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I shan't be rethinking their moral stances as much as I should be thinking is that in the sense of thinking it our way,

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so to speak, trying to undermine it. And so in this talk, I shall discuss the relations between moral status and what I call moral Cygni significance.

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Something has more significance just in case it in itself provides more reason.

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I shall argue that the moral status of something is dependent on what is more or less significant about it.

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Nothing can haemostasia if there isn't anything more or less significant about it.

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On the other hand, something can be morally significant, even though nothing has more of a moral status in virtue of it.

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The notion of moral significance is that from a more fundamental notion.

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And one we cannot say we can't manage without. By contrast, we can't manage without the notion of moral status.

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And I think we'd better do so.

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Walter sort of directed our intention yesterday to quotation from David Garcia, where he says that the more my concept, my status is is redundant.

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And I must have read this work by by David, because I've read a fair, fair amount of stuff.

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But I was probably sort of thinking, Oh yeah, yeah, and not sort of.

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No, not not realising that one day I'd be sort of trying to.

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They think they construct an intention of state as myself.

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So I hope I hope this one, I percent you went back to too familiar.

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All right.

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It's the contrary to what I believe that there could be free floating experiences that these experiences with our subjects having them to me,

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an abundance of experiences of pleasure and pain, enjoyment and suffering and other positive and negative kinds of experiences.

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Then the experiences, then the existence of such experiences would plausibly be more or less significant,

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that it would be a moral reason to bring it to bear. That the world contains more experiences of pleasure and fewer experiences pain.

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But it sounds wrong to say that these experiences haemostasia altarpiece,

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which I believe to be true that one way of making the world a better place would be by bringing into

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existence being whose lives contain a surplus of pleasurable experiences over painful experiences,

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then the possibility of such beings coming into existence would be more or less significant,

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that there would be more reason to have to realise this possibility.

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But we shouldn't say, I think that such possible beings have a moral status for that would suggest

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misleadingly that possible beings exist in a sense in which they don't exist,

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that exist in space and time, whereas their existence in this sense is merely possible.

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So this is the first point on on my handout.

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It says, Well, I sort of thought it was more convenient for you to have it points on the handout because you would have all the 10 points in view.

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And if I were to make a PowerPoint,

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I would just sort of it would look like this handout split divided into 10 slides, so it would be pointless anyway.

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That's the first point. Something can be more significant that it has that count, can provide more in itself,

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provide a more reason, even though there is nothing that has moral status in both.

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Is that right at? These observations gave a clue to a necessary condition for having moral status in order for something to have more status.

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Not only must it be a particular in the philosophical sense, something that exists in space and time,

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we also expect it to be something concrete and tangible, like an organic or conscious being or enmeshed thing.

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Well, bearing sort of ancient. Since the people stuff like that, we're not very well acquainted with.

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By contrast, what has more significance is rather a property of nature of this being a thing in virtue of which it possesses this

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state status and which in itself provides a reason for how this building of things should be more illustrated.

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It's natural to to take the moral status of its thing obeying to be some sort of value or worse than it has when something has value.

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It must have value in virtue of some other properties, then it's commonly said that the value of the thing supervillains,

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all these other Slovenian properties that belong to it.

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This implies that if something else were to have these subterranean property, it would have the same value, other things being equal.

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But if it's necessarily true that the value of a particular supervillains on some of his properties,

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the value doesn't irreducible or non derivative, they belong to the particular in all its concreteness.

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If a particular pig possesses a value in virtue of having a feature f,

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then we could in principle whittle away all the other features of pay without removing its value.

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Since it's value based is based only on its possession of of.

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If ultimately it's this remainder that has more as a status that is a thinner particular than what we commonly surpass.

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For instance, it might be just parts of a brain minimally sufficient for it to sustain consciousness.

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So that's that's my second point on the handout about that being the particular set him on a state of this scene,

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then being so inanimate things as regards what's Guatemala, what are morally significant properties that could provide more status?

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The theory, the familiar idea is that amongst them, we find a capacity for sentience,

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a capacity to have pleasurable and painful and other kinds of positive and negative experiences.

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Why? What is what so far is about how the notion of moral status is?

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What I say so far about moral status is intended to answer the analytical question about how the notion of moral status should be understood.

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But this claim about a capacity, if essential, as being possible.

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And ground for most, that is a more substantive claim about what fate just could provide something with more status.

