Without further ado. Thank you for coming. She's going to be speaking on a delegation of powers, of authority and international criminal law.
So to start with qualification, I'm not an expert in international law, but in recent years I've had growing interest.
I'm coming from criminal law and I have a growing interest in the area of international law and international criminal law.
And so the question I want to ask today is a question that I think is it's an important
question that keeps on coming up in the context of international criminal law.
And very often defendants that are being tried by international tribunals challenge that sort
of the court demanding to know by what right does the court or the tribunal judge them.
Now, in part, this is a question, a legal question that we can always say,
you know, go to the Rome Statute, you'll find how we we got their jurisdiction.
But in fact, this is a moral question and it is a very important one.
And in this paper, I'm trying to answer this challenge now, the challenge is based on the traditional position,
according to which it is the states as political communities that have the power and legitimacy to punish wrongdoers using criminal law.
It is therefore necessary to explain why then can international courts and
criminal how can they gain the authority to judge people for certain crimes?
Since many international courts were created by agreement of states and treaties,
it is often assumed that the authority of those courts is grounded in delegation of powers by the states to the international court.
The Tribunal, however, David Luban argues that the start of international courts cannot be based on delegation of powers,
therefore it must be based instead. And the idea of universal jurisdiction, which he justifies by reason of the fairness of the court,
that is, its ability to ensure high quality justice.
Lubin, I will argue, is wrong on both accounts,
so you cannot simply based on their ability to provide high quality justice and there is no difficulty in justifying
the sovereignty of the courts and the basic and the basis of delegation of powers by states as a matter of principle.
Nevertheless, I think that his account is an important starting point because the quality of justice of international courts
provides the reason or reason which may enable states to delegate power to those courts in certain circumstances.
In essence, what I will try to do is I think there is no problem with delegation of power as a basis for for the sovereignty of the court.
And what I will try to look at is all those who argued against the delegation
of the court and show why there is really all their arguments are flawed.
And the second part of this paper, I used the International Criminal Court, the ICC,
as a case study demonstrating how the sovereignty of the court can be based on delegation of powers.
The ICC is a good representative, not only because it is a permanent court.
It's the latest development in the area of international application of international criminal law,
but also because it gains jurisdiction both from direct agreement, from states and from referrals from the Security Council.
Therefore, if I can show the delegation of powers can be growing, can ground the sort of the court impliedly,
it may also justify the authority over a wide range of international courts and tribunals,
whether they're established by treaties or by the Security Council.
I should also say it's not that I'm saying that there is no other basis to to establish.
If so, I'm just trying to argue that I think that the what seems to be an obvious
basis delegation of power is also a good basis for the authority of the court.
So traditionally it is the states, as political communities, that have the power and legitimacy to punish the wrongdoer using criminal law.
Consequently, all four principles of governance jurisdiction of states authority requires some connections between the state.
In the coin, the principle of territoriality looks at the connection between the geography, the geographic location of the crime in the state.
The principle of active nationality concentrates on the connection between the wrongdoer and the state of his or her nationality.
The principle of passive nationality looks at the relationship between the victim and the state of his or her nationality.
And the protective principle gives states jurisdiction over crimes committed against
governmental or state interest based espionage or tax fraud or money counterfeiting.
Counterfeiting of their state currency. However, alongside domestic criminal law, the last century has seen the development of international.
Criminal law. And this development involves two types of changes to the domestic based authority.
The first is the widening of jurisdictions of state to include to include offences
that are not connected to the state in accordance with one of the four principles.
This extension is either justified by treaties or when it comes to some heinous crimes by reference to universal jurisdiction.
The second change whose origin dates back to the end of World War Two,
is the development of international tribunals that have authority to judge certain crimes.
The most recent development in this front is the creation of a permanent tribunal, the International Criminal Court.
Currently, the court judges for offences in only four offences.
Genocide, war crimes. Crimes against humanity and torture.
And in the near future, a fifth offence,
offence and the crime of aggression will also be added to the list and hopefully will be added to the list of tribal offences.
