1 00:00:02,540 --> 00:00:05,540 All right. Well, thanks very much for coming along in the sort of dog days of the summertime. 2 00:00:06,500 --> 00:00:11,480 I'd much rather be outside, and I'm sure you would as well. So. All right. 3 00:00:11,490 --> 00:00:18,170 So the topic of morality, the law of war, and I'm going to focus specifically on permissible conduct in war and the principle non-combat community, 4 00:00:18,950 --> 00:00:23,629 which confines belligerents at the time to their own military objectives and the legal equality of 5 00:00:23,630 --> 00:00:28,280 combatants which grant the soldiers the same permissions and holds them to the same prohibitions, 6 00:00:28,280 --> 00:00:34,249 irrespective of the justice or injustice of that court. I've got a little handout there for a summary. 7 00:00:34,250 --> 00:00:39,409 It's not particularly condensed, but it gives you some of the gist of some of the things I'm saying, 8 00:00:39,410 --> 00:00:46,680 because the argument quite intense and so have to go along if time to go. 9 00:00:53,300 --> 00:01:01,980 So just a little bit of terminology. So does his side satisfy his own more justified resolve to portray combatants? 10 00:01:02,690 --> 00:01:06,350 Those who say he did not satisfy is not going to call you combatants. 11 00:01:06,890 --> 00:01:10,430 The reason I don't call them judges or unjust combatants is because that implies 12 00:01:10,430 --> 00:01:14,510 that we can determine whether they're just thrown just from the side of their own. 13 00:01:14,600 --> 00:01:19,030 One of my major points is I don't think that's the case. I'm just using that as a placeholder. 14 00:01:19,400 --> 00:01:24,470 So identify the exciting components are only because that's important for developing the structure of the argument. 15 00:01:25,970 --> 00:01:29,540 Now, the dominant figure in late 20th century just war theory, Michael Walzer, 16 00:01:30,290 --> 00:01:34,069 argued that all combatants enjoy equal possess equal permissions to target one another, 17 00:01:34,070 --> 00:01:38,420 grounded in the threat that they pose to each others life in virtue of that threat. 18 00:01:38,450 --> 00:01:45,200 You can buy in from j combatants like lose their rights against lethal attack, though they're not wrong when they're adversaries killed. 19 00:01:46,160 --> 00:01:52,880 By contrast, non-combatants unthreatening by definition, retain those same rights and so are not permissible targets. 20 00:01:53,900 --> 00:01:57,920 Non-Combatant immunity and combatants equality that are grounded in a single argument. 21 00:01:58,580 --> 00:02:04,370 One may implicitly target only those who have lost their rights against lethal attack or combatants have lost that right. 22 00:02:04,430 --> 00:02:05,910 When I was all non-combatants retained, 23 00:02:05,970 --> 00:02:13,400 that was this position developed into something of an orthodoxy which was bolstered by a consonance with international law. 24 00:02:14,090 --> 00:02:17,570 But in recent years, many philosophers have become increasingly dissatisfied with it. 25 00:02:18,500 --> 00:02:24,700 In particular, the provision is discredited his account of how one loses the right to life sciences 26 00:02:24,770 --> 00:02:29,180 and consistency with other plausible beliefs about permissible harmony against war. 27 00:02:29,210 --> 00:02:33,110 So they argue that the morality of harmony is almost always asymmetrical. 28 00:02:33,710 --> 00:02:38,030 A person who defends himself against unjustified attack doesn't become liable to be 29 00:02:38,030 --> 00:02:42,560 harmed by his attacker simply by now posing a threat to become liable to be killed. 30 00:02:42,650 --> 00:02:50,030 The threat one poses must be unjustified. Moreover, posing an unjustified threat is neither necessary nor sufficient for liability. 31 00:02:50,870 --> 00:02:51,379 For example, 32 00:02:51,380 --> 00:02:58,340 a politician contends that you combatants fighting unjustified war might reasonably be thought liable despite not posing any threats himself. 33 00:02:59,090 --> 00:03:03,559 Whereas a child soldier out of his mind on drugs and with a gun to his head might not be liable, 34 00:03:03,560 --> 00:03:11,930 despite posing a threat because his critics have concluded that what matters for liability is three things one responsibility for two, 35 00:03:11,930 --> 00:03:14,990 contributing to threats of three unjustified harm. 36 00:03:15,020 --> 00:03:18,530 So those are the three components that go together to make it a liability. 37 00:03:19,070 --> 00:03:22,850 And the critics apply this in very different ways, various different combinations. 38 00:03:24,140 --> 00:03:27,110 And in doing so, they face criticism from two different angles. 39 00:03:27,140 --> 00:03:31,340 So these are the critics of world supervision that face these two different objections. 40 00:03:32,210 --> 00:03:36,020 On the one hand, people have argued that the liability view would be too restrictive. 41 00:03:36,740 --> 00:03:43,910 It would be impossible to fight any wars if we were confined to targeting only the libel because we simply cannot know enough about our adversaries. 42 00:03:44,240 --> 00:03:48,470 And our weapons are not sufficiently discriminating to pick out the libel from them alone. 43 00:03:49,520 --> 00:03:54,290 If we were permitted to fight only morally curveballs that involve no intentional violation of rights, 44 00:03:54,800 --> 00:04:00,050 then it would in practice not be permitted to fight. This is why I call this the contingent pacifist objection, 45 00:04:00,140 --> 00:04:06,300 because it concedes that in theory there might be a way of fighting justified war and in practice is never going to occur. 46 00:04:06,320 --> 00:04:10,760 So it's a matter of contingent fact we ought to be pacifists from the other side. 47 00:04:11,300 --> 00:04:18,440 Critics can challenge that the liability here can be too permissive, allowing combatants to intentionally target vulnerable non-combatants. 48 00:04:20,700 --> 00:04:25,190 That's because posing a threat isn't necessary for liability, so simply a virtue of their responsibility. 49 00:04:25,550 --> 00:04:32,480 Non-Combatants might come liable to attack. Now, another word, and I've argued that these two objections are fundamentally connected. 50 00:04:33,400 --> 00:04:38,240 The as the revisionists lower the bar for liability and as opposed to the contention pacifist 51 00:04:38,240 --> 00:04:42,740 objection and to render all the combatants who are going to kill alive or be killed, 52 00:04:43,580 --> 00:04:47,300 they render themselves more vulnerable to the second objection about non-combatant immunity. 53 00:04:47,940 --> 00:04:51,530 Because if you lower the bar for liability to show that all combatants are going to be liable, 54 00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:57,889 you don't find that many more non-combatants are going to be liable as well. But if you raise it so the non-combatants aren't going to be liable, 55 00:04:57,890 --> 00:05:01,370 you return yourself to the problem that not all the combatants are going to be liable. 56 00:05:01,790 --> 00:05:03,860 And you can't discriminate between. 57 00:05:04,010 --> 00:05:11,390 So the continued pacifist objection and the no compatibility deduction form a sort of dilemma for the fuller revisionists. 