Let me move on to introducing both Aiden and Kristie.
Aiden here is director of the Security and International Relations Program at the University of Westminster.
He has published widely on humanitarian intervention, state building, the prevention of genocide, and in particular, the responsibility to protect.
And he's the author of a recent book called The Responsibility to Protect.
It was published in 2011 or 2012, 12, 2012.
Yes, here it says 2012 rhetoric, reality and the future of humanitarian intervention, which forms the basis for some of his remarks today.
But he's also written about humanitarian intervention more broadly,
an introduction that's used a lot in teaching and research on the subject, but also specifically on debates after Kosovo.
His book, Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, published in 2008.
He's also the assistant editor of the Journal of Intervention and State Building, which some of you will be aware of,
and a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Westminster.
Now, Kristie, outraged by should use her formal name, but we know her as Christie and Kristen Rash.
Dorp has been a visiting fellow at Iraq last year.
And it was a great experience for us to have Christie with us.
She is serving now as a political affairs officer with UNAMI in Baghdad and she spent her sabbatical from February to June last year here,
where she was looking at a comparative study on U.S. peacekeeping operations with a focus on issues related to peacekeeping in RTP.
She has a long track record with the United Nations, having worked for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan,
UNAMA and Sierra Leone and also worked for the ICI TR in Arusha and Kigali.
Before joining the U.N., she had positions with the OSCE and NGOs in Palestine, Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda.
Christie has spent lots of time in a number of interesting countries, which we've discussed at Iraq.
So the way that Aden and Christie are going to divide up the discussion is Aden is going to talk more generally
about the development of the concept of responsibility to protect and the challenges with its operationalisation.
And his critique is really based. I'll let him tell you more, but on some of the difficulties with translating moral intentions into practice.
Our two piece was essentially designed to address problems of inaction and
inconsistency and aid and ask questions about whether it's succeeded in doing that.
Whereas Christie's going to look more at more scholarly, critical approaches to studying and understanding the responsibility to protect.
And she takes, I think, a less critical stance the nation in some respects.
She wants to continue to keep normative ideas at the heart of our TP.
But she also offers us a framework drawn from critical theory for thinking about our topic.
So we'll start with Aden. They're each going to speak for about 20 minutes, and then I'm sure you will have questions for them.
So, Aden, if you want to begin. All right. Thank you very much, Jennifer, for the invite.
It's great to be here and thank you all for coming today.
Before I get into I, I always feel I have to kind of start by saying I'm not a pessimistic guy.
I often feel prickly with Jennifer when I run a roundtable or a panel of some kind in San Diego earlier this year.
And certainly afterwards, a lot of people were saying, I get so cynical as a negative, you're so pessimistic, this kind of thing.
And I'd like to think that I'm not in terms of my disposition, but certainly when it comes to our P,
I would certainly agree I'm quite critical of this and I don't believe it's going to achieve an awful lot or has achieved an awful lot.
And in that sense, I suppose I'm very obviously standing in sharp contrast to people like Gareth Evans.
And there's a quote from Gareth Evans that I like to read out quite a lot.
He says, All too P has made contributions that seem likely to have a lasting impact,
and he describes it as a brand new international norm of really quite fundamental importance and novelty.
That is unquestionably a major breakthrough. And is this type of language, this type of rhetoric that tends to, I suppose,
inspire me would be the word to write about or to p I particularly as well after the intervention in Libya when Ban Ki moon and you know,
dozens of other people greeted this with great fanfare and Ban Ki moon said or two PE has arrived and from my point of view,
looking at RTP and its record, I believe we have to judge it on its impact on state behaviour.
Not on whether or not this has become ubiquitous in international political discourse.
I don't think the fact that it is a popular term is indicative of its efficacy.
I think the two things have to be separated.
And just to start well, what I'd like to do is just to try and contrast why RTP was established in the first place,
why the International Commission on Intervention, State Sovereignty, the OASIS Commission, why that was established in the first place.
Compare that with our duty today. If we think about the ICC commission, it came at the end, obviously of the 1990s.
It was established in the wake of the question, the famous question that Kofi Annan asked in 1999 after the intervention in Kosovo.
And really it was borne from the inconsistent responses in the 1990s to humanitarian, inter-state humanitarian crises,
most obviously manifest, I think, in 1994, where there was a Chapter seven mandated intervention to deal with the situation in Haiti.
But there wasn't with respect to Rwanda and this problem of what Simon Chesterman described as in humanitarian non-intervention,
you know, a lot of people, a lot of critics of humanitarian intervention and I'm certainly not a critic of humanitarian intervention,
a lot of critics feared we were going to have constant intervention.
It was just, you know, imperious plot, which I don't agree with.
And Chesterman I do agree with said the problem isn't too many interventions.
The problem is, you know, the proliferation of any humanitarian non-intervention.
Okay. And additionally, in tangible, inconsistent response was the problem of unilateral intervention action without the Security Council.
