1 00:00:01,920 --> 00:00:09,510 Let me move on to introducing both Aiden and Kristie. 2 00:00:10,320 --> 00:00:16,830 Aiden here is director of the Security and International Relations Program at the University of Westminster. 3 00:00:17,460 --> 00:00:26,610 He has published widely on humanitarian intervention, state building, the prevention of genocide, and in particular, the responsibility to protect. 4 00:00:27,030 --> 00:00:30,900 And he's the author of a recent book called The Responsibility to Protect. 5 00:00:31,680 --> 00:00:36,240 It was published in 2011 or 2012, 12, 2012. 6 00:00:37,710 --> 00:00:45,420 Yes, here it says 2012 rhetoric, reality and the future of humanitarian intervention, which forms the basis for some of his remarks today. 7 00:00:45,690 --> 00:00:49,350 But he's also written about humanitarian intervention more broadly, 8 00:00:49,980 --> 00:00:57,880 an introduction that's used a lot in teaching and research on the subject, but also specifically on debates after Kosovo. 9 00:00:57,900 --> 00:01:02,580 His book, Humanitarian Intervention After Kosovo, published in 2008. 10 00:01:02,610 --> 00:01:08,310 He's also the assistant editor of the Journal of Intervention and State Building, which some of you will be aware of, 11 00:01:09,210 --> 00:01:13,740 and a senior lecturer in international relations at the University of Westminster. 12 00:01:14,610 --> 00:01:20,070 Now, Kristie, outraged by should use her formal name, but we know her as Christie and Kristen Rash. 13 00:01:20,130 --> 00:01:24,690 Dorp has been a visiting fellow at Iraq last year. 14 00:01:25,080 --> 00:01:28,200 And it was a great experience for us to have Christie with us. 15 00:01:28,710 --> 00:01:38,100 She is serving now as a political affairs officer with UNAMI in Baghdad and she spent her sabbatical from February to June last year here, 16 00:01:38,100 --> 00:01:46,140 where she was looking at a comparative study on U.S. peacekeeping operations with a focus on issues related to peacekeeping in RTP. 17 00:01:47,040 --> 00:01:54,749 She has a long track record with the United Nations, having worked for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan, 18 00:01:54,750 --> 00:02:01,860 UNAMA and Sierra Leone and also worked for the ICI TR in Arusha and Kigali. 19 00:02:02,370 --> 00:02:12,720 Before joining the U.N., she had positions with the OSCE and NGOs in Palestine, Kosovo, Bosnia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda. 20 00:02:12,780 --> 00:02:18,900 Christie has spent lots of time in a number of interesting countries, which we've discussed at Iraq. 21 00:02:19,590 --> 00:02:25,739 So the way that Aden and Christie are going to divide up the discussion is Aden is going to talk more generally 22 00:02:25,740 --> 00:02:33,270 about the development of the concept of responsibility to protect and the challenges with its operationalisation. 23 00:02:33,270 --> 00:02:42,960 And his critique is really based. I'll let him tell you more, but on some of the difficulties with translating moral intentions into practice. 24 00:02:43,320 --> 00:02:47,670 Our two piece was essentially designed to address problems of inaction and 25 00:02:47,670 --> 00:02:51,990 inconsistency and aid and ask questions about whether it's succeeded in doing that. 26 00:02:53,460 --> 00:03:04,080 Whereas Christie's going to look more at more scholarly, critical approaches to studying and understanding the responsibility to protect. 27 00:03:04,410 --> 00:03:08,700 And she takes, I think, a less critical stance the nation in some respects. 28 00:03:09,420 --> 00:03:13,260 She wants to continue to keep normative ideas at the heart of our TP. 29 00:03:13,500 --> 00:03:18,180 But she also offers us a framework drawn from critical theory for thinking about our topic. 30 00:03:19,050 --> 00:03:25,110 So we'll start with Aden. They're each going to speak for about 20 minutes, and then I'm sure you will have questions for them. 31 00:03:25,260 --> 00:03:30,410 So, Aden, if you want to begin. All right. Thank you very much, Jennifer, for the invite. 32 00:03:30,420 --> 00:03:32,460 It's great to be here and thank you all for coming today. 33 00:03:33,780 --> 00:03:39,270 Before I get into I, I always feel I have to kind of start by saying I'm not a pessimistic guy. 34 00:03:40,830 --> 00:03:48,239 I often feel prickly with Jennifer when I run a roundtable or a panel of some kind in San Diego earlier this year. 35 00:03:48,240 --> 00:03:54,300 And certainly afterwards, a lot of people were saying, I get so cynical as a negative, you're so pessimistic, this kind of thing. 36 00:03:55,050 --> 00:03:59,790 And I'd like to think that I'm not in terms of my disposition, but certainly when it comes to our P, 37 00:04:00,240 --> 00:04:06,660 I would certainly agree I'm quite critical of this and I don't believe it's going to achieve an awful lot or has achieved an awful lot. 38 00:04:07,410 --> 00:04:14,340 And in that sense, I suppose I'm very obviously standing in sharp contrast to people like Gareth Evans. 39 00:04:14,340 --> 00:04:19,080 And there's a quote from Gareth Evans that I like to read out quite a lot. 40 00:04:19,740 --> 00:04:23,580 He says, All too P has made contributions that seem likely to have a lasting impact, 41 00:04:24,060 --> 00:04:29,520 and he describes it as a brand new international norm of really quite fundamental importance and novelty. 42 00:04:29,850 --> 00:04:37,919 That is unquestionably a major breakthrough. And is this type of language, this type of rhetoric that tends to, I suppose, 43 00:04:37,920 --> 00:04:46,360 inspire me would be the word to write about or to p I particularly as well after the intervention in Libya when Ban Ki moon and you know, 44 00:04:46,860 --> 00:04:54,480 dozens of other people greeted this with great fanfare and Ban Ki moon said or two PE has arrived and from my point of view, 45 00:04:54,720 --> 00:05:00,840 looking at RTP and its record, I believe we have to judge it on its impact on state behaviour. 46 00:05:01,290 --> 00:05:05,400 Not on whether or not this has become ubiquitous in international political discourse. 47 00:05:05,580 --> 00:05:10,560 I don't think the fact that it is a popular term is indicative of its efficacy. 48 00:05:10,710 --> 00:05:12,810 I think the two things have to be separated. 49 00:05:13,670 --> 00:05:20,790 And just to start well, what I'd like to do is just to try and contrast why RTP was established in the first place, 50 00:05:20,790 --> 00:05:27,240 why the International Commission on Intervention, State Sovereignty, the OASIS Commission, why that was established in the first place. 51 00:05:27,270 --> 00:05:35,669 Compare that with our duty today. If we think about the ICC commission, it came at the end, obviously of the 1990s. 52 00:05:35,670 --> 00:05:43,110 It was established in the wake of the question, the famous question that Kofi Annan asked in 1999 after the intervention in Kosovo. 53 00:05:43,800 --> 00:05:50,879 And really it was borne from the inconsistent responses in the 1990s to humanitarian, inter-state humanitarian crises, 54 00:05:50,880 --> 00:05:58,800 most obviously manifest, I think, in 1994, where there was a Chapter seven mandated intervention to deal with the situation in Haiti. 55 00:05:59,040 --> 00:06:06,480 But there wasn't with respect to Rwanda and this problem of what Simon Chesterman described as in humanitarian non-intervention, 56 00:06:06,720 --> 00:06:10,920 you know, a lot of people, a lot of critics of humanitarian intervention and I'm certainly not a critic of humanitarian intervention, 57 00:06:10,980 --> 00:06:14,280 a lot of critics feared we were going to have constant intervention. 58 00:06:14,430 --> 00:06:18,000 It was just, you know, imperious plot, which I don't agree with. 59 00:06:18,570 --> 00:06:22,139 And Chesterman I do agree with said the problem isn't too many interventions. 60 00:06:22,140 --> 00:06:25,980 The problem is, you know, the proliferation of any humanitarian non-intervention. 61 00:06:26,220 --> 00:06:33,360 Okay. And additionally, in tangible, inconsistent response was the problem of unilateral intervention action without the Security Council. 62 00:06:33,360 --> 00:06:42,719 And that was obviously Kosovo. The issue wasn't with sovereignty, wasn't with the laws governing the use of force, 63 00:06:42,720 --> 00:06:47,550 with respects to the principle of defending, ah, looking after your own citizens. 64 00:06:49,250 --> 00:06:53,730 The notion of states have an internal responsibility wasn't necessarily all that contentious. 65 00:06:54,030 --> 00:06:57,030 And this was reflected in Kofi Annan's reflective report on Rwanda, 66 00:06:57,030 --> 00:07:01,380 where he said the problem in Rwanda wasn't that we didn't have the legal means to intervene. 