They can take decisions,
but the decisions that can then be challenged in the EFTA court and the court decides on this on the basis of international law.
So it functions in this relation as an international tribunal under Republic International Law, giving binding decisions that bind the two states.
In addition to this, we have there is a set up which is equivalent to the preliminary ruling system within the Court of Justice.
But in that aspect, there is no obligation on national courts in the after countries to refer cases to the after court.
So it's not like in the EU, the courts of Los Angeles have an obligation to refer cases and the judgements by the appellate
court are only advisory to the national courts and not binding on the national courts.
So the national courts of the two states have the same status within the EEA as the Court of Justice actually has.
It's a different type of status. And also when it comes to including new rules,
there is the EEA joint committee where the European Commission is represented and representing the EU side,
and the EFTA Standing Committee is representing the EFTA side so that there are two
votes in this and decisions have to be taken by agreement between the two sides.
So there's no new EU rules are introduced into the EEA without an agreement between the two parties.
So this then preserves the legislative sovereignty of the two countries in a formal sense, there are some challenges to this.
One is, of course, if new rules are not taken on board, then the rules of the single market are unravelled and the other party,
as the agreement mutually says, which means the EU may take protectionist measures.
So. So if the EEA agreement is not kept up to date with the developments in the EU through certain aspects of the internal market,
rules may be taken out completely of the agreement. So let's say that a new banking directive is not introduced into the agreement.
Free movement of banking services may be removed from the and from the corporation from the market until this then it might be settled.
It is also a matter of the national authorities to implement the EU decisions international law.
So this is still as yeah.
As in any international treaty and not a supranational chief.
It's up to the national legislature to, to do this. But if this, if this is not done,
then the EFTA surveillance authority may raise issues on the on the implementation of treaties of
obligations that have been undertaken by agreeing to take on board new rules in the joint committee.
And this is, of course, then the question and the thorny question of dynamic homogeneity,
because it is not sufficient only to have the same rules at one time, but the rules must develop in line with the development in the EU.
Maybe we should go through the next one. And this goes over then to the options.
Okay. Thanks very much. You didn't say this about the Supreme Court.
Maybe you should say that the ECJ first before we go on to.
Yes. Yes, it's a slightly,
but that's a slightly different topic because that that is on the assessment of the agreement that the UK will be able to achieve.
Okay, let's, let's see what we have done and try to discuss in the book is these types of possible options.
So in terms of of this and here, of course, what we do is, is that on the one hand,
you have a formal understatement that the next company, whether they like it or somebody,
is basically dismissing this no way option or and nobody has to, of course, outright embrace that, even if there are some people supporting it.
And then you have these other three now nuclear option and I can speak a mixed is to some extent what
has been the says you could very often have because we will have a different combination anyway.
But of course it matters a lot where you have this pick and mix and this is precisely what we have been saying, that this you have no guarantee.
I mean, you cannot choose yourself that you will set the boundaries for this option.
Plus what could be mean for instance the customs union that the both internal market and.
Midas could be without that. But it's also other possibilities. It is.
And then this last one, which we thought was very important, to bring in us the most likely one, that's what we think, too.
That's what we think, too, that there would be a gap between form of connectedness,
maybe even some of the formal arrangements and the reality on the ground.
And of course, you have more evidence given with this up the mobile enough facility in Switzerland where the Swiss are formally speaking,
making their own legislation and so on. But in practice, this has been battered to the EU incompatibility.
Well, this is what they've been doing since 1984. So they are checking because they had the networks with EU officials earlier especially.
So they knew and they were interacting very closely. So there was a high level of trust also between Swiss officials and EU officials with
a justification of the EU and for the fact that this has become more difficult.
And also the fact that they have to keep updating the agreements in Switzerland has made that option very unattractive for the EU.
And there was a report that was leaked somebody was talking about saying that the EU's definitely ruling that out.
