Well, okay, let's start the last session of the day with a quick introduction by the author of the paper.
Okay, I should start by thanking the organisers for giving me this opportunity to present this paper,
but actually to write it and certainly this message that I have.
So we had 5 minutes for apologies and for the brief presentation, so I should start for apologising for all I've done wrong.
And, and then we're going to apologise now.
So. So just a short presentation and I'll just give you two pieces of information.
The first piece of information is for those of you who don't like my conclusion.
And the second piece of information is for those of you who think you don't like my conclusion, but actually do.
So the first piece of information, that's just the structure of my argument.
So if I'm right that the conclusion follows from the fourth, for instance,
you know that if you don't like the conclusion, you should reject one of the premises of the argument.
So for instance, you might deny that we you might deny that it would actually be permissible for poor people to wage war on us if we were,
that is, rich people killing 18 million of them a year by military neutral.
You might deny that we would be liable to a military attack. Second, you might deny that the foreign policy analysis of global poverty is right.
Then we kill 18 million people per year by imposing an unjust global structure on them.
And that put this slightly humorous remark and based to this premise I can read even what is not explicitly written.
It doesn't explicitly write anywhere that we kill poor people in the Third World.
But I think I find it's hard to see how we could deny it,
given what he writes about our imposing an unjust structure on them and thereby making them die.
Third premise policy analysis is correct.
I'm going to assume this so I won't defend his analysis.
And fourth premise there's no relevant, morally relevant difference between our killing.
Pakistan's 18 million poor people each year through military means alone do so by imposing an unjust global structure.
And that's actually a claim that I defend in the paper.
So this is what I argued and this was.
So here's a piece of information for those of you who might think you don't like my conclusion, but actually do so.
Three things. I do not argue. I do not argue that the first and the third premise is correct.
I shouldn't hide too much behind that because I actually think that the first premise of the argument is correct.
But I don't offer you if any one of you is a pacifist.
I do not offer you any evidence in this paper. I am simply assuming that there is there could be a military confrontation between rich
and poor countries in which countries who were killing 18 million poor people a year.
And then it would be permissible for poor people of poor countries to fight back.
We would we would be liable to attack by them.
With regard to Pakistan's analysis of global poverty, I'm less certain that it is actually a correct analysis.
So is a very simple minded thought. A lot of poor people in the world live, or at least used to live in China and India.
And it's true of neither China or India that any of those mechanisms set pocket points to dictators
taking over from democratically run governments in order to set up the natural resources of the country.
That this can have been said to course the poverty, those two countries.
And given this allowed, given that a large proportion of the world's poor live in those two countries,
I think that's at least an issue that he has to address.
The reason I don't think it might be such a big problem for my argument is that even if we don't kill 18 million poor people a year,
if we kill 9 million people a year, that's pretty many people as well.
So that's the first thing I don't argue.
So the second thing I don't argue is that it is permissible for poor people to kill people under circumstances under which it
would not be permissible to kill them in the compound for each million deaths a year as a result of military aggression scenario.
So the outcome that make here is compatible with having implausibly strong views on civilian immunity.
So if you think that that even in war are very strong civilians have very strong immunity to the military, then you can put that into the argument.
And rather than be making the same claim with regard to the situation of killing poor people in the poverty scenario.
And finally, I do not claim that the premise is strictly true.
I do mention some ways in which the way in which we harm poor people by violating the negative rights are different from
the standard type of cases of violating people's negative rights in the pocket scenario that might have more significance.
The reason I'm not overly worried about this is that I think that even if we allow that, there are various ways of violating people's negative rights,
the difference is that the way in which we violate poor people's negative rights,
even though they are less morally problematic than paradigmatic cases of violating people's negative rights.
The difference is so huge that it will rule out the possibility of just redistributing wealth.
So that a. Thank you.
I'm just going to start very briefly by summarising what I think Casper's two main claims.
So the first claim is a conditional claim,
and it says that if it is true that we contribute to bringing about the deaths of millions of poor people because we impose an unjust system,
global institutional system on them, then we are liable to be attacked by them.
And this means that it wouldn't be wrong for them to attack us. This particular claim about liability.
Again,
if I'm right and understand the argument is to be distinguished from a claim about an overall permissibility of a war of the poor against the rich.
Because it might be that, given the particular circumstances in which this war would occur,
the war would be impermissible because the criteria of proportionality and of utility might not be met.
In this particular case, it's highly unlikely that if the poor were to attack the rich,
the poor would actually succeed in in winning this war and obtaining that just cause they're fighting for.
So on the one hand, Casper says, yes, if we are contributing to these terrible harms and deaths, we are liable to attack.
It wouldn't be wrong for the fall to attack us. But on the other hand, it would be impermissible,
all things considered for the poor to attack us because the criterion, especially of nonce utility, would not be met.
And in all likelihood, in this particular case,
and Casper's argument overall relies on a moral distinction that many find plausible, others find implausible.
That is the distinction between actions and omissions. And in his view, or at least on the view that he is canvassing in this particular favour,
liability only makes sense if one actively contributes to bringing about a particular harm.
And even though one might want to challenge this premise of the paper,
I am not going to discuss it in my comments and focus on the two main claims that
Casper makes taking for granted the particular moral framework that his adopts.
And I'm going to try and raise two challenges to the two main claims.
On the one hand, I am going to suggest that even if it is true that we contribute in some way to bringing about these deaths,
in fact, only very few amongst the rich people would be liable to attack.
And the second thing that I want to say,
and this is probably more provocative and I am not very happy with defending this claim that I am just going to outline in a second,
but it seems to me at least prima facie plausible the second claim is even if the rich are not involved,
they are not causing the poor to die and so they are not liable.
And even if in all likelihood the poor will not succeed in waging war, it would still be permissible for them to do so.
I realise this is a very extreme claim, but I want to try an argument for this.
So the first one, the question of liability for the rich. Now Castro thinks that the conclusions he gets to in this paper are very polemical indeed.
He thinks that one might even see them as a reductio of his argument.
You consider this possibility, you don't think it is, but you see them as very polemical.
And I have to say that when I first read the paper, I thought, yeah, of course we can.
We kill these people by appropriate and entitlements that are that are not ours.
Surely they have a right to enforce them and even kill us if that's what we are doing to them.
And I think that the in a way,
the simplicity of this moral picture is a bit artificial because of some of the simplifying assumptions that Kasper makes in the paper.
And I realise that these are assumptions,
but I think that the paper and the conclusion becomes a lot less obvious and the paper more interesting if we relax some of these assumptions.
And I have in mind two assumptions either explicitly or implicitly made.
The first one is the suggestion that in a way there are the rich people and all of them are contributing to contributing
somehow to the same extent or in the same way to causing the deaths of the poor and presumably in the rich world.
