1 00:00:09,170 --> 00:00:18,350 Hello and welcome to this second seminar in Michaelmas series on the dictatorship syndrome in the Middle East. 2 00:00:18,350 --> 00:00:26,870 Today, we're moving from Egypt to Iran and we're meeting to talk about authoritarian or 3 00:00:26,870 --> 00:00:31,970 revolutionary reflections on the nature of the state in the Islamic Republic of Iran. 4 00:00:31,970 --> 00:00:39,740 I'm delighted to be joined here today by two very good specialists on contemporary Iranian politics. 5 00:00:39,740 --> 00:00:46,100 One is Mariam Arms All Day from Princeton. The other is sort of strange Baradi, Amy. 6 00:00:46,100 --> 00:00:52,860 And we're going to be giving each of them 10 minutes roughly to give us a short presentation. 7 00:00:52,860 --> 00:00:58,670 Then we'll have another 10 minutes or so in which I'll engage in conversation with them. 8 00:00:58,670 --> 00:01:03,320 And then after that, we'll move on to the general Q&A for half an hour. 9 00:01:03,320 --> 00:01:08,540 We do need to end the session promptly at 6:00. We need to keep the time. 10 00:01:08,540 --> 00:01:20,180 So without more ado, I'd like to turn to Mariam Olens all day and invite her to give us the first presentation of our seminar this afternoon. 11 00:01:20,180 --> 00:01:24,920 Hello, everyone. Thank you so much for having me in the seminar series. 12 00:01:24,920 --> 00:01:36,980 I'm really excited to be part of this programme. So we hear very frequently from the Islamic Republic officials about how the government in Iran, 13 00:01:36,980 --> 00:01:43,030 its institutions, its policies and even the nation itself is a revolutionary one. 14 00:01:43,030 --> 00:01:49,220 This marker revolutionary, even though we're 40 years, 40 plus years away from the 1979 revolution, 15 00:01:49,220 --> 00:01:55,640 is still very well alive in the governmental discourse on all levels of its operation. 16 00:01:55,640 --> 00:02:00,200 So the question I'd like to address today is what does this emphasis on this, 17 00:02:00,200 --> 00:02:06,380 on the revolutionary character mean in practise beyond just an ideological posture? 18 00:02:06,380 --> 00:02:13,220 Of course, there is one obvious function. It gives the authoritarian state the justification to repress any other voice as counter-revolutionary, 19 00:02:13,220 --> 00:02:23,210 to frame it very easily as counter-revolutionary. But beyond this ideological function, is there any veracity to the claim to a revolutionary nature? 20 00:02:23,210 --> 00:02:28,130 Does it mean anything with regard to actual everyday dynamics of governance? 21 00:02:28,130 --> 00:02:31,730 And I believe the answer is yes. 22 00:02:31,730 --> 00:02:37,670 I have done extensive research on the origins of what is arguably the most prominent state apparatus in contemporary Iran, 23 00:02:37,670 --> 00:02:44,630 and that is the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, also known as Sebel two forces speakers. 24 00:02:44,630 --> 00:02:52,300 I think this early history tells us a lot about the nature of state and governance in Iran at large by showing us a certain, 25 00:02:52,300 --> 00:03:00,740 quote unquote, revolutionary characteristics that became a vital part of state and state institutions, including the IRGC from early on. 26 00:03:00,740 --> 00:03:10,470 But not only limited to that early phase, it has left its footprint for the years to come on state institutions. 27 00:03:10,470 --> 00:03:16,700 So we know in the early history of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 28 00:03:16,700 --> 00:03:21,960 there was incessant friction between the liberal minded, technocratic, provisional government led by me. 29 00:03:21,960 --> 00:03:31,970 It was gone on the one hand, and the more radical clerics around Khomeini and their left foot followers who work within revolutionary institutions, 30 00:03:31,970 --> 00:03:35,870 largely the IRGC became an official entity. 31 00:03:35,870 --> 00:03:39,770 Only about two months after the February 1979 revolution. 32 00:03:39,770 --> 00:03:43,070 But in the first few years of its existence, 33 00:03:43,070 --> 00:03:54,590 its support came mostly from the radical clerical camp in the government and not the technocratic section which actually controlled the budgets. 34 00:03:54,590 --> 00:03:59,540 The technocratic provisional government. And later on, the first elected president, 35 00:03:59,540 --> 00:04:08,510 I won't have somebody said were more fond of refurbishing the professional police and the army and not investing in the IRGC. 36 00:04:08,510 --> 00:04:17,600 This means that contrary to conventional wisdom, the IRGC did not receive comprehensive state support from the moment to the inception in April 1979. 37 00:04:17,600 --> 00:04:21,350 It took another two years approximately for that to happen. 38 00:04:21,350 --> 00:04:29,810 So before it acquired such support, before it had a proper organisation and enough funds or equipment or even minimal training for its volunteers. 39 00:04:29,810 --> 00:04:39,320 It was put to the test of straining situations such as the ethnic conflict in many border areas that the most intensive of them was in Kurdistan. 40 00:04:39,320 --> 00:04:50,750 I'm sure you know, and very soon after it engaged in a conventional war with Iraq when Iraq invaded Iran in September 1980. 41 00:04:50,750 --> 00:04:56,060 In my research, I tried to understand what this early pre consolidation involvement in action 42 00:04:56,060 --> 00:05:01,590 meant for the future of the Earth to see and governance in Iran of large. 43 00:05:01,590 --> 00:05:09,790 One thing I found in my interviews with first generation IRGC veterans, as well as some active members of the organisation, 44 00:05:09,790 --> 00:05:18,270 was this that either an intensive battle situations or in everyday organisational work in like urban centres, 45 00:05:18,270 --> 00:05:27,030 they trusted one another's improvisation in the lack of any other structure, in the lack of any professional training and experience, as I mentioned. 46 00:05:27,030 --> 00:05:30,030 But they didn't do this just as a last resort. 47 00:05:30,030 --> 00:05:38,490 Relying on improvised direct action of supposedly dedicated volunteers was actually much more in line with the spirit of the revolutionary times. 48 00:05:38,490 --> 00:05:46,320 And it was credited as such by all levels of leaders and the peers as well. 49 00:05:46,320 --> 00:05:57,240 So volunteer a small group, leaders and politicians in the radical camp all relied in this asset on this urge for direct action amongst volunteers, 50 00:05:57,240 --> 00:06:04,500 not just to get the job done when there was no other way to go, but because they also believed this was the right way of doing things. 51 00:06:04,500 --> 00:06:17,400 So to give you an example. You know that the IRGC was involved in action against the Kurdish insurgency as early as 1979 alongside 52 00:06:17,400 --> 00:06:25,710 the regular army who was trying to defend its barracks there in after one of the operations there, 53 00:06:25,710 --> 00:06:35,760 one of the joint operations, the the IRGC operations commander, Abu Sharif, said this in a press interview. 54 00:06:35,760 --> 00:06:39,660 Quote, The government and the army tied our hands in the past. 55 00:06:39,660 --> 00:06:46,530 We will not listen to them from now on and we'll act directly where necessary if we need something that the government is not provided immediately. 56 00:06:46,530 --> 00:06:57,300 The people who will do that for us. And then this is a very prominent sentiment going on on different grandson levels. 57 00:06:57,300 --> 00:07:03,300 But this is also not an uncommon incident in the first couple of years after any revolution. 