Welcome to our afternoon session. Paid for by Professor Christopher, whose respondent is Dr. Michael Rakoff.
And I think you should just get started.
So first, thank you very much to welcome to the South and to the two other people, to David and the two other people's names.
I'm forgetting now who are worthy you like directors and to the hospitality of
of Oxford and thank you for your indulgence or what I hope was your indulgence.
And in an exercise, in thinking out loud or thinking in public, which probably ought to be discouraged,
this is a this paper is a beginning of an introduction to a book.
I'm trying to finish this year on democracy and war.
And I found I was just chatting about this at lunch.
I found and maybe as I move through the arc of a philosophical career, I become more and more beset by questions of methodology.
That confidence I had in particular ways of framing problems, and particularly more kind of axiomatic approaches to problems, has waned over time.
And this paper was a way of picking a particular topic and trying to nibble a little more around the edges of some of these methodological questions,
in particular the relation between, in a sense, the kind of the verdicts of history,
the kind of the sociological legitimation of collective violence and what moral philosophy and I think sort of intuition,
pump type examples bring to us that discrepancy between the ways in which we forget violence, we forget it at the roots of our national histories.
We forget it in relation to wars. The wars come to seem assumptions that the discrepancy between the ideal theory of philosophy and the realism
of war is something I've been thinking about for a long time and then unwilling to accept the answer.
And I was told myself at the beginning of that philosophical career,
which is that philosophy should do what philosophers should do, say things, say we, that things ought to be,
and let the world take note and become convinced that we need a more complicated relationship than that and the papers and have to think about that,
but not terribly successfully. I'm South also asked me to say a word about how the [INAUDIBLE] a paper about yes post bellum found its way into
a UCI bellum conference and it came in part from not paying too much attention to the theme of the conference.
Apart from the title Why We Fight? Why do we fight?
We fight to win. What do we want to do when we win? Well, that was the question I gave myself, but there is also quite an obvious connection.
It and it's the one that I refer to the the Gary Bass article from a couple of years ago that he highlights that an unjust
peace will vitiate an otherwise just war and that we need to I think this is right by taking a different direction the best.
I think we need to think about what the rights of victory are in order to argue back to what can be a just motivation for war.
Because if in fact the rights of the victor are extremely limited,
then it's hard to it's hard to justify the waging of war as a device for securing deterrence, remaking institutions and the like.
The end of the paper ends.
So the paper moves through a number of ways of imagining how one might justify the rights of the victor.
Now, the rights of the so the rights of the victor within international law have been constrained dramatically over, you know, over history.
But there's still we've moved past a right of the pillar trade and and revenge towards well, I think we still have revenge but but towards still,
I think quite profound rights to reshape political institutions and that it's really that core right of the victor to reshape political institutions,
which is, for me, the problem of justification.
I try to consider a number of approaches to that problem and end up, I think oscillating between to the conclusion is not conclusory.
The conclusion of the paper is that we can think of two different approaches to different ways that might be successful.
Justifying this one is simply a duty to make sure that a people is governed, and if the victorious nation is the nation with the resources to do so,
then it has a right that extends no further than it's duty to not leave people.
It is vanquished in conditions of anarchy. That's one consideration.
The second one is an attempt to still play out this thought I have that the political violence has.
We have to think about it in a somewhat different way that we have to recognise the relation to.
Violence, the way violence and the creation of new regimes.
We have to in some sense acknowledge that violence lies at the heart of the emergence of almost all political
regimes and to see victorious nations not as enjoying something that we would describe as a right.
There's no clear moral justification for what they do, but nonetheless, occupying a kind of grey zone,
of grey zone in which there's a kind of frank acknowledgement that this is how politics happens.
I'm treading in that suggestion over a paper I wrote a few years ago trying to deal with it.
You know, the ticking time bomb question about how one thinks about supreme emergency
cases and justifications in these cases and in that other and that other paper,
which I think I cite here and that other paper,
I end up at a somewhat similar position, which is that it's hard to have confidence in moral principles,
the extension of moral principles to these cases, for obvious reasons, they seem more like singularity is in our thought.
It's hard to justify. It's hard to justify the torture.
It's important to justify the torture. And yet there also seems to be something about the kind of the de facto history of the case,
that the choice that has to be made and that puts it in some different kind of normative space.
I'm starting to babble here,
but the the I think there is a similar I'm intrigued by the thought that there's a similar kind of singularity in these moments of
regime change where we've lost the baseline for evaluating transformations to property in the case of some kinds of revolutions,
transformation and, and violence and others,
that we we need a different set of ethical principles to examine these kinds of cases than we're used to in in the cases of interpersonal morality.
So sorry. That's kind of spewing a lot of the thoughts of the paper into into the audience.
And maybe Massimo can help clean them up and tell me what I thought.
All right. Well, thanks to you like and thanks to seven in particular for putting together such a great insight and for inviting me.
And thanks to Chris for such a great paper. So good.
The paper focuses on an interesting question of useful spell, namely the question of the justification of the rights of victors.
These rights include things such as free drawing of territorial boundaries, relocations of populations,
seizure and redistribution of property, imposition of reparative payments, punishment of leaders and officials.
And so. And good question is, what is the justification for for these rights?
And this is an important question, he suggests, because if the requirement of this post bellum are not met,
the war will be unjust, in spite of the fact that the requirements of user bedroom and using by law met.
So there are of proportionality that the peace must meet in order for the war to be justified.
So what is it that justifies the victory of states rights to interfere with the sovereignty
of the defeated state in order to reshape its political institutions and punish its members?
So there are two extreme answers. One is the difference, according to this view of victors acquire no rights by the fact that they won.
All they have are the rights that they originally had before the war started and
the right to acquire because of the wrongful acts committed by the losing state.
So here, victory makes no normative difference and puts reject this view because at odds with how we normally understand the rights of victims,
we normally think that because to acquire a limited right to govern the internal
matters of the of the losing state and on the other on the other end of the spectrum,
there is the the motive that says the victors acquire a complete right, so the victors become sovereign over the territory of the losing state.
So on this view, basically they can do whatever they want or do on that,
on some of some other versions of the law that there are constrained by national duties of justice and could reject plausibly.
I think this view as well as an instance of the view that might makes right of you that and is the notion of rights of substantive good.
Now, in between these two extremes, there are a series of other views that he focuses on in this paper.
The first group is what he called the epistemic foundations of the right of the victorious state.
Now, leaving aside the strong theological interpretation of this view, there seem to be two formulations.
One says that victory reveals which state was right before the beginning of the war.
So the victor, the right of the victors,
is grounded in the fact that the fact that they won the war shows reveals that they were right in fighting the war.
And there is a second formulation of this of this epistemic view that says
that there is no straightforward answer to the question which state was right?
But what is the decision procedure that determines that?
And because it's sympathetic to some extent, at least with this view, he says, it's often more important simply to decide than to decide,
rightly, given that the conflict about who's right in many cases will have negative consequences.
So given that establishing the NTC, the rights of the parties is harder than we normally think,
it is not implausible to think that war and my function as the decision procedure to establish was right,
at least when we lacked better decision procedures, for example, in international court.
So let's try to get back to this later. There's time.
But I want to focus on the what he calls the substantive foundations of the right of of the Victory State and the three formulations of these people,
the victor's right to govern over the state,
the lost the war can be grounded in the right to deter future aggression by that state or by other states or.
And this is a second variant of this view by the right to punish the wrongdoer.
The second view says that the victor's right is grounded on the right to establish a superior mode of political life on the vanquished,
and that there's a third view that says that the victors right is grounded on the right to implement the natural duties of justice.
So, for example, to disagree stole a governing authority in the Territory to ensure rule of law.
