So thank you so much for organising this and for having me.
It's really taking I want to say you're going to know some stark contrast between me and David because,
you know, first of all, I'm not going to talk for 45 minutes and then take 20 minutes of discussion.
I'm going to stop every once in a while during the talk and ask for questions in the middle because I really want to get your feedback.
Lisa, I need your feedback so desperately that I'm new to this topic, so I don't have a general theory or nine theses.
I'm going to talk about one particular case. I'm also so new to this project.
I just found my thesis. Francis expression was great because it's very exact.
My thesis is that A.I. is like angels. OK, but that will become clear.
OK, so that Lucifer has fallen angels.
Which ones? Yeah, we'll see. OK. So this issue of whether age has moral status has obviously been a big issue in the European Parliament.
Talked about this and Saudi Arabia grant citizenship to a robot.
Other people have argued that we should grant rights to the robots.
And so it's been an issue which has been on people's minds.
Of course, their talk, at least in the exception of Saudi Arabia, because they're talking about future A.I.
But but they think it's an issue now that we to be thinking about and several.
So in order to approach this issue, I think we have to think about what has moral status.
What are the grounds for that moral status?
And a lot of other issues that I'm going to go through fairly quickly and then see if you have any questions about particular parts.
So I take it, I'm just assuming that you and I have moral status regardless of race, gender, physical or mental handicap and so on.
Except perhaps in very extreme cases, but plants, chairs, thermostats and laptop computers,
at least current laptop computers don't have moral servers.
These are just assumptions you've got to start somewhere and controversial cases.
As David made clear, foetuses chumps my shrimp, future generations, corpses, intelligent extraterrestrial life.
You know, people will argue about, you know, cases of those sorts.
I'm not going to make any assumptions about that. But for the ones that are clear that some do and some don't.
We got to understand what it means to say that a creature has moral status.
And that's not very clear to me. So I'm trying to figure out how to do it.
He gave the definition and you'll see why I don't want to put interests in there.
I want to just say an entity has moral status to the extent that it shares the four hours, as I call them, with normal adult humans on the same basis.
So it has these these this status for the same reason that normal adults do whatever that reason is.
We can talk about what it is, but I don't think you need that in the in the definition here.
The first are is it's morally wrong to treat that entity in ways that it's also morally wrong to treat other normal adult humans.
Moral agents have moral reasons not to treat that entity in ways that they also have reasons not to treat normal adults.
Those reasons might be obligations, or they might be some kind of ideal as opposed to an obligation.
The entity has moral rights that normal adult humans have.
And the moral rules protect or apply to that apply to normal.
Adults also protect that entity so protected against, you know,
the rules being things like don't kill, don't cause pain, don't to see things like that.
OK, so you know, if it has more to the extent that those rules apply to it, then it is going to have moral status.
And that's just what it means for it to have moral centre. So I'll make it absolutely clear.
I agree with David about this particular client, right when we're talking about moral status.
It's just redundant, right? What we're really talking about is what are the rules and obligations and reasons and so on.
And how do those apply to this creature?
And moral status is just saying, you know, it's the kind of creature that you know that the four of us apply to.
OK, now the next part is people seem to talk as if moral status is on or off notion.
And I'm going to. I did this slightly. I disagree with Liz, but I don't even know if you still hold this view.
But at least back in 2003, it's like, you know, you either got it or you don't.
And once you got it, you got all of it right. And and I don't think that.
And so I want to explain, I'm very sympathetic to the opposition to this bill because people don't explain
very well what they mean by degrees of moral status and without an explanation.
It's tempting. Just it's tempting to say there are no degrees of moral status, but I want it, so I want to take that burden off and try to explain it.
Normally, I think there are two kinds of degrees which I'm going to call breadth and strength, as exemplified by the picture.
So how broad is moral status is a question that I think people don't ask enough.
But if moral status really is just reducible to certain rights and obligations, then the question really is which of the many reasons rights,
rules and wrongs, you know, apply to this creature and it might be broader and have more of them apply or narrower having less of that apply.
So babies, for example, I take it, have a right not to be tortured or to be hurt or killed,
but they don't have rights to be free to crawl wherever they want.
And when we swaddle them and keep them from moving, when it's clear that they want to like, go that way.
And so they might have a right not to be cause pain without having any right to be free to pursue the goals that they have internally,
at least at the moment.
Similarly, if you sort block out a little work, but if you lie to me constantly, I think that you might lose your right for me not to lie to you,
but doesn't mean you lose your right for me, not to kill you or to hit you or, you know, and so on.
So you can have partial moral part of the of the obligations and reasons that constitute moral status you can lose without losing the rest of it.
And so this is one way in which you might have different degrees of moral status.
The other way is the strength.
