I'm very pleased to be able to introduce our first speakers across the seminars for Hillary Reagan Welsh from University of New England.
And he's going to be reading paper in think good intentions in political life against virtue, possibly for those who haven't been here before.
The format is somewhat flexible. We have a talk, we have a discussion, and then it comes to this.
We have a glass of high quality, some cross wine. How we do it all in 90 minutes.
So without further ado, take it away. Thanks for having me.
Part of the background of this was, I suppose it's a few years ago now in the compendium of political philosophy.
I think the. Blackwill there's an article by Geoffrey Brennan about the contribution of economics to political philosophy,
and there's a climate in it that one of the main contributions of political philosophy,
of sort of economics to political philosophy was this idea of virtue, parsimony, and explain that as we go through.
But in some ways,
the idea can be caught up here in the sort of Hume's you contriving a system of government and fixing the civil checks and the Constitution.
Every man ought to be supposed to know that and have no other enclose actions than provinces.
So generally, I think it's a commonplace of political theory that the good life and the good society are intimately interconnected.
In order to maximise their chances of living well, we require a well-ordered polity and this is one of the fundamental challenges of politics.
Typically, we regard a good society as, amongst other things, a society that has well-designed institutions.
Now, one crucial aspect of this design challenge concerns itself or concerns the relationship
between individual virtue and fluke political institutions that are desired.
Is it in general a good idea for those institutions that demand from participating individuals a virtue rich in or virtue rich input?
Or should we prefer those which are thrifty with respect to virtue inputs?
So I mean, that's the central question that I'm looking at, whether or not we want to economise on virtue or not.
So my aim is to argue that moral virtue still has a role to play in the project of fostering good society on the planet.
So I think it's a common feature of traditional political philosophy.
Uh, well, one common feature is the assumption that in order to realise a good society require virtuous citizens.
And by virtue of my virtue, I really mean here is being oriented towards the common good or being other regarding.
So I don't have a more substantive account of virtue in mind.
What I mean is, look what I in the title of the paper, good intentions are something like good intentions.
So when I'm talking about being recalling virtuous citizens,
what I'm talking about is that you have people who are oriented towards the common good
or or another way of putting it is the other regarding in some significant sense.
Now I know. It's like, you know, something, you know?
But the one thing I don't want to get into too much is, you know, the fun details of different historical figures.
But I would take, you know, part of the idea of Plato's Republic to be something like this,
that in order to generate a good society, what we need are good citizens and the most.
But some of the more extreme versions of this you find in some of the utopian socialists.
So somebody like Charles Boyer who thought that the solution to the horrors of commercial society is for all individuals to unite into communities,
government relations of fraternity. So his idea was that we need to I mean, here on the eve of the market, he saw himself as an enemy of the market.
And what he wanted was small communities in which people when we their interactions with government with some ideal of universal amity.
So in social relations, you might have within a family or idealised version of the Russians we might have in the family.
He was hoping to universalise or at least make the governing principles of the citizen more muscular communism and so on.
So this is what I'm going to call a virtue, rich conception of the good society.
So a virtue, its conception of the good society demands rich virtue input on the part of those who are members of such a society in order to function.
And a corollary is that if people are not so motivated and such virtue inputs are not forthcoming, then society won't flourish.
And indeed, many of the visions of a good society like for years cannot work unless the citizenry are motivated by the, you know, the common good.
Okay. So I think this is quite a natural view and you hear it put forward by various.
You know, politicians at different points. But if it's a natural view, there is, at least since in century, an alternative,
according to which if we're faced with toying with choice between two social systems.
But all things being equal, we should prefer that alternative, which requires the least virtue on the part of the citizenry.
And I should call this the tradition of virtue parsimony. And I want to just briefly say that we find it in Mandeville.
So so you can trace its origins and early modern philosophy with Bernard Manville in something called a fatal disease.
And this is the quote. I mean, I don't know if anybody's read Mandeville, the.
It's a long and difficult piece of poetry, if you might put it that way.
Thus, every part was full of us, the whole mess of paradise. Such were the blessings of that state.
Their crimes conspired to make them great. The worst of all the multitudes of something for the common good.
And though is summed up in the slogan, which is the sum total of five of these private vies public benefit.
Manuel also writes that human frailties may be turned to the advantage of civil society and modes of supply the place of moral virtue.
Now, this has at first bear a paradox, but I think only if one holds a sort of compositional idea or composition of thought.
The nerds have good society and you need to have good members.
So the idea would be something like an informal logic that talk about the fallacy of composition.
So I suppose the idea is roughly and some of the man who would say it, there's no reason to think that the law would have a good hold.
You need to have good parts. And so but it does bear paradox and certainly it's certainly counter to a great deal of political discourse.
You know, historically in political philosophy and then in contemporary political society,
you know, it's always you know, it's not what you can do for society. It's almost aside from the view, it's what you can do for society.
Although we might concede Vanderbilt biological possibility of lives giving rise to public benefits.
There's little explanation to be found in Manville about how this might function,
how private vices might give rise to public benefit that the commencement of that task fell to Adam Smith and the invisible hand.
So whose idea? The invisible hand furnished a mechanism or an explanatory mechanism for explaining how could be the people maybe not being vicious,
but certainly being self-interested could give rise to public benefits. So I've got the quote here that you've all come across.
It's not from the benevolence of the butcher, the proof of life that we expect at dinner, but from their regard for their own self-interest.
Okay. So the idea is self-interest or self-love is causally efficacious in the production of certain material social benefits.
