OK. Well, this is my first show in Egypt, and I think your intelligence service to begin with fixing claims first.
There's no persisting in unity yourself. Second, there's no fundamental, real distinct object on the one hand and their properties on the other.
Third, there's no fundamental or real secret within the base. He will place all properties of things in common, properties of things.
Fourth, no fundamental real distinction between objects or substances on the one hand and the processes and then the other.
This reality isn't truly divisible into causes. In fact, six objects aren't governed by laws of nature.
Ontologically distinct from them. But I think the same is central to metaphor, which is metaphysics.
He also holds seven.
There's no freewill as ordinarily understood, although I wouldn't say much about this and that nothing can ever happen otherwise that it does.
And that's a position which is often called determinism, although the name isn't apt to Nietzsche's Kenneth.
Finally, at the moment, it seems to me that he inclines towards the ancient but also very modern view.
So there's a fundamental, non-trivial sense in which reality is one.
And towards what seems to me to be the most plausible, though difficult, view of the nature of reality that is the heart,
the really hard nosed modernist view, which is the Spinoza Magalia and receiving an end in Ternium and white.
How do you do that? This is number 10 on my list.
Reality is suffused with. Even if it doesn't consist of mentality in some formal sense and it seems correct to attribute tend to them.
If only because he famously holds the lead, but that everything is world power.
Because to say this is already to endorse ten in some form, to say that everything is in some respect mental.
I know just a matter of craft. That is false.
Considered or conceived of it somehow. Went away.
So I think we have the core of not just metaphysics. And I'm going to put aside and let.
I'm neither, for example, points out that Nietzsche doesn't mention love. When he surveys, it won't work.
And I know of one to 10. I think the first seven negative claims are certainly true and that the final three positive category probably true,
which is known as perspective based, who's sceptical about truth, a word which he likes to put an inverted commas.
And about our project in metaphysics. And he has a rich variety of valid purposes in expressing himself in this way.
But it's not seriously doubt that he isn't as mature thought prepared.
So all of what age at least he doesn't think his views on these matters are wholly true in inverted commas
or true only from the perspective of some dry facts on cluster drives or not really about what he calls,
I quote, true being of things that in themselves are things. And I'm happy to leave the detailed defence of this last point to others.
Jill Richardson, for one and this talk I want to focus on two six inches endorsement of one.
The view is that there's no persisting unitary self, I think needs no argument.
And it's deeply bound up with the endorsement of true crime. No, this is separatist, not a free will.
The argument age is pretty, pretty tangled up with three sticks.
I will talk about it a bit, but I want to read essentially a set to make one point now,
which is that the reason the name determinism is inappropriate in each case is that although he makes
free use of the motion to power because he purges the thesis that nothing can ever happen otherwise.
It does of the notion of compulsion, the notion of necessity understood as some kind of compulsion.
He treats it rather. And in my view, most deeply as a as a kind of tautology in a way that we can perhaps picture first by thinking of lightning,
his causeless universe in which every true statement about anything is now that truth and then perhaps again,
indirectly, of the food I mentioned, list block universe of relativity theory.
What about nine? I'm just going through someone saying a few things about these people getting on to the main issue.
The view that in some sense always won. But I don't want to insist on this, Masaomi.
Irony that Nietzsche's criticisms of the two mystical cutting tendencies and the
matching atavistic tendencies of human thought and language tend in this direction.
Thinking, he says, takes apart what is really one. And this is one of his most constant themes.
It's live. Less clear, perhaps on a subject for another time that he's a an all out monas.
I mean, a thing this. Stockholders.
But it's so in line with commonalties that as many injured philosophers and many modern physicists and cosmologists who hold that,
there is the final analysis. Only one thing, that space time, which is itself an object to concrete.
We'll meet his views, have a fine ancestry.
They are, in a sense, traditional, and they're strongly in accord, as I've always said, as much in present day physics.
