Well, it's a great pleasure, ladies and gentlemen,
to be here to introduce the speaker at what is one of our most prestigious lectures in this college.
We have an annual lecture from the European Studies Centre, which is enormously active anyway.
It's, it's, it's one of the most of all asset centres are active, but the European Studies Centre is particularly active shall we say.
It's, it's always, you always have extremely good seminars and very good speakers.
And I know that tonight is going to be yet another high point in what you do.
And I'm very, very pleased to be able to introduce Professor Offered.
He will be taking questions at the end and what you need to do is attract the attention of the students over there who's got a microphone.
And if you could wait till you get the microphone and if you could introduce yourself, that I think would be nice.
And so we'll we'll end up the lecture with with some questions.
Professor Ofer is a political scientist and sociologist.
He held the chair of as professor of political science at Humboldt University in Berlin and earned his
degree at the University of Frankfurt and then his have a habilitation at the University of Constance.
He is now well, he says he's retired, but it doesn't sound much like a retirement to me at all.
He is now teaching on a part time basis at the Hertz School of Governance School of Public Policy, where he holds a chair of political sociology.
He has held professorships in the course of his long and distinguished career at the universities of Bielefeld and Bremen,
and he has held research, visiting and professorships and taught courses quite literally around the world the United States,
Canada, Australia, Russia, Hungary, Poland, Austria, Italy, Netherlands and a very,
very long list of places where he has contributed his knowledge and his scholarship.
His fields of research include democratic theory, transition studies, European Union integration and welfare, state and labour market studies.
He has a long list of publications which, if I were to read them all out, would not leave enough time for him to lecture.
But his most recent work includes a book Modernity in the State, East and West,
Institutional Design in post-Communist Societies, and most recently in 2006,
a book with the marvellous title, Reflections on America, Tocqueville, Faber and Adorno in the United States, a very interesting trio indeed.
He is talking tonight on returning to Europe.
Divides and challenges in the enlarged in the enlarged European Union.
And like you all, I'm very much looking forward to it. Please join me in welcoming you, Professor, often.
So thank you very much for your kind words of introduction, and thank you for inviting me to this lecture, which I had heard before.
I'm very honoured to be invited as Speaker, but I want to do is to look at the present state of the European Union and in
particular three of its contracted construction sites that are of particular interest.
And I will spend an even amount of time on these three construction sites.
The first is the question the divide, the conflict, the tension, the cleavage between member states and the union, the relationship.
The second a very briefly, I just mentioned this because it is and the discussion everywhere in Europe is the relationship
between five of the six original member states on the one hand and what is commonly used under the.
Acronym PIGS. That is the.
Five States and the cabinet. Fiscal financial precariousness.
Portugal, Ireland. Italy, Greece and Spain.
Pigs. And thirdly, and most extensively, I'm going to talk about another third divide.
In Europe, and that is the divide that is marked by the former Iron Curtain.
That is the divides, tensions, challenges, conflicts that exist between the EU 15 or the old member states and the EU ten.
That is the new Member States of a past socialist history, leaving out one and a half Mediterranean islands that make up the 27 at the moment.
So the first question that is being us and that I want to briefly discuss is the question of member states.
And the EU, the limitations of democratic accountability at the European level and its consequences for democracy at the national level.
The problem is not primarily that the EU must become democratic, which has happened to an extent through the Lisbon Treaty.
It is that Member States politics must remain democratic and not the democratic.
Process at the member state level should not be pre-empted and distorted by European decision making.
Moreover, major institutional actors at the EU, as many analysts have observed,
that South being one of the most prominent major institutional actors at the EU level, namely the European Central Bank,
the European Court of Justice and the Commission, when it operates as a rule enforcement agency,
have a direct impact upon the citizens of the member states and therefore must be subjected to some kind of institutionalised legitimacy test.
The intensity of institutional interdependence between the national and the European levels of governments is bound to thwarts attempts to
isolate the two levels and to protect the national political system from the effects of the democratic deficiencies at the European level.
That there is, in fact, reason for concern that if the shift of political power from the democratically legitimised national governments to
the EU is not accompanied by some kind of compensation through additional channels of supranational legitimation,
democracy within in nation states will be perceived as the key.
A democracy. I'm not going to discuss democracy except for one distinction that I found useful.
