We'll have a brief summary of the paper by its author, Patrick Emerton.
So to say this is actually a co-authored paper.
So with my own Monash colleague Toby Hadfield, I hope the paper is clear enough in its overall purposes.
What we're trying to do is look at how various possible positions in relation to just war, and particularly not exclusively.
As you said, Belgium can be seen as being sort of grounded in deeper conceptions of political morality.
In the first section, we distinguish three different types of defence of war.
So defence against genocide, homelands, defence, which we characterise as defence against expulsion.
The problem should also, I think, be extended to include defence against enslavement.
And then what we regard as more problematic category of political defence,
which is we defence of a political control over a particular population or particular territory.
We then go on to consider taking it.
The ordinary principles of individual self-defence would justify wars in defence against genocide or wars in homeland defence.
We then go on to consider what would be needed to justify wars and political
defences of characterised it and talk a bit about what that would require.
And to summarise it, what we think is key is what sort of values can be said to be being defended in the context of political defence,
such that it's justified to create the engagements and exposing many people to potentially lethal harm in the cause of political defence.
And we argue that a sort of position which we characterise broadly, but I hope intuitively, plausibly has liberal cosmopolitanism,
is going to have a lot of trouble identifying any state other than a liberal state as enjoying the privilege of political defence.
In the second section of the paper, we going to try to bring out some sort of further features of the liberal cosmopolitan approach to just war.
We argue we have a legal date or through Jim that I want to summarise now.
But in another paper, Toby and I have argued that moral equality of combatants can be defended through certain arguments,
and we argue that liberal cosmopolitans won't have that available to them.
So in a sense, I guess unsurprisingly, particularly for members of this audience, they end up being committed to sort of non traditional,
although apparently now orthodox symmetry in relation to this in Bella on on you said bellum.
We argue that the liberal cosmopolitans are going to have an asymmetric account there.
And again, it might not be surprising that Liberal cosmopolitans will be sceptical of neo liberal states having a political defence of privilege,
that we try to bring out some features of that that are perhaps not entirely obvious.
In particular, the, we think certain features of the universalism to characterise as Liberal cosmopolitanism
will lead to liberal cosmopolitans having quite a low threshold for defence of others,
which then is likely to license sort of a broader range of interventions than certainly tradition would permit,
and perhaps also that intuition might seem to permit.
And we also argue that because national self-determination movements for various both sort of a sort
of a merely empirical but also perhaps somewhat deeper reasons are likely to be non-liberal liberal.
Cosmopolitans are also likely to have an adverse view of national self-determination
and indeed perhaps slightly odd view that it would be better to first
subject peoples to wait for a liberal state to intervene on their behalf than to act in their own national self-determination through nonlinear means.
In the third section of the paper, we consider sort of some alternative accounts of political morality.
Unlike itself yesterday, we think that there are interesting differences between Walser's account and rules account,
and we try to bring some of them out and we think that A rolls through his account of international public reason is able to give a plausible,
a tenable story about what value might be set up against individual involvement of inviolability
to then permit a privileged political defence to arise at least some non-liberal states.
But we argue they'll still be some sort of limitations there.
So you still get something quite non-traditional out of rolls and you're really going to, we say, have to go to quite a romantic story,
a romantic national story to get anything like sort of traditional common sense in the conclusion of.
Then at the last section we go on to ask, having looked at these various pictures,
is the value that these various accounts of political morality can affirm the mod warrant.
Political I'm a political self-defence really valuable enough to license widespread killing.
And we think if your ends of the honourable position your commitment to national self-determination and that value would really
have to be very romantic perhaps in the light of 20th century history and plausibly romantic to think that that's justified.
Which means if any of that was so, then you'd be at least a type of limited pacifist.
Accepting the war is justified only in respect of defence against genocide or homeland defence.
And we say that liberal cosmopolitans, because of the great value they place on individual inviolability,
are probably compelled towards that sort of limited pacifism, which again is a sort of a,
we think in kind of an interesting and non-intuitive result that I think a lot of the we feel that a lot of the
contemporary approaches in just war so tend to accept that Liberal states will still have a fairly robust privilege,
privileged political defence, but we think that's probably doubtful. So that's the summary group.
COMMENTATOR is James Patterson from Manchester. Okay, great.
Now before I start, I say I'm up on you Patrick's article in PPA, but I thought, well, I'd Google them and see what came up.
And I think number three was a Patrick Hamilton Appreciation Society on Facebook.
I knew that I was going to have a very tough gig when when the leading leading line is.
The man's a genius. But you're right, which is that's actually written by equity in a law lecture.
Another philosophy lecturer that's actually read about you as an equity in trusts is in a very different tonight.
Okay. Let me I'll give a very brief summary.
As I understand Patrick and Tobi,
I'll try and cover all the bits that Patrick just went over so Patrick can tie the concern with what I call the privilege of political defence.
Now, this fits this privilege has two features endangerment, where our state may justifiably endanger its own citizens in its defence and force,
where the importance of a political organisation licenses the use of force and thus the exposure of its own citizens and opponents,
citizens potentially lethal harm. Now, most of the paper, as Patrick suggested,
is concerned with considering which particular states possess this political defensive
privilege and also outlining different conceptions and requirements of this privilege,
and particularly the requirement of normative integration between the government and citizens.
Now, Patrick and Toby claim on the one hand, that a liberal, cosmopolitan,
liberal cosmopolitan position and liberal state may enjoy this privilege, because in the case of endangerment, of commitments,
individual autonomy and its ability to articulate its decision to go to war in terms of public reason,
and because in the case of force and liberal state is the realisation of individual autonomy
and potentially the kind of hence was the idea of individuals political self-determination.
On the other hand, they argue that liberal cosmopolitan says very high cosmopolitanism sets a very high threshold for normative integration,
which means that non-liberal states don't possess the political defensive privilege.
And so, as Patrick says, that they think that liberal,
cosmopolitan cosmopolitanism presents a widespread license for a range of humanitarian interventions.
Now, in addition,
they claim that liberal cosmopolitans can't explain why any particular Liberal government has a political defence of privilege without
also citing the voluntary associations may possess the political defensive privilege or endorsing an ancient liberal appeal to security.
And this means that states enjoy, at best,
a privilege to defend themselves from challenges to non-liberal state forms of government, but not against other liberal states.
Okay, so that's how I understand the paper now. For the most part, they seem to be concerned with liberal liberal imperialism.
And so they suggest at one point that the liberal cosmopolitan view seems like this give rise to the danger of excessive
intervention both by liberal states and against other liberal states and by any state against more liberal states.
In page 26. Now, in my discussion, I want to present some arguments against this view.
I'm not going to argue that liberal cosmopolitanism may be far less, far less interventionist than Patrick and Toby imply.
So Milwaukee, first, as a matter of principle, I think morality of war, liberal cosmopolitans may be less prone to vention.
But before I think so, I think it's worth noting that the fact that liberal cosmopolitans might seem to deny non-liberal states
a right of political defence against intervention from liberal states shouldn't seem to be surprising.
So liberal states deny the legitimacy of non-liberal states.
States that lack legitimacy in the deep morality of or at least may be subject to intervention.
So it seems to me it's almost self evident, almost perhaps tautological that for liberal cosmopolitans,
non-liberal states don't possess a just cause to use force to protect their non-liberal states from intervention by people states.
Okay. Notwithstanding that point, let me not present five reasons why a liberal cosmopolitan might not be keen to advocate intervention.