The main elements found in our clients in the Buddha and some of the work of the Buddhist near contemporary Plato in early modern times,
they connect strongly with the of lightness, at least, and more recently with Whitehead and the later Russell, amongst others.
Many more Connexions can be made, some of which I'll indicate. But I'm not particularly concerned with the questions of influence.
There are fundamental points on which nature agrees with Descartes, and this is a point that pleases me stress.
Descartes is a great genius, misunderstood, and also at which I agree with law and human can't Tripplehorn.
None of this is surprising. Truth tends to occur independently to different thinkers and to force its way out.
Matt, I'm quoting William James, who says that metaphysics means nothing but an unusually obstinate effort to think clearly.
And no one is more obstinate to nature. It seems to me the fact that he has this completely uncanny nose for truth,
which seems to extend beyond the psychological to physical events, is bewildering to me.
And some of this, I think, came up earlier to do it.
The panel session that I attended where Connexions were made between just thought pleasant physics, but not all of you again.
Anyway, my cousin died just to give a brief explanation.
Part of what I take to be the right view about the fundamental nature of reality with some special reference to Nietzsche.
So I'd be amazed and worried if there were anything new. What I have to say about Nietzsche.
I simply want to provide a certain view of reality with one distinguished reference point amongst others.
I'm going to use the late notebook's freely even mandery good quotations from the word mutuel published in The Sun.
So I also see this paper containing slots for supporting causations to be supplied by others.
So that's the first thing to do. Reality as it is, as it is in itself.
That's the first thing to do when it comes to a discussion reaches metaphysics and it shouldn't be unnecessary.
But philosophy is, of course, a cesspit of misunderstanding.
One of the things the first is to do is to note that agent isn't sceptical about the notion of reality as it is in itself.
This is hardly surprising because such scepticism is incoherent.
It's incoherent because on the hand of one to be is necessarily to be a certain way at any given time to be somehow or other.
And to the way that being is at any given time just is the way it is self.
And if you don't like the reality of time, you can just drop the words at any given time.
Someone might say that the point fails Nietzsche's case because he holds that being is becoming.
But obviously, that's no good. Reality is a certain way as it is in itself, whatever the nature reality is.
So if reality is coming and I have no objection to his terminology,
although I get to avoid it for the most part because it has ancient and tangled roots.
So if reality is coming, then that's the way reality is in itself. And there is, of course, a certain way becoming a reality isn't as it is in itself.
I'm going to skip a few points objections based on the misunderstanding of quantum mechanics.
Another possible objection is the teacher writes that I quote, There is no truth and they quoted in what can be thought of must surely be a fiction.
The first one to make a reply to that, of course, is that there's no tension between holding the.
Does it determine the truth about how things are themselves? And scepticism about our ability to know what it is.
Second, it's true that need to constantly stress is the point that ordinary human thought or language
is profoundly adequate when it comes to the attempt to try to express the nature of reality.
Given thought and language is in part essentially constituted by force structures fictionalisation zobel errors about that reality.
Still, each and every before. Meadowland thinks that there's anything insuperable difficulty using language that builds
in such areas to express truth about those very errors or indeed truth of other kinds.
So we have to weigh remarks which seem to express global scepticism about the possibility
of expressing the truth about anything against the vast mass of the rest of his work,
which is everywhere premised on the assumption that it is possible to express the truth about things.
After all, the vast body of his work consists almost entirely of truth claims of this sort.
I guess maybe this is a dead issue. That's what I've been picking up. I recently.
But it used not to be. It's not as if it's hard to fit these highly general, duplicative remarks by nature into his work, infinite as a whole.
It's easy. It's easy to understand their point in the context of his other views.
It's no harder than understanding the intuitively natural Buddhist distinction between conventional truths and ultimate truth.
I don't need to see the horrible amount of time has been wasted here.
As Carmen said, I'm quoting many historians of philosophy with all their intended praise.
A tribute may be a nonsense to populous past policies they are incapable of recognising beyond what the philosophers actually said,
what they really meant to say. And again, if we take a single passage is torn from their context and compare them with one another,
contradictions are not likely to be lacking, especially in the work that is written with any freedom of expression.
