But and I have we've based on this issue before in the past.
I've written and also taken parts since a public policy very much as a defender of conscientious objection for health care professionals.
And I am the director of the Anscombe Bioethics Centre, which is the Roman Catholic Centre for Bioethics in Oxford.
But today we're going to do something rather different.
And I'm going to criticise the the the idea that there should be conscientious objection permitted
in healthcare and tests the strength of those arguments and others who's going to do the opposite.
So perhaps I just ask you to introduce yourself first and then then I'll start with my.
Yeah, yeah, thanks. So I'm back to your Bedini. And I'm a senior research fellow at the Oxford Centre for Particular Ethics.
And I have worked quite a lot on the ethics of conscientious objection and have in the past.
I got through to writing a book on that. And yeah, as David said, I made two times the case against.
Conscientious objection. Health care. So I don't think that medical health care professionals should be allowed to continue.
We object to performing. Activities that are part of her job.
But as David said in this case, an interesting thing about this debate today is that I would try to defend the view that I disagree with.
So did you to make a stronger case, the strongest case possible for the idea that we both disagree with?
And that should be interesting, because you should probably bring up bring down the essence of the nature of the
disagreement here and maybe might allow us to make some progress in the debate.
So I think so just to sort of structure would be so David will be speaking for 15 minutes, defending the opposite view.
I would be speaking for 15 minutes and then we would have five minutes each to reply.
And then there is going to be a Q&A and someone will moderate that.
Yes. So what do you do? So if you do have questions as you go through, do you write them in the in the chats, in the Q&A?
And hopefully somebody will be able to pull out some of that later on.
So so let's make a start on the issue.
So the issue is, should conscientious objection be permitted in health care?
Should health care workers be permitted to not have to provide particular treatments or interventions if they have a conscientious objection?
And I'm going to argue no. I'm going to argue that we should not allow health care workers.
At least we shouldn't allow them a generalised permission in advance.
So that's what I'm going to argue against,
that generalised permission in advance to providing treatments or procedures which go against the health care workers deeply held moral beliefs.
Obviously, in a particular instance, somebody might say, I don't want to do this and you might have a conversation.
And an that way you might come to a different agreement. But we're talking about conscientious objection as a as a practise, if you'd like,
as a as a kind of claim that the doctors or nurses can make if they say,
no, I don't want to do this because it goes against my conscience and I shouldn't have to do it.
So what is the problem with with with accepting a right to conscientious objection,
with accepting that people should be allowed to follow the consciences?
Well, parts of the easiest place to start is,
is with positive actions that we can see that even though it is a good thing in general to allow people to act according to their conscience.
Allowing people to to to act as they as as I believe is right is a good thing.
That does not give a nobody I think thinks it gives a healthcare professional the right to break the law.
If the law is broken, it's still the law is broken by a positive act.
So let's say, for example, that the law prohibits the encouragement of suicide.
The encouragement or assistance of suicide, as it does in this country. Well, let's say I as a as a health care worker, psychiatrist,
say I disagree with this law and I decide that I will provide for my patient a lethal drug to a patient who is suicidal,
because I think in this case, that's that's what will be good for my patient.
Well, I might think this and I might think this contentiously, but it would still be illegal and I would still be liable.
And the fact that I say in the law should be different doesn't give me a right to do so, doesn't give me a right to do so without consequences for me.
Maybe I go to court and maybe I win in court, but I am liable.
Prima facie I'm liable. And this seems reasonable because we don't think the doctors should be a law unto themselves.
Doctors are not a law unto themselves. Nurses are not a law unto themselves.
Say they fit within a ideas of what we accept and healthcare, which are accepted by society as a whole, which are laid down by society as a whole.
And I think that at least in some issues and issues,
particularly around life and death issues such as abortion or infanticide or suicide or mercy killing,
we think that these things are and should be matters of law matters on which the law decides what is permitted and what is not permitted.
It is precisely because indeed these matters of life and death are moral issues and ethical issues, not merely technical ones,
but it is society as a whole which decides what is the view of the good and the
just and the right in relation to these things that we should uphold in society.
What are the values that our society wishes to hold in healthcare in relation to matters of life and death?
And this is not just true at a state level. I would say, but it's also true at the level of institutions, hospitals or professional bodies.
Organisations have consciences. They have an institutional conscience.
And the institutional common conscience reflects the values of that institution.
And if it's a professional body, the professional standards of that institution,
that's what how professions differentiate themselves from from just groups of people with expertise, that people are committed to certain values.
And these values are then and codified in the professional bodies.
And this restricts what professionals are allowed to do. That's indeed the whole point of professional standards.
Professional standards restrict professionals to working to certain standards.
And. Even though it's easier to see in relation to positive actions and in regards to Prohibition's,
the same thing calls in regard to Duty's a profession, a professional has certain duties as a professional.
And that's what makes them a profession.
So if somebody asks me for help as a healthcare professional and I refuse to provide and refuse to prepare to refer to somebody else,
to provide a particular intervention which might be helpful, then I may harm them.
And that would then go against my duty. At least my prima facie duty to help them.
Imagine, for example, I'm a consultant who objects to refer in children to intensive care.
If the if the child is likely to survive only with cognitive disabilities.
I'm a I'm of of our kind of a hard utilitarian sort who thinks that people ought to be productive.
And if if people are going to come out of intensive care with significant disabilities, they shouldn't go into intensive care at all.
Let's say I have this view and the parents want the child going into intensive care.
But I say no, no. That goes against what I think is right.
Do I have the rights to object?
I'm refused not only in my own case, but also refuse to refer to another doctor who I know would take a different view.
Why should I, as the health care professional in a in a privileged situation,
why should I exercise my power to to get in the way of accessing treatments that some doctors might accept or some doctors might not?
Imagine again, and you'll see by my examples that that that's where I come from.
Generally, in terms of moral views, I imagine someone who is a is a militant secularist,
a member of the National Secular Society and secular medical thought forum who refuses.
As a matter of conscience to inform chaplaincy services about a dying patient because he objects to the presence of religious ministers in hospital.
And that I say as a result of this refusal, a patient dies alone and without the support of of their own faith tradition.
In some cases, a case like that, somebody might have a conscience.
Objection.
And it might be true that I mean, it might be reflect their conscience, but it may lead to harm, physical harm or spiritual harm to somebody else.
And this this is an indication that we can't at least have an absolute view of of the rights of conscientious objection.
But you might say, OK, let's have conscientious objection. But still with a duty to refer.
But if somebody objects to a procedure.
But you say. But you can't object. But you have to refer to somebody else will do the procedure.
How is I really respect the conscience at all? I mean, if I objected to something because I think it will harm my patient.
But you say I have to pass on that patient to another doctor who would do it
and harm my patient for me because I don't want to get my hands dirty myself.
But I don't mind the patient being harmed. That doesn't really respect conscience, I think.
So the problem is that we respect conscience, but then we might have harms that happen because of of my conscience being wrong.
