1 00:00:00,120 --> 00:00:14,310 Okay. It's a great pleasure to introduce Commodore retired professor of newly created Steam Journey who was has been a Hudson fellow here at Oxford, 2 00:00:14,350 --> 00:00:18,210 has been associated with the Family Carriage War program as a visiting fellow. 3 00:00:19,200 --> 00:00:24,839 And crucially in that time while he was doing those things, 4 00:00:24,840 --> 00:00:35,850 was working on this strategy for action now available a snippet of 999 and to be read by all of course 5 00:00:35,850 --> 00:00:43,200 is around that that he will be speaking his career in the Royal Navy as well as including a number of, 6 00:00:43,200 --> 00:00:50,400 of course, of what he fought at sea, including responsibilities in the directorate, of course, the planning. 7 00:00:51,240 --> 00:00:59,879 He was principal staff officer, the chief of Defence Staff. He deployed as well as the number of operational deployments before Afghanistan. 8 00:00:59,880 --> 00:01:04,890 He went as the strategy director of the British Embassy in Kabul about which he has spoken. 9 00:01:05,010 --> 00:01:11,520 Most interestingly, I have to say to this group before in terms of of the counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan, 10 00:01:12,630 --> 00:01:17,040 and he has also been involved in the staff of the royal court. 11 00:01:18,570 --> 00:01:21,610 And the professorship is at the University of Plymouth. Great. 12 00:01:22,590 --> 00:01:27,550 And your title to see the strategy for his strategy of this under the title of him. 13 00:01:28,500 --> 00:01:33,030 Thank you. I'm going to talk about the subjects of strategy today. 14 00:01:33,030 --> 00:01:36,870 But actually, if I'm really talking about some things, not strategy, but strategy making, 15 00:01:37,290 --> 00:01:43,019 and I think it's an important distinction I want to sort of journey and it sort of started with the Falklands War, 16 00:01:43,020 --> 00:01:50,060 I suppose, and being deployed to the Falklands War went through operational roles versus operational deployments. 17 00:01:51,240 --> 00:01:58,649 Then we sort of arrived in about 2005 and I can remember sitting in St Anthony's with you and talking about strategy and what I foresaw. 18 00:01:58,650 --> 00:02:04,380 All I felt was intuitively a lack of a capacity to make strategy properly in this country. 19 00:02:05,430 --> 00:02:08,610 I went on after that job or after those discussions. 20 00:02:08,610 --> 00:02:17,490 We kept talking, but I went on then to ask the chief of staff's principal staff officer deployed to Iraq and to Afghanistan, 21 00:02:17,910 --> 00:02:21,000 but really was right to the sort of central and some of the key decisions. 22 00:02:21,000 --> 00:02:24,809 I don't talk about these today. Afghanistan was fine. 23 00:02:24,810 --> 00:02:28,470 I was the only naval officer, senior Naval Observatory employee to deploy. 24 00:02:28,940 --> 00:02:33,450 And that had its moments. I think Cheryl Cooper is my talk to recently. 25 00:02:34,530 --> 00:02:35,069 He's a charmer. 26 00:02:35,070 --> 00:02:43,379 We didn't agree on everything, but actually because the Afghans got extremely confused by the idea of having a commodore in Afghanistan, 27 00:02:43,380 --> 00:02:47,160 he started calling brigadier general, which was great fun, 28 00:02:48,030 --> 00:02:53,400 though it did come a moment ago when I was in Herat deploying to Iraq to have a look at the overall camp in Herat, 29 00:02:53,550 --> 00:03:01,110 and sat down with the corps commander to seven corps through Afghanistan to a seven core Afghan army. 30 00:03:01,350 --> 00:03:09,179 And what I thought would be what I was a courtesy call immediately became clear to me that it was going to be something else, 31 00:03:09,180 --> 00:03:12,510 because he got his maps out and it was clear that we were going to start to talk about dispositions, 32 00:03:12,970 --> 00:03:18,150 because I'm a naval aviator and I'm conscious of the army officers and probably ex-army officers in the audience. 33 00:03:18,150 --> 00:03:23,790 So I suddenly faced with that decision, should I say something to him and explain that I'm actually a naval aviator? 34 00:03:23,790 --> 00:03:29,099 My job was to fly from carriers and to drive ships, or should I actually just get on with it? 35 00:03:29,100 --> 00:03:33,480 But I thought to myself and I'm looking at Rob, have thought to myself, How hard can this Army staff be? 36 00:03:35,310 --> 00:03:40,620 We sat down with his dispositions and for about half an hour or so reorganised thought things through. 37 00:03:41,040 --> 00:03:44,219 And I'm pleased to say that the Taliban have still not invested. 38 00:03:44,220 --> 00:03:48,209 Alright, and what I want to talk to today is about strategy. 39 00:03:48,210 --> 00:03:49,530 And on a much more serious point, 40 00:03:49,530 --> 00:03:56,370 I came back from Afghanistan angry and I was angry because it was extremely difficult to really get Whitehall to think strategically. 41 00:03:57,300 --> 00:04:02,310 I remember coming into a briefing amongst other places in number ten and not to the Prime Minister, 42 00:04:02,310 --> 00:04:05,580 but to special advisers and actually saying there is no strategy out there. 43 00:04:05,730 --> 00:04:09,750 And this is in late 2000, late 2007, early 2008. 44 00:04:10,320 --> 00:04:13,590 The answer I got was, well, that's the right strategy. This is it. 45 00:04:14,160 --> 00:04:22,290 What they were talking about was a British strategy for Helmand province, which essentially amounts to 1/34 of the country. 46 00:04:22,860 --> 00:04:27,960 And it was very difficult to explain to people that actually Helmand would matter, but not really that much. 47 00:04:28,440 --> 00:04:32,610 And even one wants to use metaphors like it was a bit like thinking about an election. 48 00:04:32,610 --> 00:04:36,749 Robin I've just had this conversation at lunch about like think about an election this country 49 00:04:36,750 --> 00:04:41,400 and working out whether or not success or failure can be judged from what happens in Somerset. 50 00:04:42,330 --> 00:04:45,390 There are much more in places, much more important places in Afghanistan. 51 00:04:45,720 --> 00:04:48,870 But I came out of angry because it was very, very difficult to actually make a change. 52 00:04:49,290 --> 00:04:53,129 So that's what my thing is going to be about today. 53 00:04:53,130 --> 00:04:59,870 I want to start off with the proposition, and the proposition is about thinking about strategic, thinking about our capacity. 54 00:04:59,960 --> 00:05:05,150 You say to do, well, am I going to test it and I'll test it using some simple frameworks that I have in my book. 55 00:05:06,350 --> 00:05:12,950 I'll use those frameworks. Look at those kind of case studies. I'll talk about Iraq and these are decisions which I was pretty much engaged in. 56 00:05:13,250 --> 00:05:18,080 Apart from Libya, talk about Afghanistan campaign level, talk a little bit about Libya. 57 00:05:18,530 --> 00:05:26,930 Then I'll talk to the big grand strategic decisions. And one of the big to me was why did we go from Iraq to Afghanistan when we did in 2005? 58 00:05:27,410 --> 00:05:33,950 And was Libya the right thing in 2011 when we were already heavily committed in Afghanistan? 