But they are cuts as easily resolved by those who have mastered the idea of the whole.
So maybe this is just banal. I mean, what each has no truth,
no knowledge of metaphysics remarks do is teach us something about how to region both in his published books and in his notebooks.
Take a simple example. When nature proposes, the reality is best thought of as a continuum or unified process whose nature thought,
human thought and language inevitably falsified by cutting it up, but especially in temporal distinct objects or individual causes and effects.
He's claiming that this is how things actually are.
So you're saying this sort of thing involves, Jonathan, on the question of fact, that nature is certainly Chumstick his own and whether or not that.
So he certainly doesn't think that words like Continuum are condemned by belonging
to human thought and language to being ultimately and applicable to reality.
I would qualify some of those remarks about Continuum in the light of the again,
of the session I just attended, which talked quite a lot about Nietzsche's commitment to some kind of control.
If you agree on anything, it's necessary to do that now.
Okay. Now, what about that question that I just mentioned, which concerns for blindness to species?
Well, very roughly. Physics, I think it has sufficiently shown that all objects of process that there should be clear well thought of this process.
We've learnt the matter is astonishingly theory, but substance is almost inconceivable in substantial relative to our everyday conception.
GRANEY Individual particles were already being treated as insubstantial as mathematical points
and hands me a theoretical posits in the 18th century as something Nietzsche was aware of,
in fact. And they lost to a particular punctuality long ago as they gave way to fields in post 1925.
Quantum physics leading up to a popular phenomenon of entanglement, everyday objects and stones to brains, collocations patterns of energy,
diaphanous process entities whose existence evokes a constant interchange with the quantum vacuum given,
which is literally correct to say that that party constituted by the quantum vacuum.
So the idea of the processes or events requires some sort of substance that is
somewhat distinct from which they can go or occur as really long collapsed.
The whole object process properties, state event, conceptual clustering of concepts is indeed hopelessly superficial.
Nor do we need modern physics to see this any more than the ancient Indian Greek philosophers did.
Some of the distinctions in the object process property of the state of clusters seem to lead us to more real,
irreducible, metaphysical, fundamental differences. They seem integral to almost basic discursive subject predicate forms of thought,
and we can allow their very natural, practically indispensible in everyday life.
But they are profoundly misleading because when taken up in metaphysics as a guide to the fundamental nature of reality,
each of them constantly stresses. And it isn't actually particularly hard to see that this is all reality is white.
Whitehead was moved to observe by his study of 20th century physics.
And as Heraclitus remarked, nature's beings becomings, as Richardson says.
So arts matter is best thought of as process.
The matter is essentially dynamic. Essentially temporal, essentially changeable.
Object or matter can't be conceptualised as things whose existence can be cross.
Separately from the temporality, quote, nature.
Another familiar quotation, the separation of doing from the doer of what happens from something that makes it happen.
Process from something that's not process, but is enduring substance.
The body, soul, etc. The attempt to grasp what happens is a kind of displacement and repositioning of what he is,
what persists, that ancient mythology set down to believe in the cause and effect.
Once this belief is found, a fixed form in the grammatical functions of language.
Well, I thought I think that we should always call matter time matter for matter of time
so that we never for a moment forget is the central temporality and central change.
When you grasp matter has time, there's no McGibbon in its being at a time.
And if it's fruit indeed is not given in to being absorbed insofar as it's considered at a time,
but only when it's considered through time except through is already wrong
because it carries the false picture of maximum somehow travelling through time,
which is false because matters kind of as part of its B in such a way that it can't really be said to exist through time to when you see all this.
Then you see that to assess it. A third piece is eight that nothing can happen.
Dance is just to say that matter. That's time.
That is what he needs to say,
that even to say that matter does certain things or behaves in a certain way is already to the fortified reality reality matter and suggests,
insofar as it suggests, that its behaviour could be distinguished from its nature.