Now Coots is sympathetic to the first few, at least in the formulation that focuses on deterrence, not the one that focuses on punishment.
Since he would be to the advantage of all states to reduce the number of wars,
the victorious state acquires the right to do things such as punishing leaders or reducing the military capability
of the vanquished in order to deter the aggressor state as well as other states for future aggression.
And of course, you know, these. Right must be balanced with respect for national service, emulation of the state.
The lost. If I understand, is also sympathetic, at least to some extent, with the second to the second view.
Once the conqueror status forfeited its ordinary presumption against interference through aggression, victors may have not only the right,
but also the duty to reshape the conquered state and, where possible, establish a superior mode of political life.
And of course, there are obvious risks here that could signal.
What about the third view? What? The third view is at least one interpretation, a weak version of the second.
So in a sense is less controversial, given the dangers incurred by those living in a territory with no functioning political institutions.
Leaders plausibly have a duty to install some form of government to ensure that these dangers are prevented.
Now notice that this third view is completely independent from the use of balance,
and the courts acknowledges this in that it equally applies to whoever wins, whether it is the aggressing or the defending country.
So a state responsible for moving in a just war would have the duty not to leave the losing state without a government.
And so for this reason, the third view does grant some duties.
But these duties are grounds for humanitarian intervention, but not not a basis for legitimacy.
So let me let me start with the substantive foundations of the rights of the victims, and in particular with the terraces.
I think that this is the foundation that could seem to consider less controversial,
could start from the observation that the right of a state to defend itself
triggered by an aggressive war is as uncontroversial a ground of war as we can get,
and that the right to deter once aggression has taken place follows closely on its heels.
Why is that? And his argument is that I'm quoting now Given that few wars are better than more,
a system in which aggression receives an additional sanction will be to the advantage of all states.
And I think this formulation is important because it shows that the right is grounded in the well-being of all states.
Or, if you prefer, we could see in an impersonal demand of justice,
the demand of justice to reduce the number of aggressive acts, since these are morally impermissible.
Now, my question is, well, then why should the state have won the war?
The war in particular, enjoy this, right? So if state a unjustly attacked state, be be certainly has the right to go to war in order to defend itself.
But once these goal, namely self-defence, has been achieved, there is the separate problem of achieving the further goal, namely deterrence.
I can see why this goal requires interfering with the sovereignty of the losing
state in a way requires punishing leaders and reshaping the Constitution as some.
But what is the justification for bit in particular, having this right, given that the right is grounded in the interests of all state?
Or, as I said, in an impersonal demand of justice, consider the right, the right to put leaders on trial with the aim of deterring future aggressions.
Why not give this right to an uninvolved state if the animal state will be able to do a better job?
Why should an Israeli if the tribunals of C or D would be more efficient in prosecuting and punishing the leaders?
And indeed, we might think that there are very good reasons why animal states would do a better
job than a even if their respective tribunals are normally equally reliable.
First thing, the tribunal tribunals of an animal a state might be more impartial.
Second thing, their decisions by me might be more easily accepted by the members of the defeated country who would even be afraid of victors justice.
And the same is true in the case of the other two in the other two substantive conditions that you consider.
Indeed, I think my suggestion is even stronger in the case of the right to install a new government or a new
mode of political life so that the goal is to author the political constitution of the losing state.
It seems to me that it will make sense to give the right to do so to the state
best able to design the new constitution rather than to the victorious state.
We should look, for example,
for a state with a more developed legal culture which would do a better job in designing the political institutions of the regular state.
That's good. He himself acknowledges that then the right tool in the right to install a you
a new government is grounded in a what he calls a can flies off principle.
These are principles defended by philosophers like John Finney's or Leslie Green.
But in his own words, he puts on one or two words.
These principles. These principles normally state that any party with the capacity to affect the rescue ought to do so.
But then why select the Victory State, in particular at the Fed?
The rescue seems to me that considerations of efficacy are normally what grant his duties,
and the following writes this, for example, as the degree view.
Now the possible reply that came to my mind when I was trying to think about this problem is that what I thought?
Whatever particular raises the right of the state attack to defend itself,
we also particularised the right to deter the attack in state after the end of the war.
But then I thought, Wait a second, what is it that Particularised is the right of the state to defend itself?
And I'm not sure I'm I should confess, I'm not an expert on this debate.
So maybe there's an obvious reason that I'm just not aware. But seems to me that it might be argued that there are no more reasons for this.
It might be argued that attack states have a right to defend themselves, but this right is not exclusive.
In other words, it's just that normally other states are not keen in getting towards the defence states that
are able to defend themselves unless their interests are also threatened by the aggression.
Somehow,
by say that Gareth protect or protectors created their own states on earth that will be willing to defend other states that are just attacked,
you know, and they would do these in the best possible way by respecting the requirements of using battle or minimising the killing us,
so that I'm not sure that any of the attack states would have the right to defend itself.
The protectors they have the right. I think we can see this clearly in the case of individual self-defence,
say that I'm attacked and the only way I can defend myself is by killing the aggressor.
But someone else next to me could defend me equally effectively without killing the aggressor.
Now, I'm not sure that this person would have a duty to defend me. Maybe it would just.
I don't know. But my suspicion is that if he was willing to defend me, then he would.
Then he would have the right to do so. And I wouldn't have the right to defend myself.
Of course, I could be excused for doing so. I guess my question is, is this does this make sense?
And if it does make sense, I suspect that this view is equally true in the case of collective violence and in the case of individual bargaining.
So I think that could say much about the difference between the two is convincing and important.
But I think the same conclusion would hold in both in both cases here.
Now, if if this view is correct, I suspect it wouldn't make much of much difference in the case of the right of states to defend themselves,
but most likely would make a difference in because of the duty to go over and over the
losing state in order to deter or to restore the rule of law still in your government.
Why is that? Well, I think that it wouldn't make a big difference in the case of the right of states to defend themselves,
because, as I said, states are not in any way in going toward that effect.
Other states that are able to defend themselves. And when they do, we have all reason to suspect that they have an agenda.
So even if I'm right, the states would be that other states would be better able to defend that state.
The attack state would probably have the right to defend itself for the simple reason that no other state will exercise this right.
But when it comes to the right to govern the losing state in order to reshape its institutions or face the leaders,
animal states might be less reluctant to intervene, although again, we should be wary of possible hidden agendas here in this case,
I think the right the right to govern doesn't fall on the Victoria State,
but on the state that best able to do the job and think again about the parallel with the individual case if they harm the aggressor,
I certainly have a right to provide him with first state, the right to interfere with his physical integrity,
to provide first aid, which is grounded in a national duty to rescue.
But if there's a doctor around that, I have the duty to let the doctor deal with the aggressor.
Now, if I'm right about all this, it seems that none of the substantive foundations conceded by cuts can ground the right
of the victorious state to do any of the things that Victoria states normally do.
The right thing is not a government to change the constitution,
to punish the leaders does not belong to the victorious state, but to whichever state is best placed to do his job.
So the Victoria State would have this right only if states are better placed to do the job, to do them to their duty,
say that they don't want to be involved or even as a matter of fact, the Victoria State is the one best suited to that to realise these goals.
But notice that in a sort this would be a merely contingent fact.
Even so, there would be no relationship between its right to govern.
And the fact that he won the war now is that this objection doesn't target the importance of using ballot.
Consider in consideration in establishing that the war is just what is.
Target targeted is rather the contrast that underlies the treatment of how we should
think about useful spelling could suggest that we should choose between two views.
On the one hand, the view that victory grants specific rights for the victors,
and on the other hand, the view that there is no link between just peace and just war.