And that was obviously Kosovo. The issue wasn't with sovereignty, wasn't with the laws governing the use of force,
with respects to the principle of defending, ah, looking after your own citizens.
The notion of states have an internal responsibility wasn't necessarily all that contentious.
And this was reflected in Kofi Annan's reflective report on Rwanda,
where he said the problem in Rwanda wasn't that we didn't have the legal means to intervene.
The problem was, as he said, the failure to intervene was driven more by the reluctance of member states to act.
Not that we didn't have laws or not that the government in Rwanda claimed the right to do whatever it wanted to its own people.
So ultimately, if that is the nature of the problem, I believe we can localise,
we can focus it into one particular issue, which is the influence of politics on law enforcement and essentially the P5,
the fact that the permanent five members of the Security Council have this enormous power but no duty to act,
hence this inconsistent record now or two feet from that basis has emerged.
Okay. What does it become today? Well, it has instituted no change in the laws governing the use of force.
It is not instituted no change in the institutions charged with enforcing the laws, certainly no duty to act and the veto power of the P-5 remains.
That's the legal side of it. In terms of the strategic side of it,
then the strategy has been of creating moral norms and exercising leverage through global civil society and popular advocacy.
The notion that if we can, you know, get this term widely used, it will create a normative pressure that the P5 and other states simply cannot resist.
And then the second side of that strategy, which I don't have time to talk about today, but has been this increased focus on prevention?
It's not really about reaction, actually. You know, it's really about prevention.
That was the thing we always wanted to emphasise and I've said elsewhere, I think that's evasion.
The result of that, however, the result of the strategy and the lack of legal change I think has been manifest with respect to the Arab Spring.
And what respects to Syria, I think is very clear to have a system where the U.N. Secretary-General and Kofi Annan, as the special envoy to Syria,
end up pleading with the Security Council to do something is an embarrassment and,
you know, degrades the international system is embarrassing for the U.N.
It's embarrassing for international law, a law for.
If we look at how the situation has been dealt with at the Security Council on two occasions,
China and Russia have both cast double vetoes against very modest action.
There wasn't a proposal to intervene militarily in Syria.
These were very modest proposals to do something about what was happening in Syria, and even that was too much for China and Russia.
So we end up with this spectacle of the UN general and the special envoy pleading for action, the Security Council simply not taking action.
And then we have the chorus of outrage from non-governmental organisations.
Now that surely is very reminiscent of Bosnia in 1992 and of many humanitarian crises which predate RTP.
And in that sense I think, I think it's right to ask.
But what has changed the problem in the Arab Spring,
I think is very clear why we've had this inconsistent response intervention in Libya, non-intervention in Syria.
It's the P5. Essentially. The reason for intervention in Libya was that Gadhafi had alienated himself so much from the Arab League,
in particular from the Saudi royal family, that he'd no friends up there.
The Arab League despised Gadhafi personally and were in favour of getting rid of his regime.
I'm all in favour of the no fly zone. And if you read the explanations regarding the chronology of that particular intervention, all the key players,
particularly Hillary Clinton, say when the Arab League called for intervention, that was the game changer.
That meant we couldn't be seen to resist intervention in the face of the Arab League calling for intervention.
Now, why did the Arab League call for intervention in Libya?
Surely it wasn't because they have a concern for human rights, given how they reacted to the situation in Bahrain.
So we have a situation that we can identify why there was intervention in Libya,
which has much to do with geopolitics within that particular east region.
Why was there no intervention in Syria? Again, I don't think you have to be a genius to point to the fact that particularly Russia's links,
which Syria has shielded Syria from outside intervention.
Why was there very, very little international criticism of Bahrain and why Bahrain?
The Bahrain monarchy was doing. Again, because Bahrain very close ties with Saudi Arabia,
the United States and the West more generally do not want to go against Saudi Arabia in that
particular region and hence the situation in Bahrain where you have outside intervention,
but outside intervention from the Gulf Cooperation Council to support the Bahrain government
in putting down the protesters is met essentially with silence at the international level.
So that's the practical result of our troop inconsistency, where you have an intervention in Libya but no intervention in Syria.
And essentially the political considerations determining how the international community responds to inter-state crises.
Now, in that sense, we have to confront this notion, which is invariably put forward, that because our topic is discussed widely and is widely used,
has made this remarkable transition from being a kind of abstract academic notion in 2000, 2001 to becoming, you know,
a key rhetorical term in international political discourse, that that in itself does not evidence its efficacy.
And look as it as a quote about this,
we talks about the amount of PhD thesis that have been written about RTP and the amount of books in this university.
Yeah, well, I've written a book about RTP as well, but he says This is fantastic.
You could fill a small library with these things as though that again in itself this is evidence of something good is emerging here.
But beyond just the fact that academics and PSU students are writing about RTP, it certainly is also entering into international discourse.
Nobody could deny that. However, the question I would ask is why would any state not support the response of the state?
It's not actually all that controversial. If you look at a 2009 General Assembly debate on the responsibility to protect.