Though both areas of development of international criminal law begs the same question.
Right. By what right do those courts of tribunal judge us?
I think they deserve separate discussion. And in this discussion I will only concentrate on the international courts and tribunals.
I also think that there is an interplay and interrelation between those two.
Those two questions, inevitably. So by what?
So and what moral ground can international tribunals ground their authority and legitimacy?
David Luban is one of the very few to offer an answer to this question, and although I disagree with him, I think his account is an instructive one.
He develops a fairness based justification for what he terms pure international criminal law,
which in effect are those four offences we were talking about.
His argument is developed in two stages. First, he argues that the basis for the legitimacy of international tribunals in general
and the ICC in particular must be grounded in the idea of universal jurisdiction.
Although he recognises that the ICC operates on a theory of delegated jurisdiction whereby state parties,
then state parties transfer to the ICC their own territorial or nationality based jurisdiction over pure international crimes.
He argues that,
and I'm quoting it is far from obvious the criminal jurisdiction is something the state can legitimately delegate to whoever it chooses.
If it can delegate criminal jurisdiction to the ICC, then why not to the Kansas City dogcatcher, the World Chess Federation or the Rolling Stones?
I'm all for Rolling Stones. Thus a more stable basis is needed, and this could be found according to Leuven, in the idea of universal jurisdiction.
In the second stage,
Lubin goes on to justify universal jurisdiction on what he terms the manifest fairness of the procedures and punishment of the international court.
His point is that it is the ability of these courts to provide champagne quality justice.
That is a grounds for the sorting legitimacy of these tribunals.
I must say I've presented this paper in the States and when I said champagne quality justice,
I had a few things coming up asking me, is that good quality justice?
So as Europeans, I appreciate that you are you appreciate that it is right at least good champagne.
So Lupin goes on to explain that the need to comply with the requirement of natural justice means that, and I'm quoting again,
only tribunals that have some kind of internationally recognised state authorisation,
paradigmatic clear authorisation by multilateral groups of states such as the UN are likely to be able to satisfy them.
Evidence must be gathered from foreign war zones by trustworthy and impartial investigators.
Evidentiary chain of custody must be maintained. Defence counsel and judges recruited and paid.
Defence witnesses subpoenaed across borders, appealing pinholes created in staffed rules,
written safe humane prison found in long term confinement monitored.
Realistically, only states can carry these discs.
Therefore, he admits, that is ultimately why it will not do to grant criminal jurisdiction to the Rolling Stones in the World,
Chess Federation has said. So even if we accept Ruben's premise that delegation of jurisdiction cannot ground authority of the ICC,
which is and must be founded on the notion of universal jurisdiction, something that they will come back to later.
It seems to me that Lubin is confusing two distinct issues,
and this confusion is camouflaged by Logan's use of the terminology of legitimacy to address issues of authority.
His discussion involves what I think are two distinct notions of authority.
The first is what I call jurisdictional authority. And the second is decision authority.
Jurisdiction authority involves identification of the moral basis for recognising the jurisdiction of a body.
The seizure authority involves the ability to hand down an authoritative judgement
in order for decision or a judgement to be to have the quality of authority,
it must respond to two claims. First, the body has jurisdiction authority, and second, that the jurisdiction on authority is exercised in a fair way.
Thus, jurisdiction authority is a prerequisite for decision authority.
It's one of the two conditions in order to have decisional authority.
And the other hand, the recognition of jurisdictional authority is not logically dependent on the existence of fair process,
although in practice the ability to provide fair process and thus decision authority is an important
consideration in deciding whether to recognise the jurisdictional authority of a given body.
Right? So one of the things that we need to take to bear in mind when we think that to give to to grant jurisdiction authority
is the ability of that court at the end of the day to produce something that will be authoritative judgement.
When Rubin argues that the ICC is legitimately legitimacy, is dependent on the Court's compliance with the demands of natural justice.
He's correct in so far as he's referring to legitimacy in the sense of decision.
