1 00:00:01,460 --> 00:00:04,400 Thank you very much. Thank you. Thank you for this invitation. 2 00:00:04,410 --> 00:00:13,010 It's really a pleasure to be here today and to have a chance to to share some some views on the intervention in Libya. 3 00:00:14,600 --> 00:00:18,979 I have had a career both in government and outside government. 4 00:00:18,980 --> 00:00:30,470 And and some of the lessons I will try to draw today come from that sort of mixed experience of the civilian government with or variations, 5 00:00:30,710 --> 00:00:38,060 EU operation needed operations and but also from my recent involvement in more European security affairs, 6 00:00:38,510 --> 00:00:47,090 I was last here especially as an advisor to the group on a group of experts on the NATO's strategic concept. 7 00:00:47,800 --> 00:00:52,940 And I had no rights. And so some of this will be reflected in this presentation. 8 00:00:53,990 --> 00:00:57,770 Obviously, it's very early to draw lessons from Libya. 9 00:00:58,750 --> 00:01:08,809 The operation has only begun a couple of months ago. And it's it's the final outcome of the operation remains pretty unpredictable. 10 00:01:08,810 --> 00:01:16,010 So it would be somehow difficult to say whether it's a it's such a tremendous 11 00:01:16,010 --> 00:01:21,740 success that we can draw fantastic lessons or is such a dramatic failure that it's. 12 00:01:22,970 --> 00:01:27,110 So my my look at it will be more to say at this stage. 13 00:01:27,110 --> 00:01:31,880 What does it tell us about military capabilities in Europe, 14 00:01:31,970 --> 00:01:43,190 about the transatlantic relations and about the Europeans and EU in that context and doing that? 15 00:01:43,580 --> 00:01:47,930 My first one would probably be to emphasise the fact that there are some unique features that are 16 00:01:47,960 --> 00:01:53,660 associated with the Libyan operation that we should we should keep in mind when discussing that. 17 00:01:55,220 --> 00:02:02,120 The first one is that the operation was decided in the context of what was perceived that the humanitarian emergency, 18 00:02:04,880 --> 00:02:08,600 when the decision was taken to start the air campaign, and two, 19 00:02:08,600 --> 00:02:14,530 to first to get the U.N. Security Council resolution adopted and then to start the air campaign. 20 00:02:14,540 --> 00:02:23,570 There was this sense that has been maybe a bit lost since, because obviously some of the civilian casualties have not stopped, 21 00:02:23,780 --> 00:02:36,140 but to prevent a massacre in Benghazi and to limit further civilian casualties, that was the whole purpose of the resolution. 22 00:02:36,470 --> 00:02:46,280 And that was the main political driver, I believe, behind the operation when it started this. 23 00:02:46,700 --> 00:02:56,209 And there there is something that we might probably discuss in the Q&A is how this was connected to the responsibility 24 00:02:56,210 --> 00:03:06,290 to protect and these are two dimension is is interesting especially since it got a bit lost as the operation evolved. 25 00:03:06,290 --> 00:03:16,609 So so I mean this justification for for going to the use of force was was then somehow 26 00:03:16,610 --> 00:03:22,210 wondering and I leave that open for the moment whether it's a good case for law to be, 27 00:03:22,960 --> 00:03:24,770 it's whether it's a good case study or not. 28 00:03:24,770 --> 00:03:35,300 But I probably lean towards the later the latter in in thinking that all of this might also explain a certain sense of unpreparedness. 29 00:03:36,350 --> 00:03:42,140 I think we discussed and interviewed some of the military planners for the operation. 30 00:03:42,470 --> 00:03:51,980 They emphasise the point that everything was pretty much planned in a rush, meaning that they had limited time to plan for the operation, 31 00:03:52,250 --> 00:04:01,579 that the standard practice, which would have been to use a dedicated headquarters to that did not take place. 32 00:04:01,580 --> 00:04:11,840 And somehow it was a sort of emergency contingency planning with very limited time to do that, with a lot of unknowns for the military plan. 33 00:04:11,910 --> 00:04:18,620 As they were planning, they didn't know what would be the exact scope of the resolution mandate. 34 00:04:19,400 --> 00:04:24,620 As you remember, this all started with the no fly zone debates and ended up with something a bit broader. 35 00:04:24,980 --> 00:04:35,210 So obviously, the planning, military planning changed as as the resolution mandate became more known. 36 00:04:35,990 --> 00:04:44,479 Secondly, the number of participants and the nature of the coalition were not known either. 37 00:04:44,480 --> 00:04:53,540 When the planning started, it wasn't clear whether it was going to be a NATO operation or the EU operation in ad hoc coalition, 38 00:04:53,840 --> 00:05:00,510 a sort of coalition of the willing operation. And this was obviously and. 39 00:05:00,680 --> 00:05:07,370 Would take part in the operation. And again, as you remember the at the outset of the operation, 40 00:05:07,370 --> 00:05:15,740 there was a big idea on the part of the French and the Brits in particular that this should involve a significant Arab input, 41 00:05:16,070 --> 00:05:19,130 which turned out to be extremely limited. 42 00:05:19,580 --> 00:05:24,620 So it's very much a Western operation at this stage. 