59 00:05:35,480 --> 00:05:39,740 So then I'll finish off some some deductions and about say what? 60 00:05:40,550 --> 00:05:45,890 So what's proposition? That's my proposition that you read it. 61 00:05:47,060 --> 00:05:52,190 I'm not alone in this. There are a bunch of strategy. 62 00:05:52,190 --> 00:05:55,640 Insurgents, I suppose you could call us actually trying to make change in Whitehall. 63 00:05:56,030 --> 00:05:59,600 It's hard work, but we're making progress. Where does it come from? 64 00:06:00,320 --> 00:06:04,430 This is a important and I think it's a fabulous quote from General Andre. 65 00:06:05,240 --> 00:06:10,250 For those who don't know of his work, I thoroughly recommend his An Introduction to Strategy written in 1956. 66 00:06:10,670 --> 00:06:17,959 It's probably still one of the best pieces in terms of strategy making wonder about who's the French general and engaged in a whole load of things. 67 00:06:17,960 --> 00:06:18,530 Interesting. 68 00:06:18,570 --> 00:06:28,580 He is the only Four-Star officer who's written, as far as I can see in the last two years on strategy, which is a rather curious, curious observation. 69 00:06:28,580 --> 00:06:33,320 I think it's more modern. Have a look at that. 70 00:06:34,850 --> 00:06:41,179 Quotes. That is from Bill Jenkins, who Jenkins runs the Public Administration Select Committee. 71 00:06:41,180 --> 00:06:47,120 And again, for those who haven't, I thoroughly reckon this document has Commons Defence Select Committee who does national 72 00:06:47,120 --> 00:06:50,900 strategy because Burton is one of the people who recognise that this is a shortfall. 73 00:06:52,850 --> 00:06:58,190 And I'm glad to say that having been part of this and within the organisation now looking at it as a, 74 00:06:58,720 --> 00:07:03,230 as an author and, and a thinker, I think there's really something in this. 75 00:07:03,680 --> 00:07:07,310 We're starting at last I that the most important thing when I was interviewed by the committee 76 00:07:07,910 --> 00:07:11,059 is that the key thing is we last have the insight that we're not very good at this. 77 00:07:11,060 --> 00:07:15,610 In some areas I'd like to say we had the insight within Westminster, which we don't chart. 78 00:07:16,670 --> 00:07:19,700 We'll get there. So that's my proposition. 79 00:07:22,130 --> 00:07:28,430 I'm to test the proposition. I'm going to use two very simple things that I've used from my book ship What is good strategy look like? 80 00:07:28,490 --> 00:07:34,250 And for those of you who are strategic thinkers, the term good strategy is a poor term strategy. 81 00:07:34,550 --> 00:07:37,880 Generally speaking, it's about a dialectic, it's about a confrontation. 82 00:07:38,300 --> 00:07:41,030 So that's why Superior is the much better term, 83 00:07:41,540 --> 00:07:47,390 because good strategy can only be gauged in terms of a confrontation if it's confrontational or in a circumstance. 84 00:07:48,050 --> 00:07:51,020 I'll also use a term called the strategic estimate. 85 00:07:51,440 --> 00:07:58,190 I'll talk a little bit about this, but for those of you who are of military background, you will recognise the term estimate which is is use. 86 00:07:58,580 --> 00:08:03,110 It's a set of structure questions for the commanders as to where we think through problems. 87 00:08:03,110 --> 00:08:08,360 And it is no more or less than that. And I'll use that just to say how we might frame strategic thinking. 88 00:08:10,220 --> 00:08:13,430 What does superior strategy look like in my book? 89 00:08:13,430 --> 00:08:19,969 And I've sort of come at it both deductively and also from historical historical sense. 90 00:08:19,970 --> 00:08:23,870 Usually Strachan has a big idea in it or a collection of smaller ideas. 91 00:08:23,870 --> 00:08:27,680 Let me give you an example of that. An example is the Second World War. 92 00:08:28,100 --> 00:08:32,810 What is the very first big idea in the Second World War when the Americans enter it? 93 00:08:33,170 --> 00:08:34,280 To me, it's dead simple. 94 00:08:34,280 --> 00:08:41,870 It's Germany first when having made that significant decision next, you then find that most of the strategic judgements from there flow from that. 95 00:08:43,760 --> 00:08:47,720 Usually the strategy is easy to to explain. 96 00:08:49,280 --> 00:08:55,670 There's a sense of initiative, and this comes from General Slim's work. Actually, Slim's work has always was he's always about having the initiative. 97 00:08:56,240 --> 00:09:00,530 It's doable operation, nice operational, terrible term, but it's difficult to find another one. 98 00:09:01,490 --> 00:09:06,290 But there's also flexibility. And the last but most important, I think, is the ability to bind the key players. 99 00:09:06,800 --> 00:09:14,270 And sometimes there are theoretical discussions about actually having suboptimal strategy because actually binds the coalition players much. 100 00:09:14,360 --> 00:09:17,390 If you ask me what, I prefer to have a theoretical strategy that's perfect, 101 00:09:18,140 --> 00:09:22,990 but nobody agrees to, or suboptimal strategy and adequate, and all the coalitions agreed to. 102 00:09:23,000 --> 00:09:26,450 It's the latter every time, because the former actually simply won't work. 103 00:09:27,320 --> 00:09:32,299 So that's really the test. But again, as I've said, the test can only be against situations. 104 00:09:32,300 --> 00:09:37,400 And I have three very simple tests for effective strategy. For successful strategy wasn't effective. 105 00:09:38,030 --> 00:09:43,009 So did it deliver the political objective was inefficient to deliver the political objective 106 00:09:43,010 --> 00:09:47,750 within the resources that we had originally envisage and then durability to the results in India. 107 00:09:48,530 --> 00:09:56,419 And on those tests, I would say that looking back historically, I am conscious that I've got a great thing to tell you. 108 00:09:56,420 --> 00:09:59,790 Professor of War Studies has sat in front of me, so I'm cautious about historical job. 109 00:10:00,400 --> 00:10:01,210 I'm not a historian, 110 00:10:01,510 --> 00:10:08,290 but I would say that Frederick the Great and what a great strategist and I would say Napoleon was a pretty awful one based on those tests. 111 00:10:10,870 --> 00:10:16,960 But now there is more to the substance of what it is that I want to use to test some of my case studies. 112 00:10:18,100 --> 00:10:23,590 The term the military estimates is a term which is really about sets of structured questions in the military. 113 00:10:23,920 --> 00:10:26,440 Those of you with a military background, the audience will recognise it. 114 00:10:27,280 --> 00:10:32,080 We actually called commanders estimates and it's the estimate is about questions are run through those questions. 115 00:10:33,100 --> 00:10:38,710 When I was working for Jokester of the Chief of Defence Staff in 2005 and we were struggling to find out what was going wrong, 116 00:10:39,700 --> 00:10:43,880 I came back to him, he asked me to have a look at this and I came back to him and said two things. 117 00:10:44,060 --> 00:10:51,580 The first, that strategy is being made in the Ministry of Defence by a major and deliberately low level area of the organisation. 