Authority for decisional authority requires the existence of a fair criminal process.
However, legitimacy in the sense of jurisdictional authority cannot be grounded in compliance with natural justice.
Such a claims amounts to arguing that the existence of the second aspect of decisional authority is also the answer to the first aspect,
and thus both aspects connecting to one right. We just have the issue.
Fair justice jurisdiction cannot be gained simply by ensuring natural procedural justice.
The ability to endure to ensure a just process is insufficient to provide any domestic court jurisdiction
over a person with regards to whom there is no other basis for jurisdiction to use that example in,
I'm quoting If an English court delivers champagne quality, good champagne quality,
due process in Polish courts did not this would not give an English court the right to try a Polish thief for theft committed in Poland.
Nor can such claims to procedural propriety giving to national courts in authority
they would otherwise look at defendants challenged by what right do you try me?
Must be answer for a trial to be legitimate in the sense of decision authority.
The answer our procedures, respect to the means of natural justice is not an answer to this challenge.
But more importantly,
I'm not convinced by Rubin's first claim that there is a problem with the idea that states can delegate their jurisdiction to international tribunals.
His reasoning, which I think reflects the US position, seems to be that if we allow states to delegate their jurisdiction to international tribunals,
then what is there to stop states from delegating their powers to clearly
inappropriate bodies such as the World Chess Federation or the Rolling Stones?
Lubin compares the delegation of powers to international tribunals, to delegation of powers to private body.
Therefore, it would be useful to examine the possible underlying claims against delegation of powers
to private body and see if they are similarly applicable to international tribunals.
This discussion will also help us flesh out both the special features of the
international tribunals and the important role of the state in punishment.
Looming objection can thus be based on one of three or four distinct underlying claims.
I will look here only at two claims. One is to look at the role of the state as an is instrumental.
It may be based on a lockean view that the state are instrumental in punishing
those who deserve to be punished because they are best placed to do the job.
That is, it assumes that the wrongdoer deserves to be punished for attribute to this or consequentialist reasons it doesn't really matter.
And claims that the states are better placed to determine what the wrongdoer justly deserves and subsequently accurately inflict that sanction
and those who justly deserve the negation of power to punish the private bodies who inevitably are not similarly able to make these decisions,
would therefore be objectionable. If this is a basis for Rubin's rejection of delegation as a basis for international tribunals jurisdiction,
then it is viable only if we cannot differentiate between delegation of powers to
private body and delegation of powers to public bodies such as international tribunals.
It. Proven himself provides us with the basis for making such distinction.
Only state authorised or supported tribunals but not private body are able to ensure fair procedures in punishment.
If he is right about this and I think he is right about this, and then it appears that his objection to the delegation based society is removed.
Moreover, I don't think that Rubin's rejection and delegation of power is really based on this kind of argument,
because Rubin himself thinks that international criminal tribunals can legitimately punish wrongdoers for certain crimes,
meaning that he must think that this, at least for these offences, international tribunals are at least as well placed as national courts.
The second argument I want to look at is a state centred justification for against delegation of powers to punish private parties.
This argument is based on the claim that states have a power to punish because and one variation in,
I'm quoting punishment is a conventional device for the expression of attitude,
of resentment and indignation and of judgements of disapproval and probation,
and the part either of the punishing authority himself or those in whose name the punishment is inflicted.
And of course, since punishment is an expression of the judgement of the community,
only the state which is the modern representative of the community, can make such representation.
A different variation advanced by death argues that punishment is not an expressive exercise,
but rather a communicative one, which involves holding the wrongdoer to account and punishing him.
Yet for similar reasons to the ones I've just explained, his account to require is that the state will be the one to punish.
Now I tend to agree with stuff with that position.
The trial says to rules holding the wrongdoer to account and punishing him.
I also think that to achieve this, it is essential that the state resources in private bodies would be in charge of the process and its execution.
Nevertheless, this does not prevent delegation of jurisdiction altogether.
