1 00:00:01,710 --> 00:00:09,780 In the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Considerable academic attention has already been focussed on preventive war and 2 00:00:09,780 --> 00:00:15,180 Michael Walters classic account of anticipation already appears injustice, 3 00:00:15,360 --> 00:00:23,159 unjust wars. I think the recent sanctions on Iran and the debate over its nuclear program suggest the usefulness of a 4 00:00:23,160 --> 00:00:31,710 forward looking perspective on preventive war rather than a retroactive perspective that was offered so far, 5 00:00:32,280 --> 00:00:34,020 primarily with reference to Iraq. 6 00:00:34,820 --> 00:00:43,920 I'm going to focus here on the contemporary literature and just war theory, much of which I would say opposes early military strikes. 7 00:00:44,130 --> 00:00:49,890 And I'm going to suggest that it actually contains the resources to support an early Israeli strike on Iran. 8 00:00:51,210 --> 00:00:59,010 Ultimately, I'll propose that Iran is a legitimate candidate for early military action designed to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons. 9 00:01:00,000 --> 00:01:03,420 I agree that in principle, under certain conditions and when the time is right, 10 00:01:04,020 --> 00:01:10,470 a unilateral Israeli strike on Iran would be justifiable, both morally and legally as self-defence. 11 00:01:11,670 --> 00:01:15,329 First, what are we talking about as an issue? 12 00:01:15,330 --> 00:01:24,150 And David wrote in, pointed out in the introduction to their collection and pre-emption, the terminology of this discussion is significant. 13 00:01:25,110 --> 00:01:31,830 Pre-emptive war aims to avert an imminent harm. Preventive war aims to avert the harm that its temporally distant. 14 00:01:32,790 --> 00:01:36,750 Preventive war is widely condemned morally and legally prohibited. 15 00:01:37,200 --> 00:01:38,100 By contrast, 16 00:01:38,430 --> 00:01:47,010 many contemporary just war theorists and many international lawyers regard a unilateral response to an imminent attack as justifiable self-defence. 17 00:01:47,280 --> 00:01:51,810 Though the precise meaning of imminence as well as individual cases remain contested. 18 00:01:53,280 --> 00:01:58,830 Physically, legal scholars ask the same questions about the legitimate onset of war and the meaning of imminence. 19 00:01:59,380 --> 00:02:05,090 But this distinction between pre-emption versus prevention is less prominent in their discussions. 20 00:02:05,580 --> 00:02:11,489 Legal disagreements are phrased in terms of the license granted to states or their inherent right recognised in 21 00:02:11,490 --> 00:02:19,590 the UN Charter to act in self-defence if an armed attack occurs while the U.N. charter system aims to avoid war. 22 00:02:19,890 --> 00:02:28,469 Chapter seven of the Charter recognises two exceptions to prohibitions on the threat or use of force self-defence 23 00:02:28,470 --> 00:02:34,800 if an armed attack occurs and military action undertaken with authorisation by the Security Council. 24 00:02:35,190 --> 00:02:42,180 For the lawyers, the question is whether any particular act of belligerency in question can be assimilated to self-defence. 25 00:02:43,320 --> 00:02:46,710 Otherwise, it can be legal only if authorised by the Security Council. 26 00:02:47,420 --> 00:02:54,540 At what early stage might we regard an armed attack as having occurred or begun to occur justifying self-defence? 27 00:02:56,070 --> 00:03:02,340 Judge Fletcher offers an interesting conceptual point about various commentaries on Article 51. 28 00:03:03,060 --> 00:03:10,560 He says on the plausible assumption that an imminent attack is one which is already actually present in progress and in that sense has begun to occur. 29 00:03:11,190 --> 00:03:14,520 There's absolutely nothing pre-emptive about responding to it. 30 00:03:14,820 --> 00:03:20,250 You don't need a broad notion of what constitutes an armed attack and the theory of pre-emptive war. 31 00:03:20,520 --> 00:03:25,800 One or the other will do. But why should we wait to be attacked at all? 32 00:03:26,730 --> 00:03:31,710 Striking earlier may well prove less costly in human life than waiting for the threat to mature. 33 00:03:32,400 --> 00:03:38,580 Different points out the following with reference to Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear facility in 1981. 34 00:03:39,450 --> 00:03:42,329 Israel reasonably believed that if it did not attack immediately, 35 00:03:42,330 --> 00:03:47,400 it would have lost its only realistic chance to eliminate this threat to its continued existence. 36 00:03:48,030 --> 00:03:52,290 In fact, the reactor in the sun with when French engineers who were building the plants were absent. 37 00:03:52,800 --> 00:03:55,790 It is indeed an important feature of this example. 38 00:03:55,800 --> 00:04:02,490 The man says that there were no legitimate human targets and thus no attacks, whether intended or unintended, on the innocent. 39 00:04:03,180 --> 00:04:07,830 Although his preventive attack was clearly illegal and was universally condemned at the time, 40 00:04:08,070 --> 00:04:12,630 a very strong case can be made that it was an instance of legitimate prevention. 41 00:04:13,290 --> 00:04:16,920 And while Senator Armstrong makes a similar point about the Israeli attack. 42 00:04:17,100 --> 00:04:18,760 From a consequential point of view. 43 00:04:19,200 --> 00:04:25,410 If they had waited to bomb it when it was active, then very many people in Iraq would have been killed by the explosion and in nuclear fallout, 44 00:04:25,650 --> 00:04:31,080 whereas only a few people were killed when they bombed the reactor before it was active. 45 00:04:32,400 --> 00:04:35,960 Israel's attack on Osirak was widely condemned. 