58 00:05:12,290 --> 00:05:17,900 Now, one way that they respond to these two objections is by invoking the distinction between the morality and the law of war. 59 00:05:18,650 --> 00:05:23,090 They argue that these two objections might be good reasons not to implement their view in the laws of war, 60 00:05:23,690 --> 00:05:26,660 but they do not undermine the kinds of wars underlying morality. 61 00:05:27,470 --> 00:05:32,750 So what I'm going to do in this paper is first to summarise the most fully developed version of this argument, 62 00:05:33,440 --> 00:05:39,140 and then I'm going to criticise it, and then I'm going to ask what I what the relationship between Moore's Law and its morality should be. 63 00:05:40,940 --> 00:05:48,140 So I call this move it into law and then this section I'm going to talk about what the health law does, how it works in the revision. 64 00:05:49,580 --> 00:05:54,300 It's quite a simple idea. And people are. Sometimes I choose to do so. 65 00:05:54,780 --> 00:05:59,340 Other times I do so by mistake or accident, for example, because I lack important information. 66 00:06:00,270 --> 00:06:03,180 This predictable wrongdoing shouldn't go through a lot of reasons, 67 00:06:03,540 --> 00:06:11,010 but it might be relevant to choosing our laws just as the most prominent version of this view is espoused by Jeff, my mom. 68 00:06:11,490 --> 00:06:14,730 And I'm doing a sort of redux of his of his arguments towards it. 69 00:06:15,450 --> 00:06:18,450 It's also been a source of being mentioned in passing by several other division 70 00:06:18,450 --> 00:06:22,559 and stuff like that so far and of throw and somehow I can deploy tone code. 71 00:06:22,560 --> 00:06:28,200 It follows that at one point. So it's a fairly common point of reference for them without often being fully developed. 72 00:06:28,230 --> 00:06:33,600 So this version by Jeff is kind of the, the only real attempt to really put some meat on the bones. 73 00:06:34,050 --> 00:06:42,630 So that's what I'm kind of working from. So in the context of war, we have two causes of predictable non-compliance that are particularly troubling. 74 00:06:43,980 --> 00:06:50,760 First, there is the lack of important information and the combatant status in particular. 75 00:06:50,760 --> 00:06:57,860 Whether that side is satisfied is a and whether this particular operation in which they're engaged is as necessary, 76 00:06:57,870 --> 00:07:03,150 whether it's proportionately conducive to their right and whether their targets are liable to be killed. 77 00:07:03,360 --> 00:07:09,690 These are all very complex and urgent questions because answers will depend on ambiguous, often unavailable information. 78 00:07:10,350 --> 00:07:15,540 So the serious epistemic short that that issue of voluntary non-compliance, 79 00:07:15,540 --> 00:07:20,580 voluntary obviously will presuppose a somewhat fundamental that's kind of what starts in the first place. 80 00:07:21,600 --> 00:07:31,280 But that aside, we know that whatever rules or principles establish for one side will likely be arrogated to themselves by the other side. 81 00:07:31,290 --> 00:07:37,530 So if we if we grant the combatants a certain set of permissions, you can but will take those commission marks on them as well. 82 00:07:37,860 --> 00:07:41,940 They're not going to voluntarily adhere to a more restrictive set of rules. 83 00:07:42,870 --> 00:07:47,130 And we just know that this is the way people will behave because it's predictable wrongdoing. 84 00:07:48,420 --> 00:07:52,800 Now, revisionist denial of its predictable non-compliance is relevant to the morality of war. 85 00:07:54,180 --> 00:07:59,160 They argue that the epistemic shortfall might make acting morally difficult, but that's nothing new. 86 00:07:59,730 --> 00:08:06,660 And doing the right thing is often followed. If we're also giving full information, then you'll find even when that information is incomplete, 87 00:08:07,200 --> 00:08:12,690 we might be excused for failing to do something similarly that others will abuse our principles. 88 00:08:12,700 --> 00:08:14,730 There's no argument against them as principles, 89 00:08:16,410 --> 00:08:23,250 but these are both appropriate work they to be when we're devising what the law should be, if people will routinely disregard the law, 90 00:08:23,730 --> 00:08:28,830 or if it makes demands that can't possibly be achieved, that will be regarded as irrelevant or unfair, 91 00:08:28,830 --> 00:08:32,760 unrealistic, and it will lose its capacity to guide action. 92 00:08:32,940 --> 00:08:36,270 So if you think the law has any purpose, then we should encourage it to have. 93 00:08:36,720 --> 00:08:41,880 We should we should frame the laws so they take these elements of predictable non-compliance into account. 94 00:08:43,520 --> 00:08:47,490 And on this basis, revisionists argue that morality and law should come apart, 95 00:08:48,450 --> 00:08:53,309 that a combatant equality and non-combatant immunity lacks substantial foundations and moral principle, 96 00:08:53,310 --> 00:08:58,379 that they might be justified as laws combating inequality. 97 00:08:58,380 --> 00:09:05,710 Because if we had asymmetrical laws of war, so laws of war which gave admissions to the Dutch combatants, which they denied to the combatants, 98 00:09:06,730 --> 00:09:10,410 and these laws would be unworkable because of uncertainty over who's on the job side 99 00:09:10,950 --> 00:09:14,580 and the question of who is liable to be killed or render impossible to enforce. 100 00:09:15,300 --> 00:09:21,690 And any commissions that we grant to the just psychiatric combatants would be abused by the new combatants as well, 101 00:09:21,720 --> 00:09:26,010 either because they believe themselves to be justified or simply unscrupulously. 102 00:09:27,000 --> 00:09:34,290 So since we know that any asymmetrical laws would have those effects, we have to introduce capacity equality. 103 00:09:34,290 --> 00:09:42,120 So there's a legal justification for even if there's not a moral justification, and the same sort of argument goes for justify non-combatant immunity. 104 00:09:42,680 --> 00:09:47,580 And even if it's true, morally speaking, but non-combatants can sometimes be liable to be killed. 105 00:09:48,120 --> 00:09:55,530 A law that is enshrined as permission for combatants would inevitably be abused by new combatants, 106 00:09:55,950 --> 00:10:00,630 as well as being abused by Jacob Buckley's in other circumstances when they shouldn't take advantage of it. 107 00:10:01,260 --> 00:10:05,640 So we need to have a blanket provisional authority non-combatants to forestall this sort of abuse. 108 00:10:07,530 --> 00:10:13,259 So this means that we can answer the contention pacifism, the notion that community injunctions in this way we can say, 109 00:10:13,260 --> 00:10:19,050 yes, these are salient, practical concerns and it would be difficult to implement the revisionists liability. 110 00:10:20,280 --> 00:10:25,080 But is pragmatic concerns and also what our fundamental moral reasons are in war, 111 00:10:25,740 --> 00:10:28,890 the fact that the principle is abused or not to follow doesn't make it falls. 112 00:10:30,330 --> 00:10:35,730 But they are relevant to the laws of war and those of or should be designed to taking into account. 113 00:10:36,360 --> 00:10:42,210 So in practice, soldiers and states don't have to worry about being paralysed by an injunction to kill only the reliable. 114 00:10:43,410 --> 00:10:47,770 The fact of the matter is that many difficulties, I'm told, with a predictable voluntary non-compliance. 