> 00:10:44,860 I guess maybe this is a dead issue. That's what I've been picking up. I recently. 95 00:10:44,860 --> 00:10:54,060 But it used not to be. It's not as if it's hard to fit these highly general, duplicative remarks by nature into his work, infinite as a whole. 96 00:10:54,060 --> 00:10:59,770 It's easy. It's easy to understand their point in the context of his other views. 97 00:10:59,770 --> 00:11:08,410 It's no harder than understanding the intuitively natural Buddhist distinction between conventional truths and ultimate truth. 98 00:11:08,410 --> 00:11:12,940 I don't need to see the horrible amount of time has been wasted here. 99 00:11:12,940 --> 00:11:19,790 As Carmen said, I'm quoting many historians of philosophy with all their intended praise. 100 00:11:19,790 --> 00:11:27,490 A tribute may be a nonsense to populous past policies they are incapable of recognising beyond what the philosophers actually said, 101 00:11:27,490 --> 00:11:36,420 what they really meant to say. And again, if we take a single passage is torn from their context and compare them with one another, 102 00:11:36,420 --> 00:11:42,100 contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in the work that is written with any freedom of expression. 103 00:11:42,100 --> 00:11:48,380 But they are cuts as easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the whole. 104 00:11:48,380 --> 00:11:52,990 So maybe this is just banal. I mean, what each has no truth, 105 00:11:52,990 --> 00:12:02,320 no knowledge of metaphysics remarks do is teach us something about how to region both in his published books and in his notebooks. 106 00:12:02,320 --> 00:12:10,570 Take a simple example. When nature proposes, the reality is best thought of as a continuum or unified process whose nature thought, 107 00:12:10,570 --> 00:12:20,020 human thought and language inevitably falsified by cutting it up, but especially in temporal distinct objects or individual causes and effects. 108 00:12:20,020 --> 00:12:23,650 He's claiming that this is how things actually are. 109 00:12:23,650 --> 00:12:31,780 So you're saying this sort of thing involves, Jonathan, on the question of fact, that nature is certainly Chumstick his own and whether or not that. 110 00:12:31,780 --> 00:12:36,970 So he certainly doesn't think that words like Continuum are condemned by belonging 111 00:12:36,970 --> 00:12:43,480 to human thought and language to being ultimately and applicable to reality. 112 00:12:43,480 --> 00:12:48,940 I would qualify some of those remarks about Continuum in the light of the again, 113 00:12:48,940 --> 00:12:55,530 of the session I just attended, which talked quite a lot about Nietzsche's commitment to some kind of control. 114 00:12:55,530 --> 00:13:01,120 If you agree on anything, it's necessary to do that now. 115 00:13:01,120 --> 00:13:07,930 Okay. Now, what about that question that I just mentioned, which concerns for blindness to species? 116 00:13:07,930 --> 00:13:16,870 Well, very roughly. Physics, I think it has sufficiently shown that all objects of process that there should be clear well thought of this process. 117 00:13:16,870 --> 00:13:26,140 We've learnt the matter is astonishingly theory, but substance is almost inconceivable in substantial relative to our everyday conception. 118 00:13:26,140 --> 00:13:32,890 GRANEY Individual particles were already being treated as insubstantial as mathematical points 119 00:13:32,890 --> 00:13:37,870 and hands me a theoretical posits in the 18th century as something Nietzsche was aware of, 120 00:13:37,870 --> 00:13:45,310 in fact. And they lost to a particular punctuality long ago as they gave way to fields in post 1925. 121 00:13:45,310 --> 00:13:57,280 Quantum physics leading up to a popular phenomenon of entanglement, everyday objects and stones to brains, collocations patterns of energy, 122 00:13:57,280 --> 00:14:04,450 diaphanous process entities whose existence evokes a constant interchange with the quantum vacuum given, 123 00:14:04,450 --> 00:14:10,390 which is literally correct to say that that party constituted by the quantum vacuum. 124 00:14:10,390 --> 00:14:14,180 So the idea of the processes or events requires some sort of substance that is 125 00:14:14,180 --> 00:14:20,770 somewhat distinct from which they can go or occur as really long collapsed. 126 00:14:20,770 --> 00:14:29,550 The whole object process properties, state event, conceptual clustering of concepts is indeed hopelessly superficial. 127 00:14:29,550 --> 00:14:38,020 Nor do we need modern physics to see this any more than the ancient Indian Greek philosophers did. 128 00:14:38,020 --> 00:14:44,080 Some of the distinctions in the object process property of the state of clusters seem to lead us to more real, 129 00:14:44,080 --> 00:14:52,690 irreducible, metaphysical, fundamental differences. They seem integral to almost basic discursive subject predicate forms of thought, 130 00:14:52,690 --> 00:14:58,090 and we can allow their very natural, practically indispensible in everyday life. 131 00:14:58,090 --> 00:15:05,020 But they are profoundly misleading because when taken up in metaphysics as a guide to the fundamental nature of reality, 132 00:15:05,020 --> 00:15:14,250 each of them constantly stresses. And it isn't actually particularly hard to see that this is all reality is white. 133 00:15:14,250 --> 00:15:18,280 Whitehead was moved to observe by his study of 20th century physics. 