118 00:10:51,580 --> 00:10:55,960 And we didn't really take much, much look at it. And the second thing is I said that we have no estimate. 119 00:10:56,290 --> 00:11:03,610 So whereas if you had asked me to take over a if you'd asked me as an operation commander to do something, I'd run through these questions. 120 00:11:03,880 --> 00:11:07,870 If you'd asked me as the training commander, would we do it? We just didn't didn't do those questions. 121 00:11:08,350 --> 00:11:14,290 One of the questions that I've got in the book. Seven What is the political and strategic context? 122 00:11:14,650 --> 00:11:18,820 We so often get this one wrong, and I've got examples of that. 123 00:11:18,820 --> 00:11:24,490 I'll talk about that. So what's odd to me, this is almost like what's the political map within which we're operating? 124 00:11:24,700 --> 00:11:29,740 And I think that actually, as I look back and I include myself, we all made mistakes and I look back, 125 00:11:30,040 --> 00:11:36,040 we simply didn't give enough thinking to this question time and time again, why are we fighting? 126 00:11:37,150 --> 00:11:41,680 What is the political issue contest? And again, this question isn't really, really very well thought through. 127 00:11:42,670 --> 00:11:47,140 What, for example, is the political issue contest in the global war on terrorism? 128 00:11:48,250 --> 00:11:52,630 I think there's a rhetorical question. This one also gets missed. 129 00:11:52,670 --> 00:11:56,920 What's the objective and why? I think it's very interesting. If you look at the Vietnam War. 130 00:11:57,370 --> 00:12:03,730 One of the good studies in the Vietnam War says that 70% of the generals in the Vietnam War didn't know nor did not know what the objective was. 131 00:12:04,630 --> 00:12:10,480 And if you asked me about Afghanistan and Iraq, I think there's still a fair bit of lack of clarity on both of those, particularly Afghanistan. 132 00:12:12,070 --> 00:12:14,500 So those are the things that you need to do. To me, they are the foundations. 133 00:12:15,700 --> 00:12:19,359 Then I start to talk about what resources are available to achieve this objective. 134 00:12:19,360 --> 00:12:23,050 It's very easy to see the resources in terms of two things. We tend to think in terms of blood and treasure. 135 00:12:23,710 --> 00:12:27,100 Those are all tangible resources of people money. 136 00:12:27,760 --> 00:12:31,030 But we often forget there are other resources as well. To me, times are terribly important. 137 00:12:31,030 --> 00:12:37,059 Resource How much time we got? Another terribly important resource is political capital because actually sometimes in 138 00:12:37,060 --> 00:12:41,379 these things you actually you use up a [INAUDIBLE] of a lot of political capital and again, 139 00:12:41,380 --> 00:12:45,600 prestige tends to be another one that's linked in that. And I don't think we give enough thought to that shift. 140 00:12:46,330 --> 00:12:52,390 I mean, if people have thought through what Afghanistan might have been like over a ten year period and we have done things differently, 141 00:12:52,720 --> 00:12:55,330 and I would say that a fair bit of political capital has been used up. 142 00:12:55,330 --> 00:13:01,810 And one Prime Minister, your career has probably been quintessentially damaged for the Iraq campaign. 143 00:13:05,220 --> 00:13:09,209 What course of action could we adopt now getting into strategy. So the course of action to be a stretch. 144 00:13:09,210 --> 00:13:15,060 So how are we going to do this? And this answers the question. My next question is what course of action should we adopt? 145 00:13:15,060 --> 00:13:17,760 And the reason I have those two different questions is that I think it's worth through 146 00:13:18,210 --> 00:13:21,690 thinking three or four different ways to do these things before you actually make a decision. 147 00:13:22,470 --> 00:13:28,230 That's not my idea, is General Slim's idea. Again, to me, of all the books that I've read on strategy, 148 00:13:28,230 --> 00:13:34,500 the one that isn't about strategy but is the most fascinating nevertheless is defeating to victory by probably the best, 149 00:13:34,500 --> 00:13:41,399 in my view, is probably the greatest general segment we will build. Slim and the last thing what should be the spiritual approach? 150 00:13:41,400 --> 00:13:47,940 Strategically difficult question to get your mind around, but it comes from a conversation I had when we were doing policy planning. 151 00:13:48,450 --> 00:13:55,680 We were writing up our thinking at the end of 911, we'd done the thing called the Strategic Defence Review, a new chapter. 152 00:13:56,460 --> 00:14:02,090 I was the deputy director of the organisation. My director was a terrific civil servant and he said, You know, see, 153 00:14:02,100 --> 00:14:07,290 we need to get this policy implemented in a way in the spirit in which we wrote it. 154 00:14:07,290 --> 00:14:12,299 And so it's having that spirit. And I understand the spirit of your approach. Well, I can't justify that one evidentially. 155 00:14:12,300 --> 00:14:14,940 I can do the rest, actually, but I'm terribly sure it's important. 156 00:14:16,230 --> 00:14:18,960 So those are the frameworks and I'm going to use to actually look at our case studies. 157 00:14:21,240 --> 00:14:26,220 And that's if I have one big point, these are the areas that we don't do the thinking properly. 158 00:14:27,870 --> 00:14:31,710 Thinking can make a difference. My brother's a middle Eastern specialist, actually. 159 00:14:32,370 --> 00:14:41,819 He understood extremely well as a result of his study, done two tours in Afghanistan, two in Iraq, and predicted to me almost to the month. 160 00:14:41,820 --> 00:14:46,530 And in terms of how it played out, how the Syrian campaign would play out for the first six months, 161 00:14:47,220 --> 00:14:49,650 not at all in the way that actually people anticipated. 162 00:14:49,650 --> 00:14:56,280 But he understood the tribal dynamics and the power dynamics going on within Syria was those, I think, where we need to really invest our thinking. 163 00:14:57,960 --> 00:15:02,070 Okay, let's come to my first case study, Iraq 2005. 164 00:15:02,070 --> 00:15:06,330 I was in the Chief of Defence Staff's Organisation. 165 00:15:06,330 --> 00:15:09,360 I was his executive assistant, if you like, his principal staff officer. 166 00:15:09,360 --> 00:15:18,879 And my first job in taking over the post was to actually go out with with my walk resembles General Mike Walker and Tony Blair. 167 00:15:18,880 --> 00:15:22,709 And we went out and to Iraq and had a look at the campaign, a war room. 168 00:15:22,710 --> 00:15:34,980 Some of you may come across some Jonathan, not Jonathan, very, you know, wonderful Army officer and it very, very direct man. 169 00:15:34,980 --> 00:15:39,750 I remember him almost literally poking Tony Blair in the in the chest on three or four issues on Afghanistan. 170 00:15:39,750 --> 00:15:45,510 Very interesting to watch that. Mike Walker was completely nervous about this search for the prime minister. 