Just talking self-interest, not vicious or malevolent behaviour.
I mean, I think Mandel as much black a figure in a way, because he's actually talking between businessmen.
The butcher, the baker here are not acting viciously, they're just simply looking out for their own interests.
Now, I think in order to get the argument going, we're going to go with this in terms of the principle of virtue passing.
I think there's two assumptions or two implications for institutional design.
One is the naive assumption, you know, and this is probably more controversial.
This is what I'm getting from him. I'm not suggesting this is what Smith is holding, but I think it ought to be the principal virtue, parsimony.
And it's something like this going in. And you also need the idea of governing by self-interest.
The naive assumption is that those designing social institutions should assume that human beings are self-interested.
That's talk influence of political writers and established it as a maxim than
contriving any system of government and fixing the civil checks of the Constitution.
Every man ought to be supposed to nave and to have no other engine all his actions and private interest.
Okay. And the second on those who fell asleep, we should govern by self-interest.
So the idea is the conclusion is that given this fact about human nature,
we should attempt to govern by indulging that self-interest rather than sitting at policies against it.
Presuming that doesn't exist, anyone from whom we find by this interest we must govern him.
And by means of that, make him, notwithstanding his insatiable avarice and ambitious, cooperate in public good.
We find a similar point in Bentham also. So it's a it's a fine line of thought that gets going here of institutional design.
So make it it's man's interest to observe that conduct, which is his duty to observe.
If you follow this on raising, then choosing between different ways of organising society in social institutions,
we should clearly opt for that which relies less on virtue and which panders to human self-interest.
Okay. So what I then come up with is what I call the principle of virtue parsimony.
And it's roughly this that Brendan's talking about in different Brendan's talking about in
the companion to political philosophy when he's talking about the contribution of economics.
And the idea is that if we're faced with a choice between two or more forms of institutional design,
then all other things being equal, we should prefer the one that requires less virtue input from a citizens.
The one that requires more. Okay.
So so far so good. Now, I mean, I think one thing to note here is that there is this question of the reference to Brennan.
The idea is that the central contribution economic stability policy is a virtual scarce.
Now. I mean, clearly, it is something that economists have discussed.
And you find I mean, he's James Buchanan, for instance, Evan Smith on which are some bikers.
He says, I do not know the fruit salesman personally and I have no particular interest in his well-being theories, Supercuts,
etc. I do not know and have no need to know whether it is in the Dallas publicity extremely wealthy or somewhere in between.
If the two of us were in such exchanges now, and I think part of it is in contemporary economics,
there's a tendency to try to give a scarcity definition of economics.
So since a lot of. Robbins the 1976 comic songs of 1946, there's been a tendency to see economics as the discipline which studies human behaviour,
as the relationship between man's ends and scarce means, which have alternative uses.
And obviously one of the ideas here is that virtue in that sense is is.
But I don't really want to say I don't want to say the science is only coming from economics.
I think misleading midstream to maintain the influence of this idea is to silence the influence of economic theory,
because I think in a way the principle has an appeal to that,
has a certain explanatory appeal because of certain social scientists in the West in particular.
One of these. One reason it has some appeal is basically the success of market economies.
So it provides an explanation for that success.
They succeed because they rely on self-interest.
Markets are successful for the very reason that Adam Smith pointed to when he founded the food chain before him.
So the benefits of the market are often said to derive from the dedicated selfishness of economic agents and any virtue input.
So any virtue input being there, an invisible hand will fail to deliver its optimal outcomes?
I think so. That's one aspect.
But there's another I mean, probably less important, but the failure of various utopian projects, which relied heavily on what, you know, virtue,
input, virtue of which political projects might also be seen as reason for preferring or endorsing the principle of the virtue parsimony.
I mean, there's a story among I'm from Australia, there's all this, but there's in the late 1890s there was a I mean in the many of these,
but there was a group of disenchanted socialists or unionists who left the country after the three strikes were broken and went and set up a commune,
you know, New Colony, New Australia and Paraguay. And the idea of this New Australia was that it would be founded on, you know,
socialist principles by people who were the only there'd be no market, you know, you know, hierarchies.
And it would be just governed purely by, you know, some sort of universal amity.
And the failure of some of those kinds of projects are often given as more grounds for not for endorsing virtue personally.
Right now, of course, you know, I'm not the first person to talk about this.
The one person who's had sort of fame is Albert Hirschman in an article called Against Parsimony.
And he argues that sponsoring virtue parsimonious institutions undermines the virtue we do possess.
He suggests that our promotion of institutions that idealise self-interest affects our other regarding sympathies.
So that's one line of response to this idea of virtue class.
And funnily enough, he suggests, okay, suggest that promotion of these institutions undermines our good will if you want to do it that way.
Interestingly, Brendan Hanlon in a later article mockingly referred to this as the muscle wastage thesis.
But you know, it's the idea that if you don't express the virtues of some kind of other regarding attitudes,
then those professors who waste away way as if you don't exercise any muscles.
What's the base? I mean, I sort of prefer to live in a milky Way.
Now, there is, of course, a lot of empirical literature that is at least, you know, if it's not a on this point, it's relevant.
And one is the so-called crowding out thesis.
An economist, Bruno Frei, has done a lot of work to show that money undermines certain intrinsic motivations.
So markets might be said to create out of virtue, and that would be one way of responding to this idea of virtue parsimony,
which is it's not the main line I'm going to run you on.
