I speak today is my person is the professor of practical effects at the University of Guttenberg,
and he's going to be speaking to us about priority realism.
And we're lucky to have another expert in priority Arianism Derek Hough.
In response, Zingerman's is going to talk for about half an hour and then they'll have a discussion and there's time for questions at the end.
I will will do that. But so let make a start right away.
I mean, welcoming in my personal place. Thank you very much.
And I'm very honoured to have Derek.
Yes, my respondent, I I've learned more from Derek.
Much more from Derek. Any other philosopher, dead or alive.
And for that reason I should perhaps be fair rather than honour to have him as a respondent,
because I'm there's a risk that I will learn today from him that I've been mistaken about certain things.
Anyway, what I'm going to talk about is some claims that Derek makes in his lecture Equality and Priorities.
In that lecture, he he claims that egalitarianism is expressed in levelling down object.
And more precisely, he claims that to tell teleological, not the ontologically egalitarian is exposed to this objection.
The difference between these views is that when both are concerned about unjust or unfair inequality,
the ontological egalitarianism takes an injustice to say certainly a situation
where we have to be brought about by wrongdoing by moral and moral agents,
whereas according to down to logical egalitarianism, there are not so-called natural,
unjust inequalities brought about some people being born disabled and things like that.
Levelling down objection is to the effect, I suppose many of you know it is that if we consider population where some are better off,
some somebody else and we decrease it, whether they of the better off or lower the better off down to the level of all the worse off.
We don't have to do it. It happens. Yes. Okay, it happens.
And change like that is according to logical egalitarianism in one respect for the better,
because now the equality doesn't exist anymore or it's a smaller inequality in another respect,
it's it's a change for the worse because some people have become worse off.
Nobody's become better off. So one might think of logical egalitarianism as consisting of two principles.
One principle about saying something like It's bad in itself if some some individuals are unjustly worse off,
some in some other individuals a principle of equality, the other principle of utility or beneficence,
saying that it's better or morally better if people,
individuals are better off from worse off or saying something like is better, that there is a bigger a greater sum of benefits.
And it is the first principle, the principle of equality, according to which the levelling down situation is in one respect is something better.
Namely, it's better in terms of equality, whereas it is worse according to the principle of utility.
So it might be all things considered, a change levelling down might be changed for the worse.
But all the same egalitarians are committed to teleology.
Can they get a task? Are committed to saying that in one respect this is the change for the best.
All that nobody is better off. And some are worse off and those who are better off.
Now, there are claims that there is another view called priority terrorism or the Paris Review,
which avoids this objection and proletarian this and says something like and that usually formalises it,
saying that it's more and more important to to benefit those who are worse off.
And that's our best role. Or alternatively, you can say that the weight,
the more weight or value of a benefit is determined by the absolute level of the recipients of this benefit.
So if the recipient is somebody who's worse off, the benefit has a high of more weight or value than if,
if, and the recipient is somebody who is better off.
I believe that I am proletarian some just like, yeah,
this Harrison ism is committed to an impersonal value and egalitarianism is committed to an and and impersonal value of equality,
saying that it's it's bad that there is unjust or unfair inequality and that this isn't something which is bad, necessarily bad for people.
Take a personal value such as, for instance, of pleasure.
It's good for people to feel pleasure.
It's good for them to fail. But to feel as much pleasure as somebody else does isn't something that is good for you.
For the people who who who have this pressure now in the priority area,
impersonal value is to the effect that Private Hellenism says that if we are to distribute a benefit such as a pleasure,
it has more, it has greater, more weight.
If we give this benefit to somebody who is worse off and that to somebody who is better off,
but it is to feel pleasure or have a benefit is as good for the person who's better off as for the person who is worse off.
So it doesn't have any. And the pleasure, the benefit isn't better for the worse off than it is for the better off.
This is an impersonal. That is the fact that it is giving the benefits to self.
It's something that makes the outcome better than giving it to the better off person.
Now, as I said, there are claims that.
Proletarian and avoid the levelling down of action.
And the reason they think so is that it makes no difference, he says,
to our concern to the proletariat and concern for the worth of people, whether there are people who are better off.
So it doesn't make any difference to that.
So if we level down, the better off people know that that's claim is perfectly correct.
But it doesn't follow. I will argue from that claim that priority irony isn't expressed to the levelling
down object because there might be other respects in which this outcome is better.
So it would be true on proletarian ism that in one respect, levelling down is better.
To say that this is the case. All right. I want to have a look at a series of cases where the sum of benefits in all outcomes is the same.
And it's also the case that there is equality.
Nobody is better off than anyone else in this in these outcomes.
What differ in those outcomes is the number of people who are individuals existing.
So I'm going to. I'm excited to take it.
I think it's so simple that I think you don't need to enjoy it.
So simple. I don't need to find something I learned from corporate America.
But the first hour of which is an outcome I call a hand 1 to 100.
So I better write it down one person at level 100.
Yes. I don't want to repeat that every time. No, no, no. Then you say to it, 5425, ending up with 101.
That's clear enough. Yeah. So we have a cast out counting somebody.
One person has a level over 100.
This is the outcome I call one 100.
Eric and I went ahead and then we have a second round count to Fitbit where people are two people at at a level of 50.
And eventually we have an outcome here, which is 100 hundred one, 101.
Okay. Now, these outcomes, according to both utilitarianism and egalitarianism, these outcomes will be equally good.
And all things considered, if we apply these views to utilitarianism, regulatory system,
these cases different involving different people, different number of people, we get a result that they sometimes are equally good.
But if we apply prioritaires to this and these outcomes,
we get the results that this outcome here is is the best one and all things considered, and this is the worst one.
Why is that?
That's because benefits here have the greatest moral way they can have in this series, because benefits here go to people who are worse off.