67 00:07:01,530 --> 00:07:07,680 The problem was, as he said, the failure to intervene was driven more by the reluctance of member states to act. 68 00:07:08,280 --> 00:07:13,740 Not that we didn't have laws or not that the government in Rwanda claimed the right to do whatever it wanted to its own people. 69 00:07:14,520 --> 00:07:18,719 So ultimately, if that is the nature of the problem, I believe we can localise, 70 00:07:18,720 --> 00:07:27,900 we can focus it into one particular issue, which is the influence of politics on law enforcement and essentially the P5, 71 00:07:28,590 --> 00:07:35,070 the fact that the permanent five members of the Security Council have this enormous power but no duty to act, 72 00:07:35,370 --> 00:07:41,670 hence this inconsistent record now or two feet from that basis has emerged. 73 00:07:42,000 --> 00:07:47,460 Okay. What does it become today? Well, it has instituted no change in the laws governing the use of force. 74 00:07:47,760 --> 00:07:56,730 It is not instituted no change in the institutions charged with enforcing the laws, certainly no duty to act and the veto power of the P-5 remains. 75 00:07:58,410 --> 00:08:00,780 That's the legal side of it. In terms of the strategic side of it, 76 00:08:00,780 --> 00:08:08,720 then the strategy has been of creating moral norms and exercising leverage through global civil society and popular advocacy. 77 00:08:08,970 --> 00:08:17,460 The notion that if we can, you know, get this term widely used, it will create a normative pressure that the P5 and other states simply cannot resist. 78 00:08:17,970 --> 00:08:23,820 And then the second side of that strategy, which I don't have time to talk about today, but has been this increased focus on prevention? 79 00:08:24,360 --> 00:08:27,300 It's not really about reaction, actually. You know, it's really about prevention. 80 00:08:27,310 --> 00:08:32,430 That was the thing we always wanted to emphasise and I've said elsewhere, I think that's evasion. 81 00:08:33,210 --> 00:08:39,870 The result of that, however, the result of the strategy and the lack of legal change I think has been manifest with respect to the Arab Spring. 82 00:08:41,820 --> 00:08:51,570 And what respects to Syria, I think is very clear to have a system where the U.N. Secretary-General and Kofi Annan, as the special envoy to Syria, 83 00:08:51,570 --> 00:08:57,810 end up pleading with the Security Council to do something is an embarrassment and, 84 00:08:58,230 --> 00:09:01,410 you know, degrades the international system is embarrassing for the U.N. 85 00:09:01,680 --> 00:09:04,920 It's embarrassing for international law, a law for. 86 00:09:06,150 --> 00:09:11,130 If we look at how the situation has been dealt with at the Security Council on two occasions, 87 00:09:11,610 --> 00:09:17,310 China and Russia have both cast double vetoes against very modest action. 88 00:09:17,970 --> 00:09:20,670 There wasn't a proposal to intervene militarily in Syria. 89 00:09:21,210 --> 00:09:27,090 These were very modest proposals to do something about what was happening in Syria, and even that was too much for China and Russia. 90 00:09:27,450 --> 00:09:35,430 So we end up with this spectacle of the UN general and the special envoy pleading for action, the Security Council simply not taking action. 91 00:09:35,790 --> 00:09:38,880 And then we have the chorus of outrage from non-governmental organisations. 92 00:09:39,420 --> 00:09:47,730 Now that surely is very reminiscent of Bosnia in 1992 and of many humanitarian crises which predate RTP. 93 00:09:48,240 --> 00:09:51,520 And in that sense I think, I think it's right to ask. 94 00:09:51,520 --> 00:09:55,080 But what has changed the problem in the Arab Spring, 95 00:09:55,170 --> 00:10:00,150 I think is very clear why we've had this inconsistent response intervention in Libya, non-intervention in Syria. 96 00:10:01,060 --> 00:10:11,350 It's the P5. Essentially. The reason for intervention in Libya was that Gadhafi had alienated himself so much from the Arab League, 97 00:10:11,350 --> 00:10:14,980 in particular from the Saudi royal family, that he'd no friends up there. 98 00:10:15,340 --> 00:10:21,020 The Arab League despised Gadhafi personally and were in favour of getting rid of his regime. 99 00:10:21,040 --> 00:10:30,549 I'm all in favour of the no fly zone. And if you read the explanations regarding the chronology of that particular intervention, all the key players, 100 00:10:30,550 --> 00:10:34,570 particularly Hillary Clinton, say when the Arab League called for intervention, that was the game changer. 101 00:10:34,990 --> 00:10:39,160 That meant we couldn't be seen to resist intervention in the face of the Arab League calling for intervention. 102 00:10:39,670 --> 00:10:42,130 Now, why did the Arab League call for intervention in Libya? 103 00:10:42,490 --> 00:10:48,610 Surely it wasn't because they have a concern for human rights, given how they reacted to the situation in Bahrain. 104 00:10:49,450 --> 00:10:52,840 So we have a situation that we can identify why there was intervention in Libya, 105 00:10:53,320 --> 00:10:56,380 which has much to do with geopolitics within that particular east region. 106 00:10:56,770 --> 00:11:03,190 Why was there no intervention in Syria? Again, I don't think you have to be a genius to point to the fact that particularly Russia's links, 107 00:11:03,190 --> 00:11:06,820 which Syria has shielded Syria from outside intervention. 108 00:11:07,540 --> 00:11:11,980 Why was there very, very little international criticism of Bahrain and why Bahrain? 109 00:11:12,400 --> 00:11:16,960 The Bahrain monarchy was doing. Again, because Bahrain very close ties with Saudi Arabia, 110 00:11:17,360 --> 00:11:21,339 the United States and the West more generally do not want to go against Saudi Arabia in that 111 00:11:21,340 --> 00:11:26,260 particular region and hence the situation in Bahrain where you have outside intervention, 112 00:11:26,650 --> 00:11:31,030 but outside intervention from the Gulf Cooperation Council to support the Bahrain government 113 00:11:31,030 --> 00:11:35,350 in putting down the protesters is met essentially with silence at the international level. 114 00:11:36,040 --> 00:11:43,930 So that's the practical result of our troop inconsistency, where you have an intervention in Libya but no intervention in Syria. 115 00:11:44,140 --> 00:11:51,010 And essentially the political considerations determining how the international community responds to inter-state crises. 116 00:11:52,030 --> 00:12:00,999 Now, in that sense, we have to confront this notion, which is invariably put forward, that because our topic is discussed widely and is widely used, 117 00:12:01,000 --> 00:12:08,440 has made this remarkable transition from being a kind of abstract academic notion in 2000, 2001 to becoming, you know, 118 00:12:08,440 --> 00:12:16,390 a key rhetorical term in international political discourse, that that in itself does not evidence its efficacy. 119 00:12:16,990 --> 00:12:19,240 And look as it as a quote about this, 120 00:12:19,240 --> 00:12:25,310 we talks about the amount of PhD thesis that have been written about RTP and the amount of books in this university. 121 00:12:25,330 --> 00:12:29,650 Yeah, well, I've written a book about RTP as well, but he says This is fantastic. 122 00:12:29,860 --> 00:12:36,070 You could fill a small library with these things as though that again in itself this is evidence of something good is emerging here. 123 00:12:36,910 --> 00:12:42,880 But beyond just the fact that academics and PSU students are writing about RTP, it certainly is also entering into international discourse. 124 00:12:43,000 --> 00:12:50,310 Nobody could deny that. However, the question I would ask is why would any state not support the response of the state? 125 00:12:51,220 --> 00:12:58,690 It's not actually all that controversial. If you look at a 2009 General Assembly debate on the responsibility to protect. 126 00:12:59,170 --> 00:13:04,720 If anybody has the time to read all the various different submissions made by the states at that debate, 127 00:13:04,750 --> 00:13:09,430 the fascinating not so much because of what the Western states say about it. 128 00:13:09,430 --> 00:13:15,070 But if you read what North Korea, what Iran and what Sudan say about the responsibility to protect, 129 00:13:15,430 --> 00:13:18,370 there is use of old responsibility practice fantastically. 130 00:13:18,390 --> 00:13:29,530 The Sudanese statement on RTP goes into social contract theory the need for the government to be responsive to the citizens, etc. etc. 131 00:13:29,890 --> 00:13:34,180 Of course, the very same government that's been indicted by the ICC that perpetrated 132 00:13:34,180 --> 00:13:39,129 massacres routinely in Darfur states can very easily nod their heads and say, 133 00:13:39,130 --> 00:13:43,390 Yes, we like RTP precisely because it's inherently vague. 