43 00:05:24,890 --> 00:05:37,120 And finally and I'll come back to that in detail is the US contribution itself was known only at the very latest, 44 00:05:37,580 --> 00:05:44,120 the latest stage of the planning process as the US was pretty reluctant to get involved. 45 00:05:44,150 --> 00:05:48,680 I'll come back to that in a second. So on the U.S. involvement. 46 00:05:48,800 --> 00:05:57,560 Second and second, a unique feature. It's quite clear that the US involvement was decided pretty late in the process. 47 00:05:59,450 --> 00:06:10,160 What I mean by that is that there was a very important debate in Washington that we're all familiar with, 48 00:06:11,090 --> 00:06:19,970 with the fact that for different reasons there were serious doubts raised in Washington on the feasibility, 49 00:06:20,540 --> 00:06:30,260 the opportunity of of of of launching a military operation, both for the political reason yet another war in an Arab states, 50 00:06:31,430 --> 00:06:38,160 in a muslim state, which obviously played a role in the reluctance of the Obama administration to get involved in this one. 51 00:06:39,260 --> 00:06:44,390 And secondly, a sense of military overstretch, which was very clear in the Pentagon, 52 00:06:45,080 --> 00:06:56,420 where Secretary Gates made clear that from the outset of the I mean, in the very first days of the crisis, that it was a test for the Europeans. 53 00:06:56,840 --> 00:07:10,579 And that's basically that the U.S. military had very little capabilities to offer to and was itself focussed 54 00:07:10,580 --> 00:07:19,700 on Afghanistan and didn't want to be to lose its focus by getting involved in Libya in a significant fashion. 55 00:07:20,820 --> 00:07:28,610 And similarly, my reading of the internal debate, of course, we will have to wait for the next Woodward book to get to the insights of that. 56 00:07:29,150 --> 00:07:40,730 But was that and both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama sort of made the decision to move forward under the pressure of the French and British allies, 57 00:07:41,930 --> 00:07:50,239 both for purely military reasons, there were some capabilities that would only the US could provide, 58 00:07:50,240 --> 00:07:56,030 so the operation would have been far more difficult without US involvement. 59 00:07:56,450 --> 00:08:03,800 And secondly, it was sense that in the context of the Arab Spring, 60 00:08:04,550 --> 00:08:14,420 it was a sort of opportunity to demonstrate that the West was siding with the right guys to to put it in in simple terms. 61 00:08:14,630 --> 00:08:28,100 And that somehow could not be accepted to see the see the sort of massacre of of unarmed civilians take place without acting. 62 00:08:29,690 --> 00:08:41,570 One interesting element of this is I think a lot of this has to do with not so much the memories of Afghanistan or Iraq, 63 00:08:41,690 --> 00:08:43,370 but a lot to do with the Balkans. 64 00:08:43,790 --> 00:08:51,590 And it's not I think it's worth noticing that some of the people that were involved in the policy discussions, in the planning of this, 65 00:08:53,090 --> 00:08:58,100 I'm thinking on the French side, but probably also in London and Washington, 66 00:08:58,340 --> 00:09:05,000 where people that had the personal, political, institutional memory of the Balkans. 67 00:09:05,360 --> 00:09:08,510 And that I think it gives a sense. 68 00:09:09,050 --> 00:09:18,620 You know, for me, the an interesting comparison is the decisions of the Senate of 95 about Bosnia when when the French and the Brits 69 00:09:18,620 --> 00:09:28,609 established the rapid reaction force and decided to sort of move out of the strictly blue helmets into peacekeeping forces, 70 00:09:28,610 --> 00:09:33,890 into something more that had been pushing the Americans into a NATO led operation. 71 00:09:34,490 --> 00:09:39,200 I think we have we have pretty much an interesting parallel to be drawn there. 72 00:09:40,820 --> 00:09:47,510 A second thing about the US involvement and again fairly unique is the fact that the US 73 00:09:47,510 --> 00:09:55,630 military commitment ended of being fairly limited and going to a few more details in a minute. 74 00:09:55,640 --> 00:10:00,560 But and the choice which was very much pushed by. 75 00:10:00,690 --> 00:10:07,950 The British government to use a need to commend assets, 76 00:10:08,640 --> 00:10:15,600 which was a way to make the point that using need to secure the US involvement 77 00:10:16,560 --> 00:10:21,600 proved somehow wrong in the sense that it didn't secure that U.S. involvement. 78 00:10:21,600 --> 00:10:29,909 And in fact the US involvement was much more significant in the non-NATO phase of the operation than in the NATO phase, 79 00:10:29,910 --> 00:10:40,050 and that's when stated was in charge. The US contribution to the campaign declined, although it stayed. 80 00:10:41,220 --> 00:10:46,380 It remained quite important in pure military capability terms. 81 00:10:47,340 --> 00:10:48,270 Finally, a third. 82 00:10:48,270 --> 00:10:58,079 The third feature for this introduction that I would highlight is the fact that the West was divided in its efforts to resolve the Libyan crisis 83 00:10:58,080 --> 00:11:10,260 over a wide spectrum of positions Berlin abstaining in the U.N. Security Council and opposing quite publicly the use of force as an option, 84 00:11:10,260 --> 00:11:12,720 that was not a reasonable one. 85 00:11:13,560 --> 00:11:24,510 Paris and London taking the lead in the military campaign and willing some other countries like Italy in that direction and Washington engaging, 86 00:11:24,510 --> 00:11:29,820 as they said, reluctantly, before withdrawing most of its forces. 