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Right. So we'll start the final session. We started 5 minutes late, so we'll go in 5 minutes after the end of that.

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And as we'll stick to the same format as we've had before, Jeff will give a brief summary,

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a brief introduction followed by Victor, who will give a not brief response.

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So it's still going live.

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And then if I could set it up, we might get Jeff to speak again, and then maybe everyone else will have a chance to say something to his chat.

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So I apologise for the lateness of my paper.

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I hope some of you had a chance to read it because I think neither one of us is actually going to summarise it.

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Let me begin by quotation from Patrick's paper,

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because there's serendipitously there's a nice statement of the problem to which my paper is a response in here.

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Patrick says, Once war has broken out,

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the international realm lacks effective institutions to determine facts of culpability for each participant soldier.

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The pre-eminent, least salient and effective institution is the government of his or her state, which has ordered him or her into battle.

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Only those soldiers whose culpability is settled independently of these institutional considerations, that is,

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those who are themselves aware that their cause is unjust will fail to enjoy a personal defensive privilege.

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So the defensive privilege rests on absence of relevant moral knowledge.

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For Patrick and Toby, my paper makes a proposal for an institution to determine not really the facts of culpability,

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but one possible ground of culpability, namely whether the war in which a person is fighting is unjust.

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Now, this is important, in my view, because I think the morality of war.

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Hinges on. I should say the morality of participation in war hinges on use ad bellum facts is in most cases, with a few exceptions.

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My view is that it is morally wrong to fight in an unjust war, or at least a war that lacks a just cause.

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Now, many people have pointed out, of course,

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that the practical implementation of this revisionist understanding of the morality of war is subject to an important constraint.

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It's the epistemic constraint. That is, how can soldiers know or be expected to know whether or not their war is morally just or unjust?

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And many people have argued for the traditional doctrine of the moral equality of soldiers by appealing to this fact of epistemic limitation,

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they say. But we have to have a division of moral labour.

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The governments or the populations decide whether or not it's permissible to go to war.

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That's properly their sphere to determine whether the people of a particular country are going to go to war.

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And then the job of combatants is just to fulfil the will of the people or to obey the orders of the properly authorised government.

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And some people suppose that these are the epistemic constraints that give rise to the necessity of the division of moral labour,

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actually provide a permission or even a justification for people to fight in a war that is in fact unjust.

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Other people think that this provides an excusing condition,

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but even if it provides only an excuse and condition, this helps to perpetuate unjust wars.

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Because if people believe either that they are permitted to fight, if their war turns out to be unjust, or at least if they will be excused morally,

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if their war turns out to be unjust, they will lack an incentive to try to determine whether the war is just unjust,

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and if they see that it is in fact unjust, refuse to fight in it.

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So there's a practical aim at the heart of my paper,

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which is to try to reduce the epistemic excuse and conditions that would be available to people who fight in unjust wars.

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And of course, I think that, as I note in the paper,

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that if one minimises or reduces the epistemic excuse and conditions than some of

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the other types of excuse and condition will be reduced in significance as well.

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So what I'm proposing is that there is a need and a really important need to provide people and citizens as well.

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But combatants or soldiers in particular with reliable epistemic guidance about whether or not wars

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in which they are commanded to fight are just uncertain how to provide this epistemic guidance.

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I make a proposal in the in the paper.

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I'm much less confident about the details of the proposal than I am in the need for some kind of institutions to fulfil this function.

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So I tried to do a bit of the work in thinking about this,

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but confidently expect that people will be able to point out all sorts of the in the proposal that I've made,

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I've welcomed those because to it either I take this to be a very serious idea and if

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I'm making mistakes in thinking about how to give practical shape to this this idea,

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then I need to know about that. So and I'm sure I'm making mistakes and I'd be happy to have those and very happy to have those pointed out to me,

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because it's a case in which I think it's really important to try to get it right to do the very best that one can.

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What I say suggests we need in the first instance is a new and better understanding of the morality of you

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sat down the history of thought about the just war is not terribly good on this war was very different

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in the day of the classical just war theorist as international society evolved and changed the focus in the

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theory of the just war and in legal thinking about the law of nations shifted very much away from you,

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said bellum, towards use in Bello,

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because there is greater scope for practical regulation of the conduct of war than there was for the prevention of war.

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So for a good while you said Belgium kind of dropped out of the picture.

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And this is true in international law as well as in the theory of the just war.

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Around the time of the 19th century, especially in the late 19th century, the resort to war was regarded as a sovereign and right of states,

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something they could do for basically any reason in in international law.

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So this is an area that has been neglected, the understanding of you, said bellum.

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So I think and of course in 20th century international law of war, you see this very, very little there has been in the UN charter is,

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as you know, to to legitimate many instances or occasions for the resort to war in the event of an actual armed attack.

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And if the Security Council authorises a state to go to war when it perceives a threat to international peace and security,

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not a very subtle, nuanced, complicated,

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sophisticated understanding of you, said bellum, because there's a bit more in other areas of international law,

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apart from statutory international law, but not much.

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So we need, I think, a new or a new, richer, deeper understanding of the morality of you, said Bellum.

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We need then to be able to translate a richer understanding of the morality of you, said Bellum,

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into some kind of code that can be understood by the agents of State as a guide to practice.

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And then after we get such a code,

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we need some kind of body to interpret it in particular instances and apply it to particular

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wars to facilitate our understanding of whether a particular war is just or unjust,

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permissible or impermissible. And I suggested two possibilities in the paper.

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We could have an unofficial code with no particular.

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Standing. Could have some kind of interpretive body again, with no particular official status.

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Maybe something along those lines could conceivably be enough.

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Certainly be better than nothing. But I suggested, you know, ideally the code would be a new law of you, said bellum,

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a new understanding of the law of you, said bellum, and a new legal instrument.

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And ideally, we could have some kind of official court whose mandate was to interpret and in some states and administer that body of law.

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So in my view, not for enforcement purposes, but for purely epistemic purposes.

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I suggested in the paper the possibility of a special chamber within the ICJ that would deliver advisory opinions.

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It wouldn't be binding on states.

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No idea of whether that suggestion is in any way realistic.

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There's a question, you know, Simon Connor raised with me earlier, and that is why why a court?

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Why would one want a court? And one of the reasons is that courts can have a particular kind of epistemic function.

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That is, if you look at what ordinary criminal courts do, a large part of what they're doing is epistemic.

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They're trying to figure out whether someone is guilty or innocent.

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And they we have devised procedures for criminal courts that are actually pretty good

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at determining whether a particular person is guilty or innocent of an offence,

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certainly more reliable epistemic than in any individual's private judgement.

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So that's one reason for trying to produce something like a court that is a body that would be constrained in

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its reasoning by conformity with a particular code that it would itself have a certain epistemic authority.

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And for the operations of this body, its deliberative procedures would also be constrained in a in a certain way.

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You'd have deliberative procedures that were marked out in advance as being reliable for generating.

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Authoritative answers to the questions submitted to it.

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So that's, you know, one reason for looking at the court as a kind of model for deliberation about these issues.

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There's also just been the need for authority quite generally.

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So people will pay attention to the judgements of this body.

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And I am assuming that, you know,

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if judgements have force of law that gives them a kind of authority in people's minds that they wouldn't otherwise have.

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I suggested to Simon during the break, it just occurred to me while we were talking,

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that might be better if it might be more effective if one could have the use ad bellum code within a holy book, you know,

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some sort of holy, holy scripture, and instead of a court,

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you could have a kind of priestly caste that would be charged with the task of

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interpreting the the understanding of the morality of war in the particular holy book.

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And then the judgements of the body wouldn't have the force of law, rather they'd have the force of the Word of God.

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And that would be even better if we could convince everybody that this was the Word of God and it was actually epistemic.

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They're reliable. But second best would be some kind of court whose judgements would have something like the authority of law about matters of you,

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said bellum, where the courts could actually pronounce on a war was in progress,

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and that would then provide combatants in the war on both sides with with with

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reasonably reliable guidance about whether what they were doing was wrong or not wrong,

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certainly in most cases more reliable than their own private judgement and I think more

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reliable from an impartial point of view than what they were being told by their own state.

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Because as we all know, states do just lie to their soldiers and their populations, particularly when they want to fight wars.

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They're very good at concocting all kinds of lies and so on.

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And we have a history of this even in democracies, and then we know it happens in non-democratic societies,

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but amazing how easily people are lied to and accept the lies,

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even in democracies, even when they people know they have a history of being lied to over and over and over again.

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They still believe the next round of lies.

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Was that for me this time, ladies and gentlemen, time.

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So I'm finished.

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And now I and I welcome Victor's ludicrous remarks on a little bit further, so to say thank so much to say for organising such a fantastic conference.

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I'm the last speaker because no one gets a chance to speak up.

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And this would be a good opportunity to never knew that talking about mass killing could be so much fun.

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So let me reconstruct the first part of Jeff's argument and then address to issues in it.

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Okay. So many people endorse the permissibility of participation,

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which is the thesis which holds that it's morally justifiable to kill in the course of war,

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when one's political leaders, acting on behalf of the state, has declared the war on the state of those killed to be just.

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And they believe there's a duty of positive reasons, usually of obedience, to fight in accordance with such a declaration.

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And Jeff rejects this view rightly.

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We can call it the stupid view of those who hold that even though we should be cautious about even though this is true,

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we should be cautious about blaming and punishing those who fight on the other side for war,

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for the reason that people are often excused and may act even in a praiseworthy manner by being courageous.

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I bracket this and tell you this is the fishy idea that people can be courageous for doing horrible things, and I'm not sure about that.

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And courage might depend on goodness, but let's say so even though we should,

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we shouldn't blame or punish these people because they not the excuse or they might even be praiseworthy.

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In some ways we should hold them permissible. Their participation is false.

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Furthermore, endorsement of the permissibility of participation causes more people to fight for the unjust side in a war of claims

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and endorsement of the permissibility of participation does not cause people to fight on the just side of the war,

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or if it does, which could cause them to fight.

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From the tough side of the war in other ways were people to reject the permissibility of participation.

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And so it seems to follow that it would be better if well, obviously, it would be better if fewer people fought on the unjust side of a war.

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Were there to be few effects on people fighting on just sides of war.

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And therefore it would be better if people in general were not to endorse the permissibility of participation,

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because that would have more effects on people who are fighting on the unjust side that on the just sides,

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it would be good if people didn't believe in the benefits of participation.

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So the practical effects of rejection, general rejection of the principle of participation would be enhanced if people were to make

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accurate and confident judgements about whether the war declared by their state was just.

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And what's required then is authoritative guidance about whether the war is just.