So they have this sort of maximal moral weight here because private happiness obsessed that is sort of benefits to the worse off has its own way.
Whereas in this case some benefits here here have a very level more where because there's somebody who is well
off so that the benefits just sort of get their way in the way that the benefits increases as we get down here.
Yeah. In this outcome one they have in the next one.
So this is my but I summarised on on the first point on the handout according to priorities
Harry and it's an outcome 101 in which 100 individuals each has one unit wrote that is better,
all things considered than an outcome one one in which one individual enjoys all 100 units.
But according to basic healthcare, in this new utilitarian, these outcomes are equally good.
And this means that a proletarian ism implies something I call the desirability of of welfare, if you excuse is better.
All things considered, if a quantity of welfare is distributed over men as many recipients as possible so that each recipient gets a minimal benefit.
Now, if that is so that the last outcome is better, all things considered, that this is second point in the handout.
There must be some respect in which this outcome is better,
and that is that the average moral weight of value of a unit of welfare is higher
in this outcome 100 to 1 since the recipients of benefits here are worse off.
Now, this is an impersonal, as I said it,
this is an impersonal waste of all value because a benefit is not better for those who are worse off than for those who are better off.
Now, if we were to reduce it, gradually reduce the number of people who receive benefits and in the last outcome 101,
reduce it to 9 to 9 people, 98 people, and so on.
And so reduce and decrease the sum of of of benefits in that outcome.
It's still that for a while that outcome still is better.
All things considered according to priorities some.
Then then the first outcome and so on, because it is reasonable to say that the sum of benefits is smaller in these outcomes.
It's still the case that because the moral weight is certainly average,
more weight over benefit is so much greater in these outcomes that outweighs the fact that that's a smaller sum offensive.
If that if that wasn't the case, that is sort of the greater weight wake of up for the benefit could outweigh the sum it.
It couldn't be the case that say if we were to decide whether to give two units to two units to two units of benefit,
two to the best for all or one unit to somebody who's much worse off that the latter could be the best.
That presupposes that the weight them all the way to the benefits to outweigh the size of the benefits.
Now, eventually, however, if we go on reducing this number of people in this outcome,
we get to a point where the outcome is no longer better, all things considered,
but it will still be better in one respect,
namely this respect that the average home value or weight of all benefits is higher than in the first outcome.
One, two, one, one. Sorry.
101. Yes. So now we have then a situation in which an outcome is is better.
In one respect, there it's it's not better or worse, all things considered, because we have so reduce the sum of benefits so much.
Now, that is precisely but I claim it is a case in, in,
in the levelling down situation with this reasoning with is that we can view reformulate proletarian ism as consisting of two principal.
The first principle says that it's better is the sum of benefits.
This isn't on the handout three since that I mean, is something that struck me this morning.
It might be a mistake, but anyway, especially if this whole sum of benefits is greater.
That's the one principle. And the second principle is that it's essential or better if the average and the average of.
This. It's.
I. That is, these are the two two principles.
One can say prioritise realism to consist of context, reformulation.
And the second principle is a counterpart to the tell tale, your logical principle, which we can reformulate as follows It's better if.
Unjust inequalities.
Inequalities are minimised.
Right now it is this second principle here, which,
according to which makes it the case that private parliamentarian ism is exposed to the levelling down objection,
because in the levelling down situation,
it is the case that the average wage or benefit is higher increases because there is benefits with the lower more weight,
the benefits of the better off they disappear.
So what remains is a benefit to have a greater weight.
So the average wage of benefits goes up.
And that principle is a counterpart to sort of a corporate status, just principle of obedience,
entirely logical utilitarianism, which exposes the levelling egalitarianism to levelling down.
Objection. So we have the reason why private happiness is exposed to levelling down
objection is that it has the principle of essentially trespass against arianism,
which this might be obscured. By the way a proletarian ism is, is, is ordinarily formulated.
But I, I try to sort of bring out that criterion is,
consists of these three principles by considering this cases in this area of cases where we have an outcome which is better,
all things considered, if we apply prior apparent mistakes, but it's the same as the sum of benefits is it's the same set.
It must be another respect in which this outcome is better now because because the
best proletarian ism egalitarianism all refers to the levelling down of action.
They are they are violating a principle that Derek calls the person effect in class.
And this is something you you have to hand out in the middle of.
That is this principle.
That PSA PAC says that an outcome can't be better or worse than another in any respect unless
it's better or worse for for someone now based on best private fairness and egalitarianism,
violate for the reason that they are committed to an impersonal value actually.
But there's an awake person affecting claim which I called a pack star and it says an outcome can't be better than and not all things considered,
unless it's better or something. So they think the bad talks about what's better, all things considered, not just better.
In one respect, this is the principle that bears egalitarianism and private happiness.
And we can respect it. And egalitarianism can respect that principle if it's it's what what Derek calls moderate.
And this is something you also find on the handout.
Again, Peronism is moderate. If, again, inequality is achieved simply, if again, inequality is achieved simply by a loss of benefit,
the latter always outweighs the former, and then the loss of benefits always outweighs the gain of equality.
Somebody has to gain something in order for the equality to be better off.
So, for instance, if.
If we were to make an IT situation better in respect of equality by sort of removing who benefits from the better off and adding one to the worse off,
that's an outcome which would be worse, according to utilitarianism,
because the sum of benefits carried out by it's it could be better according to that the moderate version of egalitarianism
but an outcome in which we simply remove benefits for somebody can't do this or that that moderate version.
And, and there's another similar doctrine which I call and tie in egalitarian ness and this is that says that also in the handout says an unjust
equality inequality in respect of the distribution of benefits is something bad in itself that detracts from the value of an outcome.