87 00:11:29,830 --> 00:11:38,760 So we have a fairly wide spectrum that that contrasts very much with, whether it's in the situation in Afghanistan, where, at least in theory, 88 00:11:39,540 --> 00:11:51,180 the Western alliance, NATO, is very much united behind a common goal in spite of the huge differences in terms of of military input into the campaign. 89 00:11:51,600 --> 00:12:00,629 So for that, I'm not sure I would pull the comparison too far, but there is a sort of a new divide, 90 00:12:00,630 --> 00:12:09,420 a bit like the Iraq divide between those who intervene and those who don't and amongst those who don't, those who oppose the idea, 91 00:12:09,900 --> 00:12:18,750 the idea of an intervention and criticise it, and that in spite of efforts on the part of diplomats to agree on some of these differences, 92 00:12:19,770 --> 00:12:25,139 they still remain in informal discussions with German officials. 93 00:12:25,140 --> 00:12:28,920 They still question whether the use of force was a wise choice. 94 00:12:30,090 --> 00:12:36,180 And even those who are a bit critical about the German vote in the UN Security Council, 95 00:12:37,530 --> 00:12:45,570 they still make the point that the air campaign will not solve anything, which is, after all, a point that is worth making. 96 00:12:45,840 --> 00:12:52,379 And that obviously because of the time constraints I was mentioning, was not discussed thoroughly before the operation started. 97 00:12:52,380 --> 00:13:02,220 So, you know, and they were there was no clear alternative offered by those who were reluctant to use force to that. 98 00:13:04,230 --> 00:13:09,030 So to come to the more military part of of of the lessons. 99 00:13:09,600 --> 00:13:14,069 I would I would put the emphasis on one element, 100 00:13:14,070 --> 00:13:25,710 which is which are the limits of European military capabilities that were very severely highlighted from my perspective during this campaign. 101 00:13:28,320 --> 00:13:31,410 All in all, it is a very limited air campaign. 102 00:13:33,090 --> 00:13:41,640 The it averaged 200 assaults a day, which is the fairly small amount of of of flights. 103 00:13:42,450 --> 00:14:01,260 And amongst those, the number of offensive sorties that those who strike are currently to above 60 and never peaked far above 100 per day. 104 00:14:02,670 --> 00:14:11,100 If you want and and this is after the America the withdrawal of American offensive of most of the American offensive capabilities. 105 00:14:11,880 --> 00:14:20,700 So in if you compare to that with another air interdiction air strike campaign, which is Kosovo, Kosovo, 106 00:14:20,700 --> 00:14:27,780 for over a period of three months, averaged 700 to 1000 sorties a day, including 300 strikes a day. 107 00:14:28,470 --> 00:14:36,360 So if we have something which is very much about one fifth of Kosovo in terms of 108 00:14:36,360 --> 00:14:43,440 of the air power engaged in the operation and the number of of strikes performed. 109 00:14:43,710 --> 00:14:46,800 So it's a very limited campaign from a military perspective. 110 00:14:47,160 --> 00:14:55,020 And in spite of that, the Europeans have been very, I think, a very hard time to perform the mission. 111 00:14:56,730 --> 00:15:00,300 Obviously, France and Britain said the national. 112 00:15:00,640 --> 00:15:03,400 And being a gospel Ahmet Ahmet don't follow the French. 113 00:15:03,400 --> 00:15:17,050 And the Persian element for the Brits alone provide about two thirds of the capabilities engaged and and and most of the offensive missions. 114 00:15:19,060 --> 00:15:32,190 Not only that, but the US assets are critical to making this mission possible without the US support, 115 00:15:32,200 --> 00:15:36,400 in spite of what I was saying in terms of withdrawing of offensive capabilities. 116 00:15:36,940 --> 00:15:44,980 The US support is critical in several fields. You have air in your air to air refuelling. 117 00:15:45,940 --> 00:15:52,540 The did or do European capabilities would not allow on their own the mission to go 118 00:15:52,540 --> 00:16:02,480 on at its at its current pace limited base in absence of U.S. tankers available, 119 00:16:03,760 --> 00:16:08,770 air tankers available. You have the same problem with the you. 120 00:16:09,050 --> 00:16:17,290 That is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, where US capabilities are critically needed for NATO to be able to perform the mission. 121 00:16:17,950 --> 00:16:28,749 And there was is is a request to the U.S. to provide the long range UAV so the drones for the mission, 122 00:16:28,750 --> 00:16:33,490 which again, the Europeans didn't have available for that. 123 00:16:33,850 --> 00:16:37,270 So so there were significant military shortcomings. 124 00:16:38,350 --> 00:16:47,799 And and many Europeans, even those who contribute to the mission. 125 00:16:47,800 --> 00:16:53,530 So they are only provided have only provided very, very limited capabilities, 126 00:16:54,010 --> 00:17:06,100 handful of planes and with and many of them already feel a bit overstretched with that. 127 00:17:06,220 --> 00:17:14,470 So it's something that is, I think, very telling about the status of of European military assets at the moment. 