58 00:07:03,300 --> 00:07:10,530 So how is the case of Iran different? I think it's rather unique, this case of state building in Iran, 59 00:07:10,530 --> 00:07:15,360 because the reliance on improvised direct action was institutionalised both within 60 00:07:15,360 --> 00:07:20,660 the IRGC and within the section of the more radical side of the government, 61 00:07:20,660 --> 00:07:28,050 mainly because it had to be deployed under intensive work conditions. So it was deployed in the lack of other resources. 62 00:07:28,050 --> 00:07:36,660 It paid off at least partially. And so and it was validated as true revolutionary dedication. 63 00:07:36,660 --> 00:07:48,120 So it became a modus operandi that was hard to let go of even after the first few years to as as current examples, contemporary examples. 64 00:07:48,120 --> 00:07:54,750 Think about, for instance, the encounters between the IRGC, small boats and U.S. Navy units in the Persian Gulf. 65 00:07:54,750 --> 00:08:04,140 That always creates friction or about the downing of a U.S. drone in twenty nineteen by the Iranians around the Iranian border. 66 00:08:04,140 --> 00:08:09,420 In such instances, talk to your commanders who are involved. But regardless of how involved they are, 67 00:08:09,420 --> 00:08:16,710 they run in state and the military proudly presents them presents such instances as the act of a brave 68 00:08:16,710 --> 00:08:26,360 and dedicated soldier or a group of them firing at will and encourages this sort of action further. 69 00:08:26,360 --> 00:08:31,280 Now, how does this help us with understanding the nature of authoritarianism in Iraq? 70 00:08:31,280 --> 00:08:35,940 The question is also a good conduit to the theme of the seminar series, which used after. 71 00:08:35,940 --> 00:08:39,230 One, his book, The Dictatorship Syndrome. 72 00:08:39,230 --> 00:08:48,020 I think the fact that many revolutionary conditions, including in Iran, lead to authoritarianism is not simply caused by doctors. 73 00:08:48,020 --> 00:08:53,930 One who suggests good citizens who identify with authoritarianism or their, quote, 74 00:08:53,930 --> 00:09:03,800 robust and chronic obedience, unquote, or even due to the fact that it's not due to the fact that, 75 00:09:03,800 --> 00:09:13,770 as he describes the Iranian case, I'm quoting, countries under the thumbs of men of religion are more receptive to dictatorship and quote. 76 00:09:13,770 --> 00:09:23,760 These all do play a part for sure. Although I believe they are more effective, other structural forces and not causes of the rise of authoritarianism. 77 00:09:23,760 --> 00:09:32,850 But in addition to such factors, I believe more importantly, we have to remember that a revolution provides opportunities for direct action, 78 00:09:32,850 --> 00:09:38,490 which in turn give the participants a sense of having their own faith in their hands. 79 00:09:38,490 --> 00:09:42,960 It is the sense of participation rather than tame compliance or being good, 80 00:09:42,960 --> 00:09:49,320 obedient citizens that lures people into cooperating with the revolutionary apparatus. 81 00:09:49,320 --> 00:09:55,920 In the case of Iran, the continued availability of venues for direct action has preserved this attraction to some extent. 82 00:09:55,920 --> 00:10:06,720 The continued attraction for volunteers in organisations such as the Basij, which is the demobilisation branch of the IRGC, 83 00:10:06,720 --> 00:10:16,350 has in turn created a system with flexible capillary control based on the participation of a good number of the people. 84 00:10:16,350 --> 00:10:19,910 So to wrap up, I'd like to suggest that behind the security apparatus, 85 00:10:19,910 --> 00:10:25,650 Panopticon and its power that is infused into the society lies a revolutionary institution, 86 00:10:25,650 --> 00:10:31,530 albeit in an organisational sense of the word, not in a radical ideological sense of the word. 87 00:10:31,530 --> 00:10:37,860 This revolutionary institution tolerates and encourages direct action that is ideologically in line with Islamic Republic models, 88 00:10:37,860 --> 00:10:42,690 of course, and thereby it sustains a sizeable popular base. 89 00:10:42,690 --> 00:10:49,560 Over the years, this popular base is not necessarily brainwashed, that is to say, to serve the state. 90 00:10:49,560 --> 00:10:56,340 Rather, institutions of power keep them committed and interested by authorising spontaneous direct action, 91 00:10:56,340 --> 00:11:00,510 even though revolutionary times are long past. Now, I'll stop here. 92 00:11:00,510 --> 00:11:16,740 Thank you very much. Thank you, Marianne, for this very interesting overview over the role and function of the IRGC over the decades. 93 00:11:16,740 --> 00:11:26,160 My remarks are going to be pretty much centred on on the topic of my of my book, 94 00:11:26,160 --> 00:11:33,360 namely this whole issue regarding state institution building within the Islamic Republic. 95 00:11:33,360 --> 00:11:41,880 My contention is that the very construction of the state from the revolution onwards for the past decade, 96 00:11:41,880 --> 00:11:47,610 for the past four decades, has really been a work in progress and that we can have a robust debate, 97 00:11:47,610 --> 00:11:57,410 obviously not on this occasion, on whether the Islamic Republic can today really be defined as a state, according to Western political theory canids. 98 00:11:57,410 --> 00:12:05,820 And one of the reasons why the debate and discussion within the Islamic Republic on the exact nature of the state are 99 00:12:05,820 --> 00:12:13,550 not on the exact limits and boundaries or of the power and authority of each solution is still ongoing after 40 years. 100 00:12:13,550 --> 00:12:21,740 Also has to do with the fact that these state institutions are very varied and non-uniform origins. 101 00:12:21,740 --> 00:12:30,470 Suffice to note that both the Iranian post revolution constitution, both in its 1979 edition and its 1989 revision, 102 00:12:30,470 --> 00:12:35,630 is really a mixture between Western political traditions, particularly the French Fifth Republic, 103 00:12:35,630 --> 00:12:44,030 from which the current institution of the presidency was directly inspired and also fringed doctrines of Shiism, such as the right to Figi, 104 00:12:44,030 --> 00:12:52,310 but also ad hoc bodies that were brought about by various exigencies and crises in the management of the state, particularly throughout the 1980s. 105 00:12:52,310 --> 00:12:58,990 Cases in point here are the Masad Council and the Supreme National Security Council. 106 00:12:58,990 --> 00:13:08,110 And such an unwieldy arrangement has worked in quotes during the past decades for a number of reasons. 107 00:13:08,110 --> 00:13:14,380 One of the important one of the key reasons behind this was, of course, 108 00:13:14,380 --> 00:13:19,180 the fact that the political elite and the political class was configured in a way which 109 00:13:19,180 --> 00:13:26,170 allowed for competitive politics to determine the incumbents of several state institutions, 110 00:13:26,170 --> 00:13:29,020 particularly the parliament and, of course, the presidency. 111 00:13:29,020 --> 00:13:45,580 And this this was a buttressed by factionalism, which was really the the model around which everyday politics really organised in Iran. 112 00:13:45,580 --> 00:13:55,630 However, I would argue this aspect, namely a competitive form of politics within the precinct of the Islamic Republic's political class, 113 00:13:55,630 --> 00:14:06,670 has faded in recent years as the Islamic Republic has started to grapple with challenges from a new opposition, which I will discuss later. 114 00:14:06,670 --> 00:14:15,880 And also the vexing issue of generational change within its political class and the absence of suitable vehicles for implementing the same, 115 00:14:15,880 --> 00:14:24,580 such as structured political parties which have been absent in Iran for decades and coupled to coupled to all of this. 116 00:14:24,580 --> 00:14:32,170 One thing that is really affecting the nature of the contemporary state and Islamic Republic is the 117 00:14:32,170 --> 00:14:38,470 deepening legitimacy crisis that the Islamic Republic has been facing since 2009 and since 2009. 