So therefore we have the negative version of four in place.
And I'm not going to do positive for a fourth simply because it's just all objects or processes, he said.
So that's the first plank. All the things we naturally pick out as objects are just as well.
And actually, with no great difficulty thought of as processes of fundamental metaphysics,
given that we allow ourselves to go on talking of objects at all.
Mostly you perhaps to consider very seriously whether to go on talking of objects at all.
But it's undoubtedly convenient for many purposes as need to realise.
And it isn't, in fact, that hard to suspend or suppress a potentially misleading implications of such talk.
So here's that was just one familiar and I think relatively clear sample of Nita's metaphysical thinking and one simple
way to frame his general metaphysical approaches is as a rejection of two doctrines we can call separatism aestheticism.
Next thing on my hand, no one can state and criticise these doctrines again, making the point clear, using the language of mortgages and property.
Again, it's not as if the statement and criticism are undermined by the fact that the
language of object to property in ought can be used as the doctrines buildings.
So separatism separates objects shot from an object against ages five and nine and also against
one third to separatism and separates an object from its property owners against spaces too.
That's a crucial doctrine, which I'm going to discuss in some detail.
It's separatism combined with a static system in separating matter from force against six pieces.
Six put otherwise in the explicit terms of six separate things from the laws of nature.
And that, says separatist Hickley, that the lanta govern the former separatism and status and combined again against these four.
That's remarkable. Section two separate basic existence from time to temporality, or, in more Neogen terms,
being from becoming in a way profoundly contrary to modern physics.
Well, let's distinguish 10 slash eleven claims. The purposes of philosophical discussion of this separation, too, is of course artificial.
There are many internal connexions and redundancies amongst the claims. So, for example, theses three can be seen as dropping out of two and six.
And I believe direct discussion of five. That is the views on causation two, four, five and six.
In fact, all up to six go very closely together. What should we opposed to statuses?
Well, dynamicists process metaphysics, error, Clintonism and the ends don't matter to separatism.
Well, murders, holism, metaphysical, relational isn't the Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination.
Maybe an hour ago, Nagarjuna formulation of the emptiness doctrine.
Well, there are lots of names you can have. I favoured the name Identity Metaphysics.
Now, the name may be thought to express only the rejection of separatism and also status ism.
But this too is superficial. It depends on another full separation, the separation of separatism from statuses, the separation,
which is very useful for political purposes, which is to repeat metaphysically superficial.
Well, particularly, it depends on the idea.
There's a sharp distinction between space and time, and that's why there is radically an extraordinarily forth.
Given what we know of the nature of space time, we don't speak freely of space time.
Using the single word to mark the collapse of the idea of space and time were radically distinct from each other.
But we might do well to add the word matter into that word, to get a single word space time matter.
The Nobel Prise winner, Steven Weinberg, suggests that all the objects we take ourselves to have to.
We have to do with in life are best conceived of guys like space time being itself a physical object.
The only one there is an essentially substantial something that's a part of it.
That may be what resource and vast tracts of metaphysics find distinctness, discreetness,
numerical difference, identity, metaphysics, finds unity, continuity, identity, identity, metaphysics.
After all, if indeed you take us through those OWFI, Spinoza is one of its exemplary practitioners,
followed by shelling Inventure of the term and Hengel nature still lies in the same tradition.
It lies there because it is true, because it's a tradition, and although it also lays a great stress on differences of force or power of rank.
Well, separatism and status as in my very deep in language with its Basle subject, pretty good form where we can see easily enough that this is so,
and we can say so in language, find ways of putting things that avoid the problem.
We have in language, words like process flow in flux.
Allow us to say what is wrong with conceptions of the nature of reality which finds sharp separations, discrete existences.
We're really there are nothing we can say with Heraclitus in whose proximity nature writes,
I quote, He feels warmer and better than anywhere else that everything flows.
OK. Now consider two seemingly radical claims,
there's no fundamental distinction between to be made between objects on the one hand and their properties on the other.