If anybody has the time to read all the various different submissions made by the states at that debate,
the fascinating not so much because of what the Western states say about it.
But if you read what North Korea, what Iran and what Sudan say about the responsibility to protect,
there is use of old responsibility practice fantastically.
The Sudanese statement on RTP goes into social contract theory the need for the government to be responsive to the citizens, etc. etc.
Of course, the very same government that's been indicted by the ICC that perpetrated
massacres routinely in Darfur states can very easily nod their heads and say,
Yes, we like RTP precisely because it's inherently vague.
It's I describe it in my book as the agreement of 2005 as a triumph of the lowest common denominator.
Okay. The one achievement that I would accept is constitutes achievement in 2005 was situating RTP as being focussed only on the four crimes listed.
Beyond that, however, I don't see that as an awful lot to celebrate.
Where are the thresholds? Where is there anything about cuties? It's so vague that essentially it amounts to a rhetorical commitment.
We promise to behave internally and we also stand ready to act if citizens in our states need help.
However, if rhetorical commitments to protect one's own citizens and even citizens abroad based on a system of self-regulation was sufficient.
Then we would never have needed article because we've had that system for decades, if not centuries.
If you look at the first part of the internal responsibility of states,
states have very, very rarely, if ever suggested, particularly in the post charter era.
We can do whatever we want internally. If you look at the number of international agreements states have signed since 1945 proscribing genocide,
racial discrimination, torture, etc., etc., states are more than happy to put their hands up and say, we accept.
We can't do certain things. Internally, what are they actually in force?
That, of course, is not a another matter. After 2005, Tony Blair said for the first time at this summit,
we agree that states do not have the right to do what they will within their own borders.
But that's simply untrue. Ban Ki moon, for example, said all too P rests on longstanding obligations under international law.
So anybody who's, you know, even had a cursory glance at international law regarding human rights will see that prior to 2005,
there was dozens, if not hundreds of laws saying states cannot do certain things internally.
The problem wasn't the absence of laws or rhetorical commitments.
The problem was enforcing these internally in terms of the external aspect of.
We will intervene if you don't adhere to the internal.
Again, the 1990s demonstrated time and time again that there was a legal means for intervention.
Chapter seven of the UN Charter. Okay.
A number of times the Security Council said what's happening internally is a humanitarian disaster that we can't stand idly by and just watch.
Resolution 794 passed in 1992 and a UN Somalia justified intervention on the basis of
the magnitude of the human tragedy and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation.
This is in 1992. In the course of the debate about how to respond to Somalia,
Russia said it supported intervention because it claimed it had an obligation to put an end to the human tragedy in that country.
Now, that's 1992, two years prior to the Arab Spring.
Russia says it has an obligation. Now, it's very easy to say that obviously I have an obligation, but then later on,
I don't have any obligation and shy away from having any kind of a duty ultimately.
In the 1990s, we were it was very clear that because of the capacity of the Security Council to occasionally reach agreement on how to act,
there was a legal means to address internal crises.
The problem was there was no duty, there was no automatic response.
Hence it became a question of are our national interests involved?
Now what ought to be advocates say is that, yes, we're addressing that.
We're addressing that latter problem about the national interest, because we're creating is no momentum that these states simply cannot resist.
Now, I think it's very important, you know, it does something to that. I mean, I don't discount normative evolution.
Norms do inform laws. Laws don't follow from from from above.
They come from contestation and they come from normative discussion.
However, when we talk about norms, we need to be very clear about differentiating them from from two things.
Firstly, from political consequence, political culture like the Big Society, I don't think you can't call the Big Society the norm.
Also need to differentiate between norms and common aspirations that we all want to make.
Poverty history. Yes, we all want to make poverty. History is make poverty history a norm.
No, I don't think so. It's a common aspiration, a norm.
And I'm using a quote here from Therese Reinhold.
She says, An interest objectively shared standard of appropriate behaviour, not just an aspiration and not just a commonly used term.
And if we look at norms,
and particularly the people who write extensively about that even more and think talk about the need to think seriously about the micro foundations
on which theoretical claims about norms rest and evaluate those claims in the context of carefully designed historical and empirical research.
Simply to say ought to be as popular. Everybody talks about it. Hence it's a norm, just doesn't cut it.
If we talk about norms as being more than just popular terms and we look at, well,
is there agreement, is there is into subjectively sharing standard of appropriate behaviour.
We look at what ought to be is and we see it's inherently nebulous.
Okay. First of all, there's the problem reflected in this growing canon of literature ought to be that altarpiece is absolutely everything.
If you look at, you know, just type to pay into Amazon and see the book titles that come up.
The responsibility to protect relating to the environment, climate change, the responsibility to protect relating to language.
Everything is not one or two piece of it.
We always talk about prevention and there are some aspects to rebuild and also reaction, but it's become so broad as to be essentially meaningless.
You could say there's nothing it doesn't cover looking more specifically than at its nebulous nature,
where the thresholds when do we decide that this particular issue demands being moved from pillar one to pillar two of the military,
whatever it is, for example, it respects the Darfur.
