It's a delight to be here for the second year of the Oxford War Group.
We have to find a way of continuing to do this because it's such an exciting group to bring together.
I'm not going to take very much time for introductions. I'm going to try to keep the same rules and conventions going.
So to give Gérard a no more than 5 minutes, sort of 3 to 5 minutes to introduce the paper, because we've all read it.
And then I will give Nancy Sherman the opportunity to be the lead respondent for around 12 to 15 minutes.
The only thing I want to say is, as someone who works on the responsibility to protect from a slightly more applied perspective,
I found this a fascinating application of what we call in politics our two.
So I will I will take us to no more than 1:10, because otherwise it will encroach on lunch.
So which of which, unfortunately, in Oxford goes for only a set period of time.
So you will starve if we don't end it. US what? We.
Gerhart, go. Thank you. So, yeah, so Vincent asked me about.
Writing a paper for the conference. I was very quickly thinking about poverty and I was thinking about how to do that in the military context.
I mean, it seems a little bit difficult to find. Profitable ways that before you go to war?
I think that. And so I thought maybe we can use innovation growth to promote growth.
So yeah, so this situation is. But it's global poverty according to.
For Thursday's crowd, approximately 35,000 children are reportedly ready for each day.
That is pretty amazing. So then the purpose kicks off with a visit from Office Space, where Castle meets Angel.
And it's been said about the situation of the global poverty on Earth and here on Earth.
He could, because he actually is a protector with our humanitarian interventions.
So the Democrats should try to ask him to intervene on behalf of the global threat.
And then I think, ah, I mean there are three types of costs that we have to consider.
Course with the material costs to the actual people that will come after the intervention is over.
I have to what extent, if I have a duty to carry these costs, to build these costs,
which will be either by just new development aid or institutional changes that will be developed,
but how much cost that will be could be difficult to estimate.
I proposed that something like 5 to 10% could be recouped on that record.
And then I investigate to what extent that cost would be something that we have a duty to bear.
And then, of course, it's important to see to what extent the uplift are related to the poverty.
And I suggest that there might be three ways in which these issues that might be related to global poverty.
Two types of attribution. One is are really related and the other one by enabling it by.
And then of course they might have failed to prevent all three might be more or less culpable and all of them will.
All of them are sensitive to culpability in a way that the high culpability, the work of holding forth on the Afghan people,
if the importantly contribute or preferred they are less they are less confident in both of them.
So that's one type, of course.
And then, of course, the indirect cost of intervention that would include death of soldiers and death of civilians are collateral damage here,
assuming that the civilians will not be targeted.
I mean, you could imagine that actually what they did was to target civilians in order to get to force people to start changing their behaviour.
So that would be more like a terrorist type of use of force and I don't see anything theoretically problematic with that.
But I'm just not addressing it here. So I do have it in another paper, but not here.
So in this paper I'm basically interested in the killing of civilians, the side effects that means that,
it could seem, is more easy for people to understand that killing people.
And then, of course, the soldiers who would be killed.
I mean, it's difficult to say and it's very difficult to imagine to what extent or how people on earth would react to something like this.
I've asked quite a few people and quite a few people seem to support this intervention, surprising it.
But obviously to what extent is permissible to launch this intervention with a high number of soldiers?
As. We still will also depend on to what extent we could say that the soldiers are fighting a just and unjust war.
And to what extent, if they are fighting in a just war, which I assume they are,
if it is justified to have this humanitarian intervention to of extent, they can flow through the rebel fighters with an excuse.
But so to what extent is it gospel the soldiers of African countries that then.
The current situation where 35,000 children die of poverty is huge.
To what extent can they have a comfortable story to tell that will give them a good excuse for trying to prevent this intervention?
Okay. I guess my 5 minutes is up. Yeah. Yeah.
If you can wrap up one thought there wrapped up.
Great. So I will. That's a fairly succinct summary.
Sure. Nancy. Oh, excuse me. I'm happy to give some comments.
Well, the layout of the paper, it's just been been summarised.
And I did find it fascinating. But I guess I want to look at a little bit more what sort of intervention these angelic
protectors might have in mind and how it might look from the eyes of a soldier.
So I want to make a little bit flesh here, if you will, the mixed metaphor warrior angels, nobles, psyche.
So we've got a military engagement, and I'm presuming it's primarily lethal force for protectors or warriors,
but I'm not actually sure how it's supposed to work. And I may have misinterpreted some of what I read as I'm listening to your comments.
But in general, you're talking about soldiers taking out soldiers or military installations,
I guess, with some amount of permissible collateral damage yet. And that's the second part of the paper.
But in the earlier discussion, what you've been talking about primarily is what the harms ordinary civilians produce in creating and contributing,
enabling poverty and how they might be, in fact substantively responsible for it.
So I was I was thinking of an attack on them in some way.
And so presumably they're not on a battlefield or working in a military installation,
but in their homes as enablers, contributors through various policies.
And I had a specific example. It was sort of in my mind from talking to someone recently.
And so just sort of imagine this more heinous version of a recent Similac scare.
So Abbott factories in Sturgis, Michigan and it produces baby formula.
And in order to be profitable,
they've cut corners on hygiene with the result that they have cans in plastic containers of baby formula in which are beetle parts.
It's true. And beetle larva that are not too palatable are easily taken by young stomachs.
Now, so the cans are all recalled in America,
but they go on to be shipped to Angola so that the company won't lose massive sales and still remain profitable.
There's some in the factory that know what's up.
Most of upper management presumably does know,
but they're keeping quiet and many don't want to make trouble because Michigan's in tough economic times and they don't want to lose their own jobs.
So Kaiser gets the green light to militarily intervene.
It's sort of how I'm thinking of or Kaiser gives angel military the green light.
And so in what sense is the factory a legitimate target?
Who indeed is targeted? When they're targeted, when do they have the right to resort to defensive force?
To what degree is collateral damage minimised in soldiers assumed.
Angel angels seem to take on the preponderance of harm or risk.
And the examples are sketchy, but I just don't know.
Again, I'm I'm very concerned about what the epistemic bar is for knowing who to target or not.
And you share the view that they're just an unjust combatants and also a non categorical combatant non-combatants distinction.
So there are more or less innocent non-combatants or civilians.
And you say that collateral damage already erodes non-combatant immunities, so good reasons to weaken it further.
You argue that I'm one of those people, you know,
who worry a lot about the epistemic burden on soldiers and even angels who may have night goggles, vision that allows them to discriminate.