171 00:15:45,510 --> 00:15:46,379 I thought quite likes it. 172 00:15:46,380 --> 00:15:50,430 But actually what he was saying is that we didn't really have a strategy here and he was the only person who actually did it. 173 00:15:51,690 --> 00:16:00,060 But the question for me as the political objective and what was the political objective for the British the British nation in that campaign? 174 00:16:00,960 --> 00:16:02,580 Those are the ones we classically talk about. 175 00:16:04,350 --> 00:16:13,739 If you ask me what I think happens and this is pure speculation, I think what happens is in early April 2002, Tony walks out to the states. 176 00:16:13,740 --> 00:16:17,760 He has a conversation with George. George takes him in, set aside and said, look, we're going to do Iraq. 177 00:16:18,060 --> 00:16:21,540 Are you with us? Tony said, yes. He comes back to this country. 178 00:16:21,540 --> 00:16:25,110 He says, we're against Iraq and the Foreign Office say, my God, Prime Minister, you realise that this is illegal. 179 00:16:25,800 --> 00:16:30,930 He said, We'd better find a rationale in that case, and I think that's what leads us to to weapons of mass destruction. 180 00:16:30,930 --> 00:16:36,870 That's purely speculation. I can't justify it, but I think what it misses and actually the British objective was something different. 181 00:16:38,400 --> 00:16:45,150 I think that's what the British objective was. And I think actually we completely blew it and we blew it because of what happened in Basra. 182 00:16:45,150 --> 00:16:51,900 I think the British objective almost with that decision was really I'm so sorry, you can't read it and let me read it out. 183 00:16:52,470 --> 00:16:56,700 It was of good along to the US. And what would that mean to me? 184 00:16:56,740 --> 00:17:03,450 That means sticking it out in Basra. Basra mature the crown and also to learn from our successes there. 185 00:17:03,450 --> 00:17:09,809 So what do we see happening? I think what we see happening is that we start to see a divergence in British and American strategy since the late 2007. 186 00:17:09,810 --> 00:17:10,380 What do we see? 187 00:17:10,830 --> 00:17:23,139 We see the Americans surging into to mid 2007, surging into Iraq based on a change, a clear change in strategy played out under Petraeus. 188 00:17:23,140 --> 00:17:25,800 And we see the British drawing down why the British are drawing down. 189 00:17:26,490 --> 00:17:30,230 I can't tell you exactly, but I think a lot of it was too stirrup had taken the view. 190 00:17:30,240 --> 00:17:35,069 But then the new Chief of Defence Staff was that the Iranians are going to try and kick us out of Basra. 191 00:17:35,070 --> 00:17:42,000 We were finally retreating content. We simply had to get on and make that so to me that it completely missed the point. 192 00:17:42,060 --> 00:17:48,210 You know, if we were in this to act as good allies to Americans, we not to have thought it through. 193 00:17:48,330 --> 00:17:51,450 And what do we see in early 2008? 194 00:17:51,720 --> 00:17:54,810 We see the Americans starting to have some success. 195 00:17:54,810 --> 00:17:59,820 We also see the charge of the knights and we actually see a change in Basra. 196 00:18:00,330 --> 00:18:05,920 But what happens much more subtly, it's not very well recognised at all. Is that actually a new British general? 197 00:18:05,920 --> 00:18:13,799 One general personal friend of mine, 97, arrives out in Basra and he and Richard Iron, who some of you may also know, Colonel, 198 00:18:13,800 --> 00:18:20,940 in charge of the training for the Americans for the Iraq division out there, actually start to make a change in differences. 199 00:18:20,940 --> 00:18:26,249 And within about nine months, they made such a difference. That's Petraeus is going round. 200 00:18:26,250 --> 00:18:33,180 Odierno has now taken over from Petraeus is going around and saying to the rest of his American divisional commanders, 201 00:18:33,180 --> 00:18:37,220 they want you to be operating like the British are in Basra because it's the model campaign. 202 00:18:37,230 --> 00:18:42,270 So in nine months from having had what was a pretty disastrous period for the British, 203 00:18:42,660 --> 00:18:49,990 we now have turned this campaign and within nine months, actually, it's seen by Odierno, the four star general, as great success. 204 00:18:50,400 --> 00:18:56,070 And what do we do at that moment? We withdraw and we go instead to Afghanistan. 205 00:18:56,790 --> 00:19:01,770 I want to talk about that decision a bit, but let me take you to the next campaign, because it's this is a bigger strategic issue. 206 00:19:02,160 --> 00:19:07,530 Let me take you to the next the next my my case studies. 207 00:19:07,740 --> 00:19:11,320 And this is about political context. I want to understand what the political context is. 208 00:19:13,290 --> 00:19:16,620 Some of you I know, Hugh and I think Rob may have seen these diagrams before. 209 00:19:17,070 --> 00:19:21,770 They're about Afghanistan. They're diagrams which we were looking at. 210 00:19:21,780 --> 00:19:28,349 I remember looking at it specifically in the American headquarters in Mountain Top secret headquarters. 211 00:19:28,350 --> 00:19:32,490 The Brits were the only ones, I think, with access there and with limited access as well. 212 00:19:32,940 --> 00:19:40,320 But we were looking at diagrams which were not unlike this on the right and on the left hand side, there you see this ethnic distribution. 213 00:19:41,160 --> 00:19:43,100 So this is the ethnic description of the Pashtuns. 214 00:19:43,100 --> 00:19:48,930 And what we were looking at was not this, but we looking at a distributed disposition to the security instruments, 215 00:19:48,990 --> 00:19:52,680 the bombs, the IEDs, everything that happened in Afghanistan. 216 00:19:52,680 --> 00:19:59,100 And what was fascinating was they've pretty much actually followed the Afghan ethnic disposition. 217 00:19:59,670 --> 00:19:59,879 So. 218 00:19:59,880 --> 00:20:06,300 Well, that told us it was a it was one of those moments we thought, blimey, you know, this isn't an Afghanistan insurgency, it's a Pashtun insurgency. 219 00:20:07,080 --> 00:20:12,300 And I think it's a terribly important observation. What you're seeing here is another reflection of the same thing. 220 00:20:12,600 --> 00:20:17,970 This is the United Nations maps, and it's sort of telling you where they're happy to operate and whether or not happy to operate. 221 00:20:18,420 --> 00:20:24,840 2006, this is before the Brits go in. You know, they're generally speaking, happy to operate in the north, but not in the south. 222 00:20:24,840 --> 00:20:29,940 And it's all to do with this being a Pashtun insurgency. Why are some two other escorts in the audience? 223 00:20:31,080 --> 00:20:38,120 The way I sometimes describe the Pashtuns as they're a bit like the Scots and the girls are here to the east, or a bit like the Highlanders. 224 00:20:38,130 --> 00:20:40,380 And if they're not fighting each other, they're fighting anybody else. 225 00:20:40,380 --> 00:20:47,640 And really well, the tyranny here to the south and west are a bit like the lowlands. 226 00:20:48,510 --> 00:20:53,760 They're not always fighting. They're pretty good. They're not always fighting, actually, because they've got the enemy on the southern border. 