I wonder if I may interrupt you and ask you whether you're making a distinction
between Norway model and the Norwegian option who are exactly one and the same?
At this point, I think we're thinking about the same.
I don't think we make any distinction on this side in that sense that I and you can put this question because also it's a good point,
because we could say that there is no such thing as the Norwegian model,
strictly speaking,
because this also mediates so that the Norway option would probably be one specifically tailor made and maybe want to make that kind of distinction.
We're talking about not the option for Norway, but the option for the UK and that would be the option which is adopted.
Yes, like no way out of the model. I can see that in. Yeah.
And that is an important distinction, you know, because the practice also will develop itself and could also diverge considerably from the formula.
And also model has this kind of holistic connotation.
So even if you in the book, you can use it interchangeably.
I mean, I think that as soon as you can go in one place to be more, it makes more sense.
That's really that option. Is that you okay?
If we had tried to say something about possible lessons. The back model.
I think the most important thing is the predictability. And this is also.
This is what you get, which is the situation. I'm going to say that's power of it.
Don't touch the air. And they are very concerned about Brexit also starting to spin out of control because that also is not really so.
But but it certainly emphasises the triangular structure.
So it emphasises this whole the state sovereignty and national democracy like that's the type of story.
Maybe we can say something about the court their cautious in comparison with with Switzerland which have the same rules on some of the aspects,
mainly on goods, but also on the, on the free movement of persons and on establishment of physical persons because of the free movement of persons,
but not on legal persons, not on corporations.
And that is that's a lesson to Norway, is that in order to have the Court of Justice to interpret these rules,
which are identical in their formulation to the rules in the EU treaties and in the secondary legislation,
in order for the Court then to interpret them identically.
You need the institutional settings, the institutional build up that the has.
So the Court of Justice has said in the EU context that because of the institutional setting and because of the aims of the EEA,
these rules are interpreted identically to the way the Court of Justice interprets the rules within the EU,
whereas in Switzerland, in the Swiss case, they have interpreted the same rules differently in line with the so-called Polydor Jurisprudence,
which originally split back to the free trade agreement with Portugal,
where they said that since the and the institutional setting and since the aims of the agreement is less than the single market,
there is no guarantee for an identical interpretation of the likely world rules.
So I think that's a that's a major and important lesson also to take away from the EEA as compared to free trade agreements.
And of course, treaty changes also will post checks.
As you have been writing about, treaty changes will also automatically be used to changes in the area of the envelope,
automatically also feed into this agreement.
So that's also something that the states themselves, under this agreement will offer, will influence all of the treaty changes.
But what if you also don't look at practice? I'm pretty sure that this went because we've heard this.
People don't know about what the EEA agreement is in many cases, of course, that you know.
So the only way in which to have assurance is that it is associated with being inside the EU.
Then there's no problem. So but, but the moment people start thinking and wondering, is this relevant or not, it's becoming much more complicated.
So this is this is a perceptual issue, a practical issue people will be facing.
It's not a legal issue as such, but it has to do with how we are actually being treated by all kinds of different actors across Europe,
whether they understand you as being part of this or not. So so the behaviour component,
I don't think we should underestimate this because Europe is very complicated and has very large variations in terms of the competence people have,
in terms of the framework. Now what we have been discussing in the book also is that in way that the whole issue of EU membership is depoliticised,
that basically also facilitates the ongoing adaptation process because you take away some of the political heat,
you can bracket that because the system would have gone into stealth,
otherwise it would not have been able to deal with this issue if they were continuously banding head,
banging each other's head on the issue of membership.
That's why they reacted to that and went along with adaptation and have had this work of the process now.
So the question is, is this a necessary requirement? And this is a question for the UK is is the politicisation of this a necessary requirement
or is it something that can still function when the situation is much more politicised?
So if it is so that the de-politicize aspect is a requirement, will the UK be able to ever live under those type of circumstance?
That was one. The second one is.