118 00:14:38,470 --> 00:14:44,680 We've had different waves of of significant popular unrest and protest. 119 00:14:44,680 --> 00:14:53,290 In 2009, we had a mainly urbane urban middle class protest against the electoral outcome of that year. 120 00:14:53,290 --> 00:15:00,670 But it has morphed into serious strife amongst the urban margins, 121 00:15:00,670 --> 00:15:10,420 the fringes of of society due to political and especially economic reasons in recent years. 122 00:15:10,420 --> 00:15:22,120 And the reaction of the state system as a whole to these challenges has been to resort 123 00:15:22,120 --> 00:15:28,750 to violence and to our very own form of control over over the means of violence, 124 00:15:28,750 --> 00:15:34,570 which has been endorsed by the entire gamut of East in a regime personalities and 125 00:15:34,570 --> 00:15:40,300 ference from those who are defined as reformers to those are defined as conservatives. 126 00:15:40,300 --> 00:15:47,830 In the past, I would argue the political class had figures who could cater to such anger or to some two such 127 00:15:47,830 --> 00:15:53,920 desires for change from various strata of society and turned them into electoral capital. 128 00:15:53,920 --> 00:16:00,470 And that was one of the reasons why, for example, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad managed to rise to the presidency in 2005. 129 00:16:00,470 --> 00:16:06,910 And I believe that this potential has has has has weakened considerably in recent times, 130 00:16:06,910 --> 00:16:12,610 with the political class entrenching and being unable to offer a suitable response to these 131 00:16:12,610 --> 00:16:23,770 challenges beyond the aforementioned adoption of of of a security discourse and scooty discourse. 132 00:16:23,770 --> 00:16:34,990 So the other important factor that I mentioned previously consists of the Islamic Republic facing an evolving opposition. 133 00:16:34,990 --> 00:16:38,230 So in the 1980s and 1990s, 134 00:16:38,230 --> 00:16:46,600 what constitute the opposition to the Islamic Republic were mostly the remnants of secular forces from the monarchists leftist, 135 00:16:46,600 --> 00:16:57,220 then the Mujahadeen HYG organisation, of course, which emerged as as as as the opposition in exile in Iraq and so forth. 136 00:16:57,220 --> 00:17:08,050 These were either people aligned to the junkyard regime or entities and personalities were taking part in the revolution, 137 00:17:08,050 --> 00:17:16,150 but then had fallen out progressively with the Khomeini's faction who grabbed control of state power in the Islamic Republic. 138 00:17:16,150 --> 00:17:19,780 However, now this has evolved considerably. It is mostly domestic. 139 00:17:19,780 --> 00:17:22,150 It is not exiles like the rest. 140 00:17:22,150 --> 00:17:31,080 The previous forms of the previous generations of opposition activists, personalities and entities not connected to the old political organisations. 141 00:17:31,080 --> 00:17:38,620 So examples are the spontaneous trade unions that have immersions more or less 2006. 142 00:17:38,620 --> 00:17:44,140 I believe the first one was the trade union of the workers of the boss company of Tehran. 143 00:17:44,140 --> 00:17:57,160 Now we have worker activism in the form of they half to pay workers and and people who have rallied around her cause like Stampeder Union. 144 00:17:57,160 --> 00:18:04,290 These. Trade unions have led to some unprecedented developments, for example, in recent months. 145 00:18:04,290 --> 00:18:13,310 We've seen the most serious industrial action in Iran in the past four decades, pretty much since the autumn and winter of 1978. 146 00:18:13,310 --> 00:18:18,350 Then we've had lawyers such as some elements of civil society, prominently lawyers, 147 00:18:18,350 --> 00:18:22,900 and here Nasserism today, the imprisoned lawyer is that is a clear example of this, 148 00:18:22,900 --> 00:18:30,260 student leaders and then even relatives of those who are being imprisoned or repressed returning talk to opposition activists themselves. 149 00:18:30,260 --> 00:18:32,240 And this form of opposition is home grown. 150 00:18:32,240 --> 00:18:40,750 It has little or no ties to the veteran groups that he said does not really subscribe to key milestone events which form the Islamic Republic, 151 00:18:40,750 --> 00:18:48,170 the revolution, the Iran-Iraq war. It doesn't really share the political classes reading of these. 152 00:18:48,170 --> 00:18:53,360 And so far has found really little in terms of the state's willingness to genuinely engage with it. 153 00:18:53,360 --> 00:18:58,940 So the state is not really opening up to this form of opposition. 154 00:18:58,940 --> 00:19:15,010 And I'll finish with some concentrations regarding what could happen in the in the transition from the current second Islamic Republic, 155 00:19:15,010 --> 00:19:21,940 if you can name it this way. The first one having been, of course, the one which was in place between 1979 and 1989. 156 00:19:21,940 --> 00:19:30,820 And this one, which has started in the post, Khomeini, Iran undoing the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 157 00:19:30,820 --> 00:19:38,230 So in my view, another constitutional revision following the passing of the current supreme leader appears inevitable. 158 00:19:38,230 --> 00:19:45,670 Ayatollah Khomeini's rule is strongly personalistic and shaped around his his is his 159 00:19:45,670 --> 00:19:50,590 own personal authority and his own relationship with the rest of the political class. 160 00:19:50,590 --> 00:19:57,700 As to some extent, to a great extent, actually, Khomeini's rule was prior to him. 161 00:19:57,700 --> 00:20:01,060 So this third Islamic Republic, if you can call it this way, 162 00:20:01,060 --> 00:20:11,530 is likely to present considerable differences with regards to previous ones, particularly in terms of popular participation. 163 00:20:11,530 --> 00:20:21,910 And I would argue elite dynamism and elasticity. So popular participation in in in choosing in selecting some of the incumbents of the state 164 00:20:21,910 --> 00:20:29,500 institutions with also regards to the extent to which the elite will have diversity within its ranks. 165 00:20:29,500 --> 00:20:37,390 It is uncaused, therefore, in my view, to be an evolution of the previous republics, 166 00:20:37,390 --> 00:20:44,710 the first and second one, and will not really be a revolution with regards to them, 167 00:20:44,710 --> 00:20:53,740 but will probably constitute a further drift towards the entrenchment of the new generation 168 00:20:53,740 --> 00:21:02,270 or the political class on on the state in ways in which we have to still observance. 169 00:21:02,270 --> 00:21:06,620 Thank you. Thank you very much, Silverbush, and thank you both. 170 00:21:06,620 --> 00:21:14,060 I think your two presentations have in it a very nice way, pull this in slightly different directions. 171 00:21:14,060 --> 00:21:20,700 And, you know, I work extremely well with with the title of today's seminar, which is authoritarian or revolutionary. 172 00:21:20,700 --> 00:21:22,580 And Mariam, it seems to me, 173 00:21:22,580 --> 00:21:33,380 in emphasising the institutionalisation of informality and spontaneity and the modus operandi of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. 174 00:21:33,380 --> 00:21:38,660 Suggested that that revolutionary aspect is still very much with us. 175 00:21:38,660 --> 00:21:44,570 Whereas still, Bush has talked much more about the way that the system is evolving. 176 00:21:44,570 --> 00:21:51,800 And as it loses its capacity to respond to societal moods and currents, 177 00:21:51,800 --> 00:21:58,880 it's actually becoming less revolutionary and more authoritarian in a traditional sense. 