1 00:00:00,090 --> 00:00:04,500 Welcome to you all to Third Friday seminar of the term, 2 00:00:04,500 --> 00:00:12,540 an Oxford event at the Middle East centre where we're hosting two wonderful scholars from across the Atlantic on the theme of dictatorship. 3 00:00:12,540 --> 00:00:22,380 Those of you who've been attending regularly will be familiar with the series that we've started this term on the basis of Allah as well in his book, 4 00:00:22,380 --> 00:00:31,080 The Dictatorship Syndrome. And I'd like to welcome at this point our guests from across the Atlantic Danish Farooqi and Dally Anfernee. 5 00:00:31,080 --> 00:00:37,080 Welcome to you both. Just so that everyone can see you, although you have to unmount in order for people to go to see you. 6 00:00:37,080 --> 00:00:42,540 I think my name is Sam Azami. I am a department lecturer at Oxford. 7 00:00:42,540 --> 00:00:45,330 I am the department lecturer in contemporary seismic studies. 8 00:00:45,330 --> 00:00:54,030 And it gives me great pleasure to welcome Dalia Fahmy and Danish Farooqi to talk about a liberal liberals and the future of dictatorship in Egypt. 9 00:00:54,030 --> 00:01:01,050 This, in a sense, serves as a counterpoint to the perspective presented by Allah as funny a couple of weeks ago, 10 00:01:01,050 --> 00:01:03,600 based on his book, The Dictatorship Syndrome. 11 00:01:03,600 --> 00:01:12,180 Both Danny Fahmy and Danish Farooqi are the authors of an edited volume with a title that is quite similar to this week's presentation. 12 00:01:12,180 --> 00:01:18,440 The title is Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism A Liberal Intelligentsia and the Future of Egyptian Democracy. 13 00:01:18,440 --> 00:01:25,170 And in a sense, these two scholars have pointed out certain challenges that liberalism faces in Egypt in particular, 14 00:01:25,170 --> 00:01:32,340 that renders it an illiberal form of liberalism. So I want to briefly introduce our two speakers and then I'll quickly hand over to them. 15 00:01:32,340 --> 00:01:36,360 They'll have a short period, about 10 minutes to give a presentation. 16 00:01:36,360 --> 00:01:41,310 And I think they'll take a slightly different tack on their presentations, as we will see shortly. 17 00:01:41,310 --> 00:01:45,570 And we welcome participants to ask questions immediately. 18 00:01:45,570 --> 00:01:51,420 We will pick up on the question that potentially midstream. For that, we have our colleague, Professor Walter Armbrust, 19 00:01:51,420 --> 00:01:59,910 who will be waiting in the wings to read to us the questions that are coming in that can then be addressed by Vesser, Dalia Fatmeh and Danish Farooqi. 20 00:01:59,910 --> 00:02:07,530 So let me very briefly introduce them both. And because we have just one hour and we want to make this short and sweet. 21 00:02:07,530 --> 00:02:11,760 I'm going to give brief introductions. Both of these scholars, a very accomplished. 22 00:02:11,760 --> 00:02:13,860 And I could go on for a while. 23 00:02:13,860 --> 00:02:20,280 Dali Fahmy is associate professor of political science at Long Island University, where she teaches courses on U.S. foreign policy, 24 00:02:20,280 --> 00:02:27,210 world politics, international relations, military and defence policy, and much else besides, much of it focussed on the Middle East. 25 00:02:27,210 --> 00:02:32,670 And she is a senior fellow also at the Centre for Global Policy in Washington, DC. 26 00:02:32,670 --> 00:02:38,040 As I've mentioned already, she is the co-editor of a volume entitled Egypt and the Contradictions of Liberalism. 27 00:02:38,040 --> 00:02:45,390 And the other co-editor is with us, Danish Farooqi. And Dalia has written a number of books and other edited volumes. 28 00:02:45,390 --> 00:02:52,920 She's compiled a number of academic journal articles. But of course, both of these scholars are quite well known to the media circuit. 29 00:02:52,920 --> 00:02:59,910 They very often contribute to media outlets, whether in the form of interviews or in the form of op ed pieces. 30 00:02:59,910 --> 00:03:05,010 Danish Farooqi, for his part, is currently a visiting scholar at the Centre for the Study of Genocide and Human 31 00:03:05,010 --> 00:03:10,840 Rights at Rutgers University and a doctoral candidate in history at Duke University. 32 00:03:10,840 --> 00:03:15,930 A scholar of the Middle East and Islamic history with a particular emphasis on Islamic political thought. 33 00:03:15,930 --> 00:03:20,220 He has spent several years in the Middle East as a researcher and a journalist. 34 00:03:20,220 --> 00:03:26,850 And as noted, he is also the co-editor of the work whose title informs our own title for today, 35 00:03:26,850 --> 00:03:30,510 namely illiberal liberals and the future of dictatorship in Egypt. 36 00:03:30,510 --> 00:03:39,660 Without further ado, I'd like to hand over to our speakers and I'd like to remind everyone that they are free to ask as many questions as they like. 37 00:03:39,660 --> 00:03:46,890 Beginning immediately and Walter Armbrust will kindly curate them and pass them on to the speakers once they're finished. 38 00:03:46,890 --> 00:03:51,710 So I think, Dalia, you are up first. If you'd like to go, please. 39 00:03:51,710 --> 00:03:55,650 Well, thank you so much and good evening to all of you out. 40 00:03:55,650 --> 00:03:56,600 Across the pond. 41 00:03:56,600 --> 00:04:03,200 And good afternoon to those here in the States and thank you to the Oxford Middle East centre for hosting us in this important moment, 42 00:04:03,200 --> 00:04:09,020 RISI dictatorship and authoritarianism or authoritarian tendencies on the rise 43 00:04:09,020 --> 00:04:13,820 throughout the world and for including us in this theme framed by Dr. Aslan, 44 00:04:13,820 --> 00:04:20,750 his latest book, The Dictatorship Syndrome. And of course, thank you, Dr. Asmi, for moderating the session. 