I'm not going to disagree with it, but that's not the argument I'm going to run.
But equally, there are crowding in theses. So. Famously, Voltaire said, Enter the exchange of London implies more respect.
A little than so should say the many, of course. You'll see there agents from all nations, the symbol for the utility of mankind.
They're the Jews, Mohammed.
And the Christians are with one another as if they were the same religion and give the name infidel only to those who go bankrupt.
Right now, this again is I mean Hirschman in another book calls his to do commerce thesis facilitated commerce.
Rather than making us vicious or lying, the loss actually softens us.
And softens us and makes us. Morally improves a moral standing, if want to put it that way.
I mean, Smith has a similar line.
At one point he talks about how the Dutch, who are the most merchant, the mercantile nation, are the most timely, you know, the most punctual.
And given the you take that to be a virtue. He thinks it's an example.
If it's honest, please tell me. Okay.
So and that's one way. I mean, this debate about trading and in crowding out is where a lot of the debate about,
you know, the relative effect of markets on our sort of virtue has gone.
I want to talk a slightly different story in a stronger way would be that markets require virtue.
So as and that's again, some people say, you know, I mean take Kenneth Arrow here in the absence of trust,
opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation would have to be foregone norms of social behaviour,
including ethical, moral codes, maybe reactions in society to compensate for market failures.
I think that's an even stronger line.
Would say not this decision undermines the market's underlying virtue, but that, you know, that actually requires virtue.
Now, what I want to do is just take a slightly different tack. I think there are virtual accommodating accounts of how those material benefits,
the market rise and also chance of why virtually rich social channels are since failed.
But if we typically will explain enough of this phenomena, and given that are equally plausible,
then there are further normative grounds for preferring the virtue, accommodating accounts over the parsimonious ones.
So I'm not actually, I'm not first when I'm not saying the virtue of person is false.
What I'm trying to do is undermine some of the epistemic grounds for preferring the principle of virtue parsimony.
Okay. All right. Now, it's often assumed.
It's often assumed that if you are opposed to the virtue, rich, and if you think that there is some kind of problem with projects,
that role of institutional arrangements that rely on people having virtues, that you must therefore endorse parsimony.
And one quote, Alexander Hamilton, the federalist, the assumption, universal venality of human nature.
This is less an era in political raising, the assumption of universal rectitude and the economy.
So what I'm trying to say is it's not as if we had to choose entirely between either virtue, rich or virtue.
Parsimonious accounts. I suggest that I call him is false, since that overlooks another position that I'll call political and perfectionism.
You might think of it as a middle path according to the imperfection, as human beings are one consistent account of human nature,
I suppose self-interested but not devoid of other, regarding concerns or concern for the common good and to subject to various kinds of temptation.
So for the political perfectionist, the aim of political institutions is not to minimise the requirements of virtue.
Rather, it's that we should avoid presenting agents with institutional moral hazards which may tempted into socially damaging behaviour.
Now there's a further debate and in a way you might actually think this is what John looks on about.
And as I said before, I mean, I'm not enough of a scholar.
So if it's if this account is laughing, then so be it.
And that's good. There's a quote, but if it's not, then I'm not for what I want to do is just present,
want to take the, you know, a position in between parsimony and the virtue rich.
And if that's what Locke is defending, then fine.
But it's a quote from Locke. I doubt not that it's unreasonable for men to be judges in their own cases.
Self love will make men possible for themselves and their friends.
And on the other side, ill natured passion and revenge will carry them too far in punishing others.
And it's nothing but confusion and disorder will follow. God has certainly appointed government to restrain the partial and violence of men.
Now, what I'm saying is, I mean, Locke is saying here to a parcel, and as I say, I don't necessarily want to get into the whole debate.
But and that's, I suppose, what I'm saying, we're imperfect. At the same time, it's not as if with that, we're devoid of any virtue whatsoever.
Where do you want to say that that's lost? The View is another question,
but the point of what I'm saying here is that the repudiation of virtue rich social formations did not commit
once the principle of virtue passed me because there's at least one other way of assuming the virtue.
So, I mean,
I'm suggesting that it is a good idea to there are reasons for wanting to avoid virtue which forms the social arrangements of social institutions,
but that doesn't necessarily permit you to the principle of virtue parsimony.
All right. Now, one one of the grounds that leads people towards virtue parsimony is the successes of the profit motive and the market.
And people see that as evidence that the principle of virtue of parsimony. I want to suggest that that remains an open question.
Arguments for the virtue of parsimony clearly connected to a view about the benefits of market prices,
all about how the realised markets are set to work because they harness self-interest through the incentives of the pursuit of profit provides.
Now let's just assume, I mean, you know, again you might want to disagree with that, but that the invisible hand mechanism works.
Let's just say that the invisible hand does what that its pursuit of profit generates social
benefits that are not necessarily intended by any of the agents who bring them about.
I mean, that's a sort of the paradox of the invisible hand that people pursuing certain kinds of goals have outcomes that they didn't intend.
But one of the questions is whether the profit motive excludes moral. So the question like this was more content.
And for me, I think part of the problem here is a conflation of self-interest and selfishness.
The mere fact that off pursue my own interests does not make me selfish, nor does it mean that I cannot respect the interests of others in doing so.
There is a tendency to want to say that the fact that you are pursuing some kind of self-interested project means
that there's no moral content or no other regarding content whatsoever in your deliberations or in your actions.
So in a way, what I'm doing is just reiterating Bishop Butler in the lectures of the sermons at Rawls Cathedral.