46 00:04:35,970 --> 00:04:38,910 It was condemned by the Security Council without a US veto. 47 00:04:39,300 --> 00:04:46,740 But the limited casualties it incurred suggest that striking early, at least in some cases, is morally advantageous, 48 00:04:46,800 --> 00:04:51,720 both from consequential perspective and from the perspective of the rights of the potential victims. 49 00:04:52,410 --> 00:04:59,880 And in fact, most writers on this topic point out that from the 16th to the 19th century Europe. 50 00:05:00,010 --> 00:05:08,709 In the war theorists argued straightforwardly for the legitimacy of preventive war and to forestall even the most remote type of threats, 51 00:05:08,710 --> 00:05:11,620 particularly any alteration in the European balance of power. 52 00:05:12,640 --> 00:05:19,870 And it's also noted by Walter and David Grodin and others that their logic ran as follows. 53 00:05:20,200 --> 00:05:26,230 War is inevitable. Fighting later rather than sooner will be far more costly, if possible, at all. 54 00:05:26,560 --> 00:05:29,920 So why wait? Why wait? 55 00:05:30,580 --> 00:05:38,559 The answer, as usual, comes from Michael Walzer, and it's been restated many times since stated flatly there are two basic reasons for waiting. 56 00:05:38,560 --> 00:05:43,870 One concerns consequences, the other concerns the rights of the potential victims of attack. 57 00:05:44,140 --> 00:05:50,830 As for consequences, reinstating a permissive doctrine of prevention with lower the threshold for war. 58 00:05:51,010 --> 00:05:55,480 And again, make war too frequent and routine, this time with devastating modern weapons. 59 00:05:55,750 --> 00:06:01,990 It would make for to frequent because the doctrine of preventive war would justify too many wars calculating far in advance. 60 00:06:02,260 --> 00:06:10,120 If war is in fact inevitable, and what the relative costs would be would be based on biased and imprecise calculations. 61 00:06:10,510 --> 00:06:18,550 This would also be open to bad faith abuse. It would make war too routine because the doctrine of preventive war treats war casually 62 00:06:19,270 --> 00:06:24,160 as an instrument of policy rather than a last resort in the face of actual aggression. 63 00:06:24,910 --> 00:06:28,080 Furthermore, the preventive war doctrine generates conflict. 64 00:06:28,120 --> 00:06:32,230 If states can expect to be attacked at any time by other states that view them as threatening. 65 00:06:32,680 --> 00:06:37,210 Then they have strong reasons to attack earlier and pre-empt their adversaries, as it were. 66 00:06:38,230 --> 00:06:44,260 But as Alan Buchanan points out, these consequential objections contain two separate arguments that can be overcome. 67 00:06:44,830 --> 00:06:50,140 First, they point to the dangers associated with accepting a general rule permitting prevention. 68 00:06:50,620 --> 00:06:58,360 They don't themselves rule out any possible case, exceptional case of justified preventive war. 69 00:06:59,020 --> 00:07:03,610 Second, these consequential objections focus on potential error and abuse. 70 00:07:04,010 --> 00:07:12,610 Buchanan. Buchanan himself believes that this can be overcome by subjecting preventive war to review by international institutions. 71 00:07:12,790 --> 00:07:15,760 Others, like Henry Su, David Luban, George Fletcher, 72 00:07:16,180 --> 00:07:21,760 call for more reliable intelligence information that was supplied prior to the American war in Iraq. 73 00:07:23,320 --> 00:07:27,340 And all these consequential concerns have one further failing, as David Luban points out, 74 00:07:27,700 --> 00:07:31,790 arguing that adoption of prevention is likely to license too many wars. 75 00:07:31,810 --> 00:07:38,370 Begs the central question. By assuming that more preventive wars are necessarily worse than less preventive wars, 76 00:07:39,160 --> 00:07:44,350 in particular, preventive wars are justified in terms of self-defence and preserving human rights. 77 00:07:44,720 --> 00:07:49,180 Then sometimes more preventive wars might be better overall than fewer preventive force. 78 00:07:49,750 --> 00:07:55,630 Sometimes it's in the late 1930s. Abstaining from preventive war may result in more war rather than less war. 79 00:07:55,930 --> 00:08:00,700 Appeasement, as opposed to prevention, may actually lead to large scale war. 80 00:08:01,990 --> 00:08:05,680 Though apart from these consequential reasons for avoiding escalation and conflict 81 00:08:06,430 --> 00:08:10,540 and the aspiration to minimise human suffering associated with too many wars. 82 00:08:10,780 --> 00:08:18,760 There are also principled, right based reasons. As long as the state and its members haven't engaged in any act of aggression. 83 00:08:20,260 --> 00:08:25,719 How could they possibly be liable to attack a sovereign state and its members have a legal 84 00:08:25,720 --> 00:08:30,520 and moral right not to be attacked so long as there's not engaged in any aggression. 85 00:08:30,790 --> 00:08:34,060 Just McMann raises this problem, but he also supplies the answer. 86 00:08:34,630 --> 00:08:41,500 He describes the type of threat that could justify preventive war as analogous to the domestic crime of conspiracy. 87 00:08:41,890 --> 00:08:46,330 Putting an adversary at risk by committing a crime of aggression that falls short of attack. 88 00:08:46,780 --> 00:08:54,340 In principle, can generate moral liability to attack. Though the burden of proving such conspiracies, McMahan says, is very high indeed. 