45 00:04:20,750 --> 00:04:28,580 So the events that led up to the January 25th revolution and its power as a transformative moment in North Africa and move on, 46 00:04:28,580 --> 00:04:33,560 demonstrate the strength of people from all walks of life, Muslim and Coptic. 47 00:04:33,560 --> 00:04:37,730 Liberal and conservative. Secular and Islamist. [INAUDIBLE] and wealthy. 48 00:04:37,730 --> 00:04:42,560 Educated and illiterate. Coming together calling for freedom, dignity, 49 00:04:42,560 --> 00:04:51,260 good governance and democracy present in this transformative moment where both the masses and the intellectual, the popular elite. 50 00:04:51,260 --> 00:05:02,540 But as the uncertainty of post revolution took place, this decidedly non-democratic forces began to further consolidate power. 51 00:05:02,540 --> 00:05:10,820 And the elites or the intelligentsia, those that hold the most power independent of the state apparatus, grew increasingly silent. 52 00:05:10,820 --> 00:05:17,030 This group silence and by extension their complicity with what became a repressive 53 00:05:17,030 --> 00:05:22,160 military regime runs counter to what we know and democratic transition theory. 54 00:05:22,160 --> 00:05:26,570 Which begs the question of why was the elite silent? 55 00:05:26,570 --> 00:05:32,250 What caused them to turn on the population? They stood alongside Biden in Times Square. 56 00:05:32,250 --> 00:05:37,730 Now, this notion of complicity I want to focus on because Dr. A Swannie also focuses on it. 57 00:05:37,730 --> 00:05:46,010 And I want to beg the question of who's complicit here. So the impetus for us to put this book together came full circle after the aftermath 58 00:05:46,010 --> 00:05:52,880 of the horrific massacre of protesters in Rabaa and not the squares in 2013, 59 00:05:52,880 --> 00:06:02,540 which gave rise to a narrative of a Byford committed Egyptian society in which undesirables could be or needed to be outright eliminated 60 00:06:02,540 --> 00:06:12,260 to cleanse Egyptian society leading to a Human Rights Watch has called the largest single day massacre of protesters in modern history. 61 00:06:12,260 --> 00:06:16,700 Now the role of the intelligentsia in their silence and in some regards, 62 00:06:16,700 --> 00:06:24,200 promoting this exclusionary narrative remains the key motivating factor for us behind this project. 63 00:06:24,200 --> 00:06:29,090 Their complicity all gave rise to anti-democratic values, 64 00:06:29,090 --> 00:06:39,630 undermining the democratic process they purport it to uphold and the dismantling of the very civil society which years of their work was based. 65 00:06:39,630 --> 00:06:45,390 Well, Dennis is going to focus on the ideological foundation, but particularly individuals. 66 00:06:45,390 --> 00:06:54,690 I'm going to focus on the few institutional or structural dimensions owing that philosophical foundations do give rise to these institutions. 67 00:06:54,690 --> 00:07:04,290 Now, the book, because it's an edited volume, does go into the role of NGOs, student movements, civil society, the media, education and other aspects. 68 00:07:04,290 --> 00:07:13,890 But I'm going to focus on the parliament and perhaps in the Q&A we can briefly talk about other institutions such as media and the judiciary. 69 00:07:13,890 --> 00:07:20,490 Now, these are institutions that are meant to safeguard democracy and foster a liberal society and liberalism, 70 00:07:20,490 --> 00:07:27,570 begging the question of do illiberal institutions foster a liberal society or vice versa? 71 00:07:27,570 --> 00:07:31,880 And what is the connexion now, Dr. Swann? He does touch on this. 72 00:07:31,880 --> 00:07:40,770 Alby is coming at it in a very different way, placing the onus of complicity on a population or people. 73 00:07:40,770 --> 00:07:47,610 And I'm going to focus on an alternative causal frame, which I will discuss later. 74 00:07:47,610 --> 00:07:54,330 So in looking at robust and strong political parties as being key tools for ensuring 75 00:07:54,330 --> 00:07:59,760 state political development and granting a structure to political participation, 76 00:07:59,760 --> 00:08:09,360 it's organisation, it's expansion. Political parties are meant to help ensure the overall stability of a liberal democratic process. 77 00:08:09,360 --> 00:08:18,420 Regrettably, however, this is not the case in Egypt, where weak institutions have considerably hampered democratic consolidation. 78 00:08:18,420 --> 00:08:21,720 In particular, the Egyptian Legislative Assembly. 79 00:08:21,720 --> 00:08:29,220 That is the bulk of my work as the site of cultivation of laws regulating political party formation have 80 00:08:29,220 --> 00:08:36,480 proven complicit in outright and feeling Egyptian political institutions rather than emboldening them. 81 00:08:36,480 --> 00:08:44,820 Rather than being an outlet for civilian voices, political parties in Egypt remain instead deeply circumscribed and ultimately ineffectual. 82 00:08:44,820 --> 00:08:51,990 Put another way, despite the key role of a multi-party system in the preservation of a liberal democratic political order, 83 00:08:51,990 --> 00:08:59,060 the dysfunctional nature of party politics in Egypt has instead promoted an illiberal political order 84 00:08:59,060 --> 00:09:06,030 in stride and perpetuated at the systemic level the structural illiberalism in Egyptian politics. 