Or you might say you might say, well, you have a duty to refer.
But then but then you may have harms happen when the person is right to object.
And the patient would have been helped by following that conscientious objection.
Conscientious objection as an idea. We think of in terms of military service.
That's one of the key elements of of conscientious objection.
Going back to the 18th century,
people have talked about conscientious objection and in relation to military service and in the United Kingdom in 1916 in the middle of the Great War.
The Military Service Act, 1916 instituted conscription, mandatory conscription,
unusual in Britain, but allowed objectors to apply to military service tribunals.
Though, in fact, the military service tribunals were generally very hard on the objectors.
They were not sympathetic to the objectives. And a lot of them, they said they didn't accept their objections and they sent them to the front anyway,
and people were then imprisoned and traumatised. But even where it did work, which was not universal.
Conscientious objection at Wolfer has been seen as objection to the whole practise to being a soldier,
and it allows you not to have to be a soldier, but it's not an objection to a particular procedure.
Not in general, anyway, and neither is an objection to a particular war.
So there've been a number of attempts to say, for example, in the Vietnam War, this was a very big issue.
There were people who said that they weren't pacifists. They accepted that you could sometimes have a just war, but the Vietnam War was not won.
And so they objected to serving in that war. Their objections were not accepted and they weren't accepted because the notion of conscientious
objection was an all or nothing to do with conscription and not to do with discretion.
It didn't really cover that. So all in all, I think that the the the idea of conscientious objection that happens in the military
is so different to to what's proposed for health care that it's not a very good model.
And even if we accept that you shouldn't send people to fight, if they have an objection to fighting,
I don't think that really helps us to see why why we should have conscientious objection within healthcare.
After all, you don't get conscripted to be a doctor. In fact, you get paid rather a lot.
So that's a difference between the kind of situation, the social situation of the conscripts and of the doctor.
And more broadly, and you can see this in relation to it, too.
Also to Wolfer. If you have a conscientious objector, allow a conscientious objection to a war that isn't going to stop the war,
that isn't raising questions about the war. That just allows some people to opt out of it.
So the most fundamental question that somebody might have who objected to a practise isn't really being addressed,
addressed by conscientious objection, as it might be by protest or by civil disobedience.
And indeed, the crafting of laws which protect conscience in relation to two particular procedures.
Almost always. And I can't think an exception offhand.
There are parts of laws to increase the practise which the person objects to, to increase the objectionable practise.
Therefore, conscientious objection laws are always laws which are passed, which the person who objects would prefer the law not to be passed.
So this is a rather curious thing that you have in theory.
Right, which is enshrined by law in a law that a person would prefer not to have been passed.
And conscientious objection laws tends to be put forward as a kind of compromise, but really,
therefore, to try to help make more acceptable a law to introduce a certain practise.
And if you have if you think that the practise might be unethical or harmful,
then then to to be in favour of conscientious objection might in fact, be to help promote the thing that you object to.
It's a kind of fig leaf for the acceptability of a practise.
So better, rather than thinking about what my feelings are to think about the practises.
And should these practises be part of medicine or not, should assisting suicide be part of medicine or not?
That's the key question. Rather than the idea of a conscientious objection, which is itself, I think,
a very slippery notion and doesn't deliver what people who are in favour of the objection might might hope.
So I'm not arguing that there's no value in promoting inclusive city and working practises or
there's no value in trying to accommodate people's conscience as part of living together,
working together in society. But the notion of a conscientious objection as a kind of practise or a right seems to me not a helpful model.
It gives the impression of an absolute right, which is simply not credible.
It encourages moral issues to be thought of as private, whereas moral issues are precisely public.
I think I think that the law is about the imposing of morality and it promotes a weak compromise,
which in the end satisfies neither the objectors nor the majority.
And on this note, I will hand over to Alberto to defend a conscientious objection.
OK. Thank you. That's he was very convincing to me.
Now let me just remind you, because some people might have come online a bit later.
So what we are doing is we are defending the position. We don't agree with.
So if you hear me talking now about in favour of conscientious objection,
that's precisely because I disagree with that idea, because these are going you what I'm about to say.
So but anyway, here is my conscience hat on and here is my strongest case in favour of conscientious objection in medicine.
And the obvious starting point for me is the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights, which says that people,
every human being has a right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
So these three things are put together by the idea of conscience is really the most important concept here,
because we have to remember that when we talk about conscientious objection, we often think about objections based on personal religious views.
But the notion is actually quite broader because people might be morally strongly opposed to certain practises.
For example, most obviously abortion quite independently of their religious views.
So the first thing to clarify is that conscientious objection is not meant to be privilege for religious people.
It's not just about religion.
So the principle of freedom of conscience is a secular principle that applies to any moral view, whether religiously based or not.
And actually, it should be people who are not religious,
people who are secular in a sense that should be strongly in favour of conscientious objection,
because freedom of conscience and freedom of religion are some of the basic principles of liberal societies,
and they are not really related to any particular religious view. Now, if we talk about freedom of conscience.
So we want this concept of freedom to be meaningful. So what does it mean to be free to do something?
Of course, none of us is completely free to do anything.
There are always limits that the law or the social expectation pose on things that we can do.
But we want the cost of freedom to be meaningful. And so we want the limits that are post on our freedom to be as small, as minimal as possible.
And in the case of the health care profession, if the condition for entering this profession that in theory we are free to choose,
everyone is free to choose whatever profession they want. So if I am limited in my choice of joining a certain profession,
because something that belongs to the profession of a few particular practise in that
profession are things that a morally disapproval I morally against these practises,
then it means that for me the choice is really between preserving my moral integrity and choosing to enter a profession.
And to me, this sounds like a strong limitation of freedom of conscience.
So one may say, yes, you're free to choose a profession, but once you choose a profession,
then you have to stick to whatever requirements of profession entails.
But that's really not compatible with a meaningful notion of freedom of conscience because it's quite a high price.
They have to pay for my free choice to join the profession. So if we want to cut the concept of freedom of conscience to be meaningful,
we need to make sure that the choice to join a certain profession is really a free choice.
And the price that people would have to pay is not too large.
So this is the first consideration in favour of conscientious objection in healthcare.
And it's really rooted in U.N. Declaration of Human Rights, which is one of the fundamental codes of regulating our societies.
So it is the first thing. The second thing is related to the importance of moral integrity.
Now, when we talk about conscientious objection in healthcare,
although there are lots of practises that in theory and sometimes those in practise healthcare professionals can object to.
So the most obvious example is the domain practise the domain,
the stereotypical case of coaching objections because of a doctor or a healthcare provider more generally that doesn't want to take part in abortions.
Now, abortion is obviously obviously a very controversial if.
A controversial issue. It is widely debated.
There is a lot of disagreement about the morality of abortion,
but if I am morally opposed to abortion, either or second grounds or on religious grounds,
and if I'm required by my job contract to perform an abortion, death to me is equivalent to being asked to perform to murder someone.