128 00:17:14,980 --> 00:17:20,810 And I think it's interesting and it makes good points and, you know, 129 00:17:20,860 --> 00:17:32,080 connects to the concern expressed by Secretary Gates in 2010 about what he calls the denuded demilitarisation of Europe from a capability perspective. 130 00:17:32,230 --> 00:17:42,220 I think it is quite clear. So ultimately, in this context, NATO's appears pretty much as a shallow military alliance. 131 00:17:43,360 --> 00:17:50,729 And it's, you know, alleged overwhelming conventional superiority ends up being an American contention and security. 132 00:17:50,730 --> 00:17:55,660 It's not a need to so little without the Americans or with a limited American involvement, 133 00:17:56,350 --> 00:18:07,179 doesn't have that sort of overwhelming conventional capability that that enables the European side of NATO's, 134 00:18:07,180 --> 00:18:20,380 even with the support of of Canada, to to run a a very limited air campaign again. 135 00:18:21,730 --> 00:18:29,290 So there are and the fact that many in Europe are making the point after a couple of months 136 00:18:29,290 --> 00:18:34,929 that maybe this has gone on for too long and maybe we've spent too much money on this, 137 00:18:34,930 --> 00:18:38,560 and do we have the ammunition necessary to continue and things like that? 138 00:18:38,830 --> 00:18:47,560 And for the moment, completely putting aside the political dimension of this debate, are sort of making that point. 139 00:18:48,550 --> 00:19:04,210 So it's I think it's a very, very important point to to have in mind, which is that all together, when there is this even a NATO operation, 140 00:19:06,490 --> 00:19:15,730 short of a significant American involvement, only France and Britain are in a position to commit significant military contributions. 141 00:19:16,060 --> 00:19:23,980 And even those military contributions, we have a sense of overstretch in Paris or London on that. 142 00:19:25,000 --> 00:19:30,850 And that's not much to say about where the others stand in this. 143 00:19:31,960 --> 00:19:37,330 So that has implications is it will be my second point on the the transatlantic partnership 144 00:19:37,330 --> 00:19:45,520 and need to I would suggest in 2010 when NATO's strategic concept was adopted, 145 00:19:46,330 --> 00:19:53,649 it was seen by many as a sort of a renewal of force, as Madeleine Albright put it, 146 00:19:53,650 --> 00:20:00,340 to, you know, the alliance getting together for 60 years and and sort of making the. 147 00:20:00,390 --> 00:20:06,960 Behind it. We were all very much committed to this transatlantic dimension. 148 00:20:07,140 --> 00:20:15,240 But I believe that one year after not even one year after, the alliance appears in fairly poor shape politically, as I would saying, 149 00:20:15,240 --> 00:20:24,420 Europe was divided between the US, depending on where you sit to, you know, interventionist hawks and peace minded doves. 150 00:20:25,130 --> 00:20:29,100 But and it's it's not a good sign. 151 00:20:30,360 --> 00:20:38,540 It did struggle together a rather conditional and limited U.S. support for an operation in its backyard. 152 00:20:39,810 --> 00:20:48,570 And many of those who advocated the fact that NATO's should be in charge within the alliance amongst the 28 allies. 153 00:20:48,870 --> 00:20:58,380 In fact, one senator was in charge, did just that as a way to get political oversight over the operation, but didn't commit any force if they had any. 154 00:20:58,710 --> 00:21:03,750 Since many countries just don't have an Air Force for that kind of mission within the alliance. 155 00:21:05,550 --> 00:21:15,120 So that leaves us with a new that is more and more a sort of virtual alliance which politically lasts a 156 00:21:15,120 --> 00:21:22,920 united view of strategic affairs and military and lacks militarily the capabilities to shape events. 157 00:21:23,010 --> 00:21:29,010 If the US is not in the driver's seat. So I think it's it's interesting in, 158 00:21:29,160 --> 00:21:37,080 in the sort of post-Lisbon context where supposedly a new was given a fresh start to see that 159 00:21:37,080 --> 00:21:45,239 in this Libyan context this situation if we were to do a genuine post-crisis assessment, 160 00:21:45,240 --> 00:21:49,770 I think that there are several issues that would need to be tackled in the transatlantic context. 161 00:21:51,030 --> 00:21:55,800 I think first and foremost, and I'll come back to that in a second for the Europeans, especially. 162 00:21:56,470 --> 00:22:00,150 And they really need to think seriously about security challenges and defence. 163 00:22:00,600 --> 00:22:03,270 And where do they stand in that debate? 164 00:22:03,360 --> 00:22:10,800 Are they ready to make the sort of minimal budgetary effort in order to not to completely vanish from the security landscape? 165 00:22:12,270 --> 00:22:19,350 Or are they entirely subcontracted defence and security matters to the Americans, 166 00:22:20,040 --> 00:22:25,770 even if the would be the US is less and less interested in European security. 167 00:22:27,060 --> 00:22:31,320 So we are in this situation and again, 168 00:22:32,070 --> 00:22:42,180 I wouldn't at this stage tell if if going into Libya was the best option and the use of force was the best option. 