85 00:09:06,030 --> 00:09:13,830 The elucidates how the failure of political mobilisation in Egypt to make significant gains largely grounded in 86 00:09:13,830 --> 00:09:20,790 the systemic failure of party politics as a mouthpiece for the political aspiration of the Egyptian masses. 87 00:09:20,790 --> 00:09:27,110 And unfortunately, not only does this continue today. It is worse than it was pre revolution. 88 00:09:27,110 --> 00:09:35,550 Now, throughout modern history, Egypt has proven largely incapable of providing a meaningful outlet for political opposition. 89 00:09:35,550 --> 00:09:43,560 Since the overthrow of the monarchy in 1952 and the free officers movement, the Egyptian state has ushered as a secular republic. 90 00:09:43,560 --> 00:09:49,410 Yet the demands on a Republican government to vest power in the government and through elected representatives. 91 00:09:49,410 --> 00:09:59,520 The Egyptian republic, from its inception, gave rise to a series of structural conditions that both undermine and circumscribe political contestation. 92 00:09:59,520 --> 00:10:05,520 Deficit of democracy or democratic consolidation in Egypt speaks to an equally pressing phenomenon. 93 00:10:05,520 --> 00:10:15,190 Democratic decay, hard won stability can be put in jeopardy by rapid social change, institutional rigidity and organisational complicity. 94 00:10:15,190 --> 00:10:21,030 And when considering the owners constraint under which the opposition parties in Egypt operate, 95 00:10:21,030 --> 00:10:29,820 working against the backdrop of the pendulum swing of democratic consolidation through formerly a wholly superficial elections and institutions, 96 00:10:29,820 --> 00:10:34,170 that potential for democratic decay becomes very much apparent. 97 00:10:34,170 --> 00:10:42,180 For these political institutions do not perform the same functions in an authoritarian context as they would under a democracy. 98 00:10:42,180 --> 00:10:51,300 The primary aim of political institutions under authoritarian regimes is to ensure the state society relations can be controlled, 99 00:10:51,300 --> 00:11:01,080 where demands can be revealed without appearing as acts of resistance, where issues can be hammered out without undue public scrutiny. 100 00:11:01,080 --> 00:11:08,220 And while resulting agreements can be addressed in a legitimate form publicised by such accordingly, 101 00:11:08,220 --> 00:11:18,150 the function of such institutions under authoritarian regimes is not the cheque on authority of the executive, but rather to control society at large. 102 00:11:18,150 --> 00:11:24,600 By circumscribing formal avenues of participation now post revolution, 103 00:11:24,600 --> 00:11:33,210 there is this question of what is political pluralism and cannot function in Egypt now after the January 25th revolution. 104 00:11:33,210 --> 00:11:39,780 Within a few days, we saw the flourishing of the beginning of political parties. 105 00:11:39,780 --> 00:11:45,420 And it begs the question, why was this impossible under Mubarak and what has happened today? 106 00:11:45,420 --> 00:11:55,500 So under the Mubarak regime, we saw that there was a law that prevented political party formation because of redundancy. 107 00:11:55,500 --> 00:12:03,070 And so by design, political party formation leading to contestation and politics was by design eliminated. 108 00:12:03,070 --> 00:12:06,720 And this begs the question, and we can talk about it more in the Q&A. Why? 109 00:12:06,720 --> 00:12:13,740 When we think about opposition in Egypt or opposition parties in the Middle East, persay are the Islamist in nature. 110 00:12:13,740 --> 00:12:24,920 Post revolution, when the law was changed, we saw a flourishing of political parties within the first few days of the change of the law. 111 00:12:24,920 --> 00:12:29,720 The first party to be registered was was the centre party, the loss of party. 112 00:12:29,720 --> 00:12:34,430 Another newly formed Egyptian Democratic Social Party founded by Dr Harmer Hemsley, 113 00:12:34,430 --> 00:12:41,280 who is a contributor to our volume, who is an academic here in the States today, formerly with the Carnegie Centre. 114 00:12:41,280 --> 00:12:45,980 Forming a party comprised of hundreds of professionals and university professors. 115 00:12:45,980 --> 00:12:54,140 A few days later, the secular West Party hosted a symposium for all Egyptian secular parties, both old and new, to join the new established order. 116 00:12:54,140 --> 00:13:00,830 Very few days after that, 73 members of Egypt's oldest leftist party to get more walked out of party 117 00:13:00,830 --> 00:13:05,210 headquarters over contestation of what is their new party going to look like, 118 00:13:05,210 --> 00:13:08,510 ultimately leading to deeper discussions on party formation. 119 00:13:08,510 --> 00:13:15,680 But it wasn't just that moment of pluralism that existed within the Islamist network or the Islamist frame. 120 00:13:15,680 --> 00:13:24,020 We saw a flourishing of political parties where the Muslim Brotherhood no longer, for example, had a monopoly on religion and politics. 121 00:13:24,020 --> 00:13:28,370 The centre party was formed to other parties were formed. 122 00:13:28,370 --> 00:13:32,150 And for the sake of time, I won't go into detail. 123 00:13:32,150 --> 00:13:41,810 But I want to focus on is that here we saw the flourishing of political party formations almost instantly after the revolution. 124 00:13:41,810 --> 00:13:50,540 With political platforms being established, with beginnings of contestation of the coming parliamentary election right after the revolution. 125 00:13:50,540 --> 00:14:00,200 And it begs the question of Dr. Aslan, his assumption of not just who is complicit, but who was pacifying this new order. 