I'm assuming that rich people are sort of relatively well-off inhabitants of Western states.
I mean, it's hard to exactly pinpoint, but it seems to be a reasonable approximation of who counted people,
but presumably different rich people differently involved in bringing about these particular negative outcomes for the poor.
So the president of a very wealthy country must be a lot more responsible than a shop assistant in Trenton, New Jersey.
And this is the first claim and the second this is the first simplification that I think makes things a bit too easy for you.
And the second one has to do with the distinction between actions and omissions.
So I take it that the reason why actions have a particular moral weight is because of the involvement.
The agency of the particular person was acting in bringing about a certain outcome.
But here again, I think we could have a more nuanced view of what kind of involvement of the agency we're talking about.
There are very many different ways of acting and of having one agency involved.
And we could put together, on the one hand, the sort of empirical claim that the ways in which different rich people contribute
to world poverty varies with the sort of normative claim about the the fact
that the moral weight of certain actions tracks the degree of immoral involvement
of the agency of the particular actor in bringing about a certain outcome.
It seems to me that very few people in the rich world would sort of meet a threshold of involvement of the agency that might justify killing them,
the shop assistant intervention and a lot of other people. This is a challenge to the view.
If we take this more nuanced approach,
I wonder whether to what extent we could say that the rich people as a whole would be liable to attack maybe a lot fewer than you suggest.
So this is the first part of the comment about the question of liability for the rich.
The second part of the comment. S Yeah. Just to clarify.
Yeah. So it's an omission. How could it. In terms of the picture in relation to.
So I took it that the reason why an action the reason why bringing about a particular harm is morally worse makes you liable
to worse consequences that just failing to prevent it is because your agency somehow is more involved in this particular.
So the serving of that intervention is probably the level of it more.
If the idea is that you are all the more liable, the more you contribute to a particular harm in the sense that your agency is more involved in it,
and considerations about intentionality,
but also other kinds of considerations about what the impact of what you're doing is on the overall outcome then.
Yeah. Thanks, Claire. So the second point about permissibility and so Caspar says, and I think supposedly that, you know,
looking at criteria, you use a bellum if we consider proportionality and especially law utility,
all things considered, it should be permissible for the court to attack the rich because they're just going to cause
a great deal of harm and obtain very little themselves because they're probably going to fail.
And the thought that I had in connection with this argument is whether it actually makes
sense to apply such heavy moral burdens of the on people who live in such extreme conditions.
So we are the poor in a situation that we might want to say is outside the so-called circumstances of justice.
So the fact that he is not moderate is absolute.
And the only way they have to survive seems to be if, you know, they've tried out persuasion,
you know, trying to convince the rich people and so on and so forth.
The only thing they can do, the one thing that is left to them would be just to go and have a war, wage war against them.
And even though I realise that the utility criterion on utility criterion wouldn't be met,
I just wonder whether it makes sense to place such a heavy burden on them.
So even though even in an in a situation in which they have two societies, one is a rich society, the other one is a poor society.
And the poor society is not because the rich have done anything to it, but because of some kind of natural disaster.
So in this particular case, I would imagine on the particular moral framework that you assume in this favour,
the rich would have a duty to assist those in need.
That is the poor. But the poor wouldn't have a strict right to assistance, so to speak.
So if the rich didn't assist, they would be acting wrongly, but they wouldn't be wrong in the poor in particular.
And the poor therefore would not have a strict right to wage war against the rich because the rich wouldn't be liable.
They haven't contributed. That would be the view. Even so, and even if the poor would be unlikely to win, it just seems very strange to me.
Very in a in a way, a bit inhuman, so to speak, to to expect them not to wage war,
to say that it is even impermissible to do that given the particular circumstances in which they live, if they are just dying.
Maybe they're thinking of it. It's highly unlikely.
But maybe if we take such extreme measures, the rich might realise or anyway that just I just want to go tell them, look at what they've done to me.
I'm just wondering the thought underlying this and I realise it's sort of provocative and maybe a little crazy,
but I'm genuinely wondering whether under conditions of absolute scarcity,
it makes sense to hold people responsible to the same degree or to the same moral standards than we would under different conditions.
So these are my thoughts. Well, we have plenty of time for discussion, but maybe we should stick to the.
A newly established customer of a restrained finger. Henry was first.
Okay. I thought this first is just meant to be sort of a public interest announcement of this paper.
At least one other paper cites David Lumens 1980 just for Human Rights article.
He wrote a later article in which he really significantly qualified those views.
And no one ever seems to remember that this doesn't settle any local suffering, cause then he was right the first time.
But I just think it's an interesting article.
Also, since I'm retired, I don't get to assign anyone any readings in a book called Global Justice and Transnational Politics.
And then by Pablo The Grief and Somebody.
Cronin And it's called Intervention and Civilisation Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War.
So but now there's something clearly more substantive at 1.1 place when might try to go with Laura's second crazy for it would be you know we
often get these examples in which we are told of somebody is an absolutely catastrophic situation and so it counts as a supreme emergency.
And so they can, you know, slaughter lots of civilians or whatever.
And my response to those cases is to think before we sort of authorise those people to the slaughter of civilians wherever it is it might be.
Some of the rest of us are to do something, you know,
like there often this kind of intervention cases where the only way the desperate people could win would be a news to other
people that of course we could just send in the 101st Airborne or whatever and in and do something slightly more restrained.
And it seems to me you can do one way you could go with the flow is last point is say yeah it really does.
Like given how callous and totally unconcerned we have shown ourselves to be, maybe they really wouldn't be unjustified in attacking us,
from which we conclude not the visual targets, but that we should we should do something.
I mean I mean, you know, in the sense that I think this is sort of silly because,
I mean, there's plenty of good reasons why we should be doing something anyway.
But at least it seems kind of one more reason why maybe we should finally get serious.
The reason being that we've left people in this situation in which they either,
you know, die with no dignity or watch a totally futile importance attack.
And those are the only options we've left them. So maybe we ought to think about giving them another option.
Okay. Could I just say and also in response to last point, I think that this line of thought is somewhat sympathetic.
Sorry, I thought what we were saying was actually quite sympathetic to what you say,
that it's and it wouldn't be wrong to attack them in a in a previous case where they contribute,
but it would be all things considered and permissible. And I thought that would be the thing. Never mind.
Yeah. But as I would like to think of my arguments, it would be consistent with taking the view that you take it.
It's simply not a view that it is a view that says that given that we make poor people as badly off as they are,
then it is permissible for them to kill us if they that was a way of preventing this unjust structure and we're liable to attack.
But that is consistent with saying that even if we do not make them as the officer as they are,
even if they're just in this condition of absolute disgust, scarcity,
and we have nothing to do that it's permissible for them to attack us, that that would be,
I take it, a more extreme view in a way than the one I have defended here.