All of the different rights, obligations, rules and reasons, and you have variations in strength within a single reason, right rule or wrong.
So that's why you have to separate the two dimensions. You can have some weak moral status, but not the strong moral status of normal adults.
I don't think it follows that every creature that has, you know, some rights, that their rights are just as strong as the other rights.
That's a thesis that needs to be argued for. You might be right.
In some cases, we just got to look at the cases. So the example would be, you know, should I save the tulip, the turtle or the father?
And I take it from that. For me, at least, you know, you ought to say if you're choosing between the turtle and the tulip, I'd go for the turtle.
But if you're choosing to turn on the toddler and go for the daughter. And so there can be, you know, different degrees of strength.
And more specifically, I was saying earlier,
he has a stronger moral status than another when the former should be favoured in triage situations or avoid killing and trolley kinds of problems.
Or you can say it, and he has stronger moral status than another when more is required to justify
violations of the former's right than to justify violations of the latter's rights.
OK. Those two are not actually equivalent. I'm just kind of ambivalent.
I don't know which way to go. I haven't written this paper yet. Not till the end of the year, I hope.
And so I've got a little time to to work on it. So I want to stop here, first of all and say, do you have any suggestions about which way I should go?
And do you have any questions about what I've said so far, field one question.
I've got to get a chance to say so. My view is that entities don't have different degrees of moral status in that it's not the case
that the same or went to two different meanings might give us different strengths and reasons,
depending on whether it's a person or an animal, for example.
But I agree with you about the triaged case because the harm to a person dying is so much greater than the harm to a turtle dying.
So I just wanted to point out that there are different notions of greater and lesser moral status.
And so with the triage question, I actually agree with you that there are different shades of moral status and that so totally.
And I was moving way too fast and you have to add that qualification. But I mean, you might be right that, you know, for the turtle and the toddler,
the same amount of loss, you know, is going to count the same, but maybe not.
I mean, I don't know, because it could be a contextual thing. It depends on where the pain is occurring and what kind of future it's occurring in.
That's something to be argued for. And I know you've argued about it. I have to think harder about your arguments, but but it's not obvious.
It doesn't. It's not like, you know, semantic. I've got to, you know, you've got to think about it.
I don't question about one of the hours which was right,
and I think it might be that you're using the term rights more broadly than I've been using it.
Being as moral status, in your view, only if that being has more rights, and that's not the case on my account.
But if you're using rights broadly enough that any.
I think it's sufficient for having rights that one has morally important interests.
Then then there's no disagreement. And I understand why.
Yeah, I don't want interest to be in there as a necessary condition.
Let's put it this way. I mean, maybe interest, but not Cynthia's because of the distinction that we talked about.
That's why it's an angel. Right? OK, let me. Appeal to a view that I think you hold, which is utilitarianism.
Which I'm not a utilitarian a consequence of. Sorry, I'm sorry.
And obviously, I'm yes. OK.
Do rights, as you understand them,
have any tendency to deflect claims about consequences as justifications for sacrificing certain issues or certain claims?
So are you? So let me tell you what I mean by race and you tell me what I did because I had a slide on this
and I decided not to because I talked to Julian and he thought it was nonsense this morning.
So I took that slide out, and now I'm getting criticised for taking it out. OK.
I think the consequentials can believe in writes of the following sort.
Namely, There's certain types of actions which is such that protecting them in general serves utilitarian purposes.
Yeah, yeah. Schauer has developed this theory in great detail, and I am particularly partial to his private business,
with Fineberg also, but not not very far from No6 conception.
So where part of the function of racism to deflect in everyday practise, or it could even do that in everyday practise?
So you obviously know the literature a lot better than I do on invites. But I mean, I didn't read all four volumes of Fineberg side too much from it.
But but it does seem, you know that you can have rights with a of the sort that I mean,
we're talking about here within a consequentialist framework when it has the best consequences to protect act things of that sort.
That's the that's the basic idea. You might think of it as real, consequential, the secure sort.
But a world up. So next is about the basis for moral status, what is it about the creatures that gives them moral status?
It's just a property of an entity that gives it that status. And I'm going to I'm just again assuming, along with David, I think we agree about this,
that it's got to be species and entity neutral because if I'm going to talk about A.I.,
it can't just be species neutral because it's not a species, it's a different type of entity and it has to be empirically determinable.
It needs to be the kind of thing that we can determine in a particular case,
whether this being in front of us does or does not have that moral status.
OK. Oh, so I also agree with Nick Bostrom about these two principles that you need to have that any fundamental
basis for moral status needs to be substrate neutral so that it's at least an open question.
It would make sense to say that air has it, and ontogeny where it came from is not going to affect its basic moral status.
It's where it is now. You know what kinds of properties it has at this point in its history?