But just equality is not anything good in itself and as positively to the value of an outcome.
This principle implies that if we have an outcome in which no benefits whatsoever,
in which everyone is is at the zero level, there's nothing good about that outcome all day.
There's equality in it. So equality, just equality doesn't add positively to the value of an outcome.
It's only the case that an unjust inequality detracts from the value, makes it less than it would be if we were to consider the total sum of benefit.
Now, prior terrorism could respect that principle the way you can person effective claim
is if proprietary ends are except what I call the value of beginning to exist.
Namely if they say that it's good for somebody to begin to exist and aid a worthwhile life if they don't say that sort of thing.
But they still say that an outcome like a hundred was the last I've got on the black one is better, but not better for somebody.
They will violate this weaker cause and effect black because in that case we will have an outcome which is better,
all things considered there, it isn't better for for anyone.
So priorities around.
I think we'll have to accept this view of the value of beginning to exist if they want to be conform to a weaker person effective.
And I think they will will have to do that because otherwise it would be strange for them to,
to sort of criticise egalitarianism for, for, for violating the stronger person effective class.
But let me emphasise one thing at the end,
namely is that I don't I haven't presuppose that we apply these doctrines like prioritising this of egalitarian,
some utilitarianism and so on to these cases where we have a different number of recipients of of benefits.
All I'm saying that if I'm talking about what what these these doctrines would say if they were to apply to those cases,
this is all I need, because what I wanted to arrive at is the claim that priority consists of these two principles on the blackboard.
Because if that is the right way of constraining private antagonism, it is exposed to everything down objections and even even to to worst problems.
Because proletarian ism will imply that in the levelling down situation, the outcome continues to be better in one respect,
even though we passed a point where the better off are at the same level as the worst off,
when the benefits of the better off go down even further,
that means that the average more value of benefits goes up, and so the outcome will be in any respect better.
So.
Actually shifting from egalitarianism to prior terrorism because living down section is a jumping out of the frying pan into the fire, I would guess.
But that's all I have to say.
All right. Okay. Go ahead with your response. Yeah.
First I want to say something about the levelling down objection, which was in your paper that you didn't actually say it in the talk.
And you say, I grant that egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection,
but I don't regard this objection to serious egalitarian should simply deny that
there's anything counter-intuitive about an outcome being better in one respect,
although it's not better for anyone.
Well, I think you there assume that in presenting the levelling down objection, I'm appealing to the person effecting claim.
How can it be in one way better if it's better for no one?
Now, I did, but I actually wrote that the person making it has less full access than the levelling down objection.
And I reject the person if it can claim as a you know,
I reject even the weak person effect and claim that an outcome can't be worse, all things considered, if it's worse for no one.
I think that's very often true as is shown in cases that I call the non identity problem.
However, that's just about the strength of the levelling down objection as applied to egalitarianism.
I mean, I think we can say there are some ways in which one or two outcomes might be better there.
It's better for no one. That's certainly possible, but not if.
The only change is that the better off people become as badly off as everyone else.
So it's that particular claim that the objection appeals.
You know, you make the striking claim that the priority view is also open to the levelling down objections of a slightly different form.
No, actually, it can be a simpler case than the one that suppose that everyone starts at level
one and then everyone becomes much worse off falls to the level of ten benefits.
Well, you say that that's in one way better because the average value of the benefits that people are receiving is higher.
Yeah, but as I intended, the priority view, it doesn't appeal to the average value of benefit.
It appeals to the total moral value of benefits.
The difference between priority view and utilitarianism is simply the utilitarian say that it's better if there's a greater some benefits.
Proletarians say it's better if there's a greater weighted sum of benefits with benefits
doing more to make the outcome better the worse off the people who are who receive them.
And since the priority view appeals to the total sum of benefits weighted in that way, there's no respect in which it's a bad feature of the outcome.
If the average benefit per person has less moral value because they're better off or a good feature if because everyone's worse off,
the average value is greater.
So I'm just puzzled why you think that the priority view doesn't appeal to the total sum of weighted benefits, but only to the average sum.
Now, in an earlier talk, you did suggest that a priority and might say that if everyone becomes much
worse off so that the average value of the benefits they receive is greater,
that that isn't a good feature of the outcome. It's a bad feature of the outcome.
And then you suggested, well, that that would imply that on the priority view,
it would be in one way better or in one way worse if everyone became better off.
But I just didn't follow that argument. It seems to me, though, on the periphery, it's always better if people become better off.
If they become better off, then the extra value gets less.
But there's nothing bad about the average value of getting less.
So I just wondered why you thought that the priority view had to appeal to average rather than total?
Well, the reason the reason I, I don't talk about to total that more value is that I want to separate two principles and.
Well, but the part of you differs from utility. Arianism in the gist says that it's not a total sum of benefits, it's the total wastage of benefits.
That's the only difference. Yes, you could. Great. But I mean, consider the two principles that I expressed proletarian.
I just reject the second one. The proletariat never appeals to the average, but.
But that gives the same result. No. In those two principles.
It just sort of separates two principles that are combined in the claim about way to interpret the differences.
But the difference is, if you take the priority view to say things are in one way better,
if the average moral value of benefits is greater because everyone's worse off,
you get the absurd result that things are going one way better if everyone's worse off,
if instead the priority view combines the principle of utility with the principle,
how much more it makes the outcome better depends on how well off they are.
Then you never refer to the average value you own have to the total weighted sum of benefits.
So you can't as work claim that the priority you ought to take the form which
makes it open to your objection rather than the form which avoids the objection.
Which is what I intended. But. But if we consider this less serious of cases.
But I'm about to turn to those because those raise a different question.
Yeah, I do agree. I use those cases to to to argue that in one respect, prior terrorism, they say about a first.