The sense was the first part of our trip is all about the primary responsibility being the whole state.
The primary responsibility, therefore, is with the Sudanese government. Let's let them get on with it.
Okay. Now, that obviously wasn't the data logic use.
It respects the Libya very quickly moved from being. It's no longer possible to look at the primary responsibility of Libya.
We have to jump in. Okay. But where is it clear?
When that happens. Additionally, the question has to be raised about what do states understand by RTP?
Again,
if you go back to the General Assembly debate in 2009 and read what China says about to pay China it or to be at a General Assembly debate in 2009,
compare what China says about RTP to what Sweden, the UK, the US say, and there are two very different understandings about RTP.
How can we talk about it being a norm if we have two, if not more than two different alternatives, what that norm actually entails?
Additionally, although the intervention in Libya was cited by many as a kind of the high watermark of all to be in the dawn of a new era,
Jennifer isn't giving you a plug here. Wrote an article about the intervention.
I mentioned a very important point here that in resolution 1973,
there is no mention of the international community's responsibility to protect
as a mention of Gaddafi's and Libya's responsibility to protect its own people.
But the justification for intervention is not we have a responsibility to protect people in Libya.
And what Jennifer says about that, and I would agree,
is that this is evidence of the fact that it is still contested by some members of the Security Council.
Now, that was at the time of 1973.
It was contested subsequently as evidence that it appears to become even more contested because states that abstained on 1973 have said,
if that's what our duty entails, we allow you to impose a no fly zone and you dramatically expand your understanding of what that means.
And we're never going to sanction anything like that again.
The suspicion about what our two pillars has grown since 1973, and arguably so has the contestation surrounding its meaning.
In that sense, its status as a norm is very, very contested.
I would suggest it's not a norm at all. It's a term that's used.
The fact that it doesn't have a normative qualities, therefore totally undermines the argument that is normative force,
that forcing states to take certain action and looking at this logic of championing moral norms over as the way to effect change.
One of the key things, as reflected in the literature by advocates of ought to be is is an almost an
arrogant dismissal of international law and the need to reform international law.
It tends to be something that not all, but the majority of RTP advocates simply just don't talk about.
In 2009, I interviewed lots of NGOs in New York over two pangas, and when I raised international law with them, it was almost like, why?
Why, why are you talking about international law? We don't care about that.
We're talking about normative momentum. And what I think is wrong with this is that it's born from an overinflated sense of global civil societies.
Capacity to effect change in the little bubble in New York, it seems everything is is very exciting.
We can do an awful lot of things and we're having meetings constantly what ought to be, and we're applying pressure all the time outside.
However, to what extent does this normative force, this global civil society, really influence the P-5 in particular, Russia?
Is there any evidence that decisions made in Moscow are influenced by primarily
Western non-governmental organisations championing or to be same goes for China?
The same also has to be asked about Western states.
At least two examples stand out which demonstrate the limitations of global civil societies capacity to effect change.
One would be Darfur, where global civil society had a fantastically successful campaign in terms of generating,
you know, press coverage and headlines. Couldn't have done more. Even got George Clooney involved.
However, action wasn't taken. You could also say about Iraq, massive international protests against Iraq, huge protests in Washington, London.
And yet the governments in those countries ignored what seemed to be the majority opinion and went ahead anyway.
I think we have to be very careful about assuming that normative momentum,
global civil society revolts by INGOs are going to change the position of states.
And it's a it's a it's a strategy, I think, that derives from a kind of a misplaced belief in kind of a totally logical understanding of history.
The liberalism in the Cold War, it's the end of history. The spread of liberal values is irresistible.
Therefore, law will eventually somehow catch up with morality.
All we need to do is champion the right thing, and it simply will come.
There was a there is a lack of a concrete strategy there.
There was also a lack of understanding of why in the 1990s, these types of issues suddenly gained prominence.
There's a sense that this is now a new era that's going to last forever.
The spread of the liberal Western view, the changing conflict, the distribution of power,
the international system, the rise of China, the rise of Russia. This tends not to be factored into the equation.
How is that going to change the disposition of the.
You already counsel as these states traditionally reluctant to embrace these types of norms that
clearly will have to have a negative influence in the capacity of these particular norms to actually,
if their norms at all, to do much to effect real change.
Okay. Yeah. In the book I mentioned in the final chapter, an essay by Reinhold Niebuhr called The Children of Darkness, the Children of Light.
And he talks in that essay about why we have democracy and why we have laws.
Because we have laws and we have democracy not because people are good, but because people can't be trusted.
We need to have accountability. We need to have legal systems so that we can enforce laws to stop people taking advantage.
And he describes as the children of light,
those people who naively think that we can simply talk about the right thing to do and expect the right thing to happen on the basis of that.
And in the book, I try to draw a parallel between all two people today and the Children of Light that no one talked about,
in the sense that granted, there were many good people,
many very persuasive people out there who talk about the need to do the right thing,
but they fail to understand the extent to which that has to be reflected in in laws, particularly laws regarding the enforcement of human rights.