Five more principled reasons so of so more deeper reasons.
Plus, Patrick can take you suggest that liberal cosmopolitans may prefer intervention to a liberal state by legal states,
the national liberation of a self-determination movement. This is because, they argue the majority of self-determination movements are not liberal,
since they lack the political opportunity and resources to establish themselves in a liberal basis.
However, I think that this misses the point that liberal cosmopolitans could have a forward looking account of national self-determination movements.
Well, the legitimacy of a movement depends on whether it's reasonably expect it to form a Liberal
government and not whether it's Liberal now and if it's likely to form a Liberal government.
Liberal cosmopolitans, I think, wouldn't necessarily endorse intervention instead of a self-determination movement, because that's the first one.
Second, as I said, Patrick and Toby suggest that a liberal cosmopolitan can't explain why a particular
set of liberal political arrangements can't be defended against any alternative.
And this means that they think the liberal states are immune to attack by other liberal states wanting to depose another Liberal government.
So I think that it's a footnote that draws on Symonds.
Now, I think that a plausible explanation can be offered as to why liberal cosmopolitanism might not be willing to sanction
such intervention in a liberal democracy that citizens participate in their elections for their particular government.
So any alternative in government imposed by a third party wouldn't be elected by the people, and so it lacked legitimacy.
In other words, citizens and liberal democracy seemed to me to be tied to that particular government because they voted for it,
and changing that government without their consent, in effect, would discard the results of the ballot boxes.
And so this connection to a of the government, to its citizens,
seems to present a reason why you might think that liberal states have a defensive privilege against other liberal states.
Okay, thirdly, a fairly straightforward point.
If a liberal cosmopolitan holds that there's a difference between doing, allow, doing and allowing,
there might be far less willing to endorse intervention in general, and especially when what is being allowed is egregious.
So such as in cases where a state lacks political defence, a political defensive privilege, but isn't engaged in mass killing.
Fourthly, it's common in a liberal cosmopolitan literature to defend the principle of external
support and put generally those subject to the intervention need to be need to welcome it.
So they need to endorse it somehow.
So this might take the form of an opinion polls and the victims or potentially burdened bystanders or more indirectly,
the use of secondary sources or indicators of the citizens opinions.
For instance, by reliable intermediaries like supply,
might this kind of consent principle or some sort of external support either might be important in a liberal cosmopolitan position?
Well, most obviously intervention might be harmful to those subject to it.
So those who are culpable for the situation but may have to take on its burdens should have some input,
although perhaps not a veto about whether the intervention actually occurs,
i.e. because whether they are actually going to accept the risk of these burdens being placed on them.
In addition, it seems important as a matter of individual political self-determination,
the kind of value that Patrick and Toby appeal to, that those subjects,
the intervention, have some say about any changes to their government, even if the current government is illegitimate according to Liberal standards.
If an intervener unilaterally imposes a new government without consulting the individuals that be subject to this government,
it may seem to reduce further the small amount of individual self-government that currently exists.
So my point then is a liberal cosmopolitan mind or some sort of consent principle, and this further reduce any interventionist tendencies.
Okay. The fifth point concerns intervention by non-liberal states.
Patrick and Toby claim that on a liberal cosmopolitan view,
liberal states composites the political defensive privilege against other non-liberal states.
And so in the papers, they cite the case of Iraq and Kuwait.
And they suggest that that's the case where neither side possessed a political defensive privilege.
Now, on the contrary, it seems to me that although it might affect the permissibility permissibility of liberal intervention,
I think a liberal cosmopolitan could in principle endorse a non-liberal state's defensive privileges
in the case of the forcible change of government to an even the more non liberal government.
So I think that a liberal cosmopolitan could defend the defensive privileges in the case of an even changes to an even more non Liberal government.
And I think Kasper kind of raised a similar point in one of the cases.
It raised a similar point in one of its questions earlier yesterday.
So although a non-liberal state may not enjoy a fully fledged defence of privilege that justifies endangerment and force against liberal states,
they might possess a limited political defensive privilege against a non-liberal aggressor.
And so this would be the case. Defending the action would be comparatively worse in terms of individual autonomy,
which is the value that Patrick and Toby appeal to, to explain why liberal states possess a political defensive right.
So Kuwait might enjoy a limited political defensive privilege against a successful
intervention by Iraq because ruled by Saddam's tyranny would be to be even worse individual,
individual autonomy than under the Kuwaiti constitutional monarchy.
So, for instance, the I found out I found out this from the great Wikipedia that magically Aloma, which is the National Assembly of Kuwait,
may be abolished and that as a result, there may be an even lower degree of political self-determination in Kuwait.
Okay, so this might justify something approaching endangerment.
However, this limited defensive privilege, I think, might not fully justify the full principles of endangerment and force.
It might not permit substantial costs being borne by the Kuwaiti civilians in defence of their a bit less non-liberal state,
but it might still permit resort to force and potentially some sort of embellished privileges as well.
Okay. So those are kind of five more deeper reasons, as I call them, in the written version of the paper.
This response.
I'm going to briefly I'll say something about two kind of fairly obvious, but more pragmatic arguments I think should just be flagged up.
So Patrick and Toby suggest a couple of points that the personality constraint will prohibit the use of force.
But I think they generally downplay the importance of this concern as a constraint on liberal interventionism in the light of Iraq and Afghanistan.
We all know now that changes in governments,
possible changes in government are very unlikely to succeed and in very few limited circumstances because simply that unlikely to be successful.
And I think in practice this is going to be a notable constraint.
It's going to pull our intuitions why we might think the intervention isn't isn't justifiable.
Secondly, I think it's worth reiterating that. The deep morality of war is only one part.
It's an important part of the morality of war,
but it's only one part of a fully fledged account of the morality of war and a fully fledged liberal cosmopolitan position.
We need to take you need to take into account more pragmatic concerns.
So liberal cosmopolitans might might endorse a highly limited political defence of privilege as a matter of the deep morality of war.
But I think they could also present a real consequentialist justification for maintaining a much higher threshold.
And such an argument might run as follows Given the costs of intervention in general, both in terms of lives and resources.
There needs to be a high bar for intervention to be justified in order for there is a sufficient room for it to be proportionate.
And this might be through a restriction on the use of military force two occasions where there is a
qualitatively and quantitatively significant amount of good that can be achieved to outweigh any potential harm.
And this might lead to saying that somebody's life is only in cases of mass violation of basic human rights.
The intervention could potentially have just cause. Moreover,
you might think that maintaining a role where you can intervene in cases of where the political
defensive privilege is lacking is very much open to abuse in in reality by powerful intervening states.
And so you need a higher bar to reduce any possibilities of abuse.
Now, this kind of kind of real consequences thinking, I think, has a further implication for Patrick and Toby's argument.
They suggest that the rules of intervention in international law based on the non-liberal value of national self-determination.
However, I think that a credible case could be made for the view of extension of a political
defence of privilege and potentially other sovereign rights in international law.
It's quite a lot of states, and based on the liberal cosmopolitan role consequentialist vision.
So maintaining rules that generally protect states places with defensive
privileges might be the currently optimal way of protecting individuals rights,
given the risks of abuse by a more permissive environment.
Okay, so I'm not convinced and that liberal Cosmopolitan isn't necessarily that interventionist both in the deep,
moralistic, almost practically and, well, Germany.