Yeah, but but look what you what you I mean, those cases involve different numbers of people in existence and they raise different questions.
And I like to turn to them. But before we do that.
If you take the cases that I actually considered where there's the same people who exist in all of the outcomes,
I'm simply saying to you, surely I can be right in saying that the average moral value of the benefits that people receive is irrelevant.
It's only the total sum of weighted benefits to which the principle appeals.
Now, I don't see why you think a priority.
You can't say there's nothing good if everyone becomes badly off so that the benefits that they receive have greater average value.
There's nothing good about that on neither do you.
And that's because it differs from utilitarianism only by giving extra weight and benefits.
But I certainly I can't make my my case without appealing to find that to say.
Yeah, okay. All right. I'll turn to the second one then. Right.
Well, before I turn to your cases, I want to consider a range of similar cases.
This involves a set of different possible outcomes, in all of which the same people would exist.
So different from you in that respect. In one outcome, one person is at level 100, everyone else is at zero.
Second outcome two at 50, everyone else is zero.
For 25, everyone else is zero. And then at the end you get everyone at one.
Okay. Now it is true that on the priority view it would be better if this hundred benefits were
shared equally than if they all went to one person or if they all went to two people.
But then so does the egalitarian think that and so does the utilitarian.
So when you got the same people in all the outcomes, it is indeed desirable if the welfare is used among these people, but that's no objection.
Now, if we turn to your case, the difference is that in your case, different numbers of people would exist in the different outcomes.
Now, I think I may have misled you here by a phrase in which I introduced the priority view.
I said It's enough to consider different state of affairs, in all of which the same set of people would exist.
Now, that was misleading. You might have taken me to meant that if we reach a view about those cases, which I call the same people cases,
then we can apply our conclusions to cases in which different people would exist or different numbers.
But when I said it's enough to consider same people case, I didn't mean because then.
You can apply to all cases. I meant we've got enough to discuss if we tried also to discuss cases with different numbers of people.
That raises a whole new set of questions.
So my priority view was explicitly designed for cases that don't raise these special puzzles when different numbers of people are different.
However, I'll now turn to what you say about what the priority of you implies in those cases.
You say that on the priority view in an earlier paper,
it's better to bring the new people into existence because that's benefiting people
whose level is lower because they're at the neutral level of non-existence.
And that involves assuming that when the priority view says benefits to people, do more to make the outcome better when they're worse off.
We include all of the merely possible people, people who never exist because, well,
they're worse off than people who are having a good life because they're at level zero.
No, I didn't intend the principle to apply to people who are merely possible and never existed.
You could have a similar objection to the egalitarian view.
You might say, Well, rather than giving more resources to people who exist, you should bring new people into existence because they're worse off,
because they're at the neutral level that worse off than all the other people.
Now, you rightly say that egalitarian principles aren't meant to cover people who never exist.
It isn't a relevant inequality that we exist, and they don't.
And the same is true for the priority view. When I say it's more important to benefit people who are worse off.
I'm not including merely possible people who never exist.
Now you might then say, Yeah, there's a difference here because you can have you can consider different outcomes.
Yeah. You don't consider bringing people into existence.
You just consider outcomes that already exist.
You have one outcome where there's one person that's well-off as a 100 hundred and you can say another,
but you're comparing that with an outcome in which that person doesn't exist.
That's why you say that in this example, the priority of you, rather than having one person at level 100, be better to have 100 people at level one.
Now that's implying that the second is better because the benefits would go to people who otherwise wouldn't exist.
Yes. And in that respect, badly off and I'm saying, well, just meant to apply to people who never existed.
But but if you make you if you make an adjustment about these two outcomes involving different numbers of people.
Yeah. You can you can have the view that one outcome is better or the equally good or whatever,
and take no view that they are better because they're better for somebody, namely people who come in.
Well, I thought I thought your main objection to the priority view was that it claims it's better to have 100 people at level one.
Yeah. Because that's benefiting people otherwise.
No, the claim is just that that's the way that the benefits are high.
Yeah, but that's because you're saying I mean, on the prior, you know, the weight,
the weight of a benefit is higher if it goes to someone who's worse off.
Yeah, well, you're assuming that if you bring some in into existence, that benefit is going to suffer.
Now, that's a pretty badly off. No, that's a different claim.
You know, you can you can make the claim that the benefits have a greater more weight,
because they go to somebody who who is badly off at the level of one in the last outcome
without saying you're benefiting somebody by having brought that person into existence.
Well, that's why I switched in my case, in which all the same people exist in all the outcomes,
and either one of them is at 100 or two at 50 or they're all at once.
Yeah, that's okay. Some people say that Jeff McMahon.
Yeah. Would take the view. Is that a case where you have more people existing?
That outcome can be better, even though it's not better to fall for it.
Yes, I agree it might be better, although it's not better for anyone.
But I mean, there are really two really two points.
One is the priority of you, as I defined it, applying to cases in which.
All of the same people would exist when you turn to cases in which different people would exist or different numbers.
That's completely different. It raises very different problems.
And I think if some principle looks pretty plausible in cases where the same people exist,
you can be justified in accepting that principle, although it's not clear when you turn to cases in which different numbers of people.
Yes. What's the wider principle in which insane people cases would imply the conclusion you accept?
I mean, here's another example. Many people think that an outcome can be worse.
All things considered, if it's worse for no one, that's the person effecting claimed.
Stop that you discuss. Well, that's plausible in cases in which all and only the same people exist.
But once you switch to a case in which different people exist, it's very easy to see how an outcome can be worse.
All things considered. Even though it's worse for no one. That's true.
If the result of our energy policies is people who live two centuries from not who, which are low level,
although their life is worth living rather than people, different people who would be at a higher level.