When we get into the question of what should be done, which is, of course,
one of the questions people invariably ask to me, what we should be focusing on.
Those of us who want to see humanitarian intervention happen when necessary is we need to discuss legal reform.
This has been described by UN Peters as the missing link in order to be.
It just doesn't exist there. And that's what we need to talk about.
Toscanini, Hans Carlson, people like that that I've been reading a lot in the last year,
they all talk about the current international legal system as being primitive,
to use her hands, Carlson's word, precisely because of the problem at the latter end regarding enforcement.
Not that there wasn't sufficient number of laws or moral norms floating around,
but the enforcement of these laws and any functioning legal system has to have the of the means by which it can objectively enforce its laws.
At the moment, we have a conflation between politics, national interest and the enforcement of laws, which is the P5.
To try to work with that system is a waste of time.
Unless that system divorces, political decision making and national interest because states will always have national interest from the objective
enforcement of laws such as that regarding internal respect for human rights and external action to protect human rights.
We're going to be locked into this cycle of occasional interventions where
everyone gets very excited and they're usually in humanitarian non-intervention.
Just to close. What I would say about our turkey is that it has chosen temporary fame over long term effectiveness.
It's granted it's in the headlines in many of its key players like Gareth Evans are, you know,
widely touted as the sort of heroes and people that should be vaunted are respected.
But that type of superficial fame and ubiquity in the in the long term is not going to solve the underlying problem.
The underlying problem has to be and must be identified as the legal deficiency at the heart of the present system,
the inability of the international legal system to enforce its own laws.
And if we want to generate norms and normative momentum, that should be the norm that we proliferate.
The norm of legal change is essential if we want to effect a positive change in the record of interest.
International responses to inter-state crises. I'll leave it there.
Thanks. Thank you. I'm sure there's lots that we can pick up on in questions from from Aiden's remarks.
And I've heard him give a couple of talks now and this one was slightly different.
So it's I always I always pick out something different and I've got some questions of my own.
Kristie, would you like to go next? Okay. We heard about a lot about this trip, I think, being official.
I'm trying to make a point in my presentation the point that normative advocacy is not superficial but can be actually derived from discourse.
Like I prepared to talk, basically, I'm going to beat this out, but I will make every effort to be intelligible.
If you can't follow the argument, just raise your arm. And I know that need to kind of slow down.
Okay, but wait, let me begin this presentation.
Is then your okay on the evolution of actual discourses on intervention and state building and then interest ultimately.
But eight months ago I followed with great interest for the nation of Dr. Leyla Khalil from Selassie at ILA,
and as she outlined, the multitude of ways in which kind of insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
the agenda and the manipulation in power relations in terms of dire consequences for all involved, both in terms of lack of time,
for meaningful interaction of host communities, civilian casualties and credibility of international actors.
A critique of distorted emancipatory peacebuilding practice in particular directed at the US military and
its normative strategy that suffered from a general paradox in so far as I simultaneously sought to defeat,
assimilate and engage and hence was unable to maintain validity claims that would have been intelligible to the local population and other audiences,
or uphold an internal ethics that would have prevented horrible transgressions such as adequate.
Excuse me. Could you see that? Yeah. We can't hear you.
Okay. In its relentless search for additional sources of legitimisation, it even sought to assimilate academic discourses.
Her position some light on the larger question why international forces were unable to win hearts and minds and said you are buying into a
narrative of internal focus and cross-cultural cooperation at local populations could have just been internalised easily and the fear perspective.
It appears that this lack of common ground did not result from an imminent clash of civilisations unnecessarily, from a conflict between open,
modern and close traditional views, as many had initially wanted to embrace change on their own cultural terms.
In my view, it was more a consequence of an ongoing, no knowing, parallel,
evolving worldviews that were in constant state of reinterpretation after 911 and less in the end, less and less space for goodwill,
cross-cultural dialogue and humanitarian concerns that were added later on to the equation,
only to discredit further the overall notion of humanitarianism and compete globally competing collective needs.
We ID invest in the restoration of legal certainty amidst ongoing violence is
lighter than competing narratives of cultural survival and the conservative
backlash that Tom Elliott has described persuasively in the case of the U.S. the to the face closely the Society of the United States of fear,
a term that captures the prevailing state of mind of a nation.
So very different of that of the issues that. A customer, not an analyst.
He's one of your favourite. I've got to stand for some type of shift in justification of international military practice,
best expressed in the names of U.S. operations with meaning,
which from the title to self-defence, the war on terrorism, and finally to war against evil.
It was a narrative exclusively tailored for home audience,
but it also sought to lobby with some support and not engage Afghans and just someone's view.
One of the central contradictions of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is that that nation building efforts were typically,
typically justified by reference to war on terror. But or to put this in more to the point, in the light of his own needs for consolidation,
the U.S. did not concern itself with other integrative worldviews, which both proved a very costly mistake.