134 00:13:44,400 --> 00:13:49,840 It's I describe it in my book as the agreement of 2005 as a triumph of the lowest common denominator. 135 00:13:50,410 --> 00:13:58,960 Okay. The one achievement that I would accept is constitutes achievement in 2005 was situating RTP as being focussed only on the four crimes listed. 136 00:13:59,170 --> 00:14:02,410 Beyond that, however, I don't see that as an awful lot to celebrate. 137 00:14:02,920 --> 00:14:11,080 Where are the thresholds? Where is there anything about cuties? It's so vague that essentially it amounts to a rhetorical commitment. 138 00:14:11,410 --> 00:14:19,000 We promise to behave internally and we also stand ready to act if citizens in our states need help. 139 00:14:19,600 --> 00:14:29,530 However, if rhetorical commitments to protect one's own citizens and even citizens abroad based on a system of self-regulation was sufficient. 140 00:14:30,160 --> 00:14:35,050 Then we would never have needed article because we've had that system for decades, if not centuries. 141 00:14:35,620 --> 00:14:38,650 If you look at the first part of the internal responsibility of states, 142 00:14:39,340 --> 00:14:43,900 states have very, very rarely, if ever suggested, particularly in the post charter era. 143 00:14:44,050 --> 00:14:53,290 We can do whatever we want internally. If you look at the number of international agreements states have signed since 1945 proscribing genocide, 144 00:14:53,290 --> 00:14:59,260 racial discrimination, torture, etc., etc., states are more than happy to put their hands up and say, we accept. 145 00:14:59,590 --> 00:15:02,629 We can't do certain things. Internally, what are they actually in force? 146 00:15:02,630 --> 00:15:08,630 That, of course, is not a another matter. After 2005, Tony Blair said for the first time at this summit, 147 00:15:08,630 --> 00:15:12,380 we agree that states do not have the right to do what they will within their own borders. 148 00:15:12,380 --> 00:15:20,720 But that's simply untrue. Ban Ki moon, for example, said all too P rests on longstanding obligations under international law. 149 00:15:21,110 --> 00:15:29,330 So anybody who's, you know, even had a cursory glance at international law regarding human rights will see that prior to 2005, 150 00:15:29,630 --> 00:15:34,350 there was dozens, if not hundreds of laws saying states cannot do certain things internally. 151 00:15:34,370 --> 00:15:37,830 The problem wasn't the absence of laws or rhetorical commitments. 152 00:15:37,850 --> 00:15:42,180 The problem was enforcing these internally in terms of the external aspect of. 153 00:15:42,890 --> 00:15:45,830 We will intervene if you don't adhere to the internal. 154 00:15:46,610 --> 00:15:52,520 Again, the 1990s demonstrated time and time again that there was a legal means for intervention. 155 00:15:52,550 --> 00:15:55,690 Chapter seven of the UN Charter. Okay. 156 00:15:55,700 --> 00:16:04,160 A number of times the Security Council said what's happening internally is a humanitarian disaster that we can't stand idly by and just watch. 157 00:16:04,880 --> 00:16:11,840 Resolution 794 passed in 1992 and a UN Somalia justified intervention on the basis of 158 00:16:11,840 --> 00:16:16,400 the magnitude of the human tragedy and the deterioration of the humanitarian situation. 159 00:16:17,090 --> 00:16:21,920 This is in 1992. In the course of the debate about how to respond to Somalia, 160 00:16:22,250 --> 00:16:30,560 Russia said it supported intervention because it claimed it had an obligation to put an end to the human tragedy in that country. 161 00:16:31,340 --> 00:16:35,899 Now, that's 1992, two years prior to the Arab Spring. 162 00:16:35,900 --> 00:16:43,130 Russia says it has an obligation. Now, it's very easy to say that obviously I have an obligation, but then later on, 163 00:16:43,280 --> 00:16:47,510 I don't have any obligation and shy away from having any kind of a duty ultimately. 164 00:16:48,440 --> 00:16:56,240 In the 1990s, we were it was very clear that because of the capacity of the Security Council to occasionally reach agreement on how to act, 165 00:16:56,570 --> 00:17:00,290 there was a legal means to address internal crises. 166 00:17:00,440 --> 00:17:04,670 The problem was there was no duty, there was no automatic response. 167 00:17:04,880 --> 00:17:08,720 Hence it became a question of are our national interests involved? 168 00:17:09,770 --> 00:17:12,889 Now what ought to be advocates say is that, yes, we're addressing that. 169 00:17:12,890 --> 00:17:19,730 We're addressing that latter problem about the national interest, because we're creating is no momentum that these states simply cannot resist. 170 00:17:20,810 --> 00:17:25,770 Now, I think it's very important, you know, it does something to that. I mean, I don't discount normative evolution. 171 00:17:26,120 --> 00:17:30,590 Norms do inform laws. Laws don't follow from from from above. 172 00:17:30,950 --> 00:17:33,650 They come from contestation and they come from normative discussion. 173 00:17:33,980 --> 00:17:39,950 However, when we talk about norms, we need to be very clear about differentiating them from from two things. 174 00:17:39,950 --> 00:17:46,580 Firstly, from political consequence, political culture like the Big Society, I don't think you can't call the Big Society the norm. 175 00:17:47,350 --> 00:17:53,299 Also need to differentiate between norms and common aspirations that we all want to make. 176 00:17:53,300 --> 00:17:57,379 Poverty history. Yes, we all want to make poverty. History is make poverty history a norm. 177 00:17:57,380 --> 00:18:01,130 No, I don't think so. It's a common aspiration, a norm. 178 00:18:01,130 --> 00:18:03,470 And I'm using a quote here from Therese Reinhold. 179 00:18:03,890 --> 00:18:11,600 She says, An interest objectively shared standard of appropriate behaviour, not just an aspiration and not just a commonly used term. 180 00:18:12,410 --> 00:18:13,520 And if we look at norms, 181 00:18:13,520 --> 00:18:21,739 and particularly the people who write extensively about that even more and think talk about the need to think seriously about the micro foundations 182 00:18:21,740 --> 00:18:28,130 on which theoretical claims about norms rest and evaluate those claims in the context of carefully designed historical and empirical research. 183 00:18:28,520 --> 00:18:33,560 Simply to say ought to be as popular. Everybody talks about it. Hence it's a norm, just doesn't cut it. 184 00:18:34,910 --> 00:18:39,170 If we talk about norms as being more than just popular terms and we look at, well, 185 00:18:39,170 --> 00:18:44,090 is there agreement, is there is into subjectively sharing standard of appropriate behaviour. 186 00:18:44,750 --> 00:18:48,150 We look at what ought to be is and we see it's inherently nebulous. 187 00:18:48,800 --> 00:18:56,990 Okay. First of all, there's the problem reflected in this growing canon of literature ought to be that altarpiece is absolutely everything. 188 00:18:57,840 --> 00:19:02,420 If you look at, you know, just type to pay into Amazon and see the book titles that come up. 189 00:19:02,930 --> 00:19:09,410 The responsibility to protect relating to the environment, climate change, the responsibility to protect relating to language. 190 00:19:10,070 --> 00:19:12,770 Everything is not one or two piece of it. 191 00:19:12,770 --> 00:19:20,989 We always talk about prevention and there are some aspects to rebuild and also reaction, but it's become so broad as to be essentially meaningless. 192 00:19:20,990 --> 00:19:27,649 You could say there's nothing it doesn't cover looking more specifically than at its nebulous nature, 193 00:19:27,650 --> 00:19:35,059 where the thresholds when do we decide that this particular issue demands being moved from pillar one to pillar two of the military, 194 00:19:35,060 --> 00:19:37,670 whatever it is, for example, it respects the Darfur. 195 00:19:38,060 --> 00:19:43,310 The sense was the first part of our trip is all about the primary responsibility being the whole state. 196 00:19:43,370 --> 00:19:47,030 The primary responsibility, therefore, is with the Sudanese government. Let's let them get on with it. 197 00:19:47,600 --> 00:19:51,210 Okay. Now, that obviously wasn't the data logic use. 198 00:19:51,230 --> 00:19:57,049 It respects the Libya very quickly moved from being. It's no longer possible to look at the primary responsibility of Libya. 199 00:19:57,050 --> 00:20:00,590 We have to jump in. Okay. But where is it clear? 