Are you concerned that our own interests or happiness and a reasonable endeavour to secure and promote it is a virtue and the contrary behaviour,
faulty, inviolable sense of the commons where for reflection we approve of the first thing, condemn the other conduct both in their selves and others.
Now one of the things that Butler was on about was not conflating or not confusing self-interest and selfishness.
And I think if we take those lessons into our understanding, the profit motive.
I think we tend to talk about the profit motive, but I think it's better to talk about profit motives,
but in the plural, because there are different ways that we might pursue profit.
Some of them which, you know, if we look at the motivation structure, some of them will include other regarding content and some of them don't.
So I can imagine somebody who likes been pursuing profit by itself does not make one selfish in the world at all regarding motives.
I think that would be to endorse an ever so only conception.
The profit motive that the profit motive is a singular motive.
And you can't distinguish between different ways in which some of the secret of profit.
Alright, so what I'm to suggest to you, and this is a long way round, but I'm going to distinguish between different forms of the profit motive.
So you might pursue profit for its own sake without any moral side constraints.
So we use the notion of goals inside constraints that comes from full selection.
We can actually draw distinctions between kinds of profit motive.
This term look at path I kind of myself and Tony Lynch come up with this idea in your line at the time is to try to get it into the idea we fail.
But I noticed it's in a word, a day to get that far.
Alright. One might pursue otherwise why not pursue it as a primary goal with certain moral law constraints on one's actions.
And that's a for. Well so what's the point of this? I'm saying there's different kinds of profit motives.
I want to suggest as an open, empirical question as to whether the benefits of Smith's invisible hand can be
sheeted home to pure self-interest or to a morally constrained relative of the.
All right.
So is it the case that the benefits of the invisible hand and this is the main reason people are driven towards the principle of virtue, parsimony?
Is it the case of the invisible hand works on profit motives that have no moral side constraints?
Or is it one that operates on the farming profit motive to do that moral side constraints?
And if it's the latter than the principle virtue of passing is false.
For in such circumstances, choosing the system which requires less virtue would lead us towards less material benefits.
Those aside, I mean, I think that remains an open question.
So that's the first thing, I guess. I mean, there's a sort of trying to undermine the epistemic grounds that that's an argument against virtue.
Parsimony is just saying, well,
it remains an open question whether or not the invisible hand comes from a kind of relatively virtue free pursuit of profit,
or whether it comes from a profit motive, sort of constrained by certain sorts of moral considerations.
Okay. There's another argument that people often give, and this is about promotion of virtuous citizens.
I'm going to fight that from Aristotle. Now, this is sort of heading back to the virtue rich,
but there's a long tradition in political philosophy of defending the idea that virtue should be encouraged or fostered.
So if you think about our story, he had this idea, but first laws and presumably you can include this in the purpose of,
you know, institutional, but more generally so law givers make the citizens good by inculcating habits in them.
And this is the aim of every law giver. If he does not succeed in doing that, his legislation is a failure.
It is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.
Well, now a common argument in favour of virtue fostering action is that there are significant benefits in time for the citizens themselves,
sort of involvement in institutions that require virtuous behaviour.
So one is that maybe society is better so that the citizens themselves benefit from being involved in such
activity through participation in such institutions that provide active opportunities for the exercise of virtue.
And this is dissolving itself since the days of the formation of virtuous citizens.
And the arguments analogous to the claims by the supposed long dead writers like Ernest Fife and principles of social and political theory,
that democracy is valuable in itself the opportunities it provides for individual development.
Is that kind of argument? That's not just the outcome that matters,
but it's the opportunities provided for people to be involved in democracy or in the
sometimes virtuous institution and the effects it has upon the way that they are,
I think, right now. But I think so if we stop here, we think about how there's difficulties with this.
As we already know, there are strong grounds for questioning the viability of the church.
Political institutions and political history would seem to indicate that when such institutions require requires besides,
disaster often follows shortly thereafter. So you might think all this is just heading back to where we were before with the voting rights.
However, the notion of such problems is not to endorse the idea of virtue personally.
But there's at least one other relevant process to say before political interventionism.
According to the profession's model, the danger of forms of political law if the required operation by CITES can be understood
in terms of our proclivity for partiality in making and applying in moral judgements,
rather than at complete lack of any moral sense.
The lessons of political history of virtue rich institutions can be accommodated within a model that does not treat morality is building systems.
So. But at this point, I mean, I'd love to have NOI for a reason.
Preferred interfaces models that the model that you possibly say look to the such of the route to us because all of those you know sort of.
What I was going to put forward was a construct and I'm heading towards India.
So that's a constraint principal of fostering virtue.
I mean, I actually think there's something to this, but I wanted to give a more moderate version of it.
So this is so these two arguments I'm running against, against the two parsimony.
The first one is to simply look,
it's not clear that you need to get rid of virtuous or virtuous content in order to get the benefits, the invisible hand.
And the second one is that there may well be some virtue or benefit to be, you know,
something laudable, something desirable about having institutions which foster virtue.
So the way of phrase this is if we have to choose between two forms of organisation that we have good reason to believe equally efficacious,
and we should choose the one which is more likely to foster virtue. All right, so let's throw.
Maybe it's a work of principle that if you had two different. Once a social institution.
And the people who like to produce, you know, the benefits of your life.
And I really want you to know that. They're equally clearly efficacious.
Then the prince, the institution chooses the one which is more likely to foster virtue.