89 00:08:55,030 --> 00:08:57,370 David Lubin also suggests that in some cases, 90 00:08:58,530 --> 00:09:05,680 act of preparation for planning purposefully to use weapons of mass destruction is analogies to conspiracy to commit a crime, 91 00:09:06,070 --> 00:09:15,940 forming the wrongful intentions, intending to launch a large scale attack on basic human rights backed up by persistent and overt action to further, 92 00:09:15,940 --> 00:09:21,280 this plan is comparable to the domestic crime of conspiracy and insufficient 93 00:09:21,730 --> 00:09:25,450 to deprive a sovereign state and its soldiers of their immunity from attack. 94 00:09:26,140 --> 00:09:33,790 So both the consequential objections and the liability of those oppositions to pre-emptive action can be overcome. 95 00:09:34,480 --> 00:09:41,590 As for consequences, it's quite possible that the benefits of a particular pre-emptive strike will outweigh the bad consequences, 96 00:09:41,680 --> 00:09:45,850 including the harm that the action will cause to the general rule against prevention. 97 00:09:46,270 --> 00:09:54,190 As for liability, a state is liable to prevent a force if it acts in ways that are analogous to conspiring to commit a crime of aggression. 98 00:09:54,970 --> 00:09:59,860 We're left with a legal requirement of imminence. Even if one of. 99 00:10:00,250 --> 00:10:04,360 And I'm not sure many of you will. But something like a conspiracy is under way. 100 00:10:04,630 --> 00:10:09,040 At what point would it be legitimate to resort to force in response? 101 00:10:11,770 --> 00:10:17,860 As I said, ordinarily under the U.N. charter system, the use of force absent the prior occurrence. 102 00:10:17,860 --> 00:10:28,060 But armed attack is illegal. It is, however, widely accepted, though admittedly not unanimously accepted, 103 00:10:28,300 --> 00:10:34,390 that Article 51 permits member states not only to engage in armed self-defence after they have been attacked, 104 00:10:34,660 --> 00:10:41,110 but also to pre-empt an armed attack that is imminent. When I say generally accepted, I'm citing George Fletcher. 105 00:10:41,110 --> 00:10:44,710 I'm citing, for example, that David Rosen might disagree. 106 00:10:45,730 --> 00:10:49,600 As Fletcher puts this, no one would reasonably propose a doctrine of self-defence, 107 00:10:49,990 --> 00:10:56,860 but was limited to striking back only after being struck by a phalanx of bombers or guided nuclear missiles, 108 00:10:57,910 --> 00:11:01,480 pointing out that such a requirement would turn self-defence into reprisal. 109 00:11:02,590 --> 00:11:10,090 While it is clear, Fletcher continues in customary international law that the right of self-defence includes the response to an imminent attack. 110 00:11:10,450 --> 00:11:13,450 There was no treaty explicitly defining imminence, 111 00:11:13,750 --> 00:11:19,720 and it's consequently legally unclear what this actually means in terms of triggering the right to self-defence. 112 00:11:20,320 --> 00:11:23,530 In discussing early military action, 113 00:11:23,530 --> 00:11:29,650 Walter describes a continuum of anticipation rather than a stark dichotomy between imminent and not imminent threats. 114 00:11:30,130 --> 00:11:39,580 At the most restrictive end of the continuum, we quotes the US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, from 1842 regarding the Caroline incident. 115 00:11:39,940 --> 00:11:45,070 Webster wrote In order to justify pre-emptive violence, there must be shown a necessity of defence. 116 00:11:45,550 --> 00:11:50,170 Instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation. 117 00:11:50,650 --> 00:11:55,270 Well also argues that this doctrine of pre-emption, popular among legal scholars, 118 00:11:55,570 --> 00:12:04,810 is far too restrictive and permits no more than the obvious last minute reflex action in response to an attack which is already underway. 119 00:12:05,080 --> 00:12:10,240 Welter states this doesn't address itself usefully to the real life cases of imminent war. 120 00:12:11,140 --> 00:12:18,490 So Walter charts a middle course more permissive than Webster's reflex action, but falling short of promise of preventive war. 121 00:12:19,390 --> 00:12:24,610 Walter argues that the point of sufficient threat justifying preventive action is met, 122 00:12:24,610 --> 00:12:32,409 where the following three conditions obtain a manifest intent to injure a degree of active preparation that makes that intent 123 00:12:32,410 --> 00:12:40,120 a positive danger and a general situation in which waiting or doing anything other than fighting greatly magnifies the risk. 124 00:12:41,320 --> 00:12:45,309 Since that time has been noted more than once that imminence may no longer be 125 00:12:45,310 --> 00:12:50,860 comprehensible in the straightforwardly temporal sense in terms of weeks or days, 126 00:12:50,860 --> 00:12:57,940 especially in the age of weapons of mass destruction. The requirements of imminence may be fundamental to justifications of self-defence, 127 00:12:58,300 --> 00:13:04,990 but this requirement need not necessarily be a simple countdown of weeks or days before the impending attack, 128 00:13:05,410 --> 00:13:11,650 but rather the notion that a first strike is justifiable when it is undertaken at something like the last moment. 129 00:13:11,950 --> 00:13:15,220 First, successfully preventing the horror with is intended to forestall. 130 00:13:16,360 --> 00:13:23,050 This understanding essentially adopts the just for requirements of last resort to the spear of anticipation. 131 00:13:24,280 --> 00:13:28,629 Fletcher supplies the following example Suppose a terrorist threatens to implant that 132 00:13:28,630 --> 00:13:33,640 undetectable nuclear device that is set to explode in a year if it would stop now. 133 00:13:34,090 --> 00:13:41,500 Once the device is implanted, it will be too late. In these cases, the attack is not imminent, but the threat is real and ineluctable, 134 00:13:41,680 --> 00:13:46,150 and recognising the right to legitimate defence would seem sensible and appropriate. 