So if for me, abortion is this morally equivalent as murder, asking me require me to perform an abortion would be a requirement to violate.
So seriously, by that my moral integrity and to the extent that we value moral integrity, that signs that I should not be required to do that,
at least for those practises that can be reasonably be thought to be ethically problematic.
An abortion or euthanasia, for example, where it is legal is one of those things.
So you would not ask anyone to murder someone.
And in the same way, you should not ask a conscientious objector or someone else from the moral position
or a religious opposition to abortion or euthanasia to perform these activities,
which to these people are equivalent moral equivalent to murder.
Now, of course, people who argue against conscientious objection do sometimes make his argument about sort of slippery slope argument.
So the idea is that if you allow conscientious objection because of abortion or euthanasia or some other controversial part,
maybe IVF, then any doctor can object to any health care provider.
Just so we're not talking just about doctors and looking health care professionals more generally, nurses, for example.
So any any health care professional can object to literally anything. So what what is the limit?
For example, the Muslim doctors can object to medically inspected people of the opposite sex, which have been.
So where do we stop? So what was the principle?
But typically does working in favour of conscientious objection.
Like me. So they did.
They wanted to set some boundaries. Is so if you think something like abortion.
So abortion is not the same as giving the vaccines or antibiotics or abortions with a peculiar practise.
So there is a lot of reasonable disagreement about abortion. And in these not so obvious that abortion is or should be part of healthcare.
So whether abortion is health care is quite a controversial topic and is one of those things where there is a reasonable disagreement.
To many people, abortion is not properly health care and therefore it shouldn't be part of the requirements of health care professionals.
So abortion. The reason is, for example,
that some of my think that quite plausibly that the pregnancy is not a disease and therefore a health care provider is not under any at
least ethical obligation or probably also professional obligation to to provide abortions because there is no disease to be treated.
So that's you. And indeed, that may be the reason why many medical codes of many medical associations worldwide do have conscious closes.
So do allow conscientious objection. So I will say that wherever there is some reasonable disagreement, for example, because of abortion,
then a conscientious objection should be allowed because it makes sense to be against the idea that abortions,
healthcare, for example, the same for euthanasia, for example.
So we don't need to commit to that yet if anyone can object to anything just because we allow conscientious objection to abortion.
Now, there is another issue about conscientious objection to referring patients.
So this is something David mentioned as well. So one might say that, OK.
If you allow you to object to conscientious objection to providing a certain service,
at least you need to make sure that your patient does receive the service that they are entitled to receive.
And that implies, at the very least, that you should, first of all,
inform the patient that whatever they might need to require is an option available to them.
And secondly, facilitate access to the service by referring patients to, for example, one of your colleagues that you know is available to provide it.
But again, that depends a lot on how any single health care provider conceives of the idea of complicit in the wrongdoing.
If someone is a committed Roman Catholic, for example,
then a referral for an abortion clinic is morally equivalent to doing it to performing the abortion itself.
So this will be a form of cooperation in the wrongdoing that according to the.
Doctrine is imperviousness, what the country will call material cooperation.
In doing so, it's not acceptable because it is the same thing as if someone comes to you and ask you to murder someone and you say,
no, sorry, I can do that.
But he just said, but let me let me tell you, it is this guy down the road who you can go there and ask this guy and he would perform.
He would murder this person for you. So that would be seriously, ethically wrong for me.
So in the same way as I should be free not to perform an abortion because of my moral integrity,
because my freedom of conscience in the same way, I shouldn't be required to refer someone for what it take to be murder.
And after all. So, as David said, we do have conscious clauses in other areas and these are normally they can not to be problematic.
So the most obvious example is the military conscription. So in the case of military service, it's typically been the case.
Pacifists or more in general or those who have some strong moral push up to war.
They were exempted from doing something precisely because of freedom of conscience, for the peace of principle.
Freedom of conscience is considered so important that people were allowed not to go to war,
for example, even when that was on otherwise and legal requirements in their country.
So in the same way as someone can opt out from doing something that they consider
morally wrong indicates that military service in the same way that it should be.
So the same principle should be applied to health care provision because it's killing someone in war.
For some people is as morally wrong as killing someone, for example, a foetus in a HEATHCOCK context.
So there is no more difference. From the point of view, one is subjective morality.
We can also think about other cases in history where.
We now see that it was a good thing that we allowed or not that to be allowed,
but that there were people who did conscientious objector certain practises.
So the most obvious example is the case of the Nazi medical practises and medical experiments.
So now we know now we see that what a Nazi did in most cases when they carried out medical experiments was seriously,
seriously morally wrong because these experiments were performed without the consent of participants.
They were very harmful. They were clearly unethical by contemporary ethical standards.
And back in those days, there were people who were deemed conscientious objector.
These practises, some doctors refused to take part in these experiments precisely because they were unethical.
So it was a good thing that people were allowed sorry that people did conscientiously object.
Whether or not they were allowed. That's not true. The point here, the point is that in the same way, if we think of certain practises today,
like, for example, abortion or other things dying, you have that context, which is funny.
It's good that there are some people who continue to object because these are a sort of
reminder like of being a bit humble when we make our judgements about healthcare procedures,
because after all, we might be wrong about the ethics of abortion. We might be wrong about the ethics of euthanasia.
When I say ethics, I mean what is encoded in current guidelines. So maybe maybe it is true that abortion is ethically wrong and maybe it is true.
It is a good thing that these these days are people who do conscientious objector,
because that reminds us that, you know, we make mistakes in our ethical assessments made.
Maybe the current medicine is not as bad as Nazi menacing, but is at least seriously, ethically flawed and conscientious objection.
So our right to conscientious objection is a constant reminder that we should
always be careful and always examine the ethics of current health care procedures.
I think I ran out of time, so. That's right.
That was fifteen minutes, I suppose. Where do you think that it was found?
Well, I. Obviously, I find myself agreeing with large parts of it, despite myself.
But I think some things were a bit quick.
And I just pick you up on. At the end. That I think it is.
I think it is an important point.
The people who objected to the Nazi medicine and we think of the twin experiments with in Auschwitz and so on Mengele.
But but more so really the euthanasia of of disabled people, young people with cognitive impairments,
large scale euthanasia practised very, very corrupting, very harmful.
Alas, few people did object. Most people went along with it.
But some people did object. But they didn't object because they had a right to conscientious objection which was enshrined.
And they would not have wanted and I would not want a law.
It says, yes, let's have large scale killing off of of children with intellectual disabilities.
But you get a conscience clause with it.
So the the the Nazis had neither of those things.
They didn't have the conscience clause and they did have the bad medicine. So I agree that.
Trouble some people, people who refuse, people who follow their conscience are sometimes useful,
but I think sadly, if you do, then follow your conscience and sometimes you will have to pay a price for that.
What I don't think is realistic is the notion that you can have an exemption in advance
so you don't have to pay a price so you can be exempt from doing these things.