Well, I say the claim is radical and it may indeed be on Aristotelian, but it's hardly radical.
If by radical we mean radically unorthodox, it seems to be relatively little known.
But Descartes spinners alive and count amongst those who unite with nature in their endorsement, too.
They all hope to use it slightly, extend Descartes terms that there is no real distinction,
only a conceptual distinction between an object considered at any given time and its properties, its attributes most.
Well, there's no real distinction between two things and be on Descartes terms when they can't possibly exist apart.
The clearest case in which A and B can't possibly exist apart.
And it isn't. And perhaps the only is the case in which A and B are identical.
But then there's only one thing and nothing can exist apart from itself.
Strikingly, for some, it's striking the case of an object at any given time and its properties considered at that time as a case of this kind.
So I came. So two is true, the claim that there's no real distinction between an object and its properties.
That's because positive ocean, two objects or substances are literally identical with properties.
Well, at first this claim seems plainly false, given the standard training and analytic philosophy.
And given the extreme naturalness, counterfactual thought which builds in so many of the metaphysical areas.
Nietzsche's criticises. But not after a while. Well, I've argued for too in another place.
And here I'm just going to cite other people instead. So here's Descartes. It's concise.
I quote the attributes of a substance when considered collectively, he says, are indeed identical with the substance.
Nature is even more concise. I quote, thing equals its qualities.
Subtract, subtracted, doing as he often says and does no to a left over.
One might think that Descartes life that Spinoza want to hang onto a robust notion of substance in a way that need to dust.
But there is a fundamental respect in which this isn't so much the right one.
The great rationalists are not less radical in nature and actually lock in who rules also fully in line,
epistemologically speaking and holding that we have absolutely no legitimate idea of substance, nor any.
Indeed.
Any legitimate reason to suppose it exists insofar as it's taken to be something that is in any way other than a more than particular qualities.
So amongst the seven most well-known early modern philosophers, only Baqi is out of line.
This issue, except the British empiricists, keep it epistemological.
They're going to logical thesis.
This object is literally identical with its properties.
This is indeed radical and initially difficult to think given the structure of human thought of the language given.
In particular, the word property is an intrinsically relational word that asks for something for it to be a property of,
but it's sufficiently understandable to that. And it's also hand again right in line with modern physics.
Does it seem hard to think? Well, actually, it's not that. And it's something that one can grow into deeply.
And Capice is doing philosophy or indeed physics data is, as it were, missed a substance for most philosophers.
But the popular version of early modern philosophy bears little resemblance to the true story, which is much, much more exciting.
Descartes was neither the first nor the last to think that the word substance is an empty word,
a mere placeholder with no clear meaning other than existed for real.
He did, though, very much want to be left in peace to get on with his work, and he really was most anxious not to annoy the church.
And he used the word substance increasingly in communication with others who couldn't really think in
other terms because he has these famous comments to his friend Regis or his one time friend Regis,
about how he shouldn't annoy people, try and talk in their language.
Actually, it's also is perhaps insufficiently well known that Descartes agreed with nature.
As I understand it, that all is one, at least insofar as the material universe is concerned.
Descartes, the universe is a single substance, one big extended thing.
It just has these different sort of mobily gradients of texture, which we think of as trains and cars people.
But it only one thing you can't.
It's also alongside, Peter's remarked.
When he says and I quote that in their relation to substance accidents or properties are not really subordinated to it,
but are the manner of existence of the substance itself. He gets the matter.
Exactly right. It seems to me nothing more needs to be said.
And as so often in philosophy, the mistake is to try to say more, put aside philosophy and consider an object in front of you.
In the fullness, that's reality. There's no ontological subordination.
The object's properties to the object itself. There's no existential inequality or priority of any sort.
No one geological dependent either on the other. No independence of either from the other.
There is, in other words, no real problem of universes and particulars as traditionally understood.
Only a number of philosophically habitual ways of understanding the terms, object and property.
That just can't survive a proper appreciation of the present point.
