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I speak today is my person is the professor of practical effects at the University of Guttenberg,

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and he's going to be speaking to us about priority realism.

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And we're lucky to have another expert in priority Arianism Derek Hough.

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In response, Zingerman's is going to talk for about half an hour and then they'll have a discussion and there's time for questions at the end.

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I will will do that. But so let make a start right away.

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I mean, welcoming in my personal place. Thank you very much.

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And I'm very honoured to have Derek.

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Yes, my respondent, I I've learned more from Derek.

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Much more from Derek. Any other philosopher, dead or alive.

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And for that reason I should perhaps be fair rather than honour to have him as a respondent,

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because I'm there's a risk that I will learn today from him that I've been mistaken about certain things.

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Anyway, what I'm going to talk about is some claims that Derek makes in his lecture Equality and Priorities.

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In that lecture, he he claims that egalitarianism is expressed in levelling down object.

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And more precisely, he claims that to tell teleological, not the ontologically egalitarian is exposed to this objection.

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The difference between these views is that when both are concerned about unjust or unfair inequality,

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the ontological egalitarianism takes an injustice to say certainly a situation

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where we have to be brought about by wrongdoing by moral and moral agents,

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whereas according to down to logical egalitarianism, there are not so-called natural,

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unjust inequalities brought about some people being born disabled and things like that.

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Levelling down objection is to the effect, I suppose many of you know it is that if we consider population where some are better off,

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some somebody else and we decrease it, whether they of the better off or lower the better off down to the level of all the worse off.

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We don't have to do it. It happens. Yes. Okay, it happens.

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And change like that is according to logical egalitarianism in one respect for the better,

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because now the equality doesn't exist anymore or it's a smaller inequality in another respect,

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it's it's a change for the worse because some people have become worse off.

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Nobody's become better off. So one might think of logical egalitarianism as consisting of two principles.

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One principle about saying something like It's bad in itself if some some individuals are unjustly worse off,

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some in some other individuals a principle of equality, the other principle of utility or beneficence,

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saying that it's better or morally better if people,

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individuals are better off from worse off or saying something like is better, that there is a bigger a greater sum of benefits.

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And it is the first principle, the principle of equality, according to which the levelling down situation is in one respect is something better.

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Namely, it's better in terms of equality, whereas it is worse according to the principle of utility.

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So it might be all things considered, a change levelling down might be changed for the worse.

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But all the same egalitarians are committed to teleology.

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Can they get a task? Are committed to saying that in one respect this is the change for the best.

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All that nobody is better off. And some are worse off and those who are better off.

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Now, there are claims that there is another view called priority terrorism or the Paris Review,

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which avoids this objection and proletarian this and says something like and that usually formalises it,

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saying that it's more and more important to to benefit those who are worse off.

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And that's our best role. Or alternatively, you can say that the weight,

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the more weight or value of a benefit is determined by the absolute level of the recipients of this benefit.

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So if the recipient is somebody who's worse off, the benefit has a high of more weight or value than if,

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if, and the recipient is somebody who is better off.

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I believe that I am proletarian some just like, yeah,

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this Harrison ism is committed to an impersonal value and egalitarianism is committed to an and and impersonal value of equality,

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saying that it's it's bad that there is unjust or unfair inequality and that this isn't something which is bad, necessarily bad for people.

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Take a personal value such as, for instance, of pleasure.

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It's good for people to feel pleasure.

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It's good for them to fail. But to feel as much pleasure as somebody else does isn't something that is good for you.

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For the people who who who have this pressure now in the priority area,

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impersonal value is to the effect that Private Hellenism says that if we are to distribute a benefit such as a pleasure,

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it has more, it has greater, more weight.

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If we give this benefit to somebody who is worse off and that to somebody who is better off,

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but it is to feel pleasure or have a benefit is as good for the person who's better off as for the person who is worse off.

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So it doesn't have any. And the pleasure, the benefit isn't better for the worse off than it is for the better off.

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This is an impersonal. That is the fact that it is giving the benefits to self.

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It's something that makes the outcome better than giving it to the better off person.

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Now, as I said, there are claims that.

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Proletarian and avoid the levelling down of action.

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And the reason they think so is that it makes no difference, he says,

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to our concern to the proletariat and concern for the worth of people, whether there are people who are better off.

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So it doesn't make any difference to that.

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So if we level down, the better off people know that that's claim is perfectly correct.

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But it doesn't follow. I will argue from that claim that priority irony isn't expressed to the levelling

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down object because there might be other respects in which this outcome is better.

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So it would be true on proletarian ism that in one respect, levelling down is better.

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To say that this is the case. All right. I want to have a look at a series of cases where the sum of benefits in all outcomes is the same.

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And it's also the case that there is equality.

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Nobody is better off than anyone else in this in these outcomes.

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What differ in those outcomes is the number of people who are individuals existing.

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So I'm going to. I'm excited to take it.

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I think it's so simple that I think you don't need to enjoy it.

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So simple. I don't need to find something I learned from corporate America.

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But the first hour of which is an outcome I call a hand 1 to 100.

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So I better write it down one person at level 100.

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Yes. I don't want to repeat that every time. No, no, no. Then you say to it, 5425, ending up with 101.

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That's clear enough. Yeah. So we have a cast out counting somebody.

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One person has a level over 100.

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This is the outcome I call one 100.

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Eric and I went ahead and then we have a second round count to Fitbit where people are two people at at a level of 50.

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And eventually we have an outcome here, which is 100 hundred one, 101.

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Okay. Now, these outcomes, according to both utilitarianism and egalitarianism, these outcomes will be equally good.

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And all things considered, if we apply these views to utilitarianism, regulatory system,

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these cases different involving different people, different number of people, we get a result that they sometimes are equally good.

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But if we apply prioritaires to this and these outcomes,

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we get the results that this outcome here is is the best one and all things considered, and this is the worst one.

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Why is that?

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That's because benefits here have the greatest moral way they can have in this series, because benefits here go to people who are worse off.

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So they have this sort of maximal moral weight here because private happiness obsessed that is sort of benefits to the worse off has its own way.

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Whereas in this case some benefits here here have a very level more where because there's somebody who is well

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off so that the benefits just sort of get their way in the way that the benefits increases as we get down here.

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Yeah. In this outcome one they have in the next one.

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So this is my but I summarised on on the first point on the handout according to priorities

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Harry and it's an outcome 101 in which 100 individuals each has one unit wrote that is better,

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all things considered than an outcome one one in which one individual enjoys all 100 units.

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But according to basic healthcare, in this new utilitarian, these outcomes are equally good.

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And this means that a proletarian ism implies something I call the desirability of of welfare, if you excuse is better.

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All things considered, if a quantity of welfare is distributed over men as many recipients as possible so that each recipient gets a minimal benefit.

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Now, if that is so that the last outcome is better, all things considered, that this is second point in the handout.

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There must be some respect in which this outcome is better,

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and that is that the average moral weight of value of a unit of welfare is higher

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in this outcome 100 to 1 since the recipients of benefits here are worse off.

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Now, this is an impersonal, as I said it,

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this is an impersonal waste of all value because a benefit is not better for those who are worse off than for those who are better off.

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Now, if we were to reduce it, gradually reduce the number of people who receive benefits and in the last outcome 101,

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reduce it to 9 to 9 people, 98 people, and so on.

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And so reduce and decrease the sum of of of benefits in that outcome.

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It's still that for a while that outcome still is better.

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All things considered according to priorities some.

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Then then the first outcome and so on, because it is reasonable to say that the sum of benefits is smaller in these outcomes.

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It's still the case that because the moral weight is certainly average,

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more weight over benefit is so much greater in these outcomes that outweighs the fact that that's a smaller sum offensive.

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If that if that wasn't the case, that is sort of the greater weight wake of up for the benefit could outweigh the sum it.

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It couldn't be the case that say if we were to decide whether to give two units to two units to two units of benefit,

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two to the best for all or one unit to somebody who's much worse off that the latter could be the best.

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That presupposes that the weight them all the way to the benefits to outweigh the size of the benefits.

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Now, eventually, however, if we go on reducing this number of people in this outcome,

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we get to a point where the outcome is no longer better, all things considered,

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but it will still be better in one respect,

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namely this respect that the average home value or weight of all benefits is higher than in the first outcome.

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One, two, one, one. Sorry.

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101. Yes. So now we have then a situation in which an outcome is is better.

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In one respect, there it's it's not better or worse, all things considered, because we have so reduce the sum of benefits so much.

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Now, that is precisely but I claim it is a case in, in,

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in the levelling down situation with this reasoning with is that we can view reformulate proletarian ism as consisting of two principal.

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The first principle says that it's better is the sum of benefits.

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This isn't on the handout three since that I mean, is something that struck me this morning.

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It might be a mistake, but anyway, especially if this whole sum of benefits is greater.