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So it would be nice if we had someone to tell us which wars were just and which was were unjust.

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Just so let's think about how we can get good guidance about this.

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Let's set off a body of really smart people who know a lot about war and they can think about it a lot,

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and then they can form some judgements about what the conditions are for.

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A just war would not be good, and then they could make declarations about particular wars and say,

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Well, this one's allies and this one's dodgy, so don't go into that one.

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And then when we have a rejection of the permissibility of participation, then people would be less likely to participate on the unjust side.

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They might still participate on the justices. And so the just would win and that would be good.

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So sounds nice. That's the argument.

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And Jeff has given you an outline of some of the practical considerations that might determine how we should set up these courts.

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I'm not going to get into that. Okay.

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So I don't want to obviously doubt Jeff's rejection of the possibility of participation, which is which is obviously right.

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But I want to address two questions. One is the question preliminaries of the set up of this court,

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which is the question about whether it would be better if people generally rejected the permissibility of participation.

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That's obviously something which is independent of its truth, right.

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It might be really nice if lots of people hold this stupid view because maybe that would make things turn out better.

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So I want to try and give some reasons why we might think that it's better when people endorse the stupid view, even though it's stupid.

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And then the second question is whether we think that Jeff's court could provide

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the kind of authoritative guidance on hardline considerations that we need.

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Okay. So would it be better if people generally rejected the permissibility of participation?

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Well, widespread rejection of the permissibility of participation would help to dissuade the

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morally motivated from participating in wars that they believe or suspect to be unjust.

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But they might also always be decisive because sometimes there'll be prudential considerations

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for them to go into these unjust rules which override their moral motivations.

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Assuming, though, that some people sometimes act on them all judgements,

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which might be true, then it's plausible that at least some people are going to join in.

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On the unjust side, rejection of the permissibility of participation will result in the person not fighting in a war under two conditions.

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The person believes that the unjust war is unjust,

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and prudential considerations don't motivate the person more profoundly than their moral judgements,

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and so sometimes lead a person not to fight in a war that's in fact unjust.

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But it will sometimes lead a person not fighting a war. That's just it.

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Sometimes I make mistakes about the justice of the war, and Jeff tends that.

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It'll tend to have the former effects more often than the latter.

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So I want to be I want to examine the extent to which these two conditions are likely to be fulfilled,

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both in democratic and human rights compliant states and states, which are non-democratic and less human rights compliant.

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So we've reason to suspect that citizens of democratic and human rights compliant states are less likely to

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follow the declarations of their states than citizens of non democratic and human rights non-compliant states.

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Despite the fact that democratic and human rights compliant states are more likely to form

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the correct moral judgements than non-democratic and human rights non-compliant states.

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Why should this be?

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Well, first, non-democratic and human rights non-compliant states do much more to foster an attitude of compliance among their citizens.

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Secondly, non-democratic and human rights. Non-compliant states restrict access to information and a broad range of views that tends

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to undermine critical attitudes and tend to educate their citizens less effectively.

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So although non-democratic in human rights,

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non-compliant states will likely make worse judgements than democratic and human rights compliant states, citizens will tend to trust them more.

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I think that's something we might at least make. And furthermore, citizens of non-democratic and human rights,

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non-compliant states will tend to trust international institutions less and less because those states will

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tend to restrict access to information about these institutions and try to undermine their credibility.

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Hence, rejection of the permissibility of participation will tend to have less effect in non-democratic and human rights non-compliance.

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It states that it will have in democratic and human rights compliant states, even in force supported by credible international institutions.

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It will tend not to undermine participation in unjust wars in those states, and those states are more likely to start and participate in unjust wars.

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And this will also undermine the effectiveness of rejection, of the permissibility, of participation in preventing unjust wars.

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Furthermore, the rejection of the permissibility of participation will have less effect in non-democratic and human rights.

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Non-compliant states for the reasons that those states will tend to provide people with more profound prudential reasons

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to participate in such wars as much more draconian measures to punish people who don't go and enjoy the conflict.

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Some of those measures may even be sufficiently powerful to render participation in an unjust war admissible.

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In contrast, in democratic and human rights compliant states,

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rejection of legitimacy of participation may have more profound effects for people in those states are encouraged to have

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critical attitudes toward the policy of their government and will tend to have great confidence in their own judgement.

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Furthermore, as the measures used to punish non-compliance will be less draconian,

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people are more likely to act on those judgements and not go to war.

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But whilst the rejection of the permissibility of participating will tend to undermine people's willingness to participate in unjust wars,

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it will also undermine their willingness to participate in just wars.

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And that's not only because they'll tend to form mistaken judgements that a just war is unjust despite institutions telling them otherwise.

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These are critical issues, but also because they'll tend to be criticised and condemned for going to war by their fellow citizens,

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some of whom will say the war is unjust, even when it's just who may also make the mistaken judgements about the admissibility of war.

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Despite these institutions, we still tend not to trust.

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So this suggests the rejection of the permissibility of participation is likely to weaken the war making capabilities of democratic and human rights

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compliant states much more profoundly than it will weaken the war making capabilities of non-democratic and human rights non-compliant states.

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This may well be that the tendency of non-democratic and human rights, non-compliant states to perpetrate unjust wars will increase in the field.

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And for the reason the left feel that they more confident about not being

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resisted by these democratic states where all citizens choose not to go to war.

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10 minutes. More than half of this war is down, but it is down.

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Okay. So given that comparative war making capabilities that matter, then we might think this is a bad effect.

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We reduce the overall number of people participating in the wars, but it's the comparative strength that matters in terms of likelihood of winning.

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And we want the unjustifiable to win. Right.

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So this creates one question for Jeff about whether this is going to increase the asymmetry between itself,

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states that and their war making capabilities. Now I want to talk about the capacities of the court and whether the Court suppose

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this is false and that we should get people to reject this policy of participation.

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Now let's think about how good the court is likely to be. We might have some doubts about the legitimacy of the court.

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So the court is not going to be sufficiently representative, and it's not just going to have any kind of democratic kind of authority.

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We just pick people who we think are good experts rather than try to get representatives of different cultures and so on.

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That might undermine the legitimacy of it.

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I think that the legitimacy might increase its effectiveness to some good reasons to try and bolster legitimacy.

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Just from a pragmatic point of view.

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I don't think that these reasons are decisive, though, because one for one thing, just courts are not intended to be binding anyway.

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And also, even if it were, we might think as long as it improves the situation over what we have at the moment,

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then that's obviously a really good thing. And the lack of legitimacy isn't faithful to the proposal.

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The question is whether this court would have the capacities that he claims for it.

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And we might think that the tendency of a decision making body to make judgements depends

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on two capacities that it might have the capacity to make good moral judgements,

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but also its capacities to evaluate a set of facts.

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And the thought that I have here is that Jeff school might be really good at developing a set of moral capacities.

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Is all of these really smart people to think about you something?

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And of course it's going to be lots of fighting and disagreement and Casper and Gerhart

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are going to try and fight for the board and other people are going to reject that. And so somebody's got to fight the other.

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Let's just suppose that somehow the people kind of get to some sort of consensus and this does really improve its moral capabilities.

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I think that's at least plausible. That might be true.

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But then it has this epistemic problem that it doesn't have very much access to facts about the effects of war and what it's going to do.

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So we think that whether the war is just going to depend on lots of facts about

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things like security and how well the state is likely to do after you've invaded,

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and whether insurgents are likely to come into the country and all this kind of security stuff.

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And so I worry that Jeff's court is is not going to be very well suited to

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gathering the kind of information that you need about the decision to go to war.

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So very often, the court is going to think to itself, well, if I knew more about the security situation,

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I had all these facts, then I'd be able to make a confident judgement about whether the war was just.

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But I don't know very much about the facts. And so it's going to be really hard.

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And we see this in national security situations, war time.

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So when courts in the United Kingdom think about whether detention without trial is justified in human rights cases,

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they often come to the conclusion that although we have some doubts about whether the security situation is sufficiently bad to justify this,

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we're going to defer to parliament because parliament just has a lot more facts about this than we do.

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And it's only under very special situations where the court's willing to say that that's an abuse of human rights here.

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And those are usually situations where that decision doesn't depend quite so, especially on the facts.

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So the courts have been very, very deferential to parliament when it comes to thinking about security situations where the information is complicated.

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There's lots and lots of rights that are in cases. And some of the information is secret forces tend to be very deferential.

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I just think that's a systematic feature.

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Of course, it's very, very hard to get courts not to be like that entrenched, that in criminal cases we go for a conviction.

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We only get the conviction if you prove beyond reasonable doubt that the person's done it.

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There's no question of declaring anyone to be innocent to the cultural background to say this person is definitely innocent.

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We just say they're not guilty.

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But if you don't have and then there's a element of innocence that might create some sort of attitude that we should have towards people.

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Once we don't convict them, we don't really declaring anyone to be truly innocent.

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We just we just couldn't prove that they were guilty. That's what we really say when we fail to convict a person.

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But just court needs to say both that a war is just all that is unjust.

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But very often who's going to say, well, well, that's just the information to tell, whether it's just one north.

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And so that seems like a worry here. That's going to be very many cases where we just say, well, the courts is going to say, we're not sure.

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And furthermore, you might get the worry that some sceptics about protect the institutionalisation of human rights,

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worry about the some sceptics about human rights, think that when you put human rights in the court,

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what they do is they tend to legitimise the actions of both of their governments by declaring what they've done human rights possible,

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even though there's good spousal suspicion that they're not the courts not sufficiently confident to say that they're not.

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And this court might have a similar kind of problem that it tends to declare some

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wars as being not clearly unjust because the court's felt confident enough.

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And that gives people grounds to say, well, actually, it's just because the court didn't say that it wasn't.

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And so it actually might turn out to play this kind of unfortunate legitimising

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function for war that many people actually want to resist through political opposition.

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So let me wrap up there. Thanks very much for that.

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Well, I've already got Henry started, a sort of stealth war hand raising before Viktor opened his mouth.

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So I've already got 13 people on the list. And it'd be nice if everyone could be as disciplined as Viktor was,

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because with 13 people and 60 Minutes, that means an average of roughly 4 minutes per person.

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So let's be let's stick to that. Henry, take it away.

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Confession. I've tried to prepare for the shock.

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I like this. And I'm sure other people are going to point out ways in which it's utopian.

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But I take you at your word that you're trying to do something practical.

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And I want to quickly give you a couple of precedents that I think you suggested.

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Maybe he's not totally hopeless and then make one constructive suggestion.

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But there have been other sort of eminent blue ribbon panels that have actually had really significant influence on the public discourse.

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There another examples. One is the Brundtland Commission, which coined the term and defined the term sustainable development.