169 00:22:42,180 --> 00:22:52,320 But I tend to believe that one point is clear is that if the downfall of European military budgets and military readiness to use force continues, 170 00:22:52,860 --> 00:22:55,260 the use of force will just no longer be an option. 171 00:22:56,640 --> 00:23:06,210 So the sort of spectrum of option will very, very rapidly diminish on the US side of the transatlantic debate. 172 00:23:06,720 --> 00:23:14,220 I think the United States has not yet made clear what it did expect from its European allies, and I think this is a problem. 173 00:23:15,660 --> 00:23:18,780 What are the expectations in the security realm in particular? 174 00:23:20,700 --> 00:23:29,970 Is the the the military role to sort of contribute in a modest fashion to the US led operation in Afghanistan 175 00:23:32,460 --> 00:23:39,570 and be a sort of second rank or third rank or fourth round contributor to two such operations being, 176 00:23:39,960 --> 00:23:43,890 you know, offering some of the footsoldiers for US led operations. 177 00:23:45,240 --> 00:23:51,960 Or is the European role to manage some of the security environment and especially 178 00:23:52,470 --> 00:23:57,630 sort of take over responsibility in what one can consider its backyard, 179 00:23:58,500 --> 00:24:03,719 the Mediterranean and so on? So do the message from Washington on. 180 00:24:03,720 --> 00:24:12,270 This has been unclear and some of the hesitation that was perceived in Libya is, I think, 181 00:24:12,270 --> 00:24:19,810 quite telling for that, because somehow the Americans both wanted to be seen as taking the lead. 182 00:24:19,890 --> 00:24:25,950 You might remember President Obama's speech in the first days of the crisis where he forgot to mention his European 183 00:24:25,950 --> 00:24:36,569 allies as as the because he was making a domestic point for for is Republican opposition saying we still need that, 184 00:24:36,570 --> 00:24:37,170 don't worry. 185 00:24:38,850 --> 00:24:47,339 Well, at the same time, I think Secretary Gates calling for the Europeans to take their responsibility and take the lead on this operation. 186 00:24:47,340 --> 00:24:51,570 So I don't think they've made up their mind on that yet. 187 00:24:53,040 --> 00:24:59,840 So ultimately, the Europeans do have to to to clarify how they perceive themselves. 188 00:24:59,850 --> 00:25:03,990 I mean. I'll be a security provider and a strategic player. 189 00:25:04,710 --> 00:25:13,180 Or are there more and more? And that's my perception increasingly as a back to a security consumer situation and a 190 00:25:13,200 --> 00:25:18,810 sort of free rider relying on the idea that America will be there if things go wrong. 191 00:25:19,590 --> 00:25:31,020 And why should we spend any money or is I'll take any strategic risks by intervening, obviously, 192 00:25:31,020 --> 00:25:39,150 and this is my last point that I explain to them that in a minute the Europeans are quite divided on this themselves, 193 00:25:40,140 --> 00:25:53,700 but part of it being the fact that Washington hasn't sent yet some clear signals about that, I think we better think through that in advance, 194 00:25:53,700 --> 00:26:04,500 because in the current budgetary context in the US, it is likely that the burden sharing debate will start again. 195 00:26:06,630 --> 00:26:16,980 I don't see how a US Congress will accept indefinitely when there are cuts in the budget to pay for European security, 196 00:26:16,980 --> 00:26:23,340 while the Europeans continue to downsize the military budgets in military capabilities. 197 00:26:24,510 --> 00:26:31,560 There's going to be an increasing pressure on the US side and we better think about it on this side of the Atlantic. 198 00:26:32,310 --> 00:26:37,860 So finally, what are the lessons for Europe? Both the CFSP and CSDP. 199 00:26:38,970 --> 00:26:46,680 In that context, I mean see, the EU as such did not perform much better than need to and probably did worse. 200 00:26:46,800 --> 00:26:55,410 From my perspective, and I see the events related to the Libyan crisis as a series of missed opportunity, 201 00:26:57,330 --> 00:27:05,180 there was a complete lack of political leadership at all stages of the crisis coming from the EU institutions. 202 00:27:05,190 --> 00:27:11,310 We did not take the lead in trying to bring together the Europeans in a unified position 203 00:27:12,000 --> 00:27:19,830 which did not offer a sort of alternative option to the sort of use of force that 204 00:27:19,950 --> 00:27:29,969 the French and the Brits were advocating did not offer even a sort of complementary 205 00:27:29,970 --> 00:27:36,360 approach which would have been more political and would have sort of come into play. 206 00:27:37,680 --> 00:27:44,370 We haven't seen the European EU leaders on the stage on this Libyan thing. 207 00:27:45,300 --> 00:27:52,380 There was not even an early reaction in the first days of the Libyan crisis, for instance. 208 00:27:53,530 --> 00:28:03,389 The one criticism I do very strongly about this is that I believe Europe should have, and that was really a core competence. 209 00:28:03,390 --> 00:28:08,040 The task immediately set up an operation to evacuate its own citizens. 210 00:28:08,070 --> 00:28:12,630 I mean, the Chinese evacuated their citizens, but the EU, which is not that far away, 211 00:28:12,810 --> 00:28:17,790 was not able to put itself it put its act together to do a joint operation. 