I think we should be careful of criticising or endorsing a a position for why it seems to sanction in a deep morality of war,
practical moral considerations, whether they concern the roles played by institutions,
epistemic difficulties, a likelihood of compliance in the abuse, I think,
will often change the conclusions fairly radically and which perhaps tends to be a bit more upfront about this.
Okay. So I have a lengthy, overly lengthy discussion.
Yes. So the Janes are generously forwarded me his comments a couple of days ago.
So that might have a few notes on on the point about obviousness.
In a sense the true although I think some some features of what we try to bring out aren't always immediately obvious,
particularly the implications for national self-determination movements, the data,
our argument about the limitations on liberal states defending themselves against other liberal states.
So we think there is some stuff that is not entirely obvious. But, you know, we're moving on sort of to the five points.
The the final point about the Iraq Kuwait example and the idea that sort of
the slightly inadequate could defend itself against the radical inadequate.
Sounds plausible. On the third point about doing and allowing.
I don't want to think about that a bit more, but sort of on the face of it, that kind of sounds plausible.
Picking up the other three points and the point about being forward looking in relation to national self-determination movements,
I still don't think that's going to get you very far. I mean,
just sort of when I kind of trawl through my own sort of limited historical knowledge in India and the United
States are two reasonably clear examples of national self-determination resulting in a liberal state.
It's hard to think of a great many others.
So the forward looking requirement for statehood, so looking at movements which are sort of currently still in action,
just recently squashed in always going to be controversial or the real examples that the LTTE,
PKK, PLO would have seemed to be justified even if we look forward and it doesn't no great prospects there an adequate liberal statehood.
I think historically the movements in south eastern Europe against Turkey and
against Austria-Hungary after Hungarian empire good at African decolonisation.
And even if you say the poster child for something like we're not decolonisation for self-determination in Africa,
as the ANC has really struggled to achieve anything like radical liberal state.
So I thinking even forward looking this I don't think is really going to address the issue of those issues about political
capacity to establish liberal institutions don't only apply when you're sort of fighting at the kind of guerrilla stage,
but history since they really carry through for all sorts of kind of deep reasons about those situations.
And the second point about voting.
The argument in the paper he, I'll happily concede would benefit from development.
But there's at least a sketch of a response there, which is that we sort of try to fork the liberal cosmopolitan,
that if they appeal to choice or something in the neighbourhood of or metaphorically the choice of which I think would say voting as an instance.
It becomes quite challenging in our view for the Liberal Cosmopolitan to explain why other sorts of identity, realising autonomy,
affirming voluntary organisations that also inherit the privilege of political defence, which seems like a kind of a pretty strange conclusion.
But if you try to look for some concern on sort of the value of political association, of purely political associations,
then the door sides appears to be open for the proponents of a more sort of a collectivist or nationalist approach to appeal to that same value
without having consideration to extend the privilege of political self-defence and said that value in opposition to individual autonomy.
So it's I think the voting idea is sort of is vulnerable to that fork.
And your fourth comment was about the sort of popular input, perhaps not full fledged popular veto.
A couple of I think it's an interesting point and I think what going have had a few sort of responses to that in first at
least plausibly that rests upon some principle of collective political agency and the value of collective political agency,
which again is problematic for Cosmopolitan, sort of for the reasons I've just been giving.
There are practical issues, for example, if the burdens fall on one part of a population,
but the benefits on another side as opposed to intervention to defend an oppressed minority,
the issue of who gets polled and how and so on, I think actually is likely to be really quite challenging.
Meaning in general, the issue of relations between any subset of a population and its governance
legitimacy can be problematic even in a sort of a liberal democratic state,
in the sorts of situations where intervention is going on insofar as interventions lost.
And so I think that's likely to be highly problematic because that's probably
what generated the permissibility of the intervention in the first place.
And also this whole notion of popular input, of popular veto articulates some new criterion for political legitimacy,
which the implications of which are actually potentially quite radical.
For example, in Westminster, systems of government, of which obviously this country has one, in Australia has one,
the government can be changed without popular input through vote in the floor of the Parliament.
In the United States, the Constitution can be changed to a popular input through a vote in Congress in state legislatures.
So we kind of accept a whole lot of present regimes with even quite radical changes in forms of government can be legitimate without popular input.
And if suddenly, in the case of certain interventions, we've set up this kind of referendum criterion for legitimacy.
Interesting. But the flow three implications, I think, have to be thought through before we can confidently endorse that.
So that's the first sort of and the fourth point. Then on the final point you made about pragmatism and rule consequentialist and whether
international law should be seen as grounded in that rather than resting upon this,
a more kind of romantic nationalist foundations that we suggest. Okay.
And maybe but I'm feeling here and I'm drawing, I guess,
particularly on the position roles articulated in a lot of people is also sort of they're implicitly in most of the for the reasons we give up,
we think the rules captures it better. That kind of approach doesn't really fully seem to capture the value of sovereignty and that sort of approach.
It seems that the sovereignty of non-liberal states and polities is sort of dependent
upon some kind of contingent concession rather than a genuine deep equality of policies.
So those sort of there's a certain sense in which under that approach,
international law wouldn't be regarding non-liberal polities as fully equal participants in international society.
And that sort of, in our view, really leaves the imperialism concern intact.
Domain rules in law. People doesn't talk about liberal imperialism, but it does talk about real condescension of liberal condescension.
And so my feeling is that that kind of analysis still leaves some of those concerns intact.
And that's why we think if you really do want to just you know, we're not saying the current international status quo is justified.
We're kind of agnostic in the papers to whether nationalism or liberalism is the superior way to go.
But but we I think we would say, if you want to defend something like the status quo,
including that sense that it's not a condescension, it's a genuine equality, then you do have to move away from liberalism.
Okay. Thanks very much. All right.
Let me. Write down the first two or so.
So we're going to try again conditionally to use the fingered interventions, but on the same conditions as yesterday, we can't be very many.
So think of it as requiring something pretty close to supreme emergency.
But the point that's worth making is very likely still going to be worth making 20 minutes later.
So you can just get in line. And the other thing is you can't conduct a general dialogue on the basis of a finger.
The good news is, if you're in the list, you can I think it's very useful to let people go on for a while.
Okay, let's see. So I got Seth and Jeff Oak has Burns and Victor and Cheney.
Okay, that's plenty. Okay, Seth, thanks.
I really enjoyed the paper. And I think a reflection then it's it's not really a criticism.
It's just an observation, I guess that just occurred to me.
So one of the things that we're aware we're doing some of the things on a few papers is think about,
you know, what values might justify this political offensive privilege.
And one of the problems of sort of implicitly wrestling where they're thinking about is this Simmons particularity problem.
And and it struck me that in a way,
we're kind of thinking about maybe we're thinking about the values that underlie the political offensive privilege along their own sort of analogy.
Maybe Simmons is as well. So here's a thought, right? And what is it that grounds my right?
And this is going to be a fully blown, lame domestic analogy.
One of the values that underlie my right to self-defence, and one of them is my moral statement.
Okay, how do we understand the basis of moral status? It's going to be grounded in characteristics in which you can have more or less.
So I suppose it's something to do with consciousness of self-awareness.
There can be some people who can be pretty, pretty dumb if you still cross the threshold, if you like, for having moral status as persons.
And there can be some people who are incredibly reflective and amazing and just
because they're incredibly reflective and have these wonderfully developed minds,
that doesn't give them any greater rights of self-defence. Right?
So the rights of self-defence that we have as individuals is partly grounded in these
characteristics that we have crossing a certain threshold and of all of liability,
of being a range property, something like that.