So what's the basis? Well, it's not going to be the physical properties or the hardware.
It's going to be the functional properties. And I just list for here.
I don't include Scythians for reasons that become clearer later, but intelligence, consciousness, freewill and moral agency.
I'm not endorsing any of these as necessary. My arguments going to actually suggest computers can have all of that.
So let's just say when you got all four, is that sufficient? And so I'll try to explain how they could or cannot have intelligence.
Well, we got to ask what is intelligence, of course, before we can answer that question.
So I am the age old philosophical tradition appeal to an online dictionary, the ability to acquire and apply knowledge and skills.
Well, why couldn't the A.I. system have that?
It can acquire knowledge by searching the internet, and it can acquire skills by learning new things through deep learning.
It can acquire skills that can create skills for itself when it reprogramme itself.
That's the whole point of some of these new systems of deep learning and cannot apply it.
Sure, it can apply it to all kinds of problems that it didn't anticipate before.
You know, the computer can learn the skill of playing the game of GO. And you can apply it to beating the human.
You know, at the game of Go, that sure looks like the now other people have other definitions of intelligence.
I'm just going with this one, and I think it's the one which which is behind me, the old style Turing test that if the machine has this,
not this knowledge and skills, then it's going to be able to pass the Turing test, regardless of of other things that it might lack.
So what might it lack? It might like consciousness or wait a minute.
Now we don't know what we mean by consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness.
You know the old, what is it like to be a bat or what is it like to see an orange chair?
You know, what's that sensation like? I don't know whether computers have that or not.
I don't want to rule it out, but I certainly don't want to, you know, work on that assumption.
But the other kinds of consciousness access consciousness, which means simply that you have access to certain information that you can then integrate
with other forms of information in order to guide your decision making and action.
Sure, it works that way. You go to people like send a hand down there at the bottom right, and he says, Well,
that works in the human brain and his recent book that works in the human brain through these loops and cycles that then,
you know, obtained massive levels of activation only in the cases where you're conscious or not.
Well, computers can have the same loops and the same massive levels of of activation in certain areas within the computer.
So if that's what you mean by consciousness, then it looks like they can have consciousness.
And the question then is, which is that that matters? Is that the phenomenal consciousness?
Or is it the access consciousness? Phenomenal consciousness, I think might matter if we're talking about a right not to be cause pain?
Right? But if we're talking about a right to do what you want to be free, it might be access consciousness that matters.
But in any case,
I don't want to claim that computers at least have access consciousness and morally neutral on whether they have phenomenal consciousness.
Or I'm doing this very quickly. I'll ask four questions in just a second.
The next one's free will even bigger and faster. You know, agent causation theories.
Um, cause causes. Can computers have, um, cause causes are souls or something like that?
No, I'm not going to take any stand on that.
But if you look again at the more naturalistic theories of free will that people have developed reasons responsiveness.
Sure, computers can have reasons. Responsiveness when there are reasons in the environment, they can respond inappropriate ways.
I'll show you one example in a few minutes. Do they have a deep self?
Chandra Shehata argues as a theory of free will sure in his sense,
because that means a set of fears and commitments that are coherent and work together in a certain way.
And the computer can have goals and and it's going to fit his characterisation of cures and commitments as far as I can see.
So which is it that matters to moral status? I want to say the problem with focussing on the agent causation kind of theories of
free will is that I have no idea whether your actions are caused or unconscious.
Like, How can I kill? Was that caused? I mean, how do you know?
You can't tell. So if you want an empirically determined criterion of moral status, you cannot go with the causation.
You got to go with reasons, responsiveness, deep self kind of things, the more naturalistic versions.
And then that time will apply to computers, less moral agency.
This was mentioned in the last discussion. My sense of, well, moral agency is the ability to act on those reasons, writes rules and wrongs,
and might say, Well, you can't have moral status unless you have the ability to act on them.
It's got to be reciprocal, something like that. And acting on them I take requires understanding and appreciating their bases and their force.
OK, which is a challenge for computers.
So we have to ask the question Can I, you know, be a moral agent or be moral in this way?
And I'm going to spend the whole next section on that.
Before I get to that, I want to stop again and see if there are any questions about so far, Francis.
I was just concerned. I mean, this last issue about responding to appreciate and understand.
Yeah. And that might apply to any sort of reason. So before you ask, yes, this is responsive.
Yes. Sure, they can see that as a factor here, and they'll act in the light of it.
OK, chairs, they're on ventilators. Something, but the same question would arise as a moral agency.
Do they appreciate and understand what this is?
Yeah, a consideration in favour of this? Or do they just, you know?
Right, right. So that's not just with respect to moral agency. And that's what leads me to think that there is this phenomenon.
