Thank you, technical staff. Welcome, everyone. What I think is going to be a very exciting part of the process is quite possible.
This college can always see a future that's going to mean something great on the walls of the college.
It's my great pleasure to welcome you here to what is both International College and Oxford students come this
year for 73 different countries and now want to bring in people from around the world to study the world.
We have a number of settings attached to the college. The impression of an emerging centre, which is what I mean.
That's right.
And I think we have here conversations about major issues in the world and we have people who know a great deal about this part of the world.
And I'm very lucky tonight to be having that. I like to call and Coach Hasty, who is the director of the Russian process, says, this is our chair.
We hope that the Russian and Iranians these sentiments and I'd like to welcome all of you to this year's lecture.
Jeffrey is generous sponsors of the activities of the centre and through that support
were able to stage events like this for many several times throughout the year.
We would like to thank the Chancellor and the distinguished members of the panel for joining us this evening.
We would also like to thank you. I'm the pinch of foundation for making this event possible.
Unfortunately, as you know,
the current situation in Ukraine and the escalation of events has meant that Mr. Pinchuk was not able to attack on this occasion.
This year's lecture deals with a very important time issue from when we first proposed this seminar, Baku, September.
The situation, of course, is very different than the main question concern the building of it among the prospects for European integration.
Today, the concern is Ukrainian territorial integrity, especially in light of the referendum being held in Crimea this Sunday.
So now we might consider the ways in which the outcome of this referendum is likely to affect relations internationally and in the region.
We very much look forward to hearing your views and to those of all speakers on these questions.
And you should note this event will be broadcast. So if you ask your question, I'm afraid you'll need to sign a consent form.
I've been told that will be available from all student helpers.
Emily, I'm Stephanie. That is Stephanie and I will be available after the seminar.
Thank you. Thank you very much indeed.
And I'd like to underline, as the warden has done,
the my congratulations to the centre on showing such a timely sense in choosing the subject for today's discussion.
And I'd just like to also underline the fact that all those of you who signed the consent form or also, as you probably know,
resigning from any commitments which incidentally the Government may have made under the health and safety.
So you lose out on that as well. I just want to very briefly to introduce the three panellists and then to say one thing and to offer a
couple of brief anecdotes which sort of illustrate aspects of what we'll be talking about this evening.
But first of all, to introduce the panellists, first of all in Victor Pinchuk Place is Professor Gwyn Sensei from Nuffield,
and I think before that who perhaps contemporaneously as Anthony,
who is a great expert on the matters that we're going to be discussing, not least the Ukraine and Crimea,
but has also written about post-communist transitions, about the process of democratisation,
about migration, about the European Union's neighbourhood policy brackets,
what that close brackets and other issues which we'll be debating, I'm sure, during the course of this afternoon and evening.
We're obviously delighted that President Kwasniewski is with us today.
We first met at a discussion in Kharkov about two years ago when I was there with Timothy and others.
He was elected, as you know, twice as president of Poland.
And he helped to secure Poland's such a very good transition into the European Union and into later helped to anchor a democracy in Poland.
And to put Poland on its course to spectacular economic growth in comparison with the
rest of the European Union is also a very valuable contribution to the scene because he,
of course, worked in the Ukraine after the Orange Revolution and helped to make what seems to be the a hopeful beginning of the Orange Revolution.
It's going to be interesting to hear what went wrong and why the reactions to what recently happened in Ukraine have been so different,
not least in the Russian. And it's particularly happy chance that my old friend and colleague have you.
Solana is also here because he too was involved in working after the Orange Revolution to secure what seemed to be a stable future for Ukraine.
How he is a scientist, as you know, an academic minister, the secretary general of NATO's high representative to Europe's foreign and security policy,
and a very distinguished diplomat with a huge reputation on both sides of the Atlantic and indeed both sides of the Pacific.
So a great pleasure that he's back in Oxford today.
Just three short points I wanted to make.
And. I guess I've read most of Conrad over the years.
Conrad born just southwest of here, the first bit of Conrad manuscript that exists is a handwritten note from Joseph Conrad, aged seven,
writes to his grandmother to thank her for sending him some cakes, and after the expressions of gratitude, he signed Joseph Conrad's grandson.
I was joking,
and it's a reminder of the way in that borderland the territory has moved from one sovereignty to another over the over the years to anecdotes.
First of all have you and I were EU Ukraine summit and I guess about 2002 with President Kuchma.
And the summit took place in Yalta at the villa,
which had been a which had provided meeting rooms for the Great Summit towards the end of the
war between the allied leaders when they began to talk about the carving up in post-war Europe.
And it was a lovely evening, and we had a great feast after the talks, which it got absolutely nowhere.
But a great feast, not least because it was President Kuchma birthday.
And I remember we had industrial sized clumps of caviar and each place its own.
Kara, a wonderful ice vodka.
And halfway through this birthday piece, Cushman, who had his personal phone on the table next to him and picks it up as it rings.
And says, hello, Vladimir Putin fanning out to wish him a happy birthday.
And I think both of them were making a point. Yes.
The FSB. I think President Putin was making a point when I suspect that President Kuchma was making a point as well,
that he had other fish, which he could provide. And the other anecdote, which has had, in a sense, sad consequences,
is that my very first meeting as a European Commissioner for External Relations was with the then Ukrainian Foreign Minister Lankov.
And what it tells you, what sort of turn, turn about over territory.
And I saw him with a couple of my officials.
And he asked me if I could describe.
European Neighbourhood Policy.
So I told him that at the heart of it, as far as the Ukraine was concerned, was that the European Union recognised Ukraine's European vocation.
And he said, Could you say exactly what that European vocation is?
And under pressure, I fessed up. That's the one thing it didn't include was actually being a member of the European Union.
So I said, You're telling me that you accepted Turkey as a European country, but not Ukraine?
At the end of the meeting after one of my German officials said it's quite embarrassing for people like me said both my
parents were born in what is now the Ukraine and my father worked for the railways in what is now Ukraine for many years.
So I hope that during the evening, when will doubtless talk about what the European Union should do in response to what's happened in Ukraine.
When we talk about what Russia is likely to do.
We can just consider, among other things, how Europe is treating its neighbourhood.
Enlargement, after all, helped to secure the stability of Europe around our borders.
And the things of the European Neighbourhood Policy have meant that we don't have that stability alone.
The real challenge for the future of European policy.
Nobody can blame Europe for what's happening in North Korea, and I think we should have been rather better around our own borders.
And I think the first speaker is going to be president and then having a similar and then subsequent.
Thank you very much for this opportunity to speak about such a hot topic like Ukraine and the future of this country.
But for me, this was easy because I'm also the specialist, historian, politician, etc.
It's not easy to say something what is not well-known for you, but please allow me to say some of my very personal remarks to the politician.
And as a man who was involved in Ukrainian issues from the very beginning of the independence of Ukraine and throughout the course of the President,
I collaborated very closely to construct and then of course, the abuse of the Ukrainian government.
We were special envoys of European Union to find a solution in the so-called war on terrorism.
And it was our idea to to to manage this this conflict and this crisis for
all those terms about what was absolutely not according to the Constitution,
that was a good solution for this political situation.
And last months, many months before Vilnius Summit, I was a special envoy,
together with former President of the European Parliament, Peskov, a special envoy of Parliament to Ukraine.
And we try to eliminate the last obstacles before the signing of association agreement.
And our task was, first of all, to to watch all this judiciary reforms.
First, the cases of political prisoners, especially Madam Tymoshenko.
And in this capacity, I visited together with parts of Ukraine 27 times.
We spent 18, 18 months we spent with President Yanukovych, for example.
War is an unforgettable 50 hours and of many, many talks.
And, of course, our feeling when Ukraine decided or Yanukovich decided to make this U-turn was deepest frustration.
But of course, the French speaking. We did it in.
Predict that this situation can develop in such a way.
And so we not not some sympathy and believe me, this is the dynamic of the process which we can observe since November last year.
And I would like to organise my remarks with three elements because we have a conflict with some kind of film.
We have Ukraine, we have Russia in the West and not only European Union,
but the EU and the United States and Canada is quite important partner for all these
things because in front of that we have quite a big and influential Ukrainian diaspora.
Well, some words about Ukraine. Ukraine is is a special place in the world.