I don't think they had it, but whether they did, but I don't think they do.
You cannot discriminate between bad soldiers and good service, between war or between contributing and enabling civilians and those that aren't.
So, you know, battle's begun. And how do soldiers acquire the information needed to establish?
Degrees of moral responsibility for those involved if they target certain floors of the plant.
Some are upper management who might know. Not clear that the upper management is actually going to be there.
So it's that kind of worry that I have,
because I actually did take you at face value as suggesting that the contributors and enablers of the affluent like Kaisers of this world are or,
you know, where she works are amongst those to be targeted.
Then again, I was thinking, well,
maybe some of the there are guards there security guards that are hired because similar knows its contributions in this
area that it's producing harmful stuff and are the guards who are armed but the civilians who work in the plant not armed.
More likely, you know more liable to to attack than not.
So the paper raise those kinds of questions for me, precisely how I target and how, you know, targeted.
Those are or practitioners the soldiers, you know, these morally relevant role differences in attitude.
So I don't write in these specific terms. And my own approach has been to talk to soldiers who have had to make tough
choices and often who second guess those choices once the choice has been made.
And for them, war is unbearably personal.
And it's not just the what, but it's not just what they do.
But the aftermath is long and and lasts long.
And to take moral responsibility for accidental deaths of buddies and non-combatants,
to feel guilt for surviving, to feel guilt for collateral damages is in part the way that they humanise war.
And I thought, I don't know how visitors from outer space take on those kinds of issues or how we put them into the proportionality calculus.
In thinking about the long term harms that soldiers take on.
So that's something I want to put on the table. The other thing I wasn't clear about is is your inter on this was assuming your intervention is
in a highly commingled place and even takes on contributing harming non-combatants as targets.
And so in what sense are we talking about a policing kind of intervention as opposed to a more typical
war fighting intervention where more risk to civilians rather than less risk is is permissible?
That's a question I, I put out to you. And I guess in general,
I think anyone like Angels troops need to be far better prepared than I think our troops currently are to
be able to restrain lethal force and to try to make certain kinds of combat non-combatant distinctions.
But it wasn't clear to me if you were taking on those problems.
So I want to essentially throw that out,
especially given we're you're talking about war amongst the people or the people being responsible for the harming.
In what sense are they essentially as liable to attack us for that as civilians, as liable to attack us as armed combatants or something?
But that's the nature of the current.
I mean, I don't I'm not thinking that the protesters have any superhuman ability to find out who's culpable, anything like that.
We are not trying to they are just a little bit better of meet us on this.
And and what I'm thinking of is that they want to change the institutional setup, right?
So that in order to do that, they will have to force governments to do it.
I mean, exactly how this intervention is supposed to do to avert this.
First of all, I'm not a military expert. I'm not sure how to do those things, but I can't really say much about how actually they are going to do it.
And of course, but I do say, for example, that we have an exit strategy.
Right? I mean I mean, obviously, if if.
Earthlings. We are not backing down there, so they are just not giving in now.
Just continuing to fight like the Taliban. Right. It's not the troops that start doing like that.
Of course, this will not work.
You will not end global poverty by this war so as to not have the impression that that is what's happening, because then they will not go.
So they're also not like earthlings in that regard. So earthlings.
Governments. Yes, sir. So they let us live.
And maybe they will return in ten years to see if we have made any progress.
But are they also, you know, armed economic reformers like, you know, as well as armed social workers, that sort of thing?
Are they not only, you know, break the system, but also rebuild it?
You know, they are basically people like so and so.
The way in which we are supposed to do this, we have to find out. It seems to be I am not an expert,
but there seems to be some people around on earth with have ideas about how we should do this in order to solve this problem overall.
Obviously disputes but and it might not be as cheap as the example towards Georgia indicates that he thinks it is might be cost like 10% but.
So the idea is that these are just instruments and to what extent this is permissible, that is not the case at all.
You have to decide. It is not something they have to find out because they have some superior power.
So whether or not it is permissible is simply something we have to find out some something
about trying to give a first draft of this and did regard to this initial this in.
No. This is what I got is the fact that the baby faced over there.
I mean so I mean, if I was just trying to think of a, you know, a non fact a non munitions factory.
Yeah. But the place where there was ongoing, systemic and not just this particular incident,
long term contribution to malnutrition and poverty in a particular area with some complicity,
some non complicity and some uniform, some non-uniformed people and etc.
Yeah. So I mean, I mean, in order to see how bad this production is, I don't know.
I mean, how bad is actually the product? How many people get cancer from things like that?
So it might be that although all over it might could be even though it actually gives a few people cancer,
it is better that they get that they're not getting it could be that at all.
So if that is the case, then of course it is problematic to say that they are liable because even though Americans don't need it,
because they have all the products, but maybe those people who are using this product don't I don't know.
But and I'm not really interested here in to what extent it is permissible to kill ordinary, affluent people.
That is just because I bracket in this paper.
But it could be that actually that is more efficient than trying to have a.
Military intervention in order to force governments to start to change their behaviour.
It could be it could be that it would be better and more efficient that the protect they start doing
that or we just will continue to kill them or three people at random every day until they do it.
So that could be more efficient action. But these are not all talking about military use of military force.
I wouldn't talk about terrorists. So that basically can should have lots of hands.
I'm afraid I don't know you all as well as David did. So I will I will start taking a list.
And I'll start with you, Nina. Yeah, you did. As you know, he was actually first as you asked people to say yes.
When you start, do you say your name? So you Nina, I'm getting a little upset.
It's actually a minor question, but I overall,
I find that the main problem that I have with the paper is this attempt to analogise what is a redistributive war to a humanitarian intervention.
And I'm quoting from the analogy, just focus on one here.
Essentially, you try to hold on to the conditions than the Nazis.
And I wonder how you think the fact that it is a last resort,
and I wonder how you want everyone to achieve that in a context where first, it is not about seizing actually the interdiction of body.
I think it's about something much more structural. That is the distribution of resources.
And the other the fact that you are not actually talking about a state related problem,
which both come from the fact that you base your argument on the analogy of a classical humanitarian intervention,
because what you're actually suggesting is that the intervention here is meant to coerce the agent that might have the ability to
change the situation of the unfair distribution rather than the intervention or the agent from intervening to help those in need.
And that's what the classical is. If we intervene into a state in order to help the people in the state.
And I think the government came into this promising that we are not actually intervening immediately to coerce the government,
to change its acting, to change structural issues.