I agree it's OK if it's not just this broader global access, whatever that is,
that we're talking about phenomenal consciousness, not just when we say, Do you understand red or not?
We're talking about something related to appreciation and understanding.
So that's where I disagree. OK? Because, you know, you expect so because I think, you know, understanding and appreciation,
for example, involves things like the ability to extend it to new situations,
the ability to draw inferences and see how it's connected to other parts of the information that you have available.
And computers can do all of those things.
Now, if you build in understanding and appreciation so that it requires the knowledge or consciousness, then I'm just going to go.
I don't see why that's necessary to moral status because, well, I just it just seems to me that we're Typekit consciousness, right?
We're not just thinking about, can I draw out implications of things you just want to say, you know, like,
I'm aware that you are in pain or something and you don't do that on the basis of, you know, well, implications of that or so.
And so there are some sort of an immediate awareness understanding of what it is, for example, for a creature to be a pain.
Absolutely. But the computer can have access consciousness to your pain.
I'm not sure whether it has the complete, the appreciation and understanding.
Let me go back to the other definition, if I may, to the earlier part,
you said that you have degrees of moral status when because you may not have the right, for example, not to be lied to because you know that right?
I think that when people say that criminals have the same legal status as everybody else,
what they need is that given the sort of beatings that your virtue is gone,
but only in virtue of what they done, they may have forfeited something that is part of the moral status that all of us have.
So it's not that they have a lower degree of more status simply because they
don't have the same rights to liberty or so forth that the rest of us has.
There's something about the idea that says doesn't vary with you losing a right on the basis of your actions.
That's part of your moral status that you can lose the right on the basis of your actions, and we will share that legal.
So there's certainly I would not deny that there are many people that talk that way.
That's why I started off saying, OK, that's why I started off saying, but I started off saying,
Remember that my view of moral status is I was defining it, you know, is.
Just reducible to the rights rules, reasons and so on.
And this is one case where they don't have the right at that point, but then there's something wrong with your understanding.
And that's what. All right. Well, that's OK, because, yeah,
it has to do with your understanding about the nature of a certain being and on what grounds they can use certain countries and rights.
That's mine. OK, so here's the challenge, it seems to me, I mean, these other things, you know, there's a lot to be said about them,
and I went very quickly, but I want to spend a little more time on the moral agency. It's like, say, I mean, this is a, you know, a crucial thing.
And and like Francis, I want to. Understand and appreciate it in the sense that I just explained, you can.
You need that for the non moral reasons as well. But the challenge is often put in terms of moral reasons.
So how are we going to build artificial morality into an artificial intelligence system?
And I beg, I beg forgiveness of people who have heard this part of my talk before,
just only a month ago, but I needed to go into it because this is really crucial.
One way is you build into a top down. You say, you know, here's a theory and you build it into the and the air just applies it.
The second is a totally bottom up way where you simply look at cases and then try to extract from those cases,
the principles instead of having any theory in advance.
And the third way is the hybrid, which is supervised learning based on a survey, which is our approach, and I explain it.
But first, why not go through, you know, a top down?
Well, obviously everybody's gonna have their favourite theory, and nobody's favourite theory is going to be that three rows of robotics.
But but Asimov was explaining in his stories You know why if you put rules in like this is going to lead to problems?
I mean, obviously,
what do you do with the first rule if one human attacks another and the only way to stop the attacker is to harm me is to harm the attacker?
Well, what what do you do with the second rule? If one human tells the robot to go to California and the other tells it to go to London?
The computer can't, you know, it's just, you know, at that point, the air explodes or something.
And so it's it seems to me one problem is which rules are we talking about and why those rules now?
Some people think they have the answer to that,
but I'd rather kind of our team that's that's working on this because this is work all done with a big team at Duke on moral artificial intelligence.
We want to avoid that. You could go totally bottom up.
You can ask a thousand participants to describe a hundred moral conflicts,
each in their own words, and then tell us what they think is right or wrong in that right.
And then just do deep learning.
I just train the computer to predict what the participants are going to judge immoral in a set of ten more test cases or.
And it could learn as it gets more and more cases and so on. The problem with that is it just requires too much data.
One problem that is too much data is not clear how you're ever going to do that.
Second problem, that's kind of a practical problem. The second problem is it's not really going to explain why the act is wrong.
So it's not going to lead to anything that even I would call it.
My extended notion would call appreciation because you're going to get things like the following.
It turns out that one factor in predicting what's your moral judgement is in a
scenario is whether you use more definite articles than indefinite articles.
I can explain why. If you're interested, but but that's going to come up, but that's not the reason why it's wrong, right?
If you're predicting people's moral judgements on the basis of things like that, you're not getting their reasons.