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I shan't defend any such more substantive claim,

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but merely explore the implications of some familiar and more or less plausible

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candidates for being grounds for the analysed notion of of of more assets.

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It's a plausible idea that the fact that beings have pleasurable and painful experiences is more or less significant, it's a more significant,

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significant fact because having these experiences is intrinsically good or bad for these beings treating beings morally well or badly

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creating consistent saying to their capacity for sentience is exercised by their having such positive and negative experiences.

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It seems natural to think that what is morally good or bad,

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good or bad from an impulsive point of view is it is related to what is good and bad for beings, what is personally or prospectively good or bad.

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The simplest way to do this is the basic,

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utilitarian idea that what is best from my point of view is the greatest net sum of what is good for all beings.

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But if this reasoning, this kind of reasoning is correct, then in order for something,

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for something to provide for their capacity to capacity, for sentience to provide some provide more incentives, it must be exercised.

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The capacity for sentient must be exercised that is its own or a barrel must be in external circumstances such that the capacity can be exercised,

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or such that more agents can transform them into circumstances in which they can be exercised with their heft.

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For instance, a capacity to see is useless if we are in conditions of permanent darkness.

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In order for this capacity to be a venue, we must be in external circumstances in which we can exercise this.

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There must be light.

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So a plausible example of a morally significant feature is the feature of a capacity, a capacity for consciousness, at least sentient.

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But this capacity must be exercisable by the subject.

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Having experienced this that I go to bat for him, I think Francis was sort of touching on a similar point yesterday in connexion with Davis.

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Talk about the fact that a capacity for Ascension must be exercisable implies that

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the moral status can't be an internal feature that belongs to the B in itself,

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apart from its relation to external things. If, say, beings whose capacity for sentience are exercisable on Earth,

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we have to be irrevocably deported to another planet on which capacities aren't exercisable.

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Because the capacity because the beings would be permanently unconscious, these beings would no longer have any more status.

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They would be as good as dead.

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In other words, by taking having an exercise capacity for sanctions to be a property instantiation of which by being granted more status,

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we would include amongst the status grounding more or less significant properties, a property that's not internal to its subject,

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but external to it involving certain circumstances external to the bearer of the status.

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This makes talk about particulars more.

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Say it a somewhat awkward because the fact that this status is small suggests that we are dealing with something

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that belongs to the particular in itself and so to speak follows it around whatever its external circumstances,

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as long as the internal properties are intact.

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For instance, it has been objected to viability outside of Wynn as a proposed basis for the

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marital status of newborns that it's dependent on external circumstances,

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such as the equipment of a clinic where the newborn is delivered.

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Other kinds of status than most status aren't like that.

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Uh, for instance, political status you could acquire by being elected president could disappear if external circumstances,

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such such as the election is declared invalid.

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So that. In order for for her for the capacity for sentience or consciousness to be a ground for more states,

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I think we need to stress that it must be exercised.

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And similarly, if we were to extend it to potentiality, the potentiality would have to be actualised.

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But this is something I I won't go into.

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So this is the fourth point on the handout that we have our capacity for consciousnesses is exercisable depends on

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many factors external to the barrel of capacity and thus an exercise about capacities not internal to the bearer.

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And so it's not an internal feature, right? A more extensive class of beings that are endowed with moral status would result if the property of

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having organic or biological life where where morally significant and sufficient for more status,

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this class of beings would be more extensive.

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Because of that, being alive is apparently a necessary condition for having an exercisable capacity for sentience.

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Yeah, it's not sufficient.

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And the existence of as the existence of of plants and various microorganisms shall be considered extension of the class of of beings with

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processes would include these would include these organisms as well if it's sort of understood in terms of what has biological life.

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The proposal that the property of having organic by law logical life seems to be a property that

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belongs to an organism in itself for is consistent such thing as having and and and and metabolism.

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But as you know, no doubt,

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many have argued that it's difficult to understand why the property of being biologically alive should be morally important.

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For instance, it is hard to believe that it's not important that humans or other animals in a persistent vegetative state go on living.

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The proposed extension of more status to biological living creatures raises questions.

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However, we've seen reasons to stretch the class of that status,

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generating morally significant properties to properties that aren't internal but start extend externally,

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like the property of having an exercise capacity for core consciousness.

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This feature is only is, however, only extrinsic, less valuable for a subject.

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What is intrinsically valuable is exercise of this capacity.

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By having positive experiences, both better capacity is still more significant because in itself it provides a more

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reason for seeing to it that this capacity is exercised by having positive experiences.