It's a special country and a special state, because this is a state with a very, very proud history of all the state of independence.
We can speak about independent Ukraine for some almost months after World War One.
And now we can speak about 23 years of independence after 91.
And this independence was to some extent a surprise to remember, because decision about independence was decided by referendum in December 1912.
If I'm correct and I remember my talk, it's not true, because this time the leader of Ukraine and are going to Moscow,
who was a leader of Soviet Union, and for both of them, the result of this referendum was absolutely suppressed.
Gorbachev was sure that in this question, where Ukraine wants to stay in this reformed Soviet Union Commonwealth of independent
states because of the new concept of Gorbachev or they want to be independent,
his expectation was 55 to 45 in favour of this new, new Soviet Union to CIA for two preferences.
But this was different. This the Nixon was 55 for independence, 45 for this experience.
The result was surprisingly low was turnout was something around almost 90% and the result was 90.7% for independence.
All the rest for this is yes, of course.
Today when we discuss about this referendum is necessary to underline this independence for many voters,
different substance for many of them was important for many of them.
But the life of many of them was an escape from from Soviet Union sphere, etc., etc.
But it necessary to say that 91 the independence of Ukraine was founded quite soon and the huge support of the 90% of voters,
a huge part of of the society. And I think the first mistake in Russian perception of Ukraine is started in this moment,
because they still think a lot of us I would say some were small, but they still think that that's at least 50% of Ukrainians.
We are Russians and they are for Russians people. They think this is this is a wrong, wrong.
And the first independence of Ukraine is quite fresh.
24 years is not a very long time. And after this 23 years,
we can say about some strength of this country and a lot of much more weaknesses of these guys to the strength of this country, in my opinion.
Two elements. First is the identity,
the national identity of Ukraine develop and strength in this 23 years much they really we can
speak about Ukrainian nation and about much more about Ukraine than they do as 23 years ago.
And this is very important next element of thinking about the future of this country.
They are the identity, roughly speaking, the identity of Ukrainians.
Is that absolutely much more stronger as, for example, Belarus.
And the next point, which is the element of the process in the last 20 years, is increasing role and developing civil society.
In my opinion,
civil society of Ukraine is the strongest one among all post-Soviet countries in we have the first to signal on the strength of the civil society.
It was the Orange Revolution to for 2005. And after this Orange Revolution, the process of of establishment of civil society, accelerated development.
And today it is necessary to say that we have not only in Kiev, not only in western part of Ukraine, but also in eastern.
And I visited many places of the east, like Donetsk, Petrovsky or Kharkiv.
And this civil society maybe not so strong as in Kiev, but is existing and is important factor of everything.
What is what is the. We have them.
And then of course, the list of some positives elements is almost finished,
unfortunately, and then is necessary to say about the weaknesses of the country.
And among these weaknesses of the country is a law. The first is that this country is really historically, economically, very divided.
And normally we speak about this division between East and West, Russian speaking,
part of Ukraine speaking far more humanistic and more pro-Russian, etc.
And this line is, of course, quite important.
But unfortunately, this is not only one line of Ukraine, because now we see the next line of division of Crimea and the continent.
And then we have a huge division between metropolis and problems, but affairs of the country.
We have a huge difference between old generation, much more homeless of people's generation and young generation,
much more westernised generation, which is better educated with a lot of experience from many places of the world, especially Poland.
But not only they are travelling with us in many languages,
etc. and we have of course the problem with the rich people and poor people because everything will happen in the last four years.
This is something what is maybe the source of next dramatic tensions in this stuff.
But one example, Poland and Ukraine stop the 23rd wealthiest and more or less from the same level.
The GDP per capita was almost two today for a country that is 3.5 times bigger as Ukraine.
But the regions for the regions business in Poland has no chances to be among first than Ukraine.
The richest Ukrainians are extremely rich and the poor Ukraine.
Our opportunity is to report and in my opinion, this is the next element of the tensions which can be very dramatic.
The next in next month's, the next problem of the country, in the next weakness of this country is the weakness of the institutions of the state.
And that is, of course, a complicated issue.
But I think to allow the political elites in Ukraine, they are fighting against each other from the very beginning, in fact,
only in very short period after the independence,
who had some kind of bipartisan approach or such a common approach to main strategic elements of Ukraine.
First, and this is the next difference between, for example,
for my country and the EU and Poland for remain strategic goals like NATO's European Union, we have very wide bipartisan or many partisan support.
Yesterday, the Senate celebrated 52 year anniversary of our new commitment,
and especially with new circumstances and new situation, we realise how important it is for us to be in this position.
But it was possible, but from the very beginning, main goals of our policy,
strategic goals of foreign policy were accepted and supported by very wide spectrum of political forces in Ukraine.
Unfortunately not. We have a very divided and spectrum of of of political parties, of politicians.
And frankly speaking, especially since 2002, we have never ending war between these two main groups of politicians,
pro-Western and pro-nuclear, and besides Yushchenko, Yanukovich and Yanukovich Tymoshenko last years.
That is a such a very spectacular example of this never ending fight.
And the talk of of Ukrainian parliament and the next evidences of this weakness of the state is corrupt.
Corruption really in Ukraine is is is dramatic.
And even more important is the corruption in Ukraine, especially during this time, was systematic,
was it was an element of the system organised and conducted and led by the president of the country.
And that is something what is what was true even when he was the president.
And now we have a lot of information and a lot of them know that he was the leader of of this wall system, the corruption,
state corruption, which is on all levels of of the society and under all levels of the of the public institutions in Ukraine.
And, of course, next weakness of Ukraine is economy, which is very.
Michael Stipe is not enough reformed in the last 20 years, is not modernised, is very much independent of the Russian market.
And, of course, for the future of Ukraine, the modernisation of this whole structure,
the entire structure of the economy is is a must is something what they have to do in very difficult social and political conditions,
which we have now, and which, in my opinion, you are a little bit lost through the years.
So Ukraine is in very difficult, internal, very difficult situation.
And of course, this decision to go to the east or to the west is one of the strategic decisions of the country,
but is very much combined with many of other elements which create such a complicated and quite dark picture of the situation in Ukraine.
Then next element of this triangle, Russia,
both Russia and we say some simple words because in mind that I was asked many times if I understand the politics of Putin, what he's doing.
I'm so sorry that my answer would be so simple. Let me be an honest person that Putin has one goal.
And this goal is to create euro zone, to create new superpower.
And for this superpower, he needs Ukraine. He needs in time.
He needs, of course, Crimea is a part of Ukraine. He needs eastern Ukraine is a part of it.
But his main goal is to have Ukraine entire Ukraine as a part of this.
His main idea, main project is new.
Why he's fighting so much for Eurasian Union, because that's his main element in his mind, too,
to be one of the most influential historical leaders of this country after the treatment of the great Joseph Stalin.
And he would be number four. This is not a child in 2000 quotes.
Sounds like a joke, but this is not a joke. This is this is his dream.
This is his politics. And this is his determination.
And this is what we have to understand and not to be naive and not believe in something because there's no losers.
And of course, he was very close to have entire Ukraine in this concept for Europe as a rule because.
You decided not to sign the Association Agreement and the plan prepared by Putin.
Yanukovich was followed not to sign an association agreement to support Ukrainian
economy by 15 billion U.S. dollars to support Yanukovich in the election 2015,
and to have Yanukovich in the hands of Russia next year, 4050, the next year, and the next step would be exact.
Now. March, April 2014.
To change the status of Ukraine in Customs Union from the Status of Observers into status of of a full member of the Customs Union and then
Ukraine as a member of customs union will be the the one of the founders of Eurasian Union 2050 or 2016 together with Russia and Kazakhstan.
And this was and was very close to who to fulfil this that the problem what is the problem of all the leaders of post-Soviet region is that
they they don't understand what means in society and they don't understand what means the real need of the people and how the people.
Sometimes we can go to demonstrate something that is absolutely out of the imagination of these leaders, because for them,
if some who's going to protest or to demonstrate something should be paid by CIA or other intelligence from the world.
It cannot be spontaneous movement, which is a reaction and some disappointment and humiliation, frustration, etc., etc.
Demonstration, who I doubt was the result of this U-turn of Yanukovich,
which was absolutely not explained to the people because communication between the government and the people in the society was something ground zero.