So how do you ever make the argument that that there aren't any other possibilities of changing the structure, like the redistribution of resources?
And how do you. Well how do you reason that's not in the context of the state that.
You never achieve such a thing as nothing. Okay.
Thank you. So the two things, certainly the last resort and the only thing that is a requirement of intervention in that it
is that the suffering is caused by the state that was taken by the order to be the one resort,
last resort. I mean, obviously, to some extent, this is believed to be the last resort in the sense that.
I mean, it is possible probably to solve this problem or at least significantly reduce poverty related death, but without any intervention.
That is what the bodies are going to look like. So the point is that they are dying today.
So how long should wait to learn of this?
I mean, probably this will be solved. Yes, I think so.
So but in the meantime, 900 million people or something had died.
So they could just presumably just intervene and feed them.
Right. No. Okay. Okay. No, they don't have them.
So so this is the battlefield analogy of humanity to go to intervene to do that.
Right. So that three things. So. Either the suffering is caused by state or it's a state that for some reason failed to prevent this.
But so of course in this case it will be something similar to the state that it to prevent it.
I do know that most people, when they talk about humanitarian intervention, want to kind of reduce it when the suffering is caused by a state.
But I don't think that is necessary in order to justify humanitarian intervention toward the end of the state,
even though the state just don't care about certain groups of aggressively starving,
just they don't care preventing it, then I think humanitarian intervention could be justified in order to force the state to do something about this.
All right. So I don't see I don't think that is a serious problem for the analogy between humanitarian intervention or other distinctive.
Shlomi had a one finger on this. Yes, I know.
I guess my worry is that your extension?
You're saying that even if the state fails to prevent, because when we talk about I guess you have two problems with this analysis.
First, I do think there is a huge difference because even if you might say that there might be
more responsibility on all states around the world in really trying to prevent the harm,
yet I'm not sure that this is the kind of moral responsibility which passes some sort of a threshold which justified a third state to intervene.
I mean, and in a way,
I don't see what why why is the third state or Nate or some kind of international organisation has any vector of claim act against the
state who is just preventing from the humanitarian crisis to happening somewhere else as opposed to a state that is causing that.
Right. So I think there is a difference if I if the state the state aid does not intervene, she seems state to be struggling, suffering.
The people there are dying and they're not intervening and becoming a case where the state see is the one that is
responsible for the death because it stopped all the water getting into state to be where the people are dying as a result.
I think there is a huge moral difference in how humanitarian in the in late or the UN or maybe state the intervening in such crisis.
I do not think that just avoiding to in preventing or not interfering with humanitarian aid would be sufficient,
a sufficient reason for humanitarian interests, for force, for humanitarian situation.
So you have to keep this I have to say this in one society, this say these people are dying, okay?
People are dying because there is no water in their society which is not connected.
They are not in control of the sources of the water. They have enough water, but they're not giving from their water to society.
They see their neighbours are dying and they're not doing anything. They are not preventing the humanitarian.
It is a humanitarian crisis, but they're not responsible for it.
Or you say it doesn't matter. I mean, in any case, the angel and the protectors can intervene, or in real life Natal or the UN can intervene.
So I understood this like this. I think in all situation you have suffering over here and have the state have and they just don't care.
They do not so effective preventive in this case you are suffering.
You understand, does it? Yes. So you think it's a huge difference?
Of course. Yeah, I can agree others so difference.
But if to what extent with these people I mean, these people have a Spanish, right.
So in this case it would depend on what is this people's reaction to intervention.
So if if these people say that that no to whatever please come and help us.
It is of course you shouldn't intervene military because there's no need for it. No, but the people just don't care.
They're very going to stick it. Say we just care about ourselves.
We don't care about anyone else. So even if you told me I don't want to spend my resources on your country, I have more than enough water.
But, you know, it will cost me money to pass the water tanks in your state.
I can't be bothered. What happens to you? I don't. I'm not going to fight you.
I'm not causing this. But I have nothing to do with you. I don't understand.
Why does this state have a claim against intervention here and now?
They have. You said that if we want to intervene.
Okay. So the assumption here is that these states could have prevented this.
They could prevent. But they are not the cause for this now. Yeah, they could prevent it.
They don't care about you. And they say, do not intervene.
Let them know that. I know it's not saying do not intervene.
You're saying because what you've suggested is the angels and protectors.
Natal Okay, so I just have a problem with yeah.
People from the world coming but Nino to you said that you can intervene against state banks here right.
And force them to provide water to the suffering.
And I just think. Okay, okay, okay, okay.
Okay. So, so okay. So the situation is here. What is so this is Earth now is this is a.
So then the question is what is the relation between the state is not national state.
Right? So what is the relation between the state and this all this suffering?
So I suggest that are three possibilities. You can contribute by doing doing it.
You can contribute by. Enabling it to fail to prevent it. Yeah.
So if, if, if none of them did just a cool state, then of course to be able to say, okay, yeah.
So I'm going to agree that it is only, you know, it is less costly and important, but it still could still be permissible.
Okay. I think you two disagree. Okay. I'm just guessing.
And it took a while. Just slightly, wherever I might.
Well, my one observation would be, too, that we're getting slightly muddled between classic humanitarian intervention and what you're describing.
But anyway, some will pick up on the future. Yitzhak is next.
Yeah. You think you're going to allow killing soldiers?
Protect those killing. So the soldiers should be liable to killing in the scenario that you described it this way.
Yeah. I mean, I found this a little bit actually.
This isn't talking a lot about I mean, how many soldiers and to what extent is it reasonable to kill these soldiers?
Because, first of all, should the soldiers be closed to allow enable to prevent it?
Yeah. So it supposed and this is a very realistic scenario we can talk about in this context, but is please, I welcome it.
Suppose the soldiers are who they happen to be.
Yeah. And that's why, you know, they are not the enabler.
But those are who? Those who. So I would assume that the plausible description that not all soldiers are poor,
but a significant number of these soldiers in African countries are among the very unlucky assume that to be the case.
So they are not that really bad guys, so they can be about enabling.
You're talking about the state or the some of the most of the citizens of.
Yeah. Very affluent. Talking about the.
I'm talking about the basically the responsibilities of the affluent part of.
Yeah. Yeah. So all their lives are what I am thinking might not be part of this of the military forces.
I'm not really talking about whether or not these people are liable to kill because,
you know, in this day, I am not talking about really about killing civilians.
Well, I told you, yes, there will be a killing of soldiers because it's a war.