So I say, well, I won't do it. I'll just have my my my exemption. Thank you.
And the rest of the practise will still carry on unaffected.
And this is a problem I have with the way in which country conscientious objection seems to be set up as a sort of compromise.
The practise itself, the objectionable practise, is untouched.
I must carry on exactly as before. The person who objects is supposed to be completely protected.
And I think that neither of those things are quite realistic. If I object, it will have effects on other people.
And if I object, I will probably have to pay a price for it. But I still say maybe I should object sometimes.
Maybe I should refuse sometimes. But not because there is a bright start to the practise of conscientious objection.
Now, because that we have a general, conscientious objection practise.
But because this is this is all all I can do if I mean, if I worked in a supermarket I might object to to selling cigarettes on the basis of health.
Maybe they would accommodate this this maybe they wouldn't accommodate this if they didn't accommodate it
might be a price that I might have to pay and I might accept that as part of the value of of what I did.
As a matter of state and the traditional view. So I think that we should celebrate the martyrs.
And I think that we should. Do something.
I think that the compromise that we have with the the practise of conscientious objection
has a neat as a neat compromise where the the objective doesn't have to pay a price.
And the and the and the practise can go ahead untouched. I think that that's unrealistic as as a as an idea, as an ideal.
And it tends to satisfy neither. I know. So that's my problem with with conscientious objection.
No, they you shouldn't sometimes object.
Another some practises might be wrong because the the institution can get things wrong and thus the law can get things wrong.
Certainly. But the idea that the law could get things so wrong but still get it right that I can have my my little objection.
You know, that's that's that's the thing that I find difficult.
The notion of the neat, conscientious objection as as as it gets out of jail free card.
But one which doesn't really touch the practise of the objectionable practise in medicine.
Bitsie. OK. So just two quick reply on these.
So you. I think so. We we we are moving up to different level this point,
because you pick up at the last point of my argument and this was about so the nice example, the Nazi example.
So now you're talking about the level of the low.
So whether or not there should be a right to continually object.
I was in so that that's one level.
And I brought some reason for why there should be such a right and based on freedom of conscience and protection of more integrity.
Now, that example was meant to address a different point that that yes.
That sometimes conscientious objectors.
I'm actually doing the right thing, are doing a good thing, which is something that people opposed to conscientious objection often denied.
So some is someone people who are opposed to conscientious objection often would think that a doctor who
refuses to provide an abortion is doing something wrong because the doctor is denying a woman a right.
And my point was meant to to counter the arguments that.
Yes, that maybe doctors or health care providers who conscientious object are actually doing something good.
So this is a different letter. So it's not about whether this is right or wrong to allow conscientious objection.
It's about whether conscientious objectors might have thought I would be doing something that is the right thing to do.
Enough already. If you think about the nice example you can make at some point,
because he mentioned that so the Nazi were carrying out the experiments and experiments.
But imagine that there was like a clause in the in the law back then allowing people to opt out from like see doctors to opt out of these practises.
What would have happened is that probably. So if there did actually if there had been such freedom and if there'd been a real freedom,
then probably most doctors would have opted out with the result that these unethical practises, it will never had happened.
It may be the same would happen now with abortion.
If abortion is actually unethical, maybe it'd be good if people like healthcare providers are actually free not to do that,
because that would likely change things,
which is something that couldn't happen in the case of the Nazi experiments because there wasn't a conscientious objection.
But if there had been a conscientious objection to that big event, then maybe most of the atrocities that we noted Nazi did wouldn't have happened.
Yeah, I think this was. Now.
I think lease. Are you there or Mike?
I am. Yes. How do we want to proceed with this?
Well, we've actually got three questions come in already. They're quite lengthy ones.
Would you be willing to take questions now? Yeah, I think so, yeah, yeah.
I'm happy to charities Q&A thing. All right.
I'm happy to charity's Q&A. I will do my best. Yes. Okay.
So the first question has come in from Valaria and is directed to David.
And she says, again, this is quite a lengthy question. So bear with me.
As I read said in the debate, we mainly covered points concerning ethics and choice.
However, from a pragmatic point of view, when conscientious objection creates such to the likes of citizens, how can we proceed?
To better explain my question in Latin, the region in which room is located.
There are only four hospitals that choose to perform abortion, but of this, four in only one.
The reduction is not objecting to be precise one doctor.
This endangers the life of women in the region, especially those from less fortunate backgrounds.
How can we ensure that if the Italian law permits abortion, this practise is provided to all and in a safe way.
Thank you. Well, thank you.
Well. I'm here to argue against conscientious objection.
And that's not a strong argument against conscientious objection that if you have enough people object,
then you don't have the provision of the service. So if the country as a whole has thought that this is a good service to be provided,
then then there is a real problem about how you do that at the same time as as allowing conscientious objection,
particularly if there's no no sense of cost with regard to conscientious objection.
So I. I think yes, precisely.
If you object to abortion, then it is it seems to me to be clearer that you just have a far more restrictive
kind of abortion law as Ireland just have prior to about two years ago.
And under that baby, you didn't have a conscientious objection law.
You had you had a law which was directed in regards to the to the to the to the issue of abortion.
If you if you have conscientious objection, which is in practise becoming a sort of a restriction on abortion,
what you have is something which is very random and uneven. And it might be the one doctor does does lots of lots of abortions,
which are which are people who jetro Bushin would think or particularly bad and other doctors.
They they don't allow any kind of abortion at all, even in cases of of of danger to the mother's life cases,
which would have been acceptable in probably would be acceptable in law.
So I think that is a problem with conscientious objection if it if it gets to the level of of interrupting the provision of a practise.
So get cast on something about what I think. A defender of conscientious objection wouldn't apply, would lesser.
So how the defender, of course, objection would answer his question.
So assuming that I'm still doing the parts, I completely agree with the point of the question, assuming it has to be in that park.
So the main argument is that. Will be that the right of women to access abortion?
So there is not there is no corresponding duty by an individual to provide the service.
So sometimes there are rights that people have. But there is no corresponding duty.
So in the case of Eataly, for example, the fact that the women have a right to abortion simply means that abortion is legal.
So it's an option is not criminalised. But that doesn't mean that someone has the corresponding duty to provide service.
If someone is available to provide it, that's good. And so then that's fine.
But we shouldn't assume that individual health care providers have a right ever.
So you have a duty to provide the service. So this is what a defender of conscientious objection would say is not what they would say.
What is what? They're good. Can we have another question?
Yeah.
I was just having a quick look through the questions, I think this one related to this, which is a question directed towards LBJ and the attendees,
says, I believe that abortion is part of health care because prevention of disease or health promotion is considered to be part of a doctor's work.
And abortion by medical professionals can prevent some grave health related consequences,
which may happen if abortion is conducted by non medical professionals or if the women continues the pregnancy.
Is there anything else that you could explain more regarding excluding abortion from health care?