200 00:20:00,820 --> 00:20:07,900 When that happens. Additionally, the question has to be raised about what do states understand by RTP? 201 00:20:07,930 --> 00:20:08,350 Again, 202 00:20:08,380 --> 00:20:17,500 if you go back to the General Assembly debate in 2009 and read what China says about to pay China it or to be at a General Assembly debate in 2009, 203 00:20:17,500 --> 00:20:24,820 compare what China says about RTP to what Sweden, the UK, the US say, and there are two very different understandings about RTP. 204 00:20:25,060 --> 00:20:32,680 How can we talk about it being a norm if we have two, if not more than two different alternatives, what that norm actually entails? 205 00:20:33,190 --> 00:20:42,580 Additionally, although the intervention in Libya was cited by many as a kind of the high watermark of all to be in the dawn of a new era, 206 00:20:43,690 --> 00:20:47,950 Jennifer isn't giving you a plug here. Wrote an article about the intervention. 207 00:20:47,950 --> 00:20:52,509 I mentioned a very important point here that in resolution 1973, 208 00:20:52,510 --> 00:20:55,959 there is no mention of the international community's responsibility to protect 209 00:20:55,960 --> 00:20:59,260 as a mention of Gaddafi's and Libya's responsibility to protect its own people. 210 00:20:59,650 --> 00:21:04,180 But the justification for intervention is not we have a responsibility to protect people in Libya. 211 00:21:04,660 --> 00:21:06,790 And what Jennifer says about that, and I would agree, 212 00:21:07,360 --> 00:21:12,280 is that this is evidence of the fact that it is still contested by some members of the Security Council. 213 00:21:12,460 --> 00:21:15,070 Now, that was at the time of 1973. 214 00:21:15,070 --> 00:21:24,190 It was contested subsequently as evidence that it appears to become even more contested because states that abstained on 1973 have said, 215 00:21:24,760 --> 00:21:32,409 if that's what our duty entails, we allow you to impose a no fly zone and you dramatically expand your understanding of what that means. 216 00:21:32,410 --> 00:21:35,080 And we're never going to sanction anything like that again. 217 00:21:35,500 --> 00:21:43,150 The suspicion about what our two pillars has grown since 1973, and arguably so has the contestation surrounding its meaning. 218 00:21:44,110 --> 00:21:49,090 In that sense, its status as a norm is very, very contested. 219 00:21:49,270 --> 00:21:52,780 I would suggest it's not a norm at all. It's a term that's used. 220 00:21:53,110 --> 00:21:59,379 The fact that it doesn't have a normative qualities, therefore totally undermines the argument that is normative force, 221 00:21:59,380 --> 00:22:09,430 that forcing states to take certain action and looking at this logic of championing moral norms over as the way to effect change. 222 00:22:10,210 --> 00:22:16,480 One of the key things, as reflected in the literature by advocates of ought to be is is an almost an 223 00:22:16,480 --> 00:22:20,990 arrogant dismissal of international law and the need to reform international law. 224 00:22:21,010 --> 00:22:26,110 It tends to be something that not all, but the majority of RTP advocates simply just don't talk about. 225 00:22:26,860 --> 00:22:35,629 In 2009, I interviewed lots of NGOs in New York over two pangas, and when I raised international law with them, it was almost like, why? 226 00:22:35,630 --> 00:22:38,709 Why, why are you talking about international law? We don't care about that. 227 00:22:38,710 --> 00:22:48,640 We're talking about normative momentum. And what I think is wrong with this is that it's born from an overinflated sense of global civil societies. 228 00:22:48,640 --> 00:22:56,560 Capacity to effect change in the little bubble in New York, it seems everything is is very exciting. 229 00:22:56,560 --> 00:23:03,430 We can do an awful lot of things and we're having meetings constantly what ought to be, and we're applying pressure all the time outside. 230 00:23:03,550 --> 00:23:10,570 However, to what extent does this normative force, this global civil society, really influence the P-5 in particular, Russia? 231 00:23:11,350 --> 00:23:15,879 Is there any evidence that decisions made in Moscow are influenced by primarily 232 00:23:15,880 --> 00:23:20,950 Western non-governmental organisations championing or to be same goes for China? 233 00:23:21,310 --> 00:23:24,340 The same also has to be asked about Western states. 234 00:23:25,300 --> 00:23:31,030 At least two examples stand out which demonstrate the limitations of global civil societies capacity to effect change. 235 00:23:31,450 --> 00:23:37,690 One would be Darfur, where global civil society had a fantastically successful campaign in terms of generating, 236 00:23:38,140 --> 00:23:42,250 you know, press coverage and headlines. Couldn't have done more. Even got George Clooney involved. 237 00:23:42,970 --> 00:23:51,850 However, action wasn't taken. You could also say about Iraq, massive international protests against Iraq, huge protests in Washington, London. 238 00:23:52,300 --> 00:23:58,420 And yet the governments in those countries ignored what seemed to be the majority opinion and went ahead anyway. 239 00:23:58,930 --> 00:24:02,560 I think we have to be very careful about assuming that normative momentum, 240 00:24:02,770 --> 00:24:07,810 global civil society revolts by INGOs are going to change the position of states. 241 00:24:08,650 --> 00:24:17,320 And it's a it's a it's a strategy, I think, that derives from a kind of a misplaced belief in kind of a totally logical understanding of history. 242 00:24:17,730 --> 00:24:22,600 The liberalism in the Cold War, it's the end of history. The spread of liberal values is irresistible. 243 00:24:22,930 --> 00:24:26,230 Therefore, law will eventually somehow catch up with morality. 244 00:24:26,260 --> 00:24:29,770 All we need to do is champion the right thing, and it simply will come. 245 00:24:30,430 --> 00:24:34,270 There was a there is a lack of a concrete strategy there. 246 00:24:34,930 --> 00:24:40,720 There was also a lack of understanding of why in the 1990s, these types of issues suddenly gained prominence. 247 00:24:41,140 --> 00:24:45,490 There's a sense that this is now a new era that's going to last forever. 248 00:24:45,910 --> 00:24:52,729 The spread of the liberal Western view, the changing conflict, the distribution of power, 249 00:24:52,730 --> 00:24:57,280 the international system, the rise of China, the rise of Russia. This tends not to be factored into the equation. 250 00:24:57,280 --> 00:25:00,400 How is that going to change the disposition of the. 251 00:25:00,650 --> 00:25:06,650 You already counsel as these states traditionally reluctant to embrace these types of norms that 252 00:25:06,650 --> 00:25:10,799 clearly will have to have a negative influence in the capacity of these particular norms to actually, 253 00:25:10,800 --> 00:25:15,710 if their norms at all, to do much to effect real change. 254 00:25:19,250 --> 00:25:31,040 Okay. Yeah. In the book I mentioned in the final chapter, an essay by Reinhold Niebuhr called The Children of Darkness, the Children of Light. 255 00:25:31,340 --> 00:25:35,960 And he talks in that essay about why we have democracy and why we have laws. 256 00:25:36,230 --> 00:25:40,610 Because we have laws and we have democracy not because people are good, but because people can't be trusted. 257 00:25:41,030 --> 00:25:47,120 We need to have accountability. We need to have legal systems so that we can enforce laws to stop people taking advantage. 258 00:25:48,050 --> 00:25:50,209 And he describes as the children of light, 259 00:25:50,210 --> 00:25:58,670 those people who naively think that we can simply talk about the right thing to do and expect the right thing to happen on the basis of that. 260 00:25:59,240 --> 00:26:06,229 And in the book, I try to draw a parallel between all two people today and the Children of Light that no one talked about, 261 00:26:06,230 --> 00:26:09,650 in the sense that granted, there were many good people, 262 00:26:09,650 --> 00:26:13,040 many very persuasive people out there who talk about the need to do the right thing, 263 00:26:13,040 --> 00:26:22,400 but they fail to understand the extent to which that has to be reflected in in laws, particularly laws regarding the enforcement of human rights. 264 00:26:23,090 --> 00:26:27,290 When we get into the question of what should be done, which is, of course, 265 00:26:27,290 --> 00:26:31,279 one of the questions people invariably ask to me, what we should be focusing on. 266 00:26:31,280 --> 00:26:38,660 Those of us who want to see humanitarian intervention happen when necessary is we need to discuss legal reform. 267 00:26:39,080 --> 00:26:42,600 This has been described by UN Peters as the missing link in order to be. 268 00:26:42,600 --> 00:26:45,650 It just doesn't exist there. And that's what we need to talk about. 