178 00:21:58,880 --> 00:22:04,040 So I'm going to ask you to reflect a little bit on each other's arguments. 179 00:22:04,040 --> 00:22:09,620 My second question. But first, I've got a specific question to each of you. 180 00:22:09,620 --> 00:22:16,620 I'll start with you. Mariam. We we've often read. 181 00:22:16,620 --> 00:22:23,970 In some of the Western literature on the Revolutionary Guard Corps, and indeed it's not it's a view that one often encounters in Iran as well, 182 00:22:23,970 --> 00:22:28,680 that the Revolutionary Guard Corps has become more and more a sort of power behind the throne, 183 00:22:28,680 --> 00:22:37,680 within the Islamic Republican system, that it's been accruing more powers. 184 00:22:37,680 --> 00:22:48,090 It's been extending its activities into greater areas of life when it crosses horns with the organs of government. 185 00:22:48,090 --> 00:22:56,110 It's tending to emerge on top. So I just wonder whether you could tell us something about how you view those arguments. 186 00:22:56,110 --> 00:23:02,610 Do do you think that this kind of spontaneity and informality that you see in it in any way argues against that? 187 00:23:02,610 --> 00:23:06,520 Or is it something that could could work perfectly well with without it? 188 00:23:06,520 --> 00:23:10,790 With that analysis? Thank you, Edmund. 189 00:23:10,790 --> 00:23:21,170 That's the great question. I just want to point out that it's quite impossible to get accurate data on how this, like, 190 00:23:21,170 --> 00:23:31,850 overarching influence of the IRGC is actually to measure it, because we all know it's a highly securitise apparatus. 191 00:23:31,850 --> 00:23:42,050 They're not even still letting out a lot of the documents that are on like 30 year old, 40 years old. 192 00:23:42,050 --> 00:23:50,960 And I like sitting in their archives day or like treating it as a matter of security and nothing else. 193 00:23:50,960 --> 00:23:56,110 So, yeah, a lot of what we say about it and what we hear about it are conjectures. 194 00:23:56,110 --> 00:24:01,940 That said, I think this proposition, which sounds like a reasonable one. 195 00:24:01,940 --> 00:24:10,460 One does not go against the revolutionary nature that I'm in the particular sense that I'm talking about here. 196 00:24:10,460 --> 00:24:19,010 It's actually one of the strengths of the IRGC has been from the beginning, especially in the early years of the Iran-Iraq war. 197 00:24:19,010 --> 00:24:29,470 That's. That their power to recruit volunteers and allow them to feel in charge. 198 00:24:29,470 --> 00:24:39,460 Brought in more volunteers, and that was their winning card in their ribaldry with the regular army. 199 00:24:39,460 --> 00:24:48,910 Of course, it faded with years, but I believe that it because it was institutionalised to tolerate such this kind of action. 200 00:24:48,910 --> 00:24:54,520 It still continues to exist, although to a lesser extent. 201 00:24:54,520 --> 00:25:07,060 So that being a part of the power, part of their strength and the fact that they there actually are still a good number of very dedicated, 202 00:25:07,060 --> 00:25:16,630 ideologically committed leaders, commanders and volunteers like through all the ranks that are. 203 00:25:16,630 --> 00:25:25,030 That are able to claim they are that true? What's the word? 204 00:25:25,030 --> 00:25:31,120 Actually, supporters of the cause of the revolution. There is no argument against them. 205 00:25:31,120 --> 00:25:45,640 So when someone like Ghasem Sulaimani goes out and devises a radical strategy of extending Iran's influence in the region, 206 00:25:45,640 --> 00:25:49,640 it's not just a political strategic move. 207 00:25:49,640 --> 00:25:59,060 Is that the way he is doing it? The current revolutionary way he's doing it, the way he is like down to earth with his person now. 208 00:25:59,060 --> 00:26:06,100 And and they either what volunteers or draughts still. 209 00:26:06,100 --> 00:26:14,260 Is the idealistic image that the Islamic Republic needs and has always promoted. 210 00:26:14,260 --> 00:26:24,790 So there is no arguing with that. So part of that is the influence and strength of so far comes from this very aspect, I believe. 211 00:26:24,790 --> 00:26:26,980 Thank you very much, unsalable. 212 00:26:26,980 --> 00:26:36,020 The question I would like to put to do to you has to do specifically with where you ended your presentation and thinking about a third republic. 213 00:26:36,020 --> 00:26:42,750 And you you suggested that just as the transition from Khomeini to a holiday that necessitated a, 214 00:26:42,750 --> 00:26:49,630 you know, a constitutional revision and a significant change in the character of the leadership, 215 00:26:49,630 --> 00:27:00,370 I would like to argue against that and say that Khomeini's leadership was very different for 216 00:27:00,370 --> 00:27:06,670 many reasons that have to do with Khomeini's unique role in the revolution and unique charisma. 217 00:27:06,670 --> 00:27:13,270 And he could, in a way, carry that institution by his force of personality, Hogmanay. 218 00:27:13,270 --> 00:27:20,320 The institution has clearly evolved massively. I mean, it's grown into a vast bureaucracy apart from anything else. 219 00:27:20,320 --> 00:27:25,960 But I wonder whether they're really going to be the same need for any significant revision of it. 220 00:27:25,960 --> 00:27:29,860 Couldn't it be argued that this is actually now an institution that has gained 221 00:27:29,860 --> 00:27:38,700 so much momentum and so much of the shape that it's quite likely to continue? 222 00:27:38,700 --> 00:27:44,640 Thanks very much, Edmund. Very, very good question. And obviously, you know, it's very tough to predict the future. 223 00:27:44,640 --> 00:27:57,120 We don't have a crystal ball, but if we look at the past to gain some maybe insight on what the future might hold, you could argue that, first of all, 224 00:27:57,120 --> 00:28:06,030 comany took quite some time to build up the institutional leadership as it emerged in its stable sort of phase, 225 00:28:06,030 --> 00:28:14,160 if you want, which I would argue was, you know, took hold from around the end of the 90s. 226 00:28:14,160 --> 00:28:20,820 And much of Harmony's modus operandi really rests in certain types of personal relations. 227 00:28:20,820 --> 00:28:23,340 He has worked with a variety of actors. 228 00:28:23,340 --> 00:28:30,900 So, you know, to a two step from home and into Mariam's patch, you could argue that the relationship that comany, 229 00:28:30,900 --> 00:28:37,840 as with the IRGC top brass, is a very unique and personalistic one. 230 00:28:37,840 --> 00:28:45,720 And, you know, proof of this was in the sort of grief that we saw from the supreme leader during, for example, essentially Monday's funeral. 231 00:28:45,720 --> 00:28:48,780 That was a that was rather unique, I think, 232 00:28:48,780 --> 00:29:00,690 in the history of of major funerals since 1989 for the new supreme leader to build up again, such such a personal web of connexions, 233 00:29:00,690 --> 00:29:04,620 which would eventually, you know, 234 00:29:04,620 --> 00:29:12,300 emerge into the sort of bureaucracy you mention and into the sort of batur rapidly infrastructure that we that we saw emerge. 235 00:29:12,300 --> 00:29:26,940 In my view, takes time. And, of course, will be also really shaped by the extent to which the new leadership and the sort of its allies across 236 00:29:26,940 --> 00:29:33,630 this state structure will have shared personal experiences prior to that person becoming leader. 