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Now we've just seen that the property of having organic life might be a necessary condition for this capacity, for having experiences.

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This would also make the presence of organic life experience actually valuable for a subject.

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With this feature, therefore be more significant. No, I don't think so.

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For by itself, it doesn't provide a reason for promoting organic life there.

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Being a race to be a more reason to provide organic life depends on the contingent fact that there is also the distinct phenomenon

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of an exercisable capacity for for having experiences for which this property of having organic life is a supposedly necessary.

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It's the exercisable capacity that's so morally significant, right?

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So this is the fifth point that the presence of an exercisable capacity for having positive experience is only intrinsically valuable,

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but is still morally significant since in itself,

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it provides a reason for saying to it that this capacity to exercise biological life is not one in significance for its external affairs.

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Extrinsic value derives from its support of this capacity, right?

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And not a biological candidate for being more significant is the property of being a human

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being in the sense of being a member of the biological spaces species human sapiens,

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but as many have argued, perhaps most famous as a singer.

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This basis, the idea is not implausible. It has been suggested that lurking behind spaces is the idea that the ground for hire

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for the higher moral status of human beings is not their species membership itself.

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Furthermore, advanced mental capacities characteristic of human beings capacities for self consciousness,

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rationality, morality and long time planning and so on.

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But let's call these capacities personal capacities and the WHO are equipped with them persons as opposed to the sentient beings who are equipped

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merely with a more humble psychological capacities of perceiving and failing and having desires with respect to what they perceive and faith.

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It has often been claimed that in virtue of the possession of exercise, well,

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I would say personal capacities, human being human beings have a more elevated status than sentient beings.

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But it's also been pointed out that one note noteworthy implication of this approach is

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that beings who are not biologically human could have as high or status as human beings.

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Since the personal capacities could occur without a biological and genetic underpinning that makes someone human.

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But it's another implication that I think is more important in this context, namely that no,

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not all babies who are biologically human will have the same elevated status since they don't all possess personal capacities to the same degree.

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Some of them have these capacities to a higher degree than others, and some don't have them at all.

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Of those who don't actually have them, some have the potential to develop them,

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whereas other human beings are so disabled that they don't even have the potential.

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It follows that not all humans have an equal moral status, as might be true according to the radical form of our anthropocentric species system.

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So we face it, you're facing a problem of an apparently endless variability of moral status, even amongst human beings.

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Whenever we have a moral reason to trade one being better than another for its own sake.

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There is a case for saying that the former has a higher, more status than the other one.

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This means that we can't categorise grapes of being into those that have the same status.

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When Tom said yesterday in Haiti. He talked about 46 levels or degrees of what we want to say,

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but I think we would rather need 46 billion levels of it because there not only the fact that the different spaces would have different

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mental capacities is also the case that there would be within my species and a great variety between various kinds of individuals.

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Because, for instance, in the case of human beings, no.

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Two, No two human beings would have precisely the same mental capacities.

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And now the length of their lives would, would would also differ.

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And that's something else that which could be considered to be morally significant.

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So I think we would sort of face this problem that the notion of of mindset is it's useless for this purpose of categorising.

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Of course, as some people who draw a sort of magical line somewhere in the area.

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So it's sort of supposedly obliterates all differences above the line in all differences below the line said every say,

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every everybody who's well, the line would have the same status status and everyone below would have the same status.

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But I haven't seen any good justifications for such a magical dividing line.

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All right. As a result of this more sophisticated mental capacities,

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persons have further futures features that aggravate this problem of the bewildering variety of moral status.

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Plausibly, persons are subjects of this Earth and can be held to be deserving of being treated in ways that are better or worse for them.

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This arguably requires that they can be held responsible for intentionally or knowingly performing

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or trying to perform actions that have a good or bad consequences for themselves and others.

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Such agency is also an extension of the face of person,

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which involves a reference to external circumstances like exercisable psychological capacities.

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If this art is more significant, the moral value of outcomes is determined not only by how much or what is good for and bad for individuals,

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they but also by the extent to which these individuals deserve what they receive deserved,

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could activate the problems of the endless variability of moral status because

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it raises questions like if some some persons deserve blame and punishment,

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could this level them moral status below the level of other persons who have comparable mental capacity, perhaps even to the level of sentient beings?

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So the introduction of dessert, we will further complicate this matter.

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This is the seven point on the handout.