And it struck me that when we're talking about the political defence of privilege and we tend to be thinking,
I think in terms of while if you're grounded in a value,
then if the other side's going to have more value is in this how I phrase doing it, the other states have more value than the one that has no value.
Right? Which is kind of analogous to saying if some really, really clever guy wants to come kill me and I should, you know,
I shouldn't have the right to self-defence against him because he realises the values on which my right to self-defence is grounded.
And so that's so I wonder whether we should be and I think this fits better with doing this.
Let's go with your analysis, which suggests that once the state passes the threshold of normative integration,
they're going to then have this political equivalent. So I just wanted to offer that.
Yeah, I think I agree with the implications of what you're saying.
So, I mean, Rawls has the political perception of the person.
And equally, a lot of people see you have lots of international blue conception of a people, of peoples,
and it is a threshold account and that's why it's a decent hierarchical resample get over the law,
even though in Rawls own view, for example, they're not as valuable as liberal states.
But I mean, because of his international public reason framework,
that that's a purely private judgement of his in the same way that a liberal Catholic might wish that everyone else was also a Catholic.
But, you know, liberal democracy sort of can't politically and publicly act on that as a purely private desire.
So I guess that's the point that we're making. Is that why did it cross the threshold?
I mean, our discussion of Rawls is sort of truncated. I think interpreting Law of Peoples is very, very challenging.
I think David Reidy, I think, has kind of part of the best account in print,
although modestly suggests to my own account that a footnote in the collection on the WTO and human rights,
I think, also tries to get rules pretty right, and it's fairly consistent with rulings in hand.
But the way out of the rules is that to cross the threshold, you have to be a genuinely self-determining collective.
And that means that you can't be in a situation where persons are being oppressed.
Sometimes you that the phrase was a slice of logic.
And I think his articulation of his notorious limited list of human rights is these are what you need in order not to be a slave society,
which I'm a Christian, in order to be genuine, a genuine self-determining collective.
And it still actually rules out a whole lot of states which are out there in the world.
Simply enjoying the privilege of political defence. So it's the question of how does one plausibly articulate the threshold that I think liberals,
I think still are going to set a pretty high and even role sets it implausibly high relative to international common sense.
We're not disciples of we have high simplicity.
But it does it does help when you're talking about the liberal state defending itself against another liberal state.
Right. Because the fact that the other liberal state is more liberal.
So Rawls certainly will give you that. I'm great rolls at that point sort of liberal cosmopolitans.
I don't know. Say I don't know which side is favoured yet.
Yeah. Okay. Yeah, I agree with that.
But I think that at that point, you still think articulate some value that you're setting up against individual inviolability, which I think rules it.
Okay, David, figure on such analogy.
I mean, the analogy, any works, if you attribute something intrinsic value to the state,
if you think you have a country that the states realising is entirely instrumental for the people that it serves.
And I think the analogy doesn't work because the value for those individuals might be
served as well as a matter of oppression to another equally just wanting to stay.
Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So that doesn't really it doesn't change the fact that much.
But what it does, it just illustrates that the the model of just you guys, I mean,
this is this comes a lot of this presupposes of Simmons the particularity problem
specifically the idea of why you get to protect your particular set of institutions,
why they're tied to Islam.
Um, and it's just illustrative of the fact that the same thing applies, does exactly the same thing applies to those individual rights were defending.
Obviously to show that the analogy works. I mean at the moment it is just an analogy.
It has no justification for force whatsoever.
You would have to make I, I mean, on your on that I think that what you said makes me sort of at that point worry about the analogy.
I think for the same sort of reason David said that this and if you if you value individual
inviolability I just can't think of any plausible argument that a really clever person killing,
even a fairly stupid person affirms that value. Really man, unless they are informed of their preference that you be dead.
It's kind of so crucial. I mean, that's getting that up.
But I mean, but that's not the standard liberal kind of individual involved with value idea with inviolability is it's what is inviolability based on.
And inviolability is based on the characteristics that make you that grant united
status and to give an account of those characteristics that are very good,
they go, how different is this better realise or foster that with a clever person is.
Whereas I think I would agree with David that if that's what you're focusing on fill in the state clearly so it's interesting.
Okay Jeff I'm.
The the argument in Patrick's paper.
Is framed in collectivist terms.
It's focussed on the rights and privileges of states.
But. Liberal cosmopolitanism in some of its variants is a radically individualist view which discounts the importance of states.
In understanding the morality of the use of force.
And that fact opens up. Two different distinct dimensions to the problem of intervention.
First of all, there's a problem of the permissibility of intervention.
And then there's secondly, the problem of the permissibility of resistance to intervention.
And you're focusing primarily on the second of those, the political defence privilege.
But it's important to note that James's fourth point about a kind of some sort
of requirement of consent by the alleged beneficiaries of an intervention.
An instance, let's say, a humanitarian intervention.
Restricts the permissibility of intervention, the first of the two moral dimensions to the problem of intervention.
I thought what you said, Patrick, in response to James's fourth point about the fact that you can have changes in political regime.
Constitutional change and that sort of thing without popular input doesn't really address the point about intervention,
which is intervention is not changed by force, by force of arms, by war, which is the focus of what James was discussing.
His point was that one constraint on military intervention is that those who are the ostensible beneficiaries of the intervention.
Should have some say about whether they should be exposed to the risks of having a war fought where they live,
endangering their lives for the sake of some goals that they may or may not support,
even though they may be or may be alleged to be intended to benefit them.
So that's one point. I mean, I think James is right about that. His fourth point, justified interventions have to respect the.
Preferences of the people who are the intended beneficiaries.
Then on the second dimension, the permissibility of resistance.
It seems to me that the obvious thing that the liberal Cosmopolitan can say is that it may well be that the state.
If it's illegitimate, whatever, buy whatever lives may not have any right of defence of itself.
Meaning something like that government.
But the people may still, as individuals may still have some collectively actionable right against violent intervention,
even if it's alleged to be in their interests.
So I'm not saying that I know exactly how to respond to all the challenges that you and Seth have presented
to the idea that what's at stake in a struggle for self self-determination by people not of state,
but by people against military intervention is ever going to be enough to warrant violent resistance.
But that's in a way, a separate question from the main issue in your paper.
Thinking about James fourth point and the point about consent.
There is.
I mean, there is a difference between obviously between change of government by force of arms and charging government by a vote of no confidence.
So on the floor of the House. I still wonder whether, in effect, kind of referendum as criterion of legitimacy,
whether the articulation of how that applies to change by force of arms compared to
sort of change in other contexts can be clearly articulated in a way that's plausible.
I mean, I suppose one of the issues is whether we're going to revise our Constitution to permit the death penalty, for example.
That has implications for some people's lives.
Did the prison, the prospective murderers, have a right of veto or special privilege in respect of that,
as opposed to, for example, an ordinary vote sort of through ordinary sort of political means being sufficient?
I mean, not absurd that they do.
They're not intuitive that they do either. Is the is the analogy I mean, the example sort of states claim after basic analogy,
that is an analogy strong enough to bear the weight of putting on it, have to think about it a bit more.
But I'm still I'm just sort of thinking about the constitutional theory in general and forms of the way political decisions are reached.
A referendum requirement, I just think is a very radical a very radical requirement,
which if we're going to articulate it, we need to think through very clearly what implications what implications it has.
And the force of our support is fair. But I am worried that you're going to get domestic cases that might be unanimous in certain respects.