269 00:26:46,670 --> 00:26:50,270 Toscanini, Hans Carlson, people like that that I've been reading a lot in the last year, 270 00:26:50,270 --> 00:26:54,530 they all talk about the current international legal system as being primitive, 271 00:26:54,530 --> 00:27:00,440 to use her hands, Carlson's word, precisely because of the problem at the latter end regarding enforcement. 272 00:27:00,620 --> 00:27:04,520 Not that there wasn't sufficient number of laws or moral norms floating around, 273 00:27:04,850 --> 00:27:16,490 but the enforcement of these laws and any functioning legal system has to have the of the means by which it can objectively enforce its laws. 274 00:27:17,360 --> 00:27:23,960 At the moment, we have a conflation between politics, national interest and the enforcement of laws, which is the P5. 275 00:27:24,650 --> 00:27:28,610 To try to work with that system is a waste of time. 276 00:27:29,420 --> 00:27:37,459 Unless that system divorces, political decision making and national interest because states will always have national interest from the objective 277 00:27:37,460 --> 00:27:45,140 enforcement of laws such as that regarding internal respect for human rights and external action to protect human rights. 278 00:27:45,560 --> 00:27:50,200 We're going to be locked into this cycle of occasional interventions where 279 00:27:50,200 --> 00:27:55,060 everyone gets very excited and they're usually in humanitarian non-intervention. 280 00:27:55,970 --> 00:28:03,500 Just to close. What I would say about our turkey is that it has chosen temporary fame over long term effectiveness. 281 00:28:04,190 --> 00:28:08,830 It's granted it's in the headlines in many of its key players like Gareth Evans are, you know, 282 00:28:09,620 --> 00:28:17,060 widely touted as the sort of heroes and people that should be vaunted are respected. 283 00:28:17,420 --> 00:28:24,530 But that type of superficial fame and ubiquity in the in the long term is not going to solve the underlying problem. 284 00:28:24,680 --> 00:28:33,799 The underlying problem has to be and must be identified as the legal deficiency at the heart of the present system, 285 00:28:33,800 --> 00:28:37,910 the inability of the international legal system to enforce its own laws. 286 00:28:38,090 --> 00:28:43,520 And if we want to generate norms and normative momentum, that should be the norm that we proliferate. 287 00:28:43,730 --> 00:28:52,070 The norm of legal change is essential if we want to effect a positive change in the record of interest. 288 00:28:52,340 --> 00:28:55,880 International responses to inter-state crises. I'll leave it there. 289 00:28:56,060 --> 00:29:02,780 Thanks. Thank you. I'm sure there's lots that we can pick up on in questions from from Aiden's remarks. 290 00:29:03,890 --> 00:29:07,670 And I've heard him give a couple of talks now and this one was slightly different. 291 00:29:07,670 --> 00:29:11,600 So it's I always I always pick out something different and I've got some questions of my own. 292 00:29:12,140 --> 00:29:21,100 Kristie, would you like to go next? Okay. We heard about a lot about this trip, I think, being official. 293 00:29:21,380 --> 00:29:29,480 I'm trying to make a point in my presentation the point that normative advocacy is not superficial but can be actually derived from discourse. 294 00:29:32,300 --> 00:29:39,740 Like I prepared to talk, basically, I'm going to beat this out, but I will make every effort to be intelligible. 295 00:29:40,040 --> 00:29:44,870 If you can't follow the argument, just raise your arm. And I know that need to kind of slow down. 296 00:29:44,960 --> 00:29:51,140 Okay, but wait, let me begin this presentation. 297 00:29:51,170 --> 00:30:00,380 Is then your okay on the evolution of actual discourses on intervention and state building and then interest ultimately. 298 00:30:01,540 --> 00:30:07,300 But eight months ago I followed with great interest for the nation of Dr. Leyla Khalil from Selassie at ILA, 299 00:30:07,970 --> 00:30:13,629 and as she outlined, the multitude of ways in which kind of insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, 300 00:30:13,630 --> 00:30:20,370 the agenda and the manipulation in power relations in terms of dire consequences for all involved, both in terms of lack of time, 301 00:30:20,420 --> 00:30:26,290 for meaningful interaction of host communities, civilian casualties and credibility of international actors. 302 00:30:26,950 --> 00:30:33,459 A critique of distorted emancipatory peacebuilding practice in particular directed at the US military and 303 00:30:33,460 --> 00:30:39,490 its normative strategy that suffered from a general paradox in so far as I simultaneously sought to defeat, 304 00:30:39,670 --> 00:30:48,879 assimilate and engage and hence was unable to maintain validity claims that would have been intelligible to the local population and other audiences, 305 00:30:48,880 --> 00:30:53,500 or uphold an internal ethics that would have prevented horrible transgressions such as adequate. 306 00:30:54,100 --> 00:30:57,400 Excuse me. Could you see that? Yeah. We can't hear you. 307 00:30:57,520 --> 00:31:09,040 Okay. In its relentless search for additional sources of legitimisation, it even sought to assimilate academic discourses. 308 00:31:09,820 --> 00:31:16,870 Her position some light on the larger question why international forces were unable to win hearts and minds and said you are buying into a 309 00:31:16,870 --> 00:31:25,810 narrative of internal focus and cross-cultural cooperation at local populations could have just been internalised easily and the fear perspective. 310 00:31:26,140 --> 00:31:33,760 It appears that this lack of common ground did not result from an imminent clash of civilisations unnecessarily, from a conflict between open, 311 00:31:33,760 --> 00:31:40,540 modern and close traditional views, as many had initially wanted to embrace change on their own cultural terms. 312 00:31:40,690 --> 00:31:45,519 In my view, it was more a consequence of an ongoing, no knowing, parallel, 313 00:31:45,520 --> 00:31:53,650 evolving worldviews that were in constant state of reinterpretation after 911 and less in the end, less and less space for goodwill, 314 00:31:53,830 --> 00:31:58,540 cross-cultural dialogue and humanitarian concerns that were added later on to the equation, 315 00:31:58,540 --> 00:32:05,850 only to discredit further the overall notion of humanitarianism and compete globally competing collective needs. 316 00:32:05,860 --> 00:32:12,249 We ID invest in the restoration of legal certainty amidst ongoing violence is 317 00:32:12,250 --> 00:32:15,610 lighter than competing narratives of cultural survival and the conservative 318 00:32:15,610 --> 00:32:26,770 backlash that Tom Elliott has described persuasively in the case of the U.S. the to the face closely the Society of the United States of fear, 319 00:32:27,580 --> 00:32:31,000 a term that captures the prevailing state of mind of a nation. 320 00:32:31,000 --> 00:32:41,030 So very different of that of the issues that. A customer, not an analyst. 321 00:32:41,120 --> 00:32:47,749 He's one of your favourite. I've got to stand for some type of shift in justification of international military practice, 322 00:32:47,750 --> 00:32:51,649 best expressed in the names of U.S. operations with meaning, 323 00:32:51,650 --> 00:32:56,900 which from the title to self-defence, the war on terrorism, and finally to war against evil. 324 00:32:57,200 --> 00:33:00,140 It was a narrative exclusively tailored for home audience, 325 00:33:00,290 --> 00:33:05,240 but it also sought to lobby with some support and not engage Afghans and just someone's view. 326 00:33:05,510 --> 00:33:11,660 One of the central contradictions of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is that that nation building efforts were typically, 327 00:33:11,780 --> 00:33:21,080 typically justified by reference to war on terror. But or to put this in more to the point, in the light of his own needs for consolidation, 328 00:33:21,090 --> 00:33:27,410 the U.S. did not concern itself with other integrative worldviews, which both proved a very costly mistake. 329 00:33:27,620 --> 00:33:34,520 As one remembers, as Dodge has put it, that the creation of a security community as a function of social integration, 330 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:41,930 the larger lives clearly of the cultural and legal domain, and not a systemic domain, a foreign strategic interest. 331 00:33:42,410 --> 00:33:51,130 A good example to prove the source of this argument are the Iraqi suffer themselves local security communities creation as a major factor. 332 00:33:51,140 --> 00:33:55,490 And then we are talking about a localised security initiative ongoing 333 00:33:55,490 --> 00:34:00,680 responsibility to protect U.S. sentiment found however further application to the 334 00:34:00,680 --> 00:34:08,930 notion of terrorism that perceptions of coalition partners in the West and the form of the powerful counter-narrative to cosmopolitanism of the 1990. 