And of course the frustration because of the lack of this association agreement
started to change suddenly and in the frustration of the quality of leadership,
of corruption, of the frustration that social situation, the economy, etc., etc.
This is mentioned in process of some student demonstration protest which we know very well for a Poland.
So we is it in 1991 it's exactly the same procedure and the same process and the same change of of arguments and expectations, etc., etc.
And of course. This project collapsed.
Is this idea because Yanukovich is, you know, one of the stars finally escape?
And today we have a new situation for Russia, which Russia, in my opinion, was the manager of following way.
First, Crimea is the first element of this, the newest nation of of Ukraine.
And, of course, premier is today practically in Russian hands.
And so maybe even my colleagues, they have some idea what we can do.
And I'm quite pessimistic. I don't know what we can do without having Russian troops going to the bases of unstable and the
referendum which will have a result 90% in favour of of of of of of of Russia and as it was,
very small group. And the next step of of of Putin is this the immunisation of eastern Ukraine, especially before election 25th of May,
because for him is very important to say that he cannot become the new president of Ukraine because this election was not fair,
not free, that we have an election, only 60, 70% of polling station.
And this destabilisation would be the permanent element of Ukraine of Russian policy towards Europe.
The next step after 24 years away would be to continue this.
And this is very easy because with subsidies the problem, the new government will have not so much time to solve these problems.
Not enough money to do it. And we will have the government of Yeltsin.
You can be president when we have an enormous pressure from the side of Maidan, from the side of the people,
to show some positive effects of what happened in this revolution, 2013, 2040.
And in my opinion, the idea of putting today is to wait.
We don't know when it will happen. The new government will collapse.
And this Maidan number two, because Maidan number one was always the one that was my number two is Maidan.
Number two would be replaced by my number three, which will be very much against Maidan number two and will open some possibilities to create
more pro-Russian government and to create some new possibilities to say also to Europeans,
look, this country's fallen. This country is not predictable.
You have no chances to be serious partner to solve the problems of Ukraine.
And we are another place that is my enemy.
This and knowing quite well this region knowing quite well my partner's from from our past is for Russia.
I almost drew that this scenario will go on this way and we will not be the last point very strongly,
because much of the discussions of European Union and Korea,
European Union and the West, we are of course in extremely difficult situation because we are not a democratic structure.
We cannot use the methods which are against our values, our tradition.
And frankly speaking, we have not enough instruments,
even even these democratic useful because to organise huge support the financial support for for for Ukraine it needs time,
it needs a lot of discussions, etc. But my suggestion and I discussed with almost everybody in Europe what I could say.
So, first of all is to understand the investigation is necessary to understand that this Ukrainian crisis is not for days,
not for weeks, not for months. This is a question for four years.
Then the next, if we want to react correctly, is necessary to understand what Russia wants to do.
And secondly, it is necessary to prepare us in which will be very common, very and prepared from from all the West,
including USA and the government, because solidarity in this case Libya is more valuable as even some elements of this of this problem we have.
Because if if Russia because this is the next president of Russia very from day sides with quite politics.
They want to play various plays with different elements of strength of the west.
I will saying many times for Russia doesn't exist one European police they have 28 plus one European policy.
This plan to this and current bilateral contacts with European countries members
of EU with some of them privileged with some of them and some of them like that.
And this plus one is the less important policy. This is towards Brussels, towards European institutions also.
And of course we should understand that this is Russian contact contact concept in front and we should propose something with more common policies.
A lot of solidarity and actions and understanding the situation is serious and can be.
Thank you very much. The president and everyone who like to read.
Okay. Okay. So thank you very much for coming to be with us today.
Thank you very much. We appreciate it. And thank you very much for all that you're working with you and Mary Margaret, thank you very much here.
You know how much I admire you and I read your books and how much I want to drive through one of your books.
Very important, because you must make it very difficult to do say something meaningful, like after Alexander Graham.
Yes, it was a school, but I would try to say something to try to make it mean.
I think to begin with, a little history with Ukraine,
because I think we understand that probably we will understand a little bit better is the relation
between Ukraine and Russia and Russia in the European Union and the Ukraine and the European.
The first time I was in Ukraine investigation, which one?
It was two years after the sentence, the first time in 2002, three years ago.
And I had constructed a very good, strong relationship with them and I was very, very attached to Ukraine and I'd be doing that.
I think, in my view, two or three dates in my life with Ukraine, which I think are important to understand.
The first thing is that when they signed the 1994 agreement for the recording session with Ukraine,
remember that he was signed by your country like Russia, then by the United States, and there it was absolutely recognised.
They were intended to train as an independent country and to defend.
But a few years after that I happened to be in Sebastopol.
Sebastopol was the closest nobody for them to into to Moscow.
Mm. Then I left, I was 53, you old.
And I put into Sebastopol. In Sebastopol.
The impression, by God, this for me, unforgettable. He was there to have two things, truly.
One, to notice that they been separated a few years before that and we were very lucky we're not to spectacular of maybe to go into control in the
world really basically dismantled basically somewhere in 1750 but to to really something that you have to give your life in the same place
we were to live one them great things yeah we would rough it the people that were in the Russian and Ukraine they were but in fact because
we belong to the same so and we go back to do it the other day the other day when the the new version of the Republic of the American is,
of course, they abandoned appointed the new chief of military staff.
It was maybe if you send me to the sabbatical and then when he found cancel is impossible
to leave will say goodbye to you and I will be part of the people of Sebastopol.
What different options were there? So these people since Mr. Ferry to understand what is in this world what is the
relationship is still look the generation particularly areas of military people
who simply so close together which is difficult to see what is a separate and
separate and part of a simple thing that they want to tell you is September 11th,
3:00 in the afternoon, I was 18.
Well, it wasn't great. I think it was one day in the mountains in the old house of Rosneft, having lunch with that person.
And when the telephone rang saying that September 11th, the big catastrophe taking place, he didn't know anything.
You came to me.
And from there on you can imagine that we had a fantastic experience of having lived together, so I constructed a pretty good relationship with them.
Now I want to tell you something which is very important to understand when they will say,
because we don't make it, we tend to expand means at the least.
Remember that day in 1989 when the integration of Germany, the most difficult part, one of the most difficult part was to get this reunified.
Germany, it made. Because if all devastated it was moving to the east and then we get to Nazis and they go to some members of the forest and blacks,
and we were to move a game in that least.
And I thought that time and everybody understood, Americans understood and understood that that could not be done without having a conversation.
We would say no to the compensation question.
And that was a very easy thing to do, really convince the Russians that we are going and we were going to continue moving the border towards east,
that we started negotiating with Primakov at the time, foreign minister,
then prime minister and very interesting personalities, very focussed on that.
And I would tell you what happened that day was 27th of January 1997,
and I was in the dacha in Moscow we speak and the delegation of the of the nation very,
very and after two or three vodkas and when you have to remember his father's life and and father and I presented my kit,
my case and well, we are going to this and we want to do it in cooperation.
And I explain what was the deal, etc. And he took a walk and said, Come here, let's go for a walk.
What's not? And we went for a walk alone without any policeman or anything.
And the duct tape was down on the floor.
And I thought I would first to do exactly the message, Come here, I'm going to accept this.
But I want to tell you what for me would be an asset.
For me, it would be unacceptable that any threats from the far right will be taking sides.
So I'm sorry.
You to me, something I can read that will depend on how well we are able to relate that to NATO and the European Union and Russian Federation.
And we look at what we can do that we train together and without complication, we will not sit down.
Ukraine was at the heart of his heart and heart and heart because his life troubles that was born in Kiev.
So my life passes and he is in my.
Exactly. And he was obsessed with me since the day that we had one moment.
It was very, very important because I did something very important for me.
We said the same moment at the same time. He took me to the lodge and took place in which we signed an agreement with Russia.
We had an agreement, Ukraine with 35 Ukraine as an important player, and we wanted to give him that.
To give him that because we promised a serious country, a big country for Geneva people.
So from the very beginning, we have been dealing with it.
He is in the grave with great respect and really this was not going to be the question,
but we knew we wanted to live that and have done so often that to the extent has talked about it involved the Orange Revolution,
the Vietnam Revolution. I would like to underline two things.