237 00:29:33,630 --> 00:29:35,730 So if you look at comany, it's Commenee, 238 00:29:35,730 --> 00:29:42,960 his experience on the front in the 1980s and the sort of preliminary links he established with the IRGC leadership at the time, 239 00:29:42,960 --> 00:29:46,620 which became a constant and and went on and on and on. 240 00:29:46,620 --> 00:29:55,100 And you see that now he's surrounded by people who who fought in the war really to various extends, 241 00:29:55,100 --> 00:30:04,500 the IRGC top brass and and but also people who are really were with him in the thick and thin, even through some very testing times in the 1980s. 242 00:30:04,500 --> 00:30:12,810 And in my book, for example, I discussed the way he he defended Velayati, for example, in the 1980s and 90s stock all the way as well. 243 00:30:12,810 --> 00:30:23,520 So so I think that this sort of this sort of characteristics, if the new leader has to has to rely on them, will take some time. 244 00:30:23,520 --> 00:30:26,790 And and the other issue is, of course, 245 00:30:26,790 --> 00:30:37,530 that the process for the selection of the supreme leader in Iran is is more or less as opaque as as the one to select the pope in the Vatican. 246 00:30:37,530 --> 00:30:40,140 You could argue I mean, it's it's very minor. 247 00:30:40,140 --> 00:30:47,010 It's very, very difficult to to get a good impression of who the next supreme leader might be beforehand. 248 00:30:47,010 --> 00:30:50,250 A lot depends on the moment in which the selection is made. 249 00:30:50,250 --> 00:30:59,190 So Harmony's a rise to the supreme leadership also means he has to do with the exact moment to which that whole process happened, 250 00:30:59,190 --> 00:31:02,560 which was in the midst, by the way, of the constitutional revision. 251 00:31:02,560 --> 00:31:08,250 There were around a dozen sessions of the constitutional original council, which happened before his selection. 252 00:31:08,250 --> 00:31:10,650 And then the then things got a bit messy. 253 00:31:10,650 --> 00:31:17,410 He had to recuse himself, actually, from taking part in that council and discussed the June constitution and so on and so forth. 254 00:31:17,410 --> 00:31:24,690 So so I think this is the moment in which this will occur will also be important. 255 00:31:24,690 --> 00:31:27,420 So I agree with you to certain extent. 256 00:31:27,420 --> 00:31:35,860 But I also think that that that that sort of personal characteristics beyond beyond the definitions of of these two, 257 00:31:35,860 --> 00:31:43,140 the definitions of the sort of impersonal definitions of who the supreme leader might be will have a major. 258 00:31:43,140 --> 00:31:50,550 Thank you very much. I want to prolong our conversation and monopolise you and make you answer the question that I said I was going to ask. 259 00:31:50,550 --> 00:31:56,700 I've also been watching the clock, and I don't want to deprive many people in our audience has the opportunity to ask questions. 260 00:31:56,700 --> 00:32:04,530 So I'm actually going to move on now and hand over to Eugene Rogan, who is going to moderate the Q&A session. 261 00:32:04,530 --> 00:32:07,190 Eugene? Thank you very much. 262 00:32:07,190 --> 00:32:13,490 And I'm having a little bit of trouble with my video feed here, but if you could give me a thumbs up if you're hearing me clearly, please. 263 00:32:13,490 --> 00:32:22,210 Brilliant. I don't want to shout at our audience either. The questions are coming in rather rapidly now, and I won't try and take them in quick order. 264 00:32:22,210 --> 00:32:27,550 And if our panellists could give me relatively quick answers to the questions we can get through, 265 00:32:27,550 --> 00:32:31,690 as many of the audience is important questions that we as we can. 266 00:32:31,690 --> 00:32:35,140 I have one from you wanted to groups at York. To begin with. 267 00:32:35,140 --> 00:32:41,260 And I actually thought you might want to weigh in on the answer to because you were involved in the title for this panel. 268 00:32:41,260 --> 00:32:50,200 But you want to ask. I'd like to prove the choice of the terms authoritarian and revolutionary as alternatives. 269 00:32:50,200 --> 00:32:57,330 She asked. Isn't there a convergence between the two? So we can start there, please? 270 00:32:57,330 --> 00:33:04,410 I think I should start with this because I suggested the title really as a provocation, and I admitted to that too, 271 00:33:04,410 --> 00:33:11,290 because that it was a provocation and that there clearly is no in combat incompatibility between these two. 272 00:33:11,290 --> 00:33:17,740 But I thought it would provoke it, stimulate their ideas and and also our conversation. 273 00:33:17,740 --> 00:33:30,000 And I think it's working in those terms. But no, I don't think any of us suppose it is a these are mutually exclusive terms. 274 00:33:30,000 --> 00:33:36,900 Thank you, Ed. And again, viewers, if you put your name to your question, I assume that you'd like your name made public. 275 00:33:36,900 --> 00:33:41,250 If you'd like to ask your question anonymously, just post Anonymous for your name. 276 00:33:41,250 --> 00:33:43,590 The next question comes from Talaal Mohammed, 277 00:33:43,590 --> 00:33:50,580 and he would like to question how our speakers view the role of the IRGC domestically and in foreign policy, 278 00:33:50,580 --> 00:33:59,790 and particularly what happens if a former member of the IRGC, such as Current, much less Speaker Cordie Boff is elected as president. 279 00:33:59,790 --> 00:34:07,830 What would that mean for relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia? 280 00:34:07,830 --> 00:34:21,040 If I may answer first. That's a great question. As we know, the urgency has expanded its influence beyond Iran and. 281 00:34:21,040 --> 00:34:29,200 I think an interesting fact here is that although this was on the agenda from the moment of the inception of the IRGC, 282 00:34:29,200 --> 00:34:43,270 the very first attempts to do so in the failed or was actually resisted from within the IRGC when a fraction of the IRGC under the 283 00:34:43,270 --> 00:34:54,220 leadership or under the kind of tutelage of Ayatollah Montazeri tried to expand the revolution as they would say it in a very radical way. 284 00:34:54,220 --> 00:35:01,210 It faced resistance from within the IRGC and from within the clerical section of the state. 285 00:35:01,210 --> 00:35:09,790 And it was gradually crushed down with with the execution of that. 286 00:35:09,790 --> 00:35:14,350 One of the important figures who was also related to our two ties. 287 00:35:14,350 --> 00:35:25,180 It was later on after the Iran-Iraq war that another movement started, which operated not based on the radical liberation ideology, 288 00:35:25,180 --> 00:35:37,860 but on a like a very in from all kind of infusion of militias in the Middle East and kind of building them in the IRGC. 289 00:35:37,860 --> 00:35:47,560 His image, which is a state sponsored, state sponsored militia and not a not an underground insurgent one. 290 00:35:47,560 --> 00:35:54,010 So that's something that I always found interesting in terms of what will happen 291 00:35:54,010 --> 00:36:03,470 if a Safavi set like Golubev would be elected in the next presidential election. 292 00:36:03,470 --> 00:36:07,120 This this is the Bush as it was his field of expertise. 293 00:36:07,120 --> 00:36:10,630 I won't say much, but I agree with Silverbush. 294 00:36:10,630 --> 00:36:19,240 I think it goes along with his line of thinking that a more pragmatic. 295 00:36:19,240 --> 00:36:32,060 Mindset has gradually been instituted within at least a number of IRGC commanders and. 296 00:36:32,060 --> 00:36:45,100 Yes. It will be interesting to see how they would tone down the ideological revolutionary discourse to be able to follow the pragmatic ground. 297 00:36:45,100 --> 00:36:52,630 I think Savage will be able to say, well, anybody on subways could ask you to finish the answer to this question, please. 298 00:36:52,630 --> 00:36:57,970 Yes. Well, very briefly, a couple of points before I get to Ghalibaf. 