335 00:34:09,410 --> 00:34:13,969 Of all, it left the scenario when the end international effort, as we in the case of Afghanistan, 336 00:34:13,970 --> 00:34:18,110 still are looking for a dignified cut off point to minimise their losses, 337 00:34:18,350 --> 00:34:23,210 leaving a normative void in terms of perception of nation and state building 338 00:34:23,390 --> 00:34:28,010 behind an integration task that Europe has mastered with the head of the UN, 339 00:34:28,190 --> 00:34:33,110 at least for the time being of the last two years, with reference to his own history, ideas of nationhood, 340 00:34:33,110 --> 00:34:39,620 past democratic and constitutional practice, and processes of regional integration other than Afghanistan. 341 00:34:39,620 --> 00:34:43,790 In the light of an ongoing insurgency, paired power sharing, contested power, 342 00:34:44,090 --> 00:34:49,910 political processes and elections and contested histories with no other common reference point other than his 343 00:34:49,920 --> 00:34:55,280 frequent struggle against the views of the patients they most likely to for peace in the immediate future. 344 00:34:56,690 --> 00:34:59,019 So far, my reading of 911 related events, 345 00:34:59,020 --> 00:35:07,340 state intervention and stable impacts and its impact on our to be able to get back to emerging expert discourses and to strategic interests. 346 00:35:07,790 --> 00:35:13,670 Two months ago I attended a state level conference in Birmingham that did not deal with the issue of our troops directly. 347 00:35:14,000 --> 00:35:19,420 But that sort of discussion of state building would out in many ways the possibility of executive action. 348 00:35:20,120 --> 00:35:26,179 On one panel, a quantitative study funded by the US Department of Defence tried to operationalise the revival 349 00:35:26,180 --> 00:35:31,879 of Islam and to assess the impact on state building based on the hypothesis that Islam, 350 00:35:31,880 --> 00:35:37,890 presumably more than other religions, would be harmful to the idea of democracy within key questions of knowledge, interest, 351 00:35:38,060 --> 00:35:46,580 dialogue between the two civilisations and context explicitly inside a 7.0 that was entitled Political Approaches 352 00:35:46,580 --> 00:35:53,870 to State Building Projects and reiterated the minimalist argument that has been learned since nine 1990 that most, 353 00:35:53,870 --> 00:36:01,250 if not all international interventions on state but in the problematic and so far as they did more harm than good, 354 00:36:01,730 --> 00:36:07,490 I see them both from the outside by conceding that he would not normally out of this theoretical dilemma, 355 00:36:07,790 --> 00:36:10,550 a development agency in the human face on a daily basis. 356 00:36:11,300 --> 00:36:18,710 Another public could to Jackson suggested a decentralised and demilitarised pacifist version of the faith as a solution for the peace. 357 00:36:18,980 --> 00:36:26,070 That would also rule out applications of that opinion to them. Okay, this would have provided a good starting point for the presentation like this. 358 00:36:26,070 --> 00:36:33,560 Since notion of prevention and recovery within the RTP framework seem only plausible to the vital reference to state and peacebuilding. 359 00:36:34,430 --> 00:36:39,170 However, in the end, it was a paper by Mark Definite that ultimately caught my attention insofar as it 360 00:36:39,320 --> 00:36:44,550 served as a stern reminder of how much seems to be at stake at the last moment. 361 00:36:45,830 --> 00:36:51,559 But how much seems to be at stake for the UN as the last normative line of defence and the fumbling and 362 00:36:51,560 --> 00:36:58,790 contested more and more unipolar but order of 25 targeted assassinations and normative manipulation. 363 00:36:59,750 --> 00:37:07,130 The presentation that was today German lower than substance and so far as in the youth, the idea of an integrated land planning approach. 364 00:37:07,400 --> 00:37:13,910 But on paper, basically just to suggest to consider all problematic action taken within one interdependent 365 00:37:13,910 --> 00:37:19,710 context to the idea of business and culture control about individual knowledge of content. 366 00:37:21,260 --> 00:37:24,350 The Speaker concluded his plea against new level of peacebuilding, 367 00:37:24,350 --> 00:37:30,860 a notion that was developed by authors like Roxanne Richmond in a different context with a 368 00:37:30,860 --> 00:37:35,990 picture of as opposed to an official at work in a pool of a mobile phone and the champagne. 369 00:37:37,470 --> 00:37:45,299 And isn't a fashion even as modern. His most recent book a supposed level of authentic to some normative meaning for parties living in Member States, 370 00:37:45,300 --> 00:37:49,200 and the obligations on the responsibility to protect characterising their 371 00:37:49,200 --> 00:37:54,209 behaviour and moral efficacy as the ethics of public consumption by politicising 372 00:37:54,210 --> 00:37:58,140 the UN and other out of pocket will be teaching to the aim of provoking the 373 00:37:58,140 --> 00:38:02,640 other than being proactive on the legal implementation and development of forms. 374 00:38:03,150 --> 00:38:05,020 If all the votes just demonstrate to us, 375 00:38:05,040 --> 00:38:14,369 think the semantic concepts of utterly assorted notion of linguistic conceit which solely reaffirms the status quo and absence of a Security Council, 376 00:38:14,370 --> 00:38:22,019 the form and the form of the present world. Oh, this reminds me very much of the nineties that sort by England rebate on whether or not it 377 00:38:22,020 --> 00:38:27,270 should be abolished only what the difference that post-9-11 made to has from displays only to. 378 00:38:27,540 --> 00:38:33,569 And the defeat of terrorism by the UN and Islamic refugees are struggling to contain the subsequent damage 379 00:38:33,570 --> 00:38:39,840 in terms of general generic mistrust and most uncertainty amidst mounting criticism of no viable community, 380 00:38:39,840 --> 00:38:45,540 safe alternatives that would be ready for implementation. A member state endorsement, at least in the short term. 381 00:38:46,260 --> 00:38:50,969 And I would argue that it presents itself as a relevant a meaning based on similarities 382 00:38:50,970 --> 00:38:55,020 to the dilemmas of integrative work of youth construction at lower levels. 383 00:38:55,290 --> 00:39:01,380 The problematic if essentially the same as a discoursing with funding Habermas and Gadamer. 384 00:39:01,650 --> 00:39:04,950 I believe not only in the vital importance of a codification of law, 385 00:39:05,190 --> 00:39:10,130 but also in the circumvented the necessity to express and justify normative arguments that 386 00:39:10,140 --> 00:39:14,130 underline in the form of validity claims all forms of from indication and cognition, 387 00:39:14,490 --> 00:39:20,340 and with the necessity of applied speech in the possibility of dialogue, moral efficacy, law and peace. 388 00:39:21,090 --> 00:39:28,170 The school of thought that was developed as part of the right of the discipline of sociology of law is commonly known as university athletics. 389 00:39:28,770 --> 00:39:32,969 Its claim that the first speech already contains the promise of a universal 390 00:39:32,970 --> 00:39:37,950 association has become defining principle for both the country and cosmopolitanism. 391 00:39:38,640 --> 00:39:49,650 As a consequence, I value the responsibility to protect as a core principle of international ethics, regardless of conception of political. 392 00:39:52,430 --> 00:39:56,060 Differences or conflicting arguments with regard to such a implementation. 393 00:39:56,480 --> 00:40:03,920 Any effort to negate its necessity in substantive debate on international ethics or the form of the international world order, 394 00:40:04,280 --> 00:40:08,530 as you suggest, would, in my view, constitute a further of a contradiction. 395 00:40:08,810 --> 00:40:16,430 And so far as we would simultaneously seek to criticise an ideal and would seek to uphold in one form or the other in a different context, 396 00:40:16,940 --> 00:40:20,930 for example, from the condemnation against crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 397 00:40:21,590 --> 00:40:26,569 This being said, I'm also painfully aware of the necessary of the necessity of ideology, 398 00:40:26,570 --> 00:40:30,140 fatigue and procedural shortcomings in terms of accountability. 