Is that any other example other than abortion that you consider is not part of health care, even though it's in the current society?
Yeah. So I think the problem is so there's a question about what is health care and maybe related, what is a disease.
So one problem with this line of argument is that.
So if if if you if you consider something as part of health care,
simply because if there was no health care provider doing that thing, then things would be worse.
So I I think that this will be this will entail up to a broad understanding of health care,
because there are lots of things that would fall under this category if this is the criteria for inclusion into health care, for example.
We think so. Well, when this is a quite controversial sort of female genital sculpting, for example, is a part of Patika.
So many people would say no. But if someone said about the alternatives that people do these things or even circumcision for male.
So maybe we'll say, yeah. But if people do these things themselves, that will be worse.
So we might as well have a doctor doing that. And then what about torture or capital punishment?
So. Artistry is part of Africa. I would say no.
But you've got 30 is OK. We can talk to someone without some medical experts that knows when he too much more than that.
We've got him. I but this doesn't mean to have torture. He's the Afghan.
So the same would apply to abortion. So I'm afraid that could criterion sort of prove the matter with you.
Conveys a notion of how it's going to broad. So I wouldn't go down that path.
Kind of. Can I also say that I think that even if something is not health care is done by health care professionals, but it is not health care.
That doesn't mean to say that your conscience has more or less play.
I think I mean, if you just take capital punishment,
say a prison decided that they the the the they are going to have lethal injection capital punishment.
And it was going to be done by the doctor for the prison. And they made that part of the contract.
Then they then send somebody else might they might object and then they might cease to be you know,
they might lose their job as they as the as the prison chaplain.
But I think it would seem a little odd to me to say, well, we have let's have capital punishment.
But let's let's let's allow conscientious objection.
I mean, they might say, well,
we'll we'll find easier to get a prison doctor if we if we allow a little latitude here and we get somebody else in to do it.
But it seems to me if it as a matter of contract, we'll say I have a company that does that.
That isn't about the beauty products. And there are some they've done some cosmetic surgery.
And so there are some some doctors who do cosmetic surgery. And then you have to have someone who objects to a particular kind of cosmetic surgery.
They object to lightening the skin or they object to changing the shape of the eyes to make them look more European.
So they say, oh, I won't do that. I'm well, I might accept that or might not accept that.
But it it seems to me that's the that then the argument between the employer and the person who as as a surgeon does these things,
it doesn't is not obvious to me that this is is helped by having a category of conscientious objection, which is a which is a sort of legal category.
So so I can't sack the surgeon if the surgeon doesn't want to do it, even if that's actually what a lot of the business entails.
And the fact that the fact that that it's health care or not doesn't seem to me to be to be a factor here.
What's a factor is just to need somebody to deliver a service so you can you require somebody to give a service.
Should people object? I think some people some sometimes should object. But sometimes if you object, you'll pay a price.
Thank you. I'm I'm sure there are some questions that are relevant to thoughts that come in, but there's quite a lot of questions.
I think we'll just continue to take them in order and hopefully we'll we'll get some order out of chaos.
David Battisti says that this is a question for both of you.
Thank you for your brilliant speeches and your opinions.
Does arguing edge conscientious objection mean being committed to a sort of moral objectivism or even a sort of moral realism?
What is the matter ethical assumption that stands behind this argument?
I don't think he would give us a better June two yet, so I.
So I think the hearing is is a bit complicated.
I think this will require some philosophical discussion with maybe is a bit too abstract for this kind of forum.
But so in short, I think. Yes. Sure.
Arguing against conscientious objection commits to some form of objectivism.
What I think is that arguing in favour of conscientious objection commits people to some form of moral relativism.
So. No, I not know, I speak neither. Neither does somebody favourable, I guess.
These are these are more like concentric points. So I think that, like endorsing conscientious objection,
chametz people to a certain form of moral relativism with regard to at least the principle of medical ethics, but more generally, actually.
Because the deal is that the position of those who say think of certain practises,
ethical or require some practise abortion and the position of those who are
against this practise or think this practise unethical are on equal footing.
So the idea behind conscientious objection is that we need to respect both in the same way.
So that's important for people who are in favour of conscientious objection.
So it's not that they try to undermine the provision of the service. That's not the point.
So the point is that it's really about my own moral integrity. So I want to keep my hands clean.
So I really I'm not interested in whether this person does or does not get an abortion or Tiffani's or whatever.
That's not my business. So I'm only interested in preserving my conscience. So my moral integrity.
So the view here is that my view about abortion, my ethical view against abortion,
should be given the same weight as the the view of the person who request abortion.
So they are on equal footing. So in this sense, yes, I think.
Defending conscientious objection commits people to a certain form of moral relativism, which I don't say is a good or a bad thing.
But. Conceptually, I think that's true. I think.
Well, you have an irony here that the traditions which are most strongly opposed to moral relativism, which are objectivist in terms of natural law.
Pro-life view about the status of the embryo and so on.
They they also have have bought in to conscientious objection as a way to preserve something when they can't get everything.
So whereas a people that whereas the the the advocates of of both abortion and assisted suicide,
which are which are laws where you've where you often have a statutory right for conscientious objection,
those days have often come out of a sort of liberalism.
And so people have said, well, you can't you can't define in advance what makes a good death or you can't say.
But whether this is a whether this is valuable or not, wrong or not.
So we should allow because of the pluralism, we should allow permissive laws on abortion, not which allow permissive laws on on assisted suicide.
And in theory, those would also go with moral pluralism for as a basis for conscientious objection.
So I think that you can have both.
You can both have Objectivists who want to have some conscientious objection and you can have pluralists sue one time,
some conscience action and you can have pluralists. You think that that's you.
Now, I've got myself confused, but I think that there are there were ways in which both think both both of those views can be can be accepted.
I think. All right.
Thank you, very Christian, for Roger Crisp. He says he thinks this is a question mainly for David.
What about a country in which everyone believes that there should be a legal
right to conscientious objection or one in which the majority believes this?
So. Well. The process of the probe, some of the problems I had with with a conscientious objection, a,
well, conscientious objection to what I would start with and and typically it's at least in law.
It's been conscientious objection, for example, to conscription. So you have conscription, but you have conscientious objection.
But you still have conscription and you still march off people to war with very little protection in terms of voluntariness.
You don't have a voluntary army. You have a conscripted army, but you have some little exception.
So the problem with conscientious objection, I think as a as a model, people might have it.
But ironically, it might be a more heavy handed kind of society than one where you had genuine voluntariness.
I mean, that's that's more that's most obviously the case with war.
But that might also be the case in other areas of of of health care and and in regards to things like abortion and and and assisted suicide.
I would say, well, what is the function of these of these conscientious objection laws and conscientious objection of elements within the law?
Clearly, laws have passed the Bush, not 67, the California End of Life Options Act of of 2016.
Laws have passed, which involve conscientious objection. And so there has been majority support for particular laws with conscientious objection.