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That's the one principle. And the second principle is that it's essential or better if the average and the average of.

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This. It's.

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I. That is, these are the two two principles.

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One can say prioritise realism to consist of context, reformulation.

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And the second principle is a counterpart to the tell tale, your logical principle, which we can reformulate as follows It's better if.

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Unjust inequalities.

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Inequalities are minimised.

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Right now it is this second principle here, which,

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according to which makes it the case that private parliamentarian ism is exposed to the levelling down objection,

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because in the levelling down situation,

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it is the case that the average wage or benefit is higher increases because there is benefits with the lower more weight,

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the benefits of the better off they disappear.

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So what remains is a benefit to have a greater weight.

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So the average wage of benefits goes up.

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And that principle is a counterpart to sort of a corporate status, just principle of obedience,

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entirely logical utilitarianism, which exposes the levelling egalitarianism to levelling down.

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Objection. So we have the reason why private happiness is exposed to levelling down

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objection is that it has the principle of essentially trespass against arianism,

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which this might be obscured. By the way a proletarian ism is, is, is ordinarily formulated.

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But I, I try to sort of bring out that criterion is,

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consists of these three principles by considering this cases in this area of cases where we have an outcome which is better,

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all things considered, if we apply prior apparent mistakes, but it's the same as the sum of benefits is it's the same set.

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It must be another respect in which this outcome is better now because because the

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best proletarian ism egalitarianism all refers to the levelling down of action.

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They are they are violating a principle that Derek calls the person effect in class.

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And this is something you you have to hand out in the middle of.

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That is this principle.

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That PSA PAC says that an outcome can't be better or worse than another in any respect unless

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it's better or worse for for someone now based on best private fairness and egalitarianism,

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violate for the reason that they are committed to an impersonal value actually.

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But there's an awake person affecting claim which I called a pack star and it says an outcome can't be better than and not all things considered,

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unless it's better or something. So they think the bad talks about what's better, all things considered, not just better.

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In one respect, this is the principle that bears egalitarianism and private happiness.

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And we can respect it. And egalitarianism can respect that principle if it's it's what what Derek calls moderate.

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And this is something you also find on the handout.

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Again, Peronism is moderate. If, again, inequality is achieved simply, if again, inequality is achieved simply by a loss of benefit,

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the latter always outweighs the former, and then the loss of benefits always outweighs the gain of equality.

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Somebody has to gain something in order for the equality to be better off.

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So, for instance, if.

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If we were to make an IT situation better in respect of equality by sort of removing who benefits from the better off and adding one to the worse off,

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that's an outcome which would be worse, according to utilitarianism,

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because the sum of benefits carried out by it's it could be better according to that the moderate version of egalitarianism

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but an outcome in which we simply remove benefits for somebody can't do this or that that moderate version.

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And, and there's another similar doctrine which I call and tie in egalitarian ness and this is that says that also in the handout says an unjust

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equality inequality in respect of the distribution of benefits is something bad in itself that detracts from the value of an outcome.

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But just equality is not anything good in itself and as positively to the value of an outcome.

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This principle implies that if we have an outcome in which no benefits whatsoever,

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in which everyone is is at the zero level, there's nothing good about that outcome all day.

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There's equality in it. So equality, just equality doesn't add positively to the value of an outcome.

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It's only the case that an unjust inequality detracts from the value, makes it less than it would be if we were to consider the total sum of benefit.

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Now, prior terrorism could respect that principle the way you can person effective claim

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is if proprietary ends are except what I call the value of beginning to exist.

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Namely if they say that it's good for somebody to begin to exist and aid a worthwhile life if they don't say that sort of thing.

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But they still say that an outcome like a hundred was the last I've got on the black one is better, but not better for somebody.

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They will violate this weaker cause and effect black because in that case we will have an outcome which is better,

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all things considered there, it isn't better for for anyone.

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So priorities around.

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I think we'll have to accept this view of the value of beginning to exist if they want to be conform to a weaker person effective.

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And I think they will will have to do that because otherwise it would be strange for them to,

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to sort of criticise egalitarianism for, for, for violating the stronger person effective class.

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But let me emphasise one thing at the end,

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namely is that I don't I haven't presuppose that we apply these doctrines like prioritising this of egalitarian,

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some utilitarianism and so on to these cases where we have a different number of recipients of of benefits.

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All I'm saying that if I'm talking about what what these these doctrines would say if they were to apply to those cases,

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this is all I need, because what I wanted to arrive at is the claim that priority consists of these two principles on the blackboard.

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Because if that is the right way of constraining private antagonism, it is exposed to everything down objections and even even to to worst problems.

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Because proletarian ism will imply that in the levelling down situation, the outcome continues to be better in one respect,

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even though we passed a point where the better off are at the same level as the worst off,

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when the benefits of the better off go down even further,

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that means that the average more value of benefits goes up, and so the outcome will be in any respect better.

199
00:30:56,270 --> 00:30:56,680
So.

200
00:30:57,810 --> 00:31:13,440
Actually shifting from egalitarianism to prior terrorism because living down section is a jumping out of the frying pan into the fire, I would guess.

201
00:31:13,510 --> 00:31:16,890
But that's all I have to say.

202
00:31:17,100 --> 00:31:20,670
All right. Okay. Go ahead with your response. Yeah.

203
00:31:25,050 --> 00:31:31,050
First I want to say something about the levelling down objection, which was in your paper that you didn't actually say it in the talk.

204
00:31:31,620 --> 00:31:38,370
And you say, I grant that egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection,

205
00:31:38,370 --> 00:31:43,290
but I don't regard this objection to serious egalitarian should simply deny that

206
00:31:43,290 --> 00:31:47,190
there's anything counter-intuitive about an outcome being better in one respect,

207
00:31:47,790 --> 00:31:49,410
although it's not better for anyone.

208
00:31:50,460 --> 00:31:58,920
Well, I think you there assume that in presenting the levelling down objection, I'm appealing to the person effecting claim.

209
00:31:59,370 --> 00:32:02,070
How can it be in one way better if it's better for no one?

210
00:32:03,120 --> 00:32:10,200
Now, I did, but I actually wrote that the person making it has less full access than the levelling down objection.

211
00:32:10,830 --> 00:32:13,860
And I reject the person if it can claim as a you know,

212
00:32:13,860 --> 00:32:21,840
I reject even the weak person effect and claim that an outcome can't be worse, all things considered, if it's worse for no one.

213
00:32:22,500 --> 00:32:28,230
I think that's very often true as is shown in cases that I call the non identity problem.

214
00:32:28,530 --> 00:32:33,810
However, that's just about the strength of the levelling down objection as applied to egalitarianism.

215
00:32:34,260 --> 00:32:40,829
I mean, I think we can say there are some ways in which one or two outcomes might be better there.

216
00:32:40,830 --> 00:32:46,110
It's better for no one. That's certainly possible, but not if.

217
00:32:46,110 --> 00:32:50,250
The only change is that the better off people become as badly off as everyone else.

218
00:32:50,430 --> 00:32:53,639
So it's that particular claim that the objection appeals.

219
00:32:53,640 --> 00:33:04,560
You know, you make the striking claim that the priority view is also open to the levelling down objections of a slightly different form.

220
00:33:06,810 --> 00:33:11,940
No, actually, it can be a simpler case than the one that suppose that everyone starts at level

221
00:33:11,940 --> 00:33:17,310
one and then everyone becomes much worse off falls to the level of ten benefits.

222
00:33:18,300 --> 00:33:27,360
Well, you say that that's in one way better because the average value of the benefits that people are receiving is higher.

223
00:33:27,720 --> 00:33:35,400
Yeah, but as I intended, the priority view, it doesn't appeal to the average value of benefit.

224
00:33:35,940 --> 00:33:39,870
It appeals to the total moral value of benefits.

225
00:33:40,500 --> 00:33:50,160
The difference between priority view and utilitarianism is simply the utilitarian say that it's better if there's a greater some benefits.

226
00:33:52,500 --> 00:33:58,110
Proletarians say it's better if there's a greater weighted sum of benefits with benefits

227
00:33:58,110 --> 00:34:03,600
doing more to make the outcome better the worse off the people who are who receive them.

228
00:34:04,530 --> 00:34:17,370
And since the priority view appeals to the total sum of benefits weighted in that way, there's no respect in which it's a bad feature of the outcome.

229
00:34:18,030 --> 00:34:27,420
If the average benefit per person has less moral value because they're better off or a good feature if because everyone's worse off,

230
00:34:27,570 --> 00:34:31,170
the average value is greater.

231
00:34:32,550 --> 00:34:41,400
So I'm just puzzled why you think that the priority view doesn't appeal to the total sum of weighted benefits, but only to the average sum.

