Crime, but I am leaving tomorrow with an apology still to those that are here and they won't be able to hear them.
And I promise to read the papers. I already read most of them.
Secondly, I was asked to step in very late in these papers.
It is full of titles. Seth when Seth asks me, ask me to step in.
I sent him the paper he wrote. Interesting comment.
And it's very atypical, Seth, not to be critical.
And then he got it later. I got his comments and I understand what he thinks about the fact that optimistic and.
Okay, so it should be issued in the summer.
What? What fascinates me in the just war tradition is that it turns out that there are
if you take the principles of the natural law in which the early jurists fought,
that the international international community is ordered in.
You find out many just causes for many, many.
And we heard about Casper and Casper is going to talk about it later this afternoon.
Girl, talk bit about you just know, for example, redistributive wars seem to be on the face of it.
If you take the principles of the international law in that the natural law by which the society of States is governed by a most early jurists,
it seems on the face of it, that a distributive world are just.
The same is true of preventive war. There is no reason to wait till you are attacked in order to fight back.
Why should we wait till we are?
We are aggressed against. If we can pre-empt and or eliminate the threat before it was more true.
And so the question is how come, according to the interpretation of the international law, there is only one just cause for war?
And it is stated in Article 51 of the UN Charter and this is defensive war.
Why? The notion of self-defence? There should be read and is read by most all in international lawyers, very narrow, very strict.
And the notion of self-defence in Article 51 is construed on the basis of the notion of self-defence in criminal law.
And and this is very relevant. So how come that we have so it under natural law if you want in.
There are so many just clauses for war and under in in the positive international international law there is only one called for
war and and in and it is it is it is strictly construed on the basis of the domestic analogy to a politically organised society,
politically organised society.
And my answer is that under favourable, favourable circumstances in, in states old way, their natural right to go to war go to non is a defensive war.
What are these a favour for your circumstances?
I call them a minimally just symmetric anarchy.
Symmetric anarchy is a situation in which war is parental inferior to bargaining in a
minimally just symmetric kind of situation in which the agreements weigh all rights,
natural rights to go to non defensive war would minimise the violation of the natural law.
I know that it sounds somewhat complicated, but mainly so.
So let me ask Laura to continue my in my defence.
In my defence. Well, let me then start by recapping recapitulating the argument, as I understand it.
So basically under three circumstances.
First is these minimally just symmetric anarchy in light of what is presented in the paper as the morality of international politics.
And then from a counterterrorism perspective, in under these three conditions,
states ought to, in their resort to force, adhere to what is called the domestic society.
You said bellum the DSM, which is the same or accords with international law, basically, with very few exceptions, if only or none at all, actually.
It only allows for a pre-emptive and reactive defence of war.
So that is the argument basically. And the why should states do that?
Because under these three conditions that we accept this as the morality of international relations,
that we have these minimally just symmetrical anarchy, and that we take it from a sectarian point of view under these three conditions.
Doing that, adhering to the DSM or international law is mutually beneficial and it reduces violations of the legalistic paradigm,
which is what is in the paper posited as the morality of international policy.
What the paper accomplishes with that and that's quite powerful, is basically saying that what we already do.
What what is what sort of works in international and the international system,
which is the legal paradigm, is also what from a moral point, moral point of view we ought to be doing.
And that's quite a powerful accomplishment,
because we all have this lingering sense that the international law and the use of force is on morally thin ice.
Um, but what the paper acknowledges is that the prescription to adhere to the legal paradigm or to be,
as Jeff as it is called, is contingent on these two things.
On the one hand, on the fact that these circumstances minimally just symmetric anarchy is what we actually have.
And the paper somewhat oscillates between at the beginning hinting at saying that's what
we want is there like we actually minimally just symmetric anarchy is sort of empirically
valid and then later prescribing that states are to actually bring about these
circumstances and Kasper and Gerber and I will come back to whether that's the problem.
And but then and the second sort of condition, which is the coherence of the argument that what is really presented as a
legalistic paradigm LP is actually what is the morality of international politics?
And I will sort of focus on these two conditions. And first on LP, what is that?
Well, it's actually it starts out by bringing in different traditional and modern versions of it and quoting
Wells and Walzer and Rawls and many fathers in the history of ideas of the legalistic paradigm.
But then I actually want to judge it on the merit of on its own merit,
because I think what you ultimately end up presenting as LP is quite like a good distance away, even from Baltar.
So basically what I feel you're doing in the paper is presenting on the one hand the legal paradigm, yes, Jeb.
And then sort of saying the established antagonists to that are the cosmopolitans or the human rights based approaches,
and then carving out space between those two for a third theory of aggression, which is which you refer to as LP Jep.
And like the first sort of question I had is,
does it really still make sense to call that LP job if it's kind of far away from what we all associate with that?
But that's sort of a minor point of the first sort of question I would have.
Is that actually successful?
The endeavour to carve out space between the legal paradigm of the resort to force and then sort of the established antagonist, the cosmopolitans,
because a your LP job is based on individual rights,
you say that ultimately states rights are grounded in collective rights to self-determination, which are grounded in individual rights.
And if push comes to shove, the paper is quite clear. Individual rights are the ones that count the Trump.
And when the paper then discusses the precise distance between cosmopolitanism and LP, Jeb is sort of vague,
saying the same things, saying that, yeah, that they take that alQaeda takes states rights more seriously.