As one remembers, as Dodge has put it, that the creation of a security community as a function of social integration,
the larger lives clearly of the cultural and legal domain, and not a systemic domain, a foreign strategic interest.
A good example to prove the source of this argument are the Iraqi suffer themselves local security communities creation as a major factor.
And then we are talking about a localised security initiative ongoing
responsibility to protect U.S. sentiment found however further application to the
notion of terrorism that perceptions of coalition partners in the West and the form of the powerful counter-narrative to cosmopolitanism of the 1990.
Of all, it left the scenario when the end international effort, as we in the case of Afghanistan,
still are looking for a dignified cut off point to minimise their losses,
leaving a normative void in terms of perception of nation and state building
behind an integration task that Europe has mastered with the head of the UN,
at least for the time being of the last two years, with reference to his own history, ideas of nationhood,
past democratic and constitutional practice, and processes of regional integration other than Afghanistan.
In the light of an ongoing insurgency, paired power sharing, contested power,
political processes and elections and contested histories with no other common reference point other than his
frequent struggle against the views of the patients they most likely to for peace in the immediate future.
So far, my reading of 911 related events,
state intervention and stable impacts and its impact on our to be able to get back to emerging expert discourses and to strategic interests.
Two months ago I attended a state level conference in Birmingham that did not deal with the issue of our troops directly.
But that sort of discussion of state building would out in many ways the possibility of executive action.
On one panel, a quantitative study funded by the US Department of Defence tried to operationalise the revival
of Islam and to assess the impact on state building based on the hypothesis that Islam,
presumably more than other religions, would be harmful to the idea of democracy within key questions of knowledge, interest,
dialogue between the two civilisations and context explicitly inside a 7.0 that was entitled Political Approaches
to State Building Projects and reiterated the minimalist argument that has been learned since nine 1990 that most,
if not all international interventions on state but in the problematic and so far as they did more harm than good,
I see them both from the outside by conceding that he would not normally out of this theoretical dilemma,
a development agency in the human face on a daily basis.
Another public could to Jackson suggested a decentralised and demilitarised pacifist version of the faith as a solution for the peace.
That would also rule out applications of that opinion to them. Okay, this would have provided a good starting point for the presentation like this.
Since notion of prevention and recovery within the RTP framework seem only plausible to the vital reference to state and peacebuilding.
However, in the end, it was a paper by Mark Definite that ultimately caught my attention insofar as it
served as a stern reminder of how much seems to be at stake at the last moment.
But how much seems to be at stake for the UN as the last normative line of defence and the fumbling and
contested more and more unipolar but order of 25 targeted assassinations and normative manipulation.
The presentation that was today German lower than substance and so far as in the youth, the idea of an integrated land planning approach.
But on paper, basically just to suggest to consider all problematic action taken within one interdependent
context to the idea of business and culture control about individual knowledge of content.
The Speaker concluded his plea against new level of peacebuilding,
a notion that was developed by authors like Roxanne Richmond in a different context with a
picture of as opposed to an official at work in a pool of a mobile phone and the champagne.
And isn't a fashion even as modern. His most recent book a supposed level of authentic to some normative meaning for parties living in Member States,
and the obligations on the responsibility to protect characterising their
behaviour and moral efficacy as the ethics of public consumption by politicising
the UN and other out of pocket will be teaching to the aim of provoking the
other than being proactive on the legal implementation and development of forms.
If all the votes just demonstrate to us,
think the semantic concepts of utterly assorted notion of linguistic conceit which solely reaffirms the status quo and absence of a Security Council,
the form and the form of the present world. Oh, this reminds me very much of the nineties that sort by England rebate on whether or not it
should be abolished only what the difference that post-9-11 made to has from displays only to.
And the defeat of terrorism by the UN and Islamic refugees are struggling to contain the subsequent damage
in terms of general generic mistrust and most uncertainty amidst mounting criticism of no viable community,
safe alternatives that would be ready for implementation. A member state endorsement, at least in the short term.
And I would argue that it presents itself as a relevant a meaning based on similarities
to the dilemmas of integrative work of youth construction at lower levels.
The problematic if essentially the same as a discoursing with funding Habermas and Gadamer.
I believe not only in the vital importance of a codification of law,
but also in the circumvented the necessity to express and justify normative arguments that
underline in the form of validity claims all forms of from indication and cognition,
and with the necessity of applied speech in the possibility of dialogue, moral efficacy, law and peace.
The school of thought that was developed as part of the right of the discipline of sociology of law is commonly known as university athletics.
Its claim that the first speech already contains the promise of a universal
association has become defining principle for both the country and cosmopolitanism.
As a consequence, I value the responsibility to protect as a core principle of international ethics, regardless of conception of political.
Differences or conflicting arguments with regard to such a implementation.
Any effort to negate its necessity in substantive debate on international ethics or the form of the international world order,
as you suggest, would, in my view, constitute a further of a contradiction.