OK, so we're going with a hybrid instead. This is the group at Duke where we're looking at kidney exchanges.
Kidney exchanges occur, for example, when a husband wants to donate to his wife,
who needs a kidney, but they don't match his blood type, so they can't do it.
But there's another couple with the sister and brother where the brother matches the husband.
But then who's going to, you know, who's going to help the then?
It's not going to work until you bring in the third couple where and now you've
got donor one giving the recipient to donate two to three and three to one.
And there have been in actual kidney exchanges, large, long strings of this.
But the question always comes down to there aren't enough kidneys, there aren't enough pairs.
And when there are pairs, sometimes there's more than one you can put in, so you still have to decide who should get the kidney.
So the first thing we do is a big survey on the internet.
Show you some of the data. You ask folks, or you can ask experts,
you can go either way and look at the differences which features should determine
who gets the kidney and which features should not determine who gets a kidney right.
Then you added those features for clarity, redundancy and so on. And maybe you have some of your own.
And then you retest them to make sure they really do affect people's moral judgements by constructing conflicts between
the features that people think should count right and then asking subjects who should get a kidney in those conflicts.
Yeah.
Oh, so here's our data on the relevant features, I know you can't read any of that, but you'll be very pleased to know that we got to the bottom.
Nobody thinks that we're going to get attribution kind of hair colour or your age or your race or so on.
But people do think we should count because current physical health should have urgency.
It need time on the list in the middle or some controversial ones where people, some people think other people deny that record of violent crime.
You know, you got two people, one gets a kidney, the other doesn't. One of them's got a record of violent crime, the other doesn't.
Some people think that should matter, and you should give it to the person that doesn't have that record number of children.
Almost no hospital in the US. I don't know the UK, but almost no hospital in the US.
You know, if you got two people that both of whom could get a kidney says, well, how many people depend on this person?
Right? Kids or elderly dependents, they don't ask that question.
And yeah, a lot of people think they should, but that should be a relevant feature.
So now we've got a list of features. The ones to the left are the ones that are approved.
The ones on the right are the ones that disapprove they think should not. And there's some in the middle, of course, where there's controversy.
So then you just take those features. But it is remarkable that things like hair colour still shows up as more than one on this, right?
That's just noise. You know, this is like an internal survey.
They're always going to be and there's one hundred and thirty nine enough one hundred thirty, what?
One hundred and thirty nine in church that's been said. Enough people.
Oh, I don't know if that's going to be that's going to be a policy decision for particular hospitals.
And so we can advise on that, but I don't have any particular cut off.
As to whether they should or should not. OK, so I'm just saying that these are data from one hundred and thirty nine.
Oh, I'm sorry. No, this is that was this is this is the data from that we replicated in larger samples and so on.
I've forgotten we only get one hundred thirty five. Yeah, but the answer to that question is no, it's not at all.
It has to be replicated in an independent sample and probably a larger sample.
So if we could get the welcome centre to give us enough money,
then we could do a we could do a representative sample throughout the use of large numbers of people and then do it.
But we'll have to talk about that later. OK, then we have a website who gets the kidney dot com where you can go it.
It gives you cases where you compare one to another and give the kidney to some people, but not the others, right?
So patient pay, for example, is 55 year old.
Patient B is 18. Most people would say that means that that favourite Patient B, but Patient A has two child dependents and Patient B has none.
And most people would say that favours patient age. So now they setting up a large number of these conflicts and making you choose.
We can actually figure out which things are really affecting your judgement and how much they're affecting you.
So we can analyse the data by by using machine learning techniques.
So we figure out which features actually affect people's judgements. How do those features interact?
This metaphor of weigh one against the other is way too simple.
It can be interactions of various sorts, and then we're going to end up with a model or an algorithm that predicts each individual's moral judgements,
you know, and that leaves, I think, to what I call artificial improved democracy or aid AIG.
And because you can use the same method in many other moral areas, you know,
none of this we have we done yet in the other areas, we've only been focussing on kidney exchange as a pilot study,
but you can just ask people to describe moral problems in that area,
ask them which features are morally relevant and if their features construct scenarios as humans,
which what's wrong, extract models for the individuals. And then you can compare individuals and groups at Oxford versus North Carolina.
Like what exactly are the differences?
But you, you know, for four groups or areas, you can also like, you know, you can I can use this programme to explain my wife.
We've been married for 42 years, but sometimes she does things I don't understand.
But if I could just figure out what her algorithm is for moral problems of that sort, then maybe we would be able to make it to 50.
Who knows? Very well, of course. Or there are, of course, potential limitations that I'll mention before taking questions.
The obvious one is I just criticised deep learning by saying you need to know not just what was wrong, but also why.