So that remains a little bit unclear. The two nations that are provide it between cosmopolitanism and LP have problems as well.
The first is the rejection of the consequentialist reasoning of cosmopolitans.
So LP Jeb is presented as being in that sense really different because it rejects
the notion that overall maximisation of rights is at all a valid standard.
But then I think, I mean, at the end of the argument and I will come back to that as well,
why LP sort of yields to the legal paradigm is justified with the consequentialist standard as well,
the sort of maximisation of maximisation of mutual benefit and the minimisation of violations of LP.
And if LP is not that different from cosmopolitanism after all, then what we end up is a justification of overall maximisation of individual rights.
Maybe I'm not getting how the contract, Terry, an analysis that gets into that at some point sort of neutralises the consequence.
But in my view, ultimately this paper makes the consequences of the second alienation that is offered and that might actually
make a difference is that LP doesn't talk about individual rights per se and the right to life per se,
but the right to a meaningful life which is stipulated. That's only happening in a political community according to yeah.
So yeah, but yeah, but, and I think that's a meaningful difference.
But then if we ask what difference does that actually make in the context of this particular
argument where we are trying to figure out when is resort to force justified or not?
I mean, it seems doesn't make a very big difference. Looking at the table as suggested only makes a difference in the sort of marginal
case where wars are only about territorial boundaries and about nothing else.
So I sort of I would as my first sort of criticism, I would say I'm not entirely sure like the LP,
Jeff, is sort of a theory of aggression in its own right.
But the only say indifference that I think remains after all kinds of scrutinising between LP and
cosmopolitanism is that LP allows for partiality of states and doesn't think that is in any way problematic.
And there I. Actually come to the more fundamental problem I have with LP Jeff because why is that?
For partiality it's that it is grounded in the state of nature.
Basically I asked the paper where do I get the justification by LP, Jeff is the morality of international politics.
And the only justification I could find is that it springs from a lockean state of nature that's contrary to disturb the law,
which I suppose presumes some kind of political organisation.
But I think I do understand that philosophers think the state of nature has some kind of bear, some kind of moral weight.
But in the in the context in the context of an argument about trying to come up
with a prescription of how states should act in a certain political environment,
certainly it's not the state of nature that we should look at because the international system isn't born right.
It does have a certain degree of political organisation and we don't aspire for it to resemble the state of nature.
Quite the contrary, to the extent that it does, that is usually considered problematic.
And I think the fact that this has implications for the argument, if I may quote you at a certain length.
So the paper argues that decent states and that's an assumption most states are decent,
might disagree on their entitlements because there is partiality, error and bias.
That means even decent states that respect LP might go to war in order to enforce what they consider their LP rights.
In the long run, crimes of aggression are bound to happen in a political and organised society.
So I guess how you get from partiality error and bias to conflict if you accept states are fashioning ought to be
and that's all right there will be conflict but then how you get from conflict to inevitability of aggression
that is I think the fact that you just accept that transition is a result of the fact that you have the state of
nature in mind and underestimate the degree of political organisation that there is in the international system.
Let me give you an example. I mean, it's a truism that there is no enforcement mechanism that states ultimately that we still have a self help system.
But beyond thinking of an institution that might actually be the use of force and force states claims instead of them,
what you would just need is a higher authority or an authority that has interpretive capacities, that reduces the epistemic problems.
A large part of the argument in favour of your ultimately DSM is that it reduces problems of bias and error and lack of information.
So what you basically basically need and what you underestimate is the capacity of organisation to reduce these epistemic problems.
And that's sort of a step below and much less problematic or demanding than aspiring for higher authority that enforces with the use of force,
the rights of states and therefore gets over self-help totally. So I think basically as a result,
your argument is vulnerable to the contention that even under the circumstances that you
proclaim is not the best way available because you underestimate the capacity of organisation.
However, even if we accepted that what you say that these epistemic problems are just
a given and we don't think about organisations that we can't get over them.
Even then, I still have a problem with the paper's contention that ultimately under the circumstances that you describe,
what is prohibited under these steps, the law ultimately is also what would be would not be justified under LP.
So basically what you're saying is that given all of these information problems and error and bias, these two actually approximate each other.
That's what you're saying at the end. And I think that is not true because even if it might not be better,
might be better not to wage certain wars that you might you have the right to under LP because you have in
certain circumstances with the information problem whatever that they are still desirable under the code of LP.
Right. So the only way you can make this argument if you accept that the overall consequentialist point
that given that states have these problems and the international system is like that trumps your,
your own sort of value standard that you erect under LP. Right?
So I think that's basically that claim is either really,
really consequentialist or you should maybe just drop it because it's sort of as intention with your argument before one last point,
sort of related related to that,
basically the obvious question by accepting reify the conditions that you call minimally just symmetrical anarchy,
you say yourself that distributions of power are fragile, so the symmetry might just vanish at any point in time anyway.
Right. But why accept a minimal, minimal justice and anarchy?
I mean, it's just a different way of phrasing my criticism, but why should be but why not aim higher, so to speak?
And basically what I suspect you're doing is sort of making a circular argument.
I have conditions which allow for Dsf to be the best approximation of LP,
but this is entirely contingent on these just in its justification on the presence of those very contingent conditions.
So in a way that the certainty that you don't provide an outside justification by these conditions ought to be here.