The other thing that that I think.
Don't upon us, especially when writing this book, because it matters how states are relating to the fundamental aspects of the whole debate of Brexit.
One is the mode of social associational affiliation that has been dominating the debate.
I think equally important, we think equally important is how the state is actually dealing with this relationship.
And that also has to do with the knowledge of the EU or the notion of the EU,
what it is totally programming or whether it is affecting settling talks or so on, but still leaving quite a lot of wiggle room for states.
And I think this is something that in retrospect, the earlier work I did didn't pay enough attention to this.
So this. So so this is a question that comes in about the therefore, the ideological or the socio economic model involved in this.
But that is important. That also goes over to Brexit, that Norway is relatively speaking much further left than the UK is.
And there's no party in Norway that is really on par with the Tories in the UK.
It's perilous. So so that the dynamics are therefore very different in terms of design.
And that also means that the EU has not undermine the welfare state.
And I'm saying that because this was a very important consideration and in the referendum in 94,
the elected via the studies, opinion polls, the study of the results of the referendum.
So it wasn't cultural difference that meant that Norway took a different choice than that in Sweden and Finland because the margins were fairly small.
It was mainly of a significant majority of women and public sector workers who voted against
the EU membership for socio economic reasons because they wanted to protect the public sector,
the state presence and the generous welfare state and gender equality progressive policies.
That was a fundamental aspect of people's voting choice.
They were afraid that the EU was becoming a neoliberal juggernaut in 94, so that was much more of a consideration in Norway.
There were regional dimensions too, but I think if you look at the numbers, this was a fundamentally important one.
So so but but I don't think this the deepest fears have actually panned out because what it has retained very much of this governments have,
of course, had the right to these types of propositions so but haven't undermined the social in the states process.
You've changed over time not been weakened states presence has changed from a significant role in
accumulation to a much more only fundamental role in social protection and welfare and health.
So that when you say the states role in society has changed, but its significance in terms of buffering compensate because that's not far away.
Maybe the trade unions and all of these issues of this conference,
they are because of also of course large scale migration and so on can be undermined
this unless you have assurance that you have similar types of salaries and so on.
And the ice is coming up because we're talking about large numbers and so on.
So yes, this is coming up.
But then up until recently at least, there was may not be that much for some, but a lot of these things have become more place for banks.
And the question to the U.K. is, would you do the same?
And will there be one UK decision or multiple decision making from Scotland yesterday
morning that was exactly on the same wavelength on the lot of these types of issues.
So there are different voices also inside the UK on this and.
Okay, this third one that we are mentioning in the book, but probably could have taken up more.
But but no we have to basically was faced with a choice once Sweden joining the EU as to
whether it wanted to have an open border or whether it wanted to have a border with Sweden,
this border controls the votes.
So it has to be inclusive in shape, which means that when we from Norway are going to enter the EU via the UK, we have to exchange.
So because we are inside the internal border with responsibility for border controls.
Part of the reason was because it would have undermined the Nordic passport, which was has done it before in the feasibility in the Nordic region.
So there is a political importance in maintaining this open border.
It's not with the same stakes as the Northern Ireland one. But we have also faced this type of issue afterwards.
It is under this society, of course, this a very large trade begins to sweep those.
Some of the people are going through the very vast numbers of places.
Something like this because it's. Because the difference is the.
Of the. Something quickly on.
Different books. I think we are mentioning this also.
The book could be somewhere so far with the withdrawal agreement.
We've seen since somewhat different logics being played out that the EU has been operating
with no chance of establishing procedures and getting trying to ensure compliance.
This of course, has to do with information, but it also has to do with the.
The EU itself and the UK started to. Pursue the bargaining element.
And of course, the fact that they are legally programmed also matters.
And on this one, yes, this is also a very important point,
which many people don't know that the original easement that was agreed between the
EU and the other countries was rejected by the Court of Justice for legal reasons.