126 00:14:00,200 --> 00:14:03,800 And so what happened? And for the sake of time, I'm skipping over. 127 00:14:03,800 --> 00:14:10,910 And possibly in the Q&A we can talk about what happened under SCAF, what happened during the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, 128 00:14:10,910 --> 00:14:19,880 the Muslim Brotherhood, or President Morsi's time in office and then the fall and how today we have a deeply entrenched military dictatorship. 129 00:14:19,880 --> 00:14:23,670 But in diagnosing the syndrome, Dr. 130 00:14:23,670 --> 00:14:28,550 When he talks about a set of symptoms that seem to appear together and how it happened, 131 00:14:28,550 --> 00:14:33,550 how they happened, and possibly now that we know what the symptoms are, we can offer a cure. 132 00:14:33,550 --> 00:14:38,960 And the assumption is that the dictator, as an individual who controls society, 133 00:14:38,960 --> 00:14:48,470 is not just himself controlling society, but is controlling a complicit population that almost calls for this control. 134 00:14:48,470 --> 00:14:54,080 And so society are both victims and facilitators of dictatorship. 135 00:14:54,080 --> 00:14:55,730 And he capture this interestingly, 136 00:14:55,730 --> 00:15:05,450 in this story at the outset of the text of the narrative between him and his father as their standing in the wake of President Nasser's death, 137 00:15:05,450 --> 00:15:12,230 and he sees that the people are not accepting of the death. They're not accepting of the loss of the big man. 138 00:15:12,230 --> 00:15:18,950 Now, we know that this idea of the big man permeates throughout Dr. US one his other works in The Yacoubian Building. 139 00:15:18,950 --> 00:15:24,300 There is a big man in the background. In Chicago, there is a big man. 140 00:15:24,300 --> 00:15:36,300 But it denies people the idea that maybe they're mourning the defeat of Pan Arabism or the humiliation of the 1967 defeat or the coming 141 00:15:36,300 --> 00:15:47,580 uncertainty or the lack of clear path or a constitution that has not enshrined democratic institutions and the representation on the larger scale. 142 00:15:47,580 --> 00:15:52,470 There's a saying in Egypt, and I'll say colloquially, the man who she could be at. 143 00:15:52,470 --> 00:15:58,770 Should it be if you don't have a big man, you purchase a big man because you need a big man. 144 00:15:58,770 --> 00:16:05,360 And this is the kind of undercurrent of the theme in several of his works, but also here. 145 00:16:05,360 --> 00:16:14,670 And so the question remains, can we look at a complicit population as both facilitators and victims of the syndrome? 146 00:16:14,670 --> 00:16:22,110 Are there institutional factors that enshrine and ensure this, for example, institutions that I've mentioned? 147 00:16:22,110 --> 00:16:26,880 Briefly, why are oppositions always framed in Islamist terms? 148 00:16:26,880 --> 00:16:29,070 Are there institutional reasons? 149 00:16:29,070 --> 00:16:36,360 And the reason why I challenge this framing is because asking the right questions or the wrong questions may lead us down 150 00:16:36,360 --> 00:16:43,980 the route of constructing solutions that might seemingly be addressing what are symptoms or indicators of the syndrome. 151 00:16:43,980 --> 00:16:52,530 He is alluding to a dictatorship, but not of the disease of oppression and the lack of democracy. 152 00:16:52,530 --> 00:16:55,770 So I'll I'll stop here because I've reached my time limits. 153 00:16:55,770 --> 00:17:01,410 But hopefully this is the beginning of a conversation that we can have a healthy discussion and then the Q&A. 154 00:17:01,410 --> 00:17:06,540 So thank you so much. Thank you so much. Danny given you a very short period of time. 155 00:17:06,540 --> 00:17:14,730 But that was a wonderful and insightful look into the institutional challenges, on the historical challenges and in some respects, 156 00:17:14,730 --> 00:17:22,710 the cultural norms that had been instigated by certain historic phenomena in a place like Egypt that allow for, 157 00:17:22,710 --> 00:17:30,470 in a sense, the festering of this dictatorial system where political institutions, rather than being cheques on power, 158 00:17:30,470 --> 00:17:35,250 end up serving that power and being cheques on the popular will and the rest of it. 159 00:17:35,250 --> 00:17:39,910 So thank you for, in a sense, that analytical insight into, in some respects, 160 00:17:39,910 --> 00:17:45,090 a lot less one these ideas, but also some of the problems that potentially are to be found. 161 00:17:45,090 --> 00:17:51,690 And in a sense, I think Dunwich Farooqi is recently, in the past year or so recent piece in foreign policy, 162 00:17:51,690 --> 00:18:00,630 looking quite incisively or presenting something of a trenchant critique of S1, his work with respect to contemporary Egypt. 163 00:18:00,630 --> 00:18:07,440 And I expect that we'll get a taste of that in what follows. And thank you for sort of starting to ask questions already. 164 00:18:07,440 --> 00:18:12,630 People already asking questions. Please note, you do have the option of anonymizing your question. 165 00:18:12,630 --> 00:18:18,510 And so if you don't wish your name to be mentioned in the course of us mentioning the question, please anonymize yourself. 166 00:18:18,510 --> 00:18:23,460 Otherwise, we'll assume that it's okay to mention your name. But without further ado, please send Shruti. 167 00:18:23,460 --> 00:18:28,350 The floor is yours. Okay. Thank you very much. First, thanks for the Oxford Middle East centre. 168 00:18:28,350 --> 00:18:32,940 Two professors, Verhagen, Aissami and Armbrust for extending this invitation. 169 00:18:32,940 --> 00:18:39,900 And briefly, a special thanks to my collaborative partner, Professor Fahmi, even several years after our book's completion. 