But I don't think that I say anything that is inconsistent with that.
Actually, I mentioned in passing this case of the Holocaust, where one might say,
suppose that people in the Warsaw Ghetto had the they knew that they would not avoid being killed,
but they at least fought with dignity and it would seem that that might be permissible for them to do then.
I think this same kind of. So maybe it's just my misunderstanding.
And if it was my misunderstanding, I apologise for that.
But what I thought the thesis and this came later in the paper, I think, was that under those particular assumptions we would be liable.
But because these two criteria of proportionality, and especially the non-security criterion, as you said, balance would probably not be fulfilled.
All things considered, it would not be permissible.
And in fact, at some point you also have sort of imagined, imagined counterfactual that they could succeed.
Would, in that case, be wrong of them to attack us?
No. So it's even if all things considered is not permissible, it is still worth making the point.
And so that's where I think that the disagreement or suggestion of provocation, whatever lies justified, because this is just a follow up,
I think and one of the unusual argument made a minute ago,
I don't quite buy into this feasibility and proportionality assumption, but I really are about the same problem.
You didn't seem very convincing and then you try to put a face.
So let's think about India. You knew that 800 million people who earn less than $2 a day, India's a nuclear power.
Now, your scenario seems that how would this work out?
First of all, you could certainly mount a feasible threat. It could be proportional if it was only a credible threat.
In other words, they were using it as a credible threat to extort additional funds from the Western world from from from from the United States.
One that would fit into your scenario. On the other hand, it seems to me that they would do that.
It would certainly break down because it would be much worse off anyway, the United States and say, well, we're not going to invest you anymore.
But it seems like you could have both ways. I mean, feasibility, you do have proportionality.
But what will work out in the real world and I'm not sure if they would to do it or not,
but why would you necessarily assume that you're never going to be able to do this?
Okay. I think it is not essential to my arguments whether it is actually possible or impossible for poor countries to reform the unjust,
unjust global structure.
I'm severe, but but and I have to take into consideration different kinds of forces that come to me that I would also have to take into account.
Asymmetric wars. And also, if it is really that inexpensive for rich countries to eliminate global poverty,
it might be much cheaper for us to just pay the money that are needed rather than to fight wars against poor countries.
But I would say if it is possible for India to.
Pose a credible threat and in that way eliminate the unjust group structure.
And if the unjust global structure has the kind of nature that it has, according to hockey.
Well, then I think it would be permissible for India to pose a threat to us and we would be liable to having.
Put us. Jeff.
And I want to say something easy and supportive as far as first point and second in support of the first point, an asymptomatic confessor.
So forgive me if this is just the standard, but it seems to me the one thing to say about the idea that.
Responsibility for what you're.
Two years is global structures underlies the idea that the rich are actually not just allowing people to die or actually killing them.
I want to suggest that whatever global structures there are are not things that.
People who exist now can be very much responsible for being there as global structures, whatever they are,
are structures that have evolved over many generations of people is nobody who decided at any given time,
let us set up the world in this way the politics, the economics and so on.
It is evolved to be what it is. And there's never been a time when we can where any of us could together say, Well, wait a minute, this is unjust.
Let's stop doing it this way right now and and change it today.
Let's completely reorganise the world economy and world politics.
And let's just get this over with once and for all. It's just not a possibility, even for the very rich to do anything like this.
You know, any kind of change in what's being called global structures here has to be.
Some people, just necessarily a lot of people are trying to do this.
And you might want to rewrite the argument claiming that those people who are resisting
the international institutions or something like that or whatever are going to be liable.
But it's it's hard to see how anybody now can be held to be responsible for the nature of global institutions.
Secondly, I worried about the kind of coherence of our second part, because Europe mixing, I think, two things together.
You're saying, first of all, that their action would be futile.
But you were saying that we would be somehow burdening them to prevent them from engaging in this action.
But I don't think we'd be really burdening them if the action were actually unilateral,
if they weren't going to get better as a result of things that no good for them was going to call it,
and it wouldn't be adding to their burden just to say, no, you can't, you can't do this.
So and lastly, it just seemed to me that even if we thought there.
Somehow it's understandable why they would want to do this, as you said,
and look at what they've done to me or something like that, that that phrase itself suggests that what they have done,
this is just an excuse rather than a commission or a justification, would suggest that,
you know, they've made war on these rich people without any real hope of success or whatever.
And we can see that they were excused to do that. It's not clear that.
I can testify that Danny has with an excellent painting regime that it could be justified by giving too good to other than that success in the.
So in response to the first point about the global structure not being something that anyone is responsible for,
I guess that would be taking issue with Pakistan's analysis rather than taking issue with my argument.
I'm assuming that Pakistan argument is is analysis of global poverty is correct.
And he's saying things like rich states impose unjust global structure on poor countries and people living in rich countries who vote for the parties
and the governments that imposes unjust structure on poor people are complicit in this crime against humanity that is being committed itself.
So as I would suspect that that your point is more directed against focussed analysis than against my argument.
But setting that aside, to consider a case in which we have this club of rich nations and the people in different rich countries,
both for governments and these governments, meet at various points and make decisions.
They make decisions about whether or not to attack poor countries,
and so happens that they decide to wage war against poor countries, killing 8 million poor people a year.
I suppose that many would say that in this kind of case,
people who live in rich countries and had voted for governments that took part in making the decision to do it will bear sufficient responsibility
for what's happening to poor countries such that they cannot complain when they are being killed in defence of wars by poor countries.
And I am and I simply want to say that if we imagine a analogous scenario with regard to global poverty,
where the individual responsibility of a citizen in rich countries is tiny because it's not real,
it wouldn't have made any real difference in the average person that voted for different parties.
But if we think that in the military scenario,
people are liable to being harmed in a defensive war by poor countries to see why we shouldn't say the same about the poverty scenario,
provided that focus analysis is the nature of global poverty is correct and very brief.
We have a huge list. Okay. I'm sorry. It's just this.
I think you're you're you're gesturing towards the.
Killing and letting die here.
I mean, the very fact that nobody, including the Fuhrer themselves, sees what's happening as exactly like our going over there and killing them.
Points to the weakness in the argument that what you and Thomas are describing really is much more like letting people die.
And anybody can tell the difference between the functioning of global institutions as we have it today,
and how picking up our machine guns and going over there and mowing them down.
I do think it's telling that the victims themselves don't think of themselves as being killed by us.
I think that's telling to. But I also think that some of the examples he mentions say, like, well, are these medicines.
They could be produced very in very cheap ways. We sue companies that produce these very cheap medicines and as a result,
the case of preventing people from saving I don't want to interrupt, but the list is really long.
And also the finger rule is suspended for not telling the other.
I thought it was quite critical, said the council chair, leading the negotiations that critics of Donald Trump's decision.