232
00:34:41,730 --> 00:34:49,559
Now, in an earlier talk, you did suggest that a priority and might say that if everyone becomes much

233
00:34:49,560 --> 00:34:54,870
worse off so that the average value of the benefits they receive is greater,

234
00:34:55,800 --> 00:35:00,480
that that isn't a good feature of the outcome. It's a bad feature of the outcome.

235
00:35:01,680 --> 00:35:05,760
And then you suggested, well, that that would imply that on the priority view,

236
00:35:05,970 --> 00:35:11,610
it would be in one way better or in one way worse if everyone became better off.

237
00:35:13,320 --> 00:35:20,880
But I just didn't follow that argument. It seems to me, though, on the periphery, it's always better if people become better off.

238
00:35:23,580 --> 00:35:27,899
If they become better off, then the extra value gets less.

239
00:35:27,900 --> 00:35:31,490
But there's nothing bad about the average value of getting less.

240
00:35:31,890 --> 00:35:37,670
So I just wondered why you thought that the priority view had to appeal to average rather than total?

241
00:35:39,060 --> 00:35:54,750
Well, the reason the reason I, I don't talk about to total that more value is that I want to separate two principles and.

242
00:35:54,760 --> 00:36:04,860
Well, but the part of you differs from utility. Arianism in the gist says that it's not a total sum of benefits, it's the total wastage of benefits.

243
00:36:04,980 --> 00:36:17,760
That's the only difference. Yes, you could. Great. But I mean, consider the two principles that I expressed proletarian.

244
00:36:18,590 --> 00:36:23,030
I just reject the second one. The proletariat never appeals to the average, but.

245
00:36:23,100 --> 00:36:27,330
But that gives the same result. No. In those two principles.

246
00:36:28,350 --> 00:36:37,770
It just sort of separates two principles that are combined in the claim about way to interpret the differences.

247
00:36:37,890 --> 00:36:42,990
But the difference is, if you take the priority view to say things are in one way better,

248
00:36:43,170 --> 00:36:47,550
if the average moral value of benefits is greater because everyone's worse off,

249
00:36:47,700 --> 00:36:51,930
you get the absurd result that things are going one way better if everyone's worse off,

250
00:36:52,500 --> 00:36:57,690
if instead the priority view combines the principle of utility with the principle,

251
00:36:58,740 --> 00:37:03,600
how much more it makes the outcome better depends on how well off they are.

252
00:37:04,290 --> 00:37:12,870
Then you never refer to the average value you own have to the total weighted sum of benefits.

253
00:37:13,320 --> 00:37:20,490
So you can't as work claim that the priority you ought to take the form which

254
00:37:20,490 --> 00:37:25,950
makes it open to your objection rather than the form which avoids the objection.

255
00:37:26,310 --> 00:37:38,010
Which is what I intended. But. But if we consider this less serious of cases.

256
00:37:38,490 --> 00:37:42,090
But I'm about to turn to those because those raise a different question.

257
00:37:42,540 --> 00:37:53,970
Yeah, I do agree. I use those cases to to to argue that in one respect, prior terrorism, they say about a first.

258
00:37:54,330 --> 00:38:01,830
Yeah, but but look what you what you I mean, those cases involve different numbers of people in existence and they raise different questions.

259
00:38:01,830 --> 00:38:05,160
And I like to turn to them. But before we do that.

260
00:38:05,430 --> 00:38:12,180
If you take the cases that I actually considered where there's the same people who exist in all of the outcomes,

261
00:38:12,420 --> 00:38:24,000
I'm simply saying to you, surely I can be right in saying that the average moral value of the benefits that people receive is irrelevant.

262
00:38:25,080 --> 00:38:29,100
It's only the total sum of weighted benefits to which the principle appeals.

263
00:38:30,270 --> 00:38:34,530
Now, I don't see why you think a priority.

264
00:38:34,530 --> 00:38:42,990
You can't say there's nothing good if everyone becomes badly off so that the benefits that they receive have greater average value.

265
00:38:43,110 --> 00:38:47,750
There's nothing good about that on neither do you.

266
00:38:48,840 --> 00:38:55,480
And that's because it differs from utilitarianism only by giving extra weight and benefits.

267
00:38:55,510 --> 00:39:01,120
But I certainly I can't make my my case without appealing to find that to say.

268
00:39:01,120 --> 00:39:04,740
Yeah, okay. All right. I'll turn to the second one then. Right.

269
00:39:04,750 --> 00:39:10,290
Well, before I turn to your cases, I want to consider a range of similar cases.

270
00:39:11,490 --> 00:39:18,150
This involves a set of different possible outcomes, in all of which the same people would exist.

271
00:39:19,500 --> 00:39:26,370
So different from you in that respect. In one outcome, one person is at level 100, everyone else is at zero.

272
00:39:27,300 --> 00:39:30,510
Second outcome two at 50, everyone else is zero.

273
00:39:31,140 --> 00:39:36,750
For 25, everyone else is zero. And then at the end you get everyone at one.

274
00:39:37,300 --> 00:39:46,890
Okay. Now it is true that on the priority view it would be better if this hundred benefits were

275
00:39:46,890 --> 00:39:52,320
shared equally than if they all went to one person or if they all went to two people.

276
00:39:53,100 --> 00:39:58,980
But then so does the egalitarian think that and so does the utilitarian.

277
00:39:59,220 --> 00:40:10,800
So when you got the same people in all the outcomes, it is indeed desirable if the welfare is used among these people, but that's no objection.

278
00:40:11,460 --> 00:40:19,620
Now, if we turn to your case, the difference is that in your case, different numbers of people would exist in the different outcomes.

279
00:40:21,540 --> 00:40:27,770
Now, I think I may have misled you here by a phrase in which I introduced the priority view.

280
00:40:27,780 --> 00:40:36,030
I said It's enough to consider different state of affairs, in all of which the same set of people would exist.

281
00:40:36,840 --> 00:40:46,020
Now, that was misleading. You might have taken me to meant that if we reach a view about those cases, which I call the same people cases,

282
00:40:46,350 --> 00:40:51,420
then we can apply our conclusions to cases in which different people would exist or different numbers.

283
00:40:51,960 --> 00:40:57,260
But when I said it's enough to consider same people case, I didn't mean because then.

284
00:40:57,350 --> 00:41:05,750
You can apply to all cases. I meant we've got enough to discuss if we tried also to discuss cases with different numbers of people.

285
00:41:05,810 --> 00:41:07,820
That raises a whole new set of questions.

286
00:41:08,390 --> 00:41:18,500
So my priority view was explicitly designed for cases that don't raise these special puzzles when different numbers of people are different.

287
00:41:18,950 --> 00:41:23,960
However, I'll now turn to what you say about what the priority of you implies in those cases.

288
00:41:25,520 --> 00:41:30,020
You say that on the priority view in an earlier paper,

289
00:41:30,500 --> 00:41:36,170
it's better to bring the new people into existence because that's benefiting people

290
00:41:36,830 --> 00:41:41,980
whose level is lower because they're at the neutral level of non-existence.

291
00:41:43,490 --> 00:41:55,730
And that involves assuming that when the priority view says benefits to people, do more to make the outcome better when they're worse off.

292
00:41:56,780 --> 00:42:04,820
We include all of the merely possible people, people who never exist because, well,

293
00:42:05,150 --> 00:42:09,140
they're worse off than people who are having a good life because they're at level zero.

294
00:42:10,140 --> 00:42:17,180
No, I didn't intend the principle to apply to people who are merely possible and never existed.

295
00:42:18,860 --> 00:42:22,590
You could have a similar objection to the egalitarian view.

296
00:42:22,610 --> 00:42:31,819
You might say, Well, rather than giving more resources to people who exist, you should bring new people into existence because they're worse off,

297
00:42:31,820 --> 00:42:34,730
because they're at the neutral level that worse off than all the other people.

298
00:42:34,970 --> 00:42:40,940
Now, you rightly say that egalitarian principles aren't meant to cover people who never exist.

299
00:42:41,840 --> 00:42:45,110
It isn't a relevant inequality that we exist, and they don't.

300
00:42:46,010 --> 00:42:52,700
And the same is true for the priority view. When I say it's more important to benefit people who are worse off.

301
00:42:52,700 --> 00:42:56,570
I'm not including merely possible people who never exist.

302
00:42:57,590 --> 00:43:08,890
Now you might then say, Yeah, there's a difference here because you can have you can consider different outcomes.

303
00:43:08,950 --> 00:43:12,800
Yeah. You don't consider bringing people into existence.

304
00:43:13,370 --> 00:43:16,830
You just consider outcomes that already exist.

305
00:43:16,850 --> 00:43:25,080
You have one outcome where there's one person that's well-off as a 100 hundred and you can say another,

306
00:43:25,340 --> 00:43:29,000
but you're comparing that with an outcome in which that person doesn't exist.