And I'm quoting now that there's no field of right to be constructed on the battleground.
And I guess what I'm trying to say here is that conceptually, there seem to be room for a third view,
one that acknowledges that winning grants certain duties, which in turn grant certain rights to govern the losing country.
But this right is not necessarily a right of the victims. And if I can.
Just one or 2 minutes. Yeah, just one final point.
I'd like to hear a bit more about the relationship between just peace and just war.
This is just a clarification.
So it could suggest that a peace that doesn't include enough reshaping of political institutions or of the U.S. is facing an aggressive aggressors.
Political institutions to deter future aggression will not justify its course.
I'm going to show this somewhat gives me and say that country isn't just attacked by B and a goes to war to defend itself.
Now it is capable of winning the war. Meeting the conditions of using battle and using absolute conditions are actually what it is.
But Abe wouldn't be able to effectively reshape the political institutions of b, c,
you know, perhaps it's a well-known fact that B is divided by a longstanding internal fight.
Now, is it permissible for A to go to war? How should we consider these as war?
Is it justified? Is it is it just. I'd like to hear a bit more about this.
Mm hmm. Thank you. Wonderful. On the on the main part of your argument that the duty to rescue could be carried by anyone or whoever is best placed.
I mean, that seems absolutely right in principle that this wouldn't be this or the duty to rescue is in particular is to Victoria State.
It does imagine an international community with a capacity to do this kind of work.
And I guess sort of the suppressed premise in this is that no such community is on the horizon.
And there are I mean, more multilateralism and more internationalism is clearly better.
And I think in the case of the punishment of the general function, I think we you know,
we're starting to see starting to see something like that, although,
you know, clearly there are the international tribunals are identified with sort of winning winning parties and I think in the minds of the countries.
But so it really just an assumption that it's the the victorious nation that's in the position best position to do this.
Or is that loyalist volunteer similar to the self-defence argument?
But no. So I agree in principle and that's I mean, something to incorporate into into the paper.
On the second point about what I think, I just I just have a can of justice.
But I thought that your point was to establish some kind of link between the justification to do whatever
it is required to do after the end of the war and the fact that that specific country won the war.
But there's no connection in that case. The connection is right.
It becomes purely the contingency contingent. Yes, it becomes purely contingent.
Yeah. So it's not the right of the victors, the right of whoever can do it.
Right. The victor happens to be the closest to the scene. No, that that's exactly right.
And yeah, the point of that duty argument is to, in effect, try to break the notion of a kind of a right to rule.
And so I take that as actually a very friendly amendment and very helpful.
The on the question of I think I have a line where I say it seems to me that into a war,
one with insufficient sort of future going deterrence is unjustified.
And that simply it was simply a thought that the the the war won't have been worth fighting.
The costs of the war, the human costs to both nations would have been worth incurring if another war is coming down the pike so that the that
the the extraordinary cost of war need to be balanced out by the long run benefit of deterring future aggression.
And that it was simply that thought that that inadequate deterrence post-war will mean that the game wasn't worth the candle,
that that the costs of war weren't, in fact, worth occurring.
So, you know, I don't know if you have a thought about that,
because it seems to me that what to make the war unjustified would be not the fact that not enough words are prevented in the future.
But if anything, it would be that, you know, some some serious bad consequences will happen in the future.
So it's not the fact that we wouldn't be able to prevent other killings that might make the war unjustified.
But if anything, it would be the fact that other killings would follow somehow.
So the fact it seems to me that award can be justified if, you know, say we can protect certain sort of goods or listed as liable and so on.
And if these considerations are in place, the fact that that's still not enough to prevent future wars doesn't seem to me particularly well to,
you know, depends on how one specifies the range of future forces for any future war.
It's future wars against this territory that I have in mind.
Yeah. Should be open up for discussion. Sure.
Yeah. This is kind of a is a kind of question.
It's almost more like it's it's a matter of resulting in very intelligent discussion.
And you say that when it's talking about the right to kind of rebuild, if you like it, you say it's the best placed to do the job.
I think that's probably a bit too demanding.
I think it wants to say that it's the agent that's got the right to is anyone that meets a certain threshold of particular conditions.
So you might think that any agent that is going to establish these political institutions to punishment effectively, whatever.
So I think you can conceive it as a threshold. And then certain agents, a whole host of agents then may have the right to be able to act then.
Then when it comes to determining which item is actually got the particular duty, then you might say, well, you should be the one that's best placed.
So you might have a situation, for instance, where A and B can both establish both a really good job rebuilding.
But I can do it a tiny bit better than they now would be. But we think, well, both of them should have the right to be able to do it.
But when you actually saying, well, which one's got the duty, we think, well, okay, maybe because he's going to do a better job.
So it's just a slightly it's just going to slight. Right.
It's a different thing when he's talking about the right, the duty, which was best placed on the threshold.
I kind of another quick point that has. I wonder what your thoughts, both your thoughts were about which particular particular was here in question.
So the defensive wars differ from humanitarian law.
So when you engage in the war humanitarian intervention,
it's sometimes suggested that those that engaged in wars of humanitarian
intervention have got they take on the burdens of kind of rebuilding afterwards.
This is a kind of common claim that's made. Responsibility to protect the homeland seems to imply this as well.
But this might seem to kind of lead some thought that, well, there is some sort of difference between humanitarian wars and defensive wars.
But on the other hand, you might think, well, so this is asking a lot of humanitarian things as well, because, well,
not only do they have to actually engage in humanitarian intervention, they don't have to pick up the whole bill of rebuilding.
So I'm not quite sure what I think about it, but I just wondered what your thoughts.
Yeah, actually, on the first on the first or must have had to do an answer a few years ago.
First on on the first point I was going to say there might be you might think that there is a special a special privilege
that an international organisation would have if it such an international organisation with that capacity existed,
that it would have a privilege over more partisan states to engage in the
rebuilding precisely because it could be seen to be less interested and in the,
you know, the particularities of the outcome.
You know, as I said, I don't pay attention to that because it didn't seem to me that any such institution was un was really a viable player here.
But I think there might be a reason to think that it won't be simply a function of capacity, but of a distinctive kind of standing.
And I agree with you, the Mulvihill was the fact that multilateralism clearly enter into that, you know, the humanitarian.
It's true that right the once the the sort of the bill for humanitarian intervention increases, you make it much less likely it's going to happen.
It can seem unfair to the to the rescuer.
I mean, there are all sorts of situations. I think this is a sort of it's one of the general kind of paradoxes of Good Samaritan ism that,
you know, wading into a problem can land you with a whole host of responsibilities.
It but that seems to be a kind of a feature of the case that once one has interrupted sovereignty,
accepted the duty to stop and stop a genocide from taking place.
You know, you have the responsibilty to make sure that it won't take place,
that it's not just that it stop at the moment for that it won't take place as soon as you leave.
And that unfortunately requires a great deal of rebuilding now humanitarian intervention
to make a legitimate call on call on other nations for support in this effort and that.
So there's no reason to think that the intervening state has stuck with the bill,
but it does have a distinctive responsibility by being in the midst of it.
As to the first point,
I'm not sure I would simply say that to say that state aid has to be could do a pretty good job and but even do a slightly better job,
only slightly better if you are talking about realising justice.
So that would be less justice that Israel eyes on the countries be does the job done if it does the job now say
that it is it is willing to do the job and be do you think that's permissible for be to to do the job instead?
It's not just about the duty I think it's also about it also affects permissibility, right?
Yeah. I mean, I think it probably is if you if you've got, if you've got enough chances realised.
Yeah. Yeah. Do you have a finger. Yeah. Yeah.
It is about this relationship between right and duty and I didn't care what you
said about humanitarian might be applicable more widely in the sense that I think.