The idea there is that all other things being equal is a good thing to have institutions that foster other regarding capacities.
So in a way, that's getting back to what Hirschman was worried. Right.
So just by way of finishing up, I've got a little parable of the relative of mind with it must be said,
a particularly dim view of human nature recently expressed dismay at a report that suggested that more people are killed in the passenger's seat.
In the driver's seat. Now, I'm just assuming that's true.
His suggested explanation was the drivers typically act to protect themselves before the passengers and swerve away from any looming danger,
thus exposing the passenger side saw the car. And maybe that's not the explanation, but I'm open to that as well.
All right. But my relative interpreted this as a sign of the essential wickedness of humans.
Instead of sacrificing ourselves and acting as a saint, would we wilfully size solar cells at the expense of others?
Are we signs? Well, I'll be nice. My relative concluded that the statistics for girls to be nice.
I think there's another interpretation that regards this as a sign of a partiality rather than a wickedness.
We naturally react to save ourselves. This does not reveal malicious intent towards our fellow human beings.
Our instinct is to self-preservation, not harm to others. The harm to passengers is unintentional on this account.
In the same way mutatis mutandis.
We should not view the dangers and failures of virtual institutions as grounds for endorsing the principle of virtue parsimony.
When institutions fail, it may occasionally be that this is because the moral bar has been set too high for ordinary human beings,
but more likely will be that the institution has allowed the distortions of partiality to dominate.
Such partiality is not, as the Carr case shows, a manifestation of bias.
It is simply understandably a fact about how human beings work and because they tend to work that way,
that we need political institutions and ones that are so arranged as to minimise the effects of such partiality.
When one turns the second common justification of virtue parsimony, the appeal to the benefits of the market provides.
We find that it is indeterminate whether those benefits are a result of selfish bastardry
or of that ordinary human partiality that seizes favour ourselves and our interests.
It does not rule out other ongoing concerns. Those who, like my cynical relative,
take the fact that we're not always good and certainly hardly ever as good as we could be if we were
touched by saintliness to mean that we should proceed on the assumption that we are simply nodes and so on,
to the conclusion that the institutions of a good society attain perfection when they eliminate any need
for the inputs of individual virtue would seem to be T.S. Eliot's target in the poem called The Rock,
which is going on and on.
They constantly try to escape from the darkness outside and within by dreaming of systems so perfect that no one will need to be good.
The truth is that the darkness within is not our irremediable evil, but our eminently human propensity for partiality.
Dealing with this does not require perfect institutions, but it does require intelligent ones.
That intelligence will not deny our virtues or assert our business.
If we it will take us as we are and is left locked in.
Arguably, in the second treatise will seek to harness our intelligence and our virtues
so we may have more justice in the world than would otherwise be the case. Okay.
Thank you. Thank you very much. Okay.
We have time for questions. We are recording the questions.
So if you get a few, as you know as well, so you and we will podcast.
If you don't want your questions to be recorded, then.
Well, either we think what you want to ask or come see me afterwards and we will endeavour to delete the question.
So questions. Yes. Thanks very much.
Having worked a bit on the politics of Australia to try to get you the message that would impose the crisis on me.
Okay. What's that? Okay.
I just very interested in why you think it's difficult to talk about specific virtues like self-control,
empathy or courage, generosity for patients in.
Why do I think it's one of the things that do not actually talk about actual virtues?
Yeah, that's a good question. Look, I don't I don't think it's a problem in myself.
I don't think that the problem with talking about those, I was more just, you know, abstract level.
I don't know how to develop a more particular type of, you know, particular, specific virtues if you wanted to.
I was just more just picking up on this, you know, debate.
And that's the way they talk about I mean, it's what Brennan calls, you know, virtue personally.
And the idea is that there aren't any.
Regardless whether it's, you know, self-control, temperance, you know, generosity or whatever that all of those are missing.
So but when you have very different institutions, depending on which letter to choose.
Yeah, yeah, yeah. Very specific local context to now look I think that's right.
I mean, I mean, this is a level of abstraction.
I mean, presumably there's some a wide variety of different kinds of institutions,
if you will, of fostering these virtues as opposed to close proximity. Yeah, that's one problem.
Mills is more generally trying to make space for the idea of virtues than, you know,
but that is going to end up having very different kinds of ways of I mean, as you say, that the institutions that form will be very different.
Well, we don't seem to be able to use you already saying that.
But look, it is to be honest with God, I'm not opposed to doing that, but it would be much more defined by analysis and also as a service,
sort of like a general case for defending some kind of other guy who, you know, concern the common good.
Yes. Okay. I Brent, when I reflect upon your large question you were addressing,
what came to mind was there might be a non ethical input that would be worth considering.
So in other words, the answer to your question may not be answered by a moral assumption,
or it may be answered by individuals or groups aversion to risk because the risk averse person may well want.
I want virtue parsimony, because that's going to be a less risky option than requiring everyone always to be good.
So the less risk averse you are, the more comfortable you are with actually packing a lot of expectations into one's morality.
So it's really just a comment to suggest that there may be no moral inputs that are worth considering when you look at it.
Well, if one of things but it's not clear what humans saying, you know, in human reasoning more closely.
But there's two interpretations looking into saying one is that, you know, very little virtue.
Another is just as a general policy and your risk averse interpretation as a general policy,
we're probably better off in any situation assuming less virtue and more know now.
But it's not exactly getting what you want. It's very cautious.
It's just that you're saying we're better off.