And this will be the same here, too, that the Court of Justice will have to approve the agreement that is reached between the UK and the EU.
And the EU is restricted because they are acting within the competences of uh of the agreement.
So the final word will be whether the agreement is in accordance with the competences and the substantive rules of the treaty.
And that final word will be said by the Court of Justice and not by the negotiators.
Okay. What we also have and I'm not going to say much, we are also trying to say something about the possible effects on the key aspects of Brexit.
So we have were discussing political scenarios. Basically the assumption is that the effects will be quite significant regardless of which one,
but they would be different under two different types of scenarios.
And even the second one, that's what is a third one scares a lot of people because it will upset the balance quite significantly within the EEA.
And also we think that the UK would politicise this consensual unanimity provisions and so on,
making it very difficult to raise this so you could actually chase and it could also generate a lot of pressure and the
other ones would also be done with the pressure for renegotiating and this could also generate other kinds of pressure.
So under all these scenarios, it is likely to see that there would be loose and a lot of uncertainty and so on and different dynamics based.
So we have a lot of guns in the book, but we're not going to go through that now.
We'll just say something. Just just leave this now and I'll just leave it for the discussion.
Thank you. Thank you very much. And before we go to discussions, I have one security question.
Whose bank it is? Okay, that's fine.
I mean, not for this session, but for the next one. Okay.
And we have two questions to kick off the discussion, Matthew and Kalypso, who would like to to start first.
Yeah. Okay. Well, thank you very much. And thank you, John.
Eric. And that's bad for presenting.
And also many congratulations on what is a really timely and very relevant and very vital piece of scholarly work.
So much of what has been written about Brexit since the Brexit referendum has been on the referendum itself.
Right. You know what UK last how you know whether it's sort of exposed this sort of dislocation to Westminster in the population and
actually any recently the experts are beginning to grapple with what is arguably far more complicated and pressing problem.
And exactly what will a post-Brexit Britain butterfly, exactly what will the relationship with the EU be?
So I think it's it's very symptomatic of this new and welcome phase in academic inquiry.
I think another reason why this is a very important piece of work is that it tackles the tendency that you see the in some academic research and
within policymaking circles to treat European integration very narrowly as a process synonymous only with the European Union and its members.
And actually, by focusing on the multiple outsiders and the multiple ways that these outsiders interact with the EU.
Actually, what the book is doing is, is revealing your integration to be a very complex and a very most multifaceted process.
Right, that goes beyond the geographic borders of the European Union.
And that's not trivial because, you know, it allows us to begin to understand how the EU deals with this neighbourhood.
So fantastic. I'm completely on board with these sorts of things.
What I want to do is, I suppose to spend a few minutes imposing a group of three broader questions that I hope will encourage some discussion.
The first is the legalistic take on Brexit, and I suppose I turn to you here and better, but more than anything,
can you make the point quite forcefully in the book that the EU sees itself first and foremost as a legal body?
And you say and you said in a nation that the Court of Justice will have the final say and
that the EU uses very clear legal preferences and guidelines to guide external relations.
And of course so far Brexit, so many attacks, and that a large extent has been a case in point.
I do wonder whether, particularly in terms of the book,
whether it might have been useful to bring politics slightly more into the UK, into the discussion,
or at the very least to question for a moment,
if nothing more quite how indivisible or dogmatic the EU's treaty commitments, the single market freedoms actually are.
You know, you mentioned the pick and mix option. It's always striking, I think, that we hear so much about the UK's red lines.
What about the EU's red lines? I think, you know, you could go deeper.
The EU is not a one size fits all organisation.
The whole of its history essentially has been about flexing and the rules to, you know,
where there is a political imperative to do, say, the EU cherry picks the the EEA agreement is an example of cherry picking.
I suppose if I want to put that in terms of a question as opposed to sort of various comments,
quite how far is the EU and by that I mean collectively, but also the various different institutions.