And why are they in what are they libel? Yeah. So what you have that that's I mean,
one of the things that was personally for me when I read that is the doctrine of responsibility
to protect people is that they don't mention killing of soldiers as a problem of intervention.
Not in one sentence in this this report is is the death of soldiers for intervention, not the one sentence.
That's pretty amazing. So, so, so, so.
Because they are not part of the dominant view that they can see this possibly.
Yeah. They. Right. So and they're considering the death of civilians.
That's that's that's a huge obstacle to intervention. What,
what how much problems it will make for the Israeli intervention is not something
that they consider the soldiers who are said to oppose the intervention.
To what extent they can be helpful. So but I don't think I am an Orthodox fan.
Partly so. To what extent are these people liable?
Many of them will probably not be liable in a sense, but still it could be convinced of all the.
So who are you speaking about now? The soldiers. Soldiers?
If it is not many in Egypt, after all the member countries, I mean, definitely I can definitely understand.
We are talking about 9 million children. Yes.
Pearl Harbour, 1240 people.
I think soldiers were killed, 1200 something.
Very, very small number. I do not I am not sure how many soldiers it would necessarily figure.
And then but then the question is, they will be fighting an unjust war.
If they will. If they resist, resist. So assuming, of course, that intervention is justified.
So they would be fighting an unjust war. So they become.
And then they can they become that. But they are not liable by virtue of the just cause of the protectors.
The future of something else. Yes. And if the protectors make.
But the serious effort to inform earthlings of them is not to what extent, what could, what could, what could affluent country government the focus?
No, you have to find what you do. Tell them to justify, make them make it plausible that the soldiers are failing in their duty to contain the rebels.
Okay. I've got a couple of fingers on this particular point, but I'm going to ask you to be brief because I have a long list.
Okay. So I've got Guy and Nina and Victor who all want to come in on this particular point.
And then I have a list just to let you know that includes Geoff, James, Henry,
someone I don't know at the back and Victor and someone I don't know at the back and more.
So we have to go to the both of you and cut you off.
Exactly. So, guys, quickly, you need to quickly and declaring quickly involved.
Normally the soldiers, as we were reacting, was effectively just corroborating it.
The soldiers have substantial responsibility for the kinds of harms that war causes.
So if, for example, the United States is about to invade without good cause in Iraq, there are some very, very culpable people for that.
A small group of people sitting of Washington, DC, but the people in the mid range responsibility would be the soldiers rather than the civilians
somewhere who once voted for some government on some topic for the actual harm causes.
You're not talking about the American soldiers, not about the soldiers.
What about the American soldiers? That they are the ones who are sort of more responsible than the individuals who just sit
at home and once maybe voted for the leader who now sent these soldiers to do the fighting.
And. Whereas, in this economy, more responsible, morally culpable sense?
Or do you mean. Yeah, but not necessarily as well responsible as the ones who caused the harm.
And to some extent either no fault of the responsible, no more than causally responsible.
But this is an example of attacking the horrible Swiss Banking Corp, also known as HSBC.
You are attacking your soldiers, which have nothing to do essentially with the kinds of harms which were caused to the poor people.
So the people were likely to be killed, not correlated to any way to the people who are the ones causing the harm.
Yes. That may not be the situation for some humanitarian intervention.
In this in this paper in situation where they just don't care about the failure of food production.
On prime example uninformed farmers just die and.
We can't allow the electorate to solve this so that we are not allowed to interact,
which shows that maybe they should be limited to the perception of people in the world that we can inform them.
Right. They are coming in to Congress and they go home.
Here's the reason why we're coming. You shouldn't fight us. You have a judge cause you should go home.
And if you don't go home, you could say. But. If they want, yes, they will run things in the office.
So the question, why doesn't he mention the killing of soldiers and whether they can ever be viable?
And that is because the humanitarian intervention as contingent and is not about
coercing these agent into doing something with the use of military force like here
bombing African states into changing the structural setup of the world that is
overriding the sovereignty of an existing state in order that to do something yourself,
like preventing them from inflicting bodily harm.
So just to reiterate my point that I think that notwithstanding the merits of your point in its by itself,
it is not an apology of humanitarian intervention, and I think it would be more productive than that.
On the very important point of redistribute, of course, of course, to change structural systems.
We will discuss them on their own merit and thresholds that are trying to expand the
content of the treatment of feelings of existing infliction of bodily harm by a state on.
Yeah. That, that might actually be allowed.
That's not the thing about it.
But I ask you, I mean, even I mean, soldiers will die even though you interview in order to force them to change the situation.
So why don't why isn't the death of soldiers an issue for humanitarian intervention?
That I don't understand. I'm not saying that it should be defensive. That shouldn't be mentioned at all.
And maybe there is an omission, but it's much less of a problem than in your case, where you have the primary.
That you have to answer is why would anyone in and out of that state be liable to
be subjected to military force in response to in order to change the structure?
And I'm just saying it is state. Your argument as opposed to how classically humanitarian interventionism.
Which is a minimal approach. And then you're doing what you're trying to do with the agencies.
Intervening is doing that. You're not protecting the state. Oh, yeah.
Yeah. Do you want to keep. I'll just say, I mean, so what I'm thinking about is that actually three things.
First is, what is the cost that people have to take on in order to do something really long term?
And then what extent is it okay to kill soldiers in order to seize control of the government?
And then, of course, to what extent within the system is a certain number of civilians as collateral damage and of course,
the civilians might be of this affluent so that that will reduce their weight in the proportionality consideration.
But. But I think to simplify and strengthen your proposal.
It's just my thinking is very simple to say that we have an obligation to provide some resources to that level off the rich and the poor,
the obligation to provide for them some resources which they need to save their lives.
We violate that obligation. And when we do that, then we now become liable to much greater harm to save our lives.
Then when our soldiers from a defender, they just have like blockers, they just block the people coming in from getting resources.
I don't want to know how many blockers you can kill to get the resources that you need for survival.
And then most people think, well, even innocent blockers, you can kill them if you have an entitlement to go through the place where they are.
To get to that, they need to survive the survival that they need to survive.
Palpable blockers. No problem. Right. So the soldiers don't look down because that whole block of in the way of us getting the resources that we need.
They might not necessarily be culpable. I mean, even after the the blockers, if someone says, I need this resources for oil,
this person's in my way, I think many more of the needs surviving.
And there is one possible way to be the famous head of the free enterprise case where there are people drowning in the water.
Someone is climbing up a ladder and then they freeze on the ladder.