And so far as we would simultaneously seek to criticise an ideal and would seek to uphold in one form or the other in a different context,
for example, from the condemnation against crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
This being said, I'm also painfully aware of the necessary of the necessity of ideology,
fatigue and procedural shortcomings in terms of accountability.
It is in this context, I'm speaking of the necessity of idealism,
a notion that will be very different from vices unworthy of domestic reform, demand, and so long a good government, but nothing compatible.
And so far as it will not only acknowledge the value of ideal technical assumptions,
but argue for that and circumvented the necessity as part of processes of mediation and cross-cultural dialogue.
Take me to the reasoning. A model would further differ from other political,
emancipatory approaches insofar as a leftist seek to uphold the idea of AKP and argue that its critics confuse state action and systemic intrusion.
The notion of ATP itself, and they argue that the latter would be an expression of no and liberal interpretations of human security that would
preclude an application of a cosmopolitan ethics on the ground up that could strengthen union security practice,
calls for a postcolonial ethics of non hegemonic engagement as put forward that, for example,
by that laws should reflect local responsibilities and perception of dignity and local,
social and customary practice in relation to international peacebuilding.
Wants to promote human security that if something is shown valid,
they just have to be understood as a complementary process within a larger cross-cultural,
dialogic event that similar to that the enclosure has developed in recent years.
I will get back to this in a moment. And ideally ATP and I think a populist fly here.
Ideally you should find its own expression in the universe and then send it a sort of enforcement justification and obligation.
It would, however, not only require culturally sensitive ethics of action at the local level,
but also checks and balances at the international level to avoid scenarios in which a third party.
For example, simple could simply help the government by funding political convenient opposition
forces that then might misuse a broader notion of advocacy for the strategic agenda,
something that is at present not without not even through the moral threshold of the six principles that the ICC outlined as also,
Roberts has noted, any word in which there is a dominant power is going to be a considerable interest in interventionism.
An independent, extended judicial framework to enforce extended obligations like even for justice would make sense at the conceptual level.
They might be problematic at the practical level in light of the fact that at
present a majority of the Security Council members have not ratified the ICC.
Secondly, judging from our interaction in the field of military actors,
I also believe that the long awaited understanding for such foreseen in Article 43
of the UN Charter would likely be an illusion of in the present international order
unless the UN decides to build its own army from scratch and will not rely on two
continents that bring with them multitude of problems in terms of command structure,
good group dynamics and pressure. It would need to socialise its own force according to a particular set of leadership principles
that would need to be internalised to an extent where previous national IDs would not matter.
In this context, I would disagree with the sort of cosmopolitan agency,
but social to become a universally negative, legitimate bearer, arms would fight for humanity.
It would not necessarily require a cultural transformation in terms of duties applied to the vision,
as she suggests, and they can understand and act upon conventional principles.
But it would require reform of existing national military reasons to be socialisation practice.
The public first would have to be abolished before it could be meaningful resuscitated in the war thunderstorm.
However, aside from the question on how to best implement further teaching obligations,
implied idealism would start off by looking at public relations and scope for agency
within the present academic discourse that ultimately impacts on knowledge creation.
It would aim to critically engage other forms of scholarship and relevant discipline by pointing
out discourses fallacies that are also inherent in aspects of legal practice and often,
ironically, not unlike the US military in the above cited examples seeking to retaliate by seeking to win the argument,
by allowing for complete back line of communication and its mutual accusation of an ability
to speak meaningfully rather than trying to achieve a consensus on game changing principles.
They are based on the shared need for a sustainable world order and inclusive dialogue and power relations,
and consequent distortion and distorted notions of truth, justice and authenticity.
Dialogue then is aimed at prevention,
and that this initiative is initiated to more accurately see and hear the difference in, believe and in enforcement.
I believe in moral advocacy. Another relevancy will be the post-election discourse of a way that combines many concerns of political parties,
often asserting the principle of pacifism, of doing more harm from fear, perspective or peace.
post-Trump to oppose, which is often simply resigned in the light of silence and violated meaning, deprived of their normative ability.
Standard citizens feel violations of the culture and other, and often leaving the multi-dimensional,
systemic and likely interconnectedness of peacebuilding processes and the individual needs for
empowerment amid suspicion concerning alienated expression of an impulse left unsaid dialogue,
selective processes of the inside, a connectedness that is then disliked.
And Linklater's latest book, The Problem of Hummingbird Politics,
develops that the principle of doing no harm and lowest cosmopolitan denominator across culture,
dialogue and higher forms of collective moral learning that might one day also lead to a collective
legitimisation of interventions based on shared normative convictions rather than self-interest.
Movie in Japanese notion of the postcolonial subject will be a good example for such post-doctoral thought,
which is not to say that many of our concerns are not spot on and that processes of empowerment cannot be strategically manipulated,
but can and are starting from the assumptions of the hegemony of a liberal peace.
She seeks to understand best in intervention a social engineering in this position of
local agency requiring a new effort of reclaimed subjectivity and self-determination,
but still that it practical, that it might be difficult to understand why a locavore,
not a rural communities, might be victims of the new level of peace.