It does not prevent delegation of jurisdiction to other public bodies visiting international tribunals or possibly
tribunals of other states to act on behalf of in condemning the name of the state with primary jurisdiction and community,
as long as they can ensure fair process in punishment.
But according to this explanation, specifically,
the state whose primary jurisdiction must have priority as the main representative or representative of its community, subsequently,
permission to delegate jurisdiction must be limited only to instances where the state with primary
jurisdiction is unable to call the wrongdoer to account itself because it's a failed state,
or because a wrongdoer has fled the country, or where the state is unable to ensure due process because of difficulties collecting evidence,
getting witnesses or anything along these lines.
In such cases, it seems wrong that the wrongdoer would gain a windfall advantage and avoid being called to account altogether.
Note also that this explanation requires an agreement to be delegated to the delegation of power by the state with primary jurisdiction.
So it's not you can just transfer. There has to be a clear agreement.
The state who has primary jurisdiction has to give this jurisdiction to someone else when it cannot do so as a direct,
immediate representative of the people. We will return to this point later.
So the essence of the two arguments I looked at is that Lupin's objection is based
on an assumption that recognising the permissibility of some types of delegation,
i.e. to public international tribunals, inevitably means the states are permitted to delegate jurisdiction to whomever he chooses,
and such an unlimited permission to delegate jurisdiction is clearly objectionable.
It is objectionable because there are private bodies to whom delegation of power to punish is clearly inappropriate.
As I argued in a waiver, none of these of the reasons behind the objection to the delegation of powers to private
bodies require the conclusion that all delegations of power a priori are prohibited.
Alternatively,
the objection to the delegation of jurisdiction may be masking a different fear that the body to whom the jurisdiction is delegating is delegated,
may be incapable or unwilling to act justly.
This would also explain why Lubin argues that the ability to produce champagne quality justice is so important for the tribunal's legitimacy.
But if this is a real fear, then the solution is found not in a prohibition of delegation of power all together,
but rather with ensuring that the powers are delegated only to bodies that uphold natural justice.
Put another way, the problem is not just jurisdictional authority perceive,
but to bring the decision authority or the second aspect in order to achieve decision authority, the fair process.
Therefore, the solution does not have to exclude the possibility of recognising jurisdictional authority altogether,
whether it has to revolve around an assurance that it is recognised only where the
body is capable of ensuring the fair process and subsequently decisional authority.
Now, therefore, there is no reason, as a matter of principle,
that to prevent states from delegating their power to punish states are thus
permitted to delegate power to other national as well as international tribunals.
The decision when the power should be delegated is one to be taken by the state whose primary jurisdiction it not.
Any delegation of power is morally justified because powers are delegated with the ultimate view of enabling just judgement.
Or put a different way, states grant jurisdiction authority to international tribunals, which the views of those tribunals will also possess.
Decisional sovereignty. An essential condition for the delegation of power is the procedural fairness of the court.
Clearly, where a state is unable to call the wrongdoer to account by itself,
it may delegate those powers to another national or international tribunal able to do so in other circumstances.
In deciding whether power are to be delegated, a state should bear in mind,
and I'm not giving here at least of the consideration that it should bear in mind, but it is something that I think are important.
The importance of the role, its role as a representative of the people, the role of the trial is to hold the wrongdoer to account and to punish him.
The state may be best suited to communicate this message generated from its own people
as immediate representative of the people and being composed of its own people.
It may be able to convey a focussed and direct message of condemnation of that specific community.
The fact that the trial is further conducted in the territory of that state means it
is also able to convey a direct message to the victims and to the society at large.
This can be easily accessed.
One of the common problems that exist, or one of the common claims that the African countries have against the ICC is, you know,
you were conducting or the Sierra Leone court, you're conducting your justice somewhere else in a different continent.
We don't know what happens. The people in all the villages have no access to what's going on.
So having it in the place where things happen makes a huge difference because it's it's accessible to the
community and that has an important role for them supporting a state centred justification for punishment.