That's the poor stuff, and the lack of a full weather causal chain makes no difference.
But I don't think people are going to see the idea of correctness.
But the call to change the way you talk about giving the rating agency.
In itself. So the case that you give is two different forms, but in both cases to be.
Before the homeschoolers got a blank check for the negotiations.
We have lots and lots. A lot of people are going to make.
Yeah. And that's a that's a criticism I accept in the sense that I don't think I've addressed this in the way I should in the paper.
So that's something I need to work on. But I'm thinking about it.
So, so, so there a difference between the poverty scenario and the military aggression scenario.
If the poverty scenario works in the way that by recognising dictators in third world countries as having ownership of natural
resources in the country and thereby giving incentives to generals to take over power from a democratically elected government,
says the intervening agency of governments to establish an equivalent to the military scenario case.
We should imagine a case where rich countries give incentives for dictators to wage war against their own people by military means or something,
and that that would establish some kind of symmetry between the two cases I want to compare,
because they would then both involve intervening, and the claim I would then have to argue for would be that it would also be permissible for poor
people suffering from dictators waging war against their own people to attack rich countries.
As if that was a way of removing disincentives for if you want to take over power.
I assume that if the numbers are right, the numbers are big.
That could be permissible. I think the discussions about causal chains and individual agency,
I think at the moment are very unrealistic and really highlight some of the points made
in the newspaper about the inadequacy of an individual's approach to these questions.
Things like Scott Leach's responsibility shows being fairly plausible,
easy to understand, and maybe even analysis that one significant function of a legal,
rational system of legal, rational authority is to displace responsibility in terms of create structures of responsibility between individuals.
So just seems very bizarre. That participant in that sort of structure can escape of moral burdens,
harms those structures utterly foreseeable and deliberately induced by hiding behind
the shelter of the very structures that they've created to achieve that result.
I mean, as I was wanting to say in a domestic court,
perhaps shareholders are responsible for the crimes of the company in which they have been shares.
That's a positive legal question, but I think that settles the moral issue.
Just when you asked to be Marxist, right,
to think that that stuff that we put up is completely standard American analysis will get you the same treatment.
This the same consequence. So I'm much more sympathetic to policy for that sort of reason, and that's fine.
Some of those objections really extremely unrealistic and absurd. Only on the challenge.
I think I'm very sympathetic to it. I actually write it off the thesis defending it.
I think you have to do it in a Hobbesian framework is how you do it.
Not a whole lot in framework might get you there, but the moral against law will get you to something like that.
But I think that they have the resources perhaps to deal with the potential India objection,
because if it really is a war of all against all and all sovereigns are dissolved,
then the Indian government special standing to kind of act as an agent and use uses nuclear weapons, pulls away.
So you might build on that idea to try to sort of dissolve the that possibly that's met with rejection.
You might try to dissolve it in the obscene analysis. Also still preserving the admissibility of the en maps or something of that sort.
No, I haven't worked out the details. I think it's I mean, it's not that Hobbes's the framework not you can't walk.
Reasonable thoughts and questions. Okay. So I'm not sure I got the second thought.
But with regard to the first one, I, I totally agree.
And I would be crazy not to admit that some of the scenarios, I imagine are very unrealistic.
And I suppose that there is a general issue about a general methodological issue here that where
we might take different views about how one identifies basic principles of morality for all,
but thinking about it and not trying to set aside these methodological issues, do this with scenarios.
Do they tell us anything about the morality of hope?
I'm wondering if in this kind of cases, the complexity, of course, of change is such a big deal.
I mean, it might be a big deal if you think that it's very important,
whether we are talking about the death of identify people or not identify people.
So I think if we're talking about if we know for sure that if we continue with this unjust global structure,
18 million people a year will die with the complex.
The causal chains leading to the death of these 18 million people are extremely complex.
And we can't say much about we can't predict who will die in poverty and that the force of change leading from the
unjust global structure to the death of any individual poor person are something that we do not really able to chart.
I think that does matter so much, given that if we know that something like 18 million people a year,
I know we're in complete agreement to [INAUDIBLE] is right in the last row as I would like to support.
I do not think that I imposed an unjust global order upon the poor, and I find it always very silly of poverty,
as does this step in a subclause saying our governments and then and hence we impose an unjust global order.
I think that would need significant argument if Thomas argues that by going to a supermarket
and buying something or paying taxes and telling people that it seems rather strange,
rather strange thing to say,
but if there is to a participating in the global economical order is, you know, participating in the slightest provocation then actually committed,
then you can also kill people working in the sweatshop because they are participating in the same way.
So the poor would be liable to attack, too.
And the second point is, it seems to me that the whole world of liability suits behind your argument that all this argument is is mistaken.
It is not true that we become liable to attack only because we causally contribute an unjust harm.
For example, if some guy crashes the skull of another person unjustly with a copy of my Habermas, Habermas or causally contributed to an unjust harm.
But I have not become liable to attack me that if I become liable to compensation.
And the third point is one sorry. Just before we go to the third, could you just give me the case once more?
I'm sorry. I was well, you know, I published the Copenhagen Muslims linking up to the Holocaust.
And by, in your opinion, a person's head and I causally contributed, therefore, to a person's death in case somebody decides to kill somebody.
But not knowing that that would be an upcoming.
Well, I do I know that it is an outcome of first of all,
I don't know of doesn't know that an outcome of my by the zealot will kill somebody in the third world,
especially not if, on the other hand, he says that terrorism trades actually block,
you know, food coming into our country and therefore people die somewhere else.
So you have to make up your mind, is it bad for me to buy food or is it not happening?
But anyway, there is a cult of liability that is impossible.
And the third point connected to this is if if in reality imposing upon someone an unjust global order makes you liable to attack,
then you have to see the following, for example, of stuff that comes along.
And they beat me up and then they put me into an unjust prison where I am treated like scum.
Then, of course, those people who beat me up and down have imposed upon me an unjust global order.
And the other way you can impose an unjust, just global order.
Person is to to be our child if that is proper English or to give birth to a child in the Third World.
So on all mothers in the Third World who are getting children would end up having
a liable to attack because they impose an unjust global order on these children.
In this instance, the of the whole argument. Actually I have a footnote in the paper.
Yeah. About child bearing.
And so suppose that if we didn't impose an unjust world order, then, uh, the people who are poor in the world today would be better off,
but instead they would live lots of other people who would be, uh, well, pretty poorly off as well, but still lived life worth living.
I think that in that kind of case,
it becomes less clear that we that the poor who was actually living now have complained about the unjust global strike.
But I guess that's a different issue. With regards to your first point, I'm not so certain about this.
Is this issue about our governments that the governments of the most powerful countries in the world and.
It's probably not just the United States and England, France and Germany any longer.