134 00:15:18,280 --> 00:15:25,790 And as Heraclitus remarked, nature's beings becomings, as Richardson says. 135 00:15:25,790 --> 00:15:29,540 So arts matter is best thought of as process. 136 00:15:29,540 --> 00:15:36,220 The matter is essentially dynamic. Essentially temporal, essentially changeable. 137 00:15:36,220 --> 00:15:41,140 Object or matter can't be conceptualised as things whose existence can be cross. 138 00:15:41,140 --> 00:15:46,240 Separately from the temporality, quote, nature. 139 00:15:46,240 --> 00:15:52,750 Another familiar quotation, the separation of doing from the doer of what happens from something that makes it happen. 140 00:15:52,750 --> 00:15:57,140 Process from something that's not process, but is enduring substance. 141 00:15:57,140 --> 00:16:05,380 The body, soul, etc. The attempt to grasp what happens is a kind of displacement and repositioning of what he is, 142 00:16:05,380 --> 00:16:11,650 what persists, that ancient mythology set down to believe in the cause and effect. 143 00:16:11,650 --> 00:16:17,410 Once this belief is found, a fixed form in the grammatical functions of language. 144 00:16:17,410 --> 00:16:23,350 Well, I thought I think that we should always call matter time matter for matter of time 145 00:16:23,350 --> 00:16:29,650 so that we never for a moment forget is the central temporality and central change. 146 00:16:29,650 --> 00:16:34,930 When you grasp matter has time, there's no McGibbon in its being at a time. 147 00:16:34,930 --> 00:16:42,550 And if it's fruit indeed is not given in to being absorbed insofar as it's considered at a time, 148 00:16:42,550 --> 00:16:48,400 but only when it's considered through time except through is already wrong 149 00:16:48,400 --> 00:16:52,060 because it carries the false picture of maximum somehow travelling through time, 150 00:16:52,060 --> 00:17:03,100 which is false because matters kind of as part of its B in such a way that it can't really be said to exist through time to when you see all this. 151 00:17:03,100 --> 00:17:09,470 Then you see that to assess it. A third piece is eight that nothing can happen. 152 00:17:09,470 --> 00:17:13,180 Dance is just to say that matter. That's time. 153 00:17:13,180 --> 00:17:16,270 That is what he needs to say, 154 00:17:16,270 --> 00:17:25,660 that even to say that matter does certain things or behaves in a certain way is already to the fortified reality reality matter and suggests, 155 00:17:25,660 --> 00:17:32,770 insofar as it suggests, that its behaviour could be distinguished from its nature. 156 00:17:32,770 --> 00:17:38,020 So therefore we have the negative version of four in place. 157 00:17:38,020 --> 00:17:44,660 And I'm not going to do positive for a fourth simply because it's just all objects or processes, he said. 158 00:17:44,660 --> 00:17:52,930 So that's the first plank. All the things we naturally pick out as objects are just as well. 159 00:17:52,930 --> 00:17:58,150 And actually, with no great difficulty thought of as processes of fundamental metaphysics, 160 00:17:58,150 --> 00:18:01,120 given that we allow ourselves to go on talking of objects at all. 161 00:18:01,120 --> 00:18:07,180 Mostly you perhaps to consider very seriously whether to go on talking of objects at all. 162 00:18:07,180 --> 00:18:12,130 But it's undoubtedly convenient for many purposes as need to realise. 163 00:18:12,130 --> 00:18:20,470 And it isn't, in fact, that hard to suspend or suppress a potentially misleading implications of such talk. 164 00:18:20,470 --> 00:18:26,980 So here's that was just one familiar and I think relatively clear sample of Nita's metaphysical thinking and one simple 165 00:18:26,980 --> 00:18:36,610 way to frame his general metaphysical approaches is as a rejection of two doctrines we can call separatism aestheticism. 166 00:18:36,610 --> 00:18:45,210 Next thing on my hand, no one can state and criticise these doctrines again, making the point clear, using the language of mortgages and property. 167 00:18:45,210 --> 00:18:49,780 Again, it's not as if the statement and criticism are undermined by the fact that the 168 00:18:49,780 --> 00:18:55,440 language of object to property in ought can be used as the doctrines buildings. 169 00:18:55,440 --> 00:19:05,530 So separatism separates objects shot from an object against ages five and nine and also against 170 00:19:05,530 --> 00:19:11,890 one third to separatism and separates an object from its property owners against spaces too. 171 00:19:11,890 --> 00:19:16,330 That's a crucial doctrine, which I'm going to discuss in some detail. 172 00:19:16,330 --> 00:19:22,870 It's separatism combined with a static system in separating matter from force against six pieces. 173 00:19:22,870 --> 00:19:28,170 Six put otherwise in the explicit terms of six separate things from the laws of nature. 174 00:19:28,170 --> 00:19:38,170 And that, says separatist Hickley, that the lanta govern the former separatism and status and combined again against these four. 175 00:19:38,170 --> 00:19:45,760 That's remarkable. Section two separate basic existence from time to temporality, or, in more Neogen terms, 176 00:19:45,760 --> 00:19:51,790 being from becoming in a way profoundly contrary to modern physics. 177 00:19:51,790 --> 00:19:59,650 Well, let's distinguish 10 slash eleven claims. The purposes of philosophical discussion of this separation, too, is of course artificial. 