I shan't be rethinking their moral stances as much as I should be thinking is that in the sense of thinking it our way,
so to speak, trying to undermine it. And so in this talk, I shall discuss the relations between moral status and what I call moral Cygni significance.
Something has more significance just in case it in itself provides more reason.
I shall argue that the moral status of something is dependent on what is more or less significant about it.
Nothing can haemostasia if there isn't anything more or less significant about it.
On the other hand, something can be morally significant, even though nothing has more of a moral status in virtue of it.
The notion of moral significance is that from a more fundamental notion.
And one we cannot say we can't manage without. By contrast, we can't manage without the notion of moral status.
And I think we'd better do so.
Walter sort of directed our intention yesterday to quotation from David Garcia, where he says that the more my concept, my status is is redundant.
And I must have read this work by by David, because I've read a fair, fair amount of stuff.
But I was probably sort of thinking, Oh yeah, yeah, and not sort of.
No, not not realising that one day I'd be sort of trying to.
They think they construct an intention of state as myself.
So I hope I hope this one, I percent you went back to too familiar.
All right.
It's the contrary to what I believe that there could be free floating experiences that these experiences with our subjects having them to me,
an abundance of experiences of pleasure and pain, enjoyment and suffering and other positive and negative kinds of experiences.
Then the experiences, then the existence of such experiences would plausibly be more or less significant,
that it would be a moral reason to bring it to bear. That the world contains more experiences of pleasure and fewer experiences pain.
But it sounds wrong to say that these experiences haemostasia altarpiece,
which I believe to be true that one way of making the world a better place would be by bringing into
existence being whose lives contain a surplus of pleasurable experiences over painful experiences,
then the possibility of such beings coming into existence would be more or less significant,
that there would be more reason to have to realise this possibility.
But we shouldn't say, I think that such possible beings have a moral status for that would suggest
misleadingly that possible beings exist in a sense in which they don't exist,
that exist in space and time, whereas their existence in this sense is merely possible.
So this is the first point on on my handout.
It says, Well, I sort of thought it was more convenient for you to have it points on the handout because you would have all the 10 points in view.
And if I were to make a PowerPoint,
I would just sort of it would look like this handout split divided into 10 slides, so it would be pointless anyway.
That's the first point. Something can be more significant that it has that count, can provide more in itself,
provide a more reason, even though there is nothing that has moral status in both.
Is that right at? These observations gave a clue to a necessary condition for having moral status in order for something to have more status.
Not only must it be a particular in the philosophical sense, something that exists in space and time,
we also expect it to be something concrete and tangible, like an organic or conscious being or enmeshed thing.
Well, bearing sort of ancient. Since the people stuff like that, we're not very well acquainted with.
By contrast, what has more significance is rather a property of nature of this being a thing in virtue of which it possesses this
state status and which in itself provides a reason for how this building of things should be more illustrated.
It's natural to to take the moral status of its thing obeying to be some sort of value or worse than it has when something has value.
It must have value in virtue of some other properties, then it's commonly said that the value of the thing supervillains,
all these other Slovenian properties that belong to it.
This implies that if something else were to have these subterranean property, it would have the same value, other things being equal.
But if it's necessarily true that the value of a particular supervillains on some of his properties,
the value doesn't irreducible or non derivative, they belong to the particular in all its concreteness.
If a particular pig possesses a value in virtue of having a feature f,
then we could in principle whittle away all the other features of pay without removing its value.
Since it's value based is based only on its possession of of.
If ultimately it's this remainder that has more as a status that is a thinner particular than what we commonly surpass.
For instance, it might be just parts of a brain minimally sufficient for it to sustain consciousness.
So that's that's my second point on the handout about that being the particular set him on a state of this scene,
then being so inanimate things as regards what's Guatemala, what are morally significant properties that could provide more status?
The theory, the familiar idea is that amongst them, we find a capacity for sentience,
a capacity to have pleasurable and painful and other kinds of positive and negative experiences.
Why? What is what so far is about how the notion of moral status is?
What I say so far about moral status is intended to answer the analytical question about how the notion of moral status should be understood.
But this claim about a capacity, if essential, as being possible.
And ground for most, that is a more substantive claim about what fate just could provide something with more status.