227 00:20:54,090 --> 00:20:56,999 But actually they're quite good about making deals. And generally speaking, 228 00:20:57,000 --> 00:21:04,530 the girls going to these when the wars and the terrain into the south actually win the peace is what's causing it because there is a Geronimo Pashtun. 229 00:21:05,490 --> 00:21:11,760 But again, what do we do to this? It's a red thing here. So the great thing says we inserted 16 years ago. 230 00:21:12,330 --> 00:21:17,940 So the the the British equivalent if you like to 82nd Airborne but essentially 231 00:21:17,940 --> 00:21:24,360 a a body of shock troops designed and fantastic people if you're fighting a 232 00:21:24,360 --> 00:21:27,569 Falklands war and they were great to have an officer in the Falklands but are they 233 00:21:27,570 --> 00:21:31,660 necessarily the right place people to put into a delicate counterinsurgency? 234 00:21:33,000 --> 00:21:42,150 The thing that we did, we did do some reconnaissance in Helmand beforehand, and that reconnaissance told us there were probably about 400 Taliban. 235 00:21:44,070 --> 00:21:48,180 We the received wisdom is that that intelligence is wrong for the regime. 236 00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:56,330 We discovered that there are many more Taliban in Helmand than we thought because actually there's a lot of fighting as a result of us going in. 237 00:21:56,820 --> 00:22:04,110 I think that actually there probably were only 400 Taliban and that we very probably created the additional ones through the way in which we acted. 238 00:22:04,530 --> 00:22:08,459 I don't blame this. The the air assault brigade. I don't blame the parents. 239 00:22:08,460 --> 00:22:13,260 I think we ought to have seen it, but we didn't know it was simply a lack of understanding of the campaign context. 240 00:22:13,680 --> 00:22:17,070 Let me just quote to you. Is this a global problem? 241 00:22:20,020 --> 00:22:30,309 This is about the Russian engagement. When you hear I'm going to talk a little bit about when you hear this, I think instead of Russian, 242 00:22:30,310 --> 00:22:33,880 this is actually the Russian general staff talking about themselves going into Afghanistan. 243 00:22:34,450 --> 00:22:41,080 Imagine putting ourselves and seeing if we could use the same words. Russia analysis of Afghanistan is another example. 244 00:22:41,620 --> 00:22:45,610 And here's a quote from the journalist. Unlike the communist guerrilla movements in China and Vietnam, 245 00:22:46,090 --> 00:22:50,140 the Mujahideen guerrillas were not trying to force a new ideology in government on their land. 246 00:22:50,560 --> 00:22:55,990 Rather, they were fighting to defend their families, their corm and their religion against a hostile, 247 00:22:56,290 --> 00:23:01,630 atheistic ideology, an alien balance system and oppressive central government and foreign invader. 248 00:23:02,350 --> 00:23:06,610 Individual groups unconnected to the national and international political organisations 249 00:23:07,060 --> 00:23:10,510 spontaneously defended their community values and their traditional way of life. 250 00:23:11,710 --> 00:23:19,100 Doesn't that sound familiar? Well, perhaps that's the subject of questions, but I think he's got it. 251 00:23:19,400 --> 00:23:23,360 I think it's a more modern one. It's one that I'm not as a think with. 252 00:23:24,580 --> 00:23:30,540 But do we really understand the political context of the Libyan bombing campaign? I think we've tended to think a lot about that. 253 00:23:30,620 --> 00:23:37,820 And of course, I never saw certainly one in the audience. But I think a lot of enthusiasts would have expected this to be over quickly. 254 00:23:38,690 --> 00:23:42,040 A lot of other enthusiasts didn't because I'd talk to them about addiction. 255 00:23:42,440 --> 00:23:46,099 But I think one of the mistakes we may have made was to assume that these two campaigns 256 00:23:46,100 --> 00:23:49,310 were similar from that point of view was around that they were quite different. 257 00:23:50,480 --> 00:23:59,030 What did we have in Afghanistan at the time of 2003 when we when the air campaign supported by Special Forces, is happening on the ground? 258 00:23:59,330 --> 00:24:06,980 What we have is a simmering civil war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban and by no means a complete civil war. 259 00:24:07,490 --> 00:24:12,770 So essentially, we've got to ruthlessly, evenly matched opponents. 260 00:24:13,010 --> 00:24:21,500 One dormant but ready and the other in the South not ready to take it to to talk to the west. 261 00:24:22,340 --> 00:24:28,399 And so, of course, when air power comes in there and when it has properly supports, as it was then with special forces, it makes a huge difference. 262 00:24:28,400 --> 00:24:35,620 And quickly. I think actually one of the great mistakes we made in Iraq was to assume it would be like Afghanistan in this respect tension. 263 00:24:35,620 --> 00:24:41,930 Should we assume that actually the idea of special forces on horses supported by overwhelming air power was the answer. 264 00:24:42,290 --> 00:24:47,239 And of course, we said, no, that wasn't the case. So I don't think we should have been surprised. 265 00:24:47,240 --> 00:24:50,240 And yet we were given the extended duration of this campaign. 266 00:24:50,300 --> 00:24:51,350 I think we were surprised. 267 00:24:52,080 --> 00:24:57,080 I think one of the most interesting things, actually, is to watch the British and the French get suddenly nervous when the Americans say, 268 00:24:57,080 --> 00:24:59,510 look, they'll do what they say they'll do, which is not to engage. 269 00:24:59,990 --> 00:25:05,540 And as we're getting a little bit worried about whether we're going to be successful or not, the Americans are going to leave us to it. 270 00:25:05,630 --> 00:25:10,340 And there were moments when we wondered whether this campaign were perhaps as we wished it should. 271 00:25:13,130 --> 00:25:15,490 How does it how will this campaign play out? I'm not sure, actually. 272 00:25:15,500 --> 00:25:21,889 I think I think we might be lucky, but I don't think there's been much Strachan is and I speak from extremely again. 273 00:25:21,890 --> 00:25:22,700 I'm not serving now, 274 00:25:22,710 --> 00:25:30,060 but I have talked to friends actually in nature and will look for and it's a two star general operating in the central they've said. 275 00:25:30,510 --> 00:25:35,300 I said, what's the strategy like Xe? He said, Well, we don't seem to have much of a clue, frankly. 276 00:25:35,870 --> 00:25:38,540 So I think actually it'll be interesting to see how it plays out. 277 00:25:38,960 --> 00:25:45,050 I think the most interesting thing about how this plays out compared to Afghanistan is that we are now in a moment in the West actually, 278 00:25:45,050 --> 00:25:47,570 where we have very little control whatsoever of the campaign. 279 00:25:48,620 --> 00:25:53,300 Do we people from the stabilisation use and they're finding on the ground they'll make not just a difference, I can assure you. 280 00:25:53,750 --> 00:25:57,260 The only thing that will make a difference on the ground is having ground troops on the ground. 