115 00:10:48,390 --> 00:10:51,810 This means that we have to retain combatants quality. The sort of. 116 00:10:51,890 --> 00:10:55,850 Have a legal right to kill even the allowable combatants. Okay. 117 00:10:55,850 --> 00:11:02,120 So they don't need to worry about adhering to the liability in practice because it's too complex and it will be abused anyway. 118 00:11:02,120 --> 00:11:06,170 So all they need to do is follow the laws of war, which grant them math and equality. 119 00:11:07,610 --> 00:11:12,290 And the same sort of argument goes for non-combatant immunity. And we don't need to worry. 120 00:11:12,290 --> 00:11:18,139 The non-combatants are going to be especially vulnerable if we endorse the revisionist liability view, because in practice, 121 00:11:18,140 --> 00:11:28,610 the laws of war will enforce a strict prohibition on targeting non-combatants, even loved ones, which is grounded in these sort of pragmatic concerns. 122 00:11:28,760 --> 00:11:37,070 So even though there's no fundamental moral grounding for non-combatant community level, more principle at the level of law justified. 123 00:11:38,870 --> 00:11:43,460 Okay, so that's the penalty law. And I'm going to turn to critique. 124 00:11:44,510 --> 00:11:48,200 This is Section three. Why should we obey the laws of war? Now, 125 00:11:48,950 --> 00:11:54,889 this appears a law can ameliorate the impossible practical implications of the liability you only had on 126 00:11:54,890 --> 00:12:00,050 solving the kinds of when and why soldiers should obey the law if it conflicts with their moral reasons. 127 00:12:01,700 --> 00:12:06,530 If they have no such encounter, soldiers simply ought to do what they have no small reason to do. 128 00:12:07,100 --> 00:12:15,200 Then what the law says seems to be irrelevant on, and if so, just simply ought to do what the law tells you to do. 129 00:12:15,800 --> 00:12:19,490 Then one could reasonably argue that all this stuff about the morality of war is wrong. 130 00:12:19,880 --> 00:12:24,590 So forget stop talking about the morality of war. It doesn't affect the practice than the fact it's not happening. 131 00:12:24,590 --> 00:12:26,600 I think we should just focus on the laws of war. 132 00:12:27,090 --> 00:12:34,040 So there's a real contention and not only there to find his way of retaining the significance of the morality of law of war, 133 00:12:35,210 --> 00:12:40,550 but at the same time giving the appeal of the law some purchase by saying that legal reasons can sometimes override more reasons. 134 00:12:41,540 --> 00:12:47,480 And now, again, despite the popularity of this theoretical move, that sadly very little material on this question. 135 00:12:48,860 --> 00:12:51,980 Again, Jeff, is the person who's sort of developed it first. 136 00:12:54,200 --> 00:13:01,219 So any any version of this appeals law is going to have to tell us when and why our legal reasons can override our 137 00:13:01,220 --> 00:13:07,190 moral reasons and when we ought to obey the law rather than what property tells us and why that should be the case. 138 00:13:08,570 --> 00:13:17,270 So Jeff argues on the question of when we should distinguish between moral and legal permissions, prohibitions and requirements of the requirements. 139 00:13:18,290 --> 00:13:23,390 And his argument is the moral requirements and prohibitions of Trump legal prohibitions and permissions. 140 00:13:24,110 --> 00:13:26,690 But the legal prohibitions will trump moral permissions. 141 00:13:26,930 --> 00:13:31,520 He doesn't say a lot about clashes between legal requirements and moral permissions and prohibitions. 142 00:13:32,780 --> 00:13:39,680 Now comes the implications of that. And the second, on the question of why, the other two arguments for a duty to obey the law of armed conflict. 143 00:13:40,610 --> 00:13:44,780 The first is that combatants should be reluctant to give their individual judgement priority over the law. 144 00:13:45,320 --> 00:13:49,280 The law has been designed in part precisely to obviate the need for resort to individual 145 00:13:49,280 --> 00:13:53,150 moral judgements in conditions that are highly conducive to rational reflection. 146 00:13:54,170 --> 00:13:59,960 The second argues for our presently duty to obey the law grounded in the fact that disobedience will lead to further breaches by others. 147 00:14:00,560 --> 00:14:07,040 So I'm going to look at the when in the in time as my first thought on the when question is that this ordering 148 00:14:07,040 --> 00:14:12,650 of reasons renders the appeal of the law ineffectual as a response to the contingent pacifist objection, 149 00:14:12,680 --> 00:14:19,730 though it might work for the non-combatant immunity objection. So if moral prohibitions trump legal provisions, 150 00:14:20,270 --> 00:14:24,139 then the prohibition on killing the non liable trumps the legal permission to kill 151 00:14:24,140 --> 00:14:28,670 enemy combatants and soldiers shouldn't kill unless they know longer have to be liable, 152 00:14:29,420 --> 00:14:34,070 since they often can't know that they ought not to fight. And we end up being pacifists in practice. 153 00:14:34,580 --> 00:14:40,100 So that says moral prohibitions trumped legal provisions, which is what the law says they do. 154 00:14:40,100 --> 00:14:47,180 And it seems like any plausible position that now might be better match the fate of the law with the non-combatant immunity objection. 155 00:14:48,620 --> 00:14:53,990 But this is going to depend on whether soldiers are morally committed or required to kill low level non-combatants. 156 00:14:54,920 --> 00:15:03,290 And again, my man argued that moral requirements override legal reasons, but the moral commissions can be overridden by a legal new prohibition. 157 00:15:03,890 --> 00:15:08,650 So if I were committed to killing alive or battered, to kill alive or non-combatant, 158 00:15:09,110 --> 00:15:14,540 and then if it were primarily prohibited by the law, I ought not to do it on this account. 159 00:15:14,930 --> 00:15:18,650 And whereas, if I'm required to do it, the moral climate can override the legal profession. 160 00:15:19,160 --> 00:15:27,050 So a lot hangs on whether soldiers in war are required to do the killing they do and whether they may be committed from the perspective of morality. 161 00:15:28,310 --> 00:15:34,190 And I think the combatants are often going to be morally required to kill in war because they're going to have strong, 162 00:15:34,190 --> 00:15:41,870 positive reasons for actions grounded in natural, contractual and robust duties to protect their CO citizens, their comrades in the country. 163 00:15:42,710 --> 00:15:45,890 If I'm right, then this moral requirement will trump the legal prohibition. 164 00:15:47,060 --> 00:15:50,660 And so again, the practical implications of the revisionists liability if you. 165 00:15:52,210 --> 00:15:57,310 Unsatisfied by the appeals. Look. Well, let's suppose, just for the sake of argument. 166 00:15:57,310 --> 00:16:04,540 More charitably, the Jacobson's were merely primitive, not required to kill lovely enemy combatants. 