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And now it's just impossible to talk about development without claiming it's sustainable.

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The commission that produced our two P is clearly had a major impact.

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There's now, you know, bureau at the bureau, but, you know, institute connected with the UN and so on.

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And everybody's talking about how to be another example that's actually more like your court,

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because as Victor points out, you're talking about really judging cases is Amnesty International.

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Nobody asked Amnesty International its opinion.

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It just started saying you're violating human rights. And by implication, the people are.

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It was so careful and so responsible that it got a lot of credibility now as Human Rights Watch copying it.

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You know, these haven't ended human rights abuses, but they have a lot of authority and a lot of impact.

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So just to me, one crucial strategic question is exactly what question your group would try to answer first.

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And I think the first thing you probably do agree and I think you don't want to ask about legality

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because I think the lawyers are already locked into a doctrine about basically the UN doctrine,

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and that's going to probably get the answer you don't want.

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And in any case, I think what you want to ask is, is about the last thing which was a moral and the thought is start with how to define aggression.

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Now I know that you think there are other just causes besides resistance to aggression, but the thing about aggression is the lawyers are interested.

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The ICC is immobilised until they get permission from Russia.

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And so there's a sort of ready market for it.

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And I think that the humanitarian interventions that it's actually reasonable to back and the

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very few preventive wars that it's reasonable to back can actually be construed as defensive.

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And so I think a good place to start would be there if, you know, deep in your heart you want to get other causes advance.

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I just think you should save that and and start with this.

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But that this would be a place that you would think you would answer a question that people are asking what's aggression?

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And you would still be saying, here's the moral basis for deciding which aggression.

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You would be saying it's legal. The people would find that useful.

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And there's some hope.

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I think that the sort of people you're talking about could actually make a contribution to that and would notice and pay attention.

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Well, I thank you for that. Yeah, I am concerned with morality rather than law,

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but I'm also concerned with taking a richer understanding of morality and trying to codify it in a way that we can kind

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of reduce it to a set of rules that could could be action guiding where some of the nuances would have to be left out.

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And maybe you're right that it would be prudent just to start with aggression.

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But I, I have something more ambitious here where I would really be able to judge, for example,

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whether an instance of humanitarian intervention, which looks like aggression according to traditional definitions, is actually just war chest.

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You could do that. Fine. You just sign on the right understanding of aggression.

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Do well in that. Yeah, I wouldn't want to say that because that looks like, as in gerrymandering,

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a concept in order to be able to use the approved term and I don't want to call things by

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their proper names and aggression is usually one state kind of invading another state and,

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and so on. By the way, the in August, the ICC committee or whatever did did reach agreement on a definition of aggression.

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So that that has actually happened I'm just DC Simon in the back yesterday I think maybe a finger is this a finger.

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It is just fingers are going to have to be near instantaneous.

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Yeah the the definition of aggression is a crime now in the ICC statute.

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And there are issues about when it will become effective in the ICC statute.

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But there's a criminal definition of aggression now.

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And just on that point and a little bit about the last one session, and one thing that struck me, Jeff, was now there is a crime of aggression.

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And that crime is clearly, as all crimes are ones on the statute books intended to have a deterrent effect.

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Is that not really a starting point? Rather than looking to a new judicial institution which won't have that type of deterrent effect?

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Because it's not that any sanction that the ICC does have now beyond the point that it's individual criminal responsibility for the ICC.

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But clearly that's aimed at those in power, which is the same people I think you're aiming at in the court and.

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You know, in a way, not really. That is in the more of the moral territory.

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International criminal law can cover in a reliable and effective way the better.

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But I do see international criminal law speaking mainly to leaders, you know,

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and high ranking officers and so on, people who and potential war criminals,

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you know, and so on, rather than just people who may end up fighting in unjust wars, but fighting by whatever rules are in operation at the time.

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So I really want something that speaks to to the conscience of individual combatants.

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That's the primary point. I mean, it's good if it speaks to civilian populations as well,

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and even better if it speaks to political leaders and and high ranking military officers.

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But the primary audience is individual combatants, usually.

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Yeah. Okay. I mean, it sounds pretty scary, but I'm a bit suspicious about the practicality of it.

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And since you are looking for a practical solution, for one thing, the ICJ already gives advisory decisions, so I don't think it will be unique.

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It will if it will give another one. But this kind of decision can take time to decide.

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What you want is 8.00 plus hours to allow the soldiers on each side to know whether they should contribute to the war or not.

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It doesn't happen so quickly.

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If you are thinking in terms of each state, the state and states we will come to the court will have to present their case.

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But the whole thing is something that we'll get if we do it very quickly in months.

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I mean, at the very least, if not, I mean,

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this kind of things take years sometimes after the fact in court until a decision is being made in terms of compensation and things like that.

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What you're looking for is something that will come very early. The other thing is things often change.

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So take the war that you left Iraq, your war.

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So let's say that there was weapons of mass destruction that would possibly make a difference as to whether the US should have engaged in war or not.

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So if the U.S. really believed this and at the beginning, the U.S. could produce the evidence they had for the suspicions,

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and then later on they found out that actually there isn't right. And then there is a question that comes up.

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So what you want them just to clear up? Now. So now, I mean, at which point do you stop?

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Can you stop in the middle of a war because things change?

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Can you then just say to all the American soldiers, okay, no more the war.

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Now it became clear the war is unjust. Now you all have to take your thanks for your weapons and go away.

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Leave the country. And whichever solution it is, even if there is a major attack, happened in the first few days and then the devastation is so,

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so severe that they can't just leave because it would destroy the main powers in the main government institution.

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It just seems to me like the kind of decision. It's really nice if we can have this.

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And then how do you can we try to limit the supplementary question, something that's two, two or three.

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Okay. There's a little something in the paper about each each of those problems,

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I think I say in the paper that on the on the issue of time, that there is this kind of dilemma here.

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There's a trade off that is the the the longer the deliberation, the more reliable the verdict,

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but the less effective the judgement can be in limiting the wrongs that are committed.

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The shorter the term of deliberation, the more effective the judgement can be in limiting the wrongs,

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but the more likely it is that the judgement is going to be unreliable.

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So yeah, I mean, that's just a that seems to me unavoidable problem.

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But again, the question is whether something's better than nothing.

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And so obviously when one would seek some kind of reasonable trade-off between reliability and effectiveness,

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I also mentioned the problem that the moral character of a war can actually change.

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So I think that it's just judgements would have to be revisited in the light of changed circumstances.

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What was once an and just war can become a just war and what was once a just war can become an unjust war.

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They won't be different war. So, you know, a war that continues beyond the achievement of the just cause can be unjust.

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It may well be utopian to think that a country might be persuaded by a moral judgement to abandon a war in progress.

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00:42:27,650 --> 00:42:31,340
I don't know of any examples of that, though. I don't know much about military history.

392
00:42:31,340 --> 00:42:36,710
Graham was saying here he knows, you know, you read about military history as was as a child and so on.

393
00:42:37,100 --> 00:42:42,860
But wouldn't it be wonderful if if a political leader could ever have the courage to say, you know,

394
00:42:42,860 --> 00:42:49,339
I just I just realised that this war in which we're fighting is really not morally justified anymore.

395
00:42:49,340 --> 00:42:54,170
We should just stop. I mean, I think that's what President Obama should do right now in Afghanistan.

396
00:42:54,470 --> 00:42:56,810
It's just hopeless in Afghanistan right now.

397
00:42:59,690 --> 00:43:06,649
You know, whatever the merits of the initial invasion, I think some kind of military response to Afghanistan was indeed warranted.

398
00:43:06,650 --> 00:43:14,980
But the thing has dragged on now for for for ten years. And yet it's politically impossible for a leader to say there's just no point in this anymore.

399
00:43:15,050 --> 00:43:18,590
Anymore. It's, you know, it's a bad idea. Let's stop.

400
00:43:19,490 --> 00:43:32,840
Okay. Thank you. Thank you for the existence of this course implies declaration that the voting progress was unjust and illegal.

401
00:43:33,260 --> 00:43:43,260
But the protest was amended to be very interesting and suspect because it is very fluid.

402
00:43:43,940 --> 00:43:48,379
What is the essence of the war? The warning signs accepted.

403
00:43:48,380 --> 00:43:53,570
The war was decision making primarily because of two things.

404
00:43:54,140 --> 00:43:57,380
First, there is no other way to solve the conflict.

405
00:43:57,740 --> 00:44:00,770
All other ways has been exhausted.

406
00:44:01,220 --> 00:44:06,560
And second, which is crucial, is that they do not want to leave the conflict.

407
00:44:06,560 --> 00:44:11,560
And so. So the board is directed to itself.

408
00:44:12,190 --> 00:44:17,020
This is happening before the end of the rule. So there's a different question, a.

409
00:44:18,680 --> 00:44:21,770
How would its devised function?

410
00:44:22,220 --> 00:44:25,460
There are two possibilities, it seems to me.

411
00:44:25,800 --> 00:44:34,640
First, it at the foot of its population in some presumably very bad cases,

412
00:44:34,880 --> 00:44:40,190
condemning one side, authorising innovation without intervention against that.

413
00:44:40,190 --> 00:44:49,130
So. But there is other possibility to do that at the regular routine like basis,

414
00:44:49,790 --> 00:44:58,550
in which case all divorce would be assessed and that the business of the court would be

415
00:44:58,730 --> 00:45:07,310
determining which side should be conferring rights to rent ones and condemning others to defeat.

416
00:45:07,580 --> 00:45:13,010
So it could become a kind of business of of issuing licenses to the victory.

417
00:45:16,530 --> 00:45:18,960
History licenses to the victory. Okay.

418
00:45:21,300 --> 00:45:31,520
I don't think wars are accurately characterised as two sides, having agreed that war is going to be their decision making procedure.

419
00:45:31,530 --> 00:45:37,920
That is when it's not always the case that there is some pre-existing quarrel.

420
00:45:38,460 --> 00:45:44,730
It is just the case sometimes that one side invades the other because it wants to achieve some aim.

421
00:45:46,620 --> 00:45:54,810
And in those cases, it's not true that when the war ends, that leaves the initial problem unresolved.

422
00:45:54,960 --> 00:45:59,670
In those cases, for the victim of the unjust attack.

423
00:45:59,940 --> 00:46:03,600
The problem is largely resolved by the ending of the war.

424
00:46:03,720 --> 00:46:05,820
That's and that's all that it takes.

425
00:46:07,770 --> 00:46:23,340
I do think that the problem, what you see is the problem of a court licensing victory by one side or another is something that we already have.

426
00:46:23,640 --> 00:46:32,340
It is the United the United Nations can claim that a war is being fought by one side is illegal.