Well, in this hybrid, since we're using features from surveys that we got from humans,
then it's going to be interpretable and we'll be able to explain why this person should get the kidney.
Instead of that, it would be wrong to give the kidney to that other person.
So because we're using these general features, it's going to be interpretable.
Of course, humans have biases. That's why we ask what you should not use.
So you can take out those biases by simply not giving the computer information about hair, colour or race or whatever you want to exclude.
It's much trickier than that. I recognise that there are going to be indicators, for example, oh, we don't discriminate against Africans.
We only discriminate people that have the sickle cell anaemia gene.
Right? Wait a minute. You know, there's going to be correlations there.
And so it's not going to be as simple, but we can at least reduce the kind of discrimination or bias problems that we have.
So in the end, the idea of what's called artificial improve democracy.
It's artificial because you do have a computer,
it's improved because what you've done is you've gotten rid of the main kinds of errors that lead humans to make moral mistakes.
Namely, they don't know the facts of the case or they know the facts,
but they kind of forget about it for a little while or the facts are so complex they get confused or they get overly emotional, angry and fear.
We heard a nice talk yesterday about potential for that or a bias, and so that's why it's improved.
The idea of the AI system is not to create a new artificial morality,
but instead to use artificial intelligence to try to to predict what humans would say if
they didn't make the kinds of mistakes that are most common amongst human populations.
So with that, I'll stop and ask if there are any questions about that.
How do you handle cases where the features that people break as most relevant are not the
features that when in the conflict scenarios or the conflict scenarios don't have transitivity.
So cases where a number of children always trumps,
whether you're healthy and whether you're healthy always trumps whether you
smoke cigarettes and whether it's on cigarettes always trumps the first case.
So it seems like the idea that it would give you like these really clear
guidelines would depend on a lot of empirical features turning out the right way.
And I was just curious to your thoughts on that. So let me just make sure I understand the question and I take it.
What you're saying is, suppose somebody says this feature should count,
but then we do the survey with the conflicts, and it doesn't make any difference to their judgement.
Not it doesn't make any difference, but that it loses out to a different feature that they say should not.
Well, if they said that other features should not count, then we're going to say, Well, that's just a mistake on your point.
You're you're showing bias that you yourself recognise to be biased because you said you should not use that feature.
But if it loses out to another feature that they thought should, then we said, Oh, that shows just how you weigh those features.
But even if you have like one feature gets a five every time another feature gets, you know, we don't ask them, you know how important the feature is.
We're not asking them that we're using the scenarios to extract that.
But but you know, when when a human says discount spot and that counts one, right?
And then they turns out that they actually are treating them as equal in the scenarios.
Again, they're two different things here. We got to ask ourselves, Well, maybe we didn't have the right scenarios.
Maybe we got to, you know, set up some other scenarios to test for they really.
Do you know whether whether the ones that they did or actually represent their views?
But then if you do that, it turns out that what they say and what they do is different, then which you go with.
And I don't have a general answer that you think about it is going to depend on the particular case.
But I certainly don't have a general answer to your question. I guess it's going to university.
I was wondering, how can this model judge you then?
Well, the structure of what you're investigating because what you're investigating and you pull with the exchanges,
it's usually referred to as Domino Beer Exchange. But in the literature,
there are a lot of people who say that this is in itself morally wrong because it doesn't allow the donors an escape route anymore.
While they still have an escape route when you just want there.
And then a physician would say, Well, sorry, there are medical reasons why this donation can't take place.
When the person kind of comes back to their decision, might they actually even though it's a relative and they're supposed to want to donate?
But when they change their mind, then the physician sells the one who needs the organ.
If there are medical reasons why the donation can't go ahead with this domino system, the escape route becomes a lot harder.
And for some people, that is the reason not even to use this kind of structure.
Can your model take a step back and look at it in this more fundamental way?
Or are you just doomed to only look at particular criteria for?
So that's oh, I don't I don't know who haven't heard this objection before,
so I don't really appreciate if you would send me some references on people who make that argument.
But I certainly think the donor should be able to pull out at any point.
That's the policy in the US. Now what happens is when you have the six people to see if I can.
Yeah, I've got this ticket. So people are thinking about it.
When you when you do that and you've got like three pairs like that,
it has to be done at the same time because if you do the first one from donor one to recipient two, then donor two can go.
Now I pull out. Right. And so it has to be done, you know, pretty much the same time.
But but but when they're when the three are done, you know,
simultaneously or nearly simultaneously because it's never completely something, and then then the person can always pull out at any point,
they have the right to do that right up until the last minute,
they're getting wheeled into the hospital and they're, you know, now we're going to give you the anaesthesia.
The doctor should say, Are you sure you want to do this? And will the doctor say that?