But I also tend to think that there is a threshold above which because I don't think we have just one state which is like the perfect state,
the one liberal idea, which is just there is just one way to to create.
I think there has to be some kind of threshold. So maybe anyone above a certain threshold can do a good job and therefore would have it right.
But I think actually that the duty is not then the one that is based in this place,
but rather on the one that having to begin with, even if it was for self-defence.
And that's a connection that I think exists, because even if you intervene because your state state was unjustly attacked and so it intervenes,
but once it intervenes, now it has a special relationship with the people in the state.
And so I'm like any other state with my CV or even all of them can put in place a just institution more
or less above a certain threshold state a has a special relationship and therefore she has a stake,
has not only a right but also a duty to do it, whereas others I'm not sure that you know.
So let's say now two countries on the other side of the world.
Fine. So England now has the responsibility to come in.
And even if, let's say, England is best. I used to put the best just system.
It just seems to me like we are dragging people from the states in this case, from all over the world.
Suddenly they all have duties to intervene in place, just institutions, which seems to me taking it a bit too far in terms of, you know,
there is a basic humanitarian if there is genocide or something like that, you might say all countries have some kind of responsibility.
But beyond that, I'm not really sure that we can really create duties which create demand, because I think we can create.
Right. If they choose to intervene, that's fine. And the state that in fact intervene should have a duty,
whereas others would only have a right based on based in basically in its causal responsibility for having destroyed the institutions.
Yeah, I think we should also know.
So if you want to go public about my case of individual self-defence, you know, when I defend in defending myself, I, I harm the aggressor.
But there's a doctor who could and I could do something to help the aggressor.
Well, if a doctor does not have. So the doctor is not responsible? I don't think you know, I don't think necessarily has a duty.
I think doctors have a profession possibly. But someone else is just not by yet, you know.
Yeah. I don't think he has a I don't think he has a duty as such to come and help maybe if he's a good person.
But I'm not sure that I'm willing to impose any duties that include costs and things like that and say he's responsible.
You have a special responsibility because you've caused the damage, Victor.
The next one.
So I want to look at the claim that says that the thought that says that we can identify who was on the just side by looking at who won it,
which seems like it's absurd. Yeah, it gives us good reason to defend it.
Right, because you get extra points for defending of of food.
So this looks like an argument for that. But do we know that the side that lost did something that was objectively unjust?
Right. Because they launched a war where they didn't achieve their aims.
And we know that success is part of the conditions of the fighting or just war.
So they just sent all of their people off to get slaughtered and they've done it for no reason.
They haven't fulfilled any of their aims because they've lost. Right.
And then we think, well, the side that one has fought against a country that sent all these people off to get slaughtered for no good reason.
And that gives us some reason to think that that may have been justified.
But it's not a very strong reason for some reason to make us think that they're on the just side.
We don't know anything else. Then we have unbalanced reasons to think they were on the just sorry.
The is the force of moral thought that the success retrospectively validates the the war or it adds to the weight of that.
We know that they fought against an objectively unjust country.
Let's send all these people to slaughter for no reason. Yeah. They're not looking after the citizens very well.
They. They get killed and everything regularise so that prison.
But now we've got some reason to think the other side is and was also because they
fought together was this country that was willing to do that and Geoff had a finger.
Well they they they could conceivably have achieved that.
The loser could conceivably have achieved most of what it set out to achieve,
but nevertheless lost the military contest to the possibility, which for some reason, let's say this is a lot of lots of other reasons.
I think they lost a lot of lives. But isn't it prospect of success?
Not success, but it's a just war. It could have been subject to be justified, but objectively unjustified.
But if we just take it as if someone's objectively unjustified,
gives us some reason to think they were subjectively unjustified, to say that has been.
No, I mean, I think you're right about the objective of justification to decide that loss.
But the mistake is to assume that that tells us anything about the justification of the other side.
This is exactly your point from earlier in the day that the end of the spectrum tells us nothing about the justification of the other side.
I must say that both of them were responsible for the war.
And, you know, just this fact about them,
either they fought against someone who sent all of their people to mass slaughter for no reason or against someone who didn't do that.
And not just because of some reason to believe there's one last finger in response to your ludicrous point here.
And it's just an elaboration.
And a week ago. The boy joins the international community's attention to the problem has been solved.
This is the mess. The road. Yeah. So that would be a case where it's not.
Just some reason to believe those inside futuristic.
I think maybe we should move out. Okay. Sure.
Thanks a lot, Chris, for a really engaging thinker.
So my question is, I think it's essentially an objection that the ultimate goal here is to use force vote in general and I think get a 2300.
And it's it's about where we exactly use both of those begins.
So I think the objection hinges on this question of community relations, where we end up, what often happens with two options.
So we have a peace settlement that signifies the end of conflict as.
But it doesn't specify a victory.
The other alternative is that the demands are there pragmatically its word for territorial
administration or political reconstruction that happen before the end of the war.
Right. And so I wonder if this sort of affects this argument and that if you have
this pragmatic need for free territory in the territorial administration and.
Do you? Does that then kind of defeat the the particular argument that you're making, that that's what is.
It's great. So if there aren't clear actors yet. Is it is it possible?
I mean, is there a right. Can you convert something that doesn't exist on.
Right. Okay. So before the picture has been quite well. So, I mean, yeah, this is I mean, I take it this is a version of Maximus.
I mean, it's another version of the child. I don't I don't feel like I have anything at stake in the particular station argument.
I'm trying to come up with some way of thinking about what has been a practice of the Victory State, asserting it's asserting its right,
and whether or not and if it might be that other states are enjoying that right or distributed maybe true.
I mean I'm I'm intrigued by the causal responsibility are going to have tended to be somewhat
sceptical of causal responsibilities grounding much of anything in in responsibility generally.
So I'm not inclined to jump at that. But that's clearly the easiest way to particularised the argument.
But on the maximum version of this, clearly victory has no significance at all.
It simply is whoever is has the resources to bear to to solve the humanitarian problem.
And that seems right now. Chris, thank you for that.
This is a very interesting paper. On page 23 of the last paragraph before.
You say this, for instance, whatever the justice of the Iraq war, too.
Once the U.S. had destroyed its institutions of.
It had a duty to rebuild. I realise you may have been referring to a moral duty as opposed to a good lawyer that I am.
But that is. Referring to a legal pad and wondering whether you feel that, for example,
there needs to be some kind of just post Geneva Convention or additional protocol to the Geneva Convention,
another other kind of codification to the law of conflict.
And if so, what duties? What legal duty? Yeah.
So no, I was referring to moral duty. Right. The and I guess there I was polled very strongly by the causal the causal tuition.
Yeah. The. I mean, you know, the you know, my sort of reaction is that any international document will come out,
will fantasise an international process that will do this and such a process won't work.
And so this is not the most useful exercise, but that may be too cynical.
The you know, I mean, the legal duty would be to ensure that ensure that an occupied territory has functioning
representative institutions that can provide for the basic the basic rights of its citizens.
And if so, it's a, you know, more robust set of occupation or occupation guidelines.
This is among the forms of reconstruction that need to take place.
You know, reconstructing water supply,
infrastructure in settlement is reconstructing governmental infrastructure in a way that leads to a reasonably representative government.
I mean, do you do you have a response to that or talk about that?
Well, that raises other issues. I mean, for example, if an occupying power has that kind of a duty.
I'm also wondering whether actually that could lead to a duty to remain there
indefinitely periods of time until certain institutions and structures are built up.
I mean, it's it's yeah, it's an interesting it's a great idea. I just think it's not free of problems, you know, but to very brief fingers.