427
00:46:32,700 --> 00:46:40,889
The problem there, the problem there is that nobody thinks of the UN Security Council as having any kind

428
00:46:40,890 --> 00:46:47,220
of epistemic authority with respect to the justice or even the legality of war,

429
00:46:47,370 --> 00:46:51,179
because they are so heavily full that it's such a heavily politicised body.

430
00:46:51,180 --> 00:46:57,450
It is not a deliberative and impartial, deliberative body.

431
00:46:58,080 --> 00:47:06,180
Just not for those wars. Well, because that's one of the things you don't want to forbid, just wars.

432
00:47:06,720 --> 00:47:12,840
I mean, we're all. Well, but then what happens when somebody disobeys that and you have an unjust war?

433
00:47:12,840 --> 00:47:15,960
Then you don't want to forbid the just war in response to the unjust war.

434
00:47:16,330 --> 00:47:22,440
Okay. Thank you both. So you've had a lot to say in anticipation of a lot of people.

435
00:47:23,350 --> 00:47:28,540
Getting just problems about the other stuff appears not to be the sort of thing that survives.

436
00:47:29,170 --> 00:47:34,330
I will say that I think that Jeff is taking the right tack.

437
00:47:35,600 --> 00:47:39,739
But it is often overplayed. You have to study.

438
00:47:39,740 --> 00:47:43,880
The conditions of the soldier are so utterly fixed.

439
00:47:45,430 --> 00:47:54,180
Don't think that they can overcome them. And I think the proper question is to ask what happens when we overcome the other stumbling block?

440
00:47:55,170 --> 00:48:02,309
And the other thing about the epistemic argument is I think there's actually went out there on a pretty strong case to make

441
00:48:02,310 --> 00:48:11,969
that we can't have such an epistemic wall and this sort of reasoning trying to justify why we're doing what we're doing.

442
00:48:11,970 --> 00:48:15,480
And the outcome is the sort of thing that soldiers do every day,

443
00:48:16,890 --> 00:48:24,510
regardless of what we think about their access to information is what figures in how they reconcile their actions.

444
00:48:24,510 --> 00:48:28,560
It's what figures and how they plan operations. And I think that.

445
00:48:29,800 --> 00:48:38,720
This is a nice proposal to see how we can. Maybe at least do better by giving us the sort of information we need to make these sorts of decisions.

446
00:48:41,540 --> 00:48:46,520
Some things against voters. Arguments try to limit it to a couple of.

447
00:48:46,530 --> 00:48:50,690
Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's that's going to be tough.

448
00:48:51,060 --> 00:49:02,360
Yeah. I think the idea that the rights respecting army would be somehow stopped by the removal.

449
00:49:02,720 --> 00:49:08,690
The epistemic log is wrong in that it's at least possible to conceive.

450
00:49:10,260 --> 00:49:16,830
It would lead us to a smaller set of wars so that we wouldn't exhaust ourselves over these long and intractable things.

451
00:49:17,820 --> 00:49:21,360
And then the other one is.

452
00:49:23,730 --> 00:49:29,790
What we're talking about here is more rights respecting government and U.S. soldiers to fight in these things.

453
00:49:30,390 --> 00:49:39,630
And they need real resources to come back from these sorts of campaigns without being sort of not sort of shattered.

454
00:49:39,780 --> 00:49:50,560
Broken. And the problem is that on the other side, moral equality of soldiers really turns out to be comfortable.

455
00:49:51,430 --> 00:49:57,970
And if we take ourselves to be a rights respecting regime, I think it's probably need to figure out is how we can have soldiers that fight.

456
00:50:01,490 --> 00:50:05,870
And I don't have time to lay it out. I think the writers, the future.

457
00:50:06,890 --> 00:50:14,630
Before. This is professional armies. Doo doo doo doo.

458
00:50:15,070 --> 00:50:19,630
Thank you very much. I just would defend myself.

459
00:50:22,060 --> 00:50:28,600
Give me a chance. It was like all I thought was just that it wouldn't stop.

460
00:50:28,600 --> 00:50:30,219
The Army maybe wouldn't tell the army that much,

461
00:50:30,220 --> 00:50:36,040
but it would take the army to some extent in human rights facing democracies because it was taking more physical lassitude.

462
00:50:36,050 --> 00:50:40,540
Some people would decide that the war wasn't chaos, even in that it was, in fact, just right.

463
00:50:40,950 --> 00:50:46,839
Well, I think, you know, that's right. I'm just a general sceptic about what institutions tell me.

464
00:50:46,840 --> 00:50:49,900
So I take it a lot of other people are also going to be sceptical.

465
00:50:49,910 --> 00:50:55,350
The more we give up the first greater participation we just do this US will destroy it.

466
00:50:55,390 --> 00:50:59,080
Tells you what is going to form the judgement about the war which you know,

467
00:50:59,080 --> 00:51:05,889
that's I'm just I'm just I'm I'm not just going to be less true in these other countries where people don't.

468
00:51:05,890 --> 00:51:09,070
It is critical that you send officers this question especially very seriously.

469
00:51:09,460 --> 00:51:17,480
I, I think that the point would be that it's an open question as to what's what's worse for the for the rights respect government.

470
00:51:18,270 --> 00:51:26,190
Is it a sort of slavish military that just runs it, does whatever it's told to do, the forces involved.

471
00:51:26,320 --> 00:51:31,230
It's always better to have a slavish military. So you've got the slavish military that will just do whatever we want.

472
00:51:31,470 --> 00:51:34,650
And then we know that what all the other countries have this deterrence,

473
00:51:34,650 --> 00:51:37,350
that when they know that they're going to attack us, we go to slavish military,

474
00:51:37,680 --> 00:51:44,550
which we could just get a piledriver if they think they always have these critical tubes and they're going to hit us, what else is going on?

475
00:51:45,480 --> 00:51:48,490
We can we can just test the boundaries of this. We know only people with physical assets.

476
00:51:48,490 --> 00:51:54,180
She's not going to join in it, that if they've got this suspicion that the war is not going to be just, that they're going to not join in as much.

477
00:51:54,480 --> 00:51:57,960
So we just got to test the boundaries, just invade the Falklands, the base and you know,

478
00:51:58,110 --> 00:52:01,349
and they know that all these anti Thatcher critics are going to say, well,

479
00:52:01,350 --> 00:52:05,610
we're not going to participate in the wolves during the Falklands War is just and

480
00:52:05,610 --> 00:52:08,850
we don't do the fact our government told us to go and fight as a reason to fight. So.

481
00:52:10,230 --> 00:52:12,710
So let's just let's just not fight in that case.

482
00:52:12,720 --> 00:52:18,000
I mean, the whole that was at least plausible that I might have for the Falklands War might have been justified on deterrence grounds.

483
00:52:18,840 --> 00:52:23,490
I love the fact that the author and professor of philosophy at West Point, he trained for this method.

484
00:52:25,980 --> 00:52:32,250
Can I just. Yeah, yeah. 5 seconds on this. Most of our Israelis have left limits here.

485
00:52:33,300 --> 00:52:36,750
And I think of Israelis as a counterexample to what you're saying.

486
00:52:36,750 --> 00:52:44,010
That is, you find actually more dissent within the IDF than in probably any other military organisation, at least that I know of.

487
00:52:44,370 --> 00:52:49,540
More kind of active dissent and refusal to participate in certain missions and so on.

488
00:52:49,860 --> 00:52:56,460
But nobody thinks that they can just walk over to the IDF and hiding them.

489
00:52:56,470 --> 00:52:59,970
That's my question. Oh, great.

490
00:53:00,000 --> 00:53:13,040
That's very understanding. Patrick Emmerson, as the suggestions for your for an expert panel of institutional suggests from the ICJ,

491
00:53:13,370 --> 00:53:19,290
if the human rights bodies under the ICCPR and the other human rights treaties, I think they're not binding.

492
00:53:19,290 --> 00:53:28,290
The experts make decisions. Okay. On the issue of the capacity of the court, I think it victimised the boardroom viewing party.

493
00:53:28,530 --> 00:53:35,240
I think it also raises issues about the extent to which a competent legal authority can issue moral related directives.

494
00:53:35,250 --> 00:53:41,010
I think some reference to that in the future. But ultimately, the case is going to be their litigated.

495
00:53:41,140 --> 00:53:47,910
And I think both in your paper and in this empirical findings,

496
00:53:47,910 --> 00:53:54,180
which I think justification of the notion of policies are less aggressive than non democracies,

497
00:53:54,180 --> 00:53:59,490
what I think is the fact of history and a good reason to decline people in functioning

498
00:53:59,790 --> 00:54:04,740
democracy is to mobilise people for war and why the other two countries can't.

499
00:54:05,220 --> 00:54:12,000
And in the issue of where the democracies, with respect to the judgement of this body, at least when I come from Australia,

500
00:54:12,600 --> 00:54:19,500
incredible disregard for human rights bodies and when you look like the UN against ability of those bodies.

501
00:54:19,830 --> 00:54:25,560
So there's something in the paper that gives us some thoughts.

502
00:54:26,160 --> 00:54:34,680
Okay, good. I would have argued with Victor about democracies too, but I didn't get a right of reply, which is fine.

503
00:54:34,920 --> 00:54:39,230
I'm not complaining, but I would have I would have said something in.

504
00:54:39,240 --> 00:54:48,690
Okay, Jane. I think that doing what you're describing, Jeff, would be a great thing to do.

505
00:54:48,690 --> 00:54:53,280
So this is not an argument that it's a bad thing to do. But but I do see.

506
00:54:55,140 --> 00:55:02,280
The problem I see in what you're saying is not that it's utopian, but it's sort of halfway utopian.

507
00:55:02,280 --> 00:55:11,660
And what I mean by that is that when we first see proposals for international arbitration mechanisms and stuff emerge in the late 19th century,

508
00:55:12,720 --> 00:55:18,110
it was based on the notion that the world can get more enlightened because states can get more and more in.

509
00:55:18,890 --> 00:55:26,930
And it seems as if a lot of your argument is we need an enlightened world entity because the states are absolutely hopeless.

510
00:55:27,480 --> 00:55:35,510
And it just strikes me that there's kind of a tension there between the thinking

511
00:55:35,510 --> 00:55:38,720
that there must be something about the institutions of the individual state,

512
00:55:39,230 --> 00:55:49,910
that that's going to stand in the way of letting them make make these judgements more accurately, but then setting up a world body,

513
00:55:49,910 --> 00:55:54,710
which among other things, won't work unless it has the consent of the states to deliver information.

514
00:55:55,280 --> 00:56:02,769
And I'm saying that partly because. What would you say about someone and they're not mutually exclusive?