The realisation of this Kambiz is so can be uncomfortable if one's being habituated to the philosophical debate.
But it settles out and matures powerfully in time.
One looks at any ordinary object and it's deeply mysterious how they can be thought to be appropriate.
It's it's ZOS, I mean, it's being the way it is is identical to its same being.
Well, what happens, of course, now is that objection is based on counterfactuals flood to the front of many philosophers minds.
And I'll say something about this suit. The moment that we can ask David Armstrong says, and I'm quoting again,
on the hand of distinguish the particularity of a particular from its properties.
But he says the two factors are to intimately together to speak of a relation between them.
The business and the nature are incapable, existing apart from each other.
Better particulars are vicious abstractions from what may be called states of affairs.
This is a nature. Well, this seems to me to be entirely Cartesian and Spinoza and mind that CNN country human nature.
We cannot just, Armstrong says, distinguish the particularity of particular from its properties.
We can make this conceptual distinction, but we can't really speak of a relation.
A real distinction between the two is true. Objects are literally identical with their properties.
This is entirely compatible with clay and objects.
Properties, including its intrinsic or non relational properties, may do change through time while it remains the same object.
Well, no. No, it isn't. Someone says and I've got I've got this almost verbatim on the hand.
Because I thought it's a bit more complicated. If someone says to me, look, to hold the objects are identical with their properties is to hold.
This is Broman one that objects necessarily have all the properties they have.
But we know the object says we naturally say that Object X, for example, would still be the object.
It is a time t even if its properties, properties or properties and as P had been different.
T we naturally say will still be the object is even if some of these properties were other than they are.
In fact, to which I replied. True. But nothing here forbids this way of talking about the non-factual.
The fact that there a context in which we find it natural to say this is Romit to that X is properties might have been different than what they are.
One, it remains the same object doesn't provide any support at all for the mistaken idea that Romit three
an object has or must have some form or motive to be independent of its having the properties it does.
To think that it does is to build the whole metaphysics of object and property into
counterfactual thought of metaphysics that it doesn't contain a licence as it stands.
And that's simply incorrect. We can perfectly well say Roman for X might not have had the properties it does not have say it was.
Supposing that determinism is false because this doesn't put to in question.
It doesn't challenge the view that whatever happens,
everything in which the being of X consists of any time is identical to everything in which the being of X is properties.
This consists of that it's possible to read Arabic pieces to in such a way that is challenged by Grobman four.
But if one does one simply Mrs chooses to ignore the fundamental metaphysical truth expressed by two.
I can't really go on about the small, but you really need some people's equal.
I'm just reiterating the Obando theory about objects or just collections of properties.
But top of the text, as it's usually stated, is the word property, meaning a property has already had to have been transformed in your thought.
And if yo yo bundle theory is usually presented,
is still making use of the notion of property that makes it seem grotesquely implausible thing to say.
That's because the area is. To the word property. So it takes a bit of time.
Another objection, someone says I'm bought my property.
This is not. Therefore, I'm not identical to my property.
Yes, this is meant to be not knocking the likenesses law. But the reply to that is this.
This is language. No metaphysics. I think I can answer that with nature.
It's childish to think there's such an appeal to Linus's law.
Can refute identity metaphysics in this way to understand the present claim,
to accept the sense in which the being of X is identical with being its proper witness.
And that there is such a sense in question is to say that this objection has no force, simply bounces off its target.
It depends on what's been discarded.
Standard language, enshrined object property distinction that drives the interminable debate about particulars in universities.
So I don't think Frank Ramsey exaggerates when he says, and I quote,
The whole theory of universals is due to mistaking a characteristic of language for a man, fundamental character, Mistick of reality.
And Whitehead only exaggerates a little.
Perhaps when he says and I quote it all modern philosophy hinges around the difficulty of describing the world in terms of subject and predicate,
substance and quality, particular and universal. And both of them, of course, agree with nature, whose entry I played in until now.
That's just, as it were, an artefact of the fact that I had always stopped down.