399 00:40:30,680 --> 00:40:34,280 It is in this context, I'm speaking of the necessity of idealism, 400 00:40:34,550 --> 00:40:42,380 a notion that will be very different from vices unworthy of domestic reform, demand, and so long a good government, but nothing compatible. 401 00:40:42,620 --> 00:40:46,520 And so far as it will not only acknowledge the value of ideal technical assumptions, 402 00:40:46,730 --> 00:40:52,520 but argue for that and circumvented the necessity as part of processes of mediation and cross-cultural dialogue. 403 00:40:52,580 --> 00:40:57,320 Take me to the reasoning. A model would further differ from other political, 404 00:40:57,330 --> 00:41:05,900 emancipatory approaches insofar as a leftist seek to uphold the idea of AKP and argue that its critics confuse state action and systemic intrusion. 405 00:41:06,140 --> 00:41:13,730 The notion of ATP itself, and they argue that the latter would be an expression of no and liberal interpretations of human security that would 406 00:41:13,730 --> 00:41:20,000 preclude an application of a cosmopolitan ethics on the ground up that could strengthen union security practice, 407 00:41:20,540 --> 00:41:25,639 calls for a postcolonial ethics of non hegemonic engagement as put forward that, for example, 408 00:41:25,640 --> 00:41:31,760 by that laws should reflect local responsibilities and perception of dignity and local, 409 00:41:32,660 --> 00:41:36,350 social and customary practice in relation to international peacebuilding. 410 00:41:36,350 --> 00:41:41,270 Wants to promote human security that if something is shown valid, 411 00:41:41,750 --> 00:41:46,100 they just have to be understood as a complementary process within a larger cross-cultural, 412 00:41:46,100 --> 00:41:50,690 dialogic event that similar to that the enclosure has developed in recent years. 413 00:41:51,740 --> 00:42:00,410 I will get back to this in a moment. And ideally ATP and I think a populist fly here. 414 00:42:03,520 --> 00:42:11,800 Ideally you should find its own expression in the universe and then send it a sort of enforcement justification and obligation. 415 00:42:12,070 --> 00:42:17,170 It would, however, not only require culturally sensitive ethics of action at the local level, 416 00:42:17,440 --> 00:42:21,940 but also checks and balances at the international level to avoid scenarios in which a third party. 417 00:42:27,250 --> 00:42:31,569 For example, simple could simply help the government by funding political convenient opposition 418 00:42:31,570 --> 00:42:36,730 forces that then might misuse a broader notion of advocacy for the strategic agenda, 419 00:42:36,970 --> 00:42:44,600 something that is at present not without not even through the moral threshold of the six principles that the ICC outlined as also, 420 00:42:44,650 --> 00:42:51,580 Roberts has noted, any word in which there is a dominant power is going to be a considerable interest in interventionism. 421 00:42:52,690 --> 00:43:00,250 An independent, extended judicial framework to enforce extended obligations like even for justice would make sense at the conceptual level. 422 00:43:00,730 --> 00:43:04,120 They might be problematic at the practical level in light of the fact that at 423 00:43:04,120 --> 00:43:08,500 present a majority of the Security Council members have not ratified the ICC. 424 00:43:08,530 --> 00:43:12,610 Secondly, judging from our interaction in the field of military actors, 425 00:43:12,640 --> 00:43:17,230 I also believe that the long awaited understanding for such foreseen in Article 43 426 00:43:17,230 --> 00:43:22,629 of the UN Charter would likely be an illusion of in the present international order 427 00:43:22,630 --> 00:43:27,459 unless the UN decides to build its own army from scratch and will not rely on two 428 00:43:27,460 --> 00:43:31,840 continents that bring with them multitude of problems in terms of command structure, 429 00:43:32,080 --> 00:43:39,970 good group dynamics and pressure. It would need to socialise its own force according to a particular set of leadership principles 430 00:43:40,240 --> 00:43:44,890 that would need to be internalised to an extent where previous national IDs would not matter. 431 00:43:45,910 --> 00:43:49,690 In this context, I would disagree with the sort of cosmopolitan agency, 432 00:43:49,930 --> 00:43:55,570 but social to become a universally negative, legitimate bearer, arms would fight for humanity. 433 00:43:55,810 --> 00:44:01,030 It would not necessarily require a cultural transformation in terms of duties applied to the vision, 434 00:44:01,060 --> 00:44:06,280 as she suggests, and they can understand and act upon conventional principles. 435 00:44:06,700 --> 00:44:11,620 But it would require reform of existing national military reasons to be socialisation practice. 436 00:44:11,950 --> 00:44:17,410 The public first would have to be abolished before it could be meaningful resuscitated in the war thunderstorm. 437 00:44:18,670 --> 00:44:23,590 However, aside from the question on how to best implement further teaching obligations, 438 00:44:24,100 --> 00:44:28,120 implied idealism would start off by looking at public relations and scope for agency 439 00:44:28,120 --> 00:44:32,500 within the present academic discourse that ultimately impacts on knowledge creation. 440 00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:37,930 It would aim to critically engage other forms of scholarship and relevant discipline by pointing 441 00:44:37,930 --> 00:44:43,329 out discourses fallacies that are also inherent in aspects of legal practice and often, 442 00:44:43,330 --> 00:44:51,460 ironically, not unlike the US military in the above cited examples seeking to retaliate by seeking to win the argument, 443 00:44:52,780 --> 00:44:58,180 by allowing for complete back line of communication and its mutual accusation of an ability 444 00:44:58,630 --> 00:45:03,070 to speak meaningfully rather than trying to achieve a consensus on game changing principles. 445 00:45:05,570 --> 00:45:09,830 They are based on the shared need for a sustainable world order and inclusive dialogue and power relations, 446 00:45:09,830 --> 00:45:15,080 and consequent distortion and distorted notions of truth, justice and authenticity. 447 00:45:15,500 --> 00:45:17,180 Dialogue then is aimed at prevention, 448 00:45:17,390 --> 00:45:24,150 and that this initiative is initiated to more accurately see and hear the difference in, believe and in enforcement. 449 00:45:24,170 --> 00:45:33,260 I believe in moral advocacy. Another relevancy will be the post-election discourse of a way that combines many concerns of political parties, 450 00:45:33,650 --> 00:45:40,190 often asserting the principle of pacifism, of doing more harm from fear, perspective or peace. 451 00:45:40,420 --> 00:45:47,540 post-Trump to oppose, which is often simply resigned in the light of silence and violated meaning, deprived of their normative ability. 452 00:45:47,570 --> 00:45:52,670 Standard citizens feel violations of the culture and other, and often leaving the multi-dimensional, 453 00:45:52,670 --> 00:45:57,559 systemic and likely interconnectedness of peacebuilding processes and the individual needs for 454 00:45:57,560 --> 00:46:03,540 empowerment amid suspicion concerning alienated expression of an impulse left unsaid dialogue, 455 00:46:03,700 --> 00:46:08,719 selective processes of the inside, a connectedness that is then disliked. 456 00:46:08,720 --> 00:46:12,770 And Linklater's latest book, The Problem of Hummingbird Politics, 457 00:46:13,340 --> 00:46:18,409 develops that the principle of doing no harm and lowest cosmopolitan denominator across culture, 458 00:46:18,410 --> 00:46:23,750 dialogue and higher forms of collective moral learning that might one day also lead to a collective 459 00:46:23,750 --> 00:46:28,790 legitimisation of interventions based on shared normative convictions rather than self-interest. 460 00:46:29,780 --> 00:46:35,300 Movie in Japanese notion of the postcolonial subject will be a good example for such post-doctoral thought, 461 00:46:35,900 --> 00:46:42,110 which is not to say that many of our concerns are not spot on and that processes of empowerment cannot be strategically manipulated, 462 00:46:42,110 --> 00:46:48,110 but can and are starting from the assumptions of the hegemony of a liberal peace. 463 00:46:48,110 --> 00:46:53,179 She seeks to understand best in intervention a social engineering in this position of 464 00:46:53,180 --> 00:46:58,640 local agency requiring a new effort of reclaimed subjectivity and self-determination, 465 00:46:59,120 --> 00:47:02,989 but still that it practical, that it might be difficult to understand why a locavore, 466 00:47:02,990 --> 00:47:06,170 not a rural communities, might be victims of the new level of peace. 