These considerations may be decisive to prohibit delegation of power by the
state where it is able to justly hold the wrongdoer to account and punish him.
But even for if one does not agree with the state centred justification of punishment,
these are important considerations that ought to be taken into account when making the decision to delegate the powers.
It is worth noting that the idea of delegation of jurisdiction to other tribunals is not really foreign to state if in practice.
Indeed, it is a common legal practice in the context of development of the domestic application of international criminal law.
Delegation of powers from one state to another through treaty agreements is very common.
These treaties, which were created to improve international cooperation, require parties who have custody of an alleged wrongdoer to prosecute him.
If they cannot cannot extradite the suspect to the state that has primary jurisdiction over the crime.
The possibility of the state of custody to prosecute when it has no connection to the crime is best explained in terms
of delegation of jurisdiction by the state whose primary jurisdiction to the state who has custody of the wrongdoing.
So what I've tried to show so far is just that there is no limitation in principle preventing that delegation of power.
What I want to do in the second part. To examine whether we can justify or establish the authority of the ICC.
I'm the of powers. Now, if we accept the point that in principle there is no problem,
can we would we be able to ground more and authority of the ICC on the basis of delegation of powers?
Legally, the ICC gains jurisdiction over a person in a number of ways by agreement of the states and territories.
A crime is committed, or of which the alleged perpetrator is a national,
or when alleged crimes are referred to the prosecutor of the ICC by the Security Council, the agreement can be given in advance a permanent agreement.
By joining becoming a party to the Rome Statute or ad hoc after the event by by joining in the ICC retrospectively.
Now, clearly, once we accept that there is no problem in principle that states for states to delegate the power to punish the international tribunal,
then where the ICC jurisdiction derives explicitly from states agreement, the more on bases can follow clearly from that, right?
Because they actually explicitly give the permission or delegate the power.
The delegating state is legally permitted to delegate, the power to punish.
And in so far as its delegation is to a body that is that can provide high quality judgement in here.
I'm assuming that the ICC can provide high quality just in justice.
It is also morally permitted to do so.
The complementary nature of the ICC jurisdiction for there fits well even with state centred justification for punishment.
Leaving the delegating state was primary. It was the primary duty to punish the wrongdoer where possible.
So the ICC only steps in if it fails to do so.
But what if cases where the court gains jurisdiction by by referral from the Security
Council does argues that these are cases that must be viewed as claims of independent,
universal jurisdiction, and as such, they cannot be reduced to claim of delegation of power that is in good company,
including visiting the US as well as some other countries. Take the similar approach when they claim that as a matter of law and the ICC may
not exercise jurisdiction over nationals of non parties without their consent.
Then, even during the second Bush administration enacted a law permitting the US army
to invade Hague if American soldiers will be trialled in front of the ICC.
So can prosecutions be based on referrals from the security?
So so can prosecution based and referrals from the Security Council be explained in terms of delegation of authority?
I believe acting based on indirect delegation of power,
the general line of argument is based on the fact that all states are parties to the UN Charter, which sets out the Security Council and its powers.
When the Security Council acts under Chapter seven of the UN Charter, it is exercising power delegated to it by the Member States.
Collectively, decisions of the Security Council to refer a case to the prosecutor of the ICC are within the remit of the Security Council.
These decisions constitute an example of the delegation of criminal jurisdiction by the States in that case,
who had the primary jurisdiction to the Security Council.
It is therefore sufficient that the crime was committed and the territory of the state and or by a national of a state that is
a member of the UN to enable the Security Council to decide to refer a case to the prosecutor of the ICC for investigation.
Given the permanent nature of the delegation of powers, the State whose primary jurisdiction and who's delegated power in the Security
Council decision is based cannot unilaterally retract from the delegation,
from its delegation, without withdrawal from the UN altogether.
If this is correct and the legal basis for the ICC jurisdiction, even in cases of referrals from the Security Council, is delegated power from states.