There are other states that should be mentioned here. There is a sense in which they are in a position to have a greater influence on
whatever global structure we live under than countries like Zimbabwe or whatever.
And also imagine that. Imagine that a country is engaged in an.
Genocide and people will not be prosecuted in any way if they refuse to pay taxes.
And I think in that situation,
if I say I don't want to pay taxes because I don't want to be contributing to the genocide that my government is conducting.
And if I did that, if I paid my taxes despite the fact that I would not suffer any sanctions if I didn't,
then it doesn't seem right to say, well, I bear some responsibility for the genocide that my government is conducting.
Now, the fact is, of course, that people will actually suffer penalties if they do not pay their taxes.
But that might just show that the excuse for it is if the punishment is severe enough,
that they are excused for being partly responsible for what the government does.
I don't think it shows that they are not responsible at all. And also, I think we should we should compare this to a case of military aggression.
And I'm assuming that there could be cases in which a government starts military aggression
against another country and then civilians in that country are liable to be harmed.
See, as a by product of attack, incompetence of that unjust, aggressive country.
And if we say in that case that the civilians,
they are liable to be killed as a by-product of military aggression, then I don't see how we can deny that.
This is also the case in which a state imposes an unjust economic structure leading to the death of lots of other people.
The state. Sorry, there is no right to reply because we have like a really long list of views to get to where it goes next.
Things are different when you go to war.
There are several groups of people who may be liable to be killed. Some of them to a greater extent, and some of them to a lesser extent.
Some of them to no extent at all. And they're not liable to be killed.
The other states, government leaders, politicians and so on, I think they are very, very much liable.
Right. The unjust side. And they are the first group which this ought to be eliminated if we have to do it group by group.
Okay. At the bottom of the list, you'll have the babies there completely the in the seals, the ones who are unable to make up choices and so on.
Somewhere in between you have civilians who are less involved and will go up and up and taxpayers somewhere close to the top of the list,
not at the top of the list, but close to the top of the list will be the soldiers who are actually the ones
who carry out the killing and do things and take arms and shoot people unjustly.
They are the ones who will be killed in this war. Now, in your example, there's also a list of more or less culpable people.
The more culpable people are, the, again, the politicians, the governments and so on.
Next, international lawyer is a lobbying group and so on.
Swiss bankers and so on and so on and so on. At the bottom of the list, there will be again, the infants, the imbeciles.
So near the bottom of the list, you'll have the lower classes which most armies are constituted of.
And they're the group which will be killed in this war. It's not the bankers.
Pretty good reason in to in normal warfare soldiers where it's an economic killing, not to kill the soldiers.
They aren't the ones doing the killing. So bite the bullet.
Bite the bullet. Yeah, I know.
But now not just trivialises your argument, because if you are going to say,
well, we should really kill the bankers, then I do not see what the argument is.
The assumption is that the bankers kill a lot of people. These people make it through economic means.
These people may kill the bankers who kill them in self-defence. Yes, I agree.
No. So, look, here's what I'm saying.
So suppose we have two countries, Denmark and Norway. And in the first scenario, Denmark wages war against Norway, killing a lot of Norwegians.
And a lot of times people vote for the government that pursues these aggressive policies.
And I am assuming that given the kind of responsibility they have for the action of the country,
they are liable to be killed in a defensive war by Norwegian troops so that soldiers or well, soldiers and civilians.
My feeling is it might be the case that some kind of civilian immunity at stake
such that Danish civilians cannot be targeted directly by Norwegian troops,
but they can be killed as a side effect of targeting these competence.
So I think that that's a point of departure. Here's a case where Danish civilians are likely to be killed, met with such example.
So now Denmark imposes an unjust economic structure on Norway, and lots of Norwegians die as a result of poverty, and they do it by sea,
giving incentives for Norwegian journalists to seek power and by making medicine that is needed, very expensive,
such that we just won't be able to buy it, etc. Then I am saying that if you think that in the military scenario,
assuming that we are talking about the same number of civilian deaths, etc., you think that Danish civilians are liable to kill?
The same would be the case in in the unjust economic structure scenario.
So I'm not just making a trivial thing about killing bankers.
I am saying that if if you think that in the military scenario,
there's some kind of liability to be killed on part of civilians or responsible for the actions of the government, then the same is the case here.
That's true. Left to Helen. Okay, let's try and come face to face to face a face in 2005,
since the one way in which people can contribute to the hope behind just doing it is through failing to take steps.
That would mean weak national economies were protected against what he calls exogenous shocks from outside the national economy.
But global financial crises, most of the things are failing to design a system that prevents economies suffering no chance.
I think this is one way in which you can't be bothered. Now.
Okay. Just how many times on the numbers here we have 18 million people.
And I tell you, whether it does matter where we come from as a means of of action.
But if I have one person, I kill them. I take it that yields I'm a basket will not yield a just cause on their part to kill me.
Yeah. Here's your claim as saying with regard to this measure that POGO says produces world poverty.
So if I'm about if I'm a banker and I'm hoping to institute a global financial
system that fails to protect your economy adequately against this sort of a shock.
Is your position that if one person will be killed by that, then there's a just cause to kill the banker for your position?
Instead, the numbers don't matter again.
So once we start killing, I think you wanna put an effort on a million people that result from that failure too, to allow people to shock.
And that would be the kind of thing that would just cause war.
So we should just because we're number sensitive on this account and is the way that you can trade
off the seriousness of the shortfall in your duty against the number of people killed as a result.
So if I fulfil 95% of what you do as a banker to make sure that we're not exactly shocks,
but it check things quite heavily enough, my folks are at 5%.
If a result of that is I don't know. Think so. And I don't know that you want this issue just cause we're not.
Not just. Just them around. Just cause it is sensitive to both numbers and small variations in the degree of harm.
Okay. So. So we have no time, basically.
But, you know, you can you know, the questions have to be really in basically no time.
I think you're making two points. The one is about the one is about failing to implement a system that cushions economists against external shocks.
As that, I think here there is an issue about doing and allowing.
So it seems we are more here, we are more taught, we are more likely to be talking about allowing harm rather than doing harm.
And they have a short discussion of that particular mechanism in the paper.
With regard to sensitivity to numbers, I think that the argument to make is neutral on this issue.
So I think for all I am saying in this paper, I could go either way.
But as a matter of fact, I would want an account of liability to being held in self defence that this.
Well, yeah. Sensitive to numbers, but I think it's it's not something that I commit myself to have ended up in the paper.
Mr. Who has just lost two of people who are dying of starvation to defend themselves.
I don't know why you want to make herself so one way, but she made them all.
Is you imply that the active missions distinction is really important in justifying that permission to hold.
But that doesn't seem to be so obviously true.
So if Andrew failed to rescue me from a pond, what he could do just at the cost of his suit, he refuses to do it.
Now. I could kill him. And he would fall into the pond like you track myself out.