515
00:56:02,770 --> 00:56:07,930
We said, Why don't we just work from the ground up rather than the top down?

516
00:56:09,310 --> 00:56:17,070
The United States Constitution already has features that were meant to achieve just the sorts of things you're saying that the

517
00:56:17,080 --> 00:56:23,490
mechanisms for making the decision to go to war was based on the notion that you should have much discussion as possible.

518
00:56:23,510 --> 00:56:31,360
Get all the facts on the notion of a citizens army was based on the notion that if you jack up the cost of going to war for the average person,

519
00:56:31,750 --> 00:56:38,620
they'll take it more seriously, whether they wage war. The problem, of course, is that all of these things have been forgotten about or thrown away.

520
00:56:39,730 --> 00:56:48,490
You know, they were they were there at the start. And wouldn't it be equally as realistic to people to say, let's take these Republican mechanisms,

521
00:56:48,820 --> 00:56:56,200
let's make them meaningful in the cities or in the countries where they exist, and let's try and just plant them more and more places.

522
00:56:56,800 --> 00:57:03,130
I understand that's utopian proposal too, but I think strikes me as might be equally a viable solution as the one.

523
00:57:05,410 --> 00:57:12,639
Well, I'm not sure what to say about that. It certainly seems to me that the constraints on the resort to war in the United States are

524
00:57:12,640 --> 00:57:19,180
incredibly feeble and don't actually require conformity with any kind of moral principles.

525
00:57:21,580 --> 00:57:30,580
They are that they are feeble institutional constraints that don't guarantee any kind of moral reflection on the resort to war at all,

526
00:57:30,580 --> 00:57:37,180
much less imposing any kind of institutional obligation to engage in moral reflection about the resort to war.

527
00:57:37,750 --> 00:57:39,729
And they don't mean those principles.

528
00:57:39,730 --> 00:57:49,930
They're to to which legislators or executive members can appeal in trying to determine whether or not it would be principled to go to war.

529
00:57:51,580 --> 00:58:03,130
If the question about whether or not the kind of institution I have in mind could work without the consent of states, I think is is an open one.

530
00:58:03,910 --> 00:58:16,540
It depends on what. What form it would take, if it's going to if it were to take form within some pre-existing legal institutions,

531
00:58:16,540 --> 00:58:25,179
if it were to have some official standing within international law, then it would have to be subject to the consent of states.

532
00:58:25,180 --> 00:58:29,230
And it may well be that states don't ever really want to be told.

533
00:58:29,950 --> 00:58:35,469
Right. It may be that the costs to powerful states of being told that potentially being told

534
00:58:35,470 --> 00:58:40,270
that they're fighting an unjust war would outweigh for them in a prudential calculation,

535
00:58:40,270 --> 00:58:45,510
the benefit of their adversaries being told that they were fighting an unjust war.

536
00:58:45,520 --> 00:58:52,980
So you might find at least a cabal of powerful states that would object strenuously to such a court ever existing in international law.

537
00:58:52,990 --> 00:58:57,670
Certainly, I can't imagine the Bush administration ever signing on to anything like this.

538
00:58:58,430 --> 00:59:02,530
That may be true of other powerful states as well.

539
00:59:03,790 --> 00:59:10,900
In which case the idea of getting something along these lines implemented in international law is pretty hopeless.

540
00:59:11,230 --> 00:59:22,110
So one would then have to go outside international law and pursue the kind of alternatives that Henry was suggesting, something, you know,

541
00:59:22,210 --> 00:59:28,960
that would have the kind of authority and credibility of Amnesty International or the ICRC or something like that,

542
00:59:28,960 --> 00:59:35,260
which wouldn't have any kind of particular legal authority behind its judgements.

543
00:59:37,210 --> 00:59:45,100
So there's this worry also that I would say the Americans are going to try to influence the total changes

544
00:59:45,100 --> 00:59:50,950
composition or totally that the court will try and appease the Americans because they need to get them on board.

545
00:59:50,950 --> 00:59:52,780
And we know this happens in international criminal law.

546
00:59:52,820 --> 00:59:58,570
I think a piece the Americans are not trying to hold them accountable for the things they've done because it's really important to get them on board.

547
00:59:58,570 --> 01:00:05,320
So the long term future of the institution survives to go with these kinds of problems without injury as well as the use of the drugs.

548
01:00:05,690 --> 01:00:14,490
Yeah. So part of what I wanted to say in response to Cheney is I would add the ideal here is to in a way, to have maximum distance from states.

549
01:00:14,500 --> 01:00:20,530
That's the whole point. And therefore, states are going to be unlikely to be happy about such a thing.

550
01:00:20,530 --> 01:00:30,399
But you don't you certainly this thing is not going to work if it's subject to if it's going to crumble in the face of pressures from powerful states.

551
01:00:30,400 --> 01:00:37,000
And so it's not going to work. So the whole idea is independence from states.

552
01:00:37,030 --> 01:00:47,919
This is something that this is to counteract the actions of states when they're behaving badly, which they often do.

553
01:00:47,920 --> 01:00:59,390
And they may not like that. And this is also about the idea that we'll have to worry more about the kind of how that might impact.

554
01:01:02,750 --> 01:01:05,430
And sometimes these judgements are always going to be retrospective.

555
01:01:06,410 --> 01:01:11,000
We get the evidence when we have the ruling, which is going to be based on the evidence.

556
01:01:11,000 --> 01:01:20,860
So I look to go to this is just one, but that's not necessarily going to tell soldiers anything about what they should be fighting here now.

557
01:01:22,820 --> 01:01:27,610
So I wonder why they want to kind of open the doors. The idea that the judgements are always sometimes conditional.

558
01:01:27,740 --> 01:01:31,490
They might be revised, they might think there might be another rule,

559
01:01:33,270 --> 01:01:40,340
and that's going to perhaps significantly undermine the ability to give advice a lot.

560
01:01:43,700 --> 01:01:50,690
Yeah, I, I agree that there are problems in the area you're gesturing towards.

561
01:01:51,290 --> 01:01:56,149
It's not the problem is not just that the character of a war may change over time,

562
01:01:56,150 --> 01:02:08,090
but also that even at a given time, there may be unjust dimensions to a war and some dimensions to a war.

563
01:02:08,090 --> 01:02:17,090
That is, it may well be the case that the campaign that some soldiers are fighting in is one in which it's permissible to fight so that,

564
01:02:17,960 --> 01:02:21,360
um, if, if, if this kind,

565
01:02:21,390 --> 01:02:28,040
if a body of the sort that I'm envisaging were going to be, were to do its job in,

566
01:02:28,970 --> 01:02:37,400
in a way that aligned its judgements to the greatest possible degree with the judgements of morality.

567
01:02:38,090 --> 01:02:45,520
The unit of analysis would not be a war, but might be something like, you know,

568
01:02:45,630 --> 01:02:52,760
a mission or a campaign or an aim that might get, you know, sort of like, you know, the achievement of a certain aim.

569
01:02:52,760 --> 01:02:54,499
If the court could identify a certain aim,

570
01:02:54,500 --> 01:03:01,680
they could say this aim is unjust to the extent that what soldiers are doing supports the achievement of this aim, it's wrongful.

571
01:03:02,090 --> 01:03:10,350
The other hand, if the aim is best in such, and if what they're doing reasonably supports that aim, then it may not be something like that.

572
01:03:10,370 --> 01:03:14,530
I mean, I haven't I haven't worked up on this.

573
01:03:14,610 --> 01:03:18,679
This is really complex. I mean, as you know, the morality of war is terribly complex.

574
01:03:18,680 --> 01:03:24,200
If if at least some of us are right, maybe it's relatively simple if some other people are right.

575
01:03:24,200 --> 01:03:32,300
But I think that we don't understand the morality of war terribly well yet there's lot more to be done.

576
01:03:32,660 --> 01:03:40,940
This this study is in its infancy, and the more complex the morality is and the more complex the legal judgements

577
01:03:40,940 --> 01:03:44,330
may have to be or the judgements of whatever kind of body this could be.

578
01:03:44,750 --> 01:03:48,440
And you know, what can I say?

579
01:03:48,440 --> 01:03:55,759
It's not my fault. What we we should do the best we can, you know, whatever that is,

580
01:03:55,760 --> 01:04:00,500
we should be striving to provide people with reliable guidance so that they can make

581
01:04:02,570 --> 01:04:09,770
decisions about matters of extreme importance with that kind of maximal reliability.

582
01:04:09,950 --> 01:04:13,969
And I think that's, you know, a point that I haven't made and I probably don't make in the paper is that I think

583
01:04:13,970 --> 01:04:17,360
this is something that that and this is a point that I think Cheney would make.

584
01:04:17,810 --> 01:04:24,200
Um, I think I'm speaking for Cheney here. We owe it to the combatants themselves to provide them with this kind of guidance.

585
01:04:24,200 --> 01:04:28,069
It's not just for the sake of the victims of unjust wars,

586
01:04:28,070 --> 01:04:33,950
but it's also if we are going to be asking people or commanding people to go out and kill other people on our behalf,

587
01:04:34,190 --> 01:04:40,459
we owe it to them to ensure that they've got the kind of moral tools that they need to be able to determine

588
01:04:40,460 --> 01:04:45,350
whether what we're demanding that they do for us is actually something that they're permitted to do.

589
01:04:45,770 --> 01:04:49,040
Thank you. As you've noticed, we're not taking fingers now.

590
01:04:50,150 --> 01:04:59,810
So. Massimo okay. Just a brief, but mostly just about cases where the war is already taking place is about to take place,

591
01:05:00,050 --> 01:05:04,220
and the court declares that the war is just unjust, that people should act accordingly.

592
01:05:05,180 --> 01:05:08,840
The court also issued opinion when no war is taking place.

593
01:05:09,400 --> 01:05:14,090
Yeah, you know, but but there is a justification for the war.

594
01:05:14,090 --> 01:05:18,080
And so the court should encourage someone to intervene and to fight the war.

595
01:05:18,740 --> 01:05:26,160
Of course, it sounds reasonable. Well, I haven't I actually wasn't expecting your final sentence here to there.

596
01:05:26,180 --> 01:05:35,660
I mean, I do think that there are occasions in which we can foresee a war coming.

597
01:05:35,710 --> 01:05:40,250
Like, I think every body knew that the war could see that the war in Iraq was coming.

598
01:05:43,760 --> 01:05:51,020
The Bush people were making noises about it before they became Bush people back in the early 1990s.

599
01:05:51,020 --> 01:05:54,210
They were, you know, and this went on through the 1997.