178 00:19:59,650 --> 00:20:08,160 There are many internal connexions and redundancies amongst the claims. So, for example, theses three can be seen as dropping out of two and six. 179 00:20:08,160 --> 00:20:13,560 And I believe direct discussion of five. That is the views on causation two, four, five and six. 180 00:20:13,560 --> 00:20:20,500 In fact, all up to six go very closely together. What should we opposed to statuses? 181 00:20:20,500 --> 00:20:26,920 Well, dynamicists process metaphysics, error, Clintonism and the ends don't matter to separatism. 182 00:20:26,920 --> 00:20:33,880 Well, murders, holism, metaphysical, relational isn't the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination. 183 00:20:33,880 --> 00:20:38,990 Maybe an hour ago, Nagarjuna formulation of the emptiness doctrine. 184 00:20:38,990 --> 00:20:43,960 Well, there are lots of names you can have. I favoured the name Identity Metaphysics. 185 00:20:43,960 --> 00:20:49,480 Now, the name may be thought to express only the rejection of separatism and also status ism. 186 00:20:49,480 --> 00:20:57,160 But this too is superficial. It depends on another full separation, the separation of separatism from statuses, the separation, 187 00:20:57,160 --> 00:21:03,670 which is very useful for political purposes, which is to repeat metaphysically superficial. 188 00:21:03,670 --> 00:21:05,440 Well, particularly, it depends on the idea. 189 00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:12,010 There's a sharp distinction between space and time, and that's why there is radically an extraordinarily forth. 190 00:21:12,010 --> 00:21:18,790 Given what we know of the nature of space time, we don't speak freely of space time. 191 00:21:18,790 --> 00:21:24,630 Using the single word to mark the collapse of the idea of space and time were radically distinct from each other. 192 00:21:24,630 --> 00:21:35,430 But we might do well to add the word matter into that word, to get a single word space time matter. 193 00:21:35,430 --> 00:21:40,480 The Nobel Prise winner, Steven Weinberg, suggests that all the objects we take ourselves to have to. 194 00:21:40,480 --> 00:21:47,740 We have to do with in life are best conceived of guys like space time being itself a physical object. 195 00:21:47,740 --> 00:21:54,940 The only one there is an essentially substantial something that's a part of it. 196 00:21:54,940 --> 00:22:00,040 That may be what resource and vast tracts of metaphysics find distinctness, discreetness, 197 00:22:00,040 --> 00:22:07,720 numerical difference, identity, metaphysics, finds unity, continuity, identity, identity, metaphysics. 198 00:22:07,720 --> 00:22:14,170 After all, if indeed you take us through those OWFI, Spinoza is one of its exemplary practitioners, 199 00:22:14,170 --> 00:22:21,920 followed by shelling Inventure of the term and Hengel nature still lies in the same tradition. 200 00:22:21,920 --> 00:22:32,130 It lies there because it is true, because it's a tradition, and although it also lays a great stress on differences of force or power of rank. 201 00:22:32,130 --> 00:22:40,080 Well, separatism and status as in my very deep in language with its Basle subject, pretty good form where we can see easily enough that this is so, 202 00:22:40,080 --> 00:22:46,900 and we can say so in language, find ways of putting things that avoid the problem. 203 00:22:46,900 --> 00:22:49,720 We have in language, words like process flow in flux. 204 00:22:49,720 --> 00:22:56,650 Allow us to say what is wrong with conceptions of the nature of reality which finds sharp separations, discrete existences. 205 00:22:56,650 --> 00:23:04,090 We're really there are nothing we can say with Heraclitus in whose proximity nature writes, 206 00:23:04,090 --> 00:23:11,800 I quote, He feels warmer and better than anywhere else that everything flows. 207 00:23:11,800 --> 00:23:15,140 OK. Now consider two seemingly radical claims, 208 00:23:15,140 --> 00:23:21,650 there's no fundamental distinction between to be made between objects on the one hand and their properties on the other. 209 00:23:21,650 --> 00:23:27,750 Well, I say the claim is radical and it may indeed be on Aristotelian, but it's hardly radical. 210 00:23:27,750 --> 00:23:33,260 If by radical we mean radically unorthodox, it seems to be relatively little known. 211 00:23:33,260 --> 00:23:40,660 But Descartes spinners alive and count amongst those who unite with nature in their endorsement, too. 212 00:23:40,660 --> 00:23:48,050 They all hope to use it slightly, extend Descartes terms that there is no real distinction, 213 00:23:48,050 --> 00:23:57,170 only a conceptual distinction between an object considered at any given time and its properties, its attributes most. 214 00:23:57,170 --> 00:24:04,310 Well, there's no real distinction between two things and be on Descartes terms when they can't possibly exist apart. 215 00:24:04,310 --> 00:24:08,510 The clearest case in which A and B can't possibly exist apart. 216 00:24:08,510 --> 00:24:15,920 And it isn't. And perhaps the only is the case in which A and B are identical. 217 00:24:15,920 --> 00:24:20,370 But then there's only one thing and nothing can exist apart from itself. 218 00:24:20,370 --> 00:24:30,470 Strikingly, for some, it's striking the case of an object at any given time and its properties considered at that time as a case of this kind. 219 00:24:30,470 --> 00:24:37,400 So I came. So two is true, the claim that there's no real distinction between an object and its properties. 