Okay. I would try to say why compare typology of female citizenship in MENA.
I will present. I will talk a short time about economic and legal aspects related with reform.
I will do some sensitive comparison. Paraguay's most similar cases because I.
I choose Egypt and Morocco for my group. I choose Lebanon, Syria for my Nazareth.
And I choose Kuwait and Qatar for it.
For the for the Akalis. And if I have time, I will do some conclusions on post 2011.
And then my theoretical and analytical perspective on reform is really reform to parliaments.
I am a political scientist. I know very little about law.
I had to learn it the hard way. I didn't of courses. I had to do individual courses at home reading and I will.
I go through family law, through a series on citizenship.
And so I chose, which actually would be my opponent.
This year she's coming to Oslo to meet my opponents after the.
I'm very glad for that, too, because she was my door opener for family because her book on citizenship and and gender in the Middle East.
You know, when I read it was this everything is about family. You know, what is family? You know, I was curious and she was the door opener, too.
So so this is why I always deal with family. It's female citizenship team family law through female citizenship.
These two for me are important. And when not saying say that actually my citizens are not part of the Demas.
Demas is the Greek word for for people.
And democracy comes from that word because but in political science we are so focussed on Kratos, which means governance.
We forget that you govern the people and the people have two sexes, you know, female and means.
And my argument is that women and men are really not part of the demos.
So they are part of the polity, not the states, even because we have many stateless, but they are parts of the polity, but they are not part of demos,
which is a smaller ring, and they don't share equal civil political rights with males, which makes them an excluded part of the demos.
And and I focus on religious law. I'm not into Islamic jurisprudence.
So because I deal with multi-religious states, I have to do understand religious law in general.
And the framework is I want to do more stuff on looking at economy economic pressures, because if you remember,
Laurie Brandt did a book, an excellent book 15 years ago and political liberalisation.
And she took economic liberalisation as a fact, as a as a, as a as, you know, something given I would do the other way around.
I would use political liberalisation as a given.
I will focus on economic liberalisation and see the impact of economy economy on legal reforms.
So this is I want to do that. I don't know how to do it. I would try.
Why compare it is because comparison what appears at first sight to be odd becomes familiar,
and what looks familiar becomes less obvious and more fascinating.
This is a Norwegian political sociologist, Goldstein Richter, who I use in my Ph.D. as a theoretical, methodological and analytical perspective.
And I will use him. And this is this is just to show my ignorance, my personal ignorance,
because I did not know that English was the language sorry, French was the language in the courts in England.
And so does anybody know? 1360 I was like, what?
I only learned that only, you know, like two months ago. And if you see here.
This is in Salisbury taken an eastern my colleague you're you're to laugh which means God's as
my right and like I love the thing my Suzuki this is maybe it's in Syria it is dear in Moldova,
which means gods is my lord. I mean, this means I mean, I think this is interesting to see that law was in in England until 1360.
You know, this is very strange for an Arab, but I'm sure it's not strange for English people.
But for me, it was very strange. In general, personal status, though, and the motive is more progressive than the master.
This is something which the human development supports and towards the rise of human sort of sense.
And I was saying, why? Why is that so? Why is it more progressive?
So this is this is, you know, the start of my interests and to looking at what are the social forces that impinge
on female citizenship in general and family law reform in particular in MENA,
how and why do some persons form succeed while others fail in Parliament?
And so it's how can we conceive of patterns of variances, the sorts of focus I focus on the three subregions which impinge on reform.
And I mean, this is the table I have looked upon and I differentiate between two basic things which are, for me, different.
This is the individually based citizenship rights. You know, Morocco before 19 and 2004 was here.
It was group based.
What I mean by individually based citizenship is that it is a relationship between as a citizen and a direct relationship with the states.
I mean, theoretically, it is like that, in fact, is it's not.
But this is the theory. Now, here is the topological period in Morocco changed for me.
This is very big, really big that this changed in 2003.
And although it is not very you know, it's the best we have.
It's really the best we have. Sorry, this. So so this is this is happened in Turkey.
First of all, of course, Tunisia seconds.
We have this extremely interesting experience in south Yemen and now we have Morocco
to Morocco is sort of that you know that it's showing a way looks to Morocco.