But that's actually not quite right. You're better off if, depending on where you are in the risk averse spectrum.
If you're actually very risk averse, then you're then you get to it's going to appear to you as if it's some sort of moral
judgement that all is better for us or normative judgement for us to be better,
that we'd be better off at that spectrum. You might interpret that retrospectively as a moral judgement or normative judgement.
It's not a moral normally judgement at all. It's actually just coming straight out of your preferences because you're risk averse.
Yeah, if it's like that, you know, if we go back to this little this, I mean all sort of built into it,
equally efficacious and presumably therefore among the things that will be effective, equally, the risk is not going to be different.
So there's no reason if you're risk averse to choose one over the other.
In that case, we get into I mean, if I can build that into it and the presumed third party classifications also,
no, there's no greater risk with all these two possible institutional sets.
I mean, surely it's surely there is a difference in risk and that is the ones that require more virtues are riskier,
though the ones that are worthwhile, they are. You have noticed. Okay, let's just assume that a way.
Right. In that case let me conclude my about to people that in as well but in those cases then
is there any reason not to choose one requires more virtue if you're not risk averse.
What I just said. Well, there's no there's no impediment to you going with you your lot.
But what I'm saying is a confound that may be worth considering in that if you're risk averse, you know, then you.
There's something very. Also getting in the way of your choosing.
Well, let's just take this out a little bit, because, I mean, it is interesting, I think. And that's important.
What what's the what do you risk averse about the idea that people would be less
purchased and your system requires this right and therefore the system will fall over?
Know, the risk of the system falling over is a higher risk that you're willing to entertain.
Yeah. So you actually move your expectations? I think there's complications.
I mean, one of the things here is the extent to which you build into your system.
Yeah, I mean I mean, for example, one of the extent was built into the system methods for preventing, you know, you know,
being part of the system they'll drum pushing here is that, you know, we are passive, but we are capable of better than we often exhibit.
So whether or not that places us in greater risk by relying on that, it just doesn't.
That's what you think it is.
Yeah, well, I mean, that might be something that you build into it, but not if you if you want to keep the account purely normative.
Yeah. I simply reflected when I reflected on I thought, oh, maybe there's something that's just completely nobody that would need to be taken into it.
I think one of things is whether or not it is requiring virtue, in fostering virtue and what these differences are.
And in a way, you know, is is this the story? You're saying that it's risky because this one requires as much virtue on this one.
Of course. That that's right. Yeah. Yeah.
I mean the principle and the thing is what the how much you could also talk about the gist of the story so is a through fostering so
there's little versions you know whether or not whether the virtue of fostering these also have different levels of virtue requiring them.
I said, you know, you could have a system in which it might foster virtue business women as any less, among other things, for example,
acquisition by focussed members any less in terms of or more in terms of what's required from citizens,
you know, in the sense that if it doesn't, you don't get that virtue we put you over.
I mean, if you think it's I'm doing a lot of as a token project extreme version of this.
If everybody doesn't act towards the common good then you know, and hopeless.
And a lot of times there's no institutional mechanisms for responding in order to, you know, if you leave, you move.
I'm in another you know, this is rather crude or something.
You could fight great. But to think about leaders and and general citizens and so on,
if you don't have make them against systems that assume that the leaders themselves that would
benefit from some sort of useful mechanisms for constraining behaviour of those in charge.
And that's usually part of the point of lock as well. I mean I guess I'd like you to think that between fostering and requiring,
but another phrase that comes to mind is simply hope for the best plan for the
worst seems to capture that distinction that you're trying to get to that.
I mean, the second part is, I mean, this this is a sort of at on the end,
the thing I wanted to do was just I mean, this is sort of a bit of a hopefulness at the end of the initial.
What I want to do is just saying that it's an open question whether or not the benefits we get.
But there's two lines. I had one of them, whether or not the benefit come from, you know, people think this or whether there's some role in virtue.
And then it's also there's also debates now about maybe it's risky having societies that people don't work, don't cross the verge.
I mean, you know something? All right. If we can learn that that requirement of trust,
we have societies that live and support systems of them on the assumption that, you know, but it seems to undermine trust.
Then then what will the negative consequences of them over here?
And so it seems that whether you're a name or someone who's regarding their own self-interest but is,
you know, also morally good, you come to the same conclusion that you should have systems that foster.
Thank you. What could I do based on?
Based on this, it seems that. You come to the same conclusion whether you think people are intrinsically okay or not.
And I wonder if if if my interpretation of that is correct or whether you think that if people are nice,
then that system has to somehow be more stringent and you have to have a lot more safeguards and a lot more requirements.
I mean, what you coming from picking on there? Is this this this principle here is not okay.
And let's just assume with it or not, with a few systems and and these systems cause verification.
So it's under production of benefits then I'm not really saying whether or not people know so.
And in that case, you want to pick the one that crosses virtually.
Fostering virtue doesn't necessarily mean we don't have, you know, regulations for prevention of bias.
And then part of this is, you know, this thing about possibilities of acknowledging and simply locking.
In that sense, that is an acknowledgement of people's propensity to look after themselves.
We didn't have regulations in place that was just more a kind of, you know, principle of reasoning.
But if this on making claims of human lives as life, but if we look to such institutions,
institutional possibilities and we don't know with regard to what people know.
So, I mean, it's a good question asking whether or not this was a science if either, you know, I think we have qualifications and let's do like I.
I just think that just sort of some of my argument put more people are not pretty I mean this ludicrous this was back there.