I just worry about the the effect of those laws that they might both be laws that allow things that I think I would prefer to restrict doesn't allow,
and that they are more heavy handed than than than genuine voluntariness.
And in areas of society. So I think that the notion of conscientious objection might be problematic, even if it were popular.
Think about it. You want to comment on that at all or. No, I think it's the right question from running.
Guilin might keep Earth to see the issue of killing.
I think it is. And the contentious issue of the moral status of the foetus.
Does disagreement about that entail Morello's relevant relative?
Take it away. So I should go first.
So I don't think this agreement entails more activism.
What I think is that so? Because if you have disagreement, you might be the case.
Someone is right and someone is wrong. He's not that person. Disagreement is a sign of anything.
Otherwise, monotheism would be true because we all disagree about lots of things.
The point is that. But is it what you decide to do with this agreement, with these agreement?
That's my point to some form of moral relativism. For example, in this case.
So the idea that we decided, since we have a disagreement,
then we want to allow conscientious objection and therefore give all the positions, say equal weight.
So we should respond if you ask those who object. We should respond in view of those who think abortion is fine.
So pluralism itself, again, doesn't doesn't mean that relativism, but.
Again, pluralism would require people to.
Seemed to make some. It's not because we endorse pluralism, then we in the name of pluralism, we allow everything.
We still need to decide what falls within the realm of what some might call a reasonable pluralism and what force outside.
But that means that once we are within the reach of reasonable pluralism, then everything within this sphere is should be respecting the same way.
And that aspect of pluralism, of reasonable pluralism, at least to me, and take some form of ethical relativism.
In terms, for example, if you ask. So how should we treat or dispositions?
And if the answer is I think we should, they should all be on equal footing. We should respect them all.
We need a contest with pluralism that entails some form of political space, not disagreement.
Percent is the way we treat these agreement when we put all these policemen on equal footing.
That points to some form of relativism, as I see it. I think that the I think I agree with with Alberto that that it isn't about the fact
of disagreement and there is disagreement and disagreement doesn't imply pluralism.
It doesn't imply relativism. I think we were both agreed about that.
But the question is what you do with disagreement and how you manage disagreements.
Even disagreement within the realm of the of the reasonable. And I think where.
Where? Where large bodies within society, communities within society have fundamental disagreements about moral issues,
then that does that does create a problem for harmony within society.
And it does create a problem for how we live, live together and how what we deliver it is particularly problematic because of health care.
Now, if we have a national health care system or a largely insurance based health care system,
which is very systematic, it is there's a question about what you provide or don't provide.
Where are your defaults? So I think that we have to find ways within society of managing the fact of disagreement at the same
time as trying to commit ourselves to coming to correct views which will protect the vulnerable people.
I'm just not convinced. At least I'm here presenting in regards conscientious objection how useful this particular mechanism is.
So conscientious objection is really wrong. Very narrow mechanism for dealing with some kinds of disagreement.
It doesn't deal with it. There's a whole range of disagreements. It doesn't deal with.
And and it's just really about and it's not also clear what it means in terms of what what is what does it mean to be permitted?
Does it mean that you necessarily keep your job? Does it mean that you you can you can take a job which you normally would have a lot of
this practise that it's not it's not clear what was implied by conscientious objection.
So I think that you can have questions about the usefulness of conscientious objection
as a way to deal with disagreement at the same time as acknowledging disagreement.
And at the same time as saying that disagreement doesn't mean necessarily relativism.
I think Kerry has a good question to follow on from that. And they say when when do you say that an objection is conscientious when your
objections in health care a matter of preference rather than of conscience?
For either of you, I think you want to go first, David,
because of my objections are conscientious and you also might as a preference when in the end there is a difficulty of I mean,
there are procedural rules that you can you can say, well, this is procedural.
But I think there is a question about.
If people don't want to do something when they say, well, this is the kind of this person doesn't want to do something good,
which I'm going to give a very high status to and respect,
and this is a an example of the person not wanting to do something that I'm not going to respect and I'm going to to penalise them in some ways.
And the distinction between the two doesn't seem to me obvious at all.
But pop some of those I can.
So let us think what what the defender of conscientious objector was like me will say is that clearly in practise is difficult to distinguish.
What is conscientious objection, what is just objection based on mere preference or convenience.
For example, abortion is not a very pleasant procedure. So what?
What we are sure to have and that doctor objects based on conscience rather,
and based on convenience, that they just don't want to perform these things. That's true.
But one might say that there are certain things that we can reasonably presume are a matter of conscience.
For example, abortion for Catholic health care providers. That's what it has to be, a matter of conscience.
Because what we know that abortion is considered a grave mortal sin by the Catholic Church.
When I see someone objects, for example, to vaccination, say that if a doctor objects to vaccination, then we have more reasons to doubt.
It is really a conscientious objection because as much as one can be opposed to vaccines for all sorts of reasons,
it's very unlikely that is a matter of conscience in the same way as it is because of abortion or euthanasia or contraception or IVF or.
Well, there are borderline Catholic animal experimentation, for example, maybe difficult to tell,
but there are some clear case in which you can be rightly sure that something needs to be a matter of conscience.
Although I agree that the concept of conscience is quite tricky.
We have a question in from Emma for the person speaking for conscientious objection in relation to conscientious objection in medicine.
You said the doctors should be able to object only to topics which are seen as polemical,
such as abortion by many people, so that doctors did not start objecting to everything.
But in that case, it seems to me the right to conscientious objection on an individual level will not be fulfilled because
every individual choice or objection should be dependent on or determined by the social general choice.
How is this an individual conscious objection? So.
I think. Someone in federal court objection would probably not agree with the last part of the quote.
That's part of the point, because they wouldn't we wouldn't say that social norms or social expectations should
not set boundaries to just conscience because no one is really arguing for a limited,
conscientious objection. And the idea is that since we live in a society where we need to make compromises all the time,
then even the right to conscientious objection is limited by, for example, some basic social norms of social expectations.
The point is that these boundaries are not dictated but by what is legal or not.
So to what people have a right to receive or not.
But it's always the case that every right we have, even if we believe in an right conscientious objection, even you think the country is important.
You would never be an absolute right there, because, for example, my conscience can tell me to go and.
No kidding, my annoying neighbour, but not doing that, so I'm joking.
Look, I'm not doing that because rightly so, society and the law prevents me from doing that.
So even the most strenuous defender of conscientious objection would never say to the right questions or objections and absence.
Right. And it makes sense that our social expectations, the limit. These are right.
Process of the question. David, do you want to comment at all or should we move on to.
I think we can move on, right. We have a question for Peter.
I suspect this might start quite a debate now that both of you have argued for and against this issue.
And I mean, you as individuals have defended both positions in separate forums on different days.
What could a compromise between the two positions look like? Do you see any avenue for negotiation or a practical way forward?
So this might be a good moment to like that, because the question is, is it good bridge, too?