220 00:24:37,400 --> 00:24:46,280 That's because positive ocean, two objects or substances are literally identical with properties. 221 00:24:46,280 --> 00:24:51,790 Well, at first this claim seems plainly false, given the standard training and analytic philosophy. 222 00:24:51,790 --> 00:24:57,770 And given the extreme naturalness, counterfactual thought which builds in so many of the metaphysical areas. 223 00:24:57,770 --> 00:25:04,460 Nietzsche's criticises. But not after a while. Well, I've argued for too in another place. 224 00:25:04,460 --> 00:25:09,350 And here I'm just going to cite other people instead. So here's Descartes. It's concise. 225 00:25:09,350 --> 00:25:17,450 I quote the attributes of a substance when considered collectively, he says, are indeed identical with the substance. 226 00:25:17,450 --> 00:25:22,670 Nature is even more concise. I quote, thing equals its qualities. 227 00:25:22,670 --> 00:25:28,550 Subtract, subtracted, doing as he often says and does no to a left over. 228 00:25:28,550 --> 00:25:36,440 One might think that Descartes life that Spinoza want to hang onto a robust notion of substance in a way that need to dust. 229 00:25:36,440 --> 00:25:40,690 But there is a fundamental respect in which this isn't so much the right one. 230 00:25:40,690 --> 00:25:47,190 The great rationalists are not less radical in nature and actually lock in who rules also fully in line, 231 00:25:47,190 --> 00:25:53,560 epistemologically speaking and holding that we have absolutely no legitimate idea of substance, nor any. 232 00:25:53,560 --> 00:25:53,960 Indeed. 233 00:25:53,960 --> 00:26:04,150 Any legitimate reason to suppose it exists insofar as it's taken to be something that is in any way other than a more than particular qualities. 234 00:26:04,150 --> 00:26:08,590 So amongst the seven most well-known early modern philosophers, only Baqi is out of line. 235 00:26:08,590 --> 00:26:13,400 This issue, except the British empiricists, keep it epistemological. 236 00:26:13,400 --> 00:26:17,060 They're going to logical thesis. 237 00:26:17,060 --> 00:26:19,280 This object is literally identical with its properties. 238 00:26:19,280 --> 00:26:25,790 This is indeed radical and initially difficult to think given the structure of human thought of the language given. 239 00:26:25,790 --> 00:26:32,930 In particular, the word property is an intrinsically relational word that asks for something for it to be a property of, 240 00:26:32,930 --> 00:26:39,950 but it's sufficiently understandable to that. And it's also hand again right in line with modern physics. 241 00:26:39,950 --> 00:26:46,280 Does it seem hard to think? Well, actually, it's not that. And it's something that one can grow into deeply. 242 00:26:46,280 --> 00:26:55,460 And Capice is doing philosophy or indeed physics data is, as it were, missed a substance for most philosophers. 243 00:26:55,460 --> 00:27:04,260 But the popular version of early modern philosophy bears little resemblance to the true story, which is much, much more exciting. 244 00:27:04,260 --> 00:27:08,990 Descartes was neither the first nor the last to think that the word substance is an empty word, 245 00:27:08,990 --> 00:27:15,440 a mere placeholder with no clear meaning other than existed for real. 246 00:27:15,440 --> 00:27:22,610 He did, though, very much want to be left in peace to get on with his work, and he really was most anxious not to annoy the church. 247 00:27:22,610 --> 00:27:27,860 And he used the word substance increasingly in communication with others who couldn't really think in 248 00:27:27,860 --> 00:27:33,650 other terms because he has these famous comments to his friend Regis or his one time friend Regis, 249 00:27:33,650 --> 00:27:39,530 about how he shouldn't annoy people, try and talk in their language. 250 00:27:39,530 --> 00:27:44,720 Actually, it's also is perhaps insufficiently well known that Descartes agreed with nature. 251 00:27:44,720 --> 00:27:50,810 As I understand it, that all is one, at least insofar as the material universe is concerned. 252 00:27:50,810 --> 00:27:55,550 Descartes, the universe is a single substance, one big extended thing. 253 00:27:55,550 --> 00:28:03,470 It just has these different sort of mobily gradients of texture, which we think of as trains and cars people. 254 00:28:03,470 --> 00:28:07,850 But it only one thing you can't. 255 00:28:07,850 --> 00:28:09,780 It's also alongside, Peter's remarked. 256 00:28:09,780 --> 00:28:16,070 When he says and I quote that in their relation to substance accidents or properties are not really subordinated to it, 257 00:28:16,070 --> 00:28:20,530 but are the manner of existence of the substance itself. He gets the matter. 258 00:28:20,530 --> 00:28:24,160 Exactly right. It seems to me nothing more needs to be said. 259 00:28:24,160 --> 00:28:32,980 And as so often in philosophy, the mistake is to try to say more, put aside philosophy and consider an object in front of you. 260 00:28:32,980 --> 00:28:37,270 In the fullness, that's reality. There's no ontological subordination. 261 00:28:37,270 --> 00:28:44,050 The object's properties to the object itself. There's no existential inequality or priority of any sort. 262 00:28:44,050 --> 00:28:49,930 No one geological dependent either on the other. No independence of either from the other. 263 00:28:49,930 --> 00:28:55,780 There is, in other words, no real problem of universes and particulars as traditionally understood. 