I shan't defend any such more substantive claim,
but merely explore the implications of some familiar and more or less plausible
candidates for being grounds for the analysed notion of of of more assets.
It's a plausible idea that the fact that beings have pleasurable and painful experiences is more or less significant, it's a more significant,
significant fact because having these experiences is intrinsically good or bad for these beings treating beings morally well or badly
creating consistent saying to their capacity for sentience is exercised by their having such positive and negative experiences.
It seems natural to think that what is morally good or bad,
good or bad from an impulsive point of view is it is related to what is good and bad for beings, what is personally or prospectively good or bad.
The simplest way to do this is the basic,
utilitarian idea that what is best from my point of view is the greatest net sum of what is good for all beings.
But if this reasoning, this kind of reasoning is correct, then in order for something,
for something to provide for their capacity to capacity, for sentience to provide some provide more incentives, it must be exercised.
The capacity for sentient must be exercised that is its own or a barrel must be in external circumstances such that the capacity can be exercised,
or such that more agents can transform them into circumstances in which they can be exercised with their heft.
For instance, a capacity to see is useless if we are in conditions of permanent darkness.
In order for this capacity to be a venue, we must be in external circumstances in which we can exercise this.
There must be light.
So a plausible example of a morally significant feature is the feature of a capacity, a capacity for consciousness, at least sentient.
But this capacity must be exercisable by the subject.
Having experienced this that I go to bat for him, I think Francis was sort of touching on a similar point yesterday in connexion with Davis.
Talk about the fact that a capacity for Ascension must be exercisable implies that
the moral status can't be an internal feature that belongs to the B in itself,
apart from its relation to external things. If, say, beings whose capacity for sentience are exercisable on Earth,
we have to be irrevocably deported to another planet on which capacities aren't exercisable.
Because the capacity because the beings would be permanently unconscious, these beings would no longer have any more status.
They would be as good as dead.
In other words, by taking having an exercise capacity for sanctions to be a property instantiation of which by being granted more status,
we would include amongst the status grounding more or less significant properties, a property that's not internal to its subject,
but external to it involving certain circumstances external to the bearer of the status.
This makes talk about particulars more.
Say it a somewhat awkward because the fact that this status is small suggests that we are dealing with something
that belongs to the particular in itself and so to speak follows it around whatever its external circumstances,
as long as the internal properties are intact.
For instance, it has been objected to viability outside of Wynn as a proposed basis for the
marital status of newborns that it's dependent on external circumstances,
such as the equipment of a clinic where the newborn is delivered.
Other kinds of status than most status aren't like that.
Uh, for instance, political status you could acquire by being elected president could disappear if external circumstances,
such such as the election is declared invalid.
So that. In order for for her for the capacity for sentience or consciousness to be a ground for more states,
I think we need to stress that it must be exercised.
And similarly, if we were to extend it to potentiality, the potentiality would have to be actualised.
But this is something I I won't go into.
So this is the fourth point on the handout that we have our capacity for consciousnesses is exercisable depends on
many factors external to the barrel of capacity and thus an exercise about capacities not internal to the bearer.
And so it's not an internal feature, right? A more extensive class of beings that are endowed with moral status would result if the property of
having organic or biological life where where morally significant and sufficient for more status,
this class of beings would be more extensive.
Because of that, being alive is apparently a necessary condition for having an exercisable capacity for sentience.
Yeah, it's not sufficient.
And the existence of as the existence of of plants and various microorganisms shall be considered extension of the class of of beings with
processes would include these would include these organisms as well if it's sort of understood in terms of what has biological life.
The proposal that the property of having organic by law logical life seems to be a property that
belongs to an organism in itself for is consistent such thing as having and and and and metabolism.
But as you know, no doubt,
many have argued that it's difficult to understand why the property of being biologically alive should be morally important.
For instance, it is hard to believe that it's not important that humans or other animals in a persistent vegetative state go on living.
The proposed extension of more status to biological living creatures raises questions.
However, we've seen reasons to stretch the class of that status,
generating morally significant properties to properties that aren't internal but start extend externally,
like the property of having an exercise capacity for core consciousness.
This feature is only is, however, only extrinsic, less valuable for a subject.
What is intrinsically valuable is exercise of this capacity.
By having positive experiences, both better capacity is still more significant because in itself it provides a more
reason for seeing to it that this capacity is exercised by having positive experiences.