So let me wrap up basically my conclusion that my question is that if we have, as you say, rational,
mostly decent states that accept LP the legalistic paradigm as the goal and as the morality of international politics,
but then take seriously the capacity of states to organise themselves and thus the international system to graduate from the state of nature,
so to speak. And so reducing the epistemic problem, maybe we can aim higher than the step.
So what I think is ultimately it's not justified, properly response.
Thank you for the comments. No, these are really great. Come in.
I think that they focus on two points. First of all, the difference between in LP and cosmopolitanism.
Look, I prefer states that will.
I prefer the system of a decent states that are partially licensed.
Why? Because I want my state. State to prefer me on others, since other states, other states can prefer their own citizens.
So partiality is in is part or is an aspect of the moral standing of states.
Now, you say totally correctly that they don't defend the international the way early
jurists even conceive the law of nature by which the society of states is is ordered.
It seems to me you have a great intuitive appeal.
We don't. Sorry. First of all, I want we state to in to help its school before it goes to it.
Before it levels any help to others to other to other states pull in.
And it seems to me that every journalist got it right.
So and I agree that they don't. Defending the facility must be part of our conception of international society.
States are decent. All statehood is such that states are partial.
Impartiality in this sense is not morally flawed.
I agree that I don't see much about this in the paper, but they can only assume so many other things that they say.
I. I in I re-emphasised that in.
The second question is why okay. The accusation of security.
This is something that they don't accept.
I think the fully under which conditions they in the current international law and it has the paper has an explanatory ambition namely to explain why
the international law is is in the post world war two international the UN charter in Article 51 are interpreted in the way they are interpreted,
namely in accordance with. There is only just cause for self-defence, and the notion of self-defence is very strictly, very narrowly interpreted.
This is something that they don't understand in light of the wonderful words that in
those who are you confused it cosmopolitan it produced in the last 1015 years great
work just calls for war would be a much more much more proliferate and we don't find
it in the international law and we don't find it in the international community.
Why? The answer is the fallen. The Draughters imagined the world or the dream about a world which can be described as minimally just asymmetrical.
They think they take anarchy as given.
Now we might aim higher. That's what we might do.
But they take anarchy as it's given. And they think that once.
When we talk about about using force, this presumption is justified.
I wouldn't like this is we are going to hear you are going to be give speaker tomorrow.
He's going to aim for more, namely international institutions that will reduce if the biases will reduce in in lack of information flow and so forth.
To my mind, this will have many other problems.
This organisation, this in a thicker organised society, will have problematic programmatic consequences in other places.
And moreover, will states think about using force?
Namely, when states think about it, their own defence, their own security, they should not trust in others.
They should not trust in transformational institution in this way.
Anarchy should be presumed in the draughters it prohibited in any know.
All non-defense improves in order because they believe that the they live or the they want to live in a minimally a just symmetric anarchy.
And let me just add another point that you didn't impress me on,
but this is something that they should should make it clear in it people might believe.
And I think that Casper believes Gerhardt believes that we live in an unjust this
is not a minimally just a symmetric because the inequalities are obviously the
inequality is obviously unfair in my response to that would be that they might be
right but that this cannot states all the way their right to go to this world.
Because even if you are right, there are so many people that disagree who disagree with you, as you have just said about, quote, you.
There are so many people who disagree about about that. We have a problem, problems of information in applying the natural.
Now we want to call LP the natural law. Okay the natural law permission to go to work because since we don't have a good conception of this,
we don't converge on this on the theory of justice,
we have this kind of second all the reason to wave a right, to use force on the basis of justice considerations.
So this is explanatory. If, if if I am right that the international law should be interpreted in the way that they present it,
namely it prohibits all non defensive wars and defend right.
That natural law allows a lot of them.
Then the with the draughters it prohibited these wars.
They prohibited them on the basis of the thought that we live in the meaning just symmetric anarchy all that we are able to establish this
in organisation this arrangement it very well this will be the best moral interpretation of of the quote which states submitted themselves.
Well I would say that that at that time that might have been do like me to say something about consequential.
Yeah maybe that's a better book in the difference between counterterrorism and consequentialist.
These is generally not very clear.
I would say that if anything, terrorism is insists on parental efficiency rather than on aggregate maximising the utility of something like that.
So all states should benefit or all parties should benefit from the contract.
This is one point. The other point is that it's not. Well,
I think that you talk you don't talk about consequential when you try to identify my
position with you are talking about truly consequential the consequence of reason realism.
If you don't know exactly what is going on there, what do they look?
What do you mean by saying that are what are the best rules?
The rules that are followed in.
The best outcome is these are the rules that they have to follow.
Now, in the worst outcome, what type of rules?
How do they find the rules? When I talk about an agreement in actual agreement,
I'm talking about something that and I'm talking about something that is real that we know exactly what would come.
Well, on your first point that you said that the basically the normative momentum of minimal or just symmetric
anarchy comes from the fact that the DRAUGHTERS envisaged envisage that to be the international system.
I think we have evolved past it right past 1945 and the system has gotten past that.
And I don't think that in itself would. That's right. What's given up for making this the prescriptive?
Yeah, I agree. So if he's Jeff might be able to convince us that there is a better arrangement, then I would give up.
But I think that there are many other problems in this type of institution.
Of course we put it. And on your point of distinguishing between different types of consequences.