Yeah, let's try. Do you agree with that? OK. You want to go first?
OK, so I will now. We will now switch hats and I will define conscientious objection.
I think. I don't know in advance.
This is this is, in a way, the second attempt with with with Alberto.
I have I have a discussion of a different kind.
The first time we tried to have a discussion where we agreed about what we disagreed about, which, believe it or not, is really difficult,
is really difficult to have a I have honest agreement where you have properly cat characterised the the the opposite view and then say,
can we can we define what we disagree about? And I think probably we have to go back to that.
I think that's that's one thing that I'll go to said right at the end.
Nobody's defending an absolute right to conscientious objection. I think I would agree with that.
So. So then the question is, if we think of other kinds of liberties and inclusive city, what's what might what might other concepts add to this?
Because I do think I mean and this is what I partly agree with the opposite view.
I'm arguing against. I do think conscientious objection at best is a very limited thing and is something which is often misunderstood
so that we may make more progress with conscientious objection if we add it to questions like academic freedom.
Freedom of association, tolerance in society and other kinds of of liberties.
And then see how it might fit. But but it's some work that has hardly started in terms of work in progress out of that.
Yes, sir. Yeah. With regard to compromise. That's interesting because.
Conscientious objection is itself already a compromise script.
Was it a significant compromise?
And so the question now is how we compromise between what there really is a compromise and something something else now?
No, I don't think that we need to compromise, Father.
But. I if I can if I may like to rephrase the question.
So what level should we have this discussion? And I think there is already.
Enough room for discussing about the ethics of certain hafter procedure because, well, fortunately,
we are still living in a society where various, as David said, freedom of speech, academic freedom.
Now, it is true that we are going in the wrong direction with respect.
So but there is still enough room for debating about, for example, whether abortion should or should not be part of the medical profession.
I think we should have this kind of discussion which that discussion about what we say about euthanasia.
Well, anything is controversial, and that's the place where this kind of disagreement should come up.
I think I'm open to arguing with people who think abortion should not be part of the health care profession, which I need to wait.
And I think we should have the debate at that level. And that is you can have as much as I deem it as you want to declare it.
The point is that once we decide, rightly or wrongly, that something is a legitimate part of the profession,
then when it comes to dealing with patients who need a certain service, that's not the place to bring up ethical issues.
You can you can campaign against abortion. You can. You can have a debate about changing the medical codes, about abortion.
And that's fine. But the point is that if we bring the disagreement down to the level of the bedside.
So when we are actually in front of a patient or when or when we need to fulfil some responsibility of the healthcare system that we work for,
then I think necessary is not the place for disagreement. So.
I'm happy to have.
I'm happy to compromise, but not at the level of Krasker that even had to compromise on the level of setting up guidelines for the profession.
Because healthcare professionals are monopoly provider or whatever service we think healthcare professionals should provide is not a fight.
If a woman cannot have abortion from the healthcare providers, they can go somewhere else.
So they have a monopoly and therefore it responsible to point that, certainly.
So I think we ought to be clear about where we are going to have this disagreement at which level?
Well, I think the last point is very interesting because there is the question of whether.
Whether there is a problem here is the notion of a monopoly. Because if you had if you had areas of healthcare, forms of delivery of healthcare,
which were informed by different subcultures and communities, then you could have,
as you do in the United States, but not in this country,
then you might have hospitals where you didn't have abortion and hospitals where you did have abortion.
For example. And and you have you can have an ethos and a culture within.
But that's only possible if you don't have a single monopoly. There is a there is one provider, which is the state.
And everybody who works for the state does the same thing. And everybody who signs up for it has to do it in the same way.
I think that might be a bit problematic.
I mean, I'd say with abortion, even in this country, most abortion is paid for by the NHS, but not delivered through the NHS.
So you do you don't you actually don't have intent to provide who's doing the providing you have.
So it's like a private provision. And then you have people from outside and paid for by the state.
So you do actually have a variety and a number iji could be cultivated to be different.
And that would allow people to practise within. And also to seek out ways of delivering service, which were more in context with it,
in the context of a of an understanding of health care that they had.
We've had a few comments coming in saying that individuals haven't necessarily found that helpful to have you swap perspectives.
Presumably there are people here who know your views and in general, we don't think be able to say, where do you find the experience helpful?
Go settles in articulating your arguments. So it's so dear to me that was swapping back wasn't helpful or swapping until now wasn't helpful.
I think something until now wasn't OK. Well, well, perhaps if we now we have started to swap back, if we saw.
If we comment on that, then then there might be more illuminating.
I mean, I think that fun for me, it for me, it has been helpful.
And I think that perhaps in terms of the timing of where we are, that's that's that's probably good for me.
It's been helpful to think in terms of if I am in favour of conscientious objection,
which I am, I need to think of examples where the person who is objecting is wrong.
And so I'm defending a right of somebody who is who is in error. I observe kind of liberty.
What tends to happen is people in favour of conscientious objection.
Take examples where they agree with the objector and people who are against conscientious objection.
Take examples where they they they disagree with the objector.
And that's not helpful because of conscientious objection is essentially a procedural thing.
And so it's good to test it with examples where you don't agree.
And so I think that I've found useful and I do accept and I think it is useful for people who are
in favour of conscientious objection to think what are the limits of conscientious objection.
And if you're going to defend it, how can you defend it if you don't defend it as an absolute.
And how can you defend it if you don't defend it on the basis of of of of relativism,
all those still ways to defend conscientious objection as a as a a principled compromise for certain purposes.
And that's that's what I got. I mean, I think.
I'm sure sometimes Alberto was frustrated with my presentation of all of the views against,
I was sometimes frustrated with his presentation of oh oh what somebody would say.
And though I sometimes agree with him, sometimes I disagreed with him.
And in particular on this objectivity thing, I, I, I'm a strong objectivists.
I think that some people if we disagree about an issue, then either.
Either I'm right and you're wrong or you're right and I'm wrong. We're both wrong. Or or at the babies least are wrong about each other.
We've misunderstood each other. So I don't think that's necessary.
I'm glad to have found useful in trying to argue for the opposite case.
But oh, I'll leave. Yeah.
I'm on the same page with that. About that. So I mean, so the main thing is that needs to before this debate about the need for most debates.
But I think as far as I know. So. The most common.
Theme they see people doing is like arguing against the strawman.
So that's something that. Well, law, although we all know that we shouldn't do that.
But it is surprisingly difficult to avoid building up the strawman and arguing against it when you argue against a certain view.
And I mean, when I'm on it, I'm also guilty of doing that, although I know that's not really good academic practise,
but I'm surprise sometimes to see how much most traumatic the kind of practise it is widespread in academic debate.
So the point of doing this thing is trying to. Like, avoid this strategy.
So I generally wanted to convince and I didn't, I just want to make the strongest case against me,
if you will, because that's really a way of avoiding building a strawman.
And it's interesting that David said that it wasn't often always happy with the way I reported view, and it was the same for me.