167 00:16:04,690 --> 00:16:07,930 So no combatants from the side that love justification resort to war. 168 00:16:09,730 --> 00:16:16,210 If the non-combatants are liable to be killed, then I suppose to say the day combatants must have a very powerful interest in killing them. 169 00:16:16,810 --> 00:16:22,690 It must be to save their own lives, to save the lives of their comrades, or to otherwise advance their justified aims. 170 00:16:24,020 --> 00:16:30,070 This brings us now to the wide questions, because if they feel the law is going to work against the non-combatants in its abduction, 171 00:16:30,610 --> 00:16:35,620 we're going to need a compelling argument for a very strong duty to obey the law, even at such great cost. 172 00:16:36,130 --> 00:16:41,380 You have to think about how many duties there are that can be imposed on people that we think people will face, 173 00:16:41,680 --> 00:16:43,660 which require them to sacrifice their own lives. 174 00:16:44,310 --> 00:16:52,750 And advocates of the liability here more often for have been rather sceptical about the notion of duty to require that degree of sacrifice. 175 00:16:53,620 --> 00:16:57,580 And you've got to remember as well that it's the duty to obey the law at the cost of one's own life, 176 00:16:58,120 --> 00:17:03,040 even when killing the liable non-combatant in this case is, I suppose, 177 00:17:03,040 --> 00:17:08,470 aside permissible because he's liable to be denied a morally permissible action to save your own life, 178 00:17:08,980 --> 00:17:12,130 sacrificing your life because of your duty to obey the law. 179 00:17:12,460 --> 00:17:14,680 So there's a very, very heavy burden of proof here. 180 00:17:15,070 --> 00:17:19,630 We need some really powerful arguments to explain why it is we ought to obey the law in such a circumstance. 181 00:17:21,340 --> 00:17:29,200 Now, the few ideas that might advance the first one is this idea of the law providing protected reasons, whatever the principles, protected reasons. 182 00:17:30,400 --> 00:17:34,389 These are reasons to do not consider other reasons. So we should obey the law. 183 00:17:34,390 --> 00:17:39,670 Because if we obey the law without considering a claim for an individual judgement, 184 00:17:40,180 --> 00:17:43,610 then in the long run we'll actually find that we better for reasons that apply to us. 185 00:17:45,970 --> 00:17:53,710 And that doesn't seem plausible, I mean, at all in this case, firstly, because it's explicit that the law diverges from our moral reasons. 186 00:17:54,370 --> 00:18:01,710 So it's somewhat counterintuitive to say that even though the law diverges from a law reasons, it will better enable us to exclude them. 187 00:18:01,720 --> 00:18:05,950 It's not completely impossible. It's not contradictory, but it's certainly somewhat of a tension. 188 00:18:06,880 --> 00:18:13,380 But the real problem here is that this sort of argument, for protected reasons, can only work if it's exceptionalist. 189 00:18:14,440 --> 00:18:23,240 If the law always if it should always obey the law without regard to specific individual judgements in individual case, then that's fine. 190 00:18:23,260 --> 00:18:26,469 But if there are some exceptions that acknowledge exceptions to this one, 191 00:18:26,470 --> 00:18:30,100 we ought to appeal for other reasons, and they do override of duty to obey the law. 192 00:18:30,700 --> 00:18:34,480 Then we have to examine every case to see whether it is one of these exceptions. 193 00:18:34,930 --> 00:18:38,260 So this means that in every case we are paying for an individual judgement. 194 00:18:39,010 --> 00:18:44,319 So the purpose of the having the ultimate protected reasons argument to alleviate the appeal to individual 195 00:18:44,320 --> 00:18:49,270 judgement that's defensive and because we have to see in each case whether this is one of the exceptions. 196 00:18:50,050 --> 00:18:56,030 So that argument is a non-starter essentially. And the second one I think is going to be stronger than the first. 197 00:18:56,050 --> 00:18:57,610 This is a different structure of argument. 198 00:18:58,120 --> 00:19:04,960 It's not to say the law gives us reasons not to obey or reason not to regard or to think, to think through our other reasons. 199 00:19:05,500 --> 00:19:12,329 It says you have a specific reason to to obey the law itself and other represents person's duty to obey the law, 200 00:19:12,330 --> 00:19:16,840 which is very familiar from the strong political obligation in political theory. 201 00:19:19,450 --> 00:19:25,209 Now, another argument is essentially that disobeying the law in any given instance, 202 00:19:25,210 --> 00:19:30,460 even if it's justified, will lead to further disobedience by others, which would be unjustified. 203 00:19:31,450 --> 00:19:33,159 Okay. So that's the basic notion. 204 00:19:33,160 --> 00:19:40,310 And again, it's quite a familiar argument against civil disobedience, for example, and unfortunately, it is importantly complete. 205 00:19:40,810 --> 00:19:46,030 The first is incomplete in the sense that this isn't going to provide, for example, 206 00:19:46,030 --> 00:19:51,520 full respect for non-combatant immunity in circumstances where there won't be any such consequences. 207 00:19:52,310 --> 00:19:55,690 And so if you if you're going to kill non-combatants and nobody's even know about it, 208 00:19:56,110 --> 00:20:00,280 or if it's not going to really get at your side or the other side has no capacity to retaliate. 209 00:20:01,930 --> 00:20:06,820 If there's this is some standard arguments against consequentialist justifications for non-combatant immunity, 210 00:20:07,330 --> 00:20:12,040 if those consequences don't apply in any given situation than non-violence, have no protection. 211 00:20:12,040 --> 00:20:16,870 And that's the worry. The second incompleteness is normative. 212 00:20:17,470 --> 00:20:25,180 The argument lacks some important normative support specifically and is an additional kind of normative premise, 213 00:20:25,180 --> 00:20:34,120 which is the idea that if if I kill someone who is liable and other people in some sense what other people kill 214 00:20:34,120 --> 00:20:39,310 people are not allowable in some way as a response to what I'm doing in some way that can be caused by what I do. 215 00:20:39,970 --> 00:20:43,810 And I'm not responsible for their voluntary wrongdoing. 216 00:20:44,980 --> 00:20:50,860 And I was a fact that into my assessment of my action and those consequences can. 217 00:20:52,010 --> 00:20:55,970 Override my right to protect myself in this circumstance. 218 00:20:56,870 --> 00:21:02,420 So this is a very sort of strong idea that of responsibility for the wrongful agency of others. 219 00:21:04,790 --> 00:21:17,570 And I'm well, whatever is merit is kind of intrinsically it seems extremely it seems greatly in tension with the revisionist view. 220 00:21:19,040 --> 00:21:25,549 First of all, it is basically incorporating an extra more reason we're not really talking about in the powers of the law now, 221 00:21:25,550 --> 00:21:27,470 we're really talking about in the field of consequences. 222 00:21:28,010 --> 00:21:34,610 And we're saying the fact that an act is intrinsically, morally permissible isn't sufficient to determine actually permissible for you to do it. 223 00:21:35,000 --> 00:21:39,950 We have to have regard to the consequences, and you can run the whole argument without any reference to the law at all. 224 00:21:40,460 --> 00:21:44,090 You can say, if I killed another non-combatants, now that means other people killing. 225 00:21:45,140 --> 00:21:49,970 If I collide with non-combatants now it's going to lead to other people carrying on violence in future. 