264 00:28:55,780 --> 00:29:01,540 Only a number of philosophically habitual ways of understanding the terms, object and property. 265 00:29:01,540 --> 00:29:07,630 That just can't survive a proper appreciation of the present point. 266 00:29:07,630 --> 00:29:14,200 The realisation of this Kambiz is so can be uncomfortable if one's being habituated to the philosophical debate. 267 00:29:14,200 --> 00:29:17,640 But it settles out and matures powerfully in time. 268 00:29:17,640 --> 00:29:23,770 One looks at any ordinary object and it's deeply mysterious how they can be thought to be appropriate. 269 00:29:23,770 --> 00:29:30,610 It's it's ZOS, I mean, it's being the way it is is identical to its same being. 270 00:29:30,610 --> 00:29:37,710 Well, what happens, of course, now is that objection is based on counterfactuals flood to the front of many philosophers minds. 271 00:29:37,710 --> 00:29:43,600 And I'll say something about this suit. The moment that we can ask David Armstrong says, and I'm quoting again, 272 00:29:43,600 --> 00:29:48,220 on the hand of distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties. 273 00:29:48,220 --> 00:29:54,220 But he says the two factors are to intimately together to speak of a relation between them. 274 00:29:54,220 --> 00:29:59,450 The business and the nature are incapable, existing apart from each other. 275 00:29:59,450 --> 00:30:04,820 Better particulars are vicious abstractions from what may be called states of affairs. 276 00:30:04,820 --> 00:30:13,750 This is a nature. Well, this seems to me to be entirely Cartesian and Spinoza and mind that CNN country human nature. 277 00:30:13,750 --> 00:30:19,330 We cannot just, Armstrong says, distinguish the particularity of particular from its properties. 278 00:30:19,330 --> 00:30:24,180 We can make this conceptual distinction, but we can't really speak of a relation. 279 00:30:24,180 --> 00:30:30,750 A real distinction between the two is true. Objects are literally identical with their properties. 280 00:30:30,750 --> 00:30:34,300 This is entirely compatible with clay and objects. 281 00:30:34,300 --> 00:30:44,950 Properties, including its intrinsic or non relational properties, may do change through time while it remains the same object. 282 00:30:44,950 --> 00:30:50,920 Well, no. No, it isn't. Someone says and I've got I've got this almost verbatim on the hand. 283 00:30:50,920 --> 00:30:58,150 Because I thought it's a bit more complicated. If someone says to me, look, to hold the objects are identical with their properties is to hold. 284 00:30:58,150 --> 00:31:04,180 This is Broman one that objects necessarily have all the properties they have. 285 00:31:04,180 --> 00:31:09,910 But we know the object says we naturally say that Object X, for example, would still be the object. 286 00:31:09,910 --> 00:31:16,630 It is a time t even if its properties, properties or properties and as P had been different. 287 00:31:16,630 --> 00:31:22,370 T we naturally say will still be the object is even if some of these properties were other than they are. 288 00:31:22,370 --> 00:31:30,000 In fact, to which I replied. True. But nothing here forbids this way of talking about the non-factual. 289 00:31:30,000 --> 00:31:37,750 The fact that there a context in which we find it natural to say this is Romit to that X is properties might have been different than what they are. 290 00:31:37,750 --> 00:31:45,280 One, it remains the same object doesn't provide any support at all for the mistaken idea that Romit three 291 00:31:45,280 --> 00:31:52,180 an object has or must have some form or motive to be independent of its having the properties it does. 292 00:31:52,180 --> 00:31:56,060 To think that it does is to build the whole metaphysics of object and property into 293 00:31:56,060 --> 00:32:01,600 counterfactual thought of metaphysics that it doesn't contain a licence as it stands. 294 00:32:01,600 --> 00:32:12,060 And that's simply incorrect. We can perfectly well say Roman for X might not have had the properties it does not have say it was. 295 00:32:12,060 --> 00:32:16,900 Supposing that determinism is false because this doesn't put to in question. 296 00:32:16,900 --> 00:32:19,630 It doesn't challenge the view that whatever happens, 297 00:32:19,630 --> 00:32:25,980 everything in which the being of X consists of any time is identical to everything in which the being of X is properties. 298 00:32:25,980 --> 00:32:36,350 This consists of that it's possible to read Arabic pieces to in such a way that is challenged by Grobman four. 299 00:32:36,350 --> 00:32:42,730 But if one does one simply Mrs chooses to ignore the fundamental metaphysical truth expressed by two. 300 00:32:42,730 --> 00:32:46,870 I can't really go on about the small, but you really need some people's equal. 301 00:32:46,870 --> 00:32:51,220 I'm just reiterating the Obando theory about objects or just collections of properties. 302 00:32:51,220 --> 00:32:59,870 But top of the text, as it's usually stated, is the word property, meaning a property has already had to have been transformed in your thought. 303 00:32:59,870 --> 00:33:03,580 And if yo yo bundle theory is usually presented, 304 00:33:03,580 --> 00:33:08,470 is still making use of the notion of property that makes it seem grotesquely implausible thing to say. 305 00:33:08,470 --> 00:33:16,450 That's because the area is. To the word property. So it takes a bit of time. 306 00:33:16,450 --> 00:33:21,060 Another objection, someone says I'm bought my property. 