And I hope you won't find too, too primitive or simplistic.
Democracy is a accountability, and accountability applies to two questions.
One is the question how and to what extent rulers are effectively prevented from doing the wrong thing that is,
effective punishment or sanctioning capacity of the ruled over the rulers.
The second is rule as mandated and able.
To do the right thing. And how can they be mandated?
Not violating the limits of rule, but using their power for of purposes that are commonly approved.
A system of rule in which rulers are held perfectly accountable by the rules yet cannot accomplish anything,
is as much a caricature of democracy or an impoverished version as would be a system of rule which
is highly effective in shaping conditions and developments without being accountable to the rules.
So both things must come together. Moreover,
the two aspects of democratic rule hang together as it appears unlikely that the rules will
have good reasons to support a set of rulers whose capacity for significant policymaking,
as opposed to the simple execution of market imperatives and problem solving, has evidently evaporated.
The rules are powerless when the institutional resources to control rulers are absent.
But the rulers themselves can also be powerless and thus do not qualify.
By the second criterion of what a democracy is, when they find themselves incapable of dealing effectively with problems,
of providing public goods or of protecting EU societies from what could be called public bads when this is the case.
The system of rule loses its policymaking capacity.
A democratically constituted political power is idols.
In modern capitalist democracies, the major cause of the incapacitation of rulers is of an economic nature.
Marcus Hold would be policymakers in a bind.
As soon as they adopt an activist approach to the solution of social problems through policymaking,
they will be punished by adverse reactions of economic actors such as investors
and employers on whose activities policymakers depend as their tax base,
as well as their political, as well as their political support.
The present configuration of the euro polity and its largely negative integration is clearly such that it enables
economic actors to make extensive use of this mechanism of punishment and thus to disable the making of public policies.
So. So the question that citizens have of Member States looking at the European Union is
what can the European Union at all do in terms of desirable collective outcomes?
The governing or policymaking or governance capacity is at issue.
The two standard justifications that Europe offers its member states and citizens are the backward looking justification that Member States have,
after all, voluntarily giving up some of their self-identity at the point of joining the union.
And second, the forward looking of functionalist justification in terms of output legitimacy.
As for itself, again, as record as that is claimed on the grounds that general observance of these
constraints and the universal compliance with European regulations will eventually
hopefully turn out for the better in terms of the the prosperity and the assurance
of even burden sharing and the security from negative externalities and so on.
And well, I think the current issues that European policymakers face make these backward looking and forward looking justifications insufficient.
And the question is, what can actually be accomplished at the European level?
And we look at areas in which the many citizens of European member states, as well as political elites,
express a strong hope, strong demands for joint action at the European level, which, however, does not come for us.
Foreign policy is one example. European foreign policy.
Look at the recent events, the context of the MENA, Middle East and North Africa revolution.
What Europe, in spite of its having a foreign minister now is able to say to this and to do with its own means?
This is evidently very limited.
The same applies for of the entire last year the discussion of a common fiscal and economic policy or the economic policy for Europe,
that which would then help to prevent the repetition of the type of crisis that we have been through over the past two and a half years.
Another issue area that Europe has failed to generate policies that are supported or negotiated among
all member states and failed to support is the entire very urgent policy area of migration and asylum.
Again, we have a lot of conflicts here and a ongoing blockade of coordinated, concerted,
harmonised European policies after the very embarrassing experience of the Lisbon agenda of the year 2000.
There is still the need for a coordinated European social and labour market policy,
which supposedly works through means of the method of coordination.
At best, we can speak of a stagnation of these policy areas and the European initiatives and European coordinated coordinating activities,
very limited. Indeed, the same applies to the social inclusion agenda.
Now very high up the agenda rhetorically, nominally,
but mostly the member states are left alone with addressing the growing problem of social exclusion.
So the question is what can be accomplished at the European level and how can the governance and capacity of the European Union be increased?
And if we ask for the reasons for the disappointing.
Evidence that there's very little that can be done at the European level.
We often encounter the argument, well, member states follow their own interests.
The particular is selfish interests rather than joining the common cause of European affairs.
And I want to question that answer.
And I think it is of great was felt that this is of great also theoretical significance for social scientists that you
will find how little you get actually explained in terms of interests because interests are themselves not self-evident.
It is not that one should not follow our interests. By not, I mean it is normally considered to be selfish, to follow your interests.