But he's violated his duty. He could have easily rescued me just at the cost of his suit.
And I can shoot him and put myself out so he could be liable to be killed.
Even if it's just an admission of the failure of the way in which he made it is to demand the report.
And then the other way with you implied that it's only permissible to kill people when they're liable to be killed.
I think you mean intentionally, but that's not quite right.
So there can be people who are not liable who still intentionally killed them.
I brought your example earlier. Those are my cases where a person is not liable to be killed because it freezes on the road and then you do it.
You pull them off so that everyone else to escape. So if people prevent me from setting up justice institutions, which will save all these lives.
They're just preventing me from from doing what I have good reason to do.
Save all the lives of of you just institutions. And all these powerful people get in my way.
They do like to stop learning of this just so that I can go and save all these all these lives.
But they may not be liable to be killed, but it was a massive liability, much very when it comes to how many people as a means to an end,
it doesn't matter necessarily when it comes to all intentional killing.
Okay. Sue points it. It happens all the time.
You say something that you think is fairly radical, and then somebody comes along and they say something that is extreme.
But I think I'm not I'm not denying in this paper that it would be permissible for poor countries to kill us in a redistributive war.
Even if it were just a case that we simply failed our duty to assist them.
I am simply not taking any standard that I am simply going along for the sake of argument with
ascribing more significance to doing and allowing and morally significant does not in that way.
Well, but I do not really taking a stand in what way?
It is significant.
I am just saying, assuming that PwC is right, we do harm people in the Third World by making them poor in a way that kills a lot of them.
And what can they then permissible to do to us? What? What are we liable to?
What kind of defensive actions? I'll be liable on that part. So I don't think I really need to disagree with anything.
The premises imply this just means restrictions on consumption.
And I didn't want to say the other thing as well, that it is only if you are liable to be killed that you can more easily be killed.
And I'm not quite sure why you think that. I see something else in the paper.
I thought that you thought that it was liability to ground with the promises killed in wars.
Well, it is one of the things that gun permits ability to to kill you.
Okay, gentlemen, back. All right. Behind you.
Sorry. Okay. Is this from Frankfurt? I have a question on this futility point of the proportionality.
I mean, Laura posited in a way which surprised me a bit.
You said that if we do no wrong,
the poor that the poor kind of are and this are from understandable reasons they attack us that somehow I could not have anything to say.
I thought through. Other point is, if we run them and they have no chance of success, are they allowed to attack us?
But then still on page 20, I have certain problems. In a way.
You say that even if they do live and they are liable to attack.
It might still not be permissible for the for the poor to, you know, to to attack the rich people who were wronging them in the first place.
And you explain that by that you say and with reference to next judgement.
McMahon They will only be just even if it is not morally justified.
I thought it was in law that the problem is always the side effects collateral damage.
You always kill innocent by doing a war.
But when you I mean, the example of the Holocaust kind of clarified it.
If I am attacked by ten persons, they want to kill me just because I for the fun of it.
And I have the choice of defending myself. And I know I won't be successful either.
Yeah, I am going to be successful if they are still able and I wouldn't want them if I would kill them.
I mean, just have to defend my dignity, whatever. How can it not be permissible?
It seems to me that, you know, if you do it because the consequences would be bad.
So let's say 20 days would be would be missing afterwards.
Whether they would be killed, if you kind of combined is a logical reason for consequentialist reasons, but not really combine them.
But it is two paradigms in a way. I say I can't kill them because I do no wrong them, so I do not act impulsively.
It might just be the case. It would be super arrogant. Or if I would say, okay, I save myself, I know I sacrifice myself.
Perhaps they have their childhood so and they are really mean and they had a bad experience.
So I not kill them. They have families and so on and so on.
But if I would kill them, I wouldn't do anything wrong. So it is permissible.
I would think there might be other reasons, but not professional permissibility.
You should have a consequentialist paradigm you say is not permissible because it's ten lives against one, even if I discount for the culpability.
So. But you seem to combine them. I don't know how exactly works.
Okay. Here's something quite general.
It might not specifically address the point you're making,
but what I really want to say to make my argument is simply that the fact that if poor countries attack rich countries,
a lot of bad things are going to happen in Muslim, in poor countries.
I'm suggesting that this works differently in relation to more permissibility than it does from what it does in relation to more.
Ability to arm. So I'm suggesting that it would be kind of artful.
So if we assume an interpersonal setting would be kind of odd for rich people to say.
We are not liable to be harmed by you. Because if you try to undo the unjust structure that we've imposed on you, we will ban you to help that.
That doesn't seem to be a good argument for why rich people are not liable to be attacked by poor people.
But it seems to be, well, from my perspective, a good argument for why it might be morally impermissible for poor people to attack rich people.
So that is the kind of distinction I want to make.
And precisely where the threshold in terms of bad consequences lies for when it would be impermissible for you to defend yourself.
It is an issue that I don't think I really need to address here.
For sure. Yeah, a couple of kind of points to some of the criteria that we have dismissed glosses over quickly.
And I think we have completed both the difference between doing a plausible case that can be made,
the importance of the losses of principle in terms of doing John Langer's got people where you can disagree along those lines.
Secondly, a legitimate authority would have thought that.
For any fruit to be just ready to be had to go to water for the redistributive reasons to state that you can't go to war but need to be legitimate.
So a totalitarian state that's going to go to wage war for redistributive reasons and then meets the rest of the criteria,
but then just the size of the kind of pocket money itself with the of the criteria so that the company can smother a smaller place.
Third point kind of follows on from what everybody said was that I mean, I also worry that this is going to be going to be massively expensive.
So it's not just the rich that impose that.
I'm just like all of them poor. It's all for the poor. So I am thinking here about the security down by the River Nile.
So the idea is that the security dilemma.
So for those of you that don't know if the idea is the states are in this kind of anarchical system where they're
against each other and they're constantly there's a constant threat that you're going to be attacked by another state.
This means there's an arms race, so states have to continually arm themselves of more and more money involved.
Now, if this is the case and they spend more money on arms, then they don't get to spend so much on how for such attacking the global problem.
So you might think, for instance, that India and Pakistan and on your account would have some sort of just cause for
attacking each other because they they're having they have to maintain nuclear weapons,
be able to deter attack from each other rather than spending on tackling global poverty.
So I do I do worry that. If you kind of it's just a far too permissive international system.
So an international system where virtually any state, poor or rich,
has got a just cause to wage war against another because they're kind of maintaining each other,
maintaining every state in security in the security dilemma.
The current situation. This is your last point.
So the kind of situation I am addressing is one in which one party asymmetrically imposes an unjust structure on another party.
The India Pakistan scenario you're describing is one in which two parties kind of cooperate, imposing and harmful structure on each other.