307
00:43:30,740 --> 00:43:38,750
That's why you say that in this example, the priority of you, rather than having one person at level 100, be better to have 100 people at level one.

308
00:43:39,320 --> 00:43:46,100
Now that's implying that the second is better because the benefits would go to people who otherwise wouldn't exist.

309
00:43:46,910 --> 00:43:53,690
Yes. And in that respect, badly off and I'm saying, well, just meant to apply to people who never existed.

310
00:43:55,340 --> 00:44:02,630
But but if you make you if you make an adjustment about these two outcomes involving different numbers of people.

311
00:44:03,050 --> 00:44:11,540
Yeah. You can you can have the view that one outcome is better or the equally good or whatever,

312
00:44:11,990 --> 00:44:18,890
and take no view that they are better because they're better for somebody, namely people who come in.

313
00:44:19,010 --> 00:44:27,210
Well, I thought I thought your main objection to the priority view was that it claims it's better to have 100 people at level one.

314
00:44:27,230 --> 00:44:31,030
Yeah. Because that's benefiting people otherwise.

315
00:44:32,450 --> 00:44:39,890
No, the claim is just that that's the way that the benefits are high.

316
00:44:40,040 --> 00:44:43,640
Yeah, but that's because you're saying I mean, on the prior, you know, the weight,

317
00:44:43,730 --> 00:44:47,990
the weight of a benefit is higher if it goes to someone who's worse off.

318
00:44:48,440 --> 00:44:54,220
Yeah, well, you're assuming that if you bring some in into existence, that benefit is going to suffer.

319
00:44:54,280 --> 00:44:58,159
Now, that's a pretty badly off. No, that's a different claim.

320
00:44:58,160 --> 00:45:05,090
You know, you can you can make the claim that the benefits have a greater more weight,

321
00:45:05,090 --> 00:45:11,750
because they go to somebody who who is badly off at the level of one in the last outcome

322
00:45:11,930 --> 00:45:17,180
without saying you're benefiting somebody by having brought that person into existence.

323
00:45:17,210 --> 00:45:22,040
Well, that's why I switched in my case, in which all the same people exist in all the outcomes,

324
00:45:22,340 --> 00:45:26,000
and either one of them is at 100 or two at 50 or they're all at once.

325
00:45:26,070 --> 00:45:30,030
Yeah, that's okay. Some people say that Jeff McMahon.

326
00:45:30,350 --> 00:45:38,410
Yeah. Would take the view. Is that a case where you have more people existing?

327
00:45:38,420 --> 00:45:44,630
That outcome can be better, even though it's not better to fall for it.

328
00:45:44,690 --> 00:45:47,930
Yes, I agree it might be better, although it's not better for anyone.

329
00:45:48,290 --> 00:45:51,390
But I mean, there are really two really two points.

330
00:45:51,410 --> 00:45:56,640
One is the priority of you, as I defined it, applying to cases in which.

331
00:45:56,870 --> 00:46:04,400
All of the same people would exist when you turn to cases in which different people would exist or different numbers.

332
00:46:05,090 --> 00:46:08,060
That's completely different. It raises very different problems.

333
00:46:10,040 --> 00:46:18,140
And I think if some principle looks pretty plausible in cases where the same people exist,

334
00:46:20,450 --> 00:46:28,310
you can be justified in accepting that principle, although it's not clear when you turn to cases in which different numbers of people.

335
00:46:28,610 --> 00:46:36,050
Yes. What's the wider principle in which insane people cases would imply the conclusion you accept?

336
00:46:36,710 --> 00:46:43,220
I mean, here's another example. Many people think that an outcome can be worse.

337
00:46:43,220 --> 00:46:48,830
All things considered, if it's worse for no one, that's the person effecting claimed.

338
00:46:48,830 --> 00:46:54,470
Stop that you discuss. Well, that's plausible in cases in which all and only the same people exist.

339
00:46:54,890 --> 00:47:00,320
But once you switch to a case in which different people exist, it's very easy to see how an outcome can be worse.

340
00:47:00,380 --> 00:47:04,590
All things considered. Even though it's worse for no one. That's true.

341
00:47:04,610 --> 00:47:09,170
If the result of our energy policies is people who live two centuries from not who, which are low level,

342
00:47:09,290 --> 00:47:14,750
although their life is worth living rather than people, different people who would be at a higher level.

343
00:47:15,950 --> 00:47:24,470
So I think it isn't an objection to the priority view, as I described it, which applies only to cases with the same people,

344
00:47:25,550 --> 00:47:31,520
that it's not obvious what we should say about cases in which different numbers of people would exist.

345
00:47:34,340 --> 00:47:38,659
No, but. But you need. But then. But then, I mean, the other point I made,

346
00:47:38,660 --> 00:47:46,700
I wasn't just saying my version of the priority view doesn't apply to cases in which different numbers of people exist.

347
00:47:46,940 --> 00:47:53,120
I was going to say, well, if you look and see what the priority be might imply with respect to those cases.

348
00:47:53,870 --> 00:48:00,710
There's a huge difference between saying there's a greater moral value to a benefit of being at level one.

349
00:48:02,930 --> 00:48:04,399
If that comes to someone,

350
00:48:04,400 --> 00:48:15,170
some actual person who would otherwise be at zero and saying there's a greater value if it comes to someone who otherwise wouldn't exist at all.

351
00:48:16,040 --> 00:48:22,099
So in other words, just as it's plausible to say that if you believe that inequality is bad, you're not saying,

352
00:48:22,100 --> 00:48:27,710
well, one of the things that's very bad is that existing people are much better off than people who never existed.

353
00:48:27,920 --> 00:48:35,150
That's a bad inequality. You can actually. No, no, that isn't about inequality, because our principle applies only to actual people.

354
00:48:36,170 --> 00:48:43,120
I think the same is true of the priority view, the extra moral values of people in my outcomes.

355
00:48:44,120 --> 00:48:48,110
Only in one of the two outcomes. And you're saying bringing them into existence.

356
00:48:48,290 --> 00:48:50,240
If they come into existence,

357
00:48:50,870 --> 00:48:59,570
the priority view has to say that benefit matters more because it comes to people who otherwise would be at the zero level because they don't exist.

358
00:49:01,190 --> 00:49:07,880
And in other words, I'm saying two things. One is I intended it only to apply to the same people cases.

359
00:49:08,180 --> 00:49:17,090
Two, you can see why that's natural, because there's a huge difference between the way in which some people are worse off than others.

360
00:49:17,540 --> 00:49:25,760
If they exist and are worse off or if they never exist, you'd expect those to be quite different questions, and I think they do.

361
00:49:26,930 --> 00:49:36,170
Well, if you make it impossible to sort of separate in order to separate those two sides on two separate,

362
00:49:36,290 --> 00:49:42,560
you need to consider that that's cases where the sum of benefit is held constant.

363
00:49:43,880 --> 00:49:50,650
Whereas while then the moral weight of those benefits varies,

364
00:49:50,670 --> 00:49:58,130
you can't consider you consider that situation unless you you bring in different number of people,

365
00:49:58,670 --> 00:50:07,460
because otherwise the situation would be you can only change when in my example, they're the same people.

366
00:50:07,670 --> 00:50:18,770
The sum of benefits is the same. If one person gets all of 100 or to get 50 or full, get 25 or all of them get only one.

367
00:50:18,770 --> 00:50:22,100
The sum of benefits is of the same effect on the priority.

368
00:50:22,160 --> 00:50:28,190
In that case, it's better for the benefits to be shared equally between all these people.

369
00:50:29,960 --> 00:50:40,190
That's the case in which they will exist in all of the outcomes. So you can draw the distinction you want when you're considering a case like that.

370
00:50:41,150 --> 00:50:48,290
But I mean, your main objection to the priority view, I think, wasn't the one that applied to bringing extra people in,

371
00:50:49,700 --> 00:50:56,570
but was the claim that on the priority view, as everyone falls from a high level to a low level, that's in one respect.

372
00:50:56,860 --> 00:51:03,790
It changed for the better because the average value of the benefits they get is greater.

373
00:51:04,510 --> 00:51:10,809
And my initial response is that I don't know why you think the priority view gives any weight to

374
00:51:10,810 --> 00:51:20,260
the average value of the benefits rather than the total weighted value of all of the benefits.

375
00:51:20,650 --> 00:51:28,330
That was the view that I put forward, and I don't see why you think well,

376
00:51:28,330 --> 00:51:36,390
if you consider those cases first, this area areas where the sum of benefits is concerned.

377
00:51:36,520 --> 00:51:45,730
Yeah, and that's true in my example in which there are 100 people in all of the outcomes, the same people, the sum of benefits is the same.

378
00:51:47,080 --> 00:51:57,580
You either have 100 going to 152 to the other, 98 get nothing for 25 for four and the other 96 get nothing.