So I think it isn't an objection to the priority view, as I described it, which applies only to cases with the same people,
that it's not obvious what we should say about cases in which different numbers of people would exist.
No, but. But you need. But then. But then, I mean, the other point I made,
I wasn't just saying my version of the priority view doesn't apply to cases in which different numbers of people exist.
I was going to say, well, if you look and see what the priority be might imply with respect to those cases.
There's a huge difference between saying there's a greater moral value to a benefit of being at level one.
If that comes to someone,
some actual person who would otherwise be at zero and saying there's a greater value if it comes to someone who otherwise wouldn't exist at all.
So in other words, just as it's plausible to say that if you believe that inequality is bad, you're not saying,
well, one of the things that's very bad is that existing people are much better off than people who never existed.
That's a bad inequality. You can actually. No, no, that isn't about inequality, because our principle applies only to actual people.
I think the same is true of the priority view, the extra moral values of people in my outcomes.
Only in one of the two outcomes. And you're saying bringing them into existence.
If they come into existence,
the priority view has to say that benefit matters more because it comes to people who otherwise would be at the zero level because they don't exist.
And in other words, I'm saying two things. One is I intended it only to apply to the same people cases.
Two, you can see why that's natural, because there's a huge difference between the way in which some people are worse off than others.
If they exist and are worse off or if they never exist, you'd expect those to be quite different questions, and I think they do.
Well, if you make it impossible to sort of separate in order to separate those two sides on two separate,
you need to consider that that's cases where the sum of benefit is held constant.
Whereas while then the moral weight of those benefits varies,
you can't consider you consider that situation unless you you bring in different number of people,
because otherwise the situation would be you can only change when in my example, they're the same people.
The sum of benefits is the same. If one person gets all of 100 or to get 50 or full, get 25 or all of them get only one.
The sum of benefits is of the same effect on the priority.
In that case, it's better for the benefits to be shared equally between all these people.
That's the case in which they will exist in all of the outcomes. So you can draw the distinction you want when you're considering a case like that.
But I mean, your main objection to the priority view, I think, wasn't the one that applied to bringing extra people in,
but was the claim that on the priority view, as everyone falls from a high level to a low level, that's in one respect.
It changed for the better because the average value of the benefits they get is greater.
And my initial response is that I don't know why you think the priority view gives any weight to
the average value of the benefits rather than the total weighted value of all of the benefits.
That was the view that I put forward, and I don't see why you think well,
if you consider those cases first, this area areas where the sum of benefits is concerned.
Yeah, and that's true in my example in which there are 100 people in all of the outcomes, the same people, the sum of benefits is the same.
You either have 100 going to 152 to the other, 98 get nothing for 25 for four and the other 96 get nothing.
That is a case in which the total sum is the same, but it's distributed differently between these people.
And there I think most of us would think that it is probably that it's better if it's shared.
Yeah, but that's a situation where egalitarianism would yield the same result.
Yes, I know. But I thought you were saying that this is a case.
This is a case in which the priority view has the implausible implication that when the average value of the benefits is greater,
that's in one way better. Yeah, but in this sort of situation, you change the relative position as well.
Whereas this hasn't changed in my in my case. But but surely we're considering two cases that as the simpler form of your objection, you say,
well, suppose everyone is at 100, then they all suffer misfortune and everyone is earning ten.
Now your main attraction is that on the priority view, that is in one way a change for the better.
Yeah, because it's always better if the average value moral value benefits is greater.
And I'm just denying that. Yeah, no, I know it doesn't say that.
And then I thought you said, well, we can show that the priority of you has to give weight to the average value of benefits
because and then you turn to a case in which different numbers of people exist.
Now, I think that doesn't show that the part of you has to give weight to the average value.
But but I didn't think you if you said what your view would be about this case on the blackboard is.
Well, my view is I think it would be clearly worse if instead of 1 billion people in level 100, you've got 100 billion people at level one.
That's like big world class. That would be worth on priority.
No, not on priority. But that's not that's what my question is about.
Well, the priority view doesn't even apply to those cases.
But what would it say if it were?
Because, as I said, I don't need to claim is that we do a proper priority realism proletarians apply the view of cases.
The question is what you might say, what it might say.
If you compare to 1 billion people at level 100 to 100 billion people at level one, the priority of yours is one.
The second is in no way better because if these extra people come into a business that isn't benefiting people who otherwise would be at a bad level.
So the crime, if you can just say it isn't bad for people, irrespective of whether it's benefiting people,
there are benefits at at a low, low level and they would have greater way to cope with it.
Well, no,
because the point is the priority says that a benefit has greater weight if it comes to someone who without that benefit would be at a lower level.
And I'm saying that doesn't include people who never exist.
People who never exist don't count as being at a low, absolute level.
They just don't enter into the reasoning. All right.
I mean, doesn't that. Sorry, I mean, have I missed it?
Well, I just think there is a way you can formulate a prior Rotarian as my saying that a benefit you have to somebody who's who.
Otherwise wouldn't. Yeah. No, no, no, you don't you know, you don't have to say who otherwise wouldn't exist.
And so you're just looking at an outcome and you say, well, you're hearing how this person does this outcome from.
In the other outcome, it's you don't have to just look at the outcome and say, here are benefits to somebody at a very low level.
It all benefits to somebody at at the level of one where you could similarly say,
in applying the egalitarian principle that we ought to bring more people into existence, because then fewer people will be at levels here.
And all that I'm saying is that I mean, when you say what separates you,
whether you benefit people, putting them into existence, that's a separate issue from a judging.
They say, well, look, let's say that these outcomes are equally good or better,
even though they're not better for anyone because somebody is brought into existence.
But I think we should let other people be as well. All right.