It is that you cannot, because it is highly ambiguous what your interests are.
Let me develop this briefly with an example.
Suppose you are Germany and suppose the issue are euro bonds and they are now for the interest positions you can take on this issue,
pro or con eurobonds.
And it turns out that it is not clear what the priority should be from a purely interest oriented point of view.
There is amazingly little guidance from considerations of interest.
Let us go through the case from a short term and political perspective.
You can, as a German government, say, well, let's use the opportunity to cater to the resentments that prevail against the pigs.
Teach them a lesson and force discipline and also create among your national constituency the feeling of superiority of some kind,
and that has been pursued, etc. But you could also say a long term political perspective and therefore,
let's say use the opportunity to build EU economic and fiscal policy capacity in
order to prevent the repetition of a crisis such as the one we just went through.
That would then lead to a very open minded willingness to embrace the idea of euro bonds.
You could also take a long term economic perspective by saying make sure that the ability to pay is preserved or for that matter,
restored on the part of future customers of German exports.
And that would also lead to a very open minded attitude towards such a proposal of highly coordinated.
And then you could take the force of a short term economic perspective, namely, put a high priority on austerity, consolidate the budget.
Avoids being a net contributor to European causes.
And so the problem is that all of these sound somehow related to interests.
But. They cannot be aggregated innovators, and there is no metric by which these contradictory interests and or interpretations of interests add up.
And therefore we still don't know what is the best thing to do in the name of national interests.
So and I suppose that in many issues, in many countries, this can be replicated this exercise interests,
in spite of all the respect we have learned to develop forum for a realist approaches to
national as well as international policy interests do not tell you very much what you must do.
That is, interests are very ambiguous.
You don't know what your interests are. What you do know is about the shifting.
Attitudes in the mass constituency are we have as far as trust in Europe is concerned and trust in European policymaking.
In many countries, a development that in German, Germany looks the following way in the year 2002.
The question is, do you trust the European Union?
Very simple survey question was answered in the positive by 49% of the respondents and in the negative by 40%.
Today, January 2011,
the figures are that only 25% express trust in the European Union and its policymaking capacity and the full 67% vote in the negative,
since they do not have any interest in the European Union.
This is a dramatic shift, much of which not exclusively can, in the German case,
be explained as a response to the Greek financial crisis and the interpretation that governing political elites have provided of this crisis.
Namely, they are spendthrift and lack discipline and we are supposed to bail them out and it is them against be attitude,
a short sighted political logic of of interest, which has not been really counterbalanced by the other considerations, as I have summarised them.
Okay. What prevails in Europe is a pattern of negative integration of markets that is designed to increase the option of economic
exits and is designed to debase the governing capacity of national governments and their protectionist inclinations.
The market integration provides options for exits and punishes protectionist inclinations,
but the process has not been complemented by some supranational positive
integration or the restoration of governing capacity at the European level itself.
In fact, the residual elements of governing capacity that remain intact at the level of Member States are used
by them to obstruct the transfer of governance capacity from the national to the European level.
Thus, negative integration both decimates national policymaking capacity and induces national governments to cling to whatever remains of it,
rather than sacrificing it for the sake of positive integration.
There is a strong sense of in the national public sphere of Member States,
and that applies to both sides of the former and curtain a strong sense of rivalry,
jealousy, the pursuit of whatever is defined as the national interest.
And although that concept itself is fictitious and that interferes with European policymaking capacity.
Let me I have a list here of.
A number of the controversies that evolve between member states of ongoing issues on which by whatever methods,
the community method, the open method of coordination or unilateral leadership attempted by some countries has not been resolved.
And these policy issues that evade effective European harmonisation include the following.
The concern is in migration of labour, with all its ramification in terms of loss of jobs,
decline of wages in the rich countries, ethnic conflicts, political backlash and so on.
Everything that has to do with migration.
Secondly, outward flow of investments to EU countries with lower costs of employment and in particular lower taxes,
and hence the loss of employment and prosperity at the national level.
Third, the fiscal redistribution within the EU and in particular a larger EU consisting not only
in a net transfer of funds from the rich to the less prosperous countries and regions,
but also in the relative deprivation that the previous net receivers,
namely the Mediterranean countries,
are suffering or feel they are suffering after the accession of new and even poorer and therefore
even more deserving claimants among the new Member States in the east and southeast of Europe.