Well, people are trying to get help for this person and eventually just throw him off.
Okay. He's a blocker, first of all, to do that, right, because so many people are in the water.
Thanks. I think it's a good proposal, but I don't think you can just keep any number of units of blockers of anyone.
But just as long as you're saving more lives than I can, I go to the vet.
Are you dying to come in on this point? Because otherwise I'll go to jail more or less.
Okay. Can I be brief and then Jack and come down quite a bit?
Most of what I want him to say has already been said. And I think this. The finger is not being properly used.
Okay. All right. I'm quite happy to concur with that.
I'm much more used to no fingers. I never chair with fingers except with philosophers.
So you'll be very brief, please.
And then I'll go to jazz stylist, University of Hong Kong.
I was going back to the to the point way force can be used to or for actual people to do something.
I think most people in this area, and surprisingly have absolutely no problem to use, forced by the police,
for example, for egalitarian justice to suppress people into paying their taxes for redistributive purposes.
Yeah, the question is not even starving, but, you know, getting a video recorder,
which allegedly in our liberal democracies you need in order not to be poor.
But suddenly, when the question is about people starving somewhere on a massive scale,
then suddenly it's completely incomprehensible to say that people should use force in or could use force on affluent people in order to help them.
So I would like to help you just. Yeah.
Okay. Yeah, it's it's a little bit I mean, but it is different because these people are not part of the same fight as in Israel, but still.
Yes. Well,
I did want to say that this is a question about liability for omissions and in particular submissions to fulfil the duties that that people have.
And it's an issue about the liability also of people who.
Protect people. Failed to fulfil their duties from those receiving.
In force, compel the fulfilment of the duty.
And that sense, it's actually quite different. Lansky's example of a company that is manufacturing ready to take over is actually quite
different because that's the case for doing harm that the paper is concerned with instance,
failing, wrongfully allowing harm to occur.
And it's just an analogy with something like this.
Imagine there's a gated community. Part of the United States.
Millions of people starving outside the gates and to starve to death is the
responsibility of the people within the gated community for their immediate plight.
And third parties seek to assume that the people within the gated community have far
more food than they need to save the people who are starving outside the gates.
People starving outside the gates are too famished to be able to break into the gated community on their own.
So some third parties seek to break into the gated community to steal the food on behalf of the people starving outside.
The gated community, of course, has paid the guards there to protect these people now.
The normal analysis of this kind of situation is that if the people inside the gated community,
even though they may have a duty to give away their resources to the poor, people nevertheless have.
And most people are quite rightly wrong.
It is in this case that they are doing wrong,
but we believe that the property belongs to them inside and they've hired these guards to enforce that their right to keep their resources.
This may be a helpful way to think about your example, just a kind of parallel case on a smaller scale.
I think the answer is yes. One in Haiti, in some sense, this is this is what we all expect them to do.
If somebody is breaking and trying to steal stuff, it's their job to do it.
I agree with you. They ought not to defend their possessions, whether they make themselves liable actually to be killed on behalf.
In advance to say the people outside and that that I think is occurring it's going to depend on.
Judgements of personality, internal and enlargement liabilities and other numbers, the number of starving people, the number of guards and so forth.
Yeah. But. Yeah.
I mean, I mean, my paper is definitely about failing to prevent light, but it's also about doing sovereign risk.
In this case, we are assuming that the gay community has not have any.
There is no contribution towards the salvation of the people outside.
So but I don't think there is any right to do wrong.
So it's hard to give a good argument for it.
But if if if a person has a certain duty to provide a system of justice or just the right to do wrong is not a permission to do wrong.
But I don't think I'm against intervention. I deny that.
I don't know. I just wanted to say that I think I mean, yeah.
So I think the the duty of according to basic principles of our systems is pretty weak.
Likely does not demand that much of you,
but I do actually think that you have a duty to give it up and you expected that somebody else should enforce that.
So let me say, I mean, let's say there is a person who is drowning and I am standing nearby before I can press the button and drain away the water.
I'm not doing it, maybe because I do not know about it.
In that case, I think and whatever duty I would have to take on at a cost,
I think any other person can import it on me unless unless the imposition of this cost and and other costs have to be factored in.
The but if that is factored in, I do not think this person has any right to resist having that cost imposed on him.
You just have to accept the cost. So in my in my view, what I would say is liable to that cost.
And then the same goes for this for affluent people, I think we are massively doing things.
We have a duty not to do it and we don't have any claim against being forced to stop doing like I do.
I just don't think so. The question to what extent these people who are contractors would be liable to be killed.
That would obviously depend very much about the information they have and the numbers.
Okay. James Yeah. Okay. To start with, I've got kind of a couple of small technical points.
You said earlier that the ICES report doesn't say anything about Oh isn't really concerned with the soldiers lives.
I don't think that's particularly fair because the ICES report does talk about me and it does talk about the fact that
intervenors needs to be very careful in the use of means and needs to take on greater to maximise force protection,
so and so forth. So I think kind of implicitly at least they are kind of a little bit concerned about, you know, these, these sorts of issues.
But that's going to be a very small, small only.
I kind of got another point about the implication of the art of peer to peer here.
Now, since the ICES report The Art of Peace, a goal to be something different, essentially.
So it's evolved to be about for war crimes, war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and ethnic cleansing.
And it's got a very narrow views of what these are.
And I my worry about the framing of the paper in terms of the overall activities of a massively
expanding the occupation advocates the IP in the UN or wherever constantly they look pleased.
The people that are kind of sympathetic to the document simply funding it as they please stop trying to kind of push the RCP boundaries.
The RCP is what it's about. Let's, let's build a consensus about it.
So that is one question about the framing.
Now I've got this is a bigger point about the paper and I've got worried a sleight of hand is going fall, so a sleight of hand.
So it's some sort of trick being performed. And I mean, my worry is this that you talk you use the itis criteria and these kind of just war
criteria you see to whether the aliens meet these criteria have kind of evolved over time.
They're very much, I think, political criteria. So that kind of things about here and the importance of the UN Security Council,
the importance of light intention and even in certainly to that last resort and then you apply these to aliens,
you say, well, most of the things don't apply to aliens because of the aliens.
There isn't any appropriate authority. Right.
And tensions are not an issue here and so on. And the social now I think you've kind of got two options really, to kind of avoid this sleight of hand.
You can either say, well, we should have intergalactic principles,
so there should be something like a Star Trek federation that would be that would authorise, yeah.