135 00:13:47,830 --> 00:13:56,560 Arguing for a restricted doctrine of preventive war which would justify first strikes against rogue states constructing weapons of mass destruction. 136 00:13:56,980 --> 00:14:04,020 David Lubell interprets imminence in probabilistic rather than temporal terms in the traditional legal understanding of imminence. 137 00:14:04,030 --> 00:14:09,160 A first strike can be assimilated to self-defence when the wrongful aggression is imminent. 138 00:14:09,580 --> 00:14:16,600 In simple terms, Lubin argues that the same logic an attack that is imminent in terms of probability being all but 139 00:14:16,600 --> 00:14:22,750 certain justifies preventive war in self-defence when suffering from the aggression of a rogue state, 140 00:14:23,170 --> 00:14:28,390 Lubin says, is imminent in the probabilistic sense when it is virtually a sure thing. 141 00:14:28,720 --> 00:14:35,860 Preventive war is assimilated to self-defence just in the same way as pre-emptive war is assimilated to self-defence. 142 00:14:37,810 --> 00:14:41,820 Usually the Luban defines a rogue state as a threat state, 143 00:14:41,830 --> 00:14:50,620 a state fostering a militaristic and violent ideology backed up by a track record of violence and a build up capacity to pose a genuine risk. 144 00:14:51,430 --> 00:14:54,730 This restrictive doctrine holds that preventive wars are permissible against 145 00:14:55,030 --> 00:14:59,500 rogue states when a rogue state is one whose policies and past track record. 146 00:15:00,090 --> 00:15:03,750 Overwhelmingly likely that it is aiming with belligerent intentions. 147 00:15:05,700 --> 00:15:13,499 Now, this understanding of imminence in probabilistic rather than in temporal terms is persuasive because responding to a temporally imminent 148 00:15:13,500 --> 00:15:20,730 nuclear threat is entirely meaningless to self-defence when simply cannot defend itself against a nuclear attack that is literally on its way. 149 00:15:21,900 --> 00:15:29,640 Continuing to regard imminence and purely temporal terms renders the inherent right to self-defence totally void in the nuclear age. 150 00:15:30,210 --> 00:15:36,540 While it a free for all doctrine of prevention as most undesirable permitting military action, 151 00:15:36,540 --> 00:15:42,870 only once an armed attack has literally begun to occur is a hollow license in the nuclear age. 152 00:15:44,910 --> 00:15:51,090 But how likely exactly does a nuclear attack have to be in order to qualify as imminent? 153 00:15:51,090 --> 00:15:57,030 In the probabilistic sense, Lumen doesn't say. But in a later article on preventive war and human rights. 154 00:15:57,510 --> 00:16:00,600 He adds, What I think is the is an indispensable comment. 155 00:16:01,020 --> 00:16:07,080 The higher the stakes in a single attack by the enemy, the lower the threshold for preventive action. 156 00:16:07,830 --> 00:16:12,030 The sheer magnitude of anticipated harm and not only its mathematical likelihood, 157 00:16:12,300 --> 00:16:18,330 has to be taken into account in assessing the risk we face and therefore the legitimacy of military action. 158 00:16:18,720 --> 00:16:22,260 Risk equals magnitude of harm, times the probability of its occurrence. 159 00:16:22,680 --> 00:16:29,340 Once we reasonably exchange the temporal understanding of imminence for a probabilistic understanding. 160 00:16:32,270 --> 00:16:37,549 The probability of the impending attack and its enormity replaced. 161 00:16:37,550 --> 00:16:46,790 The idea that it's instant and overwhelming the magnitude of harm and not merely its likelihood of maturing, becomes part of its overwhelming nature. 162 00:16:47,780 --> 00:16:54,320 Clearly, even when the stakes are high enough, the probability of an actual attack has to be very likely and look at fluence as this as well. 163 00:16:55,130 --> 00:16:59,390 It can't just be some national psychosis about pending holocausts. 164 00:17:00,440 --> 00:17:10,640 The threat from one's enemy has to be real and likely, and not just a far off chance of some fluke disaster happening sometime in the distant future. 165 00:17:12,350 --> 00:17:18,050 Nevertheless, if high probability should replace temporal imminence as a sufficient condition for justified prevention, 166 00:17:18,590 --> 00:17:28,460 this is because we perceive the overwhelming nature of the threat in terms of its enormity, not merely in terms of its temple proximity. 167 00:17:29,030 --> 00:17:34,850 It's the extent of the projected horror multiplied by the likelihood of its overtaking us. 168 00:17:35,270 --> 00:17:40,010 That renders the risk overwhelming, though it may still take some time to mature. 169 00:17:41,450 --> 00:17:45,140 Okay. Finally, Israel and Iran. Jason, everybody's waiting for. 170 00:17:46,370 --> 00:17:56,959 In late August 2010, shortly after the opening of Iran's nuclear power plant and the US Obama administration assured Israel that the threat, 171 00:17:56,960 --> 00:18:03,330 while real and not far off, was nonetheless not imminent in the temporal sense. 172 00:18:03,530 --> 00:18:12,380 At that time, American assessments were talking in terms of a year, a year from August 2010 before Iran could construct nuclear weapons. 173 00:18:13,010 --> 00:18:19,520 In recent events, it looks like that timeframe is probably a little bit further off, maybe as far off as 2015. 174 00:18:20,270 --> 00:18:27,170 Either way, despite denials from Tehran, the US, along with much of the international community, not only Israel, 175 00:18:27,260 --> 00:18:33,229 strongly suspect Iran of developing a secret nuclear weapons program not so secret in 176 00:18:33,230 --> 00:18:37,250 fear that it will attain nuclear military capability in the not too distant future. 