600
01:05:54,860 --> 01:06:02,270
And we noticed that all these vociferous advocates of war against Iraq found positions in the Bush administration and so on and so forth.

601
01:06:02,740 --> 01:06:07,729
So one knew for a long time that this was probably going to happen and the

602
01:06:07,730 --> 01:06:14,750
United States was building its case in the media prior prior to going to war.

603
01:06:16,130 --> 01:06:20,950
In those conditions, I think the court could pronounce in advance.

604
01:06:20,960 --> 01:06:24,050
So far, we see no case no, no.

605
01:06:24,050 --> 01:06:32,240
Just cause for intervention, whether it could make judgements of the other sort.

606
01:06:32,810 --> 01:06:36,830
There is a case for war against such and such a country.

607
01:06:36,890 --> 01:06:41,490
I don't know. I haven't considered that. See, Simon shaking his head back.

608
01:06:41,490 --> 01:06:45,530
The. Think, Rhonda, maybe the other kids as well. Yeah, I do.

609
01:06:45,530 --> 01:06:51,139
And I do. That was that was the case I had in mind when you when you when you mentioned this.

610
01:06:51,140 --> 01:07:00,080
And I wanted to say, I just don't know whether this is this is an appropriate function of a recall of the kind of body that I have in mind to say,

611
01:07:00,290 --> 01:07:05,420
hey, anybody wants to go to war over here or that got our permission.

612
01:07:06,710 --> 01:07:16,700
But I do think it would have been nice if somebody had said one should go help the the Tutsi in Rwanda.

613
01:07:18,470 --> 01:07:26,090
Okay, you, Nina. And I wonder what the essence of this overwhelming intuition of everyone is, that this is unrealistic or utopian.

614
01:07:26,090 --> 01:07:31,160
And I think you said it yourself, is that what you need is the maximum possible distance to stay are two states,

615
01:07:31,610 --> 01:07:36,890
but at the same time you ground is an international law which obviously so obviously is constructed around states and stated.

616
01:07:37,190 --> 01:07:43,540
So let me just make like two points for why you should drop the law and with Henry on the point and make this about morality,

617
01:07:43,550 --> 01:07:47,810
I mean, what is the fact that you can't get around states in international law?

618
01:07:47,810 --> 01:07:55,070
Basically, what you would want is a system that we don't have because international law is formulated in a way that you can argue both sides,

619
01:07:55,070 --> 01:08:00,740
and that's deliberate. That's even for something as basic as what does it mean to have an inherent right to self-defence.

620
01:08:00,740 --> 01:08:09,920
I mean, there are these three different theories about it. The ICJ case in point, which hardly ever comes to an opinion and mostly has significance.

621
01:08:11,140 --> 01:08:16,080
Amount of judges on both sides. Mm hmm. So you would want a different kind of international.

622
01:08:16,180 --> 01:08:21,670
Well, you say that, but, you know, it's. But as long as we have states, it's unlikely that you'll get it.

623
01:08:22,030 --> 01:08:26,110
And the other part is the about the mandating system of international organisations.

624
01:08:26,130 --> 01:08:27,940
And there's a variety of differences,

625
01:08:27,940 --> 01:08:37,890
but for for the kinds of court authorities with epistemic purposes like Human Rights Commission, which is you have options, right?

626
01:08:38,380 --> 01:08:43,210
Either the state often with the with the treaty or on hoc basis for different cases.

627
01:08:43,630 --> 01:08:51,610
I mean this is the fate of these organisations tells you that the states don't wish to have that kind of authority telling them what they are doing.

628
01:08:51,970 --> 01:08:56,230
So that's a sort of, I think, the essence of why this is unrealistic.

629
01:08:56,240 --> 01:08:59,770
And the other point that it doesn't have to do primarily with states,

630
01:08:59,770 --> 01:09:05,320
but you want to address the individual and you want to tell the individual ultimately what you're doing is immoral.

631
01:09:07,190 --> 01:09:13,870
So the pool argument has. But why don't you create, like, a cognitive action if you don't tell them what you're doing?

632
01:09:14,990 --> 01:09:18,110
But we're not going to punish you for it, because under international law,

633
01:09:18,710 --> 01:09:26,240
there's no way it would be much more likely to actually reach the individual if you told them what you're doing is immoral.

634
01:09:26,240 --> 01:09:31,680
And that's why you shouldn't be doing it if you're ultimately under don't have any legal sanctions at hand anyway.

635
01:09:33,840 --> 01:09:43,110
Yeah, I think that was the point. So basically, just like the coin, you know, like I and what do you know about this?

636
01:09:43,570 --> 01:09:48,209
We as teachers of international and most closely to what you're actually describing a

637
01:09:48,210 --> 01:09:52,470
bunch of international law teachers in the UK saying before the board actually started,

638
01:09:52,470 --> 01:09:58,050
if the Iraq war is illegal, they had all these problems about you could argue the other side didn't care.

639
01:09:58,620 --> 01:10:04,320
But I think if they had been a bunch of moral philosophers, having said this war is unjust,

640
01:10:04,560 --> 01:10:13,049
everyone would listen to the signs closer to the final authority.

641
01:10:13,050 --> 01:10:32,940
A bunch of lawyers are a bunch of philosophers. If you go out with a joke, you realise that there's probably some some variations in culture here.

642
01:10:34,060 --> 01:10:40,390
If you want to find in the United States the most derided class of individuals,

643
01:10:40,720 --> 01:10:48,070
it's probably philosophers who maximally distant from divine authority United States and

644
01:10:48,100 --> 01:10:52,150
philosophers are taken more seriously in Britain than they are in the United States.

645
01:10:53,280 --> 01:11:05,550
Um, so actually I do I do think that lawyers have a whole lot more authority in with with ordinary people than than philosophers do.

646
01:11:10,030 --> 01:11:16,110
I've been taking notes on what you. On what you've said. I.

647
01:11:16,960 --> 01:11:20,650
I don't. I take all of this as helpful advice,

648
01:11:20,650 --> 01:11:24,580
and I don't really have anything to say in response except to the to the last

649
01:11:24,580 --> 01:11:29,260
point about what's the point of telling somebody that what he's doing is illegal,

650
01:11:29,270 --> 01:11:30,710
but we're not going to punish him for it.

651
01:11:30,730 --> 01:11:39,070
I mean, I do think that there's you know, there are areas of the law in which that's precisely what we say to people.

652
01:11:39,610 --> 01:11:45,999
And in some of those areas of law, we say that we're not going to punish you,

653
01:11:46,000 --> 01:11:50,970
but we're going to we're going to force you to do certain things so you pay compensation or whatever.

654
01:11:51,050 --> 01:11:59,560
I'm not judging that you're wrong, but it seems to me that legal institutions do have a certain kind of moral authority.

655
01:11:59,560 --> 01:12:04,690
And so to say to somebody, we've modelled our law on morality and what you're doing is illegal,

656
01:12:04,690 --> 01:12:09,820
but there are these contingent, pragmatic reasons why we're not criminalising it.

657
01:12:10,210 --> 01:12:12,250
And that can be quite explicit.

658
01:12:12,250 --> 01:12:19,600
We can say what you're doing and fighting in an unjust war is actually illegal use that applies to you as an individual.

659
01:12:20,380 --> 01:12:26,170
It does. It doesn't it doesn't make your action criminal, but it makes it illegal.

660
01:12:26,350 --> 01:12:33,040
And the law is based on moral norms that can, I think, be quite effective.

661
01:12:33,570 --> 01:12:42,100
So just on the credibility point of the detention of the courts, the interface between distancing itself from the states,

662
01:12:42,250 --> 01:12:48,640
two states to avoid being corrupt, but aligning as some of the states in order to improve its credibility.

663
01:12:48,850 --> 01:12:53,620
People trust their states. They think we're going to improve our credibility if we can also get the consent of

664
01:12:53,620 --> 01:12:57,549
states and get the states to think that we're an authoritative body set in the courts,

665
01:12:57,550 --> 01:13:02,440
going to be in such a pure position as you want it to be, it's inevitably going to have this tension.

666
01:13:04,360 --> 01:13:10,180
JS Okay, I'm a bit puzzled why you've rejected the Security Council completely out of hand.

667
01:13:10,900 --> 01:13:18,790
My reasoning is that in the paper you said that you're concerned with improving this current situation rather than trying to complete I don't know.

668
01:13:19,480 --> 01:13:23,000
I take them for what you say about kind of your ideal court.

669
01:13:23,140 --> 01:13:30,450
Yeah, I'm clearly better with the Security Council, right? I think the Security Council would at least be better than the current situation we face.

670
01:13:30,490 --> 01:13:36,819
So there's a number of reasons why we might think that some one that's going to be having the Security Council make rulings on which more

671
01:13:36,820 --> 01:13:43,170
than just an unjust what's going to likely to be efficacious in terms of the states are more likely to listen competence of all sides.

672
01:13:43,180 --> 01:13:51,190
So this listen the the rule is less likely to be discredited by states of now we both also think

673
01:13:51,610 --> 01:13:55,540
about the Security Council although of course it's often said isn't this full of partiality,

674
01:13:55,540 --> 01:13:58,569
but it does have a degree of impartiality,

675
01:13:58,570 --> 01:14:06,160
there is sort of some sense which is slightly impartial and doesn't mind which idea wins the war in that case.

676
01:14:07,540 --> 01:14:11,570
I mean, it's less of a liability. Well how many.

677
01:14:11,620 --> 01:14:15,969
Yeah. Have you. Very, very how many how many how many unjust wars have the Security Council actually authorised?

678
01:14:15,970 --> 01:14:19,440
Well, I don't I can't really recall that many other forces.

679
01:14:20,380 --> 01:14:24,940
So I think that's I'm a bit unsure why you've rejected it as a kind of an improvement on the current situation.

680
01:14:25,600 --> 01:14:38,299
Well. But the main reason is that the representatives to the Security Council are agents of states,

681
01:14:38,300 --> 01:14:47,960
their representatives of states, they have no particular credibility or authority as impartial thinkers about law and so on.

682
01:14:49,900 --> 01:15:01,729
And remember, the function of the court is to say not only which wars are unjust, but also which wars are just.

683
01:15:01,730 --> 01:15:10,940
And one of the problems of the Security Council is that it will it will often veto the law.

684
01:15:12,590 --> 01:15:19,489
One of the permanent members will, if it were to have this function, would veto justified wars,

685
01:15:19,490 --> 01:15:23,990
let's say, if humanitarian intervention against itself or against an ally or or whatever.

686
01:15:23,990 --> 01:15:29,959
I mean, the United States advertised the war in Iraq as a humanitarian intervention in the late stages when

687
01:15:29,960 --> 01:15:33,920
the claims about weapons of mass destruction and preventive war and so on were wearing a bit thin.