For the competition in markets, for goods and services, which is likely to drive productivity laggards in their respective industries out of business,
thereby adding to the persistently high level of unemployment in the most current member states and the
impossibility to do something about this problem by protectionist national protectionist measures.
The fifth the disadvantages imposed upon new member states by their being forced
to adopt an entire I keep company dare as a precondition of their accession.
The disadvantages current member countries suffer in terms of the loss of protection
as a consequence of European of the of European Court of Justice rulings.
And it is, in fact just that minorities of one or more countries fear will result from majority decisions within the Council of Ministers,
which are contrary to their majority in national preferences, all of which gives rise to the fear of Europe becoming a form of foreign rule.
And this sense of being controlled by the outside is very intense and explicit in the in the new member states of the socialist economies.
And it does not help, although it is a nice point made by a very prominent European politician that they he said, in my public situation,
well, they the Poles, the Hungarians, they have still to learn that there is a difference between that what was so and progressive.
But the willingness to appreciate that difference is perhaps limited.
And then of course, there is the financial market crisis of 2008 and its aftermath in the form of a pervasive
fiscal crisis that affects the new member states much more seriously than the over.
Let me try this. You see here the change from 2000 to 2009.
The only exception that survived this relatively favourably is Poland.
For the Polish exceptionalism and not the case of this is is you see this way in Latvia and Romania and even Slovenia,
which otherwise is doing quite well and have massive negative growth rates.
And they have also, except for those who have adopted the euro or are tied to the euro,
they have all these very unfavourable ratings for their credit was worse in this.
And I wanted to. It just highlighted the seriousness of the of the problem here this.
Now let me come to to the surge construction site namely the old was the new member states and the dynamics of conflict after accession enlargement.
The end of conditionality, however you want to call it. In order to model the unfolding conflicts between the old and new member states,
I suggest a sequence of three stages of strategic objectives and driving motivational forces.
The three stages which apply to the old and the new Member States are first,
the formulation of strategic objectives, which took place sometime in the nineties.
Secondly, awareness of the costs of achieving those objectives, which took place shortly before and since actually accession.
And third, the satisfaction of the disenchantment and frustration with the extent to which
the objectives may or may not have been actually reached and at what cost.
So this is a timeline where you first make plans.
Then you see what their realisation costs and how far it proceeds.
And then thirdly, you draw conclusions and you do so on both sides of the EU 15 and the EU ten, starting with the old Member States.
The original motivation for promoting Eastern enlargement was doubtlessly of a primary, primarily political nature,
because the priorities of the EU as well as NATO's around the mid-nineties consisted in helping to
consolidate democracy and the rule of law in the C Central Eastern Europe region through externally,
through externally imposed conditionality,
and thereby to normalise the political development of prospective member states through more or less soft forms of outside control.
In contrast, the new Member States, having just escaped from a tight and authoritarian form of supranational control,
they are mostly reluctant and sceptical about joining Europe and adopting a readymade are key.
But this scepticism and reluctance was consistently trumped by the prospect of past socialist reconstruction
that were based upon the expectation of free access of goods and workers to Western markets,
the inflow of foreign direct investment into the Central East European region,
and the claims to modernisation subsidies that would come from the EU once full membership status was achieved.
Once the enlargement process was completed in May 2004, respectively.
In January 2007, both sides experienced a wave of second thoughts among the new member states.
These consisted in the realisation of failures and an awareness of necessary sacrifices concerning the respective subordinate objectives.
As to the old Member States, their intended political aim of having stable and democratic eastern neighbours was
partly offset by the growing economic challenges originating from the Sea region.
These challenges came in the form of an inflow of goods and labour and an outflow of investment and funds allocated
from the EU budgets and the strategy of the new Member States to introduce a very low and flat rate Texas,
both in income tax and incorporation, corporate taxation and in value added tax.
I mean as low as 10% in Bulgaria added to the of to the concerns of the old member states.
I mean, big corporate taxes in Denmark, 56% and in Bulgaria 10%.
And that makes for differences that that they are very unhappy with.
Similarly and in a strictly symmetric of fashion elites as well as none of these and the new member states.
Begin to perceive the political costs of membership because that were framed in terms
of losses of national autonomy and the need to comply with EU wide rules and policies.