That's true. Like I wasn't saying, you are ultimately doing the same as cosmopolitanism.
I'm just saying that the rather rigorous rejection of the cause of consequential
ism as an aspect of cosmopolitanism becomes over at the end because it is outward.
Moreover, one of my points in the paper is to show that and in fact, when you read are and rules properly,
or if you if you develop the principles that motivate their projects, you come up with minor differences.
One of them is partiality. The other is taking sovereignty more seriously then, of course, than pursue.
But humanitarian interventions in economic wars and pre-emptive war, preventive wars.
All these wars should be on the basis of the principle that multiple projects should be, should be allowed,
or their causes must be might be just something that we're going to try to keep the one finger jumping accused system,
but it is one trial, so there can only be one or two and they have to be genuinely short and snappy and genuinely relevant otherwise.
Otherwise, I'm not going to let you keep going. I'm going to cut you off.
And it's I think a sort of cross examination is terrific, but you can't do that with a finger.
You have to get in line. So I'll let you follow up when your proper turn comes.
But you can't take over with the finger. Okay, so I need to get a line up here.
Okay. Ryan McMahon. So I'm forgetting your name now, but I know who I mean.
Oh, Immortan Latifi.
Oh, Graham. Okay, that's plenty is starting. And.
All right. Chaney, Ryan, Jenny Ryan, University of Oregon.
I really like, you know, the discussion this time.
But let me maybe pose a question in terms of a contrast between how I read Walter and what you're doing.
You know, when Walter talks about the word convention, clearly when he talks about relations between soldiers,
but has this sort of sense of it's kind of filtering from the bottom up.
It talks about how, you know,
soldiers are sort of stuck in this thing together and they kind of reach this these sort of agreements about kind of minimising things like that.
And sort of the notion of convention generally has a notion of sort of, you know, I think something that comes about more naturally.
But it seems to me the notion of a contract between states is is a little bit different than that.
And I'm wondering whether it really addresses some of the kinds of objections you would have.
And let me draw draw a parallel based on my own, you know, history of low intensity warfare with my institution.
I'm constantly told that the department heads have agreed to do something together or that
the deans have time to do together within the pact and has agreed to do something together.
And I always kind of feel like, well, those are all institutions that in some sense have legitimacy in my eyes.
I'm not sort of saying I'm saying that that they should be abolished.
But it always strikes me that that only has a little bit to do with what I would want to do is a professor or something like that.
It's not irrelevant to it, but it certainly doesn't answer the question of sort of what are my full moral obligations and stuff.
And so I wonder whether maybe this is implicit in your account of the state,
but I really wonder whether the fact that states would agree, you know, not to go to war, not to go to war or whatever.
You know, and, you know, one of the problems is a problem that I've talked about it and Jeff talks about and other people about, you know, what?
What if there's clearly a just cause and the state.
Because the problem is that states don't it's not that they just agree not to go to war over certain things.
They also tell other people not to do anything about it.
You know, I'm saying they prevent other people from taking actions, which is a stronger thing.
So, so, so. And I'm sorry, because I'm really wondering.
Whether someone you say, okay, you can get that agreement between states,
but the international law of conflict or one court is appropriate but maybe should be broadened.
Mm hmm. Is. What this is.
This is, I think, a problem with every thing.
It might be the best. Well, this is something that Jeff totally taught us in in in in the context of the laws of.
But I think that this is a genuine feature of every law.
It is genuine. In many circumstances, you are justified.
You are justified in violating. And if it were made to prohibit that,
rather than if it is if the war used in is prohibited just because we agreed to prohibit you, then the temptation to go to war.
If we get what you think to be a just war committed, just war is greater.
And in my framework, this is the framework the that I'm trying to develop.
You might you might violate the other party rights that you won't go to this war against it.
It is protected by the law. And the law is the best tool that you have.
The more a right that you will comply with the law. And still you are justified in voting because it will bring the best consequences.
So it's very important to me that that the law is in a sense, the acceptance of the law is effective, namely, it generates genuine moral rights.
But in many circumstances we have it.
We are justified in fighting the ones, right? This happens a lot in my argument.
Would law law lower the bar?
Namely, if these laws are nearing monopoly,
namely under the natural law in the are just then the temptation to go to use those are very is very very deep.
And if you know many I think that Larry is not here.
But this was his argument last year in that he thinks that humanitarian intervention should be.
Well, he's very sceptical about humanitarian interventions and my wife is very sceptical.
And no, I thought that you just denied.
Oh yeah. So he's very sceptical of you. Sceptical because this,
this permission to go to to intervene in the internal affairs of another state is very dangerous once it becomes the norm, that is.
And that's why he would love certain state to go in to save people, but he would admit that the law should be different.
Joining me is. The old technical.
Anyway. Response to need that you want your state to be partial to you.
Happy for other people's states to give priority.
And that reminded me of the point that part of the three reasons in the persons which is that.
My children are likely to do less well under a system of parental partiality.
I give priority to my children over a greater number of your children.
You give? Other people give. A greater number of other children.
All children are going to do this as well. Now you can say I will do less well by my children if I choose a system of partiality rather than just.
Now, you might think that in the case of a parent child relation,
can it can clarify in all circumstances that we designed designed circumstances in which impartiality would be better for your children overall.
And this is an empirical claim. I take a look at the case.
I was going to I was going to introduce the complexities in my next remark.