So I'm not really certain that the view I have about this asymmetrical situation commitment to any
view about the symmetrical situation in which this is what is going on between two countries.
Okay. I guess I would suppose that I would say that it would be just for people living in Pakistan and India to violently remove their governments.
If that was a way of making sure that economic means were used to fight poverty rather than.
Bioweapons or something like that. With regard to legitimate authority,
I mentioned there might be situations in which legitimate authority is a condition of being able to fight a just war.
But I think that it's also pretty clear that there are situations in which legitimate
authority is not necessary in order to fight the force of the Soviet Union.
Second World War. The government wasn't legitimate, but it was fighting this war when it fought the Nazis.
So I think it cannot be the case that it's always is that it's a necessary condition, whatever the circumstances, for fighting force.
It's her question for Laura Papas to listen to to help without having any right under the sun.
So we have a duty to help them, but they do not have the right to be helped or do they need a stronger rescue?
This obviously coconut cream seems to be very interesting.
And it it could change some of those fears of this really quickly here about this story of some people that we take as permissible,
but according to this scale wouldn't be the second part of the question is they do not have the right to be helped,
but they still expect to have to be held.
So what's the status?
Moreover, we are aware of that expectation that they may have.
Okay. So on the first point,
I took it that the particular moral analysis of the two society scenario one is for because of an actual catastrophe or something.
And so the other which society has nothing to do with it because it is speaking.
And I took it to be one that would follow from the premises of Kasper's argument.
So I don't think that it would in some way change in passing, enumerating various features.
And obviously there is a possibility that you have some kind of duty to help without any clear reason for the other party to have a right to be.
If there is a right to be held, I would be forced to do that.
So I talk about that on The View and maybe that Castro was proposing something like a right
would only arise in cases of contribution where you sort of positively bring about the harm.
That's the case I discussed. Exactly.
So that's the I mean, if you think that what I suggested in some way involved a different overall moral framework than the one that Caspar proposed,
I don't think that that's the case. I mean, the reason why I chose that particular example is precisely because I thought it was in line with
his emphasis on the distinction between actions and omissions about the expectations of the poor.
I'm not sure what the moral status of those expectations is.
I cannot say that they had the same types of expectations that the expectations are assuming this moral framework as the expectations
of those whose rights are being violated in the case in which some people are holding on to resources that actually belong to them.
So I, you know, right of reply, we have to go.
I am sorry. It's a couple of things in no right of reply to you is wrong.
So I really like your first point.
It seems to me the simplifying simplifying assumption that there are we is is suspicious.
And I want think about Oxford College System.
I ask people, I ask people, how is it organised?
We don't know. I don't understand it.
Is it efficient? It's it's the total opposite of efficiency.
So why why is it isn't it changed?
No one can. It's impossible to change. And the reason very seriously say it's impossible to change.
Now, it's obvious that there are many people that contribute to this structure positively.
They are agents of this structure. And still, I didn't help hold them responsible because they can change.
They can change it. No, it's it's it happens also with the global structure.
There is a race to the bottom in in terms of taxes.
No, a leader lower the tax tax rate.
And he said, look, I don't have I do not have choice because if I won't do that, then either my competitors, the opposition will do it.
We will throw me out of power. We will do the same or another state will do so.
We have a problem. We couldn't contribute to the unjust global structure and still we cannot we cannot prevent it because problems of coordination.
So even if they buy it, it seems to me that this might be something that probably did not.
It's not police fault, but your analysis fault, namely, he might be totally right in saying we impose we impose this,
but no one of us can can change the situation because of problems of coordination.
And that's why even if there is active causal contribution which involves agency,
this does not imply just calls for the ideas that we which countries impose an unjust structure on poor countries.
But they are not that they cannot they cannot avoid doing it because they don't know how to to they cannot collaborate because of system.
Because they because they cannot collaborate. There is so many so many cases of it here.
I think it makes a difference whether you say even in Oxford,
they cannot collaborate in order to change the the system, which everyone agrees that it is, that it is inefficient.
But I think it makes a difference whether they are saying we know what we should do,
but we can't cooperating in doing it because they all refrain from doing what would be needed for them to cooperate.
And the case where they say, well, we all have the best of wills,
but the fact is we do not know what we should do in order to avoid what we should do.
And in and I guess the Oxford scenario, that might be the latter case, the former case, I think it is not enough to get rich countries off the hook.
So it would be like 20 high of killers each cooperating about killing someone.
And then you say, look, why are you killing this guy?
And well, we could refrain from killing this guy, but that would require quite.
But we don't do it. So no one is to blame. But I think poverty actually makes some.
Well, I can remember I'm saying assuming that pockets.
Right. I'm not saying that in some instances, but I'm assuming for the sake of argument that it is right.
But I think at this point he would point to some proposals we have like this $3 tax on each barrel of oil being traded,
or this incentive fund for developing medicines to address diseases that are primarily that promotes primarily in and on poor people.
I think he have some proposals as to how we undo some of these bad effects of the global structural countries analysis.
We can't just plausibly say we don't know what to do.
Gentleman in the back. Yes, you should listen.
It was about me. They have to remind me.
What exactly is the point?
I guess is that by virtue of the very fact of extreme duress or absolute scarcity.
Stretchers for people who are under those conditions.
Yeah, that was one of the inspirations behind it. Yeah. I just wanted to maybe critique that briefly.
I think that one of the reasons that we have World Series is just a symbol for
it is not just to say like what conditions are people liable to be attacked,
for example, it's not just because they do X, they can be attacked, but it's because they x.
It seems as though like if you release people from this kind of moral structure, it leaves open the question who they can who they could attack.
Right. So I guess maybe more specifically.
If we release them from this consideration in the West or in rich countries.
Created this and justice. Then it is like.
We can't specify who they can look better just by virtue.
Super quick. So good point.
And I mean, I won't have time in the comments, but I want to say also something later on to Jeff in response to what he was saying,
because I think you hit on some important issues.
I do see that as being a problematic implication of the thought.
But on the other hand, so I haven't reached reflective equilibrium on this is just an intuition.
Another couple of thoughts I still have to balance and properly bad.
But the thing is, on the other hand, so what you're suggesting is we would be in some sort of Hobbesian kind of state of nature.
And that was this idea.
And I'm wondering whether, well, maybe under those conditions, if they are in such a situation of extreme scarcity, maybe that's the way we should.
I mean, part of me thinks that that's not so implausible and part of me thinks I wouldn't want to go down that line.
So I think I'm I'm still in a dilemma here. But, yeah, that's all I can say.
There are four questions left, and I think we should take them in two groups of two and particularly separate just on the compound.
So I wanted to make two brief comments. The first one was in relation to this is this point before where you say that it seems strange that somebody
should make himself not liable to be killed because he threatens to make the cost of attacking him so high.