Well, yeah, plenty of time for questions. So let me see who's who's interested in our of it.
But we'll start with Julian. So took a bunch of cancer patients to this to two different groups.
There's the older Good Prognosis Group and there's the younger worse prognosis group.
So you could give one person who's 40 years old, 100 months of life, or you could give 100 people who are 30 years old, one month of life.
So I take it then these are all people who exist, but they just think of different sorts of cancer and your priority and you.
It would be better if we gave the 130 year olds one month of life.
Prima facie, yes. And I think that's what most people would think.
If you're giving a greater sum of benefits,
which is more fairly shared and it's coming to people who otherwise would die younger and thus be worse off, it sounds unequivocally better.
Well, why? I mean, this does seem to be a kind of version of the repugnant conclusion.
If you apply it to large numbers of cancer patients, which gets smaller increments of life.
Well, look, I agree. Some people think that if there are lots of people who exist and some of these people are very bad,
they are very well off and the others are very badly. Some people think, well,
there's no point in taxing the rich and spreading it out among the starving masses
because each of them would get such a small benefit that it doesn't count.
Well, I think that's just a mistake.
Each of these many people would get us would get the benefit, and the total sum of benefits would be much greater.
Not only would the total be greater, but it would be more fairly distributed.
So I don't think there's any difficulty about thinking that when you can give
a greater total sum of benefits to people who would otherwise be worse off,
that that's a change for the better. Now, some people think if you go down to a benefit as small as, you know, an extra minute of life or something,
you know, some of the benefits like that could add up to anything significant.
And I think that's just a very deep mistake. I described the two cases in the bad old days, the tortuous.
Each turns the dial on the instrument, inflicting great pain on one victim.
But under the new system, the machines are so arranged that they go round and round it together.
They impose just as much suffering on all their victims, but none of them makes any perceptible difference to any of the victims.
Now, that's perfectly possible, and it's clear that they're imposing great suffering on their victims,
although because the effect of each act is so thinly spread, it doesn't make any sense.
So, I mean, I agree when you consider benefits and harms that are very small, there's a tendency to think, well, they just don't count.
I think that's a huge mistake. But now, how was your question applying to.
I think the main issue between Ingmar and I, because I say on the priority view,
what makes the outcome better isn't that the average benefit that people get has more moral value.
It's that the total sum of wages benefits is greater.
That was my version.
But the priority of you and Ingmar objection is directed at the average person that says, no, it isn't the total sum, it's the average fine.
And that's a completely different view. And I don't see why that is in my view.
My view is that it consists of two principles. You can divide you divide your your one principle into two principles.
And I was using these cases to say you say one is it's in one way that if there's a greater total sum of benefits and
it's in another way better if because people are badly off the benefit to each person has greater average moral value.
And I'm saying I just reject that version of the part of you, which seems to me to have no plausibility at all.
Now, we agree about that. Yeah, but I thought your objection was to the priority view.
Well, then you should consider the version that says when people benefit,
that makes the outcome better, and it does more to make the outcome the worse off they are.
Now you add up all of the benefits and you give them greater weight if they go to people are worse off.
And that's nothing to do with the average.
But I was considering a version of proletarian ism, which applies to cases where your fiat version doesn't have an all.
Oh, you mean cases involving different numbers of people? Yes. I wasn't discussing those cases.
No. I take you along that we have and we have plenty more people in this equation.
So this is the latest thing. Okay. Sorry. No disappointing.
Come back to you later. Sorry.
I was just wondering about the about the fact that the other party is not supposed to apply, I guess, I presume, to the different identities.
Right. Those are different cases, right? Yeah. But that's also true that you need to think carefully about those because as I say,
many people think one of two outcomes is worse for one person and better for no one.
It must be worse, at least in one way. But once you turn to cases in which different people exist, that leads to a contradiction.
So those are different cases which need to be. Handled in a different way.
Right. I mean, you know, handled differently.
Is there going to be sort of priority or something, some sort of for example, I mean, you talk about the cases the same number.
You have this gradual, you know, different distribution of how these resources are.
And I think it's worth it to give the different description of schemes the same, but the different identities of people in these various groups.
Well, those need different consideration, right.
I'm just wondering, are they going to be any consideration, the view that will make one of these situations more credible, better overall, that young?
And if so, will they be something like high water or something?
Well, look, I mean, let me try to be more positive. I'm sorry. I've been rather, rather rude.
Ingmar has well pointed out that if you consider cases in which different numbers of people exist and you ask,
what should the priority you say about such cases?
If you said that people's coming into existence and being at a low level,
it should be treated as a case of a benefit that has greater value because it goes to someone who would otherwise be badly off.
Then the priority, if you've so applied, leads to something like the repugnant conclusion.
Now that's well worth pointing out. And the moral as well, the priority.
You shouldn't take that for now.
And if someone says to me, Look, I agree.
The priority, as you described, didn't seem to do jolly well in cases in which all the same people exist.
But what about these other cases? What do you say about them?
That's a perfectly fair question, but I think we can be confident.
I mean, let me put it this way. We can be confident that some principle is right in cases where all and only the same people exist,
though not knowing what the wider principle is from which this could be derived.
And that's because it will normally be the case that there are several quite different, wider principles, which will all have the same implications.
And one example of that is the difference between the average principle of utility and the total principle of you.
They coincide in cases with all the same people, but they're completely different.
And so I agree there may be quite different principles that would all support the priority view in same person cases.
And we haven't yet discovered which of those different principles which could appeal to.
So there's still work to be done. But the claim there's work to be done isn't that there's an objection to the priority view in saving people cases.
That that's really all I that there is an expression of this.
Yes. So I mean, this is all that I mean, just a similar point.
So, you know, you use these cases and say, well, this to us is to say that terrorism violates the first thing.