Then the moral basis to can and must be based on the delegation of powers and not the universal jurisdiction,
except that in cases it involves referrals by the Security Council.
Usually the state who has primary jurisdiction is opposing the idea of punishing the wrongdoer.
Right. We've already noted that as a matter of law,
it does not detract from the ability of the Security Council to refer a case on the basis of this delegated power.
However, as a matter of morality, can we truly argue that the sword of the ICC is based on delegation of power,
where the state or states with primary jurisdiction clearly oppose this kind of delegation of power?
When the state was primary jurisdiction, opposes a Security Council decision.
It refers it to refer a case to the ICC. It may do so on one of the following reasons it may occur when the wrongdoer acted
in an official capacity and is therefore supported by his state of nationality.
This position may take place in both interstate as well as interstate armed conflicts in inter-state armed conflict,
even if the state of nationality does not think the wrongdoer is acted wrongly.
The state in whose territories the alleged crime has been committed also has primary jurisdiction.
It can be based. So the Security Council decision can be based on and delegated power from the state of territoriality.
But the offences with which we are concerned are not limited to inter-state armed conflict and are similarly applicable in intrastate conflicts.
Here the country was nationalities. Also the country in whose territories alleged crime took place.
Think of Syria. Right. It's both. The Syrian army is committed crimes, alleged crimes in Syria.
Right. So it's the same nationality in territoriality collapsing to one.
If the state supports the official wrongdoer, then those supporting a state centred justification for punishment.
He argues a delegation cannot be based on a cannot be a basis for the jurisdiction because a community
with primary jurisdiction does not view the wrongdoer conduct as one deserving condemnation.
The state doesn't want to punish. It supports the wrongdoer. Second, the state was primary jurisdiction.
Me opposed the holding to account and the punishment of wrongdoers for some overriding interest.
Once again, this would typically happen in intervention state conflicts.
It would be it could be that an agreement not to punish is a basis for an agreement bringing the conflict to an end,
whereas such an agreement with the dictator would be the basis for the removal from power.
For example,
there was suggestions in Libya before he could before the collapse of the Gadhafi regime that maybe they can reach some kind of agreement.
Similar ideas were raised in the context of Yemen.
Maybe we can reach some kind of agreement where the dictator will leave and we are not going to put didn't take him to trial.
It could also be for other political reasons,
all where a society decided possibly as part of a process of reconciliation that it would be better to put
the past to rest in order to allow for the various groups in society to move forward in these circumstances.
Once again, it seems difficult to argue that the Security Council and the ICC are representing the state
who clearly oppose it in condemning the wrongdoer and holding him to account for his actions.
The answer to the challenge, I think,
to grounding the moral basis for the security of the Security Council is referrals and delegation of power in the face of clear
opposition of states with primary jurisdiction lies in the failure of these states and the states with primary jurisdiction to do that,
which they ought to do,
in which they recognise in principle they ought to do all the crimes that we are dealing with their crimes which has been recognised by customary law,
by all countries, by all states, and are important for the maintenance of international peace and security.
When a state whose primary jurisdiction joins the UN, it gave a general consent to delegate its power to the Security Council,
knowing that the Security Council may act against it if it fails to uphold those principles.
The Security Council intervenes when a state is unable or unwilling to hand down its obligation and to act against those who have acted.
In a way the state whose primary jurisdiction have already agreed in principle to be wrong and deserving of condemnation.
Moreover, when it comes to inter-state conflicts where crimes have been committed by one group against another,
the state's refusal to hold the wrongdoer to account means it refuses to condemn is a representative if conduct
which is condemned by at least part or group that has been victims to those crimes within its own society.
The Security Council therefore steps into the state's shoes with the state's own prior general permission,
because the permission to a delegation of power to the Security Council is a very general intent in in nature and represents a victim.
Presumably this line of argument would mean that we should recognise one exception where the genocide,
where a genocide has been so successful so as to kill all the members of that racial or ethnic group in such circumstances.
There is there is no one left in the state whom the government has a duty to represent their gone.