I'm on the point about resistance by the people.
I'm. I mean, we certainly if the intervention licenses sort of popular resistance in defence against genocide or homeland defence,
I mean clearly we think that it's permissible in our paper if it's.
If it's lost in some sort of further or kind of broader ground of maintaining sort of their own political institutions or political practices.
I guess the challenge you see is what what account are we going to give of their their entitlement
to protect their political practices or their form of political and social organisation,
which doesn't then in some fashion, get inherited by their state.
For example, how does one articulate what their form of political and social life is,
which is defensible, abstracted away from the state in which they in fact live,
which I hypothesised in your example is it inheriting their defence of right me is challenging enough as it is to articulate
a certain people's form of collective political and social life as a kind of an issue in sort of political sociology,
let alone articulating that in a way that abstracts away from the state in which the government under which they actually live.
So at that point, I guess I challenged liberal cosmopolitanism gives show us some of the sociological detail and then maybe you're right,
but it's certainly sociological. We think at least a sociological challenge to do that.
Okay. Jeff's going to come back again. And then I have two fingered interventions on this, Major Underwood and Cecile.
I'll try to. First of all, I, I I'm not persuaded that the death row inmate example has very much force here, simply because.
It's a case in which it seems to me that the death row inmate may have forfeited any right to be involved in decisions about his own punishment.
From that point of view, if prisoners retain the right to vote.
Certainly never suppose that we should have a weighted ballot. This. On assistance by the people.
I agree with you. The challenge here is to.
Explain why a particular group of people have a right.
Resistance independently of their state to protect their desire to.
Determined collectively their own way of life.
But I'm I'm not sure I understand exactly why the state should their state should inherit their defensive riot.
It seems to me that very often. The state and the people it governs are.
Radically alienated, and the people want independence, both from their own state and from rule by other states.
I think of this quotation that I've cited and somewhere in the character in Graham Greene's novel, The Canadians, which is about Haiti under.
First he says the characters and long.
Duvalier regime is. The Marines came, I think I'd fight with the Duvalier forces.
We don't want to be ruled by Duvalier. We also don't want to be ruled by the United States.
The Journal. So thank you for my comments or I'm having a hard time seeing how.
Consensus of the rescue can be a principle. I granted as a pragmatic objection.
I actually give you a lot of stories of how hard it is to help people be helpful.
But. The respecting the concerns of the rescued seems to presuppose the sort of value in collective autonomy that is already in question.
All right. That's sort of the thing that I'm having.
I'm struck is that we're going to say like the antebellum South in the United States before the Civil War.
Slaves in the antebellum South certainly got nothing close to what we would call some sort of legitimate form of government.
They had no way to voice their their collective swill.
And the problem becomes why is that?
Any expression of that will something to be respected in a principled way when we're talking about things like slavery,
genocide and those sorts of things. So. The problem.
I have a concern for the rescuers. What's at issue is how do we value collective will?
And what seems to be the principal objection to rescuing these people is some sort of collective will.
On. If I've understood your right.
I think we're looking at Greece. Yes. Yes.
So and I'll just add in terms of sort of what we think are some of the features of some liberal cosmopolitanism that support that idea,
that sort of why should we have regard to that collective will?
Even if you've got doubts that's been genuinely articulated, given there are no liberal institutions which is being done.
Secondly, we think the universalism and the low threshold that creates the defence of others on liberal cosmopolitan
account also makes it harder for the more difficult liberal cosmopolitan to explain why that would matter,
in the sense that the idea that the liberal cosmopolitans idea that issues of what interests are best judged here of
the day becomes harder to articulate because of that kind of commitment to universality and in personality and so on.
And the bit about why the just comment about and about the death row enlightenment,
I want to push that any further on the on the point about the why the state matters.
I'm thinking if. If you sort of asked the British people to articulate what their sort of form of common political and social life is,
you said in doing that, you may not mention anything about your constitution, your houses of parliament, your monarchy, your laws.
Magna Carta. What resources would they have left?
Now, in some cases, the sort of radicalisation you talk about will obtain brought about a higher in his book,
in his general jurisprudence of Law and Society gives the example of unhappy Micronesia, where he worked for a while as a legal official.
And he says that there really was kind of complete alienation between the official law,
which is really relevant only for foreign companies dealing with. Yes. And the people of Yahoo!
Conducted entirely under customary law. And so you can get cases where the alienation is close to total in those cases.
The psychological challenge that I suggested arises, I think can be can be met.
But a lot of states amend the Constitution.
The political practices probably won't be as embedded as they are in Britain, but are likely to be, I think sufficiently embedded in period.
The modernist project has gone far enough that I do think the psychological challenge I raised won't be trivial to meet today.
That a bit more about what I'm thinking. Jess All right, so I'm persuaded that you responded to some of Jeff's challenges.
I mean, I think it's entirely it seems to me the following two pronged position seems to me to be different.
To wit, Stalin's Soviet Russia, rather, Stalin's regime had no claim whatsoever to Germany.
But the Soviet citizens had a very strong defence in particular, from what we've heard by force.
Some instances the latter. Well, it goes with the territory too.
Just to have in mind this though, it seems to me that the difficulty for this sort of general account arises at the following point.
It may very well be that one needed in Soviet Russia at the time that the institutions of Stalin's
refusing order to prosecute citizens effectively to exercise their individual rights of compliance.
So it seems to me that that might be one area in which you might want to apply pressure.
If it is the case that individual citizens with a lot of resistance against the truth can only be discharged through illegitimate institutions,
which quite institutions have no claim to being returned.
I mean, there is it seems to be clear privileges here.
So I think the second point is it is interesting about whether I mean, if you insist,
if you dissolve the state, you also dissolve your military effectiveness.
You know, I think that's an interesting episode to make for the points about.
Yes. But on the other,
I think the Russia of the Soviet case against Nazi Germany fairly clearly under our taxonomy is certainly homeland defence and also has elements
at least a defence against genocide in the sense that there was a fairly clear expulsion and or enslavement and or genocidal policy there.
So just the sorts of cases that are sort of become more doubtful as what is, let's say, the German war against Russian First World War,
where the aim was this, as I was saying, the history was that expulsion or enslavement or genocide.
But what example is episode in territories to replace Czarist regime with sort of the mocking regime?
And that's where we kind of bite the bullet right to bits like the Iraq Kuwait example.
I mean, it's been subject to kind of James point about degrees that have been subject to that.
We kind of bite the bullet of that and say, I mean, obviously multiple proportionality type issues and so on, which we talk about.
But at the level of what James is called deep morality, we're prepared to bite that bullet.
Okay. Back to the list, which is Casper Victor Cheney and Laura Casper.
I have a question regarding certain about.
That's right. That people wanted to have this positive exchange.
And one thing they might seem. Voluntary associations for expressive and affirming autonomy.
The members that said an explanation they might suggest that that's in that process.
If that's the reason why states have differences in legal cosmopolitan but don't seem
to be permitted to say that other voluntary associations that express and some of the.
The members who have the political. Defensive end isn't just a business and certainly an expensive proposition.
So my question, I'm not sure I see it. It's kind of certainly an expensive conception of yourself.
So so is my reasons. So the way you define political offensive, which is tied to.
Resistance and scepticism based government to the territory of the nation.
So you could simply make the analytical point that we define privilege.
You just need some kind of statement. But I take it that this is not the main point.
Then, of course, you've got to say that they're very best.