379
00:51:58,000 --> 00:52:04,840
That is a case in which the total sum is the same, but it's distributed differently between these people.

380
00:52:06,010 --> 00:52:11,380
And there I think most of us would think that it is probably that it's better if it's shared.

381
00:52:11,950 --> 00:52:17,890
Yeah, but that's a situation where egalitarianism would yield the same result.

382
00:52:18,010 --> 00:52:20,140
Yes, I know. But I thought you were saying that this is a case.

383
00:52:20,470 --> 00:52:29,920
This is a case in which the priority view has the implausible implication that when the average value of the benefits is greater,

384
00:52:30,130 --> 00:52:37,810
that's in one way better. Yeah, but in this sort of situation, you change the relative position as well.

385
00:52:39,160 --> 00:52:50,260
Whereas this hasn't changed in my in my case. But but surely we're considering two cases that as the simpler form of your objection, you say,

386
00:52:50,260 --> 00:52:56,270
well, suppose everyone is at 100, then they all suffer misfortune and everyone is earning ten.

387
00:52:57,730 --> 00:53:03,670
Now your main attraction is that on the priority view, that is in one way a change for the better.

388
00:53:04,500 --> 00:53:12,100
Yeah, because it's always better if the average value moral value benefits is greater.

389
00:53:12,550 --> 00:53:16,360
And I'm just denying that. Yeah, no, I know it doesn't say that.

390
00:53:17,260 --> 00:53:25,270
And then I thought you said, well, we can show that the priority of you has to give weight to the average value of benefits

391
00:53:25,870 --> 00:53:30,010
because and then you turn to a case in which different numbers of people exist.

392
00:53:31,210 --> 00:53:39,820
Now, I think that doesn't show that the part of you has to give weight to the average value.

393
00:53:40,510 --> 00:53:49,600
But but I didn't think you if you said what your view would be about this case on the blackboard is.

394
00:53:50,980 --> 00:54:00,250
Well, my view is I think it would be clearly worse if instead of 1 billion people in level 100, you've got 100 billion people at level one.

395
00:54:00,310 --> 00:54:05,110
That's like big world class. That would be worth on priority.

396
00:54:05,230 --> 00:54:09,810
No, not on priority. But that's not that's what my question is about.

397
00:54:10,240 --> 00:54:13,930
Well, the priority view doesn't even apply to those cases.

398
00:54:14,140 --> 00:54:16,660
But what would it say if it were?

399
00:54:16,960 --> 00:54:26,470
Because, as I said, I don't need to claim is that we do a proper priority realism proletarians apply the view of cases.

400
00:54:27,100 --> 00:54:30,130
The question is what you might say, what it might say.

401
00:54:30,850 --> 00:54:43,450
If you compare to 1 billion people at level 100 to 100 billion people at level one, the priority of yours is one.

402
00:54:43,450 --> 00:54:53,950
The second is in no way better because if these extra people come into a business that isn't benefiting people who otherwise would be at a bad level.

403
00:54:55,120 --> 00:55:00,819
So the crime, if you can just say it isn't bad for people, irrespective of whether it's benefiting people,

404
00:55:00,820 --> 00:55:07,570
there are benefits at at a low, low level and they would have greater way to cope with it.

405
00:55:07,960 --> 00:55:08,380
Well, no,

406
00:55:08,380 --> 00:55:20,320
because the point is the priority says that a benefit has greater weight if it comes to someone who without that benefit would be at a lower level.

407
00:55:21,910 --> 00:55:26,950
And I'm saying that doesn't include people who never exist.

408
00:55:28,240 --> 00:55:32,410
People who never exist don't count as being at a low, absolute level.

409
00:55:33,100 --> 00:55:37,450
They just don't enter into the reasoning. All right.

410
00:55:38,740 --> 00:55:42,170
I mean, doesn't that. Sorry, I mean, have I missed it?

411
00:55:44,110 --> 00:55:56,650
Well, I just think there is a way you can formulate a prior Rotarian as my saying that a benefit you have to somebody who's who.

412
00:55:56,720 --> 00:56:01,310
Otherwise wouldn't. Yeah. No, no, no, you don't you know, you don't have to say who otherwise wouldn't exist.

413
00:56:01,310 --> 00:56:08,570
And so you're just looking at an outcome and you say, well, you're hearing how this person does this outcome from.

414
00:56:08,570 --> 00:56:17,300
In the other outcome, it's you don't have to just look at the outcome and say, here are benefits to somebody at a very low level.

415
00:56:17,630 --> 00:56:25,850
It all benefits to somebody at at the level of one where you could similarly say,

416
00:56:25,850 --> 00:56:33,620
in applying the egalitarian principle that we ought to bring more people into existence, because then fewer people will be at levels here.

417
00:56:34,280 --> 00:56:39,049
And all that I'm saying is that I mean, when you say what separates you,

418
00:56:39,050 --> 00:56:44,140
whether you benefit people, putting them into existence, that's a separate issue from a judging.

419
00:56:44,150 --> 00:56:50,180
They say, well, look, let's say that these outcomes are equally good or better,

420
00:56:50,210 --> 00:56:56,090
even though they're not better for anyone because somebody is brought into existence.

421
00:56:56,690 --> 00:57:00,679
But I think we should let other people be as well. All right.

422
00:57:00,680 --> 00:57:07,000
Well, yeah, plenty of time for questions. So let me see who's who's interested in our of it.

423
00:57:07,010 --> 00:57:13,790
But we'll start with Julian. So took a bunch of cancer patients to this to two different groups.

424
00:57:13,790 --> 00:57:20,090
There's the older Good Prognosis Group and there's the younger worse prognosis group.

425
00:57:20,690 --> 00:57:30,500
So you could give one person who's 40 years old, 100 months of life, or you could give 100 people who are 30 years old, one month of life.

426
00:57:31,400 --> 00:57:38,120
So I take it then these are all people who exist, but they just think of different sorts of cancer and your priority and you.

427
00:57:38,690 --> 00:57:41,750
It would be better if we gave the 130 year olds one month of life.

428
00:57:44,090 --> 00:57:51,440
Prima facie, yes. And I think that's what most people would think.

429
00:57:53,990 --> 00:57:56,660
If you're giving a greater sum of benefits,

430
00:57:56,660 --> 00:58:05,870
which is more fairly shared and it's coming to people who otherwise would die younger and thus be worse off, it sounds unequivocally better.

431
00:58:08,180 --> 00:58:14,240
Well, why? I mean, this does seem to be a kind of version of the repugnant conclusion.

432
00:58:14,570 --> 00:58:19,160
If you apply it to large numbers of cancer patients, which gets smaller increments of life.

433
00:58:19,850 --> 00:58:28,040
Well, look, I agree. Some people think that if there are lots of people who exist and some of these people are very bad,

434
00:58:28,040 --> 00:58:32,149
they are very well off and the others are very badly. Some people think, well,

435
00:58:32,150 --> 00:58:38,719
there's no point in taxing the rich and spreading it out among the starving masses

436
00:58:38,720 --> 00:58:41,750
because each of them would get such a small benefit that it doesn't count.

437
00:58:42,320 --> 00:58:43,880
Well, I think that's just a mistake.

438
00:58:45,380 --> 00:58:51,050
Each of these many people would get us would get the benefit, and the total sum of benefits would be much greater.

439
00:58:51,980 --> 00:58:56,690
Not only would the total be greater, but it would be more fairly distributed.

440
00:58:57,380 --> 00:59:01,790
So I don't think there's any difficulty about thinking that when you can give

441
00:59:01,790 --> 00:59:06,439
a greater total sum of benefits to people who would otherwise be worse off,

442
00:59:06,440 --> 00:59:19,280
that that's a change for the better. Now, some people think if you go down to a benefit as small as, you know, an extra minute of life or something,

443
00:59:19,290 --> 00:59:24,050
you know, some of the benefits like that could add up to anything significant.

444
00:59:24,500 --> 00:59:30,730
And I think that's just a very deep mistake. I described the two cases in the bad old days, the tortuous.

445
00:59:30,770 --> 00:59:35,780
Each turns the dial on the instrument, inflicting great pain on one victim.

446
00:59:36,490 --> 00:59:42,860
But under the new system, the machines are so arranged that they go round and round it together.

447
00:59:43,340 --> 00:59:50,570
They impose just as much suffering on all their victims, but none of them makes any perceptible difference to any of the victims.

448
00:59:50,870 --> 00:59:57,260
Now, that's perfectly possible, and it's clear that they're imposing great suffering on their victims,

449
00:59:57,560 --> 01:00:02,240
although because the effect of each act is so thinly spread, it doesn't make any sense.

450
01:00:03,230 --> 01:00:11,150
So, I mean, I agree when you consider benefits and harms that are very small, there's a tendency to think, well, they just don't count.