212 00:28:18,570 --> 00:28:24,030 It ended up being a series of national operations, which, of course, made sense. 213 00:28:24,030 --> 00:28:29,580 There are no Italians and Danes in Libya, but one could have imagine an evacuation operation, 214 00:28:29,700 --> 00:28:36,270 the Italian and EU evacuation of the operation under the Petersburg task and the Italian lead. 215 00:28:36,480 --> 00:28:40,230 That would have made perfect sense. That was not just not even in the cards. 216 00:28:40,620 --> 00:28:46,860 I understand. So I find it quite, quite problematic. 217 00:28:47,520 --> 00:28:56,400 Of course, there was a complete lack of unity throughout the crisis. We didn't manage to have a serious twelfths and and to do that, 218 00:28:56,850 --> 00:29:02,309 I'm not blaming it only on those who disagreed with the French and the British blame it also on the French and the Brits, 219 00:29:02,310 --> 00:29:07,680 which at a certain point should sort of focus their efforts in securing a UNESCO resolution 220 00:29:07,980 --> 00:29:17,459 and not necessarily making sure they had the support of European partners in this operation. 221 00:29:17,460 --> 00:29:24,870 And the various EU summits where were throughout this Libyan crisis were were quite telling 222 00:29:25,050 --> 00:29:34,950 in the sense that the German felt bullied but and didn't but didn't offer an alternative path 223 00:29:35,190 --> 00:29:42,089 either you know this or complain without offering an alternative path ultimately to this very 224 00:29:42,090 --> 00:29:48,360 strange decision of voting and of having a different vote pattern than the rest of the West. 225 00:29:48,360 --> 00:29:52,049 If I may put it this way, this came as quite a shock. 226 00:29:52,050 --> 00:29:55,830 India is getting a sentence, by the way, so it's going to be interesting. 227 00:29:55,830 --> 00:29:59,820 I'll come back to that in my final questions. 228 00:30:00,940 --> 00:30:11,440 Some of the other Europeans just hide did hide behind the Germans and most of the central and Eastern 229 00:30:11,440 --> 00:30:20,080 Europeans were quite happy to not to to see the Germans somehow taking the blame for the division of the EU. 230 00:30:20,290 --> 00:30:31,090 Anita But they did surely did not commit any planes or troops or effort to this operation and they were quite happy to not be asked to do so. 231 00:30:31,780 --> 00:30:37,030 So so we have this a very divided Europe, which makes things worse. 232 00:30:37,720 --> 00:30:44,620 So that leads me to my final remark. Q Question for the future about Europe. 233 00:30:46,960 --> 00:30:52,420 The first issue and then come back to the capability issue is Europe and the EU 234 00:30:52,420 --> 00:30:57,100 altogether capable of managing even a limited military operation in its backyard? 235 00:30:58,270 --> 00:31:05,050 The short answer is hardly. And I think we have to to think about that, because I think we are. 236 00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:09,729 I mean, if we compare that to the Helsinki headline goals to I mean, 237 00:31:09,730 --> 00:31:18,850 all the capability this course of the EU in the last ten, 12 years, we are falling very much short of on this. 238 00:31:18,850 --> 00:31:27,190 And the loopholes in European capabilities have been demonstrated not only on paper in a European Defence Agency reports, 239 00:31:27,190 --> 00:31:30,880 but in practice in running this operation. 240 00:31:32,260 --> 00:31:40,360 The budgetary implications and the effect of the global financial crisis have been only increasing this tendency, 241 00:31:41,080 --> 00:31:45,310 and I think the path is likely to continue. 242 00:31:46,750 --> 00:31:49,899 Your most of your obviously familiar with the numbers, 243 00:31:49,900 --> 00:31:57,660 but I think it's quite telling to say that the EU has about as a GDP that is about 244 00:31:57,820 --> 00:32:05,500 140% of the US GDP and has a defence spending which is about 37% of the US spending. 245 00:32:06,220 --> 00:32:09,940 So so that's this discrepancy is quite telling. 246 00:32:10,840 --> 00:32:15,880 And then just to to avoid the question that I'm not advocating that we should spend as much as the US. 247 00:32:15,950 --> 00:32:24,910 Obviously the US overspends on defence and and has security commitments that are by definition much broader than the European ones. 248 00:32:25,270 --> 00:32:35,229 But I think the previous ratio, which was about 62/3 of US defence spending, 249 00:32:35,230 --> 00:32:45,850 was probably a bit more sustainable in the long term to choose to to do to do this, which was the case, let's say, about ten years ago. 250 00:32:47,380 --> 00:32:51,760 And this sort of discrepancy was more more acceptable, 251 00:32:51,760 --> 00:32:57,070 both in terms of burden sharing and in terms of what it meant for the capabilities of both sides. 252 00:32:58,600 --> 00:33:02,290 Secondly, second question, 253 00:33:03,580 --> 00:33:10,570 do the Europeans share a more or less common assessment of the security environment and a common desire to be involved in crisis management? 254 00:33:11,860 --> 00:33:16,930 For me, this is unclear. We didn't need to. 255 00:33:17,620 --> 00:33:22,180 We just don't have the security and common assessment of the security environment. 256 00:33:22,600 --> 00:33:26,200 It's one thing I believe that the strategic concept is pretty much missed. 