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But some theorists deny that they actually applicability of the concepts of deserts and other concepts to the concept of deserts,

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not a concept could make it just that some are better off than others and maintain that justice instead requires an equality of welfare.

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Roughly, the idea could be that if there's nothing like deserts, that could make it just that some are better off than others.

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Justice requires that all be equally well off.

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But even if that is so injustice, the consideration of justice requires that it all be equally well off.

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That doesn't imply that the moral status is to say that for there are still differences

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between individuals by reference to which moral considerations other than justice,

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for instance, and considerations of utility could tell in favour of inequalities between them.

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It might be have that in virtue of that greater psychological capacities.

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That's the more reason to trade some better than others because they would then

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contribute more to goodness overall by making others or himself better off.

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So it's a point that if justice demands that individuals be equal equally well off,

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it doesn't follow their moral status is to say for them to still differ with respect to two properties which are morally significant for other,

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notably utilitarian reasons. Right?

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According to Standard, The Ontological.

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Serious. It's harder to justify morally harming innocent,

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innocent and non consenting people as a means to a good end than doing so as a 14 affect of the good end.

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This would be another morally significant feature when the rights of such people are violated by, they're being harmed.

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But does it affect their status?

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Well, Francis seems to think so when she argues that what she calls inviolability is victim focussed rather than agent focus.

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And she argues that since it now says it quote doesn't focus on what I do rather than what others do.

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The fact that if I kill somebody, I would be acting now and the victim would be mine doesn't play a pivotal role in my explaining why I must kill him.

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He's right, not my agency constitutes the moral constraint.

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The fact that the other five people have the same right doesn't diminish the

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constraint as against violating the one person's right that I come up against.

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But I wonder why Francis maintained that I come up against only that constraint against violating the one person's

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right and not only constraints against violating the rights of the five people whom I could save by killing the one.

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Presumably, this is because I'm presumably this is because I'm sorry, presumably because I'm facing the option of killing the one particular humanity.

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This because I'm facing the option of killing the one now as opposed to letting the five die.

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But the fact that I have the relation of killing to one and the relation of letting

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me letting die to the fire is seems to be an agent focussed consideration.

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It has to do with the agent rather than the victims.

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It may be that if I don't say to the five, they are killed as a means by some other agent.

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But it's hard to say yeah, but it's hard to say how it could affect the status of the victims,

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whether they are killed as a means by me or by somebody else.

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It's not possible to have that. It could affect my status as an agent.

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But even if we sort of accept that the stronger consent is against harming

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and violate rights as a means is agent focus and not a master of moral focus,

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more on the status of the search and not a measure of the moral status of the victims.

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It could be more or less significant. So let me briefly summarise what I've been sort of.

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Breaking through rather quickly, a. The first time I've made about the relationship between significant,

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more significant features and their relationship to my status is that the notion of my only significant

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feature is more fundamental and in some cases in which some such features are instantiated,

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they don't. They don't make they don't seem to make up the moral status of anything.

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This is illustrated by by the fact that it may be morally significant that a world can be made

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morally better by the creations of being beings who will lead lives that are morally good for them.

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Additionally, there is a possible more significance of the distinction between home and as a means to an end and as a foreseen consequence of the end.

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And between the acts and omissions which don't have to do with the mental status of victims.

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Prima facie, it seems that the moral status of beings must be based on some internal feature of the bearer, but it's most plausible basis.

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For instance,

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possession of exercisable capacities for some form of consciousness of features that involve variations to something external to the bearer.

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Moreover, internal features of the bearer on which the moral status depends form only a minor portion of its properties.

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Finally, the attribution of a state raised a suspect, the spectre of there being endlessly managed,

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many degrees of more status since the exercisable psychological capacities that automates

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credible basis of my status vary endlessly amongst persons as well as long as sentient beings.

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This problem is further aggravated if the concept of desert is allowed to enter the picture.

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Now, none of this implies that we can truly make some simple claims about more the status.

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Sasha said that they're being beings who have moral status and that the moral status of some of them is higher than the moral status of some others.

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But these claims don't take us very far and could easily be dispensed with by claims like that.

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There are beings such that benefit at home and them is morally significant and benefit benefiting

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and harming something that is morally more so significant than benefiting and harming others.

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By contrast, a concept like that of a more significant feature is indispensable and to use.

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That the concept of more status as well seems to complicate matters unnecessarily.

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Right? So that's it. So it's five minutes.