Yeah I was curious about whether you personally I guess to give an indication
throughout the kind of work parliament would end up notably of getting rid of,
you know, retirement, but of course,
which in the end we're losing this really falsified number to approximately that we can say there are certain virtues that are,
you know what, they end up being really great for some benefits. There's a few.
So maybe honesty will be there, maybe, you know, some sort of basic side operation will be there.
And yeah, that is going to be a good reason to need these things to get a prosperous society.
And those are virtuous and as a sort of provision with virtually everything we want to, you know, to build those in, we want to acquire on on one.
Well, and that that's going to be good for society also. It's good for virtue. That's great.
And then you can so you can build in whatever virtues there are that kind of our profit making,
so to speak, and then exclude the other thing of good enough sense,
exclude, you know, certain, certain forms of justice, and then you can build in your objection and still retain the basic virtue.
Parsimony is your idea of something of this virtue, minimum surrounding virtue past months,
because presumably like this is like you go to society and you say these which is it a requirement of trust and something else.
And I'm I say to you, here's another society without those there.
So I presume, you know, with approach with that as if you're going to say to me, choose, you can presume the one that still has some virtues in it.
So you're talking about ultimate virtue minimum rather than, I guess virtue minimalism.
Yeah, that's right. That's what the basic thrust of.
Yeah. Would be is that we know as few virtues as is as.
Yeah. And you might only if you make some of your virtues. Yeah, that's right.
I mean this is because I think once again, you know, there is a lot more to say.
I mean, here's the thing.
Same approach is just assuming entirely absent and being virtually plus, which is just, you know, relative to the right to society.
But if two systems actually both are portrayed and also virtues, both of those opposing the systems, you know, the one requires flexibility.
And I consider this sort of conceptual geography to you in thinking about different ways of cutting it out.
You know, I think you have to minimalist by the sound of it, but, you know, you've got some threshold of, you know, basic floor of purchase.
But beyond that, you know, you have to work together.
So I think there's a lot more different ways we've cut off positions here. Probably that that make sense.
I don't know if there's any question, but, you know, it's you know, here comes the burdens of this conflict,
the making of the conflict between with a liberalism, communitarianism, and I can only chance.
I think we're making great progress. Look at the virtue of this this notion of of of a small community, something that we were struggling with.
And I think it's only and that's a and it can happen only in small communities.
And therefore, that's a confirmation of one another.
It's possible that the sharing of information between other persons could actually make the society more virtuous,
because everybody knows that of the other people of interest. And therefore there will.
There will need more more rich people, more business in general.
The let's see, is kind of a disadvantage, the disadvantage of scale.
And to say that in larger countries,
communities won't be able to go to like this venture because of the misinformation and its local communities would like this look like this,
which is of virtue. Because of this, they can be less risk.
But if you make in a certain time. But this is bigger than most of the part of the.
So was how do you but are you making the historical climate of societies have gotten bigger you know,
lot larger than the ones that can't rely on virtue in the way that they might have in the smaller communities.
And that's because you might actually see some of these people like, you know, SMITH And and humans only responding to societies.
And as they get larger and let's suppose the role of markets for money for this.
So it wasn't something you wanted to not look like the thing here.
So it seems like in the jury you argue for her virtue personally.
Be more effective. If so, can you talk about some examples where you might see two forms of organisation that
would be equally effective but require different levels of virtue or foster development?
The virtue in whether those types of situations are very.
Yeah. I mean, look, I mean, one, you know. I mean, like, it's not the whole society.
But think about Richard witnesses who could give relationship talks about blood donation and so.
Obviously he's not making his claim in the middle of it.
But, you know, the book itself, the book some might now become at 1971, and it was about blood sales in the US and in Britain.
And I mean, there's a lot of arguments and people talk about commodification of my photos and discuss
a lot because one of the things he says is that blood done was in my time blood donation,
because it's one of the few opportunities you have in large scale societies like ours for anonymous altruism.
Right. But the scientific question, there's another part of the book which is he gives an economic analysis and tries to show that,
you know, an economist, I don't know. But he claims that the actual British system of having donations paid is is more efficient.
Okay. And then he gets I mean, what I think I mean, it's only because, you know,
but then you get the bonus of the fact that this is more you know, it's more efficacious, it's more efficient economically.
And then you get a bonus that people have an opportunity to do something they don't do,
which is there's going to be virtue fostering in the sense that it is an opportunity people have to, you know, do something good for other people.
And yes, you have some who are. And what are those?
Yeah. Okay. I mean, they're they're going to be, quote unquote, middle sized. But let me since just finally sort of let you know, but as an example.
So I mean, I mean, because this is a group, it's all very abstract.
But these debates really, I mean, the verge passing because it's really all about markets as opposed to other forms of arrangement, you know?
I mean, that's that's what's motivating a lot of it is that you and I have a question about the term virtue,
because, of course, you know, if you're free to define it any way you want to do so in the beginning.
But still, I get the impression from the discussion also that we are actually on this side.
Right. Right. By the term of if you speak of different virtues and the different we're speaking of beneficiaries, in all honesty.
And actually all you mean is like how much meat you give to your interest as opposed to the interest of others.
Mm hmm. So I thought, look, I mean, I think. Yeah, Morgan said that, and I was thinking about this before.
No, I really don't think that's the phrase in the title of good intentions.
The way it's going to be motivated by.
That's particularly how much you might have overcome, given how much you are motivated by the desire to help others.