One, that was really the 9th of December knowing all and people were there really very, very, very committed.
We were truly making simple unity.
Okay. Making example had been what we said not long ago, not only three months.
We think all year he was really somebody with a tremendous time because of this very difficult time.
And then you had a fantastic leader that it was really of the masses really was.
And we do that, but we solved the problem.
And let me underline, once we solved that problem in the roundtable roundtable, even with the European Union.
Let me gentlemen, myself, the Russians were represented by ten women and the chairman of the do good and good
man who has left me one who one election four days and what we wanted to change
because the nation fear and the U.S. so then to the two presidents they want a full
and voluntary change for Vietnam because the next year the Russians the Europeans
stop thinking about that because peace is something that we should've done this time
it roundtable of I think we have not been a we talk you and me sometimes we spend
one day in Milan doing all those last weeks talking about how we could create the
conditions to recuperate and the spirits and that we solved the crisis in 2000.
And now from 2000 and 2007, from 2004 to 2004.
Ten, ten years in those ten years, in my opinion from the opinion Ukraine has wasted dramatically.
It's time with people and economic political because they feel able to construct a political party system they don't have in a single army,
because we, despite the immediate fighting started, we couldn't make the okay and you need to make impossible to become capable.
So we stand here for me has been the most frustrating being in relation with Ukraine, because I talk to them.
You talk to them. Yes. To Moldavia.
They can see after we have we have made in the over the last year how we will be and is full is that this is 60 but
that they said and they want to you because this is to what I said in the constitution which are taking place now.
The situation today fast as of the time they have said is very, very difficult.
But I think two mistake you make the first mistake they lost.
Not to go for the risk of the three ministers not to have died before they went.
That's been taken a week before. The situation is still ready to make it.
The agreement the president made.
You see, the Russians were there and we made some friends with Russian President Putin, who was the president of the commission,
also the Foreign Office of the Foreign Relations that's known as the ombudsman of Russia.
He said somebody constructive and he was effective in the conversation, but it was impossible to implement.
The agreement was very,
very good when and they will do it in the right political at the end of the year 2000 and this year in which we have not ended Putin,
as we have said to the court, that is.
But we cannot say that for sure.
But it seems to me that Yanukovich last because Putin told me, is this operation, do you think ever can we do that in the state?
The situation will continue to be much worse because it was in a way very favourable
to the leader because the total of the unity in elections before the end of the year.
So that's one mistake. And the second mistake, he was in the same time not having to take the agreement of 1994,
agreement where by agreement you remember a country which is a big, big chocolate of the missiles of Russia.
And the agreement would be taken by Russia with the signature of the United States of Russia in your country.
As I said before, the signatories had the obligation to do article.
I don't remember that one.
I completely agree on guaranteeing the integrity of Ukraine, the security of Ukraine written down there in south in it for more than we want to spend.
How much how many hours we spent on that one night in the in that will remember another name that I don't know three
or four maybe we spend together to try to mobilise that that degree to Putin partners agreement and find a solution.
Right let's continue in Russia, the United States and European and think that if we could have done that,
we could have presented all for us open economic help.
The situation is in Ukraine is in default.
The European Union does have money to give them up.
The Americans don't have the money at this point of law.
One reason that Russia has the money, and I am concerned about that they continue that they are met with absolutely impossible to accept.
My country got very difficult to do that because of Argentina.
And so they are maybe maybe coming back now and that time that we need to call for an agreement of that nature.
We will we will allow to have a brain getting out of the crisis into political control or attitude of time lending.
The loan was given by the states, Russia and the European Union controlling that, too.
So that was the thing that we were not good enough or rotten enough or didn't have influence with both of us.
We don't have any power, but it was not done. And I think there's still a momentum of time instead of what was done is statements.
And this included Maiden Minister, which I don't see the role of the ministers from both who might not believe.
So today in the face. I don't think the prime minister in a situation like this.
Oh, no. I mean, I tell you the consequence from I think we have had a very complicated situation for President Bush.
US and the Chinese have said one best, and Putin wants a customs union in the customs union with Ukraine because otherwise he would be a leader of it.
That's the kind of thing wants to have a European you.
What he needs, right. Importing people sophisticated to try to see into that.
Now he will get we've got a staff and you follow the news of the last days.
One which is really funny is that you can really see himself now in a very complicated situation ID to do stuff,
software, something similar or something more dramatic or he's the only one who is.
If he looks now in Ukraine, he's not in the customs union and [INAUDIBLE] be the leader of a customs union and he doesn't want to be.
They've got to solve their problems. Then we get past the United States of Europe.
I think that the crisis in Ukraine last, the crisis in the last negotiation from that last party standing fast,
maybe it is too much and maybe that pressure from the right, from the Tea Parties are going to put on hold on Obama may mean that he has a reaction.
We still don't know when, but I think the situation this the global situation now has changed very much,
much more than we think for the situation in Ukraine.
Now, for the Europeans, we want to look at Ukraine as a problem of the big powers.
Both would prefer to solve this problem as a drawing between the European Union and one of the most important neighbours.
If we enter today into any conflict, I think that would be very difficult because this is a zero sum game for some people.
Now if we can substantive can't afford this and try to bring it to a situation of regional European Union peacefully in Russia,
not in terms of American, not in terms of the big powers.
But, you know, I think there is still some possibility to resolve this in a much better manner.
And this is not it's not like that is not important.
It's not. We have to find the will to do that of now.
And so I think this can because it's and it has to move from the details of the situation.
I think that today, my my my impression today from the meeting which is taking place right now between the Curley and Lavrov.
There is a chance that something may come out of this conversation in the formation of something,
possibly not an offshoot of a contact group, a contact group which may help move that forward.
The first contact between Putin and the government of Kiev, which link him not talking to each other and contact for feedback,
would be the the envelope for some contact between Putin, somebody and somebody from Kiev and things like that.
We are really very critical of some places for this particular problem, also for Syria, because they will not be easy and control Syria.
We felt so insecure in May and then you put on it.
The problem that we have dealt with on this May, you mentioned earlier, it's a big complication.
All the elements of some of the maybe the only solution is you may move an intervention to the Eastern Ghouta is that we can you know,
I insist we want something that we don't insist enough.
What Putin wants is that, you know, the Free Syrian Army.
That's the do you know very well the difference between a free trade agreement, that Europe is a free trade agreement, which is what we offer.
We offer a free trade agreement plus.
But basically the association agreement and a free trade agreement based and the other side is a custom you know,
from good is much better but from trade is very very bad because you are in fact the union you have the tariff bank lending.
You says the whole country is fixed by the union.
That means it will be fixed. But to make it possible to Russian so great in a customs union is incompatible.
It went with a free trade agreement with the European.
So the question is this is more tricky than when we reset because I mean, the idea you don't have to choose, okay?
You don't have to choose. But even the offer isn't custom.
You union, you are choosing in a way that you will not have economic relations with the
third parties because you will not have the freedom to seek to have tariffs.
And that is a delicate point, and nobody looks into that.
But it's not a free trade agreement, the free trade agreement.
So that complicates the issue very much. Also for the European Union, for us, we want to have good relations with Ukraine.
We like to have at least a free rein in that it will be very difficult to achieve if they have a part in that.
Okay. Thank you very much. Professor.
Thank you. Thanks for inviting me to be on this panel. A Late Edition, I realise.
But I do think that today we've heard a lot about real insights into crisis situations and particularly the present when negotiations took place.
As an academic, I haven't been in those situations.
So I listen to events, both possibly on what's happening today from the sidelines, from outside.
But perhaps one can provide an overall context. So make us maybe also closing for some lessons might be already today.
Maybe the middle of a crisis is not a lot of good moments to pause.
But I think a few elements are already clear.
I want to talk a little bit about Ukraine,
the lessons that she's saying about Ukraine's transition and then following up on what we heard already and with a few comments on Crimea,
and I'm sure that you're eager to to launch into the discussion.
I think one of the key things that we see today is how risky, ambivalent policies have been.
And I'm not suggesting to you today that the U.S. to blame for what we're currently seeing in Ukraine and Crimea.
But I think while constructive ambiguity might be needed in a few crisis situations,
vagueness about where some process is going know for many years that the EU Ukraine relationship has been like.