Now we've just seen that the property of having organic life might be a necessary condition for this capacity, for having experiences.
This would also make the presence of organic life experience actually valuable for a subject.
With this feature, therefore be more significant. No, I don't think so.
For by itself, it doesn't provide a reason for promoting organic life there.
Being a race to be a more reason to provide organic life depends on the contingent fact that there is also the distinct phenomenon
of an exercisable capacity for for having experiences for which this property of having organic life is a supposedly necessary.
It's the exercisable capacity that's so morally significant, right?
So this is the fifth point that the presence of an exercisable capacity for having positive experience is only intrinsically valuable,
but is still morally significant since in itself,
it provides a reason for saying to it that this capacity to exercise biological life is not one in significance for its external affairs.
Extrinsic value derives from its support of this capacity, right?
And not a biological candidate for being more significant is the property of being a human
being in the sense of being a member of the biological spaces species human sapiens,
but as many have argued, perhaps most famous as a singer.
This basis, the idea is not implausible. It has been suggested that lurking behind spaces is the idea that the ground for hire
for the higher moral status of human beings is not their species membership itself.
Furthermore, advanced mental capacities characteristic of human beings capacities for self consciousness,
rationality, morality and long time planning and so on.
But let's call these capacities personal capacities and the WHO are equipped with them persons as opposed to the sentient beings who are equipped
merely with a more humble psychological capacities of perceiving and failing and having desires with respect to what they perceive and faith.
It has often been claimed that in virtue of the possession of exercise, well,
I would say personal capacities, human being human beings have a more elevated status than sentient beings.
But it's also been pointed out that one note noteworthy implication of this approach is
that beings who are not biologically human could have as high or status as human beings.
Since the personal capacities could occur without a biological and genetic underpinning that makes someone human.
But it's another implication that I think is more important in this context, namely that no,
not all babies who are biologically human will have the same elevated status since they don't all possess personal capacities to the same degree.
Some of them have these capacities to a higher degree than others, and some don't have them at all.
Of those who don't actually have them, some have the potential to develop them,
whereas other human beings are so disabled that they don't even have the potential.
It follows that not all humans have an equal moral status, as might be true according to the radical form of our anthropocentric species system.
So we face it, you're facing a problem of an apparently endless variability of moral status, even amongst human beings.
Whenever we have a moral reason to trade one being better than another for its own sake.
There is a case for saying that the former has a higher, more status than the other one.
This means that we can't categorise grapes of being into those that have the same status.
When Tom said yesterday in Haiti. He talked about 46 levels or degrees of what we want to say,
but I think we would rather need 46 billion levels of it because there not only the fact that the different spaces would have different
mental capacities is also the case that there would be within my species and a great variety between various kinds of individuals.
Because, for instance, in the case of human beings, no.
Two, No two human beings would have precisely the same mental capacities.
And now the length of their lives would, would would also differ.
And that's something else that which could be considered to be morally significant.
So I think we would sort of face this problem that the notion of of mindset is it's useless for this purpose of categorising.
Of course, as some people who draw a sort of magical line somewhere in the area.
So it's sort of supposedly obliterates all differences above the line in all differences below the line said every say,
every everybody who's well, the line would have the same status status and everyone below would have the same status.
But I haven't seen any good justifications for such a magical dividing line.
All right. As a result of this more sophisticated mental capacities,
persons have further futures features that aggravate this problem of the bewildering variety of moral status.
Plausibly, persons are subjects of this Earth and can be held to be deserving of being treated in ways that are better or worse for them.
This arguably requires that they can be held responsible for intentionally or knowingly performing
or trying to perform actions that have a good or bad consequences for themselves and others.
Such agency is also an extension of the face of person,
which involves a reference to external circumstances like exercisable psychological capacities.
If this art is more significant, the moral value of outcomes is determined not only by how much or what is good for and bad for individuals,
they but also by the extent to which these individuals deserve what they receive deserved,
could activate the problems of the endless variability of moral status because
it raises questions like if some some persons deserve blame and punishment,
could this level them moral status below the level of other persons who have comparable mental capacity, perhaps even to the level of sentient beings?
So the introduction of dessert, we will further complicate this matter.
This is the seven point on the handout.