See how you can have a mortgage. I put that these are unlikely to occur.
But thinking about it, I don't see why they couldn't happen.
Why would you leave pieces onstage?
You shouldn't even enjoy defensive practices because then, for instance, the UN constitutes a voluntary association.
So I suppose that's fuelled slightly different as opposed to the UN intervenes in a country to engage in civil wars.
Why couldn't the UN have a political.
Defence privilege if some passes and that's. Tries to destroy the U.N. as an organisation.
Suppose that the Catholic Church go on Internet so they give up the Vatican State and then they still retain the organisation and the church.
And then somebody tries to destroy that organisation by giving.
That's hacking and this is just said, well, why would you choose to join the.
Defence. So. So on.
The analytic point was I was like, whoops, and we'll go back in.
Whereas on the if you're in, okay, so if you're going to go that way is it's kind of fair enough.
I mean, the I mean, the U.N. exam has its own sort of complexities.
I mean, because it's I mean and the sort of uncharted these imaginary sort of military staff committee and so on.
So I think the UN kind of raises complex points.
I think they the Catholic Church example is kind of, I guess more subtly what we had had in mind.
This is I mean sort of so roles in particular so writes a lot about through the identity because identity of um of religious organisations but.
It's an issue. If you accept that, that's.
Okay. Again, Ben went to try to bring out consequences.
Okay. I guess one person's sort of redux goes another person's bullet to bite.
But it does, I think, focus on the Catholic Church,
which is a long standing organisation which has in the past just kind of fought wars in self-defence,
maybe makes the Constitution seem less extreme and mean once you focus on sort of the very wide number of smaller sort of Protestant churches,
particularly in the US, for example, which might easily be kind of identity and autonomy affirming for their members and also has
more likely to come into potential conflict with one another and the Catholic Church then.
Okay. And then if you think about remains the Church of Scientology.
And then if you go beyond religious groups to other sorts of identity affirming groups like political parties, I mean, so in a sense,
the Nazis asserted it on Blackshirts in general, sort of assert a type of political defensive privilege through their stormtroopers or whatever.
But I mean, leaving aside sort of the the particularly abhorrence of their political values, I mean,
even sort of should I like is the Greens party entitled to have kind of green shirts who defended my view.
But I think it does have following it through a kind of has implications which are kind of significant and at least to some extent counter-intuitive
is that sort of I think putting up the Catholic Church's example minimises their ways once we look at the green shirts and so on,
I think is that really the path we ought to be heading down?
Very so is the only thing I think is a good example of that sort of thing is that, you know.
Yeah. Yeah. I mean, yeah, yeah. Given that implication, if you're going to have yeah, yeah, yeah.
The fact of the matter well comes when Kasper just said this point that in order to grant the political benefit to someone's interests,
you don't have to to all the incentives. And that's the only thing you have to do to deny that this is spent.
So at the expense of.
It's too difficult to give some examples of instances where it doesn't seem like such a principled category of demarcation, I guess.
Yeah. So and yeah. And again.
Okay, Victor, one thing just to get sharpened up, I think, is the fact that an attack country has no right to defend itself against an attacker,
doesn't imply a position on the attacker to attack the country for the reason that the when the country attacks,
they might know that the defending country is going to nevertheless defend itself, even though it has no right to do so.
There's going to be this big conflict, a lot of death. I think the country with just a roll over, then they would have the right to go in,
but they don't have the right to go in because they know we're going to defend the South god of war and loss of life.
So that's just one thing, just that we should just focus on the right to defend. That doesn't imply all of these these plausibly expensive.
Most of us, this very reason will be most profound. So here's the puzzle.
When we focus on the right of defence,
how could it be that a country which has institutions which realise the autonomy of the citizens in a more effective way have.
A reason to resist the establishment of institutions that are going to realise how many of their citizens in a better way.
And that's just a challenge for cosmopolitans are not cosmopolitans, right?
That's not a special challenge for cosmopolitans. But as a general challenge,
if we're going to just impose the system is going to get you to realise your values better than the ones you have realising at the moment.
And here are the possibilities of that challenge. One of the very value those being advanced might be set back by the imposition of the institutions.
So one way to realise the values that we set up the institutions, when you come to set up the institutions for us,
part of the value of all that we have individually and realise not only through a set
of institutions is set back as institutions are imposed rather than us realising them.
And here's another one that the value itself of realising personal autonomy through a political community is time dependent.
So we are on the way to shaping ourselves as a political community will be is in a bit of a defective way.
And when you put these new institutions in place, we're going to go back to time zero in shaping all autonomy,
which then takes time to establish themselves as a community.
And there might be reasons to be defensive, sensible institutions where we're already realising quite a lot of value.
Well, but setting us back to zero and then getting us to start up again because some members of our community will die out
before they get to a position where overall they've advance their autonomy through that new set of institutions.
Well, the better it's worse to do it for some of the for some of our citizens.
On the first one, our permissions versus privilege, which sort of intended to sort of pick that up through men for us,
under the rubric of proportionality and necessity was sort of some of the roughly we could use it in a way that's the Jones point
this question of whether we emphasise that enough or not to include more substantive take to me the more substantive point,
the bit about time dependence I think is interesting.
And also I think more men tend to take that on board and that.
And also as a matter of methodology, it shows an attention to kind of like a sort of history or sort of psychology,
which is slightly different in canon from the general thrust of sort of liberal cosmopolitan writing, which is a reason not to take them on board.
But it's kind of interesting means inverted cosmopolitanism, plus a bit more sort of sociology gets us perhaps somewhere closer to common sense.
To the first point, the book, the middle point, the first substantive points about that being a challenge for all.
I'm not fully persuaded by that, because as you move away from a liberal cosmopolitan view, of course,
the value that self-determination is realising is that autonomy, or at least individual autonomy, is some other sort of value of values.
And indeed the values might be different and different in different communities.
So I'm not just me, and I'm not sure that sort of the challenge is there for everyone to say how can we sort of justify I mean,
how can we object to knocking down this thing in favour of other things for better, real and valuable things?
It is a challenge to Liberals as well. So for all liberals, not just liberals, lots of other liberals do,
but who think that liberal institutions are better at realising value than monarchists.
So it's not a challenge to moralities of liberalism.
Just one view we have. I can just take it. Yeah, okay.
That makes it okay on this. David So just on this first point about the privilege of defence,
nothing extensive with the permissibility of attack and I think he actually phrased it in a slightly weaker form.
I mean, it's not just about the fact that people sometimes will defend against an end of the right,
which you kind of said you would then incorporate as your points about proportionality, necessity.
I mean, these are analytically different concepts, right?
I mean, know, you can fail to have defensive rights for a whole bunch of reasons that don't have to do with them,
as this has lots of examples where, you know, defence would be impossible, but the attack is equally infinitesimal.
You get this in provocation cases in self-defence, for example, in the case of war, if you imagine, you know, a state that has, you know,
a regime that is enslaving its own population and that regime is then being attacked by an aggressor who controls the population as well.
I mean, it's just clear that you can have those just analytically deficient concepts.
I mean, the the case of enslavement. Then under our campaign, even the defence of privilege arises.
So you get at least an overlap in there, although I'm not sure that the objective, the distinction to draw.
Okay. Jenny Ryan, I like it here.
This is just a couple of historical comments which.
As you please, that the United States actually did have a substantial debate over whether it could go to war without a referendum.
This happened before World War One.
And the issue was that some people felt that the Constitution only empowered the country to go to war in self-defence.