Michael and Patrick. Right. Would you distinguish between occupation and just defeats?
In other words, there are laws of religion,
occupation and rights and allowances and imposts and duties about keeping the infrastructure rising and so forth,
as opposed to just defeating a country without really occupying.
That is quite right. Maybe not even pulling in, maybe doing it by remote bombardment.
Well, aerial bombardment, yeah. Some of the support. Would it be the same kind of obligation?
And if there's an obligation, yes. I mean. Right. The obligation to rebuild would be independent of I wouldn't rest on an duties of occupation.
It would be a function of having destroyed a country's infrastructure or alternatively,
that infrastructure having been destroyed that it might miss on the internationals 300.
And when you look at the transplant literature and how difficult it is to transplant effective institutions,
I mean, the tradition in central Western Europe of any confusion had to be pretty cautious, didn't have any mind.
I think your characterisation of the biology, you have to be pretty sensitive to the sociological realities that particularly is more right.
Maybe, you know, optimal physical conditions. Yes. I mean, which I think you could have noted.
Yeah. In your paper that now seem to be better. Come back to you from your comments.
Yeah. No, I certainly can't remember where. But yeah.
The right the, the possibility of success is so low that that's one.
Right. It's a reason it's reason to be sceptical that any Bravo student could exist.
On the other hand, the alternative, the sort of the walk,
the sort of the walk away position that the picture of freedom to walk away or to intervene, it seems to me, to unconstrained as well.
So, I mean, you know, as you said, the paper reflects an impasse in my thought. And I guess what?
I'm still circling around here, Henry.
I'm afraid this is going to be a string of unrelated sentences, but I'm trying to sort of draw you out on what in your opening remark was.
The comment about fact is that you take it seriously because historically back like.
One thing that worries a lot of people about the UN Charter.
Principle four The resort to war is that because it says wars have to be.
In self-defence. It doesn't allow wars which undo injustice make the world more just as otherwise.
And I take it that one argument for the UN position is that although we do want to make the world more just,
that it is war is such a terrible thing that there's a limit to the kind of cleaning up we want to do at the cost of having more and more wars.
And so it's it's on the whole, better to just leave some injustices where they are.
Right? It saves us from all wars. On page 14,
you talk about full doses and say he recognises that different to the more
heavily moralised just war tradition that the insistence on the rectitude of
one role in one part of the conflict would tend to undermine the capacity of
war to settle an issue and then talk about the value of closing the books.
And so I wonder if this is supposed to be getting at the partisan.
Part of the point here is that there is value in closing the books, that this would be within limits.
Right. I mean, since you and I don't think God is actually manipulating it and guaranteeing who wins,
we're not willing to settle for just any victory by just anybody, but kind of within reasonable limits.
And that's sort of how I take the view in pictures. Yeah, what I was thinking is it's a better thing that the fighting stop.
And and so and I'm not sure whether you this or not. And so we might grant the victor a little bit of something right in the manoeuvre
room so that the victor could do some stuff and just kind of clean up a little bit,
even if the wrong side had won, he said, provided that what he did wasn't too awful.
Right. So, I mean, it's like. Right.
No, it's right. It's a right.
That's the sort of the war is the decision procedure idea that it's we so we grant the right to the victor to redraw everything,
particularly territorial boundary issues, to redraw the territorial boundary, perhaps to, you know,
restructure to and perhaps to add in some deterrence components as well in order to make the the conflict cease may not work,
but that that would be the argument for letting the victor have that right,
as it's a way of settling the issue in the absence of an international institution or some other,
you know, third party authority who can settle the issue in a rational.
It's not that there was a pre-existing right answer and God saw to it that the war got us.
Yes, sir. It's just that, you know, there may or may not be a pre-existing right answer, but it's premised on that.
We're not going to know what that is.
We don't have any way to decisively settle the issue by reference to its rightness, only by reference to who's actually victorious.
But that's better than the alternative. I was wondering if we take one.
I really. I love the paper. And all of your writings are appreciated as a as an Army officer.
This. Desire to take seriously all employees can and do try to sort of big institutions have a way with.
Principal philosophical engagement. I wonder if we if we take the notions of asymmetry, serious and sort of the moral primacy of just cause,
if that might lead us to see that there might actually be different accounts for GPP based on different just causes of.
A one size fits all the sort of have the jpg for the underside is Victoria's the sort of.
Minimises that people running around and doing bad things, which is a good thing, obviously.
And then an ARM humanitarian version of Geneva and then a paradigmatic national defence version of GDP.
So you're saying so it certainly makes sense to think that humanitarian intervention claims
will have a different or we might have different code than sort of border disputes.
And there will be all sorts of reasons for thinking that the issue of
neighbourliness or cross-border aggression isn't isn't that significant and so on.
I mean, the sort of my way into the for those passage in the middle was the doubt that we can settle for to all parties contentment,
whether the justified or the unjustified one in the dispute. Right.
So, you know, there might be an immediate border incursion, but that will be premised on some interior claim.
So I'm not sure that we can have a body for when the bad guys win.
And body of principles for when the good guys win. Yeah.
If we can't settle who who's who after the fact. So that that's the that seems to me.
I mean, that seems to be precisely what we want to avoid,
that we need a uniform set of rules that acknowledges that in a perfect world, we're not in a perfect world in which we can.
Yeah. I mean, just in terms of bracketing, sort of the the winner being just and who's the winner of those sorts of things,
we certainly can tell the difference between an armed humanitarian intervention and a war imperative, not a war of national defence.
Yes, I think that, you know, even. Right.
Even if somebody is mistaken, war national defence turns into. Right.
Right. Well we don't. Yeah. Right. There'll be a there then be a special issue if you can kind of bootstrap your way from
an unjust aggression into a humanitarian intervention and then incur greater rights.
So. Yeah. Yeah. No, it's. It's a wonderful suggestion.
Yeah. Okay. Yeah. I actually have a question regarding the relation between rights and duties,
and I just assume that it's a wolf in national self-defence and the justice side one.
Let's take the Second World War as an example that the victor won and that he has a right.
What would you say for the following example? That is he France was was was obviously not victorious, but they suffered a lot.
Now, let's imagine the United States, they that's just simplified.
The United States won the war. And so they could determine how Germany should be shaped.
And one idea is obviously, which I think is intuitive, intuitively plausible, that somehow those who suffered from the war, from the unjust war,
have a right to reshape the aggressing country in a way that, as you said, you know, makes it more and more unlikely that this will happen again.
So I would think the French have a right to that of the parents, but they were not victorious.
I would just be curious then, would one say that the right belongs to the victorious or those who suffered the most and just the other way around?
Because then you switched to the duty, to the duty to rebuild.
But then one would think was the duty to listen to the Germans, how their country was to be rebuilt.
I mean, in the end, it worked out.
But and then there were obviously but some more dramatic versions of how to reshape Germany, like the Morgenthau plan.
Would it have been unfair to do it that way?
I mean, would there have been a duty to institutionalise a liberal democratic society, or did the Germans somehow forfeit their right in a way?
So the duty was always from the actor who helps, but I would be interested is the duty,
even with an unjust aggressor, to come and somehow give them the just society?
Sorry. On the last point on the unjust the unjust aggressor. Yeah, there was a duty to provide them.
Let's say that somebody would have made the argument.
Well, it's not about the just about justice in Germany.
It's that's about that we make a more peaceful Germany.
If that kind of I don't know, another, you know, kind of government would secure that in a better way.
Then we have no duty towards the German. It's rather about our defence against them.
So on the first point it does seem to me that yeah, this is in the we're back to the issue of particularity of whether,
you know, you know, in the one sense Stalin had clearly a right right to be at the table.