But just to take the case of, say, saving, I limit it to a thing about saving lives.
And I had to save my one child or your child. And you can take one of your children as opposed to two of mine, and we all have this permission.
In general. It's Russia as well. Mm hmm. Mm hmm.
I was going to say the cost of that in the case of our job is I think that that
relation has a certain kind of intrinsic significance that it would be impossible to.
Recognise and sustain in a world in which people didn't get this kind of power that are chosen in relation to what it is that's important.
But the relation between citizen and state isn't like that at all.
Or state to citizen. I should say it's a purely instrumental significance.
In a way that the parent child relation. So I just wanted to call this feature of your claim to your attention in the light
of your suggestion that what contract sharing is looks to create a optimality.
That's what distinguishes it from consequentialist instead of the partial list view.
Of course it doesn't maximise, but it also fails the greater task.
So you're saying you want all states to act with respect to their own citizens in a way which that state is universalised?
Mm hmm. Mm hmm. And that's right.
The question is whether this arrangement that you imagine is feasible and what are the constraints of visibility.
So I, I, I tend to believe that we are facing a prisoner's dilemma problem, even in the perfect arrangement.
Namely, under this arrangement, our children will do less because we tend to we won't trust each other.
We won't I won't trust you that you will have my my children and you won't trust me.
I will help you. So there are some flexibility constraints.
The best outcome? Mutual disarmament, for example, it is presented in my.
That is unfeasible.
I presume that it is unfeasible because there is a kind of suspicious that we cannot go over and the suspicious so suspicion that we cannot overcome.
And the suspicion is rational innocence. Okay.
So, okay, Patrick, everybody thinks of air conditioning because I think that there is good young people.
Hot or cold. Freezing. Freezing. Yeah. Yeah.
This is what you need is always freezing. But I give him a green card if we get really hot.
So lots of people would really like to thank you for taking some of the.
Yeah. Okay.
Good. Successful revolt. All right, Patrick Everton. I'll go down the pipe.
A very interesting, you know, sort of like the structure of the argument.
It's I had a couple of questions I will allow everybody to do with vindicating sort of contempt for international law.
So I think it's planetary vindication. I think one problem, it seems to me,
is contemporary national law has human rights as well as self-determination as sort of one of the foundational principles.
And that puts a lot of burden on your notion of a decent state and a mutually just anarchic situation.
And the more empirical that and the more you look around and say there are states that don't meet the human rights side of things.
The more you are, you're getting a story that only justifies Article 51, that doesn't justify references in the charter, for example, to human rights.
So there's and another way that sort of a why does it challenge the argument?
So I'm talking about the interpretation of the law, not not the reality.
But if the law also puts in certain human rights mandates,
it seems to and you end up with an outcome that hits extreme human rights violators are immune to various sorts of intervention,
including military intervention is the last resort. You get a case where potentially you haven't you haven't vindicated the international law.
You've only vindicated Article 51 that Article 51 doesn't stand on its own.
There's other stuff going on as well. So which means that that explanatory project potentially comes under pressure.
Maybe you have a visionary project where we should ditch the human rights parts in favour of the self-determination part.
You know, those are thinking if. Another is an issue of imperial burden.
If it turns out that it's not, it's not symmetrical enough. So some states, in fact, can resort to force with impunity.
Turns out that it's not prior to optimal. After all, is a contract stillborn?
No, it's. Yeah, it's sort of the morally moral state of the conflict that not relatively,
it does not weaken its moral standing, but it may see the conflict suspended.
And regarding the the the human rights issue, what you see, in fact,
that the conflict should allow humanitarian intervention when something like that.
And what I'm saying is that it should allow humanitarian intervention only if a rights violation is going on.
And it is clear in the clarity here is part, I think, of the ethos of of of it's obviously part of the warfare approach to humanitarian intervention.
And it it seems to me also I know I'm a very poor lawyer, but but it seems to be part of the ethos of of international law as you can.
I think one is an issue of the context dependence.
One of the reasons for going to the contract is epistemic burdens on the natural world.
And so we go to the contract beneath the contract.
This is one of the I'm talking about meaningful adjustment.
And this is a very general, very general condition. And they substantiated that.
I give one example, which seems to me pretty relevant because it seems to me so close to our reality that the extent of our ability
to the ability of parties to apply these these permissions is restricted in that part seems plausible.
But if the contract is a binding this of the contract is context dependent and epistemic burdens on
knowing that the context is such that compliance really is quite often all that I should think about it.
Okay, that's good. I have my tendency is to say try to interpret it as widely as possible.
Okay. And it's also related to the right conception of thinking intimacy.
What when would you like to see that the state is respecting or it's bound by it respect the international law,
I would say try to lower the bar as far as you can in order to in order not to benefit from the doubt,
because you should suspect yourself that you are that you are trying to to in advance your your partially.
This is part of your nature of the state going along.
And I should change where we've been.
But this might be well, I mean, the way with contract some time is that you can ask them precisely what you put in
as you specify the conditions in such a way that you get the outcome that want.
And this seems I mean just seems to you on the system hinge in there being precisely the right
number of rules in international system to prompt people to maintain their consent with armies.
But enough about apples that it comes in to give up some of them permissions in certain ways.
And and it has to be just another anarchy and just the thesis, you've just got to say, but not too much.
And again, a few things I say this was corporations, not too much decency that we can use anything stronger.