281 00:25:58,280 --> 00:25:59,659 I don't think we're right to say to do. 282 00:25:59,660 --> 00:26:04,639 But actually what you do have to recognise is that if you do this with air power, then the end of the bombing campaign, 283 00:26:04,640 --> 00:26:08,840 at the end of the campaign actually, then actually you lose whatever power you think you might have over the campaign. 284 00:26:09,260 --> 00:26:12,080 I happen to think that's a really good thing in the long term, 285 00:26:12,560 --> 00:26:16,040 but it'll be terribly interesting to see bits and pieces of it go wrong in the short term. 286 00:26:16,520 --> 00:26:24,229 Could you imagine, for example, those who were of the Gaddafi ilk and what that regime looks like is an open question. 287 00:26:24,230 --> 00:26:29,990 But could you imagine them suddenly in situations where actually the rebels are actually starting to do things which we don't much like, 288 00:26:29,990 --> 00:26:33,470 the look of reprisals and that sort of thing? 289 00:26:33,740 --> 00:26:38,720 What will we do in the circumstances where actually the ex Gadhafi's asked us for their support, 290 00:26:39,020 --> 00:26:43,460 to protect them and to protect the slaughter of their innocents on the ground? 291 00:26:43,490 --> 00:26:47,440 I think that puts us in a very, very interesting question. Right. 292 00:26:47,740 --> 00:26:49,460 I want to go to drones strategic, 293 00:26:49,640 --> 00:26:55,400 because I think actually much of what's going wrong is actually not because we are thinking right at the ground strategic level. 294 00:26:56,600 --> 00:27:02,360 My first case study is this one fact. I'm going to put another red arrow to one of what can you see that really? 295 00:27:03,080 --> 00:27:04,730 You can see that. That's a good point. 296 00:27:05,270 --> 00:27:12,889 Why was it that we shifted our main effort and so remain efforts a term for that military guys in the audience will recognise 297 00:27:12,890 --> 00:27:21,890 which is shifting the main priority 1 to 1 position forces shift their main effort from Iraq to Afghanistan in 2005 2006. 298 00:27:23,450 --> 00:27:31,070 Like, I can't give you all the answers, but I can give you quite a lot of it because I was I was central to a paper which went to the Cabinet Office, 299 00:27:31,160 --> 00:27:40,850 which was taken at Cabinet to actually do this. And what I can tell you about that paper was that the logics within it were all on the bet 300 00:27:40,850 --> 00:27:45,830 made all on the basis of military thinking and with no support in foreign policy analysis. 301 00:27:46,610 --> 00:27:47,450 How do I know that? 302 00:27:47,690 --> 00:27:54,560 I know it because when I the paper was given to me and there are only three people engaged in this paper, there was no underlying logic for the shift. 303 00:27:56,390 --> 00:27:59,030 Well, I thought we have got to have a logic if it was going to get sense. 304 00:27:59,060 --> 00:28:04,190 It seemed to me that the best logic from a military point of view was about about the fact 305 00:28:04,190 --> 00:28:07,519 that we would get more leverage from military investment in Afghanistan opposed to Iraq, 306 00:28:07,520 --> 00:28:11,990 because we seem to have lost a lot of consents in Iraq, where there was still a lot in. 307 00:28:13,370 --> 00:28:17,540 Emma Stone But what we did do and what I did do was put in a sentence which said, 308 00:28:17,540 --> 00:28:23,990 in the absence of any overriding foreign policy analysis, the military arguments, blah, blah, blah. 309 00:28:25,100 --> 00:28:27,890 Now, that was actually a code to the Foreign Office to say, look, 310 00:28:27,950 --> 00:28:35,600 you guys might want to have a think about whether it's a good idea moving from a state which is critical to the Americans, 311 00:28:35,960 --> 00:28:39,380 which is right in the north of the Gulf, 312 00:28:39,380 --> 00:28:46,610 which is one of our key strategic areas, and where we still may want to retain interest into one which seems less important or 313 00:28:46,610 --> 00:28:50,180 certainly seem less important to me and is not fundamental to Britain's security. 314 00:28:50,300 --> 00:28:53,600 And I still don't think what we're doing in Afghanistan is fundamental to our security. 315 00:28:55,010 --> 00:28:59,780 So that foreign policy analysis was never done. And that just seems strange to me. 316 00:29:00,830 --> 00:29:07,010 I think it's strange in part because I don't think actually we are really very good at thinking at the ground strategic level. 317 00:29:07,430 --> 00:29:10,550 And again, for those of you who really do recommend this, 318 00:29:10,850 --> 00:29:17,209 I also recommend listening in to the next of these because they're doing this again in the autumn. 319 00:29:17,210 --> 00:29:23,420 So I think December will see another public administration select committee thinking about strategic thinking about whether we're very good at this. 320 00:29:24,260 --> 00:29:30,560 You know, it's a red in here. So to get all that red says, it didn't make sense to make this decision without any supporting foreign policy analysis. 321 00:29:31,280 --> 00:29:34,460 And I think actually even the word supporting foreign policy analysis is wrong. 322 00:29:34,880 --> 00:29:35,060 I mean, 323 00:29:35,060 --> 00:29:41,660 surely we should have made a decision like that on the basis of foreign policy analysis and it should have been driven by the foreign policy analysis. 324 00:29:43,220 --> 00:29:47,630 I want us to the lecture when as the record expands, there is no talk about strategy making the end of it. 325 00:29:48,290 --> 00:29:52,100 A British diplomat came up to me and noted British diplomat and said, You know, I'm awfully sorry. 326 00:29:52,580 --> 00:29:57,800 He said, I never realised you guys in the military how important foreign policy was that made me think. 327 00:29:58,340 --> 00:30:04,310 And there was then another British diplomat, again another diplomat. And I said to Richard, how do we make foreign policy? 328 00:30:04,520 --> 00:30:09,319 And he looked at me rather quaintly. He said, he said, British foreign policy is not me, 329 00:30:09,320 --> 00:30:18,440 but rather the amalgamation and the coagulation of all the different decisions made by individual diplomats and people out in the our embassies. 330 00:30:19,100 --> 00:30:22,790 And I thought how interesting. And when you start to look in I've written about strategy making. 331 00:30:23,420 --> 00:30:29,540 I'm one of the only people to have done it. If you look at if you look for books on diplomacy and foreign policy making, 332 00:30:29,840 --> 00:30:39,860 I can find hardly anything does even less is about strategy making how much training the diplomats get in foreign policy and strategy. 333 00:30:40,460 --> 00:30:44,630 I can't detect any in the British model. And again, I think that's terribly interesting. 334 00:30:44,700 --> 00:30:48,460 So we've got untrained people making up stuff as they go along, muddling through. 335 00:30:50,060 --> 00:30:53,360 Here's my second case study Libya and the Arab Spring. 336 00:30:55,760 --> 00:31:01,430 What's the British national interest in Libya? An intervention. 337 00:31:02,390 --> 00:31:06,530 And what are the grand strategic benefits and costs? I think that's a very, very good question. 338 00:31:06,620 --> 00:31:10,500 Not just because I wrote it myself, because I think it's the one that we should be thinking about. 