451
01:00:11,570 --> 01:00:18,590
I think that's a huge mistake. But now, how was your question applying to.

452
01:00:19,160 --> 01:00:25,910
I think the main issue between Ingmar and I, because I say on the priority view,

453
01:00:27,530 --> 01:00:34,190
what makes the outcome better isn't that the average benefit that people get has more moral value.

454
01:00:34,880 --> 01:00:39,590
It's that the total sum of wages benefits is greater.

455
01:00:39,800 --> 01:00:41,030
That was my version.

456
01:00:41,840 --> 01:00:50,390
But the priority of you and Ingmar objection is directed at the average person that says, no, it isn't the total sum, it's the average fine.

457
01:00:51,470 --> 01:00:55,130
And that's a completely different view. And I don't see why that is in my view.

458
01:00:55,490 --> 01:01:04,010
My view is that it consists of two principles. You can divide you divide your your one principle into two principles.

459
01:01:04,250 --> 01:01:13,639
And I was using these cases to say you say one is it's in one way that if there's a greater total sum of benefits and

460
01:01:13,640 --> 01:01:19,760
it's in another way better if because people are badly off the benefit to each person has greater average moral value.

461
01:01:20,090 --> 01:01:26,420
And I'm saying I just reject that version of the part of you, which seems to me to have no plausibility at all.

462
01:01:26,810 --> 01:01:32,210
Now, we agree about that. Yeah, but I thought your objection was to the priority view.

463
01:01:32,510 --> 01:01:39,860
Well, then you should consider the version that says when people benefit,

464
01:01:39,860 --> 01:01:45,410
that makes the outcome better, and it does more to make the outcome the worse off they are.

465
01:01:45,770 --> 01:01:51,080
Now you add up all of the benefits and you give them greater weight if they go to people are worse off.

466
01:01:51,560 --> 01:01:53,420
And that's nothing to do with the average.

467
01:01:53,420 --> 01:02:01,610
But I was considering a version of proletarian ism, which applies to cases where your fiat version doesn't have an all.

468
01:02:02,990 --> 01:02:06,860
Oh, you mean cases involving different numbers of people? Yes. I wasn't discussing those cases.

469
01:02:07,130 --> 01:02:11,570
No. I take you along that we have and we have plenty more people in this equation.

470
01:02:13,340 --> 01:02:16,500
So this is the latest thing. Okay. Sorry. No disappointing.

471
01:02:18,170 --> 01:02:20,260
Come back to you later. Sorry.

472
01:02:20,450 --> 01:02:27,530
I was just wondering about the about the fact that the other party is not supposed to apply, I guess, I presume, to the different identities.

473
01:02:27,980 --> 01:02:35,540
Right. Those are different cases, right? Yeah. But that's also true that you need to think carefully about those because as I say,

474
01:02:35,660 --> 01:02:41,600
many people think one of two outcomes is worse for one person and better for no one.

475
01:02:41,600 --> 01:02:49,760
It must be worse, at least in one way. But once you turn to cases in which different people exist, that leads to a contradiction.

476
01:02:50,300 --> 01:02:53,800
So those are different cases which need to be. Handled in a different way.

477
01:02:53,890 --> 01:02:55,730
Right. I mean, you know, handled differently.

478
01:02:55,780 --> 01:03:04,810
Is there going to be sort of priority or something, some sort of for example, I mean, you talk about the cases the same number.

479
01:03:04,840 --> 01:03:08,320
You have this gradual, you know, different distribution of how these resources are.

480
01:03:08,710 --> 01:03:16,690
And I think it's worth it to give the different description of schemes the same, but the different identities of people in these various groups.

481
01:03:18,310 --> 01:03:20,680
Well, those need different consideration, right.

482
01:03:20,700 --> 01:03:29,370
I'm just wondering, are they going to be any consideration, the view that will make one of these situations more credible, better overall, that young?

483
01:03:29,380 --> 01:03:33,640
And if so, will they be something like high water or something?

484
01:03:33,790 --> 01:03:38,560
Well, look, I mean, let me try to be more positive. I'm sorry. I've been rather, rather rude.

485
01:03:39,280 --> 01:03:49,540
Ingmar has well pointed out that if you consider cases in which different numbers of people exist and you ask,

486
01:03:49,540 --> 01:03:53,350
what should the priority you say about such cases?

487
01:03:54,340 --> 01:04:00,580
If you said that people's coming into existence and being at a low level,

488
01:04:01,210 --> 01:04:08,950
it should be treated as a case of a benefit that has greater value because it goes to someone who would otherwise be badly off.

489
01:04:09,580 --> 01:04:15,940
Then the priority, if you've so applied, leads to something like the repugnant conclusion.

490
01:04:16,240 --> 01:04:20,740
Now that's well worth pointing out. And the moral as well, the priority.

491
01:04:20,750 --> 01:04:24,159
You shouldn't take that for now.

492
01:04:24,160 --> 01:04:27,670
And if someone says to me, Look, I agree.

493
01:04:27,670 --> 01:04:33,190
The priority, as you described, didn't seem to do jolly well in cases in which all the same people exist.

494
01:04:33,550 --> 01:04:37,060
But what about these other cases? What do you say about them?

495
01:04:37,330 --> 01:04:41,140
That's a perfectly fair question, but I think we can be confident.

496
01:04:41,440 --> 01:04:48,970
I mean, let me put it this way. We can be confident that some principle is right in cases where all and only the same people exist,

497
01:04:50,230 --> 01:04:56,500
though not knowing what the wider principle is from which this could be derived.

498
01:04:56,980 --> 01:05:05,530
And that's because it will normally be the case that there are several quite different, wider principles, which will all have the same implications.

499
01:05:05,980 --> 01:05:12,820
And one example of that is the difference between the average principle of utility and the total principle of you.

500
01:05:13,210 --> 01:05:17,710
They coincide in cases with all the same people, but they're completely different.

501
01:05:18,760 --> 01:05:26,800
And so I agree there may be quite different principles that would all support the priority view in same person cases.

502
01:05:26,980 --> 01:05:30,970
And we haven't yet discovered which of those different principles which could appeal to.

503
01:05:31,300 --> 01:05:40,750
So there's still work to be done. But the claim there's work to be done isn't that there's an objection to the priority view in saving people cases.

504
01:05:41,710 --> 01:05:45,850
That that's really all I that there is an expression of this.

505
01:05:46,760 --> 01:05:50,169
Yes. So I mean, this is all that I mean, just a similar point.

506
01:05:50,170 --> 01:05:59,880
So, you know, you use these cases and say, well, this to us is to say that terrorism violates the first thing.

507
01:06:00,370 --> 01:06:06,790
But in these two cases, you seem to see that attention plays in conjunction with the total view of population.

508
01:06:06,790 --> 01:06:10,540
Efforts for the social justice is enough to violate the personal pension.

509
01:06:11,380 --> 01:06:16,230
So if, for example, it's in conjunction with utilitarianism, which is the classic case,

510
01:06:16,250 --> 01:06:26,379
dozens and dozens of the letting down of section population case that have one person, 100 to 100 people.

511
01:06:26,380 --> 01:06:36,020
That's who. The second outcome is that, according to utilitarianism, the first is not that support anyway, because are some people that don't exist.

512
01:06:36,970 --> 01:06:45,520
Well, I actually think when you bring someone into existence with a life worth living, that should be counted as a case of benefiting the person.

513
01:06:46,030 --> 01:06:52,960
I wouldn't want actually to say, Oh, you're not benefiting them. The point I was making was a slightly different one.

514
01:06:53,560 --> 01:07:00,730
It's whether we should think, Look, there are these possible people who may never exist or are we to worry about them?

515
01:07:00,940 --> 01:07:04,090
Because after all, if they never exist, they'll be at the zero level.

516
01:07:04,570 --> 01:07:09,010
And I was saying the intuitions behind the priority of you don't I think say, well,

517
01:07:09,010 --> 01:07:13,710
we need to think about I mean, there's a very nice quotation I have from the here.

518
01:07:14,380 --> 01:07:19,630
He says, maybe if the priority signs are no way to possible people, that's unfair.

519
01:07:20,320 --> 01:07:31,660
And refusing to take into account the possible people whom you could benefit is morally obviously on a par with racism, sexism and speciesism.

520
01:07:31,840 --> 01:07:36,610
And I'm saying it isn't giving priority to benefits to actual people,

521
01:07:37,150 --> 01:07:49,420
isn't objectionable to be arbitrary or unfair because people who never exist are not being treated unfairly when we fail to bring them into existence.

522
01:07:50,590 --> 01:07:52,530
But I was trying to make a claim, which I.

523
01:07:53,680 --> 01:08:03,840
I can't I can't get Derek to do except apparently and this is that in is where you you see to people of different numbers and you.