177 00:18:37,700 --> 00:18:41,810 Israel is by far not the only possible target of Iranian aggression. 178 00:18:42,080 --> 00:18:47,030 Nor is it the only nation in the Middle East or elsewhere gravely concerned with this threat. 179 00:18:47,360 --> 00:18:49,340 In McMahon and Lupin's terms, 180 00:18:50,120 --> 00:18:59,599 it's widely believed that Iran is conspiring to obtain nuclear weapons with which to threaten and possibly use against a variety of adversaries, 181 00:18:59,600 --> 00:19:05,659 most notably Israel. Four rounds of international sanctions have been implemented quite successfully, 182 00:19:05,660 --> 00:19:09,680 I say, and the U.N. has asserted its authority to oversee Iran's nuclear plant. 183 00:19:10,340 --> 00:19:14,270 More stringent sanctions have been implemented by the US and its closest allies. 184 00:19:15,890 --> 00:19:22,460 Deep concern about the prospect of a nuclear Iran within the more westernised Arab states match those of Israelis. 185 00:19:23,870 --> 00:19:30,259 When I first wrote that, people question that. But I think the WikiLeaks have solved my problems, their fear of a nuclear Iran, 186 00:19:30,260 --> 00:19:37,040 presumably backed up by considerable international intelligence information and nothing like what predated Iraq, 187 00:19:37,640 --> 00:19:43,370 is not merely an Israeli panic about a second Holocaust, though needless to say, 188 00:19:43,370 --> 00:19:52,190 the construction of an atomic energy plant or even a possession of nuclear weapons does not automatically constitute just cause for war. 189 00:19:52,910 --> 00:19:54,800 Even with regard to military capability, 190 00:19:55,070 --> 00:20:01,940 Walter cautions that the standard military preparations that characterise the classic arms race do not necessarily 191 00:20:01,940 --> 00:20:09,290 count as sufficiently serious threat to justify war unless it violates some formally or tacitly agreed upon limit. 192 00:20:10,100 --> 00:20:15,170 In the present case, Iran's nuclear project, particularly its enrichment of uranium, 193 00:20:15,320 --> 00:20:23,270 is already in violation of international limits set by the U.N. Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions. 194 00:20:23,810 --> 00:20:30,770 Furthermore, there's a good case to be made for limiting Iran's nuclear capability as the international community aspires to do. 195 00:20:30,980 --> 00:20:34,430 And it's a case that would not apply to all other nations in the area. 196 00:20:35,570 --> 00:20:37,100 Unfair as this may seem, 197 00:20:37,460 --> 00:20:46,610 there is a significant real life difference between nuclear power as a doomsday weapon in the hands of a stable democracy with a provable no first use 198 00:20:46,610 --> 00:20:51,469 policy and a nuclear weapon and nuclear weapons in the hands of a totalitarian 199 00:20:51,470 --> 00:20:56,299 regime which actively supports terrorism and repeatedly threatens to life. 200 00:20:56,300 --> 00:20:59,120 A member of the United Nations off the map. 201 00:21:01,070 --> 00:21:06,700 Some of you will disagree, but I don't think I'm going out on much of a limb in arguing that Iran is a rogue state. 202 00:21:06,710 --> 00:21:12,740 We can call it a state of concern. I'm not interested in branding it with the axis of evil. 203 00:21:13,130 --> 00:21:18,260 I call it a threat state following David Luban. Internally, it's a domestic despotism. 204 00:21:18,650 --> 00:21:21,200 Internationally, it's a major sponsor of terrorism. 205 00:21:21,830 --> 00:21:30,470 Its ideology, hatred of the U.S. and Israel may be no yardstick for openness, but utter contempt for liberal democratic values. 206 00:21:30,580 --> 00:21:38,080 I feel Iran's track record of severe restrictions and human rights, terrorism, brutality, 207 00:21:38,290 --> 00:21:43,750 aggressive public speeches, introduction of drone bombers dubbed the ambassador of death, 208 00:21:44,110 --> 00:21:52,180 Holocaust denial and so forth indicate a violent ideology when combined with the build up capacity to pose a genuine risk. 209 00:21:52,540 --> 00:21:55,810 This makes Iran into a threat state to be reckoned with. 210 00:21:56,650 --> 00:21:58,030 It remains to be seen, of course, 211 00:21:58,030 --> 00:22:05,230 when and how Iran ought to be reckoned with and suggested preventive military action against a specific type of threat. 212 00:22:05,240 --> 00:22:10,060 Threat states amassing weapons of mass destruction can be justified as self-defence. 213 00:22:10,630 --> 00:22:16,540 Iran potentially poses just the right type of threat that warrants early military action. 214 00:22:17,170 --> 00:22:25,060 I'm afraid the theoretical discussion in the literature cannot possibly determine whether all the necessary conditions have thus far been met. 215 00:22:25,960 --> 00:22:30,760 Bearing in mind that much of this needs to be settled in the realm of practice rather than theory, 216 00:22:31,000 --> 00:22:35,380 I do have a few further hesitant comments to make on the specific case. 217 00:22:37,030 --> 00:22:43,509 First, what should we make of President Ahmadinejad's statements about Israel back then? 218 00:22:43,510 --> 00:22:50,980 Just an unjust war, as also warns that the boastful ranting to which political leaders are often prone isn't in itself threatening. 219 00:22:51,760 --> 00:22:58,480 Israel must be offered in some material sense as well. Nor are, nor are provocations the same as threats. 220 00:22:59,080 --> 00:23:05,380 Ultimately, sufficient threat in Walter's term is largely a matter of material injury and context. 