299 00:36:57,970 --> 00:36:59,860 I won't go over what Marianne was saying, 300 00:36:59,860 --> 00:37:07,180 but I would invite people to reflect on the fact that the RJC is really branching out in in more and more fields. 301 00:37:07,180 --> 00:37:15,400 So one thing that has really caught my interest in recent times is the IRGC, whose activities in the cultural and arts fields, for example, 302 00:37:15,400 --> 00:37:20,980 it has funded a company called Saffire Fields, which is producing documentary after documentary coving, 303 00:37:20,980 --> 00:37:30,400 covering every aspect of 20th century Iranian history. And they are doing so because the IRGC is involved in what I call generational change. 304 00:37:30,400 --> 00:37:34,510 It's trying to reach out to the generations, to the considerable amount, 305 00:37:34,510 --> 00:37:39,730 I would say the majority of the Iranian population, which doesn't have a living memory of the revolution, 306 00:37:39,730 --> 00:37:42,160 doesn't have a living memory of the war anymore, 307 00:37:42,160 --> 00:37:50,080 and therefore it's trying to capture its attention and to steer its direction and orient its understanding of these seminal events. 308 00:37:50,080 --> 00:37:54,760 And, of course, the main challenge is from abroad. 309 00:37:54,760 --> 00:38:04,590 You see how, for example, the recent documentary by the BBC, which brought about details of a secret session of the IRGC in thirty sixty three. 310 00:38:04,590 --> 00:38:07,840 I'm sorry, I don't know. The Gregorian calendar brought about a very, 311 00:38:07,840 --> 00:38:15,940 very lively debate inside Iran and and a lot of soul searching over how exactly to portray these histories. 312 00:38:15,940 --> 00:38:21,500 So the IRGC is is actually becoming a competitor of myself and Mariam to some extent. 313 00:38:21,500 --> 00:38:29,050 Right. They're branching out not in the academic sphere, but they're branching out into and trying to interpret and trying to develop outputs 314 00:38:29,050 --> 00:38:33,430 on the past in a way in which they can capture the potential range society. 315 00:38:33,430 --> 00:38:34,690 This is very important, I think, 316 00:38:34,690 --> 00:38:44,020 and this is goes hand-in-hand with what you read in policy reports about the agency's grab on the economy, about its role in politics, 317 00:38:44,020 --> 00:38:45,670 about the fact that, yes, 318 00:38:45,670 --> 00:38:54,490 we could we could be facing the next president to be somebody who comes out with a very clear and very prominent IRGC background. 319 00:38:54,490 --> 00:39:00,460 But to to finish, what will it mean for relations with the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, such as Saudi Arabia? 320 00:39:00,460 --> 00:39:08,440 Well, I think that any new Iranian president has to wake up to two rather pronounced shifting sands in the Middle East. 321 00:39:08,440 --> 00:39:11,890 Right. And I don't think that a President Biden, if elected, 322 00:39:11,890 --> 00:39:19,840 would would would undo what's going on now in terms of Israel getting a toehold on the shores of the Persian Gulf, 323 00:39:19,840 --> 00:39:30,730 right through Bahrain and and the UAE. And and I think that if there is any pragmatism in the outlook of the new president, 324 00:39:30,730 --> 00:39:38,560 I would you see or not they'll have to adapt to this reality and to shifting sands elsewhere as well, I would say, in Lebanon and Iraq. 325 00:39:38,560 --> 00:39:46,600 Thank you both very much. Yassmin, mother asks how we can explain or even reconcile systematic corruption amongst leaders of the Islamic 326 00:39:46,600 --> 00:39:52,690 Republic and senior ranks of the Revolutionary Guards with the revolutionary character of the organisation. 327 00:39:52,690 --> 00:39:59,150 So coming back to the revolutionary word and your title. 328 00:39:59,150 --> 00:40:10,400 I take it upon me to answer first, because I'm the revolutionary representative, I think I mean, 329 00:40:10,400 --> 00:40:17,420 this is this is a great question because it brings out what I wanted to say, but left out for the sake of time. 330 00:40:17,420 --> 00:40:30,380 And that is a part of this current old revolutionary modus operandi is informality and informality breeds corruption or makes it easier. 331 00:40:30,380 --> 00:40:43,610 From the very get go of the formation of state institutions and or what became or transforming into state institutions in the revolutionary days, 332 00:40:43,610 --> 00:40:51,560 the clerics and their followers, their life flock followers went about things as informally as possible. 333 00:40:51,560 --> 00:40:56,060 They did have organisations say, the Committee for Welcoming their mom committed, 334 00:40:56,060 --> 00:41:04,700 as well as a mock nominee for the Revolutionary Council and many other councils, as I would suggest, that were just popping out. 335 00:41:04,700 --> 00:41:12,650 But any task that they faced, they went about the organisational settings they could meet and decide on something. 336 00:41:12,650 --> 00:41:18,380 And then right after one individual decided that he wanted to do things differently 337 00:41:18,380 --> 00:41:23,060 and he would go about and do it and he would be welcomed back within the community. 338 00:41:23,060 --> 00:41:26,900 It wasn't like he wouldn't be shunned because of that. 339 00:41:26,900 --> 00:41:35,900 It was just an accepted behaviour. And this continued over the years as against your was it like if this organisation didn't work, 340 00:41:35,900 --> 00:41:40,990 another organisation would pop up more informally, like Shura Councils? 341 00:41:40,990 --> 00:41:48,690 But the more informal type of state institutions that are prevalent in Iran and even the Shura, 342 00:41:48,690 --> 00:41:54,860 the council do not are not like enforcing too much organisation or constraint. 343 00:41:54,860 --> 00:42:06,450 And I think that is what I like. That's how the revolutionary ness and the corruption actually go hand-in-hand. 344 00:42:06,450 --> 00:42:10,320 So watch any follow up on that question very, very quickly. 345 00:42:10,320 --> 00:42:20,040 And then the thing that strikes me about corruption and of course, you know, corruption was something that in previous decades, the opposition, 346 00:42:20,040 --> 00:42:26,820 that opposition I mentioned outside the country would would keep going on about about the whole how the entire Islamic republic 347 00:42:26,820 --> 00:42:36,390 was corrupt and sometimes coming up with remarkable but not very verifiable documents to back it up by the recent periods. 348 00:42:36,390 --> 00:42:40,680 Corruption has become really a battleground. 349 00:42:40,680 --> 00:42:46,320 It has become a main tool for factional fighting, for personal fighting. 350 00:42:46,320 --> 00:42:50,250 And all the dirty linen regarding corruption has been aired very publicly. 351 00:42:50,250 --> 00:42:56,490 Now we are talking about the proceedings of trials in which remarkable figures 352 00:42:56,490 --> 00:43:01,530 that cannot ever really be imagined are aired out publicly by judicial officials. 353 00:43:01,530 --> 00:43:06,090 So in my view, it is quite interesting because obviously this has a very high opportunity cost. 354 00:43:06,090 --> 00:43:09,630 Right? It really leaves a dent in public opinion. 355 00:43:09,630 --> 00:43:18,840 People open newspapers in Tehran and read about all these incredible cases of corruption, truly incredible. 356 00:43:18,840 --> 00:43:28,710 But it is it is having an effect of thinning out the political elite and leaving and sort of bringing about, I wouldn't say a Darwinian evolution, 357 00:43:28,710 --> 00:43:37,860 but bringing about will be a clash between between those who are really seeking to oust the rivals via corruption. 358 00:43:37,860 --> 00:43:50,130 So, you know, what was maybe electoral politics a few years ago has become corruption battles, if you want, in the present. 