But some theorists deny that they actually applicability of the concepts of deserts and other concepts to the concept of deserts,
not a concept could make it just that some are better off than others and maintain that justice instead requires an equality of welfare.
Roughly, the idea could be that if there's nothing like deserts, that could make it just that some are better off than others.
Justice requires that all be equally well off.
But even if that is so injustice, the consideration of justice requires that it all be equally well off.
That doesn't imply that the moral status is to say that for there are still differences
between individuals by reference to which moral considerations other than justice,
for instance, and considerations of utility could tell in favour of inequalities between them.
It might be have that in virtue of that greater psychological capacities.
That's the more reason to trade some better than others because they would then
contribute more to goodness overall by making others or himself better off.
So it's a point that if justice demands that individuals be equal equally well off,
it doesn't follow their moral status is to say for them to still differ with respect to two properties which are morally significant for other,
notably utilitarian reasons. Right?
According to Standard, The Ontological.
Serious. It's harder to justify morally harming innocent,
innocent and non consenting people as a means to a good end than doing so as a 14 affect of the good end.
This would be another morally significant feature when the rights of such people are violated by, they're being harmed.
But does it affect their status?
Well, Francis seems to think so when she argues that what she calls inviolability is victim focussed rather than agent focus.
And she argues that since it now says it quote doesn't focus on what I do rather than what others do.
The fact that if I kill somebody, I would be acting now and the victim would be mine doesn't play a pivotal role in my explaining why I must kill him.
He's right, not my agency constitutes the moral constraint.
The fact that the other five people have the same right doesn't diminish the
constraint as against violating the one person's right that I come up against.
But I wonder why Francis maintained that I come up against only that constraint against violating the one person's
right and not only constraints against violating the rights of the five people whom I could save by killing the one.
Presumably, this is because I'm presumably this is because I'm sorry, presumably because I'm facing the option of killing the one particular humanity.
This because I'm facing the option of killing the one now as opposed to letting the five die.
But the fact that I have the relation of killing to one and the relation of letting
me letting die to the fire is seems to be an agent focussed consideration.
It has to do with the agent rather than the victims.
It may be that if I don't say to the five, they are killed as a means by some other agent.
But it's hard to say yeah, but it's hard to say how it could affect the status of the victims,
whether they are killed as a means by me or by somebody else.
It's not possible to have that. It could affect my status as an agent.
But even if we sort of accept that the stronger consent is against harming
and violate rights as a means is agent focus and not a master of moral focus,
more on the status of the search and not a measure of the moral status of the victims.
It could be more or less significant. So let me briefly summarise what I've been sort of.
Breaking through rather quickly, a. The first time I've made about the relationship between significant,
more significant features and their relationship to my status is that the notion of my only significant
feature is more fundamental and in some cases in which some such features are instantiated,
they don't. They don't make they don't seem to make up the moral status of anything.
This is illustrated by by the fact that it may be morally significant that a world can be made
morally better by the creations of being beings who will lead lives that are morally good for them.
Additionally, there is a possible more significance of the distinction between home and as a means to an end and as a foreseen consequence of the end.
And between the acts and omissions which don't have to do with the mental status of victims.
Prima facie, it seems that the moral status of beings must be based on some internal feature of the bearer, but it's most plausible basis.
For instance,
possession of exercisable capacities for some form of consciousness of features that involve variations to something external to the bearer.
Moreover, internal features of the bearer on which the moral status depends form only a minor portion of its properties.
Finally, the attribution of a state raised a suspect, the spectre of there being endlessly managed,
many degrees of more status since the exercisable psychological capacities that automates
credible basis of my status vary endlessly amongst persons as well as long as sentient beings.
This problem is further aggravated if the concept of desert is allowed to enter the picture.
Now, none of this implies that we can truly make some simple claims about more the status.
Sasha said that they're being beings who have moral status and that the moral status of some of them is higher than the moral status of some others.
But these claims don't take us very far and could easily be dispensed with by claims like that.
There are beings such that benefit at home and them is morally significant and benefit benefiting
and harming something that is morally more so significant than benefiting and harming others.
By contrast, a concept like that of a more significant feature is indispensable and to use.
That the concept of more status as well seems to complicate matters unnecessarily.
Right? So that's it. So it's five minutes.