Thus, both sides begin to perceive the reasons for asking themselves was the price we
had to pay for achieving our primary objectives really was what we got for it.
Finally, if we read a variety of current indicators that emerge in the newly integrated political economy of Europe, rightly,
a third phase of regret and frustration or disenchantment has become dominant as the dynamics of the EU 27 or 25 unfolds.
To put it bluntly, both sides begin to see that what they actually receive for paying the price they paid
is less than what they had anticipated and hoped for from an EU 15 point of view.
The second disappointment relates to the fact that neither regime stability nor the liberal democratic consensus, nor for that matter,
a modern and reasonably corruption free state structure has emerged in the region, has taken firm roots in all parts of the region,
a disillusion that is all the deeper as it comes with the realisation that after formal accession has passed,
the leverage of conditionality has practically become inoperative and there are even signs of backsliding.
And I think there's perhaps too much the expenses room of this one seat, very much,
perhaps too much emphasis on the media law in Hungary, but it is read as an example for backsliding.
One also from the region has said sarcastically Now after conditionality is over, we can show them who we really are.
But maybe that is exaggerated to to use the Hungarian media at all.
But it is blithely done so in the in the Western media case of backsliding.
Conversely,
the EU ten new member states have also begun to look back at the deal they were drawn into and to see it as a definitely and favourable one.
Not only have they sacrificed too much in terms of national autonomy,
this is the official government rhetoric in places such as Poland and the Czech Republic with President Klaus.
But also they receive too little in return.
That is in terms of the all the member states preparedness to assist them on the road to a robust economic prosperity,
rather than keeping them in a position of permanent economic dependency.
This is a new experience. I mean, what is the most automobile intensive economy worldwide?
The answer is Slovakia. They produce 100 cars per year, per thousand inhabitants, 100,000.
And happiness is it is is monocultural.
And if something changes and some people even hope something will change in the mobility regime of Europeans,
then they are likely to suffer very badly from from shifts.
They are dependent upon this. I quoted another example from from Hungary.
So these are dependent economies that are very vulnerable if some major changes, of course occur in Western Europe.
Now, of course, time to show whether and to what extent the second and third stages of this somewhat gloomy model will materialise.
Concerning the first stage and the initial patterns of motivation at the beginning of the process that led to Eastern enlargement,
it is worth noting that the enthusiasm for returning to Europe as the Polish phrase was in the early nineties,
both within the candidates countries as well as in the EU.
15 Member States was markedly qualified in 1994.
Eurobarometer data show that the least welcome and least favourable assessed best European kind of.
That country, namely Norway, was supported by 75% of the EU 12 citizens,
running a full 20 percentage points ahead in terms of the support for membership compared to the most welcome.
Most welcome. East European candidate country, which at the time was Hungary and 55% of West Europeans.
So it is a good idea to admit Hungary. So the the the frame of the mental frame of counting upon the idea of cut and the divide
of Europe is still present both in the West and in the East in a very powerful way.
And the one side look at them over there and the other side looks at them over here.
And it is still a mental frame that informs many policy moves.
In other words, the political divide continues to play a significant role.
The legacy of the Iron Curtain, as well as other historical, cultural, economic, geographical,
linguistic and religious differences that exist between the EU 15 and the EU ten, where accession is in fact approved on either side.
Such support for enlargement reflects nothing like European solidarity, but to a large extent,
as one author has put it, not altruistic motives at the point of actual accession.
In May 2004, the supporters of enlargement within the EU 1515 just barely outnumber the opponents by 42 to 39%.
Among the EU, ten.
Only in Slovenia and Lithuania did an absolute majority of eligible citizens, namely 54 and 58%, support the accession of their countries.
There is a strong legacy of state socialism and not just in the demarcation line which is somehow mentally present.
Although physically, of course, no longer an obvious place to test the hypothesis of.
Perseverance of mental frames or cultural leg theory of transition is the part of
Germany that used to be until the formal end of the state through unification 1990,
the demographic and territorial basis of the GDR.
Even after 20 years since the end of the German case of state socialism,
the normative demarcation line between public and individual responsibilities continues to clearly
show up in opinion surveys comparing East Germany and West Germany as if in a natural experiment,
the GDR. The only example of transition through state murder or the death of a state is contrasting
to the six C case of transitions through the separation of states or state births.