524
01:08:03,880 --> 01:08:12,700
Yeah you can say that one outcome is better than another because that the total amount

525
01:08:12,700 --> 01:08:18,190
of benefits is great or whatever or that it isn't better for anyone where you're not,

526
01:08:18,340 --> 01:08:23,319
you haven't benefited anyone by bringing it into existence. You can separate those two years.

527
01:08:23,320 --> 01:08:29,230
That's what I've been sort of trying that point I've been trying to make, which Derek hasn't bought.

528
01:08:30,400 --> 01:08:37,959
But I mean, I reject the person effecting claim more sweepingly than you do because I think you

529
01:08:37,960 --> 01:08:42,610
thought we could at least accept the claim that one or two outcomes can't be worse.

530
01:08:42,640 --> 01:08:46,780
All things considered, if it was for no one. I think that's a mistake.

531
01:08:46,780 --> 01:08:51,370
Yes, but irrespective of what claims we're inclined to make,

532
01:08:51,940 --> 01:09:02,170
I'm just sort of trying to make the point that it is possible to take the view that those outcomes involving different people,

533
01:09:02,500 --> 01:09:11,620
that some of some of those outcomes might be better than somebody and not in fact, you have more people at a high level.

534
01:09:11,620 --> 01:09:20,050
For instance, you can say that outcome win more people at a higher level is better than one with fewer people, even though it isn't better for anyone.

535
01:09:20,260 --> 01:09:24,370
You haven't. You haven't, I agree. Benefited anyone by bringing them into existence.

536
01:09:26,050 --> 01:09:35,780
Yeah. And how is that an objection? It's you know, my point is that in talking about these cases in the serious,

537
01:09:36,190 --> 01:09:42,250
I'm not saying that the in the law case, we've made the situation better for it.

538
01:09:42,550 --> 01:09:50,620
I'm I'm only saying that you could make the claim that that outcome is better, even though you don't claim it's better for it.

539
01:09:50,830 --> 01:09:57,580
Yeah, but the only, the only question I can see it's this is that the priority of you says a

540
01:09:57,580 --> 01:10:03,490
benefit has more value if it comes to someone who's at a lower absolute level.

541
01:10:03,700 --> 01:10:11,920
Yes. And the question is, should we count among the people who are at a low absolute level, people who don't exist?

542
01:10:13,150 --> 01:10:20,590
And we could answer that either way. You beautifully pointed out, which was new to me, that if we say yes,

543
01:10:20,590 --> 01:10:26,110
let's include among the people who are at a low absolute level, all the people who never existed.

544
01:10:27,490 --> 01:10:34,149
The priority of you then leads to a worse version of the repugnant conclusion, to which I think,

545
01:10:34,150 --> 01:10:41,350
well, that shows that that you shouldn't take people who never exist as being at a low level.

546
01:10:42,790 --> 01:10:46,900
People who never exist just don't count as far as the priority view is concerned.

547
01:10:48,160 --> 01:10:57,190
But I mean, you're right to to to share that that would not be a plausible way to extend the priority principle to those cases.

548
01:10:58,720 --> 01:11:02,170
You're right. So we take another question.

549
01:11:03,620 --> 01:11:06,669
Yeah, sure. I understood.

550
01:11:06,670 --> 01:11:16,959
Why would you concede it's a first the very first question doesn't show why priority areas would be susceptible to that conclusion.

551
01:11:16,960 --> 01:11:23,680
So the example, I thought there were all people who were going to die at 30, but go on with the question.

552
01:11:24,400 --> 01:11:28,480
And so and so why would that sorry?

553
01:11:28,690 --> 01:11:39,790
Well, the question is, is it repugnant to think that instead of giving 40 months to one person, you should give one month to 40 people?

554
01:11:41,680 --> 01:11:49,410
I'm inclined to think that if 40 people have one more month in which to make their farewells to Thursday and so on and so on,

555
01:11:49,630 --> 01:11:59,130
you're going to be doing more good and it'll be more shared rather than giving the whole 40 months to one person and everyone you do it many,

556
01:11:59,140 --> 01:12:04,510
many more people's time is giving to the individuals gets smaller.

557
01:12:04,510 --> 01:12:07,700
It's more. I thought that was exactly right. Precisely for.

558
01:12:08,530 --> 01:12:12,370
No, no, that isn't the apparent inclusion at all. I mean, the point is,

559
01:12:13,030 --> 01:12:21,879
if you have a choice of either saving a single person from a whole year of pain or giving a single

560
01:12:21,880 --> 01:12:30,790
person a whole year of life or giving one more minute of life or one fewer minutes of pain.

561
01:12:31,120 --> 01:12:37,870
Each of a million people, lots of people saying, well, obviously you should give the one person a home more.

562
01:12:37,870 --> 01:12:42,499
Yeah. Rather than just giving one minute to a million people. Well, a year is half 1000000 minutes.

563
01:12:42,500 --> 01:12:46,750
So if you always did that, in those cases, everyone would die younger.

564
01:12:47,080 --> 01:12:52,060
I mean, yes, it would be worse for everyone. And I mean, I do agree that when the.

565
01:12:52,340 --> 01:12:58,940
It is so small as to be imperceptible. It's plausible that people think, well, they just don't count.

566
01:12:59,810 --> 01:13:05,090
And I think that's a huge mistake. As my case of the homeless torches was meant to show.

567
01:13:05,240 --> 01:13:12,680
None of my tortures makes any perceptible difference to any of the victims, but they together inflict great suffering.

568
01:13:13,280 --> 01:13:18,350
And that's what we're doing with global warming. You know, each act is not going to make a perceptible difference.

569
01:13:18,440 --> 01:13:24,740
But together, we're doing tremendous harm. And their permanent conclusion isn't about those cases.

570
01:13:26,210 --> 01:13:29,270
It's the claim that rather than a billion people with a wonderful,

571
01:13:29,270 --> 01:13:33,710
quality life would be better to have an enormous number whose lives are hardly worth living.

572
01:13:34,010 --> 01:13:36,680
That's completely different. But in the thousand tortuous case,

573
01:13:36,680 --> 01:13:44,360
you got individuals that suffered right at the end when you're simply giving an extra second to a large number of individuals.

574
01:13:44,630 --> 01:13:50,120
No. Single individual? No. On the contrary. Point to just the mass of note.

575
01:13:50,150 --> 01:13:57,950
The point is, if you keep doing that, if you keep doing that and you can do it once for everyone in the population, there are a million people.

576
01:13:58,610 --> 01:14:02,460
Okay. And on a million occasions, you are to give one more.

577
01:14:02,480 --> 01:14:07,580
Yet we've seen some difference. So we're talking about we're just on a one off case, a million people each.

578
01:14:07,580 --> 01:14:14,080
Get a second from your view? That's a bit like giving somebody a whole extra year on the priority.

579
01:14:14,480 --> 01:14:17,930
Well, you just a but yeah, none of those individuals gets any more than a second.

580
01:14:18,200 --> 01:14:21,680
Yeah, but look, look, the point is the reasoning is just the same.

581
01:14:22,130 --> 01:14:29,090
You're saying if people suffering is short of by only one second, that doesn't make any difference.

582
01:14:29,240 --> 01:14:34,700
It does. You're imposing a greater sum of suffering.

583
01:14:35,180 --> 01:14:39,650
I mean, an extra torture comes along, and he turns the thing once on each machine.

584
01:14:39,920 --> 01:14:46,670
Each of the victims suffers a bit more, and he's imposing a greater sum of suffering.

585
01:14:48,530 --> 01:14:59,030
But you are right. Some people think that it's okay to act in a way like this, provided you know that few people will do it.

586
01:15:00,020 --> 01:15:06,020
Although if you know that many people are going to do it, then it's wrong. I actually think that's not defensible,

587
01:15:06,560 --> 01:15:14,990
which is you get to see the harm you're doing when you consider many people are doing it, but you're doing just as much harm.

588
01:15:16,370 --> 01:15:24,020
But those really are different cases because those are about what weight we should give to benefits and harms that are trivial or imperceptible.

589
01:15:24,470 --> 01:15:27,700
And that's got nothing to do with the priority of you. John.

590
01:15:27,930 --> 01:15:31,820
John. All right, that's my one.

591
01:15:32,270 --> 01:15:38,690
Very sorry. My question.

592
01:15:39,770 --> 01:15:44,050
And I'm sorry I had to come in late. Yeah, me too.

593
01:15:46,160 --> 01:15:51,230
But let me ask you anyway, so you focus too often from one code on 101.

594
01:15:53,450 --> 01:16:00,680
And I think you think that the first one is worse than 600 years ago.

595
01:16:02,770 --> 01:16:07,640
No, it's not worse. You can't forgive anybody else.

596
01:16:09,260 --> 01:16:13,280
And yet you say on the sheet the principle that gives you that conclusion.