But in these two cases, you seem to see that attention plays in conjunction with the total view of population.
Efforts for the social justice is enough to violate the personal pension.
So if, for example, it's in conjunction with utilitarianism, which is the classic case,
dozens and dozens of the letting down of section population case that have one person, 100 to 100 people.
That's who. The second outcome is that, according to utilitarianism, the first is not that support anyway, because are some people that don't exist.
Well, I actually think when you bring someone into existence with a life worth living, that should be counted as a case of benefiting the person.
I wouldn't want actually to say, Oh, you're not benefiting them. The point I was making was a slightly different one.
It's whether we should think, Look, there are these possible people who may never exist or are we to worry about them?
Because after all, if they never exist, they'll be at the zero level.
And I was saying the intuitions behind the priority of you don't I think say, well,
we need to think about I mean, there's a very nice quotation I have from the here.
He says, maybe if the priority signs are no way to possible people, that's unfair.
And refusing to take into account the possible people whom you could benefit is morally obviously on a par with racism, sexism and speciesism.
And I'm saying it isn't giving priority to benefits to actual people,
isn't objectionable to be arbitrary or unfair because people who never exist are not being treated unfairly when we fail to bring them into existence.
But I was trying to make a claim, which I.
I can't I can't get Derek to do except apparently and this is that in is where you you see to people of different numbers and you.
Yeah you can say that one outcome is better than another because that the total amount
of benefits is great or whatever or that it isn't better for anyone where you're not,
you haven't benefited anyone by bringing it into existence. You can separate those two years.
That's what I've been sort of trying that point I've been trying to make, which Derek hasn't bought.
But I mean, I reject the person effecting claim more sweepingly than you do because I think you
thought we could at least accept the claim that one or two outcomes can't be worse.
All things considered, if it was for no one. I think that's a mistake.
Yes, but irrespective of what claims we're inclined to make,
I'm just sort of trying to make the point that it is possible to take the view that those outcomes involving different people,
that some of some of those outcomes might be better than somebody and not in fact, you have more people at a high level.
For instance, you can say that outcome win more people at a higher level is better than one with fewer people, even though it isn't better for anyone.
You haven't. You haven't, I agree. Benefited anyone by bringing them into existence.
Yeah. And how is that an objection? It's you know, my point is that in talking about these cases in the serious,
I'm not saying that the in the law case, we've made the situation better for it.
I'm I'm only saying that you could make the claim that that outcome is better, even though you don't claim it's better for it.
Yeah, but the only, the only question I can see it's this is that the priority of you says a
benefit has more value if it comes to someone who's at a lower absolute level.
Yes. And the question is, should we count among the people who are at a low absolute level, people who don't exist?
And we could answer that either way. You beautifully pointed out, which was new to me, that if we say yes,
let's include among the people who are at a low absolute level, all the people who never existed.
The priority of you then leads to a worse version of the repugnant conclusion, to which I think,
well, that shows that that you shouldn't take people who never exist as being at a low level.
People who never exist just don't count as far as the priority view is concerned.
But I mean, you're right to to to share that that would not be a plausible way to extend the priority principle to those cases.
You're right. So we take another question.
Yeah, sure. I understood.
Why would you concede it's a first the very first question doesn't show why priority areas would be susceptible to that conclusion.
So the example, I thought there were all people who were going to die at 30, but go on with the question.
And so and so why would that sorry?
Well, the question is, is it repugnant to think that instead of giving 40 months to one person, you should give one month to 40 people?
I'm inclined to think that if 40 people have one more month in which to make their farewells to Thursday and so on and so on,
you're going to be doing more good and it'll be more shared rather than giving the whole 40 months to one person and everyone you do it many,
many more people's time is giving to the individuals gets smaller.
It's more. I thought that was exactly right. Precisely for.
No, no, that isn't the apparent inclusion at all. I mean, the point is,
if you have a choice of either saving a single person from a whole year of pain or giving a single
person a whole year of life or giving one more minute of life or one fewer minutes of pain.
Each of a million people, lots of people saying, well, obviously you should give the one person a home more.
Yeah. Rather than just giving one minute to a million people. Well, a year is half 1000000 minutes.
So if you always did that, in those cases, everyone would die younger.
I mean, yes, it would be worse for everyone. And I mean, I do agree that when the.
It is so small as to be imperceptible. It's plausible that people think, well, they just don't count.
And I think that's a huge mistake. As my case of the homeless torches was meant to show.
None of my tortures makes any perceptible difference to any of the victims, but they together inflict great suffering.
And that's what we're doing with global warming. You know, each act is not going to make a perceptible difference.
But together, we're doing tremendous harm. And their permanent conclusion isn't about those cases.
It's the claim that rather than a billion people with a wonderful,
quality life would be better to have an enormous number whose lives are hardly worth living.
That's completely different. But in the thousand tortuous case,
you got individuals that suffered right at the end when you're simply giving an extra second to a large number of individuals.
No. Single individual? No. On the contrary. Point to just the mass of note.
The point is, if you keep doing that, if you keep doing that and you can do it once for everyone in the population, there are a million people.
Okay. And on a million occasions, you are to give one more.
Yet we've seen some difference. So we're talking about we're just on a one off case, a million people each.
Get a second from your view? That's a bit like giving somebody a whole extra year on the priority.
Well, you just a but yeah, none of those individuals gets any more than a second.
Yeah, but look, look, the point is the reasoning is just the same.
You're saying if people suffering is short of by only one second, that doesn't make any difference.
It does. You're imposing a greater sum of suffering.
I mean, an extra torture comes along, and he turns the thing once on each machine.
Each of the victims suffers a bit more, and he's imposing a greater sum of suffering.