Right, that the rich can make themselves not liable by making the costs of attacking very high.
And I know it seems like it's also strange that they should be able to make it morally impermissible.
I mean, they can clearly make it irrational for us to for this to happen.
But the argument by which they the reason that you have to say that, why should they be able to make themselves not liable to attack?
I think it applies exactly the same reason.
Reason applies to why should they be able to make it moral and potentially lethal to attack them just by going, we're going to take action.
If you attack us, then you're not allowed to do that.
So I think the reasoning I'm not sure why the reasoning would be different.
The other point was I thought that really we should be talking about terrorism and crime here,
not for any sort of big, big sort of methodological reasons,
but just because the argument you can kind of get out of the the very strong
revisionist implications of your argument in the context of war by saying,
well, it won't be effective. And of course, too,
damage terrorism is if they can use terrorist attacks in order to achieve these things as far as those both necessary and in the interpersonal case.
So I'm I'm going on holiday to India and I've got my camera around my neck and I start my day.
And this attack went down in the whole of Africa last year with about £4,000 worth of equipment on my back.
And maybe I would go past some people in the street who who might be their families might be dying as a result of the global economic order.
And so what I want to know is if your argument has the same implications in those interpersonal cases where either they they robbed me,
kill me properly, or even just Rodney turned my camera and said it all, and one of the kids is going to die.
We are going to have this strong implication. Are you prepared to accept strong revisionist implications in those cases where you
can't really get out of it by saying it won't be effective or it'll be disproportionate?
To support his comments or for moderating that comes from you, starting with a case of military aggression.
I think that those are cases where it's relatively clear what the demand of people who are going to go to war in response to aggression.
It's basically just withdraw his troops or stop whatever this military exercise is.
And I think your position would be. I'm fine.
Just emphasising that the. A parallel kind of demand in the economic case can arise.
You just mentioned a couple what you said about the global resources dividend, that drugs payments.
I think it would be helpful if you anticipated poor people warning the rich if you
do not estimate how much better off your made by this existing unjust world order.
You'd have to contribute under some just reforms.
And then can try to contribute some to effective poverty relief.
Then you ask it wrongly, and we think that renders you liable to certain forms of aggression.
But I find that a way of defending guilty.
But the other thought is. You see, why not start at a different point?
Why not start with a thought? Redistributive civil war is clearly permissible.
So when Castro and his comrades went to Cuba and undermined the Batista regime, I don't think that was wrong.
But that has all these kind of problems. It's not clear exactly how the regime was killing people.
What they were doing was imposing a set of economic institutions which had a relatively high level of absolute deprivation associated with it,
compared with the set of institutions which was ban imposed by the Castro.
But it seems to be clearly permissible in that case.
The Civil War was permissible. So you. So why not say the same thing?
That is not so. When we move to the international case, there is not enough difference.
So the economic redistribution is on the ground for.
Okay. I think you can do.
Andrews, Cummins very quickly. So I just thank you for some helpful suggestions of a group of us with regard to this coming.
Well, your last point about what can be done for you when you travel in Africa, I think it is a great challenge and I have to think more about it.
But no two things.
I could say that if you consider the military aggression scenario, if I could have the view that there is some kind of civilian immunity.
So you voted for your government. Your government participates in this military aggression against poor countries.
Does that mean when you travel in some of these poor countries, any poor person in that country whose plight has somehow been worsened by military
aggression by your country could do whatever he or she wants to do with you.
I could hold the view that that is not the case. You cannot be liable to that sort of harm.
And I could say the same about the poverty scenario as well.
So I think nothing, nothing in my view, commitment to saying that it would be permissible to do this.
And also, I think this your example is this further issue.
So suppose I address against someone and so I try to shoot someone and this person can.
This person can appropriate a kidney of mine to save his own life, but that has nothing to do with the threat and person to this person.
You might hold the view that even though it would be permissible to kill me in defence against my time to shoot this person,
it would not, at the same time be permissible to take away my kidney to address a different threat to life.
And I suppose one could say the same in the scenario you imagine in Africa that you could
perhaps be attacked to address the threat to pose through the country's governance structure.
But that doesn't mean that anything that you can be deprived of that will help poor people can be done together.
That would be at least a possible position.
And with regard to the asymmetry between liability and permissibility, that's an issue I have to think more about.
But the thought was that permissibility depends on harm in a way that flight ability doesn't serve you not being wrong.
If you bring about a situation in which you set up a course,
a scenario where a lot of bad things will happen if anybody does something to you that cannot affect your rights.
Whereas permissibility relates differently to harm.
But I. I need to think about this by now.
A lot of questions. This is starting to get five points long.
Yes, you have the latter over.
Margaret goes along with an idealistic proposal for my formative years that were clearly contribution is much broader and contribution.
Captured, locked away in home. I may be attached to your action, but killing seems to be more specific.
So. And the problem with this is that it starts out.
Finding some examples refocuses our intuitions that that certain things that I have very
stringent duties attached to it and be like driving ordinary person or whatever to
reduce character cases of doing harm in order to solve for stringent demand in containing
these types of killing off or contributing to harm and then control this period,
which includes a lot of other types of contributions to the.
Art is so human. And the problem with that is that we do not share the intuition that all this
other type of contribution to harm has the same normative characteristics,
that WikiLeaks is some kind of cheating going on.
I have the feeling for the a woman who will bring this dispute, compartmentalise it and kill it.
So you kill. I did. Yes, of course I did.
Did you know how to contribute?
Yes. Maybe you can say who contributed what.
So it's a much broader concept. So as you were doing this, he was able to get a lot of people agreeing that we contribute to global poverty.
But we do not kill them. And if only the killing, the narrow influences or contributions we have to hope is not only to countries established,
obviously innovative and useful for the food security in.
This broader notion contribution that you have had with the central government of the capital.
Okay. So late in day, so I won't have time to answer. Well.
Well, I think I. One issue is, why does not target use the word killing?
And I mean, that's not really much interest of much interest.
But this, of course, is the interesting issue,
the interesting substantive issue of whether the kind of whether we are talking about contributing to the death of poor people in a way that is,
morally speaking, very different from if we killed them directly.
And I have this domestic example in the paper, which is supposed to be a domestic analogy to the incentive problem in relation to dictators.
So suppose that you say to this government and if you take over this family farm,
this is democratically one family farm, we will buy the products that you produce.
And now the government has an incentive to take over the farm and does so.
And the question then is, could the people living on this family farm,
could they defend themselves by killing the person who gives the incentive to the government to take over the farm?
And even if you think that it is somehow this morally wrong to give an incentive to a government to take over this family
farm than to directly kill some of the members of the family farm rather than give the government the incentive to do it,
you must still think that it would be permissible to kill the person.
Sorry. We have been notoriously, you know, over over time.
Okay. Thanks a lot.