That also entails risks. Political events can capitalise on that.
So I think without it obviously being part of the design of the vagueness that
has surrounded both the EU's institutional set up of its commitment to Ukraine,
the reasons for all those things y y that racism fair and also on the other hand, a lack of unified political will in Ukraine.
So to pursue closer relations with the EU on the EU's terms,
in terms of how it can structure relationships with a neighbouring country like your client.
So what I want to put out there is that I think Western institutions, Western states, but also the EU is part of what we're seeing now.
So it raises the process, raises expectations which may not actually be managed.
It raises a whole range of different motivations and aspirations.
Firstly, like you said, the protest in the Maidan was about something like European aspirations.
That doesn't necessarily mean EU membership. For me and Ukrainian, that meant a whole range of expectations.
One, it's easy to see why that be the case. Again,
I think how the EU has also structured the relationship and for Ukraine has tried to say for the collective or not to collective on a particular line,
this is just part of the story. So I think that should make us pause and also reflect on the consequences of the Western policies.
On Ukraine briefly.
I think that I pick up on something that Mr. Carney has already said, given Ukraine's history, given the regional diversity of this country,
and the fact that this is a country that is for the first time in its foreign borders,
putting together the Ukrainian state since 91, Ukraine has come quite a long way.
And I think at the moment, we are mainly perceiving, obviously, a crisis of weaknesses.
I we should see, for example, I see in other regions in the south and East as an imminent danger for that.
For the whole country to look to the soul for. For Russia actively seeking to incorporate other parts of Ukraine.
So I think the Ukrainian statement has evolved as it has become stronger than we might think at the moment.
That doesn't mean that some situations can't be destabilised and it will take a while to even fall for the rest of it,
playing out for the south and east to find a new political balance.
But ultimately, I think we should not lose sight of how far Ukraine has come.
And part of that success story, I would say, is also that a previous conflict in Crimea was avoided.
And in the 1990s we might have almost forgotten about this now.
But there were there was a real potential for conflict in Crimea along to further along different dimensions and into a regional conflict,
a centre periphery conflict with Kiev, Russian-Ukrainian relations actually at the time and so on.
And that was diffused by a combination of a very drawn out constitution making process,
both at the national and regional level in Ukraine that enshrines equitably, politically entirely weak autonomy status for Crimea.
But that process of engaging all the key actors at the time is perhaps something that we should look at again.
And that whole process, I've view and a half have argued in mind we set up to conflict potential out of the situation.
So that might be much more important than the final institutional fix and the final institutional outcome.
A few thoughts on what we see at Raymond's arms.
Adding perhaps to the figure is that Mr. Cross ask again for support for Ukraine independence.
Just to also remind ourselves that in 91, 54% finance also voted in favour of Ukrainian independence.
And that was without without the commentators being a political force in Crimea.
The would have supported it, but they have thought up range of life in great numbers.
So few things can move over time, but I think that's a figure that's probably important to to remember.
Other things today were a lot less clear about. And if this referendum on Sunday could be a free and fair referendum and again academic speaking
that interesting to actually see what the preferences of finance are to anyone wanting to see that.
And the results can be easily manipulated by volume.
And if you notice and you suggest already figures for the result,
but it's not only a matter of how high the support will be and what kind of figure looks looks like may be credible.
But if we look at we had a lot of other these days about the census figures of 2001.
Oh, that's 58% for Russian ethnic Russians. And for me, about 24% of Ukrainians.
And 12th, about 12% of them you talk this various divisions, with the exception of the commentators,
don't really tell us all that much about what communists think about why Crimea's place is, first of all, self majority altogether.
And also most of the Ukrainians are Russian speakers. They have not been politically mobilised in a particular way since the 1990s.
Yes, there is a general cultural political sentiment, but that is not until very recent events very radically shifted.
This translated into a coherent pro-Russia movement in Crimea that died very quickly in 1984,
when in fact that movement also failed to address other concerns from the inside, in particular on the economy.
So that, I think, is one one factor to keep in mind. There are by now obviously generational differences.
So the younger generation in other parts of Ukraine has still not with the notion of being part of the Ukrainian side.
You can be aware of many examples around the world becoming part of the state for us in a specific region,
a specific a specific history perhaps needs to be treated differently in terms of the institutional up,
but that doesn't mean that you go against the state. And I also think that many Ukrainians, Russians are different age groups.
But again, past and present in particular, the younger generation knows how to distinguish between the messy but more or
less democratic transition process in Ukraine that saw some extreme moments,
but always most to correct that it's been messy.
It's not pursued reforms as quickly and efficiently,
but at the same time it has avoided some of the extremes on the transition process that Russia saw.
And I think people also make a choice do we want to make the choice to have the chance to speak out what they want
to join Putin's Russia today as a political system versus something that is still obviously be built in Ukraine?
Unfortunately, we won't find out now. We are not sure whether you will ever find out what the what the real preferences are.
But just to remind you that the person we currently see as a premier prime minister, his party was elected with 4% in the last regional elections.
The terms speak of somebody in Crimea, some of these actually for the parliament officially opposing the constitution.
He hasn't announced it for a while. I've seen nothing very recently under the umbrella of the party of Regional Reform.
Just party concerns the reach in the heart pretty much of the rest.
So I think at this point I want to point out we are beginning to hear a bit more about them,
often struck by the media coverage of this in this country,
how little attention has been on the economy and talk its way forward in the last week or so.
But more about them, I think from one day all of a they will become the absolutely important and decisive factor in the region.
12% of a small place is already quite something. They are united by the by memory of the deportation and of starting because a lot.
Yes, exactly. They've also become more than 20% by now from 2000 to 13%.
Also the younger generation, again, a higher proportion than also that they and they have acted and in particular when
put under pressure as a much more unifying force and they are politically organised,
they have the very well-organised political structures.
So I think the key issue now will be there are attempts going on to to buy them off, to offer them economic support and political representation.
But by definition, if you talk to us. Given that history will be sceptical of the long term nature of such promises and that will be put to a test.
Here is how how united a group based on all that can come from are also different social, economic and political interests among them.
And the control of the leadership may also not be in control of what certain groups do.
There are more than twice clues to why the government has so far not been the most important strand of the fighting to talk up a movement as such.
But that could very quickly change. 1.1 maybe I disagree slightly with you.
I cannot believe that Russia has an interest in seriously destabilising the situation in Crimea itself.
So I get a sense that there will be some break and see how the Crimean Tatars react because it would not only look bad if not this region,
if violence kicks off in protest by some of the social violence or some sort of insurgency in Crimea,
I think if they don't want us to to offer them something, to keep them quiet or even kickstarting a new migration route, among many others.
So I think that is one of the factors.
You can watch them, unfortunately, still watching as well, which leaves together with you just the first the meeting today with Senator Kerry.
One thing that has come already on that is a certain timeline.
But also, I think said, if I remember correctly,
that Poland and Russia will not and will not incorporates Crimea is writing to the Russian Federation next week very quickly.
It will be a gradual process. So again, I can be read as a as a window for a certain positive political process and maybe align with this the best.
Any Western actor I can really hope for is that it becomes possible to move it also a political cost and
probably that and that might be the lesson from the minorities in Crimea where the end result is open.
So maybe the results were Crimea leaves Ukraine, but hopefully on a different on a different footing.
And maybe there are other examples of our efforts.
Think of a process that has different stages built into it and then choices at various points.
And no, no, no site knows exactly what the choice will be,
but they commit to this in principle and ultimately I think a lot of surveillance and explains part of why is the best
escalation so quickly that Russia is reacting to the regional balance in Ukraine having been lost through the demonstrations.
If we think of the EU proposed agreement on migration to later this summer to place, I think several times you used part of the years,
but it's not that long and it was so quickly overtaken because we have talked about a national unity government,
but that would have included representatives of the southern eastern regions or the party of regional or whoever I would have spoken for for that.
That's clearly not what we've seen. So for both Russia as well as politically interesting in the east and south of Ukraine,
looks as if the pendulum has swung far too much to one side and part of Ukraine.
That's part of the problem of the your frustration,
but also part of what has held Ukraine together across all these two to sort of those two sides of this.
It's actually two simplifying both. But there are different regional forces that need to be represented in the same thing in Kiev.