But it seems perverse to say that.
In places where you've been so successful, you're going to get away just because the success of your crime and you should benefit from your campaign.
At the end of the day, and this is this this is important, but it shouldn't be remembered.
If a state really intends to object to the Security Council's referral,
then it has a right to withdraw its early general permission by abandoning the UN altogether.
So it is power that is delegated. There is a choice here.
The ongoing membership in the UN is an ongoing validation of delegation of power to the Security Council.
At any point the state can remove itself from the UN, remove the delegation under the delegation of power.
It chooses not to do so. It can argue more or less, but its end of the date.
Well, it is willing and it's said it will be willing to accept the Security Council's decision.
The failure of state was primary jurisdiction.
Reasoning doesn't waiver lead to recognition of a different exception, where the state acting as a true representative of its people.
And I'm stressing here the true representative enters an agreement with the
wrongdoer in order to bring the conflict to an end or for some other interest.
If an agreement was reached by a body that can just be regarded as representative of the people,
then justice demands the promise that has been given should be followed.
In these circumstances, the state is not failing in its obligation to its people or to the international community.
And therefore, the Security Council ought not intervene and refer a case to the prosecutor of the ICC.
And the idea that they just represent means that sometimes, you know,
it's a decision between two regimes or two groups which are small, they don't represent.
They do it for some personal interests, then it's not the true representation.
But if you take, for example, in the nineties, South Africa, there was a decision not to put to try all the old apartheid leadership.
And this decision was actually the basis. It was part of the Constitution.
It has been challenged in the constitutional court in South Africa.
And the court says, look, this was a decision which was necessary in order to reach the end of the apartheid regime.
It was agreed by people who are true representatives of the various groups in South Africa, including the blacks in South Africa,
and therefore it is a legitimate agreement that must be respected and claims that were made later
on why those leaders of the apartheid regime should nevertheless stand to trial has been rejected.
Now, an alternative explanation for the ways the delegation of powers works in cases involving referral from the Security Council can rely
on a notion of universal jurisdiction that individual states have is part of the internal application of international criminal law.
To make this claim, it is first necessary to show that the moral grounds for universal jurisdiction,
the moral grounds for universal jurisdiction that by individual states only if such moral grounds can be identified,
we can move to the next sort, to the next claim that states may delegate their universal jurisdiction through the Security Council to the ICC.
So we're not looking the Security Council no longer works on the delegated power from states with primary jurisdiction,
but actually from each of the other states because they all have universal jurisdiction.
However, if this is the basis for the ICC juries, jurisdiction and delegation of state held universal jurisdiction,
then really there is no need to go through the Security Council, right?
Presumably each of those states can delegate the power directly.
Each state is a party to the Rome Statute, can delegate the power directly to the Security Council.
But that does not fit well with the current structure of the ICC,
which says delegated powers directly from states can only follow states who had primary jurisdiction based on territoriality or nationality,
active nationality principles. It would make this limitation unnecessary and unwarranted.
Yet even if we choose not to go down this road of delegated, universal jurisdiction,
power and ground the ICC jurisdiction on either direct or indirect delegation of territoriality or nationality based jurisdiction,
the discussion of the moral basis for universal jurisdiction is not made redundant altogether.
Universal jurisdiction may still play an important role in the context of domestic application of international criminal law,
and subsequently a discussion of its moral foundation is needed.
So I'm not arguing that no need for universal jurisdiction all together.
I'm just saying it's not necessary in order to create to identify the moral authority of the international courts.
So I think the moral authority of the international courts can and often is really dealing.
Based on delegation of powers. I think the ICC is a good example.
That does not mean that it automatically is relevant to every international tribunal that has been or that will be established.
But I think it's a good representative because the International Criminal Court is based and those sources
write direct delegation of power by agreement and bases from the Security Council decision referrals.
It can be a basis for a very wide range of other tribunals and example for how delegation of power can base many other cases of authority,
jurisdictional authority of international tribunals.
And thank you very much.