Because what's what was interesting about your piece is know the Court of Justice is going to come along,
but I haven't read much at the moment about how the Commission is working with the council and how the council,
you know, it's going to try and sort of is it going to have an effect on the court?
So how does the EU collectively in the individual institutions, how far is are these individuals prepared to go beyond the legal remit?
Remit, and I may be politically elastic, I think is the phrase that I've achieved.
Second point, the image that come across very clear in the presentation and similarly clear in the book is that the Norway model is a mess.
So his message, they say, and of course, it's governed by multiple agreements, as you said.
And there's a there's a dichotomy in there as well, because the agreement doesn't oblige active states to to take on new EU legislation.
But they they do basically. I want to push you on one this deal sort of scenario.
Option three, you know if the UK does become a member of the EEA, you said the EEA, the UK will criticise the EEA.
How would you say that?
You talked in the book, you didn't mention partition, but the third pillar and I just wonder how that would work if the UK were to come into it.
What extent might the UK weaken the EEA beyond politicising it?
And I think this is a very, very important point, not only in terms of if the UK were to become a permanent member of the EEA,
but actually I think what is becoming increasingly likely,
certainly something that's been discussed in the UK and Brussels is if the UK fits the use the EEA framework to extend its transition period.
So that would be that would be something I'd be interested to hear.
Then final point very brief and I'll finish on this concerns EFTA after is a is an issue that's very close to my heart.
And because I'm just I'm in the early stages of writing in my book on, on the history and politics of the European Free Trade Association.
And of course, the book very rightly is about the EEA.
But I'm just encourage you just below, if I may, to, to for you to sort of push the EEA aside for a second and ask,
you know, the UK was a founding member of the Avacta since it left, it's done pretty well.
It's got, you know, 30 odd free trade agreements would be countries is currently negotiating still others with big countries India Brazil.
I wonder whether you could discuss the Norwegian experience of EFTA and in in relation to Britain.
Would the Brits be allowed back into after hi? How might that affect the organisation?
I say this because when I was at the archives, which are a very weird sort of in a weird dungeon under the headquarters of After Control, you know,
and last year I have myself showed around the building and the after building the
headquarters in Geneva is seven floors high and it now only occupies the one floor.
And so I was given a whole floor to myself to, to, to research, which was very surreal.
I don't do you hear door slamming? I'm not sure if it's the ghost of a British former, you know, Secretary Chambers or something.
But one of the Secretariat officials said to me, well, if the Brits rejoin, they can have the other six floors.
And, you know, is it due to half joking? Of course.
So I you know, I just wonder, how will it affect the organisation regardless of whether or not there is a relationship afterwards.
But yeah, I'll leave it there. Thanks again. It was a pleasure to be thinking about you.
I think, you know, you made the headline.
The first good news coming out of Brexit is to get those floor.
Yeah, well, they've taken back control.
Right now there is an option to say no, which is over.
Great news because the rest my British RAF 15 countries have to agree.
So they only have one collective vote in the EU committee.
So all the three countries have to agree that they want to accept the UK.
If one of them refuses, it has consequences also for the two others.
And that's also a political aspect which restrains the use of this.
Now, if, uh, if the after says no to take on board UK, there is no right to retaliation for the EU.
They can't retaliate, but they can enact what is called protective measures in the agreement,
which means then that they have a right to suspend the affected parts of the agreement.
Nobody knows what is the affected part of the agreement, so we don't know the other ways.
That's not retaliation. I mean, it's the equivalent. Well,
it's it's to maintain the balance because if you have a free circulation of goods and goods from one of
the contract parties are under different conditions then the goods from the other part of the agreement,
then there will be an imbalance in the market. So that's the that's the logic behind it.
The other consequence or the other difference is that the national courts have the last say,
and that has been exercised by the Supreme Court of Norway. There are instances where the Supreme Court of Norway said, no,
we don't agree with you have to court on this issue and we maintain our interpretation.