170 00:18:39,900 --> 00:18:45,330 Working hand-in-hand with you on this project remains one of the biggest honours of my professional journey to date. 171 00:18:45,330 --> 00:18:48,720 So thank you very much. With that, I proceed. 172 00:18:48,720 --> 00:18:55,050 So I suppose my own reading of the dictatorship syndrome was already signposted for lack of a better term, 173 00:18:55,050 --> 00:18:59,280 not only because of the themes of our book more broadly, but at the as you mention, 174 00:18:59,280 --> 00:19:06,400 but because of my own writings since then, drawing on our book's critique to more directly address Dr S1, 175 00:19:06,400 --> 00:19:12,870 his political writings so that the doctor has already been my interlocutor on several occasions. 176 00:19:12,870 --> 00:19:15,510 Having said that, for the purposes of this presentation, 177 00:19:15,510 --> 00:19:25,080 I thought it best to rely as much as possible on the thematic agenda of the book under consideration and only augment when necessary. 178 00:19:25,080 --> 00:19:29,430 To that end, I want to focus on what I considered the three most edifying chapters. 179 00:19:29,430 --> 00:19:36,600 Book would seem to have the most global resonance in the phenomenon of dictatorship more broadly. 180 00:19:36,600 --> 00:19:43,950 First, the chapter concerning conspiracy theory. As Dr Aswini puts it, quote, Without exception, 181 00:19:43,950 --> 00:19:52,500 every dictator who has seised power in the modern era has ridden the crest of a conspiracy theory and quote as a basis both for 182 00:19:52,500 --> 00:20:01,290 subverting a dictator's accountability for his misdeeds or crimes and as a basis for outright circumventing democratic institutions. 183 00:20:01,290 --> 00:20:09,150 Conspiratorial thinking gives the atmosphere necessary to discard the rule of law, even if temporarily. 184 00:20:09,150 --> 00:20:15,210 Indeed, Dr S1, his writings here almost portend the rise of anti science conspiracy theories 185 00:20:15,210 --> 00:20:21,540 about the Covanta pandemic being propagated by Donald Trump and his supporters. 186 00:20:21,540 --> 00:20:23,770 The atmosphere of misinformation is especially. 187 00:20:23,770 --> 00:20:31,210 Germane to allowing the US president to escape accountability for his mismanagement of the public health debacle? 188 00:20:31,210 --> 00:20:32,860 Similarly from Hossaini, 189 00:20:32,860 --> 00:20:40,030 Mubarak dismissing the Kefaya protest movement is part of an international conspiracy to take down Egypt to his administration, 190 00:20:40,030 --> 00:20:45,520 suggesting the same of the 2011 protests that ultimately took down his administration. 191 00:20:45,520 --> 00:20:52,120 It's clear the conspiracy has been the bedrock of preserving Egypt's authoritarian atmosphere. 192 00:20:52,120 --> 00:20:57,790 Now the next chapter under consideration concerns the spread of the fascist mindset. 193 00:20:57,790 --> 00:21:01,910 Dovetailing with his insights on conspiracy theory here, 194 00:21:01,910 --> 00:21:07,240 A speaks at length about the role of media in furthering the ambitions of the 195 00:21:07,240 --> 00:21:13,840 Dictatorships syndrome by forcibly branding a regime's critics as traitors to the state. 196 00:21:13,840 --> 00:21:22,540 Relying on the example of the Nassr error, Egyptian liberal journalists sent those whom our book actually addresses at some length. 197 00:21:22,540 --> 00:21:27,850 A Swannee aptly offers the cautionary tale that even otherwise respected journalistic 198 00:21:27,850 --> 00:21:34,180 figures can easily be tamed by authoritarian leadership and ultimately produced propaganda. 199 00:21:34,180 --> 00:21:43,930 In its service further, a co-opted media can and does serve as precisely the vehicle to disseminate conspiracy theories, 200 00:21:43,930 --> 00:21:53,650 thus offering a broader atmosphere of disinformation in which the dictator himself becomes the sole and ultimate arbiter of truth. 201 00:21:53,650 --> 00:21:58,570 These dual phenomena thus feature prominently in dictatorial regimes more broadly, 202 00:21:58,570 --> 00:22:04,690 and putting this broader campaign of disinformation to greater scrutiny is the necessary prerequisite. 203 00:22:04,690 --> 00:22:10,630 Swannie ends his book suggesting to prevent the dictatorship syndrome more broadly. 204 00:22:10,630 --> 00:22:15,190 This is all admirable and offers lessons well beyond the Egyptian case. 205 00:22:15,190 --> 00:22:23,800 And yet a more careful reading of a swamis writings more broadly, particularly as they pertain to the putative threat of political Islam, 206 00:22:23,800 --> 00:22:28,690 regrettably reveal a series of double standards that render it exceedingly difficult to read. 207 00:22:28,690 --> 00:22:37,480 The thesis of this book is altogether consistent. We see the seeds for his blind spots in his chapter on dictatorship and terrorism. 208 00:22:37,480 --> 00:22:46,990 A chapter that, at face value seems somewhat misplaced with the rest of the book drawing a parallel between religious conviction and dictatorship. 209 00:22:46,990 --> 00:22:53,020 A Swannee claims both are united by an exclusive appeal to emotion rather than intellect. 210 00:22:53,020 --> 00:22:59,320 And on that basis, both presuppose a singular monopoly on the truth. 211 00:22:59,320 --> 00:23:06,790 From there, he attempts to offer a distinction between the politically neutral Muslim and the more insidious Islamist, 212 00:23:06,790 --> 00:23:11,350 the latter of whom is the bedfellow of dictatorship par excellence. 213 00:23:11,350 --> 00:23:19,090 Yet as he weaves his parallel aslant, he relies on defensive posturing not only of Islamists but of Islamic history more broadly. 