221 00:23:08,280 --> 00:23:12,800 Someone was the discussions of Ahmadinejad's ranting concern, 222 00:23:12,810 --> 00:23:21,210 the precise translation of his alleged threat to wipe Israel off the map from the Guardian's office in The New York Times. 223 00:23:21,810 --> 00:23:26,070 Some commentators believe that these don't really sound that bad in the original. 224 00:23:26,520 --> 00:23:33,659 It's been suggested that they more accurately translate into a call for Israel to be wiped away or simply express the 225 00:23:33,660 --> 00:23:40,320 vague hope that it will somehow miraculously vanish or collapse without any specific plan for bringing this about. 226 00:23:40,860 --> 00:23:49,320 One expert suggests that MASH should be understood as a book of countries, or maybe simply as some sort of metaphor the pages of time and history. 227 00:23:49,650 --> 00:23:55,590 Admittedly, I don't speak Persian, and so all this complicated philology is largely lost on me. 228 00:23:55,920 --> 00:24:00,960 I can only say that in Hebrew as well as in English. I think this all sounds quite bad enough. 229 00:24:01,770 --> 00:24:06,510 Then there's Ahmadinejad's reference to the Jewish state as the occupying regime of Jerusalem. 230 00:24:08,250 --> 00:24:12,870 This, again, when taken on its own, surely does not constitute just cause for war. 231 00:24:13,260 --> 00:24:18,210 Certainly, the Iranian president cannot be faulted for his lack of Zionist enthusiasm. 232 00:24:19,740 --> 00:24:24,660 President Ahmadinejad may be expressing no more than the view espoused by some Western liberals, 233 00:24:24,660 --> 00:24:30,149 probably some of them in my audience here who call for the establishment of a binational Arab Jewish 234 00:24:30,150 --> 00:24:36,210 state from the Jordan to the sea in place of what is today the state of Israel and the West Bank. 235 00:24:36,660 --> 00:24:42,510 None of this necessarily indicates any hostility towards Jews or any ill intent towards individual Israelis. 236 00:24:43,290 --> 00:24:50,610 But what these generous understandings of Mr. Ahmadinejad statement neglect to point out is precisely their wider context. 237 00:24:51,090 --> 00:24:57,870 Liberal cosmopolitans will support political change within Israel that usually compliment their stand on multinational 238 00:24:57,870 --> 00:25:04,260 states with Holocaust denial and aid to terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and Islamic Jihad. 239 00:25:04,800 --> 00:25:10,440 Nor do they combine their statements on atomic energy with their hopes for the demise of the Jewish state. 240 00:25:11,130 --> 00:25:19,920 Iranian threats have to be interpreted in the context of enhanced uranium enrichment, holocaust denial, ambassadors of death and aid to terrorism. 241 00:25:20,520 --> 00:25:25,530 We need to look no further for material injury offered by Iran than its long standing 242 00:25:25,530 --> 00:25:30,600 support for terrorist organisation responsible for the murder of countless Israelis. 243 00:25:31,440 --> 00:25:35,339 The all too familiar suggestion that a murderous dictator is expressing no 244 00:25:35,340 --> 00:25:40,680 more than reasonable anti-Jewish critique shown by some segments on the left, 245 00:25:41,100 --> 00:25:44,370 and that some of his grievances are actually reasonable. 246 00:25:44,790 --> 00:25:47,130 Uttering harshly in the European years. 247 00:25:47,700 --> 00:25:55,440 Sometimes the boastful ranting of political leaders turns out to be sufficiently threatening when his hopes regarding the absence 248 00:25:55,710 --> 00:26:02,580 of Jews are expressed against the background of considerable build-up of arms and complicity in the murder of civilians. 249 00:26:03,810 --> 00:26:10,530 But this last point about murdering civilians brings out a further bit of the context in which the Iranian threat ought to be judged. 250 00:26:11,160 --> 00:26:15,060 Whether or not Ahmadinejad literally threatens to wipe Israel off the map. 251 00:26:15,390 --> 00:26:23,220 The crucial issue here is not the annihilation of the Jewish state or the Jewish people as such, but rather the basic rights of individual Israelis. 252 00:26:23,730 --> 00:26:31,620 The primary threat under consideration is the prospect of a genocidal attack against the large number of Israelis, Jews and Arabs, 253 00:26:31,620 --> 00:26:38,490 by the way, and the collateral effect on Israel's neighbours as well as other countries, as well as direct attacks on other countries. 254 00:26:39,090 --> 00:26:45,600 Though it's sometimes pointed out that a resort to nuclear warfare on the part of Iran would be totally irrational. 255 00:26:47,370 --> 00:26:55,980 It would be utterly suicidal, given what we know about Israel's military capability for Iran to resort to nuclear war with Israel. 256 00:26:56,460 --> 00:27:02,700 And so these rational wishful thinkers point out to Israelis, the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. 257 00:27:03,760 --> 00:27:11,910 Those apparently unclear to the international community that Iran would, under all conditions, refrain from using nuclear weapons against Israel. 258 00:27:13,770 --> 00:27:17,430 Why not? In an article entitled Optimal War and you said, bellum, 259 00:27:18,090 --> 00:27:24,780 both sides argue that the tourists might be ineffective against leaders who are not particularly concerned with their people. 260 00:27:25,500 --> 00:27:29,400 Leaders themselves might have reasonable hope of escaping the consequences. 261 00:27:31,080 --> 00:27:38,700 Or they might be religious fanatics or ideologues prepared to launch an attack regardless of possible retaliation. 262 00:27:39,510 --> 00:27:45,420 Consider the religious zealots who believe that death during war against enemies will bring them to a blissful existence. 