226 00:21:50,570 --> 00:21:55,190 And I'm responsible to some degree for a lot of that political wrongdoing on that part. 227 00:21:55,610 --> 00:21:59,330 So I will not to protect myself in this case, even at the cost of my life. 228 00:22:00,000 --> 00:22:05,990 Now, there needs to be no reference to whatsoever in that. So the first thing is that this shows we've had some sort of serious mis selling here. 229 00:22:06,020 --> 00:22:10,940 This is the argument that's doing the work. And this isn't, in fact, in the fields, lawyers in the field consequences. 230 00:22:11,330 --> 00:22:15,920 And what has been called the morality of war is really just a subset of the morally wrong reasons. 231 00:22:16,660 --> 00:22:20,900 But this these additional consequentialist reasons are playing a determining role. 232 00:22:21,470 --> 00:22:26,750 And I have all sorts of occasions in the lead across to other areas of the debate. 233 00:22:28,670 --> 00:22:31,040 And there other specific inconsistencies. 234 00:22:31,580 --> 00:22:38,400 And revisionists tend to be very dismissive of consequences of speculation and the general place far more important and 235 00:22:38,450 --> 00:22:44,480 far more emphasis on the importance of avoiding wrongdoing by oneself rather than preventing wrongdoing by others, 236 00:22:45,050 --> 00:22:48,560 and their insistence on the paramount importance of individual rights. 237 00:22:48,560 --> 00:22:52,280 And I think this last point is particularly important by David Barton, 238 00:22:52,280 --> 00:22:59,720 who can save his life by killing allowable non-compliance as a right to do so on the liability of the revisionist liability of you. 239 00:23:00,290 --> 00:23:03,410 It's grounded in his right to life and with that. 240 00:23:03,420 --> 00:23:10,680 So I guess that's way. I do think that you consistently demand that you forgo the exercise of this right and sacrifice himself because 241 00:23:10,680 --> 00:23:15,800 of the speculations about the possible consequences of his actions for particular wrongdoing by others. 242 00:23:16,430 --> 00:23:20,839 And you thought this seems to be directly contradictory to the nice ethical position that sets up the appeals 243 00:23:20,840 --> 00:23:25,970 and all the other people's predictable voluntary wrongdoing should not affect one or more reasons not to be. 244 00:23:27,380 --> 00:23:33,330 Now, if David Martin never confronted situations where they can save lives or advance 245 00:23:33,330 --> 00:23:36,740 the just cause by harming non-combatants more than the laws of war alone, 246 00:23:37,280 --> 00:23:45,260 then this might be a purely theoretical worry. Unfortunately for the victims, no, I don't think this is the case in contemporary urban warfare. 247 00:23:45,800 --> 00:23:50,690 Non-Combatants contribute to threats to combatants without directly participating in hostilities. 248 00:23:51,440 --> 00:23:58,310 For example, by knowingly or unwittingly revealing their position relative and making buttons or concealing information about potential threats. 249 00:23:59,270 --> 00:24:04,010 Moreover, the law doesn't only prevent combatants from targeting reliable combatants. 250 00:24:04,700 --> 00:24:09,620 It also found that they minimise harm to non-combatants with incidental 13th amendment protections. 251 00:24:10,700 --> 00:24:16,520 This imperative removes options that would reduce risks to join combatants in order to protect vulnerable, you know, combatants. 252 00:24:17,180 --> 00:24:22,160 If they do, non-combatants are, in fact liable to be killed. Then like live with you combatants. 253 00:24:22,580 --> 00:24:27,680 Answer That should not need to be minimised and Jacobson should be able to reduce the risk in these ways. 254 00:24:28,250 --> 00:24:34,160 Okay, so the point here is that if we do think that non-combatants are liable, then you can have an outcome that policy of force protection. 255 00:24:34,820 --> 00:24:41,959 Because the point is you don't have to treat. The civilians are going to be killed collaterally as a as a regrettable cost. 256 00:24:41,960 --> 00:24:44,690 You treat them just in the same way as you treat legal enemy combatants. 257 00:24:45,390 --> 00:24:53,390 And so even if there aren't many circumstances where you can gain a significant military advantage by directly targeting non-combatants, 258 00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:59,090 and there's some dispute on that. But even if there weren't those circumstances, I think it's fairly, 259 00:24:59,090 --> 00:25:09,770 fairly obvious that we can save lives of our own forces by imposing greater risks on enemy non-combatants on the enemy side, 260 00:25:10,160 --> 00:25:18,800 if we can see them as being liable to attack in the same way as enemy combatants, then we have a much more much greater scope in which to do that. 261 00:25:19,820 --> 00:25:22,880 So it's those are serious practical, both this problem. 262 00:25:24,470 --> 00:25:29,750 Okay. The next section I'm going to run through fairly briefly and this is more of the kind of 263 00:25:29,750 --> 00:25:36,710 philosophical point about the structure of normative thinking that's proposed by the appeals court. 264 00:25:37,940 --> 00:25:44,179 And the issue here really is the world distinguishing between abstract principles and applied principles. 265 00:25:44,180 --> 00:25:51,550 And this is just a continuum. It's just that here is the abstract principles that are devised or defended in abstraction from other moral and. 266 00:25:51,730 --> 00:26:01,240 Moral facts apply principles developed by taking up principles, combining them with other moral principles with other facts. 267 00:26:01,960 --> 00:26:07,240 Okay. And as they continue, it's possible that all four principles of some degree apply. 268 00:26:07,750 --> 00:26:14,920 And to some degree, abstract. And you may even sort of draw your line in various different points in terms of where you think you should go, 269 00:26:14,920 --> 00:26:18,130 as far as how abstract you should get, how far you should go. Okay. 270 00:26:18,580 --> 00:26:27,100 I think we can usefully set up and continue. What I think the appeal to law does is it affects it effectively elides the 271 00:26:27,100 --> 00:26:31,760 category of applied moral principles and inserts in its place in health law, 272 00:26:32,320 --> 00:26:38,580 and so says normative guidance in practical circumstances affected by the the 273 00:26:39,190 --> 00:26:43,450 uncertainty and a little known advance that we get in the context of war. 274 00:26:44,590 --> 00:26:47,409 Our normative resources are limited to appealing to the law, 275 00:26:47,410 --> 00:26:56,950 and following the law of morality can only give us abstract means which can't be which which are in effect irrelevant to these circumstances. 276 00:26:57,620 --> 00:27:06,250 And so on. This view is virtually feasible, extensively reasonable to say, well, in a war we ought only to kill the non-viable. 277 00:27:07,240 --> 00:27:11,170 As a matter of fact, it turns out that we're never going to be able to do that. 278 00:27:12,550 --> 00:27:21,010 But it's okay because we can just follow the laws of war, because the laws of war are designed to deal with these sorts of practical problems. 