To be that provision in decision making procedures worldwide.
So whether they would be such an intervention or whether you should have some sort of, you should have more real world examples.
So Naito intervenes to do something like this or whoever the he or whoever.
So I think that the, the one thing I have is that if you use these kind of very much political,
real world in the literal sense of in the sense of observing the fact that these are all, well, the criteria.
And and you're saying they don't apply to an alien case.
And this, I think, potentially means that you can say it is permissible to intervene.
You are correct. Yes. They are talking about maybe implicitly about soldiers to what I mentioned was that they just do not mention the word soldiers.
Yeah. So a lot of the of it, they don't seem to think about it.
But that. If I mean.
I'm no expert on artifice, so but I also noticed that when the UN Assembly actually ratified, then it was narrow.
So I agree on that. But I but I would argue for that that this narrowing is justified in the sense that it's morally wrong.
I mean, if there is a country to have a certain population who are starving,
they just don't care about it because they don't care about and they don't allow others to assist them.
Cyclone Nargis example it's the Cyclone Nargis example or then genocide.
It's you've got people subject to a natural disaster and their government is not providing them,
allowing outsiders to come in and give international assistance. Yeah.
So if you don't allow that, then I think military intervention could be justified.
Yeah.
I mean, I agree with you on a moral level, but on a practical level, if you want the other piece of work and doctrine, that can take more than that.
I mean, it's a small point.
I think it's just I think we need to be careful of the way that we're framing the practical level because there is something missing.
I mean, we lack the aliens. So I mean, obviously, this is not I am not trying to be very practical,
but the point about the sleight of hand is actually right that that you didn't yet answer is that the agent,
the aliens are basically delegated this by someone else.
And if you the right intention criterion as I understand it and just war theory is
applied to the delegator not to not to the aliens who might be delegated the role.
So by you saying it doesn't apply it actually it was it was a bit of a sleight of hand
in that you go around the question of whose right intentions should actually be.
Yeah, the aliens. Right intention isn't the issue.
The right intention is actually the angel's right intention that you should be looking at.
Other individuals are the others. So the case or not the case.
Okay. So yeah, I first of all, I do not really think intentions is that crucial, even if so,
after all this discussion, we all agree that this would be the right thing.
But the only reason why I ask them to do it is because for the fun of it, I think didn't do it.
So I don't I don't think I don't think it has actually is crucial.
But okay, so it's more like, okay, but then you should say that actually you should say yes because I say okay.
Yeah. I mean next next was the fellow at the the back it Frankfurt.
I'm going to read it because it seems to be that you proposed a solution to the structural problem of global injustice.
And I mean, one which has already been posed. I mean, how should the aliens actually achieve that goal?
And sometimes it sounds as if they just threaten the governments, the government,
see the threat and then no killing at all, and they will just sign a new WTO treaty and everything will be okay.
And then you ask yourself, okay, if what happens if the governments are nice, are not willing to accept that.
But then, I mean, the first question is, but if you after the war, I mean, what is the solution now?
Should this treaty design and then everything is okay?
But in a way you are proposing like a philosopher king or the author of the authoritarian rule of the elite,
because either the aliens should change really the minds of the citizens or they have to be in place then forcing all the morally right decisions.
So a very basic question, I think is what the relation between morality and democracy is here,
because no way one might suspect that you kind of just want to get rid of democracy as it works today.
I mean, that's a provocative question. The second is that with the gated community,
I think it has to do with whether you enter the gated community and steal something from somebody or whether there are some
revolutionaries outside and say we want to change the entire system so that in the end there might be gated communities,
but there are no people starving outside anymore. The gated communities might be a little bit more moderate.
And the question of, you know, right, right. Of wrongdoing would disappear.
So it's painted the paper.
It seems that you just say, well, they intervene in order to force somebody to get resources, which is a very concrete thing.
And sometimes you talk about changing the structures. And after the structures have been changed, then things will be so legitimate.
Then we don't have to. You know, so we have the second question.
Which alternative I am proposing? I mean I mean, obviously, it would be a problem if it needs intervention to go ahead and succeed.
It will be a problem probably when the protectors leave, in a sense that then of course,
democracy will continue and parties will target the provoke and there will be painful institutions back to back again.
But of course, that will happen. So they're not to Europe.
Last question and many of us things that even so it can be if it's also 2010.
Yes. And you will say 90 million people. Another thing is that at least in the Norwegian government, there will be people who support this very much.
This is what you need. This is actually what we need.
We need force from the outside to coordinate with governments or to force the Norwegians to give out their oil money.
Yeah. To have a coordinated effort to solve this problem and to get that we need.
So I think the partner response is that it might go better than expected.
This is fantastic because I do actually think that quite a few people have the moral belief that this is actually the right thing to do.
And I actually also think that this will be solved in I mean, not in two or three years, but maybe ten, 50 or 100 years.
I do actually think that. Sorry. By war.
No, no. Well, because people don't think it's morally right that these people who die from poverty related causes.
I think actually by institutional change or by voluntary contribution in this situation.
But I do think the moral beliefs are here with us already.
So if the aliens had a moral zero, they would have people in our drinking water.
Maybe that would do that. But of course, they don't come forward with the bad.
So you are great lawmakers. And so you said that the Saudis is going to lack a reasonable reason to reject the Iranian demands.
So just lack of just a pause in this conflict makes me think they have a just cause.
Is that what I definitely would say?
The truth is if I mean I mean, I'm basically Carter position, but I tend to think that because I should ask them to do it and that I'm.
So I don't think they have a just cause to resist.
But I am a little bit uncertain to what extent they could reasonably believe that there is, and that's what they must depend on,
what happens with their people and what kind of information the collectors are able to give them to questions that sort of like to ask at least
the first questions about which is how difficult the whole exercise of apportioning responsibility for them over the years will make it.
And they're going to come up with all the kinds of tedious objections here,
but nevertheless need to be canvassed or responded to, I think, by the aliens.
So they can object that if you are going to persuade them to wage war on the people who support the governments,
you get to wage war on the governments themselves that they're as liable,
if not more liable to not only support the current government when they could reasonably would not support one.
Then you've got all the overzealous governments that don't take a female empowerment very seriously and those kinds of things too.
They contribute as well on these governments to transport contraception and then against the reproductive rights.
So in some ways the developed country is definitely going to say, well, the answer to this is, is condoms are.
And that might be it might be kind of embarrassed by it.
It might not be one, but it's a difficult question.