In the other sense, it's hard to imagine a worse possible party to participate in the reconstruction of of Germany.
But the and so the you know, the particularity issue is very is very real.
And I don't have good resolution for that. It does seem that the the the the Allied Parties had a particular right to engage in
this form of reconstruction and of necessity that goes by way of Germany as well,
not the defeated German government, but the German people need to be included.
It needed to be included. The Iraqi people who have whatever need to be included in the process of rebuilding institutions,
because those institutions have to be representative institutions.
And that's part of the the the premise of the duty of rescue.
So so the the the people of the defeated state have a right, also a duty to govern themselves,
have a right to to participate in that as to the parties around there.
But the you know, and it's I mean,
the interesting case is the one in which the parties have the right to participate in
the reconstruction are actually not just marginally less able than other interveners,
but clearly, clearly very inferior to other possible interveners in this process of reconstruction.
And yeah, I mean, I have to think about the problem very quickly, Patrick.
They can all at once the duty of risk given by a representative institutions rather than institutions in place.
It's not because I was thinking of it as more robust than I analogised it to a duty to rescue that it's you know, who's on the scene.
But the duty is a duty natural justice is a duty to.
And it's just this continuity of that. It's a duty to create just institutions.
Laura. Yeah, I have an observation that goes back to some of the things that Martin said.
And I think that considerations about causality that.
So you're talking about the rights of the victims.
But the more we were discussing this issue, the more the idea of a right seemed to me to be somewhat misplaced just because,
rather than it being a privilege for the victims,
it looks like they have to take on a lot of burdens, like the right is actually the right to reconstruct and to set up a functioning state.
And so I was wondering whether instead of contextualising the issue in terms of the rights of the victims,
it wouldn't be it would make more sense to think of it in terms of the sort of remedial responsibilities
that follow from the fact that this terrible thing is happening before any particular consciousness.
And the idea of remedial responsibility I'm getting from David Miller.
And when we think about the media responsibility, there are many different grounds for it and one might be more responsibility.
In case the attacker was helpful, but he could also be called on responsibility as Charlie comes out benefiting.
So if you you're not contributed to this particular war, but in a way or another, you benefit.
Benefited from this law that you might have a duty to contribute to rebuilding.
It can be your capacity, which is, I think, what Michael was looking at.
And Miller also mentions community. So if you have particular ties to state, that has been really something that you might have an extra.
So that's just an observation. But you're right. I mean,
that the idea of this other strategy of just fighting the right of the victor was to do it by way
of seeing the right is grounded in the duty rather than as grounded in some other sort of power.
I mean, as to be successive, I mean, is that a position where it seems to me that the right could be seen as,
you know, as a right party's coalition introduces part of the party's particular duties,
you'd normally merely the country to the victors and said no to interfere with them in in the task of reconstruction and in particular,
not to take up arms against insurgents against the victor, assuming the victor is the occupying forces.
So I think you can remove, you know, the privilege and as a right in that sense.
Yeah, well, certainly. Right. Right on the strategy of our country.
Yeah. Now, on this strategy of argument, you know, it seems to me one of the two more promising powers, the right, the duty based one.
Right.
It will entail specific rights, rights to commandeer resources for this reconstruction, as well as, as you say, rights to insist on non-interference.
I have a finger in the back of the field and we're thinking about things and the responsibilities of.
The intervening party with the fig leaf predict the local ownership, the building.
Institutions is key. And if you don't have that. You don't have the reconstruction.
How do you. It's very difficult and it needs to be done.
How do you get around saying that something is a duty? In order to fill this duty, it requires another actor and we really have no control.
You hope that the local population are only construction, but if they don't, not duty.
So what is it called? Limited duty of responsibility where you get around the local ownership.
Right. This is a different version of Patrick's point that the success success is unlikely in any event.
So how can we specify duty? I mean, it's it's a separate version because it relies on a third party performing its role as well.
The I mean, you know, we can we specify the duty as a duty to try.
And, in fact, I mean, you can. But to make best efforts to create institutions that will function well.
You know, my question refers to what Laura just said. I'm just curious how how stringent the so-called duties of the we've done pre-construction.
I mean, suppose there's a woman married basically to an arsehole and TV show time and however he also provides for her,
you know, he buys some goods and and he pays the rent and so on.
At one point, he's about to kill her and I come in there and safer and kill her.
And of course, I would I would.
I now be I don't think that up would be under legal duty and moral duty now to provide for the woman to do what the guy did before.
So I don't see why in the state case, if we let the domestic technologies, then why intervene to who?
Somebody, for example from genocide, should that be to then be responsible for then providing institutions or something for those they say?
Right. I mean, all of the all of this sort of it's a common feature of these benevolence cases that they raise these issues of fairness and the and,
you know, sort of what's a fair imputation?
I mean, does the person who said it, it seems, you know, there's a general in fact, it's a general principle of institutional life.
The good citizens are punished for their their goodness and that free riding is rewarded.
But the. And so what do you think he has the duty to provide for?
Yes, I think that when you step into a problem, you incur a set of responsibilities that are not just I mean, they come from a range of host.
They're not necessarily. My sense is that causation is too normatively in order to do the work.
But there were reasons to think that immersion in a in a problem situation comes with a host of further responsibilities.
This is sort of the paradox of benevolence and that that, you know, there are,
you know, principles of fairness that can allow us to say this is unfair,
that I can make a I can make a claim on the aid of others to help rectify the situation.
But we can't simply walk away having given the small amount of aid if more is left there.
So, you know, you can't pull the drowning child out of the pool and leave him to leave him to, you know, dive exposure.
You need to take that further step as well. Two quick fingers on that.
Patrick and James. Sorry. And Victor. Yeah. I'm just to agree with you that it's my clarifications, I think,
to kind of help the reason why you might think in the case of Iraq, that we do have duties.
We have duties of reparations and duties to clean up the mess we've made.
So you might think the unjust states of the for unjust wars have duties to clear up whatever they cause or in anybody's example,
if you went in there and then broke the woman's arm like it because of callousness in defeat in health,
then you might have a duty to kind of then you might take duty.
But I just don't I don't see why you've done everything right.
You you take you have the burden of what should you have to do about this?
It just doesn't seem you seem very counter-intuitive. Complexity in some cases.
This isn't a promise that a lot maybe.
I know. And so there are cases where it's wrong to intervene unless certain conditions taken.
So you go and save the person, but you can make someone else worse off as a result.
And then it's permissible to save the person only on condition that you don't make this
person worse off and you don't make them worse off if you don't help them afterwards.
And that might be true.
In some cases, it is permissible to save your own citizens, but only on condition that you don't make some other people worse off.
And then you incur the duty in going toward defending yourself to these other people to make them better off.
There are other cases where that just turns out not to be true.
Then you don't incur the duty and you would be doing a bit more about how we're going to distribute some of these costs in some of these cases.
Sometimes it's going to affect the courts responsible for making this big difference.
Sometimes it's going to look really bad.
So my suggestion is just that we just think about distribution of the Constitution in a slightly more complicated way with these considerations.
Jeff. Very good points.
The first. Sometimes I think interest rates may derive from a just cause which justifies the resort to war in the first place.
So. One example might be that after a war has ended, the other side has surrendered.
And so on the side,
that just side that has fought may have a right to expect complete disarmament and defeated enemy to prevent any further threat in the future.
Which could could arise from the nature of. A justified.
This is the only way to. Star point is that.
In the case of. Again, but just for the defence against the Knicks.
British opens the door to.
In that kind of case, even though the allied powers did actually contribute to the reconstruction.
Sure. Various ways. It wasn't something which.
So I think there's this certainly. I think. At least the.