359 00:43:50,130 --> 00:43:56,220 And it is therefore interesting to see how corruption has been politicised and has 360 00:43:56,220 --> 00:44:04,970 turned into and has sort of achieved this political function in recent times. 361 00:44:04,970 --> 00:44:09,410 Thank you very much, the ambush. Now the question from Jason Kelly. 362 00:44:09,410 --> 00:44:10,700 Up to now, 363 00:44:10,700 --> 00:44:19,340 the discussion has been centred almost exclusively inward or domestically in terms of this question of revolutionary versus authoritarian state. 364 00:44:19,340 --> 00:44:26,360 I'm curious about your thoughts on the export to the revolution, which is a key pillar of Khomeini's revolutionary vision, 365 00:44:26,360 --> 00:44:30,410 was to aggressively pursue a transnational pan Islamic movement. 366 00:44:30,410 --> 00:44:33,770 Of course, this project has evolved for various reasons. 367 00:44:33,770 --> 00:44:39,910 But as briefly alluded to with Mariam's comments about costumes with a Marni's efforts, Iraq and Syria, 368 00:44:39,910 --> 00:44:54,300 within this new thrust of exporting the revolution's ideology or spirit over the past decade or so suggest that this is still a revolutionary state. 369 00:44:54,300 --> 00:44:57,180 Thank you for this question, it's a great question. 370 00:44:57,180 --> 00:45:06,720 I want to emphasise that at least in this very later phase, maybe it was different in the first three to four years after the revolution. 371 00:45:06,720 --> 00:45:12,970 But afterwords, exporting the revolution is not equivalent of exporting the ideology. 372 00:45:12,970 --> 00:45:16,470 Maybe just the like it. 373 00:45:16,470 --> 00:45:23,760 It's only as ideological as far as far as it applies to promoting she ism against Sunni Islam. 374 00:45:23,760 --> 00:45:27,570 But it's not a radical revolutionary ideology. 375 00:45:27,570 --> 00:45:36,540 Rather, it's a revolutionary, revolutionary style of organising armed forces in the region, 376 00:45:36,540 --> 00:45:47,610 as we see in Hezbollah, in Iraqiya hedged a shabby and in the organisation of Ephiny and Iranian forces in this. 377 00:45:47,610 --> 00:45:59,970 On the on the ground in Iraq and in Syria. So it has been the exporting of the revolution less in a in an ideological sense or even the spirit, 378 00:45:59,970 --> 00:46:11,920 but in a the underground modus operandi of working informally in the periphery of official states. 379 00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:18,290 Thank you very much. I hope you have a new rejoinder. I will. I will just say that again. 380 00:46:18,290 --> 00:46:22,810 On a separate matter, if you look at exporting the Islamic Republic, 381 00:46:22,810 --> 00:46:27,790 if you look at exporting support for the Islamic Republic, creating soft power for the Islamic Republic, 382 00:46:27,790 --> 00:46:34,320 I think the most successful person in the recent times in this regard was Ahmadinejad, actually, because, I mean, 383 00:46:34,320 --> 00:46:40,960 he's not really managed to generate support for the Islamic Republic in very different quarters in Latin America, for example. 384 00:46:40,960 --> 00:46:49,480 Right. So for a while, he had built up all these strange alliances with people who were very different from the body politic of the Islamic Republic, 385 00:46:49,480 --> 00:46:56,810 you know, morally, socially, so on and so forth. Chavez, Morales and even Lula, for that matter. 386 00:46:56,810 --> 00:47:03,220 But this window of opportunity really went away with with actually Rouhani becoming presidency president. 387 00:47:03,220 --> 00:47:10,240 And the Islamic Republic has gone back to exporting the revolution in very select locales, as Mariam was saying. 388 00:47:10,240 --> 00:47:19,480 It's Iraq. It's Syria, it's Lebanon. It's wherever there's a foothold of of sort of orthodox supporters which can who can assist the 389 00:47:19,480 --> 00:47:26,980 Islamic Republic and can act as the Islamic Republic's foreign policy non-state actor allies. 390 00:47:26,980 --> 00:47:34,420 I think that if you look back at the way mean jobs, it is very controversial and his very controversial way, 391 00:47:34,420 --> 00:47:39,910 of course, at the cost of even some increased isolation between here in Greece crisis. 392 00:47:39,910 --> 00:47:50,560 If you on between Iran and West succeeded in developing some form of export of the Islamic revolution of of the Islamic Republic's ideology, 393 00:47:50,560 --> 00:47:56,350 rather beyond the usual confines of these activities. 394 00:47:56,350 --> 00:48:04,030 It looks very difficult for Iran to before the Islamic Republic to be able to replicate this again. 395 00:48:04,030 --> 00:48:08,470 And certainly this hasn't happened during the Rowhani period when we went back 396 00:48:08,470 --> 00:48:15,600 to traditional forms of of attempts at ideological and soft power expansion. 397 00:48:15,600 --> 00:48:18,360 Thank you both very much. Staying in the international sphere, 398 00:48:18,360 --> 00:48:23,910 I have a question from Roger Higginson at the University of Sussex who wants to know within the context of 399 00:48:23,910 --> 00:48:32,190 sanctions against Iran and the desire in at least parts of the US political establishment for regime change. 400 00:48:32,190 --> 00:48:43,750 Do the speakers have views on regime stability in Iran? 401 00:48:43,750 --> 00:48:50,400 So would you like to begin with that one? Well, this goes back a bit to what I was saying in my main remarks. 402 00:48:50,400 --> 00:48:57,120 I think that the relationship between state and society is changing rather dramatically in recent years. 403 00:48:57,120 --> 00:49:04,010 Since 2009, we've we've had this this ongoing on and off at times wildcard. 404 00:49:04,010 --> 00:49:07,320 The Times organise the times more or less participated. 405 00:49:07,320 --> 00:49:18,060 But there is there is increasing difficulty by the state to find to find candidates who can go into regime figures, 406 00:49:18,060 --> 00:49:28,580 who can really cater to to these restless to these rather dissenting strata of society beyond the loyalist strata. 407 00:49:28,580 --> 00:49:36,420 You can go and have a look at the various evolution of the various protest, 2017, 2018 last year, all the way back to 2009. 408 00:49:36,420 --> 00:49:42,630 And I think this tells you that in the last 10 years, the sort of the stability of the regime has changed. 409 00:49:42,630 --> 00:49:47,130 My view of the political system has changed and is quite different. 410 00:49:47,130 --> 00:49:53,010 With regards to what it was previously and of course, again, if you look at the parliamentary elections this year, 411 00:49:53,010 --> 00:50:00,540 another form of non-violence sort of expression of dissatisfaction within the society, the largest voter participation. 412 00:50:00,540 --> 00:50:03,900 This was the lowest voter participation, parliamentary elections. 413 00:50:03,900 --> 00:50:12,900 So if you look at state stability from this point of view, resume stability, I think things have waned in recent years. 414 00:50:12,900 --> 00:50:17,040 However, if you look at it from the barbarian point of view, 415 00:50:17,040 --> 00:50:22,620 the monopoly over the means of violence, and here Marie-Anne can discuss the IRGC position. 416 00:50:22,620 --> 00:50:31,170 I think there is still a commitment to ensure that this monopoly remains where it has been over the past few decades, 417 00:50:31,170 --> 00:50:35,610 namely in the hands of the state and the hands of the IRGC in the hands of the security forces. 418 00:50:35,610 --> 00:50:40,770 So there is also the state's continued ability to securitise, if needed, 419 00:50:40,770 --> 00:50:46,020 to chop off the Internet if needed, and then and then go back to the status quo. 420 00:50:46,020 --> 00:50:51,720 So until there is this sort of ability by the state to be to to engage in this limited, I would add, 421 00:50:51,720 --> 00:51:03,210 elasticity sort of we can talk about instability, but but it needs to be seen to what extent this instability becomes a danger. 