214 00:23:19,090 --> 00:23:25,240 That is so caricatured and alarmist that it almost becomes a lost on his reader that the author 215 00:23:25,240 --> 00:23:32,350 only pages earlier cautioned excessively against the wilful adoption of conspiratorial thinking, 216 00:23:32,350 --> 00:23:37,540 chastising Islamists for indoctrinating their followers with the falsified version of history. 217 00:23:37,540 --> 00:23:43,090 Asani moves on to dismiss the totality of Muslim rulers throughout history as having been, 218 00:23:43,090 --> 00:23:48,850 quote, simply tyrants who Papeete perpetrated injustice plundered and killed. 219 00:23:48,850 --> 00:23:55,870 End quote, relying on incidents from the mind at Blessed and Ottoman empires to make his case. 220 00:23:55,870 --> 00:23:59,890 To be clear, there is no historian of those empires worth their salt. 221 00:23:59,890 --> 00:24:06,300 Who would question the blood spilt by those empires or by Islamic civilisation more broadly? 222 00:24:06,300 --> 00:24:10,570 Noris sexual licentiousness under the ambassador, for instance. 223 00:24:10,570 --> 00:24:16,480 Much of a secret at this point. Yet Aswini offers this this alarmist reading of Islamic history. 224 00:24:16,480 --> 00:24:25,930 In effect, to draw stark juxtaposition between political Islamists on the one hand and fascist dictatorship on the other hand. 225 00:24:25,930 --> 00:24:30,850 And in this context, Swansea's broader writings about Islamists can be better understood as part of 226 00:24:30,850 --> 00:24:35,170 an established pattern in which his paranoia about the threat of political 227 00:24:35,170 --> 00:24:44,650 Islam makes him more than comfortable suspending his own judgement about the dictatorship syndrome and the tools it employs to further its agenda. 228 00:24:44,650 --> 00:24:50,050 Conspiracy theory and media disinformation campaigns is thus no longer appear insidious. 229 00:24:50,050 --> 00:24:56,470 So long as they are directed against Islamists rather than dictators of a different persuasion. 230 00:24:56,470 --> 00:25:00,760 Indeed, as my colleague Mohammed al Masri argues very convincingly, 231 00:25:00,760 --> 00:25:08,980 the Egyptian media as an institution was quite unhinged in its reliance on conspiracy during Mohamed Morsi's presidency, 232 00:25:08,980 --> 00:25:14,470 for instance, covering a speech Morsi gave in which he addressed his audience with the salutation. 233 00:25:14,470 --> 00:25:18,520 Yeah. Yeah. Assurity my people, my clan. 234 00:25:18,520 --> 00:25:27,370 Media figures of the highest persuasion in Egypt unanimously moved to accuse the president of using an Islamist dog whistle, 235 00:25:27,370 --> 00:25:33,340 in effect pledging his loyalty not to the people of Egypt, but only to his fellow Muslim brothers. 236 00:25:33,340 --> 00:25:36,610 Despite any sober reading of the rest of that speech, 237 00:25:36,610 --> 00:25:46,390 making painstakingly clear that Morsi was indeed referring to the Egyptian people more broadly and in his capacity as a political journalist. 238 00:25:46,390 --> 00:25:52,600 Dr. Aswani himself has been no stranger to being a purveyor of conspiracy. 239 00:25:52,600 --> 00:25:57,580 Here I'll refer to an article A had written following former President Morsi's mysterious death, 240 00:25:57,580 --> 00:26:04,690 which I also addressed in that article on foreign policy, to which I'll leave my colleagues to direct you. 241 00:26:04,690 --> 00:26:13,570 More specifically, granted a swan. He does acknowledge the Sisi regime's culpability in the plane, medical neglect of an incarcerated inmate, 242 00:26:13,570 --> 00:26:20,320 but then shift gears to once again rely on hackneyed caricatures of the Brotherhood as a traitorous terrorist outfit, 243 00:26:20,320 --> 00:26:27,730 implying that the blood spilt by the Brotherhood makes its share responsibility in the former president's demise. 244 00:26:27,730 --> 00:26:32,710 In the process, a Swannee wholly suspends his hostility to conspiracy, 245 00:26:32,710 --> 00:26:36,940 claiming that Morsi was never a democratically elected president in the first place. 246 00:26:36,940 --> 00:26:42,580 Relying on the dubious charge that all elections previously won by the Brotherhood 247 00:26:42,580 --> 00:26:48,730 were a function of bribing PA voters with either cash or staples like oil and sugar, 248 00:26:48,730 --> 00:26:58,810 a charge a swannee qualifies with no evidence whatsoever as having been proven conclusively unsubstantiated innuendo of this sort. 249 00:26:58,810 --> 00:27:06,610 That essentially means that Morsi and the Brotherhood have themselves to blame for the former president's death and incarceration. 250 00:27:06,610 --> 00:27:13,870 In the same vein that the existential threat posed by the Brotherhood, Dr. Swansea's physicians suggest, 251 00:27:13,870 --> 00:27:20,170 necessitated Morsi's forcible removal by a military coup and the rise of the hitherto unimagined 252 00:27:20,170 --> 00:27:26,860 dictatorial regime under Sisi and ultimately rendered the infamous massacre in Rabat actually a square, 253 00:27:26,860 --> 00:27:29,600 an unavoidable correct. 254 00:27:29,600 --> 00:27:39,160 But to be clear, the purpose of this exercise is not to dismiss critique more broadly of the Brotherhood of political Islam or of Morsi's presidency. 255 00:27:39,160 --> 00:27:44,740 Anyone who has read our book would immediately recognise that we are no less harsh in our critiques of 256 00:27:44,740 --> 00:27:51,130 the Brotherhood than we are of the Egyptian liberal class to which the book is primarily directed. 