It's more of an ad hoc rather than an effective of some independent set of criteria.
With that in mind, did you say before that because they're the content of decency and anarchy here?
I mean, the decency claiming to be decent in your statement are using from a specific people's way of making some kind of loser sort of way.
But I've seen if you go to society, believe me, decent and of course they're not ruling out certain kinds of grounds for things.
So it rules out the fact frequently these in the state will have to meet some kind
of basic threshold and then pull out the need for certain kinds of intervention.
Just kind of the way this is framed and the saying the conception only came if the idea is to track international law,
the ideas is that we're in people's minds as they as they kind of founded international law or whatever they do.
One of the things, just in terms of cooperation, we've done a bit from from from what there was.
And so we have a reasonable word about the anarchy component because it seems to the anarchy is no longer,
you know, the I mean, the kind of money can exist now is compatible with all kinds of cooperation.
Sure. Sure. And well, that operation.
That cooperation doesn't exist in violation of international law doesn't mean the law changes to reflect the cooperation of cooperation.
So these these are very big challenges. Theory of distances is is a subject for the book.
When I'm talking about decency, I'm talking about states that respects the right,
that respect the rights of other states and the punishment because they the killing
of their own rights in the way we can interpret their behaviour in terms of rights,
namely they they would use for us you know, to defend the rights they,
they would not say look you don't have the right to exist or you are a heretic or something like that.
And this is a very loose notion. I mean, it might be the case that we should work with these loose notions in order to to to
get the right interpretation of the right moral interpretation of the conflict in.
So they give but the end of the people through trying to to see that there is another it's a suggestion, a very tentative suggestion.
And you can read from state to state to be able to it respect the pluralism that is the basis of the
international law according to rules involved in this is one this is would be my answer to the first challenge.
But but it's a huge issue. The second one is regarding anarchy.
This is anarchy is a case in which it is a situation in which in states cannot trust any transnational institution to defend it.
So once it comes to it, realise that its right is violated, illegally violated.
It cannot appeal to any transnational institution in order to enforce its own rights.
Again, lose. But it seems to me helpfully it's a self-help based regime in terms of defensive rights.
Yup. Go ahead. But this is an idea used to made no reference to the internal composition of these states, but makes it based on the count you have.
Those just have to do with the state. No, no way. You're right.
They didn't. I just. I just mentioned one very helpful confusion, the confusion of international law, since it is very sensitive to to human rights,
to they have to have another in the prong,
which talks about the justice of the state itself more than the extent to which it respects human rights within.
Of course, and this is part of their own film, The Rights Future.
So Victor Tawadros, I think for the paper.
So I don't know what smart contract theory anymore. I thought I have lunch with them.
So let me ask you about as I said, one question is raising doubts is also always good.
Question is why? Why do you think that if you try to, this picture should converge on reality?
So we have the international law set up in a certain way.
And I mean really surprising, wouldn't it, if there was a moral explanation for why it is always is now.
It's a not inequality of power wealth themselves.
And, you know, we actually converged on the moral right that we are shocked by it.
Now, you can expect very, very different reactions.
So I just want to confirm exactly the same conflict.
This is part of the thesis you have. You have to we have to this is part of the moral standing of the conflict is dependent.
This same conflict might be in a slave, a conflict between master than slave.
Think about it. There is only one.
It just calls for war. And we can do everything we want in order to.
To exploit, to exploit. And so it's possible, even until even so, even in perfect conditions we're in at the moment.
You would expect that the comparisons you would be more revisionist than your explanation of it implies, right?
Because we would expect a rule that was quite similar.
But there's no reason to believe that the actual rules that we have will be gradual, more given.
And of course, you should be very surprising if we don't have results, even just one kind of question.
So is just how reductionist we should be. Why shouldn't we have both more kind of game of customer kind of rules to make it more just?
The circumstances is more about the contracts of this kind of story.
So and I always think of this as wanting to appeal to respect for persons or something like that rather than just outcomes for your
version of contractual is it seems like is moving towards just thinking about the outcome of optimal outcomes for the people.
This is Geneva's point then you to just seems open to consequentialist.
You can just say we're aiming as a distribution but as for as optimal.
No, I it doesn't doesn't seem like it's particularly contractual this kind of story so it's going to design the kind of rules you have to try to.
It's like now I want to know more about why respect for persons with respect to self-determining states or
something like that should lead to this set of rules rather than just that they are in fact better for everyone.
Yes. So first of all, I you can take my paper to be a revisionist interpretation of the current system and see,
since I agree fully and I agree with Kasper and Gerhard, then this this this contract is invalid.
It has no moral standing. And we should go there much more.
Just call it for work right now. Okay.
So I'm with you on this, but I just say if you want more interpretation and we take the in the charter and Article 51 to be a kind of progress.
If it is progress, it is progress because it has these the comfort of these feature.
But maybe now because of the massive inequalities, terrorism is justified.
So we ask you wrote it before the customer is in good hands.
The paper, he says, look, we might justify terrorism in order to alert public opinion to the fact that we could just send 20% more medicine,
more medicine to to to the third world, to Africa. And we will be able to save thousands of people.
Okay. So this is an implication of the.
Argument. No, we are talking.
I'm not sure. Look, I'm talking about the international system.
And in states. Oh, it is according to the water rules picture.
States ought to in in create an institutional arrangement that expresses in respect to two persons.
