1 00:00:02,490 --> 00:00:06,450 Identifying vulnerability and ambiguity in the US. 2 00:00:06,450 --> 00:00:12,390 The Great, both the civilian and military world just loves models, mathematical models. 3 00:00:13,140 --> 00:00:16,020 But the problem is that they're not capturing the nuance. 4 00:00:16,620 --> 00:00:22,769 And because they're not capturing nuance, if you only have good data going in, then you're understanding what's happening. 5 00:00:22,770 --> 00:00:26,610 If you don't, if you have limited data or siloed data, then there's big problems. 6 00:00:27,120 --> 00:00:33,480 So I've seen that as a huge problem and not only in the US, but they're particularly vulnerable to that with mathematical modelling. 7 00:00:33,990 --> 00:00:41,940 But elsewhere as well. We focusing on transitions, developing effective responses for different volatile environments, 8 00:00:42,450 --> 00:00:46,670 a non cookie cutter approach and avoiding unintended consequences. 9 00:00:46,680 --> 00:00:48,509 Let's see how this is going to play out. 10 00:00:48,510 --> 00:00:57,510 That vulnerability and ambiguity in crises civilian perceptions of personal security is an under-discussed issue. 11 00:00:58,170 --> 00:01:01,889 What do people in the country really think will keep them safe? 12 00:01:01,890 --> 00:01:07,200 And there's been a few attempts at understanding that, but mostly it's been an external view of security. 13 00:01:07,200 --> 00:01:14,580 It's either been a military version of security, it's been a human rights aid organisations version of security. 14 00:01:15,360 --> 00:01:21,030 But usually that often the people in country are not really asked use on a generosity of force. 15 00:01:21,570 --> 00:01:24,750 And they're it's about their exposure to formal and informal armed groups. 16 00:01:24,750 --> 00:01:30,150 And early on, long before Iraq and Afghanistan, I understood that communities could be, 17 00:01:30,540 --> 00:01:36,780 if you want to use the term occupied or are would be visited by formal forces during the day. 18 00:01:37,320 --> 00:01:45,389 It's could be security forces, could be army, it could be policing who would then leave at night and then be visited by informal forces, 19 00:01:45,390 --> 00:01:51,840 militias, rebels, terrorists, whoever at night and civilians would be caught in the middle. 20 00:01:52,290 --> 00:01:56,040 So I'd be asking, who did you see? What are they saying? But they're caught in the middle there. 21 00:01:56,040 --> 00:01:59,610 It's their lives at stake. They're the ones in true danger and they feel unprotected. 22 00:02:00,990 --> 00:02:05,090 Different roles of civilians, of complex crises. Well, as far as I'm concerned, 23 00:02:05,100 --> 00:02:12,870 you got some role play the Bible on that and killing civilians about depicting the many roles of civilians in these situations. 24 00:02:13,380 --> 00:02:19,110 I also found victim and perpetrator were often the same person it depending on timing 25 00:02:19,770 --> 00:02:26,549 a victim could a victim defined as individuals and communities often were targeted, 26 00:02:26,550 --> 00:02:28,709 had the most horrific incidents happened to them, 27 00:02:28,710 --> 00:02:35,310 but could later in the right circumstances and act exactly the same on the group that originally attacked them. 28 00:02:35,730 --> 00:02:41,670 So there a cycle of revenge that was being perpetuated complicit supporters in 29 00:02:41,670 --> 00:02:47,040 communities and areas who just would allow groups to come in and never say anything, 30 00:02:47,040 --> 00:02:50,190 would see things happening and never say a word. 31 00:02:50,730 --> 00:02:54,720 Then a truly tragic, innocent bystander overtaken by events. 32 00:02:54,990 --> 00:03:03,719 This is really the real sad, sad situation of of individuals and communities who have no interest in conflict. 33 00:03:03,720 --> 00:03:09,720 Trying to live their lives are in the wrong place and time and then community advocate not activists 34 00:03:09,990 --> 00:03:16,559 are are highly visible people individuals so on who understand that they can be targeted, 35 00:03:16,560 --> 00:03:23,340 who have an understanding of the risks, the different roles of formal informal security forces and complex crises. 36 00:03:23,340 --> 00:03:30,209 Unfortunately, as we have seen, both state forces, formal forces and informal militias, 37 00:03:30,210 --> 00:03:34,350 rebel forces can both uphold law and order and protect civilians, 38 00:03:34,350 --> 00:03:41,069 and they can enact agendas and kill civilians depending on the situation either or in a conflict. 39 00:03:41,070 --> 00:03:46,560 And a real understanding of that by external civilian and military groups is essential. 40 00:03:48,630 --> 00:03:57,480 Refocusing on transitions is developing and communicating strategies for addressing major shifts within a country region caused by conditioned events. 