And then I discovered the DEA could be recruited to the cause, sir, because language is built in terms of the most naive prejudices.
We read disharmonious and problems into things because we think only in the form of language does believing in the eternal truth of reason,
e.g. subject, predicate, etc. because he comes first and then the historical order that nature often focuses on causation by making this point.
Let me quote this that we have a right to distinguish between subject and predicate.
He says, That is our strongest belief fact quoting even the belief in cause and effect, self condition, condition, not him,
is merely an individual case of the first and general belief of primaeval belief and subject to predict might not.
This belief in the concept of subject completely gives me the great stupidity and claims to infer, in fact, deeply connected to claims three,
five and six which are into thickly into work with each other and to this triptych that I now turn the subject,
predicate the connexion of subsequent Cosma factors, as it were, mediating the transition.
Well, the first point is the quick one, right? Seems to be clear that nature's animate, animate versions of hands, torque,
causes and effects tantamount to any sort of scepticism about the reality of what we call causal processes.
Nor do they amount to any qualification of his view that nothing can ever happen otherwise than it does.
His belief is that this may cause dissent, his belief in what we can call natural necessity.
So long as we detach this term from any idea that anything in nature is boxing, anything else but compelling.
What nature is objecting to in the classic Buddhist style is the substance, timeless separatism and talk about individual causes and effects.
He is asserting five to claim that reality is not truly divisible into Khuzestan.
Here's a quotation in the gay science concepts.
And of course the fact the merely perfected the image of becoming without reason, reaching a bounty behind it cause and effect.
There is probably never such a plurality and truth. A continuum comprises part of which we isolate a couple of pieces.
The error of dividing the reality continuum, becoming reality into discrete subsystem type of causes and effects is Kuneitra
particularly salient case of the fundamental error built in to the fundamental forward,
discursive thought that is most centrally subject, critical form or nonverbal?
Which inevitably enacts the object property Harra and or being becoming ever well against there so far.
We already have in place the positive versions of theses two four objects of processes.
There's no real distinguishing objects in their properties. The next thing to bring into line is the positive version three.
As it stands, three and negative form states that there's no fundamental real distinction early
at best conceptual distinction between a thing X's basal properties and its power.
Priorities put otherwise, and here I go to.
I'm intentionally introducing an extremely unhelpful terminology because it's
so widespread that it's worth trying to express the correct view in its terms.
Although they resist the truth. So put in these other terms through negative three states that there's no fundamental real distinction early
as the conceptual distinction between axis categorical properties and an axis dispositional properties.
Now consider three in any form. Here's again to separate up purposes of discussion an aspect of what is in it, a single thesis,
a single thesis of identity, metaphysics, which inevitably comes out as something complex and human thought and language.
So the separation is again, artificial. But one has of course, one has to do this sort of thing when doing human philosophy.
And one can perfectly well and using language and one completely well do it in the service of trying to show,
as I am now trying to show how and why the separation of artificial.
So I'm not any good at all for the moment in terms of the categorical disposition distinction.
I'm also going to continue to talk in terms of objects and properties. The separatist object property cannot be dispensed with.
Now regularly also or simply a neutral of being in a way that doesn't divide reality into objects, properties.
And by being, I just mean becoming.
I'm not saying I'm not invoking that, but I have a special dialectical purpose in retaining the language of object and property.
I'm not retaining it because the relevant points flow more easily or looking more plausible.
When we spoke the opposite reason because they look less plausible.
We'll move on, put in these terms. So the idea is that when one thinks that way, it's through in the more resistant object properties.
One can see the points home even when these terms were killed. So that's meant to give extra force to me to the attempted demonstration.
So this is the last argument to begin. It's generally agreed to talk about object taxes,
dispositions of dispositional properties in context like the present one is to talk of its powers and power properties,
which actually we may call its causal properties.
It's less clear, much less clear to me at these about the term categorical standard and used to mean in this context.
But the simplest or minimal way to understand it, I think,
is as to Notimex is basically fundamental or intrinsic or primary qualities or properties, whatever they are.