279 00:27:22,030 --> 00:27:25,689 Abstract No principles don't have to know what it is that lives in that whole 280 00:27:25,690 --> 00:27:30,129 area of applied moral principles and suggests that in those circumstances, 281 00:27:30,130 --> 00:27:37,840 in the context of war and we don't have available to us the questions I think we do have available to us, 282 00:27:38,440 --> 00:27:44,820 which is when the law prohibits or requires a given action, we can always ask more of it. 283 00:27:44,830 --> 00:27:48,700 You should obey the law. And as always, if the question is, what should I do? 284 00:27:48,700 --> 00:27:52,030 What the law allows me to do it, is it morally right to do what the laws tell me to do? 285 00:27:52,540 --> 00:27:55,030 There's always going to be this role of applied moral principle, 286 00:27:57,790 --> 00:28:03,370 distinct from the abstract principles that are formulated on the basis of artificial assumptions like full information. 287 00:28:04,270 --> 00:28:06,520 So I think that the line in that is a grave mistake. 288 00:28:07,270 --> 00:28:13,900 And what's more, I think that even if you elided explicitly, there's always an implicit applied account, I say, 289 00:28:14,170 --> 00:28:20,170 and I think that when we infer, we can infer an implicit applied morality of war from the revisionist view. 290 00:28:20,770 --> 00:28:24,489 And basically it goes like this. There's two possibilities. 291 00:28:24,490 --> 00:28:30,100 And the first possibility, let's suppose that and as I think is the case in any given conflict, 292 00:28:30,850 --> 00:28:38,620 many of the combatants in the day combatants will intentionally kill, will not be liable to be killed, and will retain their rights to life. 293 00:28:39,190 --> 00:28:41,560 That's what I think is the case. No, no one ever thinks. 294 00:28:43,450 --> 00:28:50,050 Well, this means we know in advance of fighting that we will intentionally kill non-viable people we can't win without doing so, 295 00:28:51,250 --> 00:28:59,200 so it can only be justified for us to play if there are other reasons that are going to override the reasons not to violate those rights. 296 00:29:00,120 --> 00:29:06,100 Okay. So we can only be justified only if we have these other overriding reasons. 297 00:29:06,880 --> 00:29:10,870 Now, I think it's a there a business to do with the possible exception of that. 298 00:29:10,870 --> 00:29:21,340 So far I'm very sceptical about the idea that we can justifiably override the rights to life, intentionally override people's rights for life. 299 00:29:21,940 --> 00:29:29,130 They think that these sort of lesser evil justifications are available only in extremely rare, 300 00:29:29,140 --> 00:29:32,470 unusual circumstances, definitely not in every kind of ordinary world. 301 00:29:33,880 --> 00:29:43,510 So this leads us to a very strong conclusion, which is that we ought not to fight at all if we can't fight without killing non-viable people. 302 00:29:43,900 --> 00:29:47,650 And we know that we can't justify killing a lot of people. 303 00:29:48,280 --> 00:29:52,750 On justified intentional violations of right now. We ought not to fight that. 304 00:29:52,780 --> 00:30:00,520 So in practice that it does lead us directly towards pacifism. And that's the applied morality that you infer from the in livestock law principles. 305 00:30:01,460 --> 00:30:06,430 Now, that's an assumption that the new combatants, some of them, will not be liable to be killed. 306 00:30:07,390 --> 00:30:08,770 Now, what about if we drop that assumption? 307 00:30:08,770 --> 00:30:14,919 What if we suppose that magically we can produce this Goldilocks criterion of liability, which is just right? 308 00:30:14,920 --> 00:30:22,239 So you got just the combatants that you want to kill reliable and the non-combatants you don't want to be able to kill are not going to be liable. 309 00:30:22,240 --> 00:30:25,569 So this is perfectly, perfectly balanced. The question of liability. 310 00:30:25,570 --> 00:30:33,370 Suppose we have that. Well, then, then you've still got a serious problem, because as everybody agrees, in advance of any given conflict, 311 00:30:33,410 --> 00:30:38,260 it's there's always great uncertainty about whether you're justified in resorting to war. 312 00:30:39,040 --> 00:30:47,170 Okay. So this is the basic notion that these are problems in the circuit, but in the heat of the moment, you sometimes way is somewhat uncertain. 313 00:30:47,470 --> 00:30:51,520 All right. The fourth is that I consider how we should make our choices. 314 00:30:51,580 --> 00:31:03,190 From the facts and the perspective if we turn out to be if we try to lack Italian justification, I we cannot be unjustified. 315 00:31:03,760 --> 00:31:10,030 Then everybody, everybody we kill on this. You will be will not be liable to be killed, right? 316 00:31:10,060 --> 00:31:15,459 We'll be murdering every single person who is killed in the context of this war, 317 00:31:15,460 --> 00:31:22,360 will be committing a spectacular wrongdoing and violating all of these rights intentionally. 318 00:31:24,220 --> 00:31:33,490 And I think that if even if there's a small possibility that we're in the wrong the fact that the moral risk of doing so is so enormous, 319 00:31:34,300 --> 00:31:43,840 the moral risk of killing all these people unjustifiably, in violation of their rights, is so enormous that we would be forced again towards pacifism, 320 00:31:43,840 --> 00:31:48,760 towards not fighting, unless we are absolutely 100% certain that we're justified in fighting. 321 00:31:49,390 --> 00:31:54,880 And I think that in practice, again, there can be very few situations that are just not clear cut. 322 00:31:56,080 --> 00:31:58,180 There's always going to be this possibility during the Rome. 323 00:31:58,750 --> 00:32:07,780 And insofar as there's a possibility, the enormity of the wrong that you would commit should determine that you are on the side of caution. 324 00:32:08,680 --> 00:32:14,229 I mean, the title of a recent paper on provocative studies is Full of an accident. 325 00:32:14,230 --> 00:32:22,780 Don't Know, Don't Kill. So again, I think that even if I'm wrong and all you combatants are liable to be killed. 326 00:32:23,530 --> 00:32:30,850 The uncertainty over whether we're on the right side, whether we're the taken by force, is going to mean that we're still forced towards pacifism. 327 00:32:31,690 --> 00:32:39,820 So what this means is that these abstract principles and they tend to look and feel and applied relative to the axis of war, 328 00:32:39,830 --> 00:32:41,500 the direct substrate towards pacifism. 329 00:32:42,220 --> 00:32:48,570 And if we are unhappy with that conclusion, if we take months of activism or if we think for other reasons pacifism evolves, 330 00:32:49,270 --> 00:32:52,840 then we need to re-examine the abstract principles that we stand out from. 331 00:32:53,230 --> 00:32:58,450 Need to re-examine the liability. My thought on this is that we should reject that. 332 00:32:58,450 --> 00:33:05,680 I think that's a legal justification. I think that we can justify intentionally violating rights more readily than I think we can. 333 00:33:07,540 --> 00:33:10,300 But either way, whether you set my inference from it or not, 334 00:33:11,020 --> 00:33:19,180 the fact that the view leans towards pacifism in this way either casts doubt on the outside principles from which they start, 335 00:33:20,080 --> 00:33:30,040 or requires us to endorse pacifism. So that's why my critique of the appeals law and its function in defending the revisionist view. 336 00:33:31,210 --> 00:33:37,060 I'm just going to conclude by talking a little bit about what I think the relationship between morality in law and war should be. 337 00:33:38,560 --> 00:33:41,920 I'm just going to briefly consider a couple of other positions. 