Our understanding of the sources of whatever you think the duty may be to aid.
The reconstruction. Cases of World War Two.
Certainly the right thing to do. Certainly worked out the best.
Or to claim that Germany was the right sound on the first on the first point.
I certainly agree that some antecedent rights will flow through the war to create a state a had a right to a certain border.
There's a takeover of that land. State aid wins the work. They have a right.
They have the right. They had to the border.
They had a question will be whether they have a further right to the buffer zone around that border and so on.
And that was the sort of question I was interested in. But the the the threat issue is actually the disarmament.
One seems to me to be precisely the point that calls for the the further elaboration of the victor's right.
But state aid didn't have an antecedent right to disarm state the because of a threat that state posed and that that's the preventive
war rationale that it seems to fall outside the just war that just cause harm but to to take out take out a gathering threat.
It wasn't until the war began that they acquired this further right to intrude into the disarmament process, to to impose a disarmament.
And that was that's at least. Anyway, that's how I see it. So.
So it's. So winning the war or the fact that there was a war made a difference to the right.
They had to impose the disarmament on the other party. On the second point that Germany didn't have a claim on the Allies,
Germany as a state may not have been in a moral position to make such a claim, but Germans had a claim.
The claim of rescue is what I'm suggesting. They had a claim not to be left in anarchy.
And so then having this interesting discussion of whether that's a claim on the world or claim that's specific to that,
you know, like the like and I'm still scratching my head about that.
But it does seem I want to say that the people of the defeated state do have do have a right to that form of assistance, just.
Fun I used to think about. The aim of prevention of future aggression in the way that you suggest is that I refer to it as conditional,
just because it is one that is it's an aim that is permissible to pursue by means of
war only if there is an independent just cause that justifies the resort to war.
And that activates the further right. Just. I'm no longer.
I think that's the right way to think about it. And I actually think that there can be cases where.
Justified in practice. It's probably better to require some further testing, like an actual active aggression from.
Prevention and deterrence of both these. Difficult.
Things that we do think can be pursued in war.
But a way to be activated by some other.
So you would see me, right? Which would probably disagree down here.
So you would see the active aggression by the other party as just having a kind of epistemic significances,
proving that there really is a very significant threat. The threat that sufficient to.
Well, I think it may be it may be.
It just you know, it may create a just game on its own to be an issue of aggression, but also that the start of a civil war, there was a fingerprint.
King may have stood on its head again. I'm not I I agree with you to this extent that that about the case of the Germans.
Certainly innocent people in Germany have.
To rescue in a case in which so such a high proportion of the adult population is implicated in.
In various ways in the war that their state was fighting.
I think it diminishes claims to assistance going to have is an important principle I think you're right particularly innocent people.
And it appears that you clearly don't.
Yeah, that's I mean, I just I would just say it seems to be actually a universal human right, a right to a right to governance.
Do you want to come in? Yeah. I just wonder what happens with the claim to rescue collides with the claim to deter future future aggression.
Because you talk about deterrence in terms of reshaping political institutions and in providing new institutions.
But on the other hand, deterrence is about a credible force now to prevent somebody from doing something in the future.
Yeah, the force becomes credible because we destroy infrastructures. Now the future, you won't risk it.
So the terms of the window, if I say, well, I'm going to destroy your infrastructure, but don't worry, I'll rebuild them.
So who's right? Trump is this. I thought okay, I thought you're going in a different place, which was also.
Let's go there. Yeah, right.
The well right. The, the it depends on the infrastructure.
So eliminating military infrastructure seems to be I mean, deterrence is also what I had in mind.
Destroying civilian. Yes. Yeah. And yeah.
Now, the other tension I had in mind is what if the representative institutions that you install are
quite likely to bring about an even more hostile regime to operate conflict with deterrence?
That's actually. Yeah and right. Those two can clearly and clearly come at each other and I don't have to think about that.
I don't know David and myself.
Oh, might maybe enough to deter it, to destroy the infrastructure, even if you rebuild them.
So it might be that you you would need to give an argument for why destroying the infrastructure,
even if then you rebuild them, could not be enough to deter you might be that that would be enough.
The rehabilitation of this. Right?
Yeah. Okay.
Yeah. Where? You need your rehabilitation. Not to be cushy enough there.
Yeah. So it was just a quick follow up on them on Bob Underwood's point.
So Bob was saying that if you're inclined to take the cemetery seriously,
you might want to think about different kinds of just regimes for different kinds of ad bellum status intervention and postpartum situations.
And your response to that was, well,
that might be okay if we had some kind of Islamic body that could tell you which ones are just too much as I'm just.
But we'll be done and we have to have some kind of, you know, levelling account that doesn't differentiate in that way.
And it seems to me that one of the mistakes that that makes a lot of the asymmetry arguments to make is that it assumes that
the the the the only or perhaps the primary target for these kinds of rules are the person whose behaviour would be directly,
you know, have you and this me that these a importantly other functions as well.
So one of the things that they do is that they tie the response of third parties, you know, other other nations, other states,
international agencies, when they're considering how to interact with, recognise, intervene and then postpone activities of the of the occupier.
Right. So and so it's a set of rules to differentiate on the basis of these and considerations could still be important
in terms of the judgements of these third parties will make about the actions of the of the occupier.
Right. So, so the images is that we I mean, we have a we have a pronouncement made by some third party that the right side,
one for the wrong side one and that sort of privilege is our standard or whether or not I just yeah,
I mean, you know, third parties, you know, other states, they will make their assessment.
Right. And so the question it ought to be guided by their assessment of the had done justice seems to
me that a lot of circumstances it might be entirely appropriate that they should be guided.
Yeah. I mean, even if we don't have a, you know, kind of an impartial authority to make that call.
Right, I guess I'm just and then I can imagine institutions which render verdicts, but it seems to me those verdicts are likely to be contested,
so deeply contested in virtually all cases that, you know,
you'll have conflicting institutions are very conflicting verdicts or you'll have to satisfaction those verdicts.
And that was the that was well behind my saying above that it seemed to me one
wants a uniform set of sort of delineations of the rights of the vector that,
you know, not rather than an asymmetric set which depend on some third party endorsement,
because the more expansive set of rights will be deeply contested.
But in principle, one could have such a set of institutions but wanted to come on that just maybe, perhaps an example of what they're talking about.
Just sort of contextualise it completely.
If I if we had an army that had a robust moral doctrine and in that moral document was a doctrine of use first column based on this imagery.
And I get some sort of order from my national command authority saying that the war is this specific sort of thing, while useful as well,
and seems to me a way to think of it as the necessary sufficient conditions to
satisfy that just cause at least one of the things that we consider possible.
And so if my national command authority is telling me that my just policy for war is a certain sort of thing,
let's say paradigmatic national defence and I and I go and I told my doctrine to start to do my planning and then lo and behold,
I start to notice it's a sort of recalcitrant data and these sorts of things and say, well, look,
you say that I'm going to do these other sorts of things, but we don't see those conditions sort of on the ground of our planning.
Right. This seems to be one, either it doesn't meet the U.S. criteria that you're talking about or it's a very different sort of thing.
We still have a problem. It's just a very different sort of problem.
And that's what I was trying to.
Can I go back to the busy place? Oh, yeah. Okay.
So I was on the street minding my business and no one because I COVID-19 the kids by the side of distress.
Now, surely, I mean, I believe I'm the voice. How does it happen to be possible?
You know, to have a baby? Just to clarify what you see.
Is it you view the mind you to me would be the stronger for the fact that I in the
case what I am the one who lifted the baby out of the punch in the first instance.
Yeah. I mean, initially I was very taken aback by what you've taken by the example I mentioned that Phi Phi,
the principle that the exam was meant to strike.