And as I put a question mark some other places you know Iraq where do I put Iraq?
I put it in blue. The name mean the non-Arab speaking Arabic states, Israel, Turkey and Iran, which fits differently.
And then we have no. So this is this is then this is the typology.
I work in a sphere of economy.
I was I will not talk so much about it, but I will tell you that economy is important for politics.
I mean, economy changes things, economy changes.
It's pressures the state to think differently.
And I will show you only two very interesting. So two very interesting economic what you would call indicators.
If you see this women in non-agricultural wage labour, can you see that Morocco has the highest number?
This is from 2011. It has 21% women working in North Korean sector.
Second place is Egypt. It is 19. This is the highest in the Middle East.
And then we have seen in the US 16% working in non-agricultural aggregate agrarian sector.
And the numbers for click on cluster I think is not so good because they include non citizen team-mates.
So I take them, you know, I don't take them seriously.
This is interesting because where do we have the the best legal framework for reform this Morocco?
And I think while Moghaddam has something she says that it is women working in the public
sector who are demanding more economic rights because they are the ones who see this most.
It's not the women who have to work in the fields from day to day to meet their needs.
It is the women who have high education, who work in the service sector, who work in public offices and who are organising themselves.
And I think she has a point. And I think these these numbers really show it.
Number two, which I think is very interesting, look here, the number of unemployed youth female is is is lower than the unemployed youth.
Maybe this means that more young women in Morocco are employed than men.
Can you see that's not so in Egypt.
Not so in Syria. Huh? In Lebanon.
Many young women. This is from 15 to 24 hour employees.
There is very low unemployment among young women.
They are competing for jobs after when they reach 24, when they start having children, when they start establishing families.
I think these numbers are very interesting from a social scientist perspective because they are the ones who say, Oh,
why is my brother going to have the rights when I have the same education and have the same, you know, opportunity to have the same kind of mind?
I won't mind my rights.
I think this is extremely interesting to see such such numbers and look at the social forces that are pushing for reform to give women their rights.
So this is why I think economy is important. And what's that?
When I when I look at the sphere of law, I look at the mode of institutionalised institutionalisation of the court system,
which I wrote an article where I compare states with dual courts, which is Syria and Lebanon, and states with unitary courts.
And, you know, it's very easy to see that women in states with unitary courts get more rights than men and women in dual courts,
because in drug courts, you have the religious clergy who are and present very conservative interpretations of family law.
And the interesting thing with the police is, of course,
that Kuwait has had a unitary system for a long time and Qatar has just recently merged the two courts.
So this for comparative reasons is very interesting from five, ten, ten halfway through.
Okay. Good to have you. So I just think.
Okay. So so this is this is why I do this comparison.
So this is what I just said, the U.S. court system. This is found in Egypt, Morocco to a court system.
And the police. Yeah, this is what I. But this is really interesting.
They have the dual courts in Kuwait, which have been merged. But I don't know.
You can tell me after they have in the civil court in Qatar today, they have they have some of the religious judges who are dealing with civil law.
And this is really extremely interesting. I don't like it. It's for you legal people to talk.
But for me as a political scientist, I find it very interesting that they are dealing with civil law and they are not really trained in civil law.
So what's happens is interesting to do to do to do research, I think.
Okay. I would have to step here and put in this one. Oh, this is the way I works now.
I put like I puts here in like, cities.
I look at the citizen sick regime and puts for each state and each subregion is tentative.
I have not finished. This is what I am going to do more. And so I look at the court system.
Sammartino called this fine and look what it is. And it's and this is how you do comparative work or I trying to do and interesting you know you
see when we'll see the outside again it's economic interests which pushes the states to sign.
If you really see when they sign, why they sign it, because they want to show us for the rest of the world.
They want to be part of the rest of the world. I thought, you know, 2009, we're having world championship and football in 20 years.
We have to do something to show that we are, you know, parts of the world,
not only sports and in the architecture and and in the in fabulous architecture, by the way.
So so song and and also we have to look at a strength of religious authority.
I mean, Morocco, it is law. It is explicit and public.
We have an Islamist opposition, but it is co-opted and marginalised in each of the time.
It you know, it is much more stronger.