597
01:16:13,470 --> 01:16:17,570
He could comply with this week specification.

598
01:16:17,580 --> 01:16:21,739
That's the approach which can be less and less.

599
01:16:21,740 --> 01:16:26,270
It's worse. So that seems a contradiction.

600
01:16:27,410 --> 01:16:30,980
Could I ask Derek his question? Derek?

601
01:16:31,280 --> 01:16:34,490
Yeah. This is about. This is about doubling down.

602
01:16:34,640 --> 01:16:38,890
Yeah. And it isn't actually written down here.

603
01:16:38,900 --> 01:16:47,240
But you think that lengthening John can't be better in any respect than not?

604
01:16:49,010 --> 01:17:00,680
No. My claim was that it's not a decisive objection to egalitarianism, that on this view it's in one way a change for the better.

605
01:17:01,040 --> 01:17:02,920
If the better off suffer misfortune.

606
01:17:05,650 --> 01:17:12,110
As in my says, there are other cases in which it's right to claim it's in one way better, although it's better for no one.

607
01:17:12,500 --> 01:17:20,360
And any guy then might say, Well, I think that's true here too, that quite a lot of people find that implausible.

608
01:17:21,080 --> 01:17:26,330
And the point about the priority view is that it doesn't imply that it's in one way that that's okay.

609
01:17:26,870 --> 01:17:34,010
So yeah, that I have this. So you do actually expect that levelling down kind of gives extra amount of respect?

610
01:17:35,070 --> 01:17:49,220
No, I think it's implausible, but people like Tim can say, well, yeah, it's just what would be nice to have your view about it.

611
01:17:50,240 --> 01:17:56,520
Well, my view is that it? It is an objection which has some force, but I don't think it's decisive.

612
01:17:57,090 --> 01:18:04,920
I think we have to decide whether the priority view which avoids this implication is in other ways more plausible.

613
01:18:05,250 --> 01:18:11,280
And I mean, here's one point. I read quite a lot of anti egalitarian literature.

614
01:18:12,480 --> 01:18:21,240
And what they're all talking about is there's this, you know, impersonal thing, inequality, and it's got nothing to do with anyone's well-being.

615
01:18:21,750 --> 01:18:25,080
And the priority of you does wholly avoid those worries.

616
01:18:25,800 --> 01:18:31,620
So what all I meant was, look, some people find this because in favour of the priority.

617
01:18:31,990 --> 01:18:40,290
Yeah, there's an objection to tech egalitarianism, which has some force which is completely avoided by the priority.

618
01:18:40,440 --> 01:18:46,680
That was my claim here, but I don't think the levelling down objection understates it.

619
01:18:47,130 --> 01:18:50,880
Yeah, I ask you. Yeah. All right. Let me play play by play.

620
01:18:51,210 --> 01:19:01,440
I was carrying that on proletarian so that I would count as better than this, which implies that that outcome is worse.

621
01:19:02,460 --> 01:19:15,560
Yes. And I also say that if if Ontarians don't accept the view that coming into existence, the benefit.

622
01:19:19,070 --> 01:19:25,370
They're claiming that that outcome is better with all things considered.

623
01:19:25,700 --> 01:19:31,310
And that will contradict that way here.

624
01:19:31,700 --> 01:19:35,240
Yeah. Which you believe we should reject rightly.

625
01:19:36,890 --> 01:19:43,670
I didn't have any of you. I was just pointing out that it's sort of great for what I'm.

626
01:19:43,670 --> 01:19:49,999
Can your variation of controversy this week because you think that the one on the left is worse than the one on the right,

627
01:19:50,000 --> 01:19:51,620
which contradicts this recollection?

628
01:19:52,340 --> 01:20:03,730
No, I think that on on the other tariffs, which is the view I spent a very good, you know, the peak periods prior.

629
01:20:04,110 --> 01:20:07,400
You know what I meant is your view about about please. Ah.

630
01:20:07,700 --> 01:20:13,490
So P itself as described says that the left is worse than the right.

631
01:20:15,860 --> 01:20:26,870
The left and the right. Yes. But that in itself is in conflict with the weaker personal fact that unless unless

632
01:20:27,530 --> 01:20:34,460
you take the view that bringing somebody into existence benefits those people.

633
01:20:34,550 --> 01:20:40,130
So I feel that to see it sort of the one on the left is supposed to be worse than the one on the right.

634
01:20:41,060 --> 01:20:49,070
Now, whether we take the view to bring people in or bad for them, there is no one for whom no one on the left is worse than one on the right.

635
01:20:49,550 --> 01:21:01,820
And no on this, unless you take the view which I would be inclined to take,

636
01:21:02,000 --> 01:21:08,570
namely that the non-existence are worse off because in this case that have they have a benefit.

637
01:21:08,840 --> 01:21:16,660
But in that case, in this case, they have neither anything of value nor anything out of this yet.

638
01:21:16,820 --> 01:21:21,020
So they're actually neutral. So the non existent people are still.

639
01:21:22,640 --> 01:21:29,390
Yes, comparatively speaking to me, not if they would not exist.

640
01:21:30,510 --> 01:21:35,810
Yes. But it would only be truly over there that they don't.

641
01:21:36,500 --> 01:21:44,870
There's nothing intrinsically good about non-existence, but there is something intrinsically good about this existence,

642
01:21:44,870 --> 01:21:50,410
even though it's very small said and my say this is true of them, but you haven't anybody to refer to.

643
01:21:53,270 --> 01:22:01,190
I mean, it could be the case that we we talk to specific individuals because you can have as far and in know, yeah,

644
01:22:01,350 --> 01:22:13,879
there are non-existent people so non-existent that they're just not actually we of a temporary one when I have a question about

645
01:22:13,880 --> 01:22:22,160
this position about non-existent people in the priority areas and specifically in the context of transgenerational justice.

646
01:22:22,250 --> 01:22:26,660
So I'm trying to ask what is our of terrorism as a tiny slice but as opposed to all binary.

647
01:22:27,140 --> 01:22:35,300
So take a situation where you are people but in 20 years, not 200 people because the commissioner office yeah, 100 people.

648
01:22:36,650 --> 01:22:41,440
And then you're assessing justice in two different time slices and it's like, say,

649
01:22:41,630 --> 01:22:45,530
where you have 100 people and not yet the thought of the following hundred people,

650
01:22:45,980 --> 01:22:47,060
the times like you,

651
01:22:47,300 --> 01:22:58,040
where you have 200 hundred people for ten priority charities and compare outcomes between situation one that is before 100 people have been born.

652
01:22:58,510 --> 01:23:01,820
And situation to you, those hundred people will exist eventually.

653
01:23:02,300 --> 01:23:07,730
Oh yeah. Certainly. If you're comparing to ways in which just you might go away,

654
01:23:07,730 --> 01:23:13,470
that's somewhat better for people in the 20th century, but somewhat worse for people in the 20 seconds, I think.

655
01:23:13,490 --> 01:23:17,780
And the very same people would be better off in the 22nd or the third.

656
01:23:18,380 --> 01:23:23,330
There's no difficulty about comparing those because you've got the very same people existing in both outcomes.

657
01:23:24,140 --> 01:23:32,090
I was merely saying that the principle doesn't apply to cases in which you don't have the same people in the outcomes.

658
01:23:32,570 --> 01:23:37,130
So suppose we treated that one says the consequences of one's actions.

659
01:23:37,520 --> 01:23:43,250
In hindsight, one could result in 95 people existing the second situation rather than 100.

660
01:23:43,580 --> 01:23:46,600
Oh. Then they're going to be different people, existing different people.

661
01:23:46,610 --> 01:23:49,780
And priorities are no longer applies. No, it doesn't apply to them.

662
01:23:49,790 --> 01:23:59,480
So even if the circumstance we're talking about may have a direct consequence on the issue of the December comparison,

663
01:23:59,510 --> 01:24:02,080
one of the two now on this becomes outcomes.

664
01:24:02,220 --> 01:24:08,240
Yes, I'm just trying to clarify exactly the principle that we're talking about that allows the exact scope.

665
01:24:09,680 --> 01:24:15,490
I'm sorry. Well, it just doesn't apply to cases in which different people exist in the different outcomes.

666
01:24:16,470 --> 01:24:23,980
It's only intended to apply to same people cases. And I can see someone might say, well, you know, you have to have a view about these other cases.

667
01:24:24,000 --> 01:24:37,200
Yes. But they're much harder. And because the priority view could be implied by a wide range of quite different, wider principles.

668
01:24:37,530 --> 01:24:41,730
You can be fairly confident that it's the right view about same people cases,

669
01:24:41,910 --> 01:24:46,680
even though you haven't yet worked out, which is the wider principle from which it should be derived.

670
01:24:47,220 --> 01:24:52,020
That's my view. So please join me in thanking Margaret.