688
01:15:34,340 --> 01:15:40,250
It resorted to a campaign to say that this was, you know, Iraqi freedom and so on and so forth.

689
01:15:40,790 --> 01:15:45,320
So it presented it as a as a humanitarian intervention. If somebody had said in the Security Council.

690
01:15:46,420 --> 01:15:49,730
This isn't a humanitarian intervention. This is an unjust war.

691
01:15:49,750 --> 01:15:51,910
And the United States will just veto that.

692
01:15:52,480 --> 01:16:00,460
And maybe you have it had a mind of an understanding of a reformed Security Council where permanent members don't exercise a veto.

693
01:16:00,500 --> 01:16:03,760
So I just don't know. But as it is now, I think it's pretty hopeless.

694
01:16:04,780 --> 01:16:08,290
Okay, so think about actual scenario.

695
01:16:08,950 --> 01:16:13,120
Germany and Russia invade Poland. The body.

696
01:16:13,390 --> 01:16:22,780
That year they implemented decrees that both thought both wars are the will of both Germany and Russia is unjust.

697
01:16:23,140 --> 01:16:27,910
So the Russian army starts having revolts, people deserting and so on.

698
01:16:27,910 --> 01:16:36,729
So then Germany invades Russia. Now the Russian army at this point is revolting, deserted and so on.

699
01:16:36,730 --> 01:16:43,900
So it's far less able to withstand the justified war, which is issue decreed as justified by there,

700
01:16:43,930 --> 01:16:49,960
by that body, as just is far less able to withstand that war at that moment.

701
01:16:50,470 --> 01:16:55,600
Just one point about the IDF that you mentioned earlier. The reason that the IDF is very,

702
01:16:55,600 --> 01:17:07,270
very permissive on questions of disobedience and refusal is that the amount of refusal is the level of use which is much higher than most armies,

703
01:17:07,420 --> 01:17:12,040
is still so low that it never affected the idea of the ability to carry out its missions.

704
01:17:12,730 --> 01:17:17,110
And what I think you have in mind is a body which will bring exactly that effect.

705
01:17:17,470 --> 01:17:23,980
It will prevent unjust war by by making soldiers on the unjust side unwilling to participate.

706
01:17:24,380 --> 01:17:36,460
So. Well, I think a lot depends on what happens to Soviet soldiers who refused to fight in Poland.

707
01:17:37,030 --> 01:17:47,650
If they just wander off back to their homes in Siberia and the Red Army kind of dissolves as a result of the ruling.

708
01:17:48,220 --> 01:17:51,430
Then your scenario is very worrisome.

709
01:17:52,060 --> 01:18:03,580
On the other hand, if states were to respond to the possibility that it was now an international institution that might judge their war to be unjust,

710
01:18:03,580 --> 01:18:10,360
with these the possible consequences that some combatants or soldiers would refuse to fight,

711
01:18:10,810 --> 01:18:20,889
then they could adjust the nature of their institution in advance to take account of this stance and perhaps have some provisions for conscientious

712
01:18:20,890 --> 01:18:27,640
objection that would that would allow their soldiers to remain soldiers and

713
01:18:27,910 --> 01:18:33,920
poised and ready to fight the Nazis if they were refusing to fight in Poland.

714
01:18:33,940 --> 01:18:39,249
I mean, I see what you're saying, but I don't see it as a kind of insuperable objection to the idea.

715
01:18:39,250 --> 01:18:39,399
I mean,

716
01:18:39,400 --> 01:18:52,059
I do take it that the idea that it would be an appropriate response to the existence of a body of the sort that I'm envisaging here for states,

717
01:18:52,060 --> 01:19:04,570
then to respond by making more kind of liberal or generous provisions for conscientious objection,

718
01:19:04,570 --> 01:19:10,809
retaining people within the military, within the military, and providing exemptions from certain missions.

719
01:19:10,810 --> 01:19:14,620
And so. DAVIES Yes.

720
01:19:14,680 --> 01:19:21,670
I mean, I think this is terrific and actually really, really employees and they're really committed to the paper.

721
01:19:22,210 --> 01:19:29,200
So if it comes to the he said at the beginning that what we need to start off with is a kind of thoroughgoing reconstruction of who said that.

722
01:19:29,200 --> 01:19:31,060
And clearly that will have to happen.

723
01:19:31,630 --> 01:19:37,360
But I wonder whether that's something needs to happen right at the outset, because one of the things about the reconstruction,

724
01:19:37,360 --> 01:19:41,559
you said this is going to depend on the development of the union of the authority.

725
01:19:41,560 --> 01:19:45,790
Right. Because one of the reasons why it is so crude is because the authority doesn't exist.

726
01:19:46,000 --> 01:19:51,910
Right? If this authoritative body gets stronger, you know, the stronger authority, the more sophisticated the building can be.

727
01:19:51,940 --> 01:19:56,469
So I think at the very least, they have to have kind of a parallel processes.

728
01:19:56,470 --> 01:20:01,080
And I wonder actually whether at the outset it shouldn't just simply use the existing international law.

729
01:20:01,080 --> 01:20:06,760
I'm kind of I'm not sure about that. But the second thing was on consent, so you say it rightly,

730
01:20:06,760 --> 01:20:11,740
I think that one source of consent for this country, one source of legitimacy for this body would be consent.

731
01:20:12,130 --> 01:20:16,780
But then you talk about that consent, intensive consent of states, which I just I don't think you really need.

732
01:20:16,780 --> 01:20:20,049
And it seems to me in a way you're envisaging it. That can be consent.

733
01:20:20,050 --> 01:20:24,490
You really want to go after is is individuals. I mean, you talk about soldiers.

734
01:20:24,490 --> 01:20:30,160
I think that that's one important group here. But the great thing about technology is actually you can cut the state out completely.

735
01:20:30,640 --> 01:20:35,860
You can use the other. You can literally go you know, you can set up a website, our soldiers, to sign up,

736
01:20:35,860 --> 01:20:41,230
make a commitment, say they'll only fields and an operation that's been endorsed by this body.

737
01:20:41,260 --> 01:20:46,389
Right. You can talk to them directly and you can even you can even go to the you can go to the armies.

738
01:20:46,390 --> 01:20:49,900
Right. Say, okay, US Army, you're having problems recruiting people.

739
01:20:50,200 --> 01:20:55,929
Well, how about we together do a recruiting drive whereby your new recruits will have a specific contract

740
01:20:55,930 --> 01:21:01,299
that says they only will be used in operations that are that are legitimised by this authority.

741
01:21:01,300 --> 01:21:05,440
Right. So there's an upside for the Army. And maybe they have different rights to these to the to the regular army.

742
01:21:06,010 --> 01:21:12,240
Now, that may not fly, but it's a conversation that you can have, which is about his sentencing.

743
01:21:12,430 --> 01:21:16,190
Right. So you say, Chris, Casey's got a finger there. You should probably take it.

744
01:21:16,190 --> 01:21:19,690
You say you have the bigger question.

745
01:21:20,110 --> 01:21:23,320
You say, well, even in cases of certainty, the court would be giving a kind of guidance.

746
01:21:23,710 --> 01:21:28,290
And you said in case of uncertainty, soldiers might regard themselves as being permitted to to take that.

747
01:21:28,300 --> 01:21:30,940
And I'm not sure that is the right conclusion to draw.

748
01:21:31,510 --> 01:21:38,290
And I wonder even whether the operational rules of the court shouldn't be something that I think would only make true kinds of determination.

749
01:21:38,680 --> 01:21:45,610
It would either determine that a war was clearly justified or would determine that it was unable to reach that conclusion,

750
01:21:45,610 --> 01:21:50,919
that it was clearly justified. So that would have a number of consequences. I mean, this is limited to one or two of those consequences.

751
01:21:50,920 --> 01:21:57,040
And it wouldn't it would stop the court feeling it was in a position that it always

752
01:21:57,040 --> 01:22:03,129
had to give and decision and very ambiguous circumstances which would kind of,

753
01:22:03,130 --> 01:22:07,180
I think, would problematise and undermine the legitimacy of those decisions,

754
01:22:07,180 --> 01:22:13,329
because it would only make a decision when the situation was really clear. It would also provide an incentive for states to come to the court.

755
01:22:13,330 --> 01:22:20,620
Right. Because there's an upside for them. They can get, you know, the assessment or the list is that they'll get you know, we couldn't tell.

756
01:22:20,950 --> 01:22:28,630
And then what I would want to do is say to the soldiers, you know, as a matter of morality, unless the court says, tick, you shouldn't be going.

757
01:22:29,290 --> 01:22:31,269
Okay, that's excellent. Thank you very much for that.

758
01:22:31,270 --> 01:22:40,650
If you had a chance to drop me an email, too, to help me get all of it, and the one the one comment I have is just that,

759
01:22:41,050 --> 01:22:51,400
that your two possible determinations would make it the case that this court would be operating on the reverse, a presumption from criminal courts.

760
01:22:52,060 --> 01:22:59,140
That is, you'd be operating on the presumption of guilt rather than the presumption of innocence, which may be the right thing.

761
01:22:59,170 --> 01:23:03,249
It Sir Chris and I had to figure on that.

762
01:23:03,250 --> 01:23:07,480
I've got you at the bottom of the list for four speakers, so you'll have a word and you have your say at the moment.

763
01:23:08,860 --> 01:23:19,030
That been nice to submit. Thank you. We've been talking about systemic problems and people have been using the word facts that define problem.

764
01:23:19,030 --> 01:23:26,859
But it isn't. It's as much about probabilities. And Donald Rumsfeld took a lot of stick for the business about.

765
01:23:26,860 --> 01:23:34,719
No, no, no, no, no. But I mean, I think that's actually a very accurate assessment of the decision making in which people work.

766
01:23:34,720 --> 01:23:39,670
And I think given that that's the case, the next question that raises is,

767
01:23:40,030 --> 01:23:45,860
in a retrospective democracy, why should a body with a judicial representation to talk?

768
01:23:46,530 --> 01:23:56,309
How would you describe it? You give it in the last word on this, rather than the democratically chosen and some of the things Cheney with.

769
01:23:56,310 --> 01:24:03,060
With that, we need to go back to the Republican notion of responsible, accountable government,

770
01:24:04,200 --> 01:24:08,279
which in this context specifically means removing the elements of secrecy.

771
01:24:08,280 --> 01:24:14,579
And what we need is exactly we talked about deference to the legislature or it isn't such a cohesive executive,

772
01:24:14,580 --> 01:24:19,950
and we take lines from our values and what we need,

773
01:24:19,950 --> 01:24:29,729
I think, or mechanisms to make sure that the debate is open to the soldier, to the citizen on the basis of knowing full information to facts.