So the other quick thing I think Ukraine needs to do is not only move towards present things, but also parliamentary elections,
probably especially from regional elections and forming a government because at the moment, also from a youth point of view to push ahead,
which is, I think what has been agreed so far that part of the association agreement I need to try to bring that to for
later and do that with an interim government seems not like a recipe but going from the suppression the that.
They really like one word. I sent it up to a referendum, put you in this terrible situation, etc.
And he studied the situation for years, hoped that for him will be very important to say, look, after referendum.
Everything was okay. And even I can imagine if you give some money for some resistance,
that someone would be necessary for infrastructure because all the supplies of water when you think are coming for you.
So that's the end. But the real point for me to do with this, the decision of of the Ukrainian parliament to be a part of Russian Federation.
And I expect that he will not decide that he's ready to accept, because it would be really the beginning of the Cold War,
because then, given the space for some diplomatic and political manoeuvres,
is better than that agreement that you have been developing time we thought here in a way that was applied in the really
in the future to the meetings that the always the heads were out of recognising everybody but talking in the body,
something that can be repeated to prevent to do something dramatic were the after in which really is no exit possible.
And I think that would be a way that we play our cards well.
There may be a way out. But again, if what Putin does want is to have with customs union, with the Ukrainians that is active in red,
gone, being rejected from time to see how we can dismantle them.
Presumably if if Putin has his eye on the long game, as you were suggesting,
president and the option available to him is not to actually do anything dramatic after the referendum,
but to treat Crimea like Charles in Eastern Europe, like South Ossetia.
And you know, he'd like to ask the first question.
Yeah, perhaps you can just say who you are. Andrew Thank you.
Complete microphone. Come. It was one of her roles.
So. I would actually like to ask you a question, Chancellor, if I may, but the other members of the panel might like to post a comment.
I thought your account of your conversation with the Foreign Minister was very interesting.
When you had to tell us a European vacation did not mean membership of the EU,
and he told you that his meaning the Ukraine was being discriminated against as compared to Turkey?
Well, I can say that the Turkish path has not proved to be exactly the event graves that you
just said it's being made a candidate for having against nations formally opened.
It doesn't guarantee a happy outcome,
but I wonder if you meant to imply that it would have been a possible and be
desirable for the EU to treat Ukraine at least on the same level as Turkey?
At about the time that I had that meeting with the Ukrainian Foreign Minister,
the Commissioner for Enlargement and very capable Center-Left politician called into the hall.
You made a speech in Ukraine saying get real and whatever else we offer you, we're not offering you membership of the European Union.
I think that was a terrible mistake. I happen to be of the view that we should have been serious about Turkish membership of the
European Union and that that might have have an effect on what Turkey is like at the moment.
I think that we should be have been more serious about our relationship with Ukraine and very much agreed with the point that
Professor Cessé made extremely diplomatically about the lack of clarity about what exactly it was that we were offering.
And member states I mean, states around our borders.
I'm not one of those who thinks that being opaque is always the best diplomacy.
So my answer to your question will not be opaque. Yes.
My answer to your question is, is I would have preferred the answer to both questions to have been yes.
And I mean, you know, we know very well what is the meaning of the situation.
Really, the situation that we have to offer we've got to do is not going to offer French recognition and therefore, universally,
completely, maybe you look what you make an agreement in education agreement is for somebody we can help the door open.
Remember a people want to be seen and to know that the youth can these guys and send them to these men's lives and they signed it today.
Yes and yes and no,
because I remember we were all signed The Situation Room in 91 and until we started to be in full force after 13 years of the situation,
even for a lot of people on the street, means it's some day they can be under a photo of you.
This is such a lateral thinking politically. It doesn't mean that you are not going to ever.
And that format is not the reason. I think this is why you find that you know that you are one this time they will figure it out on the other.
On the other hand, the position with Turkey is that we can offer the membership of the European Union,
but they suspect that none of us really mean to.
This is important point because, of course, why the reaction of the people in Kiev were so strong,
why the you know, the world was speaking about the 500,000 others?
Because 700,000 I heard with about 1 million people in Maidan and demonstrating in favour of European Union, European values.
And so because of this before really the Europe, despite the association agreements, the free trade agreement, no difference.
And this is really important thing. This is a value.
This is something what what is the dream of of Ukraine?
But then many, many years before Maidan, one of the Ukrainians, when Ukraine is they want to all the renovation off of the apartment.
They have two types of innovation a question of of of of the fuels slowly the cars away to remove
any other goods good renovation or euro and lose something bad is usual very much in Soviet style.
So we were in relation with the final to have a flat like in Europe.
This is something which is animating all these people living in Ukraine and the politically, diplomatically speaking,
of course maybe or in my opinion that we didn't say during this long time of association agreement negotiations that finally after association,
which is the first step after many, many years, after a lot of effort, after huge homework,
which is necessary to make sure that one day Ukraine can be the fulcrum of European political influence.
Let me I do not know. This is very real, but I'm describing what I think from the needs of Madam Chancellor Merkel.
Not long ago we said the Ukrainians this membership and please notice this is this is and if I didn't say that we were like
we were formally said to not know at this stage because I think that it is a disagreement and I don't disagree with you,
but it is worth noting that when we first when negotiating with Austria,
Sweden and Finland for membership of the European and for that relationship with the European Union,
we were offering them, as it were, limited membership.
We were offering them the opportunity of playing on weekdays, but not at weekends.
And they threw that out of the plan, incredibly, understandably.
And I think it's I think it's very difficult to come from the area of take to agree with you about the legality.
And what they signed up to would be that the area between is quite.
Marshy? Yes. Thank you, Chancellor.
My name is Rami. I'm from Georgia, but I'm student here in Oxford.
I'm public policy. So my question would be, a, what do people have heard me said about the energy policy and Russia's role within the energy policy?
I think this is one of the main reasons why Russia is so keen to talk about Ukraine and have the pro-Russian
leader in Ukraine always look historically because Ukraine is transport of Russian gas to rest of Europe.
Do you think and I think my question goes to Mr.
Mr. Solar. Do you think one of the main reasons why you always fight with Russia is change policy and the vagueness?
And the professor has been talking about the vagueness of the policy of of EU talk towards Russia.
Development is all about energy and gas is not the only but is very important in Germany that part of this gas is from the South,
from the Rhine, from the north and we are still in bad winter with the grain.
People of the north of Germany need to continue and they got from the roof of this house.
But the end game is 60% of the coal exports of Russia, 30% on the fortune of the United States of the European Union,
but only all the country from different group itself based on bad business.
Got it from one from Russia, from the EU according to what is now being talk and isn't going to talk since the use of customers.
I can say this and make this question now about how we can get to it at a very short notice.
Then I think that to be able to put the sanctions on the past of the Great Recession and that is something this
is being calculated and been studied and there is some possibility of rapid sign if things go wrong very fast.
It is only 30% of our concern for Russia is a 60% in the next gentleman here and then gentleman yes, I want to but Robert service Russian Russian.
So I want to put a question about how clever Putin is.
And I was very taken by what President Wisniewski was saying.
But I wonder if in the longer term, Putin is really quite so clever,
if he if if if any of this instability in Kiev spreads to Moscow, he could be in big trouble.
If he gets this customs union with Ukraine, it will be a non modernised, non diversify economy.
And what sort of position is Russia ever going to have piece of the China and
if the instability continues in this part of the world for very much longer,
how long is it going to be before the North Caucasus, which was only conquered 150 years ago?
I mean, let's think about how long the Irish think about my father was Irish.
These visa. He's not so clever.
I mean, I completely agree with you and I agree that the only possibility of Russia is in the East,
its enemies and going to the borders and developing the borders.
And the thing is that east, the Far East and demanded that we kind of we don't have the money to do it.
So this is a risky battle for Russia in the medium term.
And they may say, well, you are absolutely correct.
I have been also much more clever.
Politics would be modernisation of the Russia modernisation, not only the economy but all the nation to stay in the creation of civil society.
A number and I think we could put in an amazing. Oh, I asked him about civil society democracy.
His answer was no, this is impossible because we have no tradition of the school.
And this is going to stop one day. There's no.
He wasn't ready for it, I'm afraid.