257 00:27:51,130 --> 00:27:58,180 But in a political moment in which a dictatorship is on the rise globally, believers of freedom, 258 00:27:58,180 --> 00:28:09,370 democracy and the rule of law need every tool imaginable to properly push back against dictatorship and the mechanisms undergirding it. 259 00:28:09,370 --> 00:28:19,000 Dr. Aswini, to that end, has done a great service in outlining some of those mechanisms and subjecting them to a very worthy critique. 260 00:28:19,000 --> 00:28:24,280 But his own paranoid blindspots about political Islam, blind spots. 261 00:28:24,280 --> 00:28:32,620 That is our book assiduously. Documents are endemic to the project of Egyptian secular liberalism more broadly. 262 00:28:32,620 --> 00:28:36,970 Ultimately render his prescriptions of limited staying power. 263 00:28:36,970 --> 00:28:48,430 Standing up to dictatorship requires going beyond endlessly and impoverishing, critiquing its premises only when politically expedient or convenient. 264 00:28:48,430 --> 00:28:55,900 Rather, defeating the dictatorship syndrome requires the intellectual and indeed moral consistency. 265 00:28:55,900 --> 00:29:01,730 I hope the good doctor can take this into consideration moving forward and with that I think my time is up. 266 00:29:01,730 --> 00:29:07,970 Lantier. Thank you very much, Dunwich, for a very sort of thoughtful. 267 00:29:07,970 --> 00:29:14,510 And in many respects quite trenchant reflection on this one is dictatorship's syndrome. 268 00:29:14,510 --> 00:29:20,960 I think in many respects the challenge that arises from your presentations, both of you, 269 00:29:20,960 --> 00:29:28,640 is and it's articulated in the title of your book as well, and the title of this presentation, a liberal liberals. 270 00:29:28,640 --> 00:29:34,460 In a sense, what does it mean to be a liberal if you are a liberal at the same time? 271 00:29:34,460 --> 00:29:39,590 And I think this also ties in with the question that Walter will probably put to you from the audience. 272 00:29:39,590 --> 00:29:46,790 And I am sure Walter also may have questions of his own, and I would welcome him to put them to you. 273 00:29:46,790 --> 00:29:59,870 But what does liberalism mean in a context like Egypt, where in many respects it's used to limit the voice of democratic forces within the society? 274 00:29:59,870 --> 00:30:08,780 But at the same time, it is seen as legitimately doing that on the grounds that ultimately those who are not card-carrying 275 00:30:08,780 --> 00:30:15,440 liberals in these societies pose a threat to wider society and are not truly democratic. 276 00:30:15,440 --> 00:30:23,690 Yet at the same time, these figures sometimes appear to show that their own commitments to democracy have certain limits as well. 277 00:30:23,690 --> 00:30:27,920 And so this is this is a challenging sort of state of affairs in Egypt. 278 00:30:27,920 --> 00:30:33,530 And perhaps with that, if I can take this has prerogative and and begin the Q&A. 279 00:30:33,530 --> 00:30:40,490 I'll put that as a question to the two of you and feel free to answer both of you or just one of you. 280 00:30:40,490 --> 00:30:45,840 And then I'm sure there are plenty of questions that Walter is ready to put to you. 281 00:30:45,840 --> 00:30:54,140 So who would like to take this? Please feel free. I'll take a really brief why strath of how we think about liberalism as you know, 282 00:30:54,140 --> 00:31:00,500 the basic political doctrine that's about the protecting and enhancing of the freedom of the individual, 283 00:31:00,500 --> 00:31:07,910 and that is the central problem and role of politics and the role of government in ensuring and 284 00:31:07,910 --> 00:31:15,500 devising a system that gives government the power necessary to protect individual liberty, 285 00:31:15,500 --> 00:31:21,140 but prevents those from governing from abusing power. And so very loosely determined. 286 00:31:21,140 --> 00:31:27,200 That's how we define liberalism. And again, because there's so many contributors who talk about it differently. 287 00:31:27,200 --> 00:31:33,860 You know, the mechanisms of governance, the mechanisms of articulation could be different, referring to different theorists. 288 00:31:33,860 --> 00:31:40,670 However, the cornerstone here is the protecting and enhancing freedom and individual liberty, 289 00:31:40,670 --> 00:31:47,070 both for institutions and looking at the kind of democratic preconditions literature that requires 290 00:31:47,070 --> 00:31:53,840 a liberal intelligentsia to be the safeguard of this transition or the safeguard of this movement. 291 00:31:53,840 --> 00:32:00,290 And so the question for us continues to be their silence, their complicity. 292 00:32:00,290 --> 00:32:09,560 But even in the kind of recalling of the past to look for solutions towards the future, they are not just limited. 293 00:32:09,560 --> 00:32:20,120 They're actually missing the bulk of the levels of structural, political and ideological injustice that facilitate the moment we're in today. 294 00:32:20,120 --> 00:32:25,670 Thank you very much. I'm going to now hand over to Walter. That's OK. OK, I'll start by. 295 00:32:25,670 --> 00:32:31,610 Well, I confess I had had a similar question to the one that Osama has already put in, 296 00:32:31,610 --> 00:32:36,290 which was the very first question that we got, which was what do you mean by liberalism? 297 00:32:36,290 --> 00:32:43,280 But in my case, I'm just wondering why you're talking about a liberal liberalism rather than just talking 298 00:32:43,280 --> 00:32:48,440 about the failure of liberalism or the absence of it or the dysfunctionality of it. 299 00:32:48,440 --> 00:32:54,590 I'll throw that out to you. I have. I would like to get to questions that have been put to us by members in the audience. 