307 00:33:21,060 --> 00:33:25,490 This is not. Therefore, I'm not identical to my property. 308 00:33:25,490 --> 00:33:32,170 Yes, this is meant to be not knocking the likenesses law. But the reply to that is this. 309 00:33:32,170 --> 00:33:37,200 This is language. No metaphysics. I think I can answer that with nature. 310 00:33:37,200 --> 00:33:41,340 It's childish to think there's such an appeal to Linus's law. 311 00:33:41,340 --> 00:33:46,050 Can refute identity metaphysics in this way to understand the present claim, 312 00:33:46,050 --> 00:33:50,910 to accept the sense in which the being of X is identical with being its proper witness. 313 00:33:50,910 --> 00:33:58,680 And that there is such a sense in question is to say that this objection has no force, simply bounces off its target. 314 00:33:58,680 --> 00:34:01,140 It depends on what's been discarded. 315 00:34:01,140 --> 00:34:10,350 Standard language, enshrined object property distinction that drives the interminable debate about particulars in universities. 316 00:34:10,350 --> 00:34:14,880 So I don't think Frank Ramsey exaggerates when he says, and I quote, 317 00:34:14,880 --> 00:34:23,840 The whole theory of universals is due to mistaking a characteristic of language for a man, fundamental character, Mistick of reality. 318 00:34:23,840 --> 00:34:25,800 And Whitehead only exaggerates a little. 319 00:34:25,800 --> 00:34:33,240 Perhaps when he says and I quote it all modern philosophy hinges around the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate, 320 00:34:33,240 --> 00:34:42,240 substance and quality, particular and universal. And both of them, of course, agree with nature, whose entry I played in until now. 321 00:34:42,240 --> 00:34:46,680 That's just, as it were, an artefact of the fact that I had always stopped down. 322 00:34:46,680 --> 00:34:55,440 And then I discovered the DEA could be recruited to the cause, sir, because language is built in terms of the most naive prejudices. 323 00:34:55,440 --> 00:35:03,480 We read disharmonious and problems into things because we think only in the form of language does believing in the eternal truth of reason, 324 00:35:03,480 --> 00:35:15,120 e.g. subject, predicate, etc. because he comes first and then the historical order that nature often focuses on causation by making this point. 325 00:35:15,120 --> 00:35:18,450 Let me quote this that we have a right to distinguish between subject and predicate. 326 00:35:18,450 --> 00:35:26,970 He says, That is our strongest belief fact quoting even the belief in cause and effect, self condition, condition, not him, 327 00:35:26,970 --> 00:35:33,720 is merely an individual case of the first and general belief of primaeval belief and subject to predict might not. 328 00:35:33,720 --> 00:35:44,550 This belief in the concept of subject completely gives me the great stupidity and claims to infer, in fact, deeply connected to claims three, 329 00:35:44,550 --> 00:35:53,910 five and six which are into thickly into work with each other and to this triptych that I now turn the subject, 330 00:35:53,910 --> 00:36:00,630 predicate the connexion of subsequent Cosma factors, as it were, mediating the transition. 331 00:36:00,630 --> 00:36:06,560 Well, the first point is the quick one, right? Seems to be clear that nature's animate, animate versions of hands, torque, 332 00:36:06,560 --> 00:36:15,570 causes and effects tantamount to any sort of scepticism about the reality of what we call causal processes. 333 00:36:15,570 --> 00:36:21,060 Nor do they amount to any qualification of his view that nothing can ever happen otherwise than it does. 334 00:36:21,060 --> 00:36:29,100 His belief is that this may cause dissent, his belief in what we can call natural necessity. 335 00:36:29,100 --> 00:36:36,190 So long as we detach this term from any idea that anything in nature is boxing, anything else but compelling. 336 00:36:36,190 --> 00:36:45,560 What nature is objecting to in the classic Buddhist style is the substance, timeless separatism and talk about individual causes and effects. 337 00:36:45,560 --> 00:36:52,710 He is asserting five to claim that reality is not truly divisible into Khuzestan. 338 00:36:52,710 --> 00:36:55,650 Here's a quotation in the gay science concepts. 339 00:36:55,650 --> 00:37:04,050 And of course the fact the merely perfected the image of becoming without reason, reaching a bounty behind it cause and effect. 340 00:37:04,050 --> 00:37:14,820 There is probably never such a plurality and truth. A continuum comprises part of which we isolate a couple of pieces. 341 00:37:14,820 --> 00:37:22,950 The error of dividing the reality continuum, becoming reality into discrete subsystem type of causes and effects is Kuneitra 342 00:37:22,950 --> 00:37:28,860 particularly salient case of the fundamental error built in to the fundamental forward, 343 00:37:28,860 --> 00:37:35,040 discursive thought that is most centrally subject, critical form or nonverbal? 344 00:37:35,040 --> 00:37:44,280 Which inevitably enacts the object property Harra and or being becoming ever well against there so far. 345 00:37:44,280 --> 00:37:49,800 We already have in place the positive versions of theses two four objects of processes. 346 00:37:49,800 --> 00:37:57,030 There's no real distinguishing objects in their properties. The next thing to bring into line is the positive version three. 