And since World War One was not a war of self-defence as far as the United States was concerned,
and there was by Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan,
resigned from the administration over this issue and campaigned throughout the United States on
the issue that it was unconstitutional to go to war without a popular referendum interstate.
Speaker of the House of Wilson's own party agreed with this, and it only lost by ten votes to the proposal that you had to have a referendum.
It was actually revived again via World War Two.
But but. And was also gaining steam when until Pearl Harbour came along.
So I've always had this kind of interest.
And even in the United States, it's not been taken as obvious that you could have a war without a general a general referendum.
That's interesting. So the second thing is, I think I would question whether the American Revolution led to a liberal state.
It depends on what you're talking about.
Britain, the British clearly had more liberal policies on Native Americans and the British clearly had more liberal policies on slavery.
So the American Revolution did defend the liberal right that you couldn't be taxed without representation.
But but it did. But I think that the general feeling, particularly from Canada,
is that much more liberal policies would have resulted if the United States had remained a dominion.
My whole thing is not not to be American, that this has to do with defending one's territory.
And I mention this because I try to, you know, as much as possible, muddy what people see as clear cases.
And I'll do it again with one of my favourite examples, which is the attack on the attack on Pearl Harbour.
Hawaii was not a state of the United States. What happened? It was a territory that people living in United States do not have the right to vote.
They did not have the right to participate in elections.
And it was only 50 years after a tremendous argument that went on through two administrations about the legality of annexing Hawaii,
that that was finally resolved because of the Spanish-American War,
because it was felt that Hawaii was necessary, the defence of the occupation of the Philippines.
So, so, so Hawaii was basically a front colony to defend other colonies.
Now now whether or not we agree that the attack on the Y was an imminent threat to the existence of the United States,
which I think is an implausible view, it seems to be a case where you have a Liberal government.
Stealing another piece of territory. You have a fascist government attacking the stolen piece of territory.
And then the question becomes, can the Liberal government respond to the fascist government for an attack on a stolen piece of territory?
And that's and I would say, by the way, that strikes me as typical of a lot of the wars of the 20th century.
So I thought of that when I was reading the first principles about defensive ones territory, because it has never been said yesterday.
This is a kind of a muddy, muddy issue for us.
Right? The Falklands War. Yeah. Bob were brought up.
One of the things I certainly mean when we talk about sort of a defensive sort of sort of war, is that a purely defensive sort of territory?
Control over populations which don't have to chance a lot of time that has carried such armies,
have had the Falklands in mind, had so much had sort of a Pearl Harbour in mind for that that.
The as I make the point about whether the US revolution gave us a little bit of a well taken,
the other point of history of ignoring the details of how I knew who I was and stating the details
of annexation to do with defending the Philippines and also on the debate about referendum.
So thank you for those examples. Okay, so I have two points.
And the first one goes back to the discussion of the challenge for the cosmopolitan liberal to resist
the conclusion that a more just liberal state should intervene less just have will big institutions.
And I think one available argumentative avenue for the cosmopolitan Liberal is to see that
there is reasonable disagreement about which liberal state best realises liberal values.
So if you take the idea that liberalism is about the protection of freedom and equality.
And at least in the literature of political liberalism, not necessarily the of peoples.
That's the idea that these ideas can be articulated in different ways and different political systems and
that there's reasonable disagreement about which one is the more just so it would be illiberal in a way,
to impose one particular interpretation of liberalism on another liberal state, given that we cannot determine which one is superior.
So that's the first point. The second point has to do with the worries about liberal imperialism and that you put forward in a paper,
I think on page 14 of the paper, you commit these worries to the particular composition of existing liberal state.
You mentioned Europe and North America as examples.
And what worried me a little bit about this sort of reference, the real world,
is that real world liberal states very different from the kind of idealised liberal states that we find in France and little people.
And it might be that from this ability of intervention, not only depends on considerations to do with proportionality,
likelihood of success, but also on the moral position of the particular states that would intervene.
And if you agree with, you don't even need to agree with the target.
Actually, that. Western states.
If Western liberal states are somehow complicit in some international wrongs,
even from the perspective of the little people, peoples, they would count as culpable.
And there's an extra question as to whether they have the moral authority to intervene, even if the intervention of.
Uh oh. Well. Okay.
Um, on the first point, uh.
Okay. So help yourself the analytical distinction between commissions and defensive privileges.
The point about the rate of disagreement. Might show that a given liberal state doesn't have a mission.
Oh, it's not a liberal state. I'm not sure, though, how far it goes in if the intervention then takes place.
I'm not sure that it establishes the permissibility of defence, the right to defend in the sense of what values will be upheld,
that defence that would justify the tremendous suffering that would follow.
Given that, I would say that in a sense there's no we can't say of the new form of liberation that would be
imposed if there was the resistance is worse than what was there in the sense that the kind of
reasoned disagreement that what cuts both ways so that so on the first point on the second point
I agree and actually said something similar in some comments in the paper when I said it to him.
And we do sort of cross over frequent ideal and not ideal theory in a somewhat casual way.
And our sense except that criticism.
No, I'm not sure this is a defence, but I mean, sort of say rules in law peoples does the same, you mean for example.
And so I tried to get up trying to get up some passages, for example,
where he suggests that the US isn't really a liberal state at all because he took his intervention in Central South America.
But also he appeals to the US as an example of improved democratic peace, which is meant to be moving under your theory.
So there's and but you can kind of see how he falls into the problem, because if you completely disregard reality, what's the point of any of it?
So you're always looking in a sense, to try to sort of cash it out and try to get sort of something that looks within the neighbourhood.
And again, again, even a yes or no almost entirely agreed is sort of a methodological issue there,
which would try to be tighter that that our aim in being tight would not be to so tight as to kind of lose any reality.
Okay. Going to have a question from Graham Long and and that'll be it.
Oh, have you had. I didn't have a hand up before. Oh, okay.
All right. There's a little time. Good. Okay. Graham then.
Chris. So I had a question was I want to just briefly on this idea of people showing.
And that is that well, the world in light of this is if you impose something on somebody where they recently rejected that in itself is unreasonable.
So that would be a reason to resist the imposition of even a better, you know.
If somebody else thinks you superior because that you can have no claim when you've young your view of experience when they post on you,
they seem to be reasonable at all times.
And my question, I was thinking about this idea of the connection between the privilege of the physical expense and the possibility of war.
I wonder if you might be able to connect the two? I think I think because my definition of love is being cautious.
If you just talk about there being a low threshold for admissible invasion,
so you might get into the notion of just cause you might have a you might be speaking a stronger version in the weak motion might say that where you.
But it might be that intrinsic to notion just causes the idea that we want
just goes to specify a situation we wouldn't want somebody by invading them.
But it might be that this lack of privilege is going to be bad for citizens or whatever grounds the notion that we lose out.
But political events would also ground the idea that we don't want these people coming back.
But if you want to go further than that and say that lack of normal speculation because it just calls for war,
that looks a bit suspect, I'm going to do my best. My first thought is it might be circumstances where the stakes are very well
organised or is it going to be news that hasn't got itself off the ground?
But if you like the lack of military space, this isn't just nobody's fault.
But if you stick with make another claim about stakes that she loses that block, you know what,
resistance movement towards the myth of integration, then that might not be implausibly strong.
They just go through and if it's just goes to war up to that might come into place as well.
That might be one way to connect this permissibility question.
Some. So.