263 00:27:46,050 --> 00:27:54,840 I'm only partly convinced by this argument. Both sides argue that Iran's public and government have strong religious motivations. 264 00:27:55,170 --> 00:28:01,320 It is not obvious the threat of retaliation following an actual attack will dissuade aggression by such government. 265 00:28:03,090 --> 00:28:06,910 Far, far more significantly, to my mind, they also question whether. 266 00:28:07,310 --> 00:28:13,360 Deterrence is going to be terribly effective against terrorists and their supplier states. 267 00:28:14,080 --> 00:28:22,210 It's the fear, which I think it is in this case, is partly of states dispensing some form of nuclear weapons to terrorist groups. 268 00:28:22,990 --> 00:28:28,660 There may be little possibility of deterring them, either cooperate with the threat of retaliation. 269 00:28:28,990 --> 00:28:34,180 International terrorists without much of a permanent base are notoriously difficult to deter. 270 00:28:34,780 --> 00:28:40,270 States are unlikely to suffer the brunt of nuclear retaliation for a terrorist attack, 271 00:28:40,570 --> 00:28:44,979 a nuclear attack on their entire population as a response to an assault, 272 00:28:44,980 --> 00:28:52,880 however massive launched by a handful of terrorists is going to be regarded and ruled out as utterly excessive and disproportionate. 273 00:28:54,310 --> 00:28:59,350 In cases such as this one, in which the concern is partly about terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction. 274 00:28:59,920 --> 00:29:06,850 It is at least questionable whether deterrence is always a feasible option given Iran's track record of aiding terrorist organisations. 275 00:29:07,150 --> 00:29:15,130 It's overwhelmingly likely to supply US terrorist clients with weapons of mass destruction, with the hope of avoiding retaliation on its soil. 276 00:29:16,840 --> 00:29:19,900 Now, even if Iran were to refrain from any of this for the time being, 277 00:29:20,440 --> 00:29:25,060 the infliction of perpetual terror in itself constitutes an attack against Israel. 278 00:29:26,650 --> 00:29:32,440 This type of attack on the basic rights of Israelis to live safely and freely living under Iranian 279 00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:38,230 threat is virtually certain with a significant prospect of a genocidal attack backing it up. 280 00:29:39,550 --> 00:29:47,290 Now, of course, if Iran obtain nuclear weapons, individual Israelis could leave and thus avoid any threat to life and limb. 281 00:29:47,650 --> 00:29:52,990 Even the Jewish experience of persecution and genocide, this is not unlikely. 282 00:29:53,200 --> 00:29:58,780 Undoubtedly, this is one of Ahmadinejad's hopes because this would leave Israel open to be overrun. 283 00:29:59,050 --> 00:30:05,560 But it's absolutely no defence of the Iranian president to point out that he might prefer that Israelis simply leave, 284 00:30:06,310 --> 00:30:11,080 leaving Israel very vulnerable than actually killing them, 285 00:30:11,890 --> 00:30:15,910 while also captures this type of terrorising fear when he considers that a threat 286 00:30:15,910 --> 00:30:20,739 may be sufficient to justify defensive war against states and nations that are, 287 00:30:20,740 --> 00:30:28,330 in a sense, already engaged in harming us and who have already harmed us by their threats, even if they have not yet inflicted any physical injury. 288 00:30:28,930 --> 00:30:34,270 Furthermore, as noted, Iran has already inflicted physical injury with its complicity in terrorism. 289 00:30:37,130 --> 00:30:42,860 Certainly support for such attacks indicate manifest intent to injure possibly. 290 00:30:43,280 --> 00:30:46,970 Such attacks already constitute armed attacks against Israelis. 291 00:30:47,540 --> 00:30:52,880 Much more active preparation and clear direction. And Iran's intent becomes a positive danger. 292 00:30:53,300 --> 00:30:56,870 An early military strike against Iran might then be justified as defensive. 293 00:30:56,960 --> 00:31:06,650 It will also serves when a general situation emerges in which waiting or doing anything other than fighting greatly magnifies the risk to others. 294 00:31:08,060 --> 00:31:13,610 All right. I suggested that the threat of a nuclear Iran is credible and that the risk is genuine. 295 00:31:14,180 --> 00:31:20,480 Precise probability of an Iranian attack, either directly or by terrorist proxy seems extremely difficult to gauge. 296 00:31:20,690 --> 00:31:25,820 And I'll admit that this, I think, is where magnitude of harm fits into the risk factor. 297 00:31:26,120 --> 00:31:34,010 And quantitative rather than straightforwardly temporal interpretation of imminence has to come not only for the likelihood of a future attack, 298 00:31:34,220 --> 00:31:36,530 but also for the extent of harm, 299 00:31:36,710 --> 00:31:44,330 the magnitude of harm in question and anything but the most antiquated understanding of imminence relevant only to attack with conventional weapons. 300 00:31:44,840 --> 00:31:50,690 The sheer vastness of the of the possible atrocity has to fit in poor calculations 301 00:31:51,020 --> 00:31:56,750 of risk and urgent necessities as part of the overwhelming nature of the threat. 302 00:31:57,710 --> 00:32:03,230 Of course, recognising that the magnitude of harm lowers the threshold for prevent prevention is looming, 303 00:32:03,230 --> 00:32:07,640 does doesn't in itself justify any particular attack. 304 00:32:08,180 --> 00:32:14,959 So in thinking about this specific case, I think we should resist easy answers from those who would entirely disregard international 305 00:32:14,960 --> 00:32:19,190 constraints in favour of renewing an overall permissive doctrine of pre-emption. 306 00:32:19,220 --> 00:32:23,270 I think there's quite a lot of literature like that John Yoo, Alan Dershowitz and so forth. 