347 00:37:57,030 --> 00:38:03,150 As it stands, three and negative form states that there's no fundamental real distinction early 348 00:38:03,150 --> 00:38:09,670 at best conceptual distinction between a thing X's basal properties and its power. 349 00:38:09,670 --> 00:38:14,550 Priorities put otherwise, and here I go to. 350 00:38:14,550 --> 00:38:20,550 I'm intentionally introducing an extremely unhelpful terminology because it's 351 00:38:20,550 --> 00:38:25,230 so widespread that it's worth trying to express the correct view in its terms. 352 00:38:25,230 --> 00:38:33,710 Although they resist the truth. So put in these other terms through negative three states that there's no fundamental real distinction early 353 00:38:33,710 --> 00:38:41,710 as the conceptual distinction between axis categorical properties and an axis dispositional properties. 354 00:38:41,710 --> 00:38:51,840 Now consider three in any form. Here's again to separate up purposes of discussion an aspect of what is in it, a single thesis, 355 00:38:51,840 --> 00:38:59,010 a single thesis of identity, metaphysics, which inevitably comes out as something complex and human thought and language. 356 00:38:59,010 --> 00:39:07,290 So the separation is again, artificial. But one has of course, one has to do this sort of thing when doing human philosophy. 357 00:39:07,290 --> 00:39:13,170 And one can perfectly well and using language and one completely well do it in the service of trying to show, 358 00:39:13,170 --> 00:39:19,080 as I am now trying to show how and why the separation of artificial. 359 00:39:19,080 --> 00:39:24,540 So I'm not any good at all for the moment in terms of the categorical disposition distinction. 360 00:39:24,540 --> 00:39:33,040 I'm also going to continue to talk in terms of objects and properties. The separatist object property cannot be dispensed with. 361 00:39:33,040 --> 00:39:40,930 Now regularly also or simply a neutral of being in a way that doesn't divide reality into objects, properties. 362 00:39:40,930 --> 00:39:42,580 And by being, I just mean becoming. 363 00:39:42,580 --> 00:39:51,630 I'm not saying I'm not invoking that, but I have a special dialectical purpose in retaining the language of object and property. 364 00:39:51,630 --> 00:39:57,000 I'm not retaining it because the relevant points flow more easily or looking more plausible. 365 00:39:57,000 --> 00:40:01,650 When we spoke the opposite reason because they look less plausible. 366 00:40:01,650 --> 00:40:10,050 We'll move on, put in these terms. So the idea is that when one thinks that way, it's through in the more resistant object properties. 367 00:40:10,050 --> 00:40:19,140 One can see the points home even when these terms were killed. So that's meant to give extra force to me to the attempted demonstration. 368 00:40:19,140 --> 00:40:24,930 So this is the last argument to begin. It's generally agreed to talk about object taxes, 369 00:40:24,930 --> 00:40:31,830 dispositions of dispositional properties in context like the present one is to talk of its powers and power properties, 370 00:40:31,830 --> 00:40:36,180 which actually we may call its causal properties. 371 00:40:36,180 --> 00:40:42,600 It's less clear, much less clear to me at these about the term categorical standard and used to mean in this context. 372 00:40:42,600 --> 00:40:45,780 But the simplest or minimal way to understand it, I think, 373 00:40:45,780 --> 00:40:54,360 is as to Notimex is basically fundamental or intrinsic or primary qualities or properties, whatever they are. 374 00:40:54,360 --> 00:40:58,100 So X is categorical. Being approved is the totality of X. 375 00:40:58,100 --> 00:41:06,750 Is Paektu concretely existing being whatever is nature played in this definition of categorical doesn't exclude, 376 00:41:06,750 --> 00:41:14,400 doesn't exclude the possibility that the things dispositional properties should turn out to be amongst those sceptical category. 377 00:41:14,400 --> 00:41:18,990 Nor should it. So far so, perhaps so good. 378 00:41:18,990 --> 00:41:21,840 The next thing to record is it is commonly held. 379 00:41:21,840 --> 00:41:30,750 This is argued that the categorical properties of X on the ground of X is dispositional or part properties, 380 00:41:30,750 --> 00:41:38,040 and that the categorical properties of X on the whole ground of X is dispositional properties so that 381 00:41:38,040 --> 00:41:44,760 the dispositional power properties are in no way ontologically above the categorical properties. 382 00:41:44,760 --> 00:41:50,010 This view is most similarly associated with lock in multiples, 383 00:41:50,010 --> 00:41:57,180 and it's plainly central to it that the distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is at best a conceptual distinction. 384 00:41:57,180 --> 00:42:01,020 It's not any sort of irreducible logical distinction. 385 00:42:01,020 --> 00:42:07,380 There's nothing more to the power properties or panel beating of a thing than its Category four properties or category. 386 00:42:07,380 --> 00:42:11,520 Competing according to law is right. 387 00:42:11,520 --> 00:42:15,950 If the things categorically being is in place, then its part is in place. 388 00:42:15,950 --> 00:42:21,860 First things Power B block is literally part of its actual contract. 389 00:42:21,860 --> 00:42:26,490 The existing B its capital is being played. 