So I think obviously it's becoming clear that the issue of sort of a permissibility
versus privilege needs to be articulated more clearly in either of the.
In the case. And I mean, you know, and our focus obviously is sort of a primarily on the defensive privilege, which means that you rather than.
Rather. And that's why we want to make the focus, which means instead of the instance, that's a particular priority rather than permissibility.
But we also do pose the question.
We sort of pose a rhetorically and rhetorical question. Is it an argument?
It's a question. An argument. But we say instead of circumstances, what reason would a liberal cosmopolitan have?
Some principle reason have not to regard it intervention as permissible,
and obviously that the issues of abortion sort of give away under a fairly broad rubric proportionality.
Clearly a relevant set of reasons. But in your case, of a state which is sort of fledgling and only getting off the ground,
suppose that you're fairly confident that by that trickle there won't be any resistance.
You from that there are even the means of resistance. I mean, the military that have entitlements, like you said, everything else.
What reason does a liberal, cosmopolitan,
cosmopolitan have available to articulate why not to go in and impose robust liberal administrative sort of organisation?
And the answer is these people's individual autonomy in our thought is, well, our liberal regimes who can realise and indeed foster in a way that,
that the non-legal things that they want, if it's collective to the political agency,
will have that if that's appealing to a value which the liberals of the have available to.
So I mean that's sort of the the pattern of thought we're trying to develop.
And I know I don't feel that the fledgling government puts out a particularly sort of special case.
I mean, it's you know, it's just in five years time, it's pretty clear that has gone from fledgling to robust.
And I know a couple of thousand people are going to die in the intervention.
In the meantime, I therefore, you've got to kind of get a clear reason not to intervene, namely those deaths.
But it is going to be bloodless, extremely close to bloodless.
And the prospects of moving from fledgling to robust are a bit more wishful.
But that's the lesson that I can say that you and I saw from this letters.
I mean, I have a vague worry that it might be a bit paradoxical to try to impose just the institutions of the state.
And that sounds counterintuitive.
Doesn't that mean hopefully people economies that they get to decide for themselves in their own way how the institutions move out,
that they believe in autonomy?
Then there's good reason that hesitation should be about simply imposing a thank you fund.
If everything in it, if you see things going downhill.
And this is where the fledgling government potential in the case of simply being most hopeful for but it's not going off the ground.
If were just then they might intervene in ways should have to be military they can intervene to kind of support fiscal Koukoulas advisers,
these kinds of things. So we're talking about military intervention.
I think I want to see that there really wasn't any sympathy which was stopping this from happening.
I think just takes a wild and uncomfortable fact, does have a reason to just let it take a while.
If if it's an expression of influence on me, that's that's fine.
But I guess in the example of this, I in the course of taking a while, if it's not liberal, yes.
Other people's autonomy has been thwarted in the meantime. I mean, for example, no National Health Service has been set up.
Right. And so we can say that people dying or not from education system being set up, we can see that some people as high, particularly girls,
aren't being educated or I mean it is it's a fledgling isn't merely did a quite brilliant I mean I mean fledgling means
fledgling right and that means that's going on which presumably you live because of all of its links to the stuff.
So is there like a vacuum in then.
It's good, it's right, it's bad and it's good. So I guess that's sort of thought that's the that's the conception.
I guess it's driving our thoughts. Chris So this is a very simpleminded question.
Jack already mentioned the the the sort of factual significance of the fact people will
resist by having their own sons of [INAUDIBLE] replaced by somebody else's interest.
That's one thing about the normative significance of that interest in purely crude welfare terms,
loss aversion is one of the strongest psychological dispositions that we have.
We like keeping our stuff. We don't want somebody else to swap our kids.
Swapper. Swapper. Yeah. Even for another brain animal.
Yeah. And that, that, that welfare effect of somebody taking our institutions is profound.
I mean, I was thinking to the last question,
I was thinking of the ban on food on the ground interventions in the CIA's interventions in Western European policy to.
The more that you know that the government supporting of I guess the Christian Democrats
and most Western Europe and that sort of intervention to create liberal states,
arguably an improvement over over what, you know, internal communist regimes would have done.
And yet there was something profoundly, normatively offensive, not just because of the interference with the broader path of self-determination,
simply the fact that people's own institutions are being replaced or subverted.
Mean, how do you account for that? You know, it's so that sort of basic welfare significance that people don't like having their own stuff replaced.
Oh, no. In fact, you're getting an argument that from individual inviolability for Starting Point.
One of the things that's gonna be inviolable is you'll understand.
People don't like it. I guess you then it's well, fair trade offs and that's probably going to depend on sort of factual circumstances.
But I think if I mean, people don't like having institutions taken away and so they've got an interest in keeping theirs and that
pushes sort of the Liberal in favour of not inordinately favour of not intervening militarily on the river.
But equally people have an interest in being educated,
people have an interest in enjoying non-discrimination institutions, people have an interest in health.
I mean, there's a whole lot of kind of the countervailing interests with potentially countervailing interests as well.
So. What's going to depend obviously on fact to the factual details.
But I guess sort of my feeling is that that move isn't going to.
He's in has got to give you all that fine respect of a wide range of fairly unhappy institutions for the legal point of view,
fairly and happy institutional orders. But maybe I'm wrong.
I mean, I've got the intuitive weighting of the loss of version balances.
These other institution, particularly for the Liberal, are perhaps going to deepen interests.
And maybe my intuition is wrong. I mean, I was thinking the more in terms of the defensive privilege that I might I'm I
will be inclined to protect against the future prospect of a better education,
a better regimes, and that if liberalism is committed to protecting my welfare, as well as these more symbolic values.
And so I will expect my state to mean welfare as well.
Has been, I think, even been sort of beside him.
I mean, it's sort of I think it's kind of Kim looking sort of the exercise of innocence,
the significance of having institutional ownership and how they operate, meaning and so on.
But even he's pretty holds a pretty hard line on to what extent are non,
non-verbally or non autonomy fostering cultural institutions that are valuable and hopefully protected.
And he's kind of pretty sceptical there know and I think it's a kind of what if a human's good
internal reasons so I mean if you so you have to sort of think like more and more about cases I guess
more about different I mean this he is is somewhat crude a generic sketch of liberalism is perhaps
crossing that moving quickly over what is sort of quite significant possible in terms of him.
And before that too you're sort of you're sort of line to get up a robust political
debate of privilege in a range of sort of fairly clearly liberal states.
Is these is moving quite away from the picture that we see, I think sort of in in in poverty in him, whether it's in Dworkin and so on.
So and so. Okay, but nothing more.
You sort of say on that, but it's like, okay, coffee break is sacred.
So one last snapping just in response to that.
I do want to jump in your point. But so if the point is, you know, people will suffer a lot if they realise that they have been chosen.
These are better than when we talk about the covert sort of infiltration or affecting people's choices in a sort of covert way,
but what it effectively. So that doesn't mean all of you in full, the CIA intervening in elections.
Right. Because people think if people feel like they've chosen, then it's not going to affect their welfare in the way you talking about it,
I think occurred to me as I do in those cases, what I think I mean, I think it remains a contested point.
But an open question to the extent to which the CIA played a role in was visible the Whitlam government in Australia in 1975 and I mean covert.
He doesn't mean like Nixon, like literally unknown, right. I mean those who are worried about that, I mean, but there's evidence around and so on.
So successful. Okay. Yeah, right.
Well, we will take out a general evaluation of CIA, but let's take James and.