And that's I mean, in the written version of this, of course, you know, you specify a little bit more, but it does connect up with those other.
And when your question is that there's a there's a danger of equivocation across a variety of different
because that's what happens and you basically see you value of human beings to be totally vicious.
The only thing that's really relevant to say that they happen to be partially yeah,
I've given you a definition of it in the beginning, but that's all it is to be vicious because virtue is just to be other regarding.
And so more of everything actually moving towards place.
Yeah. Like having a totally separate law. But we can. But we can.
I mean, to what extent are we supposed to talk about that degrees of the extent to which we are motivated by
other regarding concerns of what does it mean and you can still get into it with a populist account.
I mean, if you want to say you're moving towards Vice, but that doesn't make a difference.
I mean, on a spectrum and I'm trying to point to sort of a common history.
Can I say something? I mean, I, I thought you made something much stronger about virtue you made actually through the character traits and.
No, that's one. Yeah. Kind of. If you didn't, I think, I think you should because you could imagine that.
I mean some parsimonious view of what's needed in a way of society might it might exactly involve certain character traits.
You might think that look, even if people are other regarding and so forth, it's no good, you know, honest.
And I've got to have a sort of yeah. An enduring disposition to be honest with something like that.
So at least some versions of virtue parsimony going to require full blown character traits,
not just from attitudes to people or to the society as a whole.
I mean, I also I'd like a minimal so it was just about prior attitudes towards and but interesting the point you pick
up there I'm like arrow when talking about that sort of trust which is obviously much thicker conception.
But yeah, I mean from my consciousness we don't need another term, but that's certainly what the term started.
I mean, and that's what they mean. Inverted made is that the extent to which were motivated by I mean,
he's not talking about like Rosalind versus virtue in that sense or, you know, Philip a foot or something.
When you talk about virtue, meaning, you know, specific or much character traits,
what do you what they're talking about is the extent to which were motivated by it's better motivations rather than, you know, habits of action.
So I mean, really point is under some versions of that phrase.
Yeah, yeah, that's fine. Yeah. Okay, that's fine.
Yeah I preach Christianity and so I would go came down though uses actually the levers
that you are the salt of the earth salt of the earth mean you have conscience,
you know, and those people have conscience, you know, they have their forced to refuse.
And those who have sought less people no conscience they you and for people.
So in Jerusalem, most of the people don't, although they were prosperous, you know,
but they were shameless, thoughtless, they would cheat people and had no resistance.
Whereas in the villages and other people at work, in fact, you had more going together.
FOSTER Unity and victims can be also made in contentment.
If people are contented, you have find them virtuous.
Okay. Well, I, I mean that in a way that connects up with what I was calling a traditional conception
or a traditional conception of political life is how do we get a good society?
We have good people.
And that's what's interesting about Mandeville, because I think it's counterintuitive given that background, not just in the Christian tradition,
but I think most of religious traditions would say that in order to, you know, in society, we want to be good.
A point of pride to try to make yourself a better person is that you live in a better society.
So yeah,
I to think what you're saying is the traditional Christian view so as to be a communist went to South India and over there people have good pictures,
you know, in foster book and they were quite a good respect.
But I mean, I suppose the question Manuel would say is, do they make a lot of money?
Right. Any further questions?
I suggested an unknown number to other people in the last week,
but I'm also reminded of the distinction between negative for freedom and positive freedom, and I wondered if that might be another interesting angle.
Influence this obviously being naughty.
Yeah, if you have a preference or if you think foundationally that somehow positive freedom is required in a way,
then I wonder if that might tilt the balance in your argument.
Also, I don't think it's anything like Oberlin, but yeah.
Yeah, okay. So I'm sort of thinking so I mean, just my Maslow.
So, so if you're if you're a fan of negative freedom or if you like a sort of million when it comes to all that I have to do is stay out of your way.
Yeah. And that's a sort of a theme and a parsimonious sort of virtue.
I mean, as long as. Okay, well, if you think you're, if you're a positive freedom type,
you think you don't actually have freedom until you have a whole heap of social competence.
And in fact, we aren't free until we go. Okay.
Yeah, I mean, probably more effective second claim that I've got here, which is in a way that's much more of a positive for emotions.
Yeah, well, listen, sorry. It's an obligation to try to foster. That's wrong.
I'm not sure, you know, kind of. I mean, yeah, kind of, but it's not a good thing.
And a follow up to what his point was a previous point,
but responses on there and then there are actually forms of organisations that
contribute efficacious in for the promoting of being a bring about a good society.
Yeah. Good results. Yeah. But it's of it because maybe I didn't get that ethical.
All right. Yes. And all of the reasons for that.
The first one is kind of the idea that they are more efficacious, even if they are more parsimonious in employing good.
So because that's often you won't get all the need for that to produce.
We thought that in ideal cases they would go it and if that is true,
then actually if this condition ever kicks in by that antecedent of the condition and and if they are never to
say things which are really different in kind of natural requirement and I have to seem ethically efficacious,
then it's never relevant to spend so much.
Let me put it past me.
This is always taking it on, on separate and separating it out from the things that might motivate people towards that principle,
which is, you know, some people claim that it you always sort of like,
you know, bias gives rise people pursuing non self-interest these are always more benefit
them and then you're right that's a Google client and that would not be possible.
But I mean, part of what I was trying to do in the first section of it was to undermine the idea,
you know, and again, you set that undermining, you know, then maybe this would follow.
Yeah. Okay. Well, thank you very much, Adrian.