41 00:03:57,480 --> 00:04:03,390 Time. Everyone was woefully unprepared for what happened in North Africa, really unprepared for Syria. 42 00:04:04,470 --> 00:04:10,800 If there's any way to anticipate and begin to understand that this the transitions that are the hard part 43 00:04:11,610 --> 00:04:17,430 stop stopping fighting or preventing fighting or securing an area is might very well be the easy part. 44 00:04:17,730 --> 00:04:21,540 But assisting an area in transition in a region transitioning is difficult. 45 00:04:22,170 --> 00:04:28,229 Refocus civilian military interventions on conflict transformation, prevention, mitigation, they said, 46 00:04:28,230 --> 00:04:37,470 protecting individuals and communities also in addressing the legitimacy of the judicial and political systems that exists in that country or region. 47 00:04:38,580 --> 00:04:42,750 Whether they're perceived to be legitimate or not is makes a huge difference. 48 00:04:43,080 --> 00:04:48,360 Host Nation Ownership and capacity. Is there an infrastructure, institutional infrastructure? 49 00:04:48,360 --> 00:04:56,550 Is there not? That requires two very different approaches coordinated efforts to civil, military and regional engagement. 50 00:04:56,820 --> 00:05:02,100 I still hear people say a conflict, talk about a conflict. 51 00:05:02,210 --> 00:05:08,870 So it's local, though. It's isolated. I really don't think there's any such thing as a isolated conflict anymore. 52 00:05:09,440 --> 00:05:15,740 And a local conflict can become global really quickly with the right motivation and technological tools. 53 00:05:16,100 --> 00:05:23,210 And it needs to be looked at that way if it stays local and stays local, because that's the decision of all parties to keep it that way. 54 00:05:25,100 --> 00:05:32,990 Developing effective responses. Re-examining ways to achieve high impact and low visibility cost effective operations. 55 00:05:33,350 --> 00:05:36,770 Cost effective is the key phrase now. 56 00:05:37,400 --> 00:05:41,959 Budget constraints for the ERA, certainly for the US, have trillions of dollars. 57 00:05:41,960 --> 00:05:46,040 This is absolutely gone and I see that certainly in Europe and other places as well. 58 00:05:46,700 --> 00:05:51,380 And there are many ways to achieve really good results without spending a lot of money. 59 00:05:52,070 --> 00:05:55,580 But it didn't seem no one seemed to be bothering with that because there was so much money. 60 00:05:56,270 --> 00:06:00,049 So it requires a rethink about how to do this effectively. 61 00:06:00,050 --> 00:06:07,820 And in small, small footprint, developing a better understanding of distinct responses and roles required by different global crises. 62 00:06:08,300 --> 00:06:15,500 A mali will require a different response than perhaps a crisis in a part of Latin America or the Asia-Pacific. 63 00:06:15,830 --> 00:06:20,690 It's not that they're so different, it's just the context may be slightly skewed. 64 00:06:20,690 --> 00:06:22,610 Maybe reform may reformatted, 65 00:06:22,610 --> 00:06:31,860 so certain action in one place may produce an unintended consequence and another incorporating constraints caused by local domestic geopolitics. 66 00:06:32,180 --> 00:06:39,440 I think of politics as a player in all of this, almost a person, almost an entity, but it needs to be figured in any equation. 67 00:06:39,470 --> 00:06:46,160 I don't think there's any way around it. Better understanding of the impact of international criminal syndicates and cartels. 68 00:06:46,730 --> 00:06:54,860 If you want to know how people, how terrorists, insurgents, rebels, arms their narcotics, money is flowing. 69 00:06:55,160 --> 00:06:57,440 Just watch the flows of human trafficking. 70 00:06:58,220 --> 00:07:06,020 Human trafficking is the number one most profitable resource in the criminal world, and on the back of that flows everything else. 71 00:07:06,020 --> 00:07:07,190 So those are mafias. 72 00:07:07,190 --> 00:07:17,210 When people are doing good research on that and you'll see how everything else is flowing globally, avoiding unintended consequences. 73 00:07:17,300 --> 00:07:22,450 This is so difficult when you see civilian organisations and military organisations. 74 00:07:22,880 --> 00:07:32,390 We're trying to help with help people have good intentions and then don't understand why their good intentions aren't rewarded with good outcomes. 75 00:07:33,470 --> 00:07:38,140 But there needs to be a better understanding of the advantages and pitfalls of waging war by proxy. 76 00:07:38,150 --> 00:07:43,850 This is part of the regional conflict dimension. We're seeing that with Iran in the US, for instance. 