339 00:31:11,480 --> 00:31:12,320 The national interest. 340 00:31:12,320 --> 00:31:19,100 I think what really matters, if you understand the national interest and you understand what objective it is you're trying to pursue, 341 00:31:19,100 --> 00:31:22,460 it gives you a much better understanding of how much price you're prepared to pay. 342 00:31:22,910 --> 00:31:24,260 And I don't think we do enough of this. 343 00:31:24,260 --> 00:31:32,240 Let me read to you from General, from going to Britain, if those of you who is one of the most fantastic stretch of distinction, American professor. 344 00:31:34,670 --> 00:31:42,170 This is about the American engagement in Vietnam. He says the US engagement in Vietnam should have been guided by a conception that ought to 345 00:31:42,170 --> 00:31:46,880 be utterly commonplace in strategic discourse and in related national policy decisions, 346 00:31:47,810 --> 00:31:51,920 but seems on the contrary, to be often neglected or limited. 347 00:31:52,250 --> 00:31:57,890 It is the conception of reasonable price being applied to strategy and national policy. 348 00:31:58,610 --> 00:32:03,320 The idea that some ends or objectives are worth paying a good deal for and others are not. 349 00:32:04,250 --> 00:32:11,390 The latter include ends that are no doubt desirable, but which are worth attempting only if the price can, with confidence, be kept relatively low. 350 00:32:12,410 --> 00:32:16,460 I would have said that that was the test which ought to govern the way what we did in Libya. 351 00:32:17,840 --> 00:32:22,440 I think there's a much more interesting issue about Libya as there is, is and I'm sure I'm going to put my read. 352 00:32:22,580 --> 00:32:28,430 You probably can't see it, but I'll talk about it. Where does Libya stand in terms of two other critical areas? 353 00:32:28,670 --> 00:32:30,110 What have we got at the moment? 354 00:32:30,140 --> 00:32:37,070 We've got the Arab Spring and whether it's been playing out, it's playing out critically in Middle East and north in Africa, 355 00:32:37,430 --> 00:32:41,570 but critically in Suez and Egypt, but also potentially in the Gulf. 356 00:32:42,560 --> 00:32:52,070 Now, what I can tell you is that with the intervention in Libya, one thing we probably did, because we were really heavily committed in Afghanistan, 357 00:32:52,070 --> 00:32:57,110 is that we used up our remaining British military contingency to do anything else in the world. 358 00:32:58,310 --> 00:33:01,730 Does that make. Does that make sense? Does that make sense? 359 00:33:01,730 --> 00:33:08,900 At a time where I think events are playing out in Egypt, which we don't really understand, and there are issues in the Gulf as well. 360 00:33:09,830 --> 00:33:13,100 What would be the financial implications of things going wrong in Libya? 361 00:33:13,170 --> 00:33:22,800 To the world system. I'm not sure they'd be that great. What would be the financial implications of this significant conflict in the Gulf? 362 00:33:23,160 --> 00:33:25,290 I actually thought they'd be pretty catastrophic at the moment. 363 00:33:25,650 --> 00:33:30,060 But I can tell you that at the moment we've got very, very little capacity if we wanted to do anything about it. 364 00:33:30,300 --> 00:33:33,780 Fortunately, the Americans have. Should they want to? 365 00:33:33,780 --> 00:33:37,379 Because actually they made the decision about and I'm sure the decision about getting 366 00:33:37,380 --> 00:33:41,100 engaged or not in Libya was made on the basis of price and whether it was worth it. 367 00:33:42,540 --> 00:33:47,630 So I think that's a really interesting question. So let me just come to conclude unconscious. 368 00:33:47,640 --> 00:33:51,210 I got about 5 minutes of promise myself about sort of 35 or 40 minutes. 369 00:33:52,470 --> 00:33:57,930 I'm going to come to to the say what in this I happen to believe in this. 370 00:33:57,930 --> 00:34:02,190 I don't think it's the only thing about what goes wrong, but I think it should. 371 00:34:02,190 --> 00:34:07,680 And so I think getting the strategic thinking right is probably a necessary but not sufficient condition for success. 372 00:34:08,100 --> 00:34:13,200 But equally, if you get it wrong, then actually it seems to me that you're going to be lucky if you actually are successful. 373 00:34:16,910 --> 00:34:21,800 Let's look at that. Another great book on strategy was written by an American admiral. 374 00:34:22,580 --> 00:34:26,600 John Whiting writes in 1966 is a great book. 375 00:34:26,600 --> 00:34:30,890 There's not really well well read enough, actually. But actually he talks about about this. 376 00:34:32,120 --> 00:34:37,220 And it's the phrase that I particularly like is those last two sentences. 377 00:34:37,250 --> 00:34:42,710 What I did across that strategy and I would turn it into strategy meeting because there's an important distinction there, 378 00:34:43,370 --> 00:34:48,470 which is so clearly affects the course of societies, such a disorganised, undisciplined, intellectual activity. 379 00:34:49,100 --> 00:34:54,410 And I can guarantee you from my personal experience that that has not changed since 1966, and it still is. 380 00:34:55,340 --> 00:34:58,610 And I believe this state of affairs might be improved. And I think he's right. 381 00:34:59,840 --> 00:35:03,760 Where would I go? On to my book. I'm shamelessly and put my book cover up. 382 00:35:05,690 --> 00:35:09,320 But actually, I suppose there's some honesty in this as well, because you know what? I do think this is important. 383 00:35:10,010 --> 00:35:13,850 I really do. The fact that we can't make strategy properly, what do I talk about? 384 00:35:13,850 --> 00:35:18,620 I talk about in the final chapter of my book, I talk about the lack of focus and knowledge on strategy making. 385 00:35:19,700 --> 00:35:25,850 I would say light-heartedly to my military friends. I said This is the best book written on strategy by serving bishops for the 70 years. 386 00:35:26,390 --> 00:35:30,460 And it is because it's the only one that says something. 387 00:35:30,930 --> 00:35:33,259 It says something that we're actually not even really thinking about. 388 00:35:33,260 --> 00:35:39,390 This now can go to one or two standard text, brilliant text, actually, about strategy and you have to work through them. 389 00:35:39,450 --> 00:35:46,550 The one text I can think of, it's foolish. I don't think you're one of the authors, but certainly one of the great street thinkers. 390 00:35:47,840 --> 00:35:53,630 It's got not one page in it on strategy making and administration, not one page standard text. 391 00:35:55,700 --> 00:35:58,190 We don't even, I think, have an insight that this really matters. 392 00:35:58,610 --> 00:36:06,469 It was very interesting at the House of Commons, the Public Administration Select Committee, that I was privileged to be to be the witness to, 393 00:36:06,470 --> 00:36:14,810 as indeed was Hugh, that one of the the deputy of the National Security Council of this country was asked about what training it had strategy. 