257 00:33:27,250 --> 00:33:30,010 And there is if you look at in the documents, 258 00:33:30,010 --> 00:33:36,640 there is a big difference between the old bridge report in the strategic concept itself, in the NATO process. 259 00:33:37,270 --> 00:33:44,950 There is no assessment of the strategic environment. And when I did ask two very senior Nieto officials about that, 260 00:33:44,950 --> 00:33:50,649 saying it's it's a pity we didn't you know, we do a strategic concept once every ten years. 261 00:33:50,650 --> 00:33:57,580 We could probably get a set for for a couple of weeks to try to find this common assessment. 262 00:33:57,910 --> 00:34:06,400 And the answer was, of course not because we disagree, which I find quite telling about where the alliance is. 263 00:34:06,910 --> 00:34:12,460 And I believe it's the same within the EU now because it's not necessarily a transatlantic divide. 264 00:34:12,940 --> 00:34:22,540 And for that, I would, as a sort of policy recommendation, have been urging to review the European Security Strategy, 265 00:34:23,140 --> 00:34:33,250 which was, as you know, issued in 2003 and vaguely reviewed in 2008. 266 00:34:33,910 --> 00:34:38,530 Somehow, we really need to think through what the Arab Spring means for security. 267 00:34:38,530 --> 00:34:42,519 Where does the EU stand in the Asian security landscape? 268 00:34:42,520 --> 00:34:44,379 How do we tackle these issues? 269 00:34:44,380 --> 00:34:54,430 Because otherwise we might face more Libyans and more divisions and have not thought through how we would approach that. 270 00:34:58,000 --> 00:35:01,070 Thirdly, one of the crucial. Students raised by Libya. 271 00:35:01,380 --> 00:35:07,550 Is there is an area of responsibility for the Europeans. 272 00:35:08,750 --> 00:35:13,580 You know, and this connects with the U.S. approach on the division of labour. 273 00:35:14,180 --> 00:35:19,430 And this connects to also what perception we have of a strategic role for the EU. 274 00:35:20,750 --> 00:35:26,930 And they are not talking only in the military sense, but also in the diplomatic involvement in managing crisis. 275 00:35:28,220 --> 00:35:37,730 So in saying, is there a source of what could be named a European backyard where the Europeans are more or less in charge? 276 00:35:39,710 --> 00:35:52,520 There is the continent itself, too, including the Balkans and some of the or near abroad to use a Russian concept. 277 00:35:53,060 --> 00:36:01,040 So whether it's the Mediterranean, the Caucasus, Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, how do we have special responsibilities there? 278 00:36:01,520 --> 00:36:08,299 If you look at the past of the yes, the options, if there is a clear message, most of those. 279 00:36:08,300 --> 00:36:15,980 Yes. Deep operation have taken place in Africa from the Horn of Africa to Central Africa, out to Western Africa. 280 00:36:17,090 --> 00:36:20,510 So and in the Balkans. So maybe it's a message. 281 00:36:20,860 --> 00:36:25,100 The one of the successes of the CFSP has been the involvement in Georgia. 282 00:36:25,670 --> 00:36:36,140 So it's a bit telling. So should we focus on that region and are the capabilities that go with that and design the policies that go with that? 283 00:36:36,650 --> 00:36:43,430 I think it's worth discussing that amongst European and that connects with the debates on the European security strategy. 284 00:36:45,200 --> 00:36:57,560 Fourthly, a question to which I have no answer, which is to ask whether the European divisions were more the exception or the rule. 285 00:36:59,060 --> 00:37:07,880 What I mean by that is, was the fact that the Europeans and especially the three big Europeans were divided. 286 00:37:08,420 --> 00:37:18,740 Was this a very exceptional setting? Based on the domestic political issues in the three countries? 287 00:37:19,340 --> 00:37:27,260 Or was it something which is likely to become more normal with a reshuffling of cards where we see France and Britain 288 00:37:27,260 --> 00:37:38,989 siding together in the countries in the aftermath of the Treaty of November 2010 or and Germany being more isolated, 289 00:37:38,990 --> 00:37:50,810 more focussed on on non hard security challenges and these the least interested in crisis management and in deploying forces abroad. 290 00:37:51,590 --> 00:37:55,910 To put it bluntly with regard to Germany, 291 00:37:56,690 --> 00:38:06,050 my question would be how we address Libya and signal the end of a parenthesis in German foreign and security policy, 292 00:38:06,290 --> 00:38:13,790 which I would call as a matter of simplification, the Fischer moment of of a Germany ready to commit itself in Kosovo, 293 00:38:13,790 --> 00:38:23,300 even in the absence of a UN security mandate of a Germany that is sending troops in Afghanistan, of a Germany that is providing forces to the mission, 294 00:38:23,690 --> 00:38:34,190 to a Germany that is very an increasingly reluctant to use force for a variety of domestic reasons, 295 00:38:34,610 --> 00:38:41,810 and probably because of more broadly of a security perception that for the first time maybe in German history, 296 00:38:42,920 --> 00:38:47,510 Germany is no longer facing any security, 297 00:38:48,350 --> 00:38:53,660 direct security challenges being in the heart of Europe with only friendly neighbouring countries, 298 00:38:53,960 --> 00:39:07,250 having resolved its historical competition with all its past adversaries, whether it's France, Russia, Poland, whomever. 