Putin is 14 years in power and his feeling today really is that I can do what I want and I don't care very much about this future for the next 20,
30 years. I want to finish my legacy, which says that I will say one day to my countrymen, look, we are a superpower again.
We go to fight. We are superpower. And this is his goal.
And he organised for that many events since he the first elected world championship in soccer.
The next event to be that we have all this.
He didn't expect to this situation in Ukraine. He was sure that he's very close to the victories which we see on the part,
of course, his and this is not only his, that is a nightmare of Lukashenko.
This indictment of of it is, of course, made up because this type of reaction of the people, they don't like it, then they are very much afraid.
But of course, as far as they will have for the idea that all this protest are organised by foreign forces,
and then they will be mistaken again because one day it can happen and it means in Moscow or even maybe not in Iceland.
Number one of the that's that's you saw possible 14 years in and the top of such country is the problem.
Last point, you know, I was before my presidency, I was chairman of Constitutional Committee of National Assembly,
which the party of Constitution of Poland and of the 97.
And in this constitution, we have a rule about two terms of of president.
If you step back to normal, the Polish president can be twice elected.
And when I finished my second term, I had thought of a visit in Washington and my good friend George W asked me why we are so good guy.
What idiot prepared such constitution in both of the world because this idiot is sitting.
This is fantastic that the food that I can travel without problems, without sanctions, without the frozen comments.
I think most of the states in the world, such as the West and this is but I never I never dreamt about you, a superpower.
And that's something we should understand.
Yeah. I'm not disappointed.
You don't have a yard. Thank you.
My question is about an element of this dreadful crisis, which I find really extraordinary hasn't been covered.
And it's the evidence which finds itself really into the very unusual problem area.
And that is because Putin has deployed his military in a way that in my four decades of military government service,
I've never seen a free zone of deploying of force, only on foot, using the most fundamental element of your armed force no tanks,
artillery, no drones, individual soldiers, but incredibly well,
easily uniformly equipped in brand new police combat uniforms who were working through a very,
very carefully controlled plan with excellent level of radiance, a personal level.
I've never seen anything like it.
Now, I believe Putin in this area was formed because he worked out that this is something which is impossible to counter in in in Crimea anyway.
It is impossible for the Ukrainian military in Crimea to counter and it's impossible for anybody outside the country.
And I believe he worked this out, although maybe it was deployed more or less spontaneously because we I'm afraid if we look at Georgia,
he here a couple of years later that actually he planned the assaults a year and a half in advance.
And I would like your opinion, first of all, on what I believe was an extremely effective military tactic,
which has proved an absolute winner with impossible precedents in the future.
And secondly, how could a stuntman do this, doing this again?
Because it worked. Thank you. There are, as you know, 50,000 Russian waiters in London just waiting.
I was waiting, was done with it. I don't have enough. You know, it was well done, unfortunately.
And I think that is difficult. It would be difficult to repeat such a scenario in eastern Ukraine because the situation is different in Sevastopol.
They have a base in eastern Ukraine now. Then of course,
in Crimea it was possible to say because of the structure of the population that they are
not the Russian sort of self defence units well equipped in some shops in Simferopol are.
It is, of course, impossible to do anything. And don't let go of your book, especially because you know this in this place, as you've read,
it has much more audience at the end today, especially after Crimea and the experience there.
But the professional and the self defence concept was, I think,
such political very of to say and especial also beauty of this self-defence that people
made up that was a little bit polemic from his side for this content of self-defence.
Yes. Yes, that's great. I think that's also a source of optimism as well,
that this is not a scenario from how maybe the response plans of someone else and gender knocks on the door.
We have not heard enough from a woman yet. Yes, there's one hit the woman with her left arm.
So I put a short comment on a short question, I'm quite sure, because it's often criticised that the pendulum swung too far.
I think it's still worth remembering that in that time, which was very remote,
the head of the population said that we would refuse, actually participate in the new government.
But at the same time there are two factions that form from the remnants of the all parties in the voting
coalition and also that was the court appointed with the highest number of votes from parliament in Ukraine.
This was a legitimate secret interim government. Actually, it's pretty, pretty high.
But I believe there should be fresh parliamentary elections. My question is more about events yesterday in Vienna,
the arrest and I really to the panel's opinion on how that fits in to what's unfolding here and how far it's connected or not.
I think some of us hope the next gesture will be the closing down of Chelsea Football Club, but that is not the answer.
Look, there's difficult with Gaza because we were surprised also by this information.
And what I read that means that the free press is arrested long because of this last week in the theatre of events about something from the year 2008.
And it is the iron issue is out of.
Well I think that the oligarchs demand speaking to they are very difficult situation some of
them which we are not close to or to do we have a problem do not expect to step into a room,
for example. They are they can be relaxed because they are doing good on the job.
They tend to they have, of course, the problems with the Russian market, etc. but this is different.
But some people call it three plus one was one of the closest supporters of the young.
I have met them. Yeah, they of course they left some problems with new government, but in my opinion,
the main fear for oligarchs today is that the next stage of this revolution in Kiev,
in Ukraine will be really not now against the politician because it's happened, but against rich people because of this social situation in Ukraine.
I think there's a huge differences between rich and poor people.
This is a source of wealth. A lot of persons that is going to be the real problem for let's face.
According I think, to the morning's Financial Times, it must be true.
The oligarch we mentioned is represented in this country by the grandson of a former prime minister,
Lord Oxford, and he was also a former member of The Friends.
And I think do we think if I were to come back to a crucial point made by Clinton presidency,
which I would reformulate your comment as follows The crucial struggle that begins
the day after the Crimea referendum on Sunday is not the struggle for Crimea.
It is a struggle for Eastern Ukraine, where 90% of the Western media coverage would be about Crimea, Russia and the West sanctions new Cold War.
And of course, that would be happening, as Ben Foster reminded us, that the crucial struggle is eastern Ukraine.
Will there actually still be elections on the 25th of May?
Will lose elections happening across the country. Will eastern Ukraine be part of a national political process?
If yes, then not only is the independence of the rest of Ukraine secured,
but Ukraine is back on a unambiguously constitutional democratic track with the at the moment.
So my question to all is what should the politicians and actors on the ground do to make sure that that comes about,
that the elections go ahead and Ukraine is part of them and what we do in the West to help them in that.
Well, I think you have the 25th of May would be absolutely crucial date.
And I hope that because one of the elements we got going, I think, about Lavrov, Senator Kerry talks about the information is that nothing is missing.
What is it for?
I mean, the Globe said during a press conference for Russia today they they stay with their own position and they do not agree with the Americans.
So there'll be no conclusions going to come off as it was impossible to predict such result.
So I think them is and I hope that the change of the day, the postponement of election is not an element of the deal,
because it would be mistake, it might have been, you know, to wait longer for some constitutional stability,
because having the president and having such a very special kind of government and the old style in the parliament,
this is what I think this president elect the 25th will see who will be elected.
This is the next point of this. My advice for leading politicians in Ukraine will be not to make this campaign very tough.
It's not to fight each other so much as we know from the history.
It's us, neither of which would be quite possible like that.
And of course the is very important to have the election that we to have these elections
well organised with a lot of international observers and in eastern part of of,
of Ukraine. And of course the main problem is how to eliminate all these possible occupational acts of violence from, from various sides.
Because all those people about themselves, the Russians have enough the groups in Ukraine which are interested in the violence.
Also today, for example, I was informed before this meeting with two persons who were killed in Banyas
through some devastation between the pro-Russians and pro-Ukrainian groups.
So if you have more and more such such a situation, you do that.
And then of course what today the Ukrainian government can do.
I think the most important is to to start very active politics towards eastern part of Ukraine because, you know, two or three days ago,
it was information that one of the former government of how to keep looking
was the rest how who wants to be this pro-Russian candidate in the election?
Now, I don't he's not the hero of my story, as I mentioned, because this would have to do with the the day.
But I think for me, it's it's mistake if if in in eastern Ukraine this feeling that really the country's split and we have
no chances for the dialogue will increase and this action of of of arrest this is something that,
in my opinion, would be good to have warned the Russian government in this election would be much better not only to have people,
candidates for Maidan in such nice, very comfortable situation who would be okay with just this is wrong.
So I think this throughout Eastern. Yes. America is a very clever man, and I think you understand the situation very well.