So X is categorical. Being approved is the totality of X.
Is Paektu concretely existing being whatever is nature played in this definition of categorical doesn't exclude,
doesn't exclude the possibility that the things dispositional properties should turn out to be amongst those sceptical category.
Nor should it. So far so, perhaps so good.
The next thing to record is it is commonly held.
This is argued that the categorical properties of X on the ground of X is dispositional or part properties,
and that the categorical properties of X on the whole ground of X is dispositional properties so that
the dispositional power properties are in no way ontologically above the categorical properties.
This view is most similarly associated with lock in multiples,
and it's plainly central to it that the distinction between categorical and dispositional properties is at best a conceptual distinction.
It's not any sort of irreducible logical distinction.
There's nothing more to the power properties or panel beating of a thing than its Category four properties or category.
Competing according to law is right.
If the things categorically being is in place, then its part is in place.
First things Power B block is literally part of its actual contract.
The existing B its capital is being played.
It doesn't exclude not given the present definition of the word categorical.
Well, I think the sofa is clearly the right to take that and B often combined with the view c that the
categorical properties of eggs are in some way ontologically over the disposition of properties.
Correct. And while C may seem natural enough at first, it is what's at issue here, because this to accept three as it does nature does.
And as I do is to deny C that it is to deny that there is any there is or can be anything more to two things B than its powers.
I agree with nature that. C is a great mistake.
However, management may seem at first fact, I think the point is effectively a priori.
Once one accepts the reality of power B two, as any serious philosopher must.
So let me try to explain. This looks to you the one to conclude.
Here is the raw power being or beings stomping, which I take to be a new tempest.
So most philosophers agree that there can be dispositional being without a categorical being.
And that can be categorical being without disposition. They accept that everything has both categorically and this position.
Most some do reject the first half of this claim holding.
Does no categorical B only disposition will be as strong as D.
I've got two letters and numbers D. This is the there is only dispositional B.
Well, I got to consider this horribly ill expressed suggestion later for that note,
instead of the following strengthened version of the claim that everything has both categorical in this position.
B. This is C, D one. And C, d do nothing can possibly have the total categorical.
B has not had the token dispositional escapology.
And conversely, nothing can possibly have the time to of being that has not out the total category B.
I think this is just obvious on reflection,
given that we can agree to use the dreaded categorical dispositional language thought before I give it this note that it's a very short step,
if it's a step at all from that conjunction of those two theses, which are just called C D.
So the seemingly stronger claim we've already encountered, that is the categorical dispositional formulation of three.
That is, there's no real distinction there only a conceptual distinction between an object,
categorical properties or B and its disposition properties and a small set.
That to my preferred candidate, the positive for the three,
which is the seemingly stronger claim that things have to go into properties or being dispositional properties,
being Rianna are really the entity identical, which can be put more simply as three.
Again, the things X is Basle being or property liveness is identical with its PABI or perfectness,
which comes down in effect in the end or being is part of B,
I say seemingly stronger because I don't think the three positive ID is really stronger than the negative.
No real distinction. Well, look, all this may seem quite wrong, and I know it does seem quite wrong to a very large number of present day.
So Commander Metaphysicians routine talks about the multiple realise ability of certain functional properties,
which proves our disposition properties, perhaps the following primitive linked objections to what I see D.
Someone's going to say, look, two things can be this positionally or power identical without being categoric, categorical,
and also a thing can be changed in respect of its categorical properties without being changed in respect of its disposition.
So two thoughts about possible worlds may prompt the idea.
Three, nothing can be changed in respect of its disposition or properties without being changed in respect of its categorical properties.
And the accompanying O for two things can be categorically identical without being disposition apparent.
In fact, good things can be solved. Nothing like searching perfect to take out too big of an argument, take three and four.
First, huge numbers of recent philosophical thought.
Experiments depend on those three before they build in the profoundly separatist assumption that the material thing Sainte-Anne.