It has had no consequences.
There have been discussions of whether the up to civilians authority should sue Norway on this, but they haven't done that.
So that is but it's also very minor. Not another.
Uh, but the main difference is on the substance, and that goes to your question and also several others.
What is sort of the how can we envisage a e a minus or a Norway minus?
And I would say that Liechtenstein is important.
Uh, of course, the political reasons why this time got the exceptions for free movement of persons are different to the UK,
but what it shows is that it is possible, it is feasible to have, uh,
less or to have quite major exceptions within the free movement, the full freedoms.
Uh, and that's, that's a political issue.
It's not a legal issue which Lichtenstein shows.
Uh, Denmark even has exemption from investment in summer houses within the EU.
I mean, so there are, uh, on the matter of substance, how far to stretch the feet, the four freedoms.
I think the Court of Justice will not interfere.
What they will interfere in is on the matter of institutional integrity and on the matter of rule of law, protection of rights.
So if the if the Court of Justice is dissatisfied with the agreement from this aspect,
they will they will be attacking, but they won't they won't interfere in the substance.
So there could be, uh, quite large.
I mean, one could accommodate the red line on immigration, I think, without upsetting the, uh, the legal, uh, build up of the single market, uh,
the cost of not having a customs union and the both Sweden of it is the case where VAT is the catchword,
that there is an all commerce between, between Norway and the EU.
Uh, VAT has to be deducted with exports from the EU and has to be imposed again.
There is no harmonisation of the VAT. That's the main difference.
I think in the main cost, which is an administrative burden, both on on the on the administration and on the.
Market actors, of course, because they have to pay this extra cost of processing the VAT that I think is the main cost.
What about what does it do to border management?
Because in the Northern Ireland debate, customs union always comes up as saying we don't have a customs union, we have to have a border.
Now VAT can be can be pulled and without having a physical border and it mostly is.
So we have you know, there are some official border crossings where if you want to process VAT and customs, you can you cross the bridge.
You're allowed to cross anywhere if you do and you try to evade the customs.
If it's a third country goods, then of course it's a crime.
It's a criminal offence that you're using. So the point is that there are spot checks and there are checks.
Yeah. And there are spots. And most of this stuff is truth.
Most of it's done in front of us. So on customs union, just to stone that point forward, it really means that the debate in the UK,
everybody's obsession with being in the customs union because of Northern Ireland is been is not founded because it really matters a single market.
Yes. Yes. Yeah, exactly. Yeah. I put this together.
No, but that's what's fascinating. And because you proved that we can we can say this deductively.
But the Norway case shows that the head of the customs in the parliamentary question
actually said it's going to cost UK something in excess of £2 billion to do actually.
So that incorporated pocketed they did with the customs said restrictions.
They can choose to do it that way. Yeah.
Yeah. No, it's I mean, I also can't get my head around the customs union without the single market.
I mean, I don't understand that. So I think it's the opposite view.
You know, the internal market is split. But Thomas,
this of course for the UK not being inside the customs union is is a much more problematic aspect because
the extent to which you have foreign components being put into products like Japanese automakers and so on,
they want guarantees from the UK government that is quite different in the UK to Norway
because most of the goods coming out of Norway are our resources originating in Norway.
So you don't of course you do have the problems of the customs goods, but it's a different magnitude than the UK, a significant.
So in that sense for the UK it's much more important.
The Norway Plus with customs union is much more important for the UK than for Norway and the other EU states.
But if you take a look at the single market, there would be no free circulation of the Irish border.
No. I mean so the customs union doesn't help. Mm. Yeah.
So it's, it's the opposite as you were saying. And so yeah.
On trust, I think one of the interesting things I mean with doing this work on this about trust and what he's showing is,
is that in Norway that there is a difference between.
The full moon arrangements and conquest of Houston and reality.
But people still trust the system now. Part of that also has to do with some reality.