299 00:39:07,730 --> 00:39:17,330 And if this is the case, what does it tell us about the future of the EU, given the normal and very important weight of Germany in the EU system? 300 00:39:18,110 --> 00:39:25,790 Do we see a division between sort of interventionist part of the EU by opposition to to to another part? 301 00:39:26,150 --> 00:39:35,390 And where do the others sit in that debate? And I think it's very we have to look very carefully into the so-called small countries in that debate. 302 00:39:36,620 --> 00:39:42,890 I think they are very important, some of them, and they don't come as as a group. 303 00:39:45,290 --> 00:39:53,770 Some of them have been engaged in the operations in Libya and have also committed lots of forces in Afghanistan in the past, 304 00:39:53,780 --> 00:39:59,720 typically Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands. Some of them are complete free riders. 305 00:39:59,730 --> 00:40:07,770 The. They don't spend anything on defence and they you know, if you look at the Austrian decision to just abandon the concept of an air force, 306 00:40:07,770 --> 00:40:12,989 it's it's a very, very easy choice to make when you're Australia. 307 00:40:12,990 --> 00:40:17,670 And I mean the most hostile neighbour is Liechtenstein. 308 00:40:18,330 --> 00:40:25,680 So you're not completely in a system where you run any serious risks. 309 00:40:26,190 --> 00:40:35,140 I mean, thought that the Eastern Europeans themselves are still in this process of wondering whether they are more focussed on that, 310 00:40:35,160 --> 00:40:38,520 which was very clear and the need to debate more focussed on territorial defence. 311 00:40:38,520 --> 00:40:46,440 And, and somehow when you you discuss or interview senior officials in Eastern Europe, 312 00:40:46,980 --> 00:40:57,570 basically their commitment to NATO operations, to EU operations is really a token to say when you ask we were there. 313 00:40:58,080 --> 00:41:02,760 So when we asked, will you be the type of relationship? 314 00:41:02,760 --> 00:41:10,170 But they they don't really buy the argument about crisis management and expeditionary need to our EU. 315 00:41:10,390 --> 00:41:22,110 They're not really interested in that. Beyond that, the very, very close region, region for them. 316 00:41:23,330 --> 00:41:29,680 The fifth and last question that is connected to the previous one is the is 317 00:41:29,680 --> 00:41:34,050 the issue of whether some Europeans have become allergic to the use of force, 318 00:41:34,980 --> 00:41:42,090 which is, I think, a big challenge. And I see that very much in the EU debates as some of you, 319 00:41:42,090 --> 00:41:51,750 I go to Brussels quite often and discuss with the people in the U.S. and in the various European institutions, 320 00:41:52,080 --> 00:41:57,270 and I'm quite struck at the fact that they feel so posed this Italian in a way. 321 00:41:57,990 --> 00:42:02,340 You know, they they they are truly convinced, which is a good news. 322 00:42:02,340 --> 00:42:10,919 That's, you know, some sort of war has disappeared from the landscape, which is true for the European continent, for most of it. 323 00:42:10,920 --> 00:42:16,889 And that's a very good news, but somehow not necessarily true for the rest of the world. 324 00:42:16,890 --> 00:42:23,100 And this sense that because we have such a great model that is post-conflict, 325 00:42:23,100 --> 00:42:31,139 because of its value and of all the and all about smart power and cooperation and make it short and doesn't 326 00:42:31,140 --> 00:42:36,930 necessarily mean that the rest of the world we will leave us in peace and we might face those crisis. 327 00:42:36,930 --> 00:42:47,370 And if we you know, the fact that we we are willing to use a force doesn't necessarily mean that we will never be confronted with that. 328 00:42:47,550 --> 00:42:55,560 And somehow I tend to believe that Libya is is a should serve as a reminder that near Europe 329 00:42:55,560 --> 00:43:02,730 we might be faced with political challenge that that might imply the use of force for that. 330 00:43:03,840 --> 00:43:10,319 And my last question is, which is connected to this one, is that what kind of narrative do we really offer? 331 00:43:10,320 --> 00:43:21,000 If we are not, then, you know, if we we take the view that the the the hard security narrative is something of the past. 332 00:43:21,900 --> 00:43:31,020 And I think the Europeans, and it's very clear in the context of the Arab Spring, have not come up with something as some sort of alternative to that. 333 00:43:32,640 --> 00:43:40,980 I wish the EU had come up with some sort of Marshall Plan with the new emerging democracies in the Arab world, 334 00:43:41,280 --> 00:43:44,640 because it is not only about our values but also about our interests. 335 00:43:44,970 --> 00:43:47,070 And I don't see that truly happening. 336 00:43:47,790 --> 00:43:59,040 So somehow what strikes me is that we are in this sort of many Europeans know no longer interested in in the use of force, 337 00:43:59,430 --> 00:44:09,330 but at the same time, not necessarily developing a significant or a truly attractive alternative to that. 338 00:44:11,070 --> 00:44:15,300 I've spoken for way too long, so I'm really looking forward to your questions. 339 00:44:15,720 --> 00:44:17,250 Thank you very much. Thank you.