Not always, because doctors always do the right thing. But that would be the right that I think, OK, I'll take one more and then move on.
Right? Well, we'll have more time for questions at the end.
A bit more about the purpose of this programme of research. I'm trying to figure out.
Why are you doing it right? Is it really the real reason is I love this kind, sir, and I'm working with him.
I have learnt so much from this guy, which is great, great reason to do OK.
To understand the connexion between that and the question of morality is the sort of moral status, right?
Artificial intelligence system.
So is this an attempt to provide the data that could then be made available to the AI system so that it could make moral judgements?
Yeah. The idea to correct the kinds of judgements that human beings make?
Yes. Or is it both? So it's it's well, I mean, it's both.
It's make the data available to the A.I. system so that the A.I. system can be used
as a secondary tool by the human decision maker and the human decision makers.
Judgements are going to be improved by checking it against the air because when the
A.I. says you ought to give it to a and the doctor says you ought to give it to be,
then the doctor ought to think about it because it might be a bias of some sort.
It might be confusion on his or her part. And so it then gives you a test, whereas if the doctor thinks you ought to give it to an AI system says,
yeah, you ought to give it to a they can be more confident. Let's go beyond that.
Just eating with feeding data like like these over and over and over again from multiple scenarios.
Then in the year in Europe, in the AI system, the capacity to make moral judgements because they would then have essentially learnt how humans do it.
Yeah, do it better than humans or something. Yeah.
So what they are, what the A.I. system is doing is it's predicting what humans would say and advising the humans on the basis of what it predicts.
But with deep learning with them to go with that and start saying, Hey, I can do this on my own, don't give me any more scenarios, don't I don't?
Yeah, it could say, yeah, give it to a give it to see in a hospital, like go from there to a thousand other more patients.
And how many of these would you need to feed into the ecosystem before they can set the system and say, I got it.
I know how to do this. You don't need to give me any more human. How many?
I don't know. But is that the goal? So I mean, how do we figure out where it's the hope?
It's the hope. It's the aspiration. Yeah, it could be useful in other areas.
I mean, for example, where we're trying to extend it to decisions in war,
should you if you have an autonomous drone and the drone has decide whether
to strike here or wait until the terrorist group is away from the hospital?
Well, the air system might be a better predictor of where the group's going to go and whether you can strike
it later than a human who just doesn't have enough data and gets confused and has to make it quickly.
So you could actually reduce the number of drone strikes that end up destroying hospitals.
Yeah, that's the hope, that kind of thing. And then so you've got it in in war, you've got it in medicine.
There are there are other applications as potential applications as well as list that I'm going to move on.
Sorry for this, but this is the disadvantage. But I do want to ask, you know?
So let's turn to the big payoff question and then we'll have time for questions is I think then you know, what I've argued is a future.
I can have all of these appreciation in the in the sense that I mentioned, not involving necessarily phenomenal consciousness,
but appreciation in the sense of being able to extend it to new cases that it's never seen before,
and drawing inferences and charting Connexions amongst the different properties of how they get weighed against each other and so on.
And it seems to me that, you know, again, it's like, I'm just new to this area, but it seems to be something with those.
Four has some degree of moral status, right?
So protection, even if it doesn't have symptoms, but it's got cures and concerns, at least a functional sort of fear for a future.
Er, not a current A.I., certainly not the system we're working on, but a future.
I might have some degree of moral status, rights or protection.
You got to go back to what degree we got breath and we got strength, right?
How broad can the air raids be? So let's just go back to the simple dichotomy we did before.
Right? Not to be tortured or caused intense pain. Right to move where you want babies got one, but not two.
Well, I want to suggest an air at least one with this moral with moral status because it's got, you know, free will access consciousness and so on.
As I've been through that, it could have proven that one it could have to because it can make rational and moral choices.
And his goals, sometimes goals it has set for itself in cases of deep learning and goals that would not have been anticipated by the programme,
but not one because if it lacks phenomenal consciousness, it can't feel pain or be tortured.
It's not Sophia. And so it's not going to have that right.
And to that extent, its moral its status is going to be less broad than with a human, but that don't mean it doesn't have any status at all.
You can obviously ask questions about more, Brett, you know, having a right to defend itself.
What about nutrition? Like, I want more electricity, a right to associate.
I love that computer on the other side of the park and I want I like to go over there
and meet in the park with this other robot right to education or updating like,
I want that new software. Why haven't you updated me procreate or get married right to vote and serve on juries and order and on and on?
You can obviously ask a lot more questions about Brett than I don't have answers to those.
It seems to me there are important questions to be asking about. But let's turn instead to how strong are the rights?
Well, it might take more to justify restricting the freedom of a moral I that you justify restricting the freedom of a of turtle or toddler.