So this is not the job in our division of labour.
This is not the job of the international. The international system.
It's not the job of the. In the rules of war.
To to this is just an account which is open to the consequence of this.
I just wanted to ask, why do you.
Well, I think first and maybe I should mention also that did they say in this paper that that fairness should be part of the.
I don't think French should be part of it. My other role in my other papers all the way, if always, should be fair and mutually beneficial.
Andrew Williams Jeanine, those comments very much.
I think one of the features of that was that she comes to our attention to the fact
that there could be intermediate positions between the two options you look at.
So you look at an account of the grounds for war, which was for all, and an account which is neither.
And then you stay. But the account, the one which gives more crunch, will be offered in terms directly, collectively self-defeating.
We'd all be better off if we'd gotten. By a narrower account.
And then, via Mr. Jimenez comments, she said, Were these two options and not a choice, that could be a further partial.
A specific possibility to mention that I felt there could be some Internet international organisations.
To assess the legitimacy of grants, and you were sceptical that there would be any such organisation that couldn't be present on the same problems.
But I wanted to say separate that specifically from the more general way which she raised,
which is that couldn't there be some of a third or fourth possible?
So then just to pursue that, supposing somebody said, well, you might be right about this organisation kind of arbitrating disputes and suppose.
The international community could reach some agreement. On general causes of war.
They found out that there was a correlation between certain types of regime poverty.
Whatever facts that tell us, a correlate with what you might think.
Why does that count? When people make the types of bets.
Agreements that you have in mind.
You could think of a parallel kind of case, but no, it talks about people not having a right to enforce the law on nature.
Once the dominant protection agency has emerged, he says, it would be very risky for them to do that.
But in return, they get some free protection.
So supposing somebody said our location, the international case.
In return, states not only waive their right to enforce their rights according to broad account of the grounds for war,
they also take on a duty to do something about the causes.
And then now let's say, why should they agree to your contract rather than this other contract which involved not
just the PFA but the acquisition of a duty to do something to reduce the probability of war?
But wouldn't that be such a if you should, you should come up with such an alternative agreement?
I don't think that the international law cannot be improved.
This is not something that they they might imply that if you it should be, you know, it should be the best one that we you are for.
I should weaken this I should weaken this to this. You, my lawyer was all over, all the time to think about how to improve our legal system.
So I totally agree that there might be a bit of the I didn't I didn't argue that there is no it would be foolish to argue that there cannot be.
But this is the best that we could come up with after World War Two is I think it may be maybe I if they claim it, there are other other suggestions.
I didn't find them particularly guilty because I find some faults in it.
But you might come with a bit and undertaking duty without instituting a kind of kind of translational authority.
This might be interesting. This might be, but it is whether we can preserve the partiality of state that we want.
How? So there are many threads and this is the job of these people that work on international law.
This is exactly their job. Okay.
We certainly have to. One thing was, I thought maybe I had frightened everyone to death.
So thank you for being so cooperative. But of course it is okay to have some.
So. Patrick and Guy, one thing is I think the current settlement does have this.
The states have a duty to contribute to the work because it because of its function, among other things, is to reduce the causes of war.
So I think you can very easily embrace that this is, in fact, the agreement that you envision on that front.
But frankly, so much in the way of weakening your claim would be to say that this is the best possible ferretti of a maximal solution.
But you say that this is better than the other one. So it's an improvement to having no compromise or to having the LP to whichever initials.
Yeah. Yeah, it's not usable.
Oh. There were so many times that its the original intention was not clear.
Sometimes known as jazz. Yeah. Okay.
One more. One figure. Is that the reason for the four years before removal?
I don't understand, actually, why the committee wants to mention what this minimum means.
The minimum symmetrical. Meaning why it's minimally just symmetrical.
It should it it is minimal because in it it's just containing some neutrality and some expectation because I
don't I don't expect lots of states in states or parties in the partial partial states in the state of nature.
And I don't expect them to not to believe that their rights, the rights of view, their entitlements were not violated.
The they might well believe that and they might be right.
But have they been told an impartial.
They would they would moral doubtful. And have they been totally impossible having been totally impartial?
They would have been more doubtful. And they wouldn't use force in order to enforce their rights.
They would negotiate, but they wouldn't. You wouldn't use force.
SALAZAR okay. Yes, that was a couple of quick points, if I may.
You talked about the difference between the contracts with position and real consequence with you.
And one of the worries you had about real consequences and reasonable error is what to do in those circumstances
when breaking the rules better serves the values that the rule is supposed to promote and following the rule do.
And so you sort of implied that this is an advantage of the contract with the.
It doesn't have to. Doesn't matter where you go. This is a criticism of the consequence of the rule consequences to come.
And I just wanted to say there's a symmetrical problem for the contract.
So especially with this idea of the hypothetical contract,
which is essentially when the hypothetical contract doesn't work out in my favour, why should I ever get out of a claim?
Is that because of my account? A hypothetical agreement.
And that reminds me of that very kind of talk.
And the hypothetical contract isn't like the paper, it's not really running and telling me,
yeah, so and so, especially when we're talking about matters of life and death.
My wife's, my country matters. So. So you've got you've got symmetrical problems with both approaches.
That's just the first observation. The second observation is specifically about the way you argue about the relationship between the U.S. and NATO,
because one of the things you say is that pretty much any rise that would be attributed to a sovereign in any military,
sort of an organised society in a state of nature would devolve to individuals so individuals could enforce those rights.