422 00:51:03,210 --> 00:51:14,410 Maria, any points drug? Yeah, I will just add quickly that just as I was brought it up, one aspect of regime stability is its repression potential, 423 00:51:14,410 --> 00:51:19,420 and that repression potential does exist as well as we're speaking. 424 00:51:19,420 --> 00:51:28,570 It has not waned. If you look at recent words like Ned Nagus budget, please book Iran refrained on the generational gap actually, 425 00:51:28,570 --> 00:51:39,190 or the generational shift that's here, which was talking about even the new the new generation is even more prone to take on radical Islam, 426 00:51:39,190 --> 00:51:54,410 because to go back to my own work, the attraction of direct action comes through when you're engaging in such activity for their rational needs, 427 00:51:54,410 --> 00:51:57,670 when they become more reasonable, they actually go elsewhere. 428 00:51:57,670 --> 00:52:09,310 The new generation of messages and the guards day, they detach themselves from the ideological commitment. 429 00:52:09,310 --> 00:52:20,500 So, yeah, I just wanted to add that there still is appeal amongst the younger generation volunteers or paid personnel to engage in acts of repression. 430 00:52:20,500 --> 00:52:25,600 And we still need to deal with that in the years to come, I believe. 431 00:52:25,600 --> 00:52:28,390 Thank you very much. I have a question from Frank Demona. 432 00:52:28,390 --> 00:52:36,460 Who wants to bring China into our international perspective, seeing you're gone as a major terminus on the New Silk Road? 433 00:52:36,460 --> 00:52:40,990 How does a revolutionary ethos operate in parallel with China's more stable, 434 00:52:40,990 --> 00:52:45,010 commercially focussed approach in the Middle East and Levant in particular? 435 00:52:45,010 --> 00:52:56,680 So if you have any reflections on China and Iran and the Silk Road Bridge One Road. 436 00:52:56,680 --> 00:53:00,590 But I can only say they won't go very well. 437 00:53:00,590 --> 00:53:06,620 Like, the Iran will not fare well if they they stick to their rebel revolutionary ethos. 438 00:53:06,620 --> 00:53:25,100 But Iran has also shown that they are. Seeking pragmatic roots when it comes to a few trusted allies or or like last resort allies like China. 439 00:53:25,100 --> 00:53:33,440 And again, they might still activate the informality of the organisations, especially with the sanctions, pressuring them to. 440 00:53:33,440 --> 00:53:38,120 To find more ways to do business. 441 00:53:38,120 --> 00:53:49,690 But, yeah, I don't think they will be emphasising or they have been relying on a radical revolutionary ethos when it comes down to business. 442 00:53:49,690 --> 00:53:54,900 Silverbush, anything to add to China, Iran relations? No, I defer to Mariyam and others. 443 00:53:54,900 --> 00:54:01,770 I'm not truly an expert on the fields. Well, I think one very brief final question. 444 00:54:01,770 --> 00:54:09,410 We have. A question from. 445 00:54:09,410 --> 00:54:16,200 And pulse, sue. Again, question revolutionary or authoritarian? 446 00:54:16,200 --> 00:54:25,160 To what extent does the state apparatus of the Islamic Republic, their comparison to the part of the monarchy, monarchies or authoritarian? 447 00:54:25,160 --> 00:54:28,290 In that case, does it do anything to the Assad regime? 448 00:54:28,290 --> 00:54:42,330 Is there any sense of a kind of evolution of the Islamic Republic in two ways that would bearer's resemblance to what had come before? 449 00:54:42,330 --> 00:54:50,480 Kind of go ahead. Thank you, Ed, and good to read your question, I think. 450 00:54:50,480 --> 00:54:51,920 Yeah, well, that's the question, right. 451 00:54:51,920 --> 00:55:00,680 To what extent was the revolution really a complete change in Iranian statecraft and the traditions of the Iranian state in the end, 452 00:55:00,680 --> 00:55:04,490 the infrastructure and the architecture of the Iranian state? 453 00:55:04,490 --> 00:55:08,690 Well, certain things have definitely changed. 454 00:55:08,690 --> 00:55:15,320 You know, we have actors such as the IRGC, you we have this sort of presidential elections every four years, 455 00:55:15,320 --> 00:55:24,390 which are always some some sort of they always create some form of dynamism and some form of motion within the Iranian political system. 456 00:55:24,390 --> 00:55:26,390 At the same time, 457 00:55:26,390 --> 00:55:36,470 political parties were or at least state political bodies or a licenced or legitimate political parties in the parliament period were very weak. 458 00:55:36,470 --> 00:55:42,080 Factionalism or personalism and personal politics were were far more was far 459 00:55:42,080 --> 00:55:46,310 more powerful as as a form of political organisation and political interaction. 460 00:55:46,310 --> 00:55:50,540 This, to some extent, has been carried over, you could argue, an Islamic republic period. 461 00:55:50,540 --> 00:55:59,780 But most importantly, if you look at the helm of the state, we still have one institution on top which is endowed constitutionally actually 462 00:55:59,780 --> 00:56:05,090 in the Islamic Republic case and informally in the A&M in the MASHU to era, 463 00:56:05,090 --> 00:56:13,540 with a lot of power and authority and and defines really the power and authority of the rest of the state system. 464 00:56:13,540 --> 00:56:18,800 They are called very differently. But the function. There are commonalities in the function. 465 00:56:18,800 --> 00:56:25,100 I don't want to say that the supreme leader is a Shah or that the Shah is is a is a value faggy, 466 00:56:25,100 --> 00:56:32,180 but the sort of similarities that we see in terms of the power and authority they wield, 467 00:56:32,180 --> 00:56:39,440 despite the fact that they're dished out in very different ways, should also make you think about the fact that they are endemic, 468 00:56:39,440 --> 00:56:47,420 some endemic traits of Iranian statecraft, which I don't think have disappeared with the revolution of 1979. 469 00:56:47,420 --> 00:56:54,290 And that brings a continuum of sorts on the quest to build a modern state system which started 470 00:56:54,290 --> 00:56:59,240 in Iran since the constitutional revolution and in fits and starts has just been hurtling, 471 00:56:59,240 --> 00:57:07,700 gone, I think, for a century to the present day. I will just briefly, ditto what Sayable said. 472 00:57:07,700 --> 00:57:13,310 I guess there are some similarities in that the very fact that authoritarianism exists. 473 00:57:13,310 --> 00:57:23,990 And that's continue to exist. But maybe it is the forum. It has been imposed on the society that has deferred because of the outburst of so many. 474 00:57:23,990 --> 00:57:32,420 The bursting of so many parallel institutions that have given people to manoeuvre 475 00:57:32,420 --> 00:57:40,270 around the the like arms of authoritarianism or in some cases be more severely cut. 476 00:57:40,270 --> 00:57:46,880 And in Eugene, I'm going to take the microphone now. 477 00:57:46,880 --> 00:57:51,620 Our time is up. Sadly, there are more questions that people would like to put. 478 00:57:51,620 --> 00:57:58,220 I'm afraid we just haven't had time to put all of them. So I'm going to sink Mariyam and Schiavo again, 479 00:57:58,220 --> 00:58:05,270 very much for such stimulating presentations and for answering the questions in such an interesting way. 480 00:58:05,270 --> 00:58:07,520 Thank you all for your questions and for being here. 481 00:58:07,520 --> 00:58:17,990 Please join us next week when Dalia Fatmeh and Danish faculty will be talking about illiberal liberals and the future of dictatorship in Egypt. 482 00:58:17,990 --> 00:58:32,398 See you next week. Bye bye. Thank you.