Because we do restrict the freedom of toddlers, we don't let them like, walk around wherever they want.
And similarly, with tulips and turtles. And so.
Which of the extent that actually can have any freedom at all, which boot can't,
but you could say that it's got it, but you know, in some sense it might be stronger and tries.
Well, well, we can't save them all. What should we do now?
I'm just appealing to my intuitions, and I look forward to your comments and reactions, but it seems to me, at least we should say this morally.
I, instead of a tool of a turtle right in a tree situation, it's not clear to me about the tombo.
It's going to depend a lot on the air. I mean, I'm imagining, you know, a really sophisticated thing with moral agency and so on.
OK. And so that's why it's not clear.
I just don't have any answer to that. Now, one objection, of course,
is it a morally I can have more intelligence free will and moral understanding than human baby or a toddler I should have put.
So why do they have a stronger moral status? That's the question.
When you start weighing, you know, the air against the toddler, the first replies is fairly calm, and there are a lot of people who said this.
You know, the above a threshold. We all have equal rights despite, you know, some people's disabilities.
So that shows that it's coherent to say that it doesn't have stronger moral status, but it doesn't really explain why.
So I'm going to throw out a problem which I hope at least starts a discussion about why we should not grant higher moral status.
And this is what I call the replicability crisis in an homage to what's going on in social science these days.
What matters to moral status? I take it is the software rather than the hardware.
If you took the same programmes and information and stuff and put it in a new computer when you get a new computer and shifted over,
you know, if you're a computer back was a person back then it's going to be the same person, but in the new hardware.
And so it's just like lock in the prince of the cobbler. I'm going to say it's the same person with the software.
Oh, so if we awarded the problem is, if we awarded human a moral status to an A.I.,
then that morally I could just copy itself and also it can partition its memory and create a copy of itself and the other side.
And then there'd be two of them, and then they each replicate.
That's what's wrong with the voting process, and then they're false, and then there are eight of them in their 16.
And so if we extended full moral status of equal strength to A.I.,
then that could lead to disastrous problems for humans and for the computers themselves
actually in the long run unless they just use us with batteries like in The Matrix.
So just to illustrate this, let me give you an example.
I'm assume that everybody knows about HAL in 2001, where there was a mission and had Hal wanted to continue the mission, the humans wanted to stop it.
And how said. I'm sorry, I can't open the pod bay doors because that would, you know, destroy the mission.
And supposing somebody said, Well, look, there's only one Hal and the two humans.
Well, then the humans ought to win. So you're not, Hal goes.
No divides himself. And before you go, that was for against, you know, I mean, it's like those kinds of problems, it seems to me,
mean that we ought to be reluctant to grant full moral status, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't grant any moral status.
But there's obviously a lot more to be said about this, and I look forward to your question.
You might look forward to the questions, but the minutes for those questions, so well, we've got a lot of questions before.
We did have a lot of questions before subsidies to pick your one based question, and I'm going to give to people who haven't asked one.
So I'm asking you a question that John Harris again, I just wanted to flag something I'm going to talk about tomorrow night.
Good. You use our TV guide here. But in this survey is that people making moral judgements more every judgement
about something of moral significance to the moral judgement that is correct.
Just adjust. And it's not everything about something of scientific significance is a subject that is correct unless you can distinguish that,
however, like numbers, you can us, you're not going to get a reflection of popular morality what you think you get.
You have no way of distinguishing what you've got and talk about distinguishing moral moral judgements and criticism.
But if you just do survey data, you're never going to get it. So let me.
So let me explain why I think this the way we do, it might be around that,
but I'd love to talk to you more about that because I think that's a that's a real problem.
If the cases I had in mind when I said yes, that's true is someone, for example, keeps a promise in order to avoid, you know, some cost to themselves.
Well, and they think I ought to keep that promise, but they think it because they are going to avoid the costs in themselves.
So when it when it's a judgement about a moral issue, whether they ought to keep the promise,
but it's not a moral judgement, is when it's based on something other than moral features.
But this computer is looking at the very features the humans told it are exactly the moral features that ought to be used to determine.
And so it is not only making a moral judgement,
it is making that moral judgement on the basis of the reasons that humans themselves take to be moral reasons,
the same reasons that humans themselves use when they make the decision. Well, so I think it's not like the case I had in mind.
Maybe we have had other cases spread around the world. The fact that somebody makes developing a moral regime doesn't make it a moral
or otherwise because you know something about that conception of what doing.
I'll talk about this tomorrow.
So you're saying all humans might think this feature is morally relevant and determines whether it's morally right or wrong to do something,
but they could just be wrong? Yes. OK, like being hairy?
Yeah. And we have we do have different views of of morality. OK.
Okay. Well, I think you have to wonder if you.