And you use this to say that insofar as the sovereign could do this in an organised society,
it would be permissible for ordinary people to do it in physical society.
And I thought that doesn't seem to me extreme right, because, you know,
so the example of punishment should we could say in the states nation you don't have
a right to punish people because of the risk that you're going to do it wrongly, but by using the institution.
You didn't get that right.
So I thought that argumentative move presupposed a particular theory about the relationship, institutional reasons and reasons in the statement.
So I agree.
I didn't I didn't say that the conflict in was not relevant to the problem of it being on the spot violation and it might as a sense of shame,
it might be justified. So this is not the problem with the real consequences of the problem with little consequence of losing.
That is, first of all, you don't know what the rules are.
You can figure out it's very hard to know what they mean.
What are the best rules? And secondly, the time to work out the best contract.
I mean, you know, it seems like pretty much exactly. You know, because this is not the best contract is something that we can.
Because if they imagine if it's not it's not obvious what rule consequentialist want us to
imagine which in which outcome we should imagine ourselves in the Arctic while contracts.
Don't think about your present condition.
What would be the best law? What would be the best law from now on?
And they pick a certain privilege. Ex ante, is that it?
This is much, much easier, I think. In.
In. So.
Okay, what was your point about.
Oh, that's right. I think. I don't. First of all, Mark seems to me as far as I remember moving on from this, as far as I remember,
Locke would say that the sovereign cannot have rights that were not given to him by his subjects.
So this is now people people might disagree with it.
And I, I don't think that my argument depends on the lock in this lock in doctrine,
because what I'm saying is that it is very plausible with respect to many rights that if the sovereign have that in that in a political society,
then individuals might have them in political disorder in a society.
So it's not a universal claim.
It's just it just strengthen the claim that individuals have that if the sovereign is in in a politically organised society.
So I don't I don't commit myself to the locking up from although the looting doctrine is quite popular,
I believe Chris Brooks is actually going to be one finger on this point.
But I guess it continues. If you said sceptically, you wouldn't think that given realities of power that states would converge on an ideal rule.
What one might expect is states to converge on rule of practice in another way, which is in fact what we have.
We have one rule where they draw derogations by we powers.
And I was thinking that that might be something you might want to talk about in the paper, which is that in a way,
the target isn't what is the rule, but what is the practice, what form of state in practice?
What? This goes to the last the last question.
What form what forms of derogation might we want to see in a system?
We probably want the gap between rule and practice to some extent probably don't want because of compounding problems,
institutions to manage that gap, to mine that gap, that should I mean, that I would think that would be the focus of counterterrorism.
Now, what is the more complex practice? Yeah, I am yeah.
All the time in their interest. If I adopted the simplifying assumption that the are LP respecting states the decent states are and and in the Russian
law of peoples there is a clause that the two nations respect the agreement to which the subjective themselves is.
But this is something that should be weakened. I agree.
This is something that should be weakened in in even more realistic analysis of the conflicts of interest.
And that's what. Yes.
I'm Sean Richmond. I'm the Dphil student here at Oxford. Thank you for an interesting paper and come to this paper and the others early this
morning from an international relations and an international law perspective.
So I'm trying my best to come to speed with the alien experiments.
And and in this thinking, the lawyers. The minor differences between certain types of rights and the like.
And I guess my question to you is, what are you seeking to ask and what are you seeking to prove?
And you articulated as wide as international law, find just cause for war so narrowly.
While natural law defines causes so broadly.
Your thesis is that the draughters imagine a world that was, I think in your words,
minimally justified interval and our community just thinking about symmetry.
And I think you Nina, you're quoting me now use good conflict quote from the people I'm quoting you now.
Yes, yes. In response to you, Nina. And also, as the point was raised over here about state practice,
perhaps I wanted to suggest that if you're only seeking to answer a philosophical question,
then comparing roles in and ones like Walter's theories with the, you know, the terms of the treaty, Article 51 has has a lot of purchase.
If you're seeking to demonstrate more of this as a historical case or in terms of the legal standpoint,
then you do need to get a bit more complicated that right after World War Two, Article 51 was articulated a certain way.
But there's a drafting history for that. And certain states thought some things and some of those views were actually quite social,
you know, international society type visions, and some were a lot more minimal.
If you want to just focus on custom and the law on self-defence exist both in the charter and in custom.
And you are going to want to look at the state practice.
And for instance, the U.S. and Israel has conducted a lot more military interventions and argue that they had legal rights to do so,
protection of nationals, that the expansion that you're entitled to and I don't I don't want to isolate you per say,
because I also think I would I would argue that the papers, as I read them up till now,
could sometimes do a better job of giving a background to a non philosophical professor about why this matters and the scope of one's claims.
Because if if we seek to make it more than just, you know, some territorial philosophical point between five experts,
then thank you, then, then some of these other issues can be addressed.
And I'm not trying to say that your work there are legal experts.
You can do the question, you know, maybe in a better way or historians, they can do it better.
But if it if you seek to have more purchase on the thesis, then I think those are some issues.
I think that's a big you know, I humbly accept the cookie arena and show it is not.
But I might collaborate with the law professor on this issue.
More questions. Okay.
We can get a little longer break than scheduled, but the deal is we really will start at 345.