

Transcript

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Agenda on behalf of these these talks, so I I wanted to see if it's the case and I really had that idea in in my mind as well. So I conducted more than 70 interviews with both parties.

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But I didn't choose them randomly, so this interview they have to know about this interplay, they have to be in those meetings.

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So it took me quite a long time.

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Figure out who.

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In those and then. So I've found out these interviews and I carried out starting with 2018, and it lasted for three years in Istanbul on cartoonist and London.

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And what emerged from these interviews was not a sense of ideals or actions dictated by Islamism as an ideology, but something unexpected.

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It was a recurring theme of every interview, and it was the.

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Of success.

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In every single conversation, without exception, and the notion of and longing for success surfaced naturally and became the central focus of the study without any promising on my part.

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The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and and NASA were keen on understanding and learning what the AKP, or in other words, back then the Turkish model was so successful this model was as you would remember.

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None.

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Was that and promoted or in one of the the words of one of the igwani's marketed to the Arab world by Western policy makers?

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Western leaders.

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Think tanks and Turkish soft power entities.

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And Islamist organisations, especially late karadavis I.

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Ms and academics as well.

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So. Umm.

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Just remember, back in back in 2011, Turkey was still seen as the preferred Muslim power by the West.

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Because of its NATO membership and the EU accession process was still ongoing and the strong ties with European markets still ongoing. So in other words.

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From the point of view of the.

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NAFTA, Weis and Igwanis right after the revolution.

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This AKP, because they were they had really close relationship with its mother movement, who AKP had a rest.

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They they never.

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Thought AKP as Islamist enough but Muslim enough so authentic, but most importantly, successful?

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So they wanted to learn from the AKP and adopt the policies of whatever AKP is giving them. We don't know then, and it was it had a legitimising power because.

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You have to realise that these parties were, even though Muslim Brotherhood had the opportunity to to, you know, stand in elections with independent candidates.

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It never aspired to. To assume for example, it it was never a free election, let alone for Nassar, his favourite president, and not even in Tunisia before Benedict was ousted.

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So they all needed technocratic and practical assistance.

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Despite being much older and much structural political movements than the AKP, they lacked experience of functioning as a professionalised political party, let alone.

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Governing from a position of power here you can see the initial assistance provided to them was strikingly basic, but you know many of the meetings were actually filled with.

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Talking about these.

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Very small quotient parts of political life.

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So what was disseminated from the AKP to anatha and then to everyone between 2011 and 13, was a toolbox of tactics.

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In other words, it was a collection of insights into the workings of the political machine and.

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That had achieved success.

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For the AKP, within a political culture that is.

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Turkey.

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Dominated, usually by Islamist, secular or Islamist anti Islamist dichotomy, as you can see, this kind of political battle.

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Fields partly mirrors the backdrop of persecution that boasts F1 and NAFTA endured for decades in Egypt. So that was another reason cited by interviews from.

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E1 and after that was said to have contributed to this interplay. So I identified A4 key category that define these tactics that AKP provided.

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The tactics falling under these categories form the essential components.

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Thus, the AKP believed were a key to its success. Similarly, in the post uprising era.

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Enacted and.

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EH1 define success as urgently prevailing in elections, which were actually, you know, main part of the I mean the components of the revolution.

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Criticise this.

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Of Islam. But they they wanted to.

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Just.

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Go ahead.

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The election win election and attaining power, which was led by someone who's now in in gaol, hired on charter. It's very close to a relationship with the AKP.

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Here another very small snippet. You can see how the AKP played a hands on role in shaping election strategies in Tunisia and Egypt.

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From 2011 to then 2014, or NASA and 2019 again for another. Obviously you can't do that for eight months, since in 2013 mostly government was ousted, they conducted tutorials.

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Before elections organised workshops and, you know, they ran training programmes tailored for various levels of administrative stuff for and they also attempted to implement a rigorous.

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Schedule during the campaign were unable to do.

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For 8/1.

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As one and after we put it, the AKP was regarded as a wow machine and election management was one of its most powerful engines.

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Another crucial tactic in the toolbox was the cultivation of a new bourgeoisie. This because this form of client's mission.

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Which had been successfully used by the AKP, contributed tremendously to its consolidation of power, again winning elections and navigating political crisis. So likewise in the in the AKP argued that if a new business elite formed in Tunisia and Egypt.

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That would help the Na Sawis and Equan stay in power and navigate the crisis and build a life.

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This vision lets AKP affiliated businessman to visit Cairo and Tunis many times and help establish 2 business associations, and they were modelled after the Akp's own musiat roughly the conservative business.

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The Muslim Business Association of Turkey and they were operating under Messias.

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But obviously you know, I I don't want to get into what happened to them because it's it's another story. But that was the thinking that.

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Of.

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Core tactics like I said in the prescription of success.

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So 2 postulations can be made about this toolbox. That's the AKP provided to an NFA and between 2011 and 13.

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While I've only, you know, shared a few snippets.

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Due to constant.

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It is.

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I hope the key idea come across. Firstly, it seems that what diffused from we're not specific policies, but rather selective tactics designed to be employed in times of crisis.

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To bolster the.

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Standing of these entities, the emphasis was on fortifying the positions of enough and I-1 and their domestic settings and to equip them to navigate.

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Challenges effectively. Secondly.

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The tactics shared were notably stripped of ideological content. They were not about invoking Islam as a means of acquiring or maintaining power. Instead, the essence of the diffusion process.

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Centred on.

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Normalisation or 1 iguan?

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To look, act and look normal as a political party and the style was distinctly managerial, aimed at delivering pragmatic solutions to immediate problems, so complex issues.

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Whether ideological or social, were simplified into practical, practical challenges requiring step by step resolutions.

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So in this context, we can assume that success has become increasingly tight to a managerial approach.

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Where Islamist movements priority applies, effective governance and operational aspects of running a state, this includes adopting modern management techniques, which is why I describe them. Some of the leaders in three of the entities, as the CEOs of Islam.

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Because they focus on delivering efficient public services.

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This shift, I think, marks a significant departure from the traditional focus on.

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Purely ideological objectives.

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So this obviously ties into a, you know, broader concept of post Islamism, but with a with a contribution to a post Cold War era neoliberal rationality. But I will not go into.

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If we could go back to revisit the ideas.

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How to look at Islamist transnational ties? I think this is another way to say that.

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I mean, like Marianne said, some of the things can be looked at only by, you know.

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Cost, benefit relations and calculus.

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To understand these dynamics, I believe we need to move beyond the Cold War era frameworks. That oversimplifies and mischaracterize such complexities and transnational ties because.

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As this might research and my book shows the interactions between these Islamist groups didn't represent a global Islamist political project like those imagined in the 1980s. And because it was beneficial.

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To both. I mean all three parties.

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Was a.

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It had a, you know, business client list benefits and you know.

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The idea of Islamist interconnectedness in this sense was over estimated, and it was, I don't think it was a pan Islamic solidarity at all.

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I think I should, yeah.