307 00:32:24,140 --> 00:32:30,980 But routine and predictable opposition to any early military strike under any conditions is equally dangerous and simplistic. 308 00:32:31,280 --> 00:32:40,040 There's no call for automatic rejection of the military option. Neither from the perspective of the just war tradition, nor from international law. 309 00:32:40,220 --> 00:32:46,280 Both has the resources for authorising such such action in the appropriate cases. 310 00:32:47,180 --> 00:32:51,050 Possibly the language of pre-emption and imminence may not even be necessary 311 00:32:51,410 --> 00:32:56,120 when one recognises Iranian sponsored terrorism as armed attack against Israel. 312 00:32:56,120 --> 00:33:02,689 That has already occurred. Certainly funding and supporting these attacks offer a material injury and constitute 313 00:33:02,690 --> 00:33:09,010 manifest intent to injure on the part of Iran and ultimately any early strike on Iran. 314 00:33:09,200 --> 00:33:11,960 It is a national endeavour and not an Israeli endeavour. 315 00:33:12,080 --> 00:33:16,580 It would be authorised in advance by the U.N. Security Council and backed by the United States. 316 00:33:17,360 --> 00:33:23,810 This is extremely unlikely. Failing that, to conclude, should Israel attack Iran? 317 00:33:24,980 --> 00:33:26,510 Like any military action, 318 00:33:26,510 --> 00:33:34,610 such an operation would only be justified at the point of last resort as an absolute last chance at averting a catastrophic harm. 319 00:33:35,270 --> 00:33:38,870 And the most crucial practical questions here cannot be answered. 320 00:33:39,260 --> 00:33:43,190 In theory, when would that be similarly satisfying? 321 00:33:43,190 --> 00:33:50,389 The just war requirement of proportionality, I believe, will depend on the extent of military action required and its costs, 322 00:33:50,390 --> 00:33:54,050 both direct and collateral, as against its projected benefits. 323 00:33:54,590 --> 00:33:59,660 All this is widely disputed, even among military experts, and I'm not a military expert. 324 00:34:00,530 --> 00:34:07,399 It's obvious that Israeli preventive action would be limited and falling far short of conquest and regime change of the type we saw, 325 00:34:07,400 --> 00:34:14,120 obviously, in Iraq. Just look at the size of Israel. Look the size of Iran. On the other hand, it's wildly optimistic. 326 00:34:14,120 --> 00:34:20,059 In fact, impossible to think that the threat of a nuclear Iran can be thwarted by a 327 00:34:20,060 --> 00:34:25,340 single in and out Israeli air strike of the type that took place in Iraq in 81. 328 00:34:25,640 --> 00:34:29,510 On all accounts, the situation is extremely dangerous and extremely complicated. 329 00:34:29,990 --> 00:34:33,260 Such a strike is likely to cause considerable collateral damage. 330 00:34:33,650 --> 00:34:40,520 It might result in enhanced terrorism against Israel, probably enhanced terrorism against Jewish communities abroad. 331 00:34:40,640 --> 00:34:45,410 Conceivably, it might result in war with neighbouring Arab countries such as Syria. 332 00:34:45,440 --> 00:34:49,909 I think that's a bit less likely. As for the benefits, admittedly, 333 00:34:49,910 --> 00:34:58,070 the optimal aim of an Israeli strike would be forestalling of developing harm and postponing the threat as far as possible into the distant future. 334 00:34:58,520 --> 00:35:05,990 It's doubtful whether any nation can be prevented indefinitely from obtaining nuclear power if it remains determined to do so. 335 00:35:06,770 --> 00:35:11,299 Halting a genocidal threat and significantly postponing its recurrence with the hope 336 00:35:11,300 --> 00:35:16,790 of future improvement in the overall situation is nonetheless no small achievement. 337 00:35:17,840 --> 00:35:23,030 As for appropriate timing, American assessments indicate, as I've suggested, 338 00:35:23,420 --> 00:35:30,290 that the threat to be averted in relation to its imminence is to be judged is not an actual Iranian attack on Israel, 339 00:35:30,500 --> 00:35:33,890 but rather the point at which Iran could obtain nuclear capacity. 340 00:35:34,370 --> 00:35:36,520 President Obama's position that. A. Nuclear. 341 00:35:36,630 --> 00:35:45,180 On it would be unacceptable implies that this eventuality in itself would constitute a harm to be averted whenever it emerges as imminent. 342 00:35:45,780 --> 00:35:48,270 Certainly it can be averted after it matures. 343 00:35:48,690 --> 00:35:56,820 Pre-emption in such cases, once a threatening nation is armed with nuclear weapons and poised to attack, is clearly not a feasible option. 344 00:35:57,810 --> 00:36:03,450 If this is so, then if and when all else fails and I stress that if and when all else fails and 345 00:36:03,450 --> 00:36:07,560 subject to reliable international intelligence gathering and proportionality, 346 00:36:08,130 --> 00:36:12,090 the right thing to strike would not be when an actual nuclear attack is on its way, 347 00:36:12,630 --> 00:36:18,450 but rather when Iran is on the brink of acquiring nuclear weapons any later than that. 348 00:36:18,450 --> 00:36:23,160 And the response is too late. Useless and probably suicidal any sooner. 349 00:36:23,250 --> 00:36:29,730 And the threat is not imminent in any sense of the word. However, if there is to be any margin for error, 350 00:36:30,240 --> 00:36:35,969 I suggest the magnitude of the risk implies that it would be preferable and justifiable for 351 00:36:35,970 --> 00:36:41,610 Israel to err on the side of striking somewhat too early rather than striking too late. 352 00:36:42,300 --> 00:36:45,420 Stated plainly there's something too much to lose. 353 00:36:46,110 --> 00:36:47,130 Thank you. Thank you for.