394 00:36:15,860 --> 00:36:21,220 It would have been difficult to have had any because he was from the Treasury. And the answer was he'd had none at all. 395 00:36:21,230 --> 00:36:24,490 That's how I interpreted interpreters waffling on. So but it hadn't. 396 00:36:25,160 --> 00:36:30,530 And if you looked around the National Security Council of this country, I think you'd probably find that the only person who's had any training 397 00:36:30,530 --> 00:36:34,819 whatsoever in is in the subject to which they're which we've given these powers. 398 00:36:34,820 --> 00:36:39,049 Is the single military man on his foreign policy. 399 00:36:39,050 --> 00:36:45,680 Again, I think I've talked about this, the need for broader foreign policy, which you can actually set your your strategic decisions. 400 00:36:45,680 --> 00:36:49,200 And I think this is a real shortfall. I think it's a problem in process. 401 00:36:49,490 --> 00:36:55,580 We don't have the right processes in this country, and we tend to assume that we can do it all in London. 402 00:36:55,940 --> 00:36:59,239 If you ask me what the simple answer to actually making interventions abroad is, 403 00:36:59,240 --> 00:37:02,360 and I'm not in favour of it generally, but if you want to make them successful, 404 00:37:02,930 --> 00:37:08,450 the simple answer to me is you get your best people and really make sure the best people send them out the listen 405 00:37:08,450 --> 00:37:12,350 what they think is best to do and then give them the resources they need and then let them get on with it. 406 00:37:12,950 --> 00:37:19,130 That's broadly speaking, how the British one in Malaya was actually letting them get on with this and stopping the press 407 00:37:19,520 --> 00:37:23,960 and has commons and other people trying to interfere with what they were doing from 6000 miles. 408 00:37:25,430 --> 00:37:29,780 But ultimately, I think it's ultimately all about people. Without the right people, we won't be able to do this. 409 00:37:29,780 --> 00:37:32,270 And I'm not sure that we're terribly good at selecting the right people. 410 00:37:32,660 --> 00:37:40,850 Let me give you two examples and examine who's the major general royal major general in charge in Basra, an inspirational leader. 411 00:37:41,070 --> 00:37:47,870 And I don't say that he's a personal friend, but he is an inspirational leader, is still not to some level operating base. 412 00:37:47,870 --> 00:37:50,990 And that doesn't make sense to me as somebody who really was successful on the ground. 413 00:37:51,740 --> 00:37:57,140 Another Major-General Andrew Mackay, who was the one general who's really successful British general in Afghanistan, 414 00:37:57,680 --> 00:38:04,069 again, was promoted to star level, pushed to the side and left the left, the service people. 415 00:38:04,070 --> 00:38:12,130 He was successful at strategic level again because they can think properly at the strategic level, have not found a place here of ones that matter. 416 00:38:13,490 --> 00:38:19,250 This is why it matters. On the left hand side, those I command the fleet are on with. 417 00:38:19,250 --> 00:38:23,090 All these guys are killed. They were killed in March 2003. 418 00:38:23,510 --> 00:38:27,650 We've done all the preparations to get them ready for operations. 419 00:38:27,980 --> 00:38:36,770 It had been a long, complex preparation, but we basically aimed off and said, look, we think you're going to be going onto operations in March 2005. 420 00:38:36,770 --> 00:38:40,610 And so we started the preparations in September 2000. 421 00:38:40,610 --> 00:38:43,630 It's from March 2003 starts in September 2002. 422 00:38:44,450 --> 00:38:52,360 They had a collision between two aircraft. And so we we then lost seven guys that I went to six funerals in 11 days. 423 00:38:52,380 --> 00:38:57,170 I can tell you that's not much fun than it was. I didn't go to support John Adams, who's the American on the right hand side. 424 00:38:57,590 --> 00:39:01,700 This was out in California in those days before I started this journey. 425 00:39:02,360 --> 00:39:07,850 I think I would have been able to look at the parents of those young men in the face and say, Yeah, we're doing the right thing. 426 00:39:08,480 --> 00:39:15,050 I'd find it much more difficult and much more difficult. They don't think we're doing the strategic plan properly, those kids. 427 00:39:15,340 --> 00:39:21,630 They are all orphans in Afghanistan, not orphans as a result of wars, but orphans nevertheless. 428 00:39:21,640 --> 00:39:25,030 And I do wonder sometimes about the way that we muck around in people's countries. 429 00:39:25,630 --> 00:39:30,640 Let me sort of finish with a quote. I'm going to quote myself this time and you can find it. 430 00:39:33,100 --> 00:39:37,179 Yeah. So I'm not saying that stretches the answer. Stretching is necessarily right. 431 00:39:37,180 --> 00:39:40,930 But let me just see if I can pull you up with this last quote. 432 00:39:42,310 --> 00:39:45,610 We talk about another strategy making coalitions. 433 00:39:47,860 --> 00:39:54,160 I'm in the complexity of the coalition situation, superior strategy becomes even more important as a guide for the strategic action. 434 00:39:55,390 --> 00:40:01,150 Some may conclude that because of the complexity and the coalition pressures, it is just too difficult. 435 00:40:01,270 --> 00:40:03,460 And instead that muddling through is the answer. 436 00:40:04,300 --> 00:40:13,310 Perhaps, but without without a shared strategy, muddling through will be multiplied across the different nations than multiply it again across them. 437 00:40:13,330 --> 00:40:16,360 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development Departments. 438 00:40:16,840 --> 00:40:24,370 Without an agreed strategy, national contingents will inevitably, unnecessarily refer back to the national capitals for direction that, when given, 439 00:40:24,970 --> 00:40:28,030 will be based on distance and incomplete precession to the position on the 440 00:40:28,030 --> 00:40:32,020 ground and will often be shaped by other factors based on domestic politics. 441 00:40:32,770 --> 00:40:39,520 This will be muddling through to the Power ten and we will have to pin our chances on the hope that the hurt of internal and internal, 442 00:40:40,000 --> 00:40:45,100 internal and international coalition actors heads blindly but broadly in the right strategic direction. 443 00:40:46,600 --> 00:40:51,850 Effective strategy making seems the better way, and even if it is mind numbingly difficult, then we do not always get it right. 444 00:40:52,240 --> 00:41:00,340 Surely we should try it. Surely we too are agents of strategy, military and civil, who safely risk their lives on the call of duty. 445 00:41:01,540 --> 00:41:05,200 Surely we owe it to the host population, to the territories where our coalitions act, 446 00:41:05,470 --> 00:41:10,090 and whose destinies are so often caught up in the success or otherwise of our actions. 447 00:41:11,260 --> 00:41:16,660 Surely these actions are better guided by the rational strategy rather than the bland, random premise of the herd. 448 00:41:17,680 --> 00:41:24,100 This is not to suggest that we will always be successful in coalition strategy making, but even if our attempts at strategy making, 449 00:41:24,100 --> 00:41:29,020 coalition do not in practice improve our prospects of success, it would be beyond conscience. 450 00:41:29,020 --> 00:41:29,910 Surely not to try.