So the GDR allows us to study the vast afterlife of the normative underpinnings of guiding ideas of states and socialism.
The Long Arm of the Past.
To summarise just a few findings from recent German surveys, East Germans favour a significantly more substantive definition of democracy.
They think that democracy implies providing for jobs.
They think that real democracy provides control over the banks.
And they think that's democracy as it is practised in their pursuit.
Procedures of a is deficient. And so the assessment of and I want to show this the assessment of market economy and institutions
and we have very good data on this from the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development.
And if I succeed and okay, this is a good example, the economic situation, this is 2006 data.
The economic situation of this country is better today than around 1989,
and the positive answers are in yellow and CB is Central Europe and Balkans and Southeast Europe is as e and as you see in both cases,
these minorities are evaluating the situation.
What is more interesting is that consistently through these macro evaluations,
you'll see that the younger are more favourably disposed in all three regions.
You have to this definition by and by age group and that of the LCR are more favourably disposed younger.
That can be a life cycle phenomenon or it can be a cohort phenomenon phenomenon and it remains to be seen.
For the time being, we can say that a minority of people are satisfied with the economic situation in the country
and that the young people and the more prosperous people are much more unsurprisingly,
favourably disposed. And it can be can show it not to one.
And attitude. Okay, this is attitude.
It's a slightly better profile, but you see the same pattern as the younger, the better, and the richer and the better.
And overall it is less than 60% of favourable judgements.
I can come to an end. Uh, okay.
This is overall life satisfaction. Uh, which in Central Europe and the Balkans reaches just about 50%, maybe lower.
So to distribute it in north of eight below in the former Soviet Union, the same pattern that you see at the at the bottom here.
Let at least this. Rather unsurprisingly, and given the weakness of liberal traditions of political culture in the region,
this imbalance provides vast political opportunities for ethno nationalist, populist, anti-European mobilisation.
What I mean by this populism is a drama of its three persons.
This is first we, the good, simple people, honest and trustworthy them our enemies, which can be enemies above enemies from the outside.
Two versions of this that the political the political elite is the business elite,
which leads to a leftist version of populism or minorities and spies and so on, which is rather discriminatory rightist populism.
And then third person in the game is a leader that unites us against them.
And this game of pointing at the enemies, pointing at the leader and the self-description as simple,
trustworthy and good versus evil, corrupt and alien is the basic.
And this is much more common, although is also in some of West European societies is much more common in the east,
partly also pointing to foreign economic elites who exploit us and take unfair advantage of us and so on.
So let me conclude by saying and in the West, there are growing doubts as to whether the logic of Eastern enlargement,
namely the logic of investing through opening capital and labour markets to the region and offering assistance to out of
EU funds will actually yield the hoped for returns in terms of political stability in Central Eastern Europe and Europe.
Wide cooperation. If anything, these doubts are being heightened or at least justified by the perception of symptoms of anti-liberal,
ethnocentric and also anti-European backlash to be observed on the scene of politics of many of the new member states.
My colleague Alain Juppe PD has nicely summarised this.
The indicators of this backlash are the rise of populist groups, political radicalisation,
weak majorities of sexual behaviour of in unstable parties and governing coalitions.
Occasional violations of democratic standards such as the rigging of elections.
Apart from tiny Slovenia, which is is a very exceptional place for reasons that I have a speculation about,
apart from tiny Slovenia, even the best economic growth performance of the region,
namely the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary have all been backsliding in assessment of the quality of their democracies between 2000 and 2007.
Internally unstable and externally uncooperative political elites are clearly giving rise to doubts in the old member states.
Was it Largement really worth the effort in terms of the economic burdens involved and also what is observed with some consternation in in the West?
Is the person in this personal listed confrontational style of in which members of political elites address each other as hostilities?
And that applies also to partisanship in in the media.
So what we can certainly conclude the contrary to what some political and cultural elites try to suggest.
In the West, the transition period is not yet over.
We are involved in the dynamic, the roots of which reach back to the Cold War and to the Iron Curtain.
Transition is not. It over and finally accomplished to the contrary,
the present crisis and the challenging resulting challenges resulting from it may
reactivate mental patterns and frames as they were thought to be a matter of the past,
but are not. Thank you very much. Thank you.