And that, of course, got something you don't find. So about two aspects of this. If you want to have the voting for the person, you must.
In addition, you have the stomach security you get from the understanding that the principles and the quality configuration itself.
And this is what the nation state writes on, you know, in terms of people being familiar with this, the federal system, such this cost.
So if you at the same time have a state that actually delivers, I think that magnifies this effect.
But the reality can be quite out of sync with these concepts we have about solving democracy and so on.
And that's what you see. But the question is, where is the record and where when do you reach it, you know?
So for now, we haven't reached that.
But of course things are being in more flux and it's more uncertainty for the EU or for staff in the office if it doesn't have a justified
or kind of a story to what people are saying and that that everybody will actually comply with because it's a bit of an experiment.
So the justification problem, probably an experiment is much more is the challenge is much bigger than that at this point.
It's our system. So so the EU's thoughts on this from the opposite angle is therefore much more difficult because you have to
develop both systemic security and the type of trustful from delivering and operating from the place of people.
So for instance, there were a lot of very good questions in fisheries we didn't touch.
I mean, just keep in mind that Iceland is also going to be part of this and Newcastle's
honestly we know with Iceland on fisheries I don't think it's going to be easy.
And part of the first scenario we had above no probably will mean that we will have to renegotiate the entire framework of fisheries management.
Some would even accept that the UK takes regains its fishing rights.
But you have to see your fishing rights in the EU and enjoying the EU.
But I'd like to say one thing, because it's a challenge for us to be more explicit in our conclusions.
We haven't really discussed this, but I think we are quite explicit in the last paragraph.
Yeah, there's one big part and I think what that says, at least from my point of view, I don't know whether you agree,
is that a soft Brexit is impossible and the only viable options are a hard Brexit or a remain in moment.
But I, I think that you can have a sneaky solution because what I'm suggesting is a wager on the sneaky solution.
I think you will have a Potemkin village more than that, actually a firm commitment by the UK to do something.
So I think though in a sense I think we are more in line because I think they will let slide into
some kind of a suspended animation or something that is not something that deliberately alters.
And I'm and we are not advocating that because of the issues that we have experienced.
So but but it is also like the EEA itself for Norway,
it was intended to be an interim agreement and it has just continued and continued and and mushroomed and so on.
So so that's the there is some sort of there is a resilience of the path dependency or that one should not
underestimate in the in terms of of getting in a situation where you have opposites that are incompatible.
You asked about the conversation aspects of the thing in Norway is that they reckon, as I said,
the members of this so that that makes it easier to continue with the adaptation without if the membership issue had come up like the
Tories are wanting to do in the UK opening up this actually then you would have had the politicisation of specific issues all the time,
the question of membership and what it entails and so on. The sovereignty becomes law.
This will automatically have been feeding the agenda.
This is what they have changed in Norway. So the argument we make in the book is that this actually facilitates this process because people know that,
Oh, we're not going to be discussing membership now. So we just talk about the cumulative effect.
Those is that we've also ignored the way as the Great Transforming Society.
But also keep in mind when I said this about Norway being more or less the socio economic model, we have,
of course a more comprehensive economic model than the EU, but you also aspires to that and that's different from Tories.
And so there's, there's also some element of, of congruency in the underlying interests.
And so that should not be underestimated because so far the EU has not been such a
fundamental affronts to any of the things that we have done to make up the illusion.
And I don't close this discussion,
so I suggest that we move it to the common realm of some to the garden in the event we can then get a drink that otherwise there is a
drink I think upstairs no outside but the wherever we will continue and the list listed five and then maybe in different contexts.
I myself come from 2 to 2 pieces which I wrote from my year in Legal Studies.
Has Peter convinced me that the only people who will Aaron on breakfast are
lawyers and convince me that there's nothing like politically no trial law.
So with this opportunity. Strict conclusions for those who have low degrees.
I invite you to read. Thank you very much to.