77 00:07:43,850 --> 00:07:49,160 Now in various areas in the Middle East, you're going to see it with China and the U.S. You'll see that with other countries in Europe 78 00:07:49,880 --> 00:07:54,800 and the superpowers in different parts of the world who are really it's really nothing new. 79 00:07:54,800 --> 00:07:57,500 The Cold War, that's really what was going on in the Cold War as well. 80 00:07:58,970 --> 00:08:03,770 Need more communication between civil military individuals and organisations in the virtual around. 81 00:08:03,770 --> 00:08:11,239 There are some attempts to do this, but there really needs to be more communication and the civilian military cross training on 82 00:08:11,240 --> 00:08:17,510 concepts of provocation and deterrence in volatile environments when it's affected by external, 83 00:08:17,870 --> 00:08:26,389 by virtual and external events. And just think of the Koran burning in one country and how many people are killed in another country because of it. 84 00:08:26,390 --> 00:08:34,880 And within the same day and you begin to picture the sort of the issues that are going on and why they need to be addressed. 85 00:08:37,980 --> 00:08:45,810 Looking ahead, developing international civilian military protocols for rapid and deeply thoughtful responses. 86 00:08:46,230 --> 00:08:49,980 This is aspirational, of course, to decision timelines affected. 87 00:08:50,310 --> 00:08:52,080 Salary by information technologies. 88 00:08:52,080 --> 00:08:58,740 There really needs to be and I think there's a lot of good people really beginning to think about this in various parts around the world. 89 00:08:59,430 --> 00:09:01,409 How can everyone communicate with each other? 90 00:09:01,410 --> 00:09:07,050 We have amazing technologies at our disposal now, but how we use them are using them to really communicate. 91 00:09:08,060 --> 00:09:15,930 And none of the I have found personally, and I think others as well have found that none of the issues have really changed the core issues. 92 00:09:16,560 --> 00:09:20,580 It's dealing with them in a more global way, a sort of a macro micro view, 93 00:09:20,640 --> 00:09:29,220 simultaneously increased international civilian military coordination and communication for effective response. 94 00:09:29,820 --> 00:09:35,250 And the US role is rapidly changing. As everyone knows. I think America is slowly coming to terms with this. 95 00:09:35,970 --> 00:09:45,810 Anyone, any Americans who work outside that country understand that America's power and affect and effective role influence has diminished greatly. 96 00:09:46,320 --> 00:09:53,610 And so while they have great, great military capacity, their ability to influence has changed a great deal. 97 00:09:53,610 --> 00:10:00,980 And that's directly connected to Iraq and Afghanistan, which I recently heard on a major political show in the US. 98 00:10:00,990 --> 00:10:07,380 A foreign correspondent returned and said, Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan are considered catastrophes by the rest of the world. 99 00:10:07,750 --> 00:10:15,920 There's a sort of silence, but no argument. Seek ways to better support internal groups seeking peaceful mitigation of conflicts. 100 00:10:15,930 --> 00:10:19,230 Again, that goes back to individual perceptions of security. 101 00:10:20,160 --> 00:10:23,700 Often those are linked conflict mitigation. 102 00:10:23,700 --> 00:10:30,299 There are usually groups really trying to peacefully settle problems that are often overlooked and ignored. 103 00:10:30,300 --> 00:10:35,790 And then as violence began to take hold or are just sidelined until much later. 104 00:10:38,880 --> 00:10:51,770 And then finally, in Iraq in 2012, I had the privilege of going back to Erbil in Kurdistan and Baghdad with the U.S. Institute of Peace. 105 00:10:51,780 --> 00:11:00,570 I then working with them on writing their history in Iraq from 2003 to 2011, and it was a good time to go back as an American. 106 00:11:00,600 --> 00:11:04,680 The military was gone, the trillions of dollars were gone, and they were not coming back. 107 00:11:05,160 --> 00:11:08,610 It was the new beginning of a new world, so to speak. 108 00:11:09,510 --> 00:11:17,940 And I spoke to a number of Iraqis and this comment about we talked about civilian and military organisations in general, 109 00:11:17,940 --> 00:11:22,829 as well as USAID, his role and this comment stuck, stuck with me. 110 00:11:22,830 --> 00:11:27,840 And I think I want to leave you with this on the value of civilian organisations versus military. 111 00:11:28,380 --> 00:11:35,670 And this was said this was told to me by a senior politician of a minority background in Iraq. 112 00:11:36,510 --> 00:11:43,800 Civilian organisations, if they do things that arms and forces cannot do, prevent the conflict and save $1,000,000,000. 113 00:11:44,640 --> 00:11:47,970 Security is not peace and the target must be peace. 114 00:11:48,450 --> 00:11:55,250 Security is everywhere because there's no peace. So thank you very much. 115 00:11:55,610 --> 00:11:58,190 Moving on to other questions.