But you are right. Some people think that it's okay to act in a way like this, provided you know that few people will do it.
Although if you know that many people are going to do it, then it's wrong. I actually think that's not defensible,
which is you get to see the harm you're doing when you consider many people are doing it, but you're doing just as much harm.
But those really are different cases because those are about what weight we should give to benefits and harms that are trivial or imperceptible.
And that's got nothing to do with the priority of you. John.
John. All right, that's my one.
Very sorry. My question.
And I'm sorry I had to come in late. Yeah, me too.
But let me ask you anyway, so you focus too often from one code on 101.
And I think you think that the first one is worse than 600 years ago.
No, it's not worse. You can't forgive anybody else.
And yet you say on the sheet the principle that gives you that conclusion.
He could comply with this week specification.
That's the approach which can be less and less.
It's worse. So that seems a contradiction.
Could I ask Derek his question? Derek?
Yeah. This is about. This is about doubling down.
Yeah. And it isn't actually written down here.
But you think that lengthening John can't be better in any respect than not?
No. My claim was that it's not a decisive objection to egalitarianism, that on this view it's in one way a change for the better.
If the better off suffer misfortune.
As in my says, there are other cases in which it's right to claim it's in one way better, although it's better for no one.
And any guy then might say, Well, I think that's true here too, that quite a lot of people find that implausible.
And the point about the priority view is that it doesn't imply that it's in one way that that's okay.
So yeah, that I have this. So you do actually expect that levelling down kind of gives extra amount of respect?
No, I think it's implausible, but people like Tim can say, well, yeah, it's just what would be nice to have your view about it.
Well, my view is that it? It is an objection which has some force, but I don't think it's decisive.
I think we have to decide whether the priority view which avoids this implication is in other ways more plausible.
And I mean, here's one point. I read quite a lot of anti egalitarian literature.
And what they're all talking about is there's this, you know, impersonal thing, inequality, and it's got nothing to do with anyone's well-being.
And the priority of you does wholly avoid those worries.
So what all I meant was, look, some people find this because in favour of the priority.
Yeah, there's an objection to tech egalitarianism, which has some force which is completely avoided by the priority.
That was my claim here, but I don't think the levelling down objection understates it.
Yeah, I ask you. Yeah. All right. Let me play play by play.
I was carrying that on proletarian so that I would count as better than this, which implies that that outcome is worse.
Yes. And I also say that if if Ontarians don't accept the view that coming into existence, the benefit.
They're claiming that that outcome is better with all things considered.
And that will contradict that way here.
Yeah. Which you believe we should reject rightly.
I didn't have any of you. I was just pointing out that it's sort of great for what I'm.
Can your variation of controversy this week because you think that the one on the left is worse than the one on the right,
which contradicts this recollection?
No, I think that on on the other tariffs, which is the view I spent a very good, you know, the peak periods prior.
You know what I meant is your view about about please. Ah.
So P itself as described says that the left is worse than the right.
The left and the right. Yes. But that in itself is in conflict with the weaker personal fact that unless unless
you take the view that bringing somebody into existence benefits those people.
So I feel that to see it sort of the one on the left is supposed to be worse than the one on the right.
Now, whether we take the view to bring people in or bad for them, there is no one for whom no one on the left is worse than one on the right.
And no on this, unless you take the view which I would be inclined to take,
namely that the non-existence are worse off because in this case that have they have a benefit.
But in that case, in this case, they have neither anything of value nor anything out of this yet.
So they're actually neutral. So the non existent people are still.
Yes, comparatively speaking to me, not if they would not exist.
Yes. But it would only be truly over there that they don't.
There's nothing intrinsically good about non-existence, but there is something intrinsically good about this existence,
even though it's very small said and my say this is true of them, but you haven't anybody to refer to.
I mean, it could be the case that we we talk to specific individuals because you can have as far and in know, yeah,
there are non-existent people so non-existent that they're just not actually we of a temporary one when I have a question about
this position about non-existent people in the priority areas and specifically in the context of transgenerational justice.
So I'm trying to ask what is our of terrorism as a tiny slice but as opposed to all binary.
So take a situation where you are people but in 20 years, not 200 people because the commissioner office yeah, 100 people.
And then you're assessing justice in two different time slices and it's like, say,
where you have 100 people and not yet the thought of the following hundred people,
the times like you,
where you have 200 hundred people for ten priority charities and compare outcomes between situation one that is before 100 people have been born.
And situation to you, those hundred people will exist eventually.
Oh yeah. Certainly. If you're comparing to ways in which just you might go away,
that's somewhat better for people in the 20th century, but somewhat worse for people in the 20 seconds, I think.
And the very same people would be better off in the 22nd or the third.
There's no difficulty about comparing those because you've got the very same people existing in both outcomes.
I was merely saying that the principle doesn't apply to cases in which you don't have the same people in the outcomes.
So suppose we treated that one says the consequences of one's actions.
In hindsight, one could result in 95 people existing the second situation rather than 100.
Oh. Then they're going to be different people, existing different people.
And priorities are no longer applies. No, it doesn't apply to them.
So even if the circumstance we're talking about may have a direct consequence on the issue of the December comparison,
one of the two now on this becomes outcomes.
Yes, I'm just trying to clarify exactly the principle that we're talking about that allows the exact scope.
I'm sorry. Well, it just doesn't apply to cases in which different people exist in the different outcomes.
It's only intended to apply to same people cases. And I can see someone might say, well, you know, you have to have a view about these other cases.
Yes. But they're much harder. And because the priority view could be implied by a wide range of quite different, wider principles.
You can be fairly confident that it's the right view about same people cases,
even though you haven't yet worked out, which is the wider principle from which it should be derived.
That's my view. So please join me in thanking Margaret.