I mean, it doesn't seem obviously like that if, you know, your your child is going to die, but you're he still has to have one.
I mean, it's a very difficult question here about what causes both of those.
Yeah. The soldiers might might visit the Afghanis for clarification on this.
I mean, how can they be sure if the soldiers think that their country is being punished or
attacked resources more than the aliens are justified in taking from that country,
then they might not have a right to exist.
So the question of the data sending of an explanation as to why the burden falls to the extensive is precisely this of all of them involved.
And only the nations also have some collective responsibility.
The second thing is they might still say something, which is there is a general notion of just cause here, a notion of just course on your count,
and that whenever Xe probably fails to discharge their duty in respect of a basic human right affirmative interest,
I take it to a sufficient extent, same as it just caused the war against that.
And if that's true,
then that might just seem it's worth asking whether it's possible is too expensive a notion just cause we have to make it was everyone in the world
and a lot of people in the world liable to the decision of a just cause for war must take into account all the different white lines in that,
for example. Well, I mean, so.
If that's true, not just the policy, but also the deeply important civil and political rights,
for example, then the scope of people who might avail of this requirement is going to expand further.
So the question is, I mean, but even so, I wonder,
do you think the split second question is would lead to a more expansive account just because it makes a lot more people liable to violence?
Presumably, but not obviously we take these other factors into account.
So what we find is that just will continue after this is the kind of thing that where we have retirement villages,
religious criteria to make allowance for the relative ease with which we satisfy this one is,
I think, satisfied just by negligently failing to do the exact extent of the duty in respect of some basic human interest.
Then are you sanguine about that slightly more expansive idea of what we can suggest that you think we should type of the vestiges of authority to?
So a lots of there might be lots of just causes then, but there might be it might still be few justified wars.
I mean, I don't understand why why allowing military force because of global poverty will expand the causes of war so much.
I mean, there are not many of the things that are left out of that. I mean, do you think that.
Well, you might expand it because partly because this makes explicit the idea that negligence is is grounds for just cause.
And it looks like it's only negligence with regard to something really serious, like, for example, 35,000 children every day.
I mean, it is negligence with regard to that. Something that is not very important.
Of course not. Yeah. I think it's an example of turning off the air conditioning.
That's wrong, I think, because that's not the cause of all the lying to the aliens invisible to force.
It only means oppressing the trainees is the oppression of the trainees.
I don't know, you know, because they enable after.
Yeah. If everyone will resist slightly.
Well everyone will just. I think that it would be different know but that is one of the civil political rights that are as important.
Yes. Because our point lies at the word subsistence.
It does not apply to free speech or people working for anything like that.
So do you think that the distributive stuff is more important than civil discourse and it
is not and was in the category of the fundamental rights that are appropriated this way.
Let federal 25,000 people who didn't have free speech on earth.
I think the case for intervention from outer space is this strong.
Yes. Okay. And then there was the first question, the long first question.
Yes, that is I think I should understand because I wonder what that is.
But surely afterwards, maybe we will be responsible. All the people that were responsible violently attacked that that was the first question.
Right. You know, as we spoke, basically. Yeah.
So so the idea here is that so if they are more responsible, yeah, you should take them if you can.
And because it could help the tension here is it won't help.
And in the sense what I'm thinking of is that countries like America, UK,
Norway, we have well-functioning governments and if we were forced to do this,
we could actually manage to do some of these non organised societies don't they do not have this ability.
So you have really fortunate to do what they're able to do, but yes, even be able to do what the protectors tried to force us to do.
I think that is what, for example, what you're seeing, many of the people argue that they are able to do so.
And then the question is, even then, how do they complain that they are forced to do something,
to do something that others also want to do but will not be forced to do because they are not able to do it?
No, I don't think we have a valid claim against not being forced to.
For that reason you might have thought and it's clear to all of the people that that's not I don't think that's essential.
Okay. I've got three names left on the list, so I'll start with Laura.
Yes, thank you. I have a question. Your understanding of assistance face duties.
So when I think about assistance, I usually have in mind things like criminal duties on humanity.
So these typically are duties to help those in need. So long as this is not too costly to yourself, they are imperfect duties.
It's not that you owe them to any specific individual.
But when you see people in need and you charge that it wouldn't be capacity at all to help them.
And typically, when I read the discussion of assistance, they don't seem to have these characteristics.
First of all, they don't seem to be empathic, doesn't matter the failure to assist and the person who is dying for it.
And so it seems that they look a lot more like uses of justice than duties of assistance.
It seems that you're breaking someone's entitlement. And what I want to ask you is,
do you actually think that the duties of assistance so you think it is a just because there are views of justice that say
when anyone falls below a certain threshold of entitlements and everybody else's entitlements are put into question.
So that sort of your duty to health is actually a duty to give something that the other people are suffering, are entitled.
And if that is the case, then the idea of an outside intervention to enforce the rights of these poor people might
seem more plausible if you think that these assistance they do meetings of justice,
that is to you know,
it's not that you should be good with resources that you own and given to the poor people is that you're actually holding on to resources.
You're not entitled that they belong to them.
And if if you were ready to fight this particular kind of framework,
I think it would be easier for you to justify outside intervention, even when we are talking about assistance, because it would be so.
A lot of what you have is something they are entitled to.
But what I definitely think is awesome is like half an hour ago is that he's the person who has a duty to assist,
has no duty to resist having to give up what he has a duty to give away.
So, for example, if you have a duty to take on certain course in order to save the person in a report or the people have imposed that cost on them.
Right. And but that doesn't necessarily mean that let's say you have a duty to take on ten cost units in order to save the person from drowning,
whatever that is. But so that you don't know a lot, this person's from three are not culpable.
An innocent bystander. So then you are enforced.
This can cost the unit of your the person itself. So the person who is about to drown has not lost anything.
You have lost ten unit. In that case, it could be that your beloved personality all the way around, of course,
that the person who I said could offer you compensation, whatever, because it was not for that.
He was entitled to this unit ten units. But I do think I don't think you have any right to raise it.
No, I don't think so. Very quickly together.
And you are right. There's no place for cooperation, of course, for if it is just justice, basically, it is.
There is no place for any kind of calculation is becoming obligatory.
Yeah, it's possible that there are two kinds of nations justice based duties and some need or justification for assistance,
which is not to do with the token, but something that could be calculated that usually is the duty or some kind of duty.
But those two seems to be very different. It's possible that justice based duties regarding catastrophes might be very vague.