338 00:33:41,920 --> 00:33:45,370 Henry's and David Roland's takes on this. 339 00:33:46,990 --> 00:33:50,610 Henry argues that the laws of war subtract the moral events, rules for war. 340 00:33:50,920 --> 00:33:53,890 Insofar as they don't, we should change them to remedy this. 341 00:33:54,820 --> 00:34:01,150 These rules, he thinks, and for far different from the morally justified rules that govern ordinary life. 342 00:34:01,870 --> 00:34:06,490 Since war, the practice presupposes the level of intention with no parallels outside of war. 343 00:34:07,540 --> 00:34:10,840 If there are going to be rules for war, if we're not simply to have laws altogether, 344 00:34:11,350 --> 00:34:15,190 these rules have to be quite different from the rules that apply to conduct in ordinary life. 345 00:34:16,780 --> 00:34:20,050 We can, and we perhaps ought not to eradicate the practice of warfare. 346 00:34:20,620 --> 00:34:24,010 So we should instead endorse rules that minimise the suffering that it causes. 347 00:34:25,270 --> 00:34:31,000 And Henry argues that these rules include the legal equality of combatants and the principle of non-combat immunity, 348 00:34:31,360 --> 00:34:32,950 among the other constraints of use and by. 349 00:34:35,560 --> 00:34:43,690 These exhaust the morality of war and Islam to conduct besides them is nothing the sort that includes two important propositions. 350 00:34:43,690 --> 00:34:49,540 First, that the morally best laws for war should aim to minimise the suffering that war causes. 351 00:34:49,540 --> 00:34:56,290 And second, that these laws exalts the morality of war. Each of these claims on its own is essentially the minimisation and exhaustion. 352 00:34:56,290 --> 00:35:02,050 On the hand of each of these claims on its own is quite controversial, but that conjunction is surely false. 353 00:35:02,920 --> 00:35:06,510 A combatant is fighting a war of territorial and aggression. 354 00:35:07,480 --> 00:35:13,630 He realises that his fighting unjustifiably should not continue to fight in accordance with the laws of his fellow. 355 00:35:14,020 --> 00:35:17,050 If he realises he's killing unjustifiably, he should stop. 356 00:35:19,330 --> 00:35:26,380 The argument for the rules of war, taking the minimisation of suffering as our aim presupposes the practice of war. 357 00:35:27,190 --> 00:35:32,410 Since we can't eradicate war, the argument goes the best rules would seek to minimise its calamitous implications. 358 00:35:33,310 --> 00:35:40,420 But individuals are entitled to justify their own wrongdoing on the grounds that it is inevitable and so must be regulated rather than prescribed. 359 00:35:41,290 --> 00:35:48,340 We address the laws of war to people in the third person, and I'm having to count them out like this since people will and justifiably fight. 360 00:35:48,820 --> 00:35:56,590 The moral imperative is to limit the damage that they do. If we formulate this in the first person, we can see how it can't exhaust morality of war. 361 00:35:57,100 --> 00:36:01,120 Since I will unjustifiably fight, the moral imperative is to limit the damage I do. 362 00:36:01,550 --> 00:36:04,990 Right. Oh, if it doesn't work. Okay. 363 00:36:04,990 --> 00:36:12,580 So David Rosen agrees with Henry second proposition and the exhaustion one, but he denies the first minimisation. 364 00:36:13,030 --> 00:36:19,030 He argues instead that the morally based laws of war should be the precepts of his version of the liability view, 365 00:36:19,660 --> 00:36:25,840 and that we should reject the traditional use and bellow in favour of laws that permit combatants to kill only those who are liable to be killed. 366 00:36:27,670 --> 00:36:33,580 I has two objections to the minimisation proposition, which is actually shared with with Jeff. 367 00:36:35,740 --> 00:36:41,980 So the first is it is based on unsubstantiated speculation about consequences such as the general objection to confidentiality as a method. 368 00:36:42,850 --> 00:36:49,210 The second I'm going to look at more is that it wrongfully instrumentalize is the rights of nonliving jargon buttons. 369 00:36:50,050 --> 00:36:56,120 And so it does this by saying that Jacob MATTHEWS, because I thought justifiably did not like you. 370 00:36:57,040 --> 00:37:02,980 If we grant you compatriots the right to kill them, we're endorsing the violation of those combatants right for life. 371 00:37:03,700 --> 00:37:08,500 Granting this right in order to minimise all suffering amounts to treating their right 372 00:37:08,560 --> 00:37:13,000 to life as a resource that we can sacrifice in the pursuit of better overall outcomes. 373 00:37:13,750 --> 00:37:15,490 And so he tries to home the point of an example. 374 00:37:16,840 --> 00:37:23,440 Imagine a society in which an ethnic minority is victimised, culminating in the annual sacrifice of one member of the group. 375 00:37:24,400 --> 00:37:29,290 The authorities have tried to prevent the sacrifice, but in the years when they succeed, the minority suffers. 376 00:37:29,290 --> 00:37:33,069 Stillbirths, abuse, including almost civil authorities, 377 00:37:33,070 --> 00:37:41,050 then legalise the annual sacrifice in order to minimise the suffering caused by this ineradicable practice of minority victimisation. 378 00:37:42,790 --> 00:37:51,400 Now clearly the argument, for example, pumps some strong intuitions over the clearly unjustified law and analogies superficially appropriate. 379 00:37:53,080 --> 00:37:53,649 Like I said, 380 00:37:53,650 --> 00:38:00,280 there's a sense in which we're trading off the rights of life and not allowing which open markets to ensure fewer rights violations overall. 381 00:38:01,330 --> 00:38:06,730 But I'm not sure whether the argument really goes through. I think we can see this if we consider the alternative proposed by. 382 00:38:08,760 --> 00:38:14,580 He wants to implement the liability in the laws of war. And in doing so, he proposes a position of restricted asymmetry. 383 00:38:14,940 --> 00:38:22,470 So he calls it and it denies any fighting rights. So you combatants and it restricts take combatants to targeting only enemy combatants. 384 00:38:23,920 --> 00:38:27,810 Now, setting aside the merits or flaws of this proposal as a practice. 385 00:38:28,500 --> 00:38:32,340 The reason by which you get through it is mistaken because it presupposes that all of those 386 00:38:32,340 --> 00:38:36,780 on the side that satisfied use the term that there is one are not likely to be killed, 387 00:38:37,320 --> 00:38:40,620 whereas all you combatants are. And this assumption is untenable. 388 00:38:41,160 --> 00:38:49,440 Some day combatants will be liable. Some you know, you combatants will not endorsing simply a asymmetry is going to instrumentalize the rights of non 389 00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:54,630 liable you combatants in order to guarantee combatants the possibility of pursuing their cause. 390 00:38:55,590 --> 00:38:58,770 Again, if the laws of war are going to mirror the liability of you. 391 00:38:59,130 --> 00:39:05,460 That can't be simply asymmetrical. They have to be completely individuated to the specific agent and to this specific act. 392 00:39:06,030 --> 00:39:09,089 And this would mean that the laws of war either extraordinarily complex, 393 00:39:09,090 --> 00:39:15,690 specifying down to the minor detail what types of killing was permissible or that have to be inordinately vague. 