And when we Kallenbach who is doing research on Egypt, she is she is also my companion citizen from Norway.
She is doing excellent research on the strength of conservatives who are now marching in to sort of redefine Islamic,
for example, law and and wanting to change it from the 2000.
In Syria, it is it is a high conservative.
I think it is low probability for change towards less gender citizenship.
After all the turmoil, Lebanon, it is very high.
Political power is distributed along sectarian lines. And in Kuwait, well, I say it's medium.
Sunni-Shia sectarianism has strengthened after 2006 following a new me media.
No, but I will show you more of that very interesting thing.
Things are happening in Kuwait because I was there before I was in I one week.
I was two weeks in Kuwait in April.
It's extremely interesting to go to the to the parliament and see what the four women's first time female representatives have done in only two years.
Amazing, amazing lot of things they have done.
I will try to write something about it, but this is really interesting what they have done in Kuwait in only two years.
They are out of the parliaments now. They were not re elected.
And I look at agents at reform. If I want to comment on an online us, I would say, well, yes, most of feminism, yes.
But I don't believe in that so much because it looks like it is more and you know, speaking.
But really, what's the what's the state authorities support is what I call Victorian Islamist ideals of domesticated womanhood.
I think this is the sort of they are sort of out, you know, Botox, feminism, maybe you can talk about it like that.
So what's it target? But, you know, compared to Kuwait, this is nothing.
Yes. 2 minutes. Okay. So I would just say a few words about how I if you want this, I can send it to you.
You can write to me your email, I can send it. This is.
And so I look here at the female citizenship outcome.
How has how has female family reform, which parts of family form have changed in these six states?
And then I look at the C main citizenship in general. Okay.
So if I go back to the conclusions. I think that's the stations regarding family law reform have gained renewed salience through Armenia since 2000.
Ironically, Contestations are less sharp after 2011 uprisings because they are enmeshed with what are presented as more important issues.
Contemporary consultations related to family law reform reflects points of dissent and conflicts that existed before the 2001 11 uprisings.
These persist in times of political transition,
although proponents and opponents invariably come to a demobilised phase where tolerance of diverse actors increases.
This second thing is not me whose written this is what we call the Bible of transitional theory and political science, which is written by O'Donnell.
Jayakumar O'Donnell. I have a this in the paper.
You can have it later, but it's very interesting to read what they write on theory, on transition and their basic.
This was written in the mid 1980s and they studied transitions in South America and and also in Eastern Europe.
Later, they did more research. But it's very interesting to see the Arab transition phase through the theories we have on transitional theory.
And in the course of transition, Afghan citizens will not necessarily get what they deserve.
That is extended citizenship, but they what they are or more probably others negotiate.
So seen within a state formation perspective this I'm really interested in state formation more than democratisation.
I think these two are are overlapping but they are separate reforms related to family law in MENA reflect
varied tracks which ruling authorities in MENA have chosen since establishment of modern territorial states,
which is around 1920.
So family law reform is thus as much part of the process of state formation in MENA as it is part of a process of democratisation.
And this is where law comes in because law is so young. It's so you know, it's so young.
It's still in the baby stage, really, in the Middle East.
If we talk about territorial states from 1920, it's only like 90 years old and the state system in Western Europe was established.
If we take a year, 1648, this is the Westphalian fourth,
this I have only one picture to show is Sami Low in Mena is perceived as the last bastion then CMA citizen.
Mena might have been the world's last colony. And this is also I have stolen from the title of the book.
But you know, we are always talked about the last colony, last only one really.
Women in Arab countries, they are financially not the worst off.
There are many, many worse places in Africa which are economically much worse, worst off.
But legally, I think it's really strange that they have so little legal power capacity.
Look at this picture.
The Qataris have forgotten that their women where heads of families for, you know, like centuries and they put this on the new statistics.
This is from September 2009. They did a survey in Qatar with the Statistics Bureau says, oh, women support families.
What's your revelation? You know, women have supported their families, you know, life for hundreds and hundreds of years, also, including in Qatar.
But when they get down on numbers, it's that household female heads of households count like I think they found like 20%.
I have the numbers. So it was like, surprise, surprise.
Okay. Thank you.