Sometimes I think he's sort of misconstrue my my actual position and not not not intentionally.
So I didn't do it intentionally. And I'm sure he didn't do it intentionally.
It's just that we have in our mind a clear idea of the things we got against do.
And the way we built up this idea is you such that we know you make it as easy as possible for us to take or to dismiss these opposite views.
And I think that this exercise is very useful.
I would be happy to do it with regard to other topics, say abortion, abortion itself from is objectionable because that's there to see.
Really an interesting thing for them. There are good arguments against abortion.
I think there are. I don't think they're good enough, but I think they're good as it's worth exploring.
And I'd be interested to the same theme because we need to avoid engaging in this kind of strawman strategy with each other.
I think it might have been helpful had we said at the beginning, and this is retrospect or perhaps get people to think about it,
to have invited people when they asked questions also to do so from the opposite perspective.
That's what we had tried to get people to think about.
So even if they didn't, even if you had questions on you, the questions were very much in terms of of a view you disagree with.
And what's wrong with that view? I think it's useful to think in terms of what you heard and say, well,
if I held the opposite view, if I held the opposite view, what kind of questions?
What I want to ask to push the speaker. What what kind of questions would I.
Well, from the opposite perspective, but I'd like to push on. That's what would have been good to do.
Yeah. I think that the format is challenged as a little bit because obviously we had wanted to do this face to
face and we had the idea of you having the hat so people could keep track of the arguments a bit more.
So perhaps if we d do this again, perhaps in person, we might think about how we can get that audience swapping going on as well.
Just following on from that,
Ronan is commenting that some they use a technique of arguing against one's own position as part of their annual course of medical ethics.
And he would like to know whether either if you've learnt anything from this exercise, I know you face it.
It's been challenging and good to to construct your own arguments against dodgems positions.
Have you actually learnt anything about the alternative? Standpoint, does it work?
So as far as I'm concerned, yes. So the main thing is that.
I think what I learnt is that. Probably the main point of disagreement in this debate, in this debate is about.
So the nature of health care about what is what is not part of health care, because it seems to me that all the problems turn on to that issue.
Because. If if we agree that. See, abortion is part of health care then.
That's a strong reason for against that. I guess conscientious objection.
But if we agree that abortion is not part of health care, maybe the case for quotients objection is weaker, but it probably is.
What criteria do we. Should we adopt to decide whether something is or is not the of care?
So if this is something I learnt says like trying to build up the argument against my position, I think.
It showed me that this may be the most difficult point to address if they want to make the strongest possible against Christians.
We I need to make an argument about why abortion is part of health, should be part of healthcare.
I think I've. I've come to think of conscientious objection as a.
As an institution or as as a practise, as something which needs to be clarified or or interrogated and.
And I think it's a classic case of people using it as a proxy for other things.
So people use it as a proxy for the. So if you're against abortion, then you're in favour of conscientious objection to abortion.
And it's just a proxy for being against abortion. So it's not about conscience objection itself.
It's a proxy for another kind of argument. And and I've I think I've come more to think and to think.
I need to think more about what is the role for conscientious objection alongside other ways of dealing with disagreement.
Reasonably. And and when it might not actually be.
When it when it might not actually be a very useful category. And I'm I think.
Some of this some of this relates to the difference between the question, should you follow your conscience and.
Should you expect anybody's help when you follow your conscience? First, I gave above no difficulty with the second.
I can see if people disagree with you about. About the results, then.
Then you sometimes should do the the difficult thing. But you shouldn't necessarily expect people to try to agree with you.
And and I've become more suspicious of purely procedural ways of dealing with disagreement without looking at what we're disagreeing about.
He Johan, is just continuing that thought.
He says thank you for this wonderful discussion on the topic of different levels of compromise.
What do you think of a solution where society grants health care workers the freedom to requestor viral,
but without a guarantee that their crest will be granted, assuming that some requests are granted and some are not?
Is this truly a compromise or is the protection of conscience so weak that it can no longer be called a right to conscientious objection?
The right to referral is a really knotty one. And I think it is because without some kind of rights referral, I'm not sure.
Oh, right. Not to refer. Then there's a real problem. Conscience objection.
But but I'm not sure how you. Deliver an equal service, but not in that in terms of what people are, what people wish, wish to be provided.
I think it's reasonable to be provided how you do that at the same time as as not having referral.
But I would also the person thinks of examples where they wouldn't want to refer things,
have examples of things they objected, say, say, for example, therapy.
Therapy to change your sexual orientation. OK. So therapy is a psychotherapy aimed at changing unwanted same sex attraction.
So you have somebody who says, well, this is just about freedom. You have this out there.
It's it's a free market. There are these people. I go to a psychotherapist and I say, if you don't give this to me,
can you point me in the direction of someone who will give psychotherapy for same sex attraction?
And if you think that this this kind of therapy is likely to be harmful, then for that reason you won't want to provide it.
You won't want to refer to it, even if it's legal. You might want also to be campaigning in the meantime for it not to be legal.
But while it is legal, you might not want to provide it, but it is a it's a real practical difficulty just to know how to protect your rights,
not to refer at the same time as having other people provide where we as a society have thought those things ought to be allowed to be provided.
I don't think I do that because that's a bit of a problem of consistency.
If you feel if you allow conscientious objection to certain practises, then you need to apply the same criteria to referral.
Because to some people. So if you're soon a conscious matters that much.
So some people are referring literally as bad as doing the actual thing.
So, yeah. So if you play one criteria for conscientious objection to performing things, you need to practise.
Same for Koshetz, which I can refer. I'm not. To me, these are inactive. To me, this means that we should have local church object in the first place.
I suppose we're going to wait. So if I can give a count.
I agree with that. But I give a counter and that's when you have professional disagreement.
So if the disagreement is not about conscience,
but it's about I don't think I don't think that that this kind of procedure is useful for for this for this disease.
Does it does a professional disagreement about that? There are some people who think this is the next thing.
I read the evidence. I don't think it's the next thing.
What happens is you can say, I don't want I will not refer you for this because I don't think it will be good for you.
But you have the right to seek a second opinion. But I'm not going to tell you who out that I disagree with because I disagree with them.
So I don't have a duty to find someone who has some crackpot idea that I disagree with.
Well, I have a duty to do is say this is what I think.
You have a right to another opinion if you disagree with me. But I don't have the right to to.
I don't have a duty to refer to someone who I know has a different view.
I could point you in the direction of how you find a second opinion.
But. But not specifically. Thank you.
I think I have a duty to point. We're very, very close to the end of this this meeting.
Say, I simply thank you very much to everyone who's joined us and to you, David.
And our blessings are so incredible. So it's an amazing way of handling each other's others perspectives.
I'm conscious that we haven't managed to get through all the questions. I do apologise for that.
But it sounds like we've got quite a list of material to have another debate again in the future.
Say we we'll keep everyone posted on that.