394 00:39:16,620 --> 00:39:22,730 I'm simply saying kill only the little, but in either way, the justice of all that we have no critical but impossible for. 395 00:39:24,240 --> 00:39:28,350 So the only way to ensure compliance with laws like those would be, again, to endorse pacifism. 396 00:39:29,520 --> 00:39:31,860 I think that leads us to the biggest analogy with this category. 397 00:39:31,860 --> 00:39:39,300 For example, if you outlaw the sacrifice, you know, preventing others from justifiably using force to defend things of real value. 398 00:39:39,960 --> 00:39:47,700 But if we implement the liability view in the laws of war leading to essentially enforcing pacifism, then we are outlawing war. 399 00:39:47,700 --> 00:39:51,000 So if they were justified uses of force and that's a serious problem. 400 00:39:52,620 --> 00:39:58,559 So both rather than issues, greater congruence between the laws of rights, important things, 401 00:39:58,560 --> 00:40:04,530 vital area that is predictable wrong doing too great a role in determining war's morality while 402 00:40:04,770 --> 00:40:11,220 is too indifferent to the epistemic difficulties of war and the subtlety of liability accounts. 403 00:40:11,910 --> 00:40:15,720 I mean theoretically committed to respecting broad significance and endorsing pacifism. 404 00:40:17,010 --> 00:40:20,940 But one of the surely by the laws and institutions have to take some forms of 405 00:40:20,940 --> 00:40:23,790 non-compliance is paramount to act in ways that are moral reasons should not. 406 00:40:25,350 --> 00:40:31,190 And the laws of war shouldn't try to directly deal binding on moral reasons too much. 407 00:40:31,210 --> 00:40:34,080 The laws of our saving the laws do exactly for moral reasons. 408 00:40:34,860 --> 00:40:40,350 But I do think that we should have greater congruence than McMahon affirms between the RAF and laws of war. 409 00:40:41,100 --> 00:40:44,550 Specifically, I think the legal equality does sometimes reflect moral equality, 410 00:40:45,090 --> 00:40:48,090 and I think there are principled foundations for non-combatant immunity. 411 00:40:48,930 --> 00:40:54,540 And more generally, I think that both the morality and the laws of use and value can be satisfied by both. 412 00:40:54,740 --> 00:40:59,979 You can. Back in a moment about the combatants in principle, but there are a couple of minutes left. 413 00:40:59,980 --> 00:41:06,629 So just run through the script. And I mean, the idea of the legal equality of combatants is really grounded in that last point. 414 00:41:06,630 --> 00:41:13,650 I think that it is radically individuated to the time as to whether you're justified in fighting. 415 00:41:14,130 --> 00:41:19,200 It can't simply be read off from the fact that you're not satisfied. It's about since I think that in fact, 416 00:41:19,330 --> 00:41:26,610 you're only justified in fighting for the rights violations you're going to commit overridden by some other moral reasons. 417 00:41:27,120 --> 00:41:32,819 It's perfectly conceivable that that might happen for somebody who is on the unjust side of the war. 418 00:41:32,820 --> 00:41:40,620 So you might be defending only his comrades what, if anything, on his noncombat pacifism, and you might be justified in fighting in that conflict. 419 00:41:42,150 --> 00:41:47,700 So my point is that if if we were going to have the law track morality. 420 00:41:47,700 --> 00:41:54,660 Exactly, it would have to be far too complex and individuated to be practicable as a form of law. 421 00:41:57,630 --> 00:42:01,320 So in that sense, we ought to have equality between these two things. 422 00:42:01,530 --> 00:42:06,170 If it was equal prohibition, then it would be ignored, if not more so. 423 00:42:06,300 --> 00:42:09,300 And something like the current system does seem to be more comfortable. 424 00:42:09,810 --> 00:42:16,530 Although I would say that the current laws of war enshrine of right for combatants to fight. 425 00:42:17,420 --> 00:42:22,530 And they specifically say that if it satisfies those criteria, 426 00:42:22,530 --> 00:42:27,870 if you to qualify for combatant status, you do have a right to fight, which means the right to kill. 427 00:42:27,870 --> 00:42:31,500 And if you're on the other side, that means the law is enshrined a right to kill unjustifiably. 428 00:42:32,040 --> 00:42:34,470 And I think that's untenable. But I think it can be easily solved. 429 00:42:34,890 --> 00:42:40,650 We can decriminalise we can have some of these decriminalised without granting a right to do. 430 00:42:40,860 --> 00:42:46,470 I guess that can be and there can be impunity for fighting an unjust war without having to say you have a right to do it, 431 00:42:46,860 --> 00:42:53,850 mitigation and the right to kill unjustifiably. So specifically, I think you have Article 43 and 44 of the first edition of protocol. 432 00:42:55,890 --> 00:43:03,719 I mean, the purpose of granting combatants that right to fight is to ensure that our communities 433 00:43:03,720 --> 00:43:06,060 and children are not going to be punished if they're captured by the other side. 434 00:43:06,540 --> 00:43:14,550 And I think you can perfectly well strip the argument for impunity away from granting I'm just talking about a right to kill. 435 00:43:15,870 --> 00:43:22,620 And so I think as a combatant, legal equality is partly grounded in moral principle and partly in practicality, not compatibility. 436 00:43:22,620 --> 00:43:29,820 I think it is grounded in moral principle. And if I think it's probably in a multitude of overlapping moral arguments, 437 00:43:30,240 --> 00:43:33,930 the one that I'm focusing on most at the moment is the distinctive vulnerability of non-combatants. 438 00:43:35,190 --> 00:43:40,950 But I'm going to just skip over that. I can talk about it more afterwards. I wrote a paper specifically on that topic. 439 00:43:42,870 --> 00:43:49,650 So I think there are good grounds for having the principles on combat community that aren't simply consequences. 440 00:43:50,400 --> 00:43:58,290 My last thought is just that one of the reasons why the revision is so often denied that the legal cause of combatants 441 00:43:58,290 --> 00:44:04,710 can have moral foundations is sends out a view that you combatants can't possibly have to fight this imbalance. 442 00:44:06,000 --> 00:44:09,420 They can't fight discriminatory because discrimination requires killing only reliable. 443 00:44:09,420 --> 00:44:14,780 So it's not going to satisfy criterion testing for whatnot and so on. 444 00:44:16,050 --> 00:44:19,110 Now my thought and that is that they return to the principles of use and valour 445 00:44:19,110 --> 00:44:22,620 specifying necessary and sufficient conditions that justify killing in war. 446 00:44:23,580 --> 00:44:28,830 And I think that's a mistake. I think the criterion is in. But I didn't find any necessary conditions to justify fighting. 447 00:44:29,370 --> 00:44:34,500 And in that sense, whether you're a GI combatant or you combatant, you can satisfy these necessary conditions. 448 00:44:34,920 --> 00:44:40,050 It doesn't mean that you're justified in fighting. All right. That will depend on appeals to you. 449 00:44:40,800 --> 00:44:45,270 The purpose of serving by fighting and the actual principles of use and below 450 00:44:45,750 --> 00:44:49,620 and beyond the necessary conditions can be met and satisfied by both sides. 451 00:44:50,550 --> 00:44:55,380 Okay, so I've run out of time and I'll leave it there and I look forward to your questions.