774
01:24:29,730 --> 01:24:37,500
But what are the factors borne in mind by the decision maker where actually, I think to get the kind of responses you want,

775
01:24:38,130 --> 01:24:44,860
it would be much more fruitful to look at domestic institutions and Republican honesty rather than international norms,

776
01:24:44,910 --> 01:24:50,640
rather than simply getting states to agree to do something at a much different.

777
01:24:53,250 --> 01:25:02,100
Okay. I agree with you that the idea of getting states to agree is probably implausible, but I don't agree with you that.

778
01:25:05,470 --> 01:25:17,500
Democratic deliberation within a large body of people is a very good way of arriving at the understanding of any moral issue,

779
01:25:18,040 --> 01:25:27,550
no matter how long you carry out debates about some complicated and difficult moral issue in a democratic country.

780
01:25:27,910 --> 01:25:38,470
You're going to be dealing with large numbers of people with rather little understanding of things, full of kind of prejudices and and so on.

781
01:25:39,010 --> 01:25:42,140
And if you if you're looking to kind of majoritarian decisions,

782
01:25:42,190 --> 01:25:50,770
I find that a really unpromising way of arriving at something approximating moral truth.

783
01:25:52,000 --> 01:25:58,299
Thank you. And we've got three more question is were Andrew and Chris, 5 minutes left.

784
01:25:58,300 --> 01:26:03,220
So, you know, I think maybe the court should make three different possible determinations.

785
01:26:03,220 --> 01:26:06,730
First, it could say there is no war to be fought whatsoever.

786
01:26:07,660 --> 01:26:11,319
Second, it could say this war that you're fighting is completely all right.

787
01:26:11,320 --> 01:26:15,399
But what is important for me is the third possibility that they say, well,

788
01:26:15,400 --> 01:26:22,090
this war that is currently being fought is unjust because Vietnam is not only trying to save the Cambodians,

789
01:26:22,090 --> 01:26:26,919
but also to to get the garbage dump at the Vietnamese border.

790
01:26:26,920 --> 01:26:31,150
And that is an unjust goal. So strictly speaking, that is an unjustified war.

791
01:26:31,360 --> 01:26:39,340
But if soldiers would not participate in that war, the the alternative would be that 1 million Cambodians would die.

792
01:26:39,550 --> 01:26:46,240
So we the courts say that this is an unjust war and we will hold the state leaders accountable for the unjust aims.

793
01:26:46,420 --> 01:26:50,280
However, we will permit the soldiers to participate in the war.

794
01:26:50,290 --> 01:26:53,979
In fact, we even endorse the participation. Yeah, yes.

795
01:26:53,980 --> 01:26:55,000
I can say just quickly,

796
01:26:55,000 --> 01:27:04,450
I think that that coincides with what I was saying in response to an earlier point about the unit of evaluation not being the war as a whole,

797
01:27:04,450 --> 01:27:15,700
but aims or missions or whatever. So what the court could say is the aim of of capturing the sum bit of Cambodian territory is an unjust aim.

798
01:27:15,700 --> 01:27:23,170
But the aim of rescuing Cambodians from Pol Pot or something is it is adjusting and that can legitimately be pursued.

799
01:27:24,310 --> 01:27:31,630
And I think you have what I think to suggest, but.

800
01:27:34,070 --> 01:27:39,670
The paper is a fun authority as you anticipate something just.

801
01:27:41,010 --> 01:27:45,000
Ability of participation, you know? More five.

802
01:27:46,240 --> 01:27:54,110
The participants will continue to do so. So then.

803
01:27:55,720 --> 01:27:59,620
It was one of the standard ways of just covering.

804
01:28:00,410 --> 01:28:03,570
It's to say that. A better.

805
01:28:09,210 --> 01:28:14,450
I'm treating him as a. Rather than on their own.

806
01:28:16,640 --> 01:28:26,330
So my first advice to. To suggest there were two ways in which you can understand your proposal within this.

807
01:28:28,140 --> 01:28:34,740
He could be counter posing an alternative authority to the authority of the state.

808
01:28:35,740 --> 01:28:42,090
Let me say that. Participants have a duty to obey rather than.

809
01:28:45,830 --> 01:28:50,230
People have raised problems. Cold.

810
01:28:53,200 --> 01:28:57,110
This is another way that you can.

811
01:28:58,020 --> 01:29:02,030
Make the argument. Is that what we.

812
01:29:02,770 --> 01:29:15,780
Which is just to say that the court might show is that the participants would have a role acting on their own judgement that involves deferring.

813
01:29:17,460 --> 01:29:22,650
It's appalling. It's the case that I look back at my own government's track record.

814
01:29:23,810 --> 01:29:27,950
And I as nearly always fun and games.

815
01:29:28,960 --> 01:29:34,060
Or at least. My government has a lower than 50% chance of being blocked.

816
01:29:37,990 --> 01:29:42,700
If the court might be better off tossing a colony back.

817
01:29:45,190 --> 01:29:50,180
That's the me that might then have enough just to undermine, you know, authority.

818
01:29:51,880 --> 01:29:55,840
Show that I'd be better off acting on my own judgement, or at least tossing.

819
01:29:57,270 --> 01:30:02,520
So that that might be a way you could respond some just by saying you're trying

820
01:30:02,520 --> 01:30:08,160
to undermine the authority of the state rather than creating alternative.

821
01:30:09,920 --> 01:30:15,070
The second observation I have is that this is.

822
01:30:20,540 --> 01:30:24,870
In the meantime, you can say a little bit more about what your views.

823
01:30:26,100 --> 01:30:37,240
Oh. I'm an instrumentalist. But the problem is so I think this authority is that as a servant to enable us to conform.

824
01:30:38,290 --> 01:30:43,210
The reasons that already apply to us. Much of a minority.

825
01:30:45,290 --> 01:30:53,870
Most philosophers or some other Democrats think that there are reasons to accept.

826
01:30:59,570 --> 01:31:06,020
So I think it would be helpful for you to respond to that kind of position.

827
01:31:07,190 --> 01:31:14,890
This. Only one of you is robust so that you might do that.

828
01:31:14,920 --> 01:31:18,990
I would say that the authority of democracy has to be implemented.

829
01:31:19,660 --> 01:31:22,930
There is. Such a magnificent.

830
01:31:24,170 --> 01:31:27,710
We need something akin to an institution judicial.

831
01:31:29,060 --> 01:31:35,470
Which is a. Something like because as you said.

832
01:31:36,170 --> 01:31:45,000
The matches are not very good and no reason is independent from the other side to stop you then.

833
01:31:46,430 --> 01:31:49,730
Okay. You can make some chances and do so.

834
01:31:49,760 --> 01:31:54,460
I have to stop you there. Thank you. I have to go before you reply to that and have a last word.

835
01:31:54,470 --> 01:31:57,799
Let's just get away from Chris. Right. I'll be brief.

836
01:31:57,800 --> 01:32:00,230
I'll make you two statements that I can argue about afterwards.

837
01:32:01,280 --> 01:32:06,950
The first one is that when David gave his proposal, it sounded a little bit crazy, right?

838
01:32:07,010 --> 01:32:10,370
But it isn't. And we're actually looking at things similar to that,

839
01:32:10,370 --> 01:32:14,509
or at least something along the lines of what David was talking about, at least in the past blogs,

840
01:32:14,510 --> 01:32:21,950
or at least think about the second one being that somewhat counterintuitive way of answering

841
01:32:21,950 --> 01:32:26,870
Janie's problem about going back to the Constitution and the things we already have.

842
01:32:26,870 --> 01:32:29,180
And answer the question is,

843
01:32:30,170 --> 01:32:38,420
Bob and I have proposed at one point that a properly construed professional army in a liberal democracy would be a check on power,

844
01:32:39,140 --> 01:32:44,030
provide a check on power when the executive branch sort of overruns its.

845
01:32:45,040 --> 01:32:49,490
Constitutional. And we did not get put in shackles.

846
01:32:50,270 --> 01:32:57,020
So that is at least enough so I can argue about those.

847
01:32:57,440 --> 01:33:04,760
Great. I would like to I'd like to hear more about your your eat your proposal and more about David's.

848
01:33:05,240 --> 01:33:08,760
I don't think I have anything much to say by way of wrapping up. I,

849
01:33:10,790 --> 01:33:16,489
I would want to pursue both of the aims that you're suggesting that is both undermining

850
01:33:16,490 --> 01:33:23,240
people's confidence in the authority of the pronouncements of their own state,

851
01:33:23,240 --> 01:33:28,370
but also trying to provide them with an alternative, more reliable source of guidance.

852
01:33:29,840 --> 01:33:37,100
So I don't think it's either or. And in fact, as you imply,

853
01:33:37,100 --> 01:33:41,809
I think counter posing an alternative authority in itself does something to undermine

854
01:33:41,810 --> 01:33:45,290
and undermine the authority of the state if there's kind of persistent disagreement.

855
01:33:45,920 --> 01:33:51,350
And I thank you also for just calling my attention to the fact that I probably should say more about the nature of authority.

856
01:33:52,310 --> 01:33:59,750
It will please you to know that although I haven't thought about this very deeply, all of my instincts are instrumentalist about authority.

857
01:33:59,750 --> 01:34:03,710
So I think I'm in agreement with you there. I'm a little distressed to learn that this is a minority position.

858
01:34:05,050 --> 01:34:08,320
It's my. It's my position. Yeah. Okay.

859
01:34:08,340 --> 01:34:10,640
Thank you. And just one quick last word as well.

860
01:34:10,700 --> 01:34:14,810
Just to bolster Armitage's thoughts about democracy, you might be concessionary to the democracy people.

861
01:34:15,110 --> 01:34:20,060
You say, even if it's true, that democracy is important for authority in domestic matters,

862
01:34:20,360 --> 01:34:24,230
when it comes to matters where the rights are engaged across states,

863
01:34:24,470 --> 01:34:31,010
then we should be less confident about the legitimacy of democratic decision making because the interests of the people

864
01:34:31,280 --> 01:34:36,740
who are most affected in the war from the other country aren't going to be engaged in the decision making process,

865
01:34:37,160 --> 01:34:45,410
you know? You know, if I'm an instrumentalist, you can say I'm not being neutral about whether I mean, this is about national democracy and authority.

866
01:34:45,830 --> 01:34:49,730
But internationally, this isn't a runner. Good.

867
01:34:50,000 --> 01:34:54,980
I agree with that, too. Thanks for all this very helpful discussion.

868
01:34:55,280 --> 01:34:56,180
Thanks so much.