467 00:47:07,370 --> 00:47:14,180 After reformulating genres as a member of a limited level of colonialism to use and expert discourses instead of cultivation, 468 00:47:14,510 --> 00:47:19,520 it becomes apparent by her argument, actually foods and labour of core assumptions of the above outlined approach, 469 00:47:20,090 --> 00:47:26,659 her and other critiques of neo liberalism echoing inside of Marx and rewrite them at 470 00:47:26,660 --> 00:47:31,160 a level that technical instituted normal processes to cede more and more learning. 471 00:47:31,880 --> 00:47:35,260 Hence, the danger of alienation and importance of information. 472 00:47:35,820 --> 00:47:41,000 Nevertheless, by becoming either dominant force that retaliate and eliminate for the sake of winning, 473 00:47:41,000 --> 00:47:45,200 or by solely taking perspective of a presumably victim of colonisation. 474 00:47:45,500 --> 00:47:53,659 Both of the aforementioned mentioned and constructive voices often leave the actual policy discourse to others many realists and powerbrokers 475 00:47:53,660 --> 00:48:00,320 of national interests who think only in terms short on frames of elections and benefit from failed normative communication process. 476 00:48:00,330 --> 00:48:10,520 In the left of left discourse of globally applied idealism starts with the simple observation that by seeking to communicate fully and proactively, 477 00:48:10,820 --> 00:48:18,020 any critique will be unable to contribute to the reversal of the present and expanding systemic colonisation of culture, specific, 478 00:48:18,020 --> 00:48:25,100 forward looking, expert discourses and cultural oversight that is ongoing through systemic policies of money, security and power. 479 00:48:25,430 --> 00:48:28,600 Those vague discourses and meaning resources that, according to the ERA, 480 00:48:28,760 --> 00:48:34,399 the main catalysts for transformation of integrated virtues should be the main reference point for empowerment and 481 00:48:34,400 --> 00:48:42,170 the development of new policies and processes and subsequent systemic civilisation on every political system within, 482 00:48:42,380 --> 00:48:50,080 and eventually to generate and bring about change as a result of this need for conceptual adaptation and is the absence of the latter, 483 00:48:50,900 --> 00:48:58,480 let a planning stage in thinking within walls and revolutions and one who local stabilisation process of integrated with 484 00:48:58,520 --> 00:49:07,660 information that is systematically misunderstood and contributes to the creation of deep psychological extended linkages, 485 00:49:07,670 --> 00:49:16,280 and also the different context that nation states possess gone how it is that society needs to as much to remain relevant. 486 00:49:16,280 --> 00:49:24,290 I would argue that such a cosmopolitan worldview would be desirable and must not preclude narrative commercial integration at local level, 487 00:49:25,970 --> 00:49:32,600 or at least like entropy, that other countries, insofar as they are fully realised, have a distinct value. 488 00:49:32,600 --> 00:49:36,320 And so first enable communication and both parties to engage in dialogue, 489 00:49:36,330 --> 00:49:42,709 to processes of justification that they normally would seek to avoid based on shared human experience. 490 00:49:42,710 --> 00:49:47,090 They set that they specify the stepping stone for dialogue between civilisations and futures. 491 00:49:47,090 --> 00:49:51,079 A lot of these. At the same time, 492 00:49:51,080 --> 00:49:56,540 it's worth keeping in mind that the person scope the action depends on the international order that mitigates 493 00:49:56,540 --> 00:50:02,790 national interest if further unleashed to the embellishment of and to the abolishment of verbatim for calm. 494 00:50:03,060 --> 00:50:11,960 Even inclusion of the. A more permanent member state may, through strategic coalitions in the long term, create more intelligence, 495 00:50:12,770 --> 00:50:18,920 uncertainty, conflict and undermine the principles of the UN Charter even more and creating additional commitments. 496 00:50:19,610 --> 00:50:22,880 Reform requires innovative and detailed thought and prevention, 497 00:50:23,300 --> 00:50:29,230 but its implementation that takes complementary needs for change and subsequent systemic stabilisation at all levels, 498 00:50:29,240 --> 00:50:33,800 and to account as also the pitfalls in terms of logical manipulation. 499 00:50:34,340 --> 00:50:39,320 Put simply, critical thinking based is of value to the art of the debate. 500 00:50:39,620 --> 00:50:43,609 And so far as it can contextualise the notion further as part of a further 501 00:50:43,610 --> 00:50:47,300 reaching discourse analysis that could help to shape policies of prevention, 502 00:50:47,630 --> 00:50:56,270 it could develop new dimensions of its practical application to establish for your work in terms of discourse, ethics, cognitive psychology, 503 00:50:56,450 --> 00:51:04,030 sociology of law, and I are fairly the latter provide insights that might be helpful if we got to this further specification of negotiation, 504 00:51:04,040 --> 00:51:11,480 mediation tools and communicative strategies for normative advocacy and capacity building at the local, national, regional and international level. 505 00:51:11,840 --> 00:51:16,940 In this context, one would have to differentiate between like minded or critical approaches like enclosures 506 00:51:17,900 --> 00:51:23,360 that acknowledge the value of universal pragmatics and helpful procedural shortcut cuts. 507 00:51:23,630 --> 00:51:29,060 Another cosmopolitan approach is such a Aeschylus will argue that cosmopolitan agency, 508 00:51:29,240 --> 00:51:34,610 the conflict over cosmopolitan Georgia is a distant possibility and instrumentalized 509 00:51:34,820 --> 00:51:39,320 approaches like terrorism as simultaneously incorporate and negate cosmopolitan beliefs. 510 00:51:39,800 --> 00:51:41,959 By now, it should be clear why a model of instrument, 511 00:51:41,960 --> 00:51:48,050 of realist approach to applied positions that seeks to derive legitimacy from a prospective effectiveness 512 00:51:48,050 --> 00:51:54,080 of interventions and serve and actions rather than genuine humanitarian intervention into action, 513 00:51:54,320 --> 00:51:56,570 would signify a contradiction in terms. 514 00:51:57,140 --> 00:52:04,580 Adamson's approach was to understand the fundamental difference between instrumental and strategic and more practical in the knowledge, 515 00:52:04,580 --> 00:52:08,930 interests and the function of law and language as the need for social integration, 516 00:52:09,440 --> 00:52:16,580 which explains his ultimate conclusion that need to be won will be, in most cases, the most legitimate and to be known. 517 00:52:17,120 --> 00:52:21,799 However, I hope to have shown that from my previous discussions that prospect of succeeding 518 00:52:21,800 --> 00:52:27,560 humanitarian action and creation of solid nations and state structures that appear to depend 519 00:52:27,560 --> 00:52:32,300 more on the integrative imagination of those you construct in local and regional expert 520 00:52:32,720 --> 00:52:36,920 that military actors would find very difficult to relate to as a result of competing, 521 00:52:36,920 --> 00:52:44,090 strategic, normative and communicative interests best expressed in the above mentioned commissioned study of the US Ministry of Defence, 522 00:52:44,450 --> 00:52:48,710 which leaves the ball very much in the court of the vision and expert discourses. 523 00:52:50,060 --> 00:52:55,910 To end on a practical note, that may be less contentious than the court, which is one suggestion of Eden. 524 00:52:56,780 --> 00:53:01,579 It would make sense to appoint indigenous expert discourses that could also include religious scholars 525 00:53:01,580 --> 00:53:07,399 at an early stage of an intervention who could liaise with other actors on the wider test of perception, 526 00:53:07,400 --> 00:53:12,920 peacebuilding and nation building, especially with special emphasis on integrative cultural and legal practice. 527 00:53:13,250 --> 00:53:18,290 This could happen in conjunction with other consultative processes of constitutions and elections, 528 00:53:18,800 --> 00:53:23,650 a task that the UN, despite the Peacebuilding Commission as a result of the Stockholm cratic focus. 529 00:53:23,660 --> 00:53:31,520 Often it could serve as example. To best practice in this regard would be the very successful in terms of religious competency alone. 530 00:53:32,300 --> 00:53:39,980 In this context, it might be useful to consider different format for finding a common case example in terms of put in context. 531 00:53:40,310 --> 00:53:43,370 But this would be entirely different in discussion. Thank you very much. 532 00:53:43,660 --> 00:53:49,700 Okay. Thank you. Thanks. Can I open it up to questions?