390 00:42:26,490 --> 00:42:31,560 It doesn't exclude not given the present definition of the word categorical. 391 00:42:31,560 --> 00:42:37,890 Well, I think the sofa is clearly the right to take that and B often combined with the view c that the 392 00:42:37,890 --> 00:42:44,790 categorical properties of eggs are in some way ontologically over the disposition of properties. 393 00:42:44,790 --> 00:42:55,860 Correct. And while C may seem natural enough at first, it is what's at issue here, because this to accept three as it does nature does. 394 00:42:55,860 --> 00:43:07,740 And as I do is to deny C that it is to deny that there is any there is or can be anything more to two things B than its powers. 395 00:43:07,740 --> 00:43:12,590 I agree with nature that. C is a great mistake. 396 00:43:12,590 --> 00:43:19,190 However, management may seem at first fact, I think the point is effectively a priori. 397 00:43:19,190 --> 00:43:25,250 Once one accepts the reality of power B two, as any serious philosopher must. 398 00:43:25,250 --> 00:43:31,340 So let me try to explain. This looks to you the one to conclude. 399 00:43:31,340 --> 00:43:36,020 Here is the raw power being or beings stomping, which I take to be a new tempest. 400 00:43:36,020 --> 00:43:42,220 So most philosophers agree that there can be dispositional being without a categorical being. 401 00:43:42,220 --> 00:43:50,540 And that can be categorical being without disposition. They accept that everything has both categorically and this position. 402 00:43:50,540 --> 00:43:54,150 Most some do reject the first half of this claim holding. 403 00:43:54,150 --> 00:43:58,820 Does no categorical B only disposition will be as strong as D. 404 00:43:58,820 --> 00:44:07,190 I've got two letters and numbers D. This is the there is only dispositional B. 405 00:44:07,190 --> 00:44:12,680 Well, I got to consider this horribly ill expressed suggestion later for that note, 406 00:44:12,680 --> 00:44:17,770 instead of the following strengthened version of the claim that everything has both categorical in this position. 407 00:44:17,770 --> 00:44:23,680 B. This is C, D one. And C, d do nothing can possibly have the total categorical. 408 00:44:23,680 --> 00:44:28,880 B has not had the token dispositional escapology. 409 00:44:28,880 --> 00:44:37,010 And conversely, nothing can possibly have the time to of being that has not out the total category B. 410 00:44:37,010 --> 00:44:39,500 I think this is just obvious on reflection, 411 00:44:39,500 --> 00:44:48,070 given that we can agree to use the dreaded categorical dispositional language thought before I give it this note that it's a very short step, 412 00:44:48,070 --> 00:44:54,580 if it's a step at all from that conjunction of those two theses, which are just called C D. 413 00:44:54,580 --> 00:45:02,360 So the seemingly stronger claim we've already encountered, that is the categorical dispositional formulation of three. 414 00:45:02,360 --> 00:45:06,210 That is, there's no real distinction there only a conceptual distinction between an object, 415 00:45:06,210 --> 00:45:11,970 categorical properties or B and its disposition properties and a small set. 416 00:45:11,970 --> 00:45:15,590 That to my preferred candidate, the positive for the three, 417 00:45:15,590 --> 00:45:21,680 which is the seemingly stronger claim that things have to go into properties or being dispositional properties, 418 00:45:21,680 --> 00:45:27,950 being Rianna are really the entity identical, which can be put more simply as three. 419 00:45:27,950 --> 00:45:35,060 Again, the things X is Basle being or property liveness is identical with its PABI or perfectness, 420 00:45:35,060 --> 00:45:42,230 which comes down in effect in the end or being is part of B, 421 00:45:42,230 --> 00:45:49,340 I say seemingly stronger because I don't think the three positive ID is really stronger than the negative. 422 00:45:49,340 --> 00:46:01,110 No real distinction. Well, look, all this may seem quite wrong, and I know it does seem quite wrong to a very large number of present day. 423 00:46:01,110 --> 00:46:08,220 So Commander Metaphysicians routine talks about the multiple realise ability of certain functional properties, 424 00:46:08,220 --> 00:46:16,080 which proves our disposition properties, perhaps the following primitive linked objections to what I see D. 425 00:46:16,080 --> 00:46:22,110 Someone's going to say, look, two things can be this positionally or power identical without being categoric, categorical, 426 00:46:22,110 --> 00:46:31,470 and also a thing can be changed in respect of its categorical properties without being changed in respect of its disposition. 427 00:46:31,470 --> 00:46:35,950 So two thoughts about possible worlds may prompt the idea. 428 00:46:35,950 --> 00:46:43,620 Three, nothing can be changed in respect of its disposition or properties without being changed in respect of its categorical properties. 429 00:46:43,620 --> 00:46:51,660 And the accompanying O for two things can be categorically identical without being disposition apparent. 430 00:46:51,660 --> 00:46:59,700 In fact, good things can be solved. Nothing like searching perfect to take out too big of an argument, take three and four. 431 00:46:59,700 --> 00:47:03,030 First, huge numbers of recent philosophical thought. 432 00:47:03,030 --> 00:47:35,760 Experiments depend on those three before they build in the profoundly separatist assumption that the material thing Sainte-Anne.