And in such cases, no cooperation is needed.
What do you mean, no calculation? As it is to judge that it's speculative,
how much does it cost those who would help or assess it for the duty to do whatever it is that they have a duty to take on certain course?
The calculation is to put the name on the cost.
I mean, there's a limit on how much cost you have to give.
In other cases, it would be okay. Yeah.
I have to move it on to the weekend. Our last question. Sorry. Or did you want to very quickly respond?
Okay, last two. So here and then, sir, and then we'll have the sort of writing to this.
But I guess the other side of sort of sympathetic to your argument for the just cause.
But I think that even at least for the the account liability of the nations underpins that
think that you can spend a lot of time on sort of the moral categorisation of the facts,
but the actual account of the facts seems a bit impoverished. And that is, I thought you could draw a bit more heavily on poverty and others as well.
So the notion of colonialism is a generational issue seems to me kind of implausible,
and that links in to your remark that relations must be about trade.
And that also seems implausible when there is data issues about finance and investment, property rights and so on.
None of which is actually has to do with trade, but are deeply embedded in colonial history in the post-colonial circumstances.
And I think much more important to do the sorts of things therefore the public is interested in is account of global market structure.
Well, what do you mean when you say generational?
What you mean? I mean, you are not colonising at all today.
I if I mean, if I steal your ring and pass on to my children and they now enjoy the benefits of enjoying your ring,
maybe that's a generational sort of issue.
The theft of rings is a very good model for understanding property American relations in the contemporary economy.
When they depend, they're of mostly intangible properties.
They depend on titles secured through registers and other sorts of implements that depend upon a huge infrastructure,
bureaucratic, infrastructural, legal infrastructure to keep going.
And I don't think that the model is stealing rings and passing them on to your children.
You should discuss the generational justice issue.
Just a very helpful model for understanding economic and legal relations in the contemporary global economy,
which are based upon huge continuing administrative and bureaucratic endeavours to keep certain structures in place and functioning.
And I think that's the sort of idea that Polly has in mind needs to happen.
That is not structure, that is not the same as in invading another country with arms and contrasting it with it.
I mean, but if you think about the situation in climate situation,
that has implications for distribution of property and registered title and what was customary title the country targets overwritten
when it was created and that that has implications for who owns the land and who gets the benefits from direct cash crops on the land.
But I think there's just a lot there that to just say it's a generational issue about theft,
but it's talking about that and levelling over the level of enabling or not.
And I think it is an important distinction between enabling and doing.
Yeah, but again, I thought I thought the account of enabling harm within is kind of quite implausible.
The main one actually looks at the details of the sort of institutional arrangements which are in place.
I mean, yes, if it was a state of natural property rights, I would might be the right model,
but I don't think that is a very plausible account of contemporary economic relations.
But another thing I wanted to say, I mean, that's a bit of factual questions, I guess,
but another sort of issue and you talked about issues of ignorance on populations on the whole,
to the extent that the institutions have an important function generating that ignorance
and you can analyse any kind of ideology or you could use a less loaded type of analysis.
I mean, we don't really think but I don't imagine we think that, say German,
Japanese citizens in the Second World War complete their ignorance when that
ignorance is the result of institutions set up to create certain states of mind.
And it's not clear to me that citizens of African countries complete their ignorance in their defence,
when that ignorance results in certain institutions and expectations that are set up precisely to make certain systems
more tenable and more acceptable to people who face inheritance as ordinary humans don't understand why that are in fact,
first of all I to that the idea that people are the originals for this account but they are not and they are not institutional in to anything.
They are intelligent people on good universities. So if if these people are able to think that poverty is wrong, it is not implausible.
My mom and also kids think it's wrong.
But I mean, if intelligent people disagree, it could also be that ordinary Afghan people could disagree with Thomas poorly.
That's one thing. The other thing is very clear.
The other thing is that I don't see why if some people in our government set up
institutions in order to hide that they are contributing to global poverty,
and I do think that we cannot be reasonable and be blamed for not finding that abnormal.
And I think the notion of hiding something. Okay.
I'm going to give you, Seth, the last question.
You have the enabling contributing section is obviously very important to the paper, and it presents some sort of.
Something like a case or intuitions of cases like that.
But there is no attempt to provide a theoretical account of why these facts about causation have significant implications.
And that, I think, is that that, I think, is the challenge for anybody who wants to make this sort of I mean,
this is the challenge that Jeff said in the 1994 paper.
Pretty much all innocence and killing in cases of self-defence is how those bare vehicles of facts, if assets can be translated into our laws,
except just by saying, well, we think that this guy would be liable to more than that guy would be.
And this guy was an enabler and that guy was a contributor. And so I would like to see a theoretical counterpoint of why make the difference.
And then whether it whether or not there is this difference on the person case at all.
Okay, so I do this right now. I don't know what's around me.
Stretch my arms out and all of this not this have not the car and the car is now rolling down the hill towards the guy.
Okay. Or in the second case, a hip classic car. And I'm not I'm not the rock out of the way.
So the first one is contributing. The second one is enabling.
In both cases, I don't know, anything is happening. So it is the bare causal facts that are different in those two cases.
I just want to know why and why we should attribute moral significance of that.
But I don't think it's something you can say I can do. That is the reason.
I think it's plausible to say that people have a strong duty to try to avoid the care of the body movements and what and.
The actions of a direct consequence of that is that to put in place the EPA.
So if we throw the rock right, we all know that the European countries got pretty stupid.
But so you have a responsibility to find out how far is the goal and things like
that before they can remove a rock with no end to the room and it for ever.
So it's hard to say that it's difficult. I think it's plausible to say that we can't help or be responsible for the
removal of the rock in the same way as we are held responsible for throwing up.
Because when you remove a rock, you have removed it forever.
And if the trouble comes tomorrow, yesterday, or in one year, you're leaving everything that enabled it.
There's still no future. I still think that, you know.
Yeah, for a rock that looks like right now,
I think that in this case I stretch my arm that all of that is misguided because it is physically exactly the same in the two cases,
literally identical except for that in this case, because the sequence one of.
Yeah, I mean yeah no no not the idea of exploring more.
It could be possible,
but document possibilities should be able to give us some kind of contractual argument for why we are responsible for the process,
but not removal of obstacles. Okay. Interesting.
Lots of interesting responses to what was a very provocative paper.
And I want to thank Nancy very much for her initial response and to you for standing and taking on the comments for so long.
It was intended and for the audience for putting up with someone who doesn't like it.