And he's absolutely able to make some gesture to towards instant.
And that is necessary one day to go so necessary for these guys, one day to go physically to the be appropriate to ask him to organise.
The only one who has enough courage is to do it was to stop the party for two days.
Well, what is it for? For the European Union?
Important in Rome? I couldn't I couldn't say again. But the first idea is not the end of the story.
It is the presumption beginning because we have visited situation Crimea.
And my feeling is necessary to expect this and the continuation of destabilisation of eastern part
of of without military forces because the Russia doesn't need military forces in this place.
They have enough organised group, they have enough support.
There is not, in my opinion, to win, which is not. You shouldn't speak about millions, but, you know, thousands and those who speak.
And this is enough to destabilise the situation. And of course, we should say openly that the Crimea is is is a problem.
And Russia can you know, we have noticed very, very few new districts of de-escalation.
So we expect not escalation, but some kind of de-escalation.
It is necessary to use some some instruments.
The main problem for you is how to describe how to define what kind of instruments we can use and for what kind of instrument we can have consensus.
Because here we have. The problem.
MacLeod From the moment I spoke about this kind of courage,
I think here at this point to entertain thoughts about some ideas of decentralisation and centralisation,
whatever you want to call it, and you don't want to use the word said, it was my way.
I think that would be a very clever strategy at this point, because it could actually ultimately,
although a lot of people inside and outside the party would not like to have said this will say a lot of things so that it could I wanted to,
I think, strengthen Ukraine internally and also protect it from further Russian intervention.
I would hope, following what you said, President,
that there are already plans in place for deploying an EU monitoring mission and with some the very distinguished
figure and really I think the president or Pat Cox or somebody who already knows all about Ukraine.
Ellen Darren Duff it may well be true that Putin has a long term plan.
Great Russia again. And you disagree.
But we've only heard about Russia as Putin, his offensive intentions.
Is it inconceivable that there's also a defensive element?
My question is to Mr. Solana. I prefer broker.
As NATO's meeting in 2008, there was a declaration that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO.
Now, the Russians took that seriously. I've read that this wasn't taken seriously by NATO.
It was just to make George Bush happy, if it were true or was that he didn't want to be close to the truth.
I happened to be in that lunch. I was not.
I had nothing to do with nature. But I haven't seen a little bit of the vibe.
And it was very clear that nobody wanted to make that mistake.
In fact, in my view, the continuation of that would never do that.
Then there was met. And after that, until the battle of Georgia, I think that nobody wanted to and minority didn't want that decision to take.
Well, I think the native membership today is not the topic and for the Ukrainians in today's government.
They are not interested in this because they, first of all, did that.
The people there are not very much in favour of it.
You know, the figure is better. But my feeling is that today for European unity, we have about 50% in favour.
We have 10% against that, 90% who are looking forward for something and permit.
I think we have more and more 30% in favour.
So I think the nature is that is not the point.
Now, you said if Russia tries to explain all this action because they are afraid that you could
be the next the last a member of NATO's that is not very well received from Bucharest.
I remember also quite well the statement of the sentence of Mr. Putin,
and this is very sentence because in Bucharest he said that for Ukraine's artificial state.
And that's,
I think means this means that it is difficult to accept the independence of Ukraine if you've seen or you treat this country as artificial.
Last question. My name is Keith Mack, and I'm a lawyer who for many years worked in Central Europe and in Ukraine.
One important element, I think, in creating an independent Ukraine is the involvement of the oligarchs.
You mentioned how wealthy they are.
There's about ten or 12 people who basically control the whole of the economy in Ukraine.
Nearly all of those people are actively involved in in politics.
Nearly all of them finance political parties.
There really isn't any political force that is independent of these ten, 12 individuals.
Some of those individuals are naturally aligned with Russia.
Perhaps not for conviction, but for economic reasons.
The others may be leaning towards what we've got in all the West.
The one thing's for sure is that they've been fighting each other since.
Today Ukraine was established and they're fighting each other right now.
And after each election in Ukraine, a new corrupt kleptocracy steps into power.
And one of the things they do, apart from enrich themselves, is actually punish the opponents.
So you have a very atomised society, ongoing conflict.
The problem here is that you've got very rich and powerful men in a conflict.
And I think part of what the international institutions need to do now is to recognise that there will be no person to negotiate any
treaty with or have any meaningful post election state or withdrawal of political institutions unless these people voluntarily.
Disengage from politics and turn it into some sort of concord amongst each other whereby they they recognise that they'd done well,
that vastly wealthy, but they can't continue in the way they have because it's effectively like dealing with barons in the Middle Ages,
but they have to voluntarily step back the way of forcing these people to do it and the benefits will come down the line.
Every chance of having a strong economy and not economy will afford those rich men many further riches going forward.
I cannot. But without that, I don't think it's going to change all this.
This is a great topic. It probably will invite us again to discuss this this problem, because I agree with the structure of Ukraine.
This combination of of money and politics, oligarchs in power is very dangerous.
This is the problem of all old post-Soviet states.
This is the same system we have. Of course, the differences that they start the same centuries in Russia.
I hope that we are close to this situation, like what you described,
that they are ready voluntarily to limit own power and only influence because they are very sure that everything will happen.
This was a shock. And before you know, because I met all of them when we discussed the Situation Room,
majority of them usually very condemned, were very much in favour of association and European Union and all the things.
And I asked them metaphors of why we are so much poorer for all this, because he understood finally, after 20 years of,
let's say, one of the capitals, that he needs rules of law, he needs the security for own money, for own property, for own life.
For him. He needs to continue to be a more normal business.
People will move on with their world because it enough needs.
And then now it seems to be more longer as he was in the last 20 years.
Of course, he's much more popular. I know he does because he decided to buy Russia from women.
It's not so healthy with civil society.
And so I think now they are close to understand they need rules of law, they need the change of this situation inside.
They and they are ready more and more to limit opposition.
But still, they have a lot of details. The first one, frankly speaking, I don't understand maybe this issue with some deeper background to make sense,
but to propose for two oligarchs that to be new governor of Donetsk and to call
voice for the new governor of this is something quote is absolutely against 17
what you said because it means again that we have this combination of of money
of all you have for political if Washington will be elected as a new president,
if he's a new task can be that good. We haven't the real oligarchs but it might a sweet or you are to see the problem.
I think without the set of control service from both sides, politicians and oligarchs and to its good new constitution,
which is absolutely important and with such understanding that after the second Maidan,
it certainly will be disaster for them because first time is okay, second time is then the third time is disaster.
You cannot repeat the same stage during 20 years because then of course it is new because of this.
So hopefully we have a chance for that. But this is very, very difficult.
And and I think with a lot of ups and downs, a lot of of of of terrorism, this this.
Probably to some quite some o'clock if you ask a really telling dramatic question, you've been asking him about the question.
Okay. So just very short, very interesting question.
I wrote the originally from Moscow, a Russian.
You know what I want to say first? Oh, no, no question.
Okay. I just thought. It's not only Putin, by the way, not only Putin, you'll be surprised within the volume,
those of people who are in the position in Russia, they're not commenting because those are very neutral.
So it's important to understand,
for some reason there is a consumption within Russian elites that what Putin is doing is possibly right, but it's up for discussion.
And that was the question. I am from the city I studied here.
Did you feel I saw a lot of research recently, Merrill Lynch, UBS and Goldman Sachs, American banks, which are saying why Russia,
especially the next week or the week after, were Russian shares because everything cheap since like next, of course.
So Crimea was difficult. It's not, of course, relax.
There'll be some sanctions. Someone who lose their property in Chelsea with nothing else, do it.
So do you agree with that?
I think that you know this so present scenario and target the sanctions on look actually what we are talking about that there
will be acceleration of the speech and it opens up a new sort of economic standoff with very serious implications for Moscow.
What's your first impression about how to handle this is what you think?
Well, I wouldn't bet. You know, I think the Goldman Sachs I.
I think this is a beginning. This is not the first time.
Okay. And can I I think that was even better than I'd hoped it was going to be.
And I think the panel were absolutely terrific.
That was a wow factor Oxford event. And I'd like you all to express your gratitude in the customary way.
Not with a crouching, but with a standing of it. Through it.