I mean, no one, it seems to me as an individual, isn't it, to provide continuing assistance to a woman who happens to be resources, you know.
Right. So. So. So I suppose what I'm trying to grapple with, oddly, is the sort of that, you know, there might be general breaches of systems.
There are cases where in discharging this, do harm the beneficiary of those duties in a way that would impose on us a further duty to have,
at least in the short term, but perhaps not, you know,
beyond the limits that no one, in any event,
isn't a duty to go in for the sake of us and the other cases where we discharge a
general duty of assistance in a way that not home but means the intended beneficiary.
And so the question that arises to do you see do you see what I mean?
Yeah. So so in the let's take first the non-Mormon case, just where it's a general duty of assistance.
So right now we have a duty to adopt the child.
But the it's great, you know, but it seems to me you have a duty not just to leave to alleviate the most immediate source of the distress,
but to ensure that in some sense the child is out of danger.
And that that was the point of my saying. You're you're mixed into this for more than just the other senior duty in your own country.
Presume that you know the justification. I must have said the justification for the duty if you see in the fact that I was the one who did the rescue.
So I was thinking about the case where I didn't do the right thing in the rescue.
But you brought your son. He's busy. He can't be bothered to ring the ambulance.
And I happened to be there, too, so. Right.
I don't think I don't think it matters whether you're you're the one who pulled the baby out or whether you're here on the scene.
It's a it's simply that you're sort of implication in the situation that I think matters who were being on the scene is what
generates that the duties that are more extensive than you might prefer and give you a claim on the assistance of others.
But in the absence of others help, you're not entitled to simply walk away and say, It's not fair that I have to say so.
Then we have, if I may. So then we have cases where in discharging the duty of assistance to be home.
Yeah. Yeah. The beneficiary too, either directly or indirectly, we take away the woman's source of support.
But I mean, I think, you know, there are limits to what we may do, it seems to me, to what we must do, you know, for the sake of others, you know,
even if we are in part responsible, you know, for the predicament, certainly in those cases where we carried out the rescue in order to benefit.
And so I think that's annoying that you press Yeah.
Yeah. No, this is a very I mean, I think it's a hard that's it's a hard issue.
It's a hard issue. And part of the sort of a walk away point, when can you wash it?
Wash your hands?
And it's clearly not at the moment of first convenience and it's not at the point of sort of moral, emotional or financial bankruptcy.
But where we're along that spectrum and I don't I don't have an answer.
But if people want to come in on that, I'm sorry. So this is have answer, gentlemen, the great shirt.
And Victor, I just wondered, I mean, surely in.
You have anybody who could rescue the baby ought to be an initial rescuer for all of us to get some of the baby out.
It seems more fair. Sure.
Yes. I'm not saying that. But what if they don't?
Do you still have to do some insisting that you do?
You have a duty to continue efforts, even if others are not doing their fair share.
Right. Okay. It's certainly true that you have a fair claim on the resources of others.
But I thought it felt particularly to the person who.
Yeah. It doesn't depend anymore. On that comes a response. Right, right, right. Yeah, yeah, yeah.
No, I acknowledge that your being the rescuer doesn't, I think determine whether you have to do this.
You should be constrained. It would be rude to say, Oh, well, all you have to do is get him out of the boat.
What you do, that's not entirely enough.
It seems to me, to be innocent of duty as a duty to the child in such a way that he's out of the this immediate danger.
You know, you could say the same thing. He would say as if, you know, from the having been killed.
Suppose the house gets bombed then it wouldn't your duty to have for the night and provide her with shelter etc. so you might be able to.
Yeah. Hurry. I think my point is basically say that it's the sort of thing again,
because just because you said all I know is that, you know, you accept that the causal chain doesn't matter.
We sort of now symmetrically situated. But I think at this point he strongly denies that your duty is less so.
And it's not just it's not just you just you've done nothing about root out of the things you see.
So I don't have any special duty because I was the one who took the baby out of the body in the first place.
It's the my duty is now lesser than that because I've done I've done something already.
So, you know, having already borne a cost, I now have a claim that, okay, whoever does the next bit,
if no one else is going to do it, I'm the second duty, but I have a lesser duty to do the next bit because I've done somebody.
That was a slightly different point to the one you responded to, I think.
Okay. Right. No, I mean, actually, my thought, my considered attitude towards customer responsibilities that is relevant for
neither necessary nor sufficient for sort of full moral reparative duties.
And if it's if one has a duty of rescue, whether or not one caused the injury, I mean, that's simply a nature of the case.
Others also and it may or may not the causal responsibility in this particular case may not particularised the duty to you.
Any anybody else also has that duty. But I do think there is causal significance to being sort of already in the chain of rescue.
And, you know, this is this general background methodological principle of trying to square a moral theory with in some sense,
the kind of sociology of moral practice. But, you know, I mean it yes.
It's a message we are have to make.
The world is a mess. We have three more fingers and not a lot of time.
So could you just please, like Victor David in law state your your input, tell them like you have illustrated the matter.
You were thinking about what happens when you could do more for the people that you've harmed and then rescues and or for other people.
So imagine that there's the baby that you pulled out of the pond and there's all
these other baby steps up alongside the point of being pulled out by other people.
Do you have any particular reason to pick out this baby that you've saved to do more for this baby, these other babies?
Look, especially if you could help some of the other babies born with them.
It's not upset at all listening. And that's exactly the way I thought about the Walkers, too.
But you guys were always on you make them really badly off the battle, down to this brutal dictatorship.
Not all these other people that you can help. Yeah. Do you have any special reparative obligations to this state that you home
where you could just provide humanitarian aid to a whole load of other people?
Like that's a real practical world problem where it's not obvious that the answer is that you should reconstruct the state,
that you've gone home for these reasons.
And what it calls responsibility is important as a very significant real world indication of what you should do in these cases.
David, if you so I think maybe there is a way to say yes to that reason.
So why don't you go this is why this kind of just complete fantasy account that,
you know, other people just seems phenomenal logically so wide of the mark,
right this you know that that somebody who's been involved in a rescue pulling a child out of a pond or rescuing an animal or whatever phenomenon,
logically you feel exactly as, Chris, if you meddle in that, you feel engaged in that.
Right. You don't feel as though, well, I've done this, but now, you know, in fairness ground, somebody else should.
You want to be the one if you want to stay engaged in that.
Now, why might that be?
One reason that might be is that being the rescue of that child, of that person establishes a kind of strong kind of relationship between you,
maybe a little bit akin to the relationship that you have in situations of friendship with family.
You know, so with friends, we can say, well, you know, this friend of mine, Jesus, I've been helping him for all this time through somebody else.
He's my friend. I want to help him more. And it seems to me that the situations of rescue, phenomenology,
that's how we feel that you pull something out of a if you're your rescue and you want to be the one,
you feel that kind of further obligation, which I think is a little bit similar to the obligation.
We feel different. Yeah. No, you might be simultaneously resentful as well.
Yeah, right. Which you also have. Yeah. Laura, very quick last word.
I think it's I think in support of what David just said so and to the effect that considerations of fairness
do not seem to have much of a bearing on cases of rescue when you're acting on duty to help those in need,
so long as this is not constitute one set for ourselves. So think about a case in which you have five, five families, five children in the pond.
Now, if it's not too costly to yourself to say all the five that I think you should say for the five,
you are under a duty to save all the five, even though fairness considerations, each person should save one.
But you know, if you opt out of that duty, you might have to save.
Four guys, and that's not unfair. That's just in the nature of the duty, so long as it's not a prosecutor's office.
Mr. Latham, thank you very much. The trial being pulled out of the Parliament.