After reformulating genres as a member of a limited level of colonialism to use and expert discourses instead of cultivation,
it becomes apparent by her argument, actually foods and labour of core assumptions of the above outlined approach,
her and other critiques of neo liberalism echoing inside of Marx and rewrite them at
a level that technical instituted normal processes to cede more and more learning.
Hence, the danger of alienation and importance of information.
Nevertheless, by becoming either dominant force that retaliate and eliminate for the sake of winning,
or by solely taking perspective of a presumably victim of colonisation.
Both of the aforementioned mentioned and constructive voices often leave the actual policy discourse to others many realists and powerbrokers
of national interests who think only in terms short on frames of elections and benefit from failed normative communication process.
In the left of left discourse of globally applied idealism starts with the simple observation that by seeking to communicate fully and proactively,
any critique will be unable to contribute to the reversal of the present and expanding systemic colonisation of culture, specific,
forward looking, expert discourses and cultural oversight that is ongoing through systemic policies of money, security and power.
Those vague discourses and meaning resources that, according to the ERA,
the main catalysts for transformation of integrated virtues should be the main reference point for empowerment and
the development of new policies and processes and subsequent systemic civilisation on every political system within,
and eventually to generate and bring about change as a result of this need for conceptual adaptation and is the absence of the latter,
let a planning stage in thinking within walls and revolutions and one who local stabilisation process of integrated with
information that is systematically misunderstood and contributes to the creation of deep psychological extended linkages,
and also the different context that nation states possess gone how it is that society needs to as much to remain relevant.
I would argue that such a cosmopolitan worldview would be desirable and must not preclude narrative commercial integration at local level,
or at least like entropy, that other countries, insofar as they are fully realised, have a distinct value.
And so first enable communication and both parties to engage in dialogue,
to processes of justification that they normally would seek to avoid based on shared human experience.
They set that they specify the stepping stone for dialogue between civilisations and futures.
A lot of these. At the same time,
it's worth keeping in mind that the person scope the action depends on the international order that mitigates
national interest if further unleashed to the embellishment of and to the abolishment of verbatim for calm.
Even inclusion of the. A more permanent member state may, through strategic coalitions in the long term, create more intelligence,
uncertainty, conflict and undermine the principles of the UN Charter even more and creating additional commitments.
Reform requires innovative and detailed thought and prevention,
but its implementation that takes complementary needs for change and subsequent systemic stabilisation at all levels,
and to account as also the pitfalls in terms of logical manipulation.
Put simply, critical thinking based is of value to the art of the debate.
And so far as it can contextualise the notion further as part of a further
reaching discourse analysis that could help to shape policies of prevention,
it could develop new dimensions of its practical application to establish for your work in terms of discourse, ethics, cognitive psychology,
sociology of law, and I are fairly the latter provide insights that might be helpful if we got to this further specification of negotiation,
mediation tools and communicative strategies for normative advocacy and capacity building at the local, national, regional and international level.
In this context, one would have to differentiate between like minded or critical approaches like enclosures
that acknowledge the value of universal pragmatics and helpful procedural shortcut cuts.
Another cosmopolitan approach is such a Aeschylus will argue that cosmopolitan agency,
the conflict over cosmopolitan Georgia is a distant possibility and instrumentalized
approaches like terrorism as simultaneously incorporate and negate cosmopolitan beliefs.
By now, it should be clear why a model of instrument,
of realist approach to applied positions that seeks to derive legitimacy from a prospective effectiveness
of interventions and serve and actions rather than genuine humanitarian intervention into action,
would signify a contradiction in terms.
Adamson's approach was to understand the fundamental difference between instrumental and strategic and more practical in the knowledge,
interests and the function of law and language as the need for social integration,
which explains his ultimate conclusion that need to be won will be, in most cases, the most legitimate and to be known.
However, I hope to have shown that from my previous discussions that prospect of succeeding
humanitarian action and creation of solid nations and state structures that appear to depend
more on the integrative imagination of those you construct in local and regional expert
that military actors would find very difficult to relate to as a result of competing,
strategic, normative and communicative interests best expressed in the above mentioned commissioned study of the US Ministry of Defence,
which leaves the ball very much in the court of the vision and expert discourses.
To end on a practical note, that may be less contentious than the court, which is one suggestion of Eden.
It would make sense to appoint indigenous expert discourses that could also include religious scholars
at an early stage of an intervention who could liaise with other actors on the wider test of perception,
peacebuilding and nation building, especially with special emphasis on integrative cultural and legal practice.
This could happen in conjunction with other consultative processes of constitutions and elections,
a task that the UN, despite the Peacebuilding Commission as a result of the Stockholm cratic focus.
Often it could serve as example. To best practice in this regard would be the very successful in terms of religious competency alone.
In this context, it might be useful to consider different format for finding a common case example in terms of put in context.
But this would be entirely different in discussion. Thank you very much.
Okay. Thank you. Thanks. Can I open it up to questions?