300 00:32:54,590 --> 00:32:57,140 I'll let you answer. You've already addressed that to some extent. 301 00:32:57,140 --> 00:33:02,690 But let me throw out one of the other questions we got from the audience, which is from Danny Rhen. 302 00:33:02,690 --> 00:33:05,960 And the question is specifically addressed to Dalia. 303 00:33:05,960 --> 00:33:12,830 And it is can you speak a bit about the relationship between political parties and civil society groups, 304 00:33:12,830 --> 00:33:18,230 the degree of elite capture of NGOs or activist groups that takes place, 305 00:33:18,230 --> 00:33:29,570 and whether you feel any segment of Egyptian civil society can operate functionally and independently of ties and loyalties to political elites. 306 00:33:29,570 --> 00:33:34,730 So these are two questions, actually, and they're very important. And I'll start with the second one. 307 00:33:34,730 --> 00:33:42,560 And geos have been historically extremely important as the kind of bull works or mechanism through a civil society is not just operating, 308 00:33:42,560 --> 00:33:47,960 but continuing to foster those democratic trends and democratic norms or attempting to. 309 00:33:47,960 --> 00:33:56,060 What we've seen in the past few years is not just an attack on sit on and geos, but the closure of many importance NGOs, 310 00:33:56,060 --> 00:34:01,520 the one of the primary cases that a lot of activists have been brought under, 311 00:34:01,520 --> 00:34:08,990 including people in the United States and throughout the academic west, have been the capture under NGO laws. 312 00:34:08,990 --> 00:34:12,980 If these were ways with which there was infiltration to defame the government. 313 00:34:12,980 --> 00:34:18,710 But today, if you look at the role of NGOs, they've been extremely limited. 314 00:34:18,710 --> 00:34:23,330 There have been the closure of NGOs and many civil society organisations. 315 00:34:23,330 --> 00:34:31,160 For example, the shut down of the UN, the DEAM Centre, an NGO that offers support to survivors of torture and violence. 316 00:34:31,160 --> 00:34:37,820 The particular Koser and attacks on feminist NGOs and those for women's rights. 317 00:34:37,820 --> 00:34:47,630 The criminal investigation of the case one seven three against human rights defenders and NGO is the investigation that continues since 2013. 318 00:34:47,630 --> 00:34:53,270 Anyone who receives funding from those who wish to harm Egyptian national security 319 00:34:53,270 --> 00:34:59,630 under the Article 78 of the penal code carries a 25 year prison sentence. 320 00:34:59,630 --> 00:35:04,580 The freezing of many of the assets of NGOs continues until today. 321 00:35:04,580 --> 00:35:11,780 This bleeds into, I think, the bigger question of the of the terrorism laws that exist in Egypt today. 322 00:35:11,780 --> 00:35:19,640 Terrorism laws that are defined with a very large swath of their definition enacted in 2015, 323 00:35:19,640 --> 00:35:24,800 continuing until today, renewed earlier this year, and actually even more stringent terms. 324 00:35:24,800 --> 00:35:30,440 And they're so broadly defined that if you look at any cases of activists today, 325 00:35:30,440 --> 00:35:35,490 any cases against Indio's members of the media, there's always a terrorism charge. 326 00:35:35,490 --> 00:35:41,090 In my latest article that looks at a pre-trial detention as a method of suspending 327 00:35:41,090 --> 00:35:46,640 activists and this kind of pre-trial purgatory where you're no longer held for 45 days, 328 00:35:46,640 --> 00:35:53,060 but up to two years, renewable tacking on more charges all under the terrorism clause. 329 00:35:53,060 --> 00:36:01,610 Anyone who is seen as speaking outside of the state narrative threatening the state narrative comes under this deep terrorism law. 330 00:36:01,610 --> 00:36:09,140 And so the closure of embryos begs the question of why are these institutions that formerly 331 00:36:09,140 --> 00:36:14,540 work outside of the structure of government but have a historically important role to play? 332 00:36:14,540 --> 00:36:19,130 Why have they become seen as a primary threat to which not only their close assets seised, 333 00:36:19,130 --> 00:36:24,370 but many of their leaders have been arrested under under the terrorism law? 334 00:36:24,370 --> 00:36:30,130 The first question was about, I think, if I recall correctly, political party formation, 335 00:36:30,130 --> 00:36:34,750 and I think it might be referring to what I was hoping someone would ask you how it is. 336 00:36:34,750 --> 00:36:39,280 Why is it in Egypt when we think of political opposition? 337 00:36:39,280 --> 00:36:44,200 We think about Islamist parties. We think about primarily the Muslim Brotherhood. 338 00:36:44,200 --> 00:36:50,590 If you look at that law that I was mentioning in my earlier presentation, the law was designed to actually undermine, 339 00:36:50,590 --> 00:36:55,510 undercut and prevent the establishment of secular and leftist parties, 340 00:36:55,510 --> 00:37:02,890 which were important in the 1952 revolution in the writing of the first constitution that's no longer there. 341 00:37:02,890 --> 00:37:11,080 And so secular leftist parties have always been seen as a threat, an underlying threat of the Egyptian regime. 342 00:37:11,080 --> 00:37:16,360 And so the establishment of secular and leftist parties has always been very difficult. 343 00:37:16,360 --> 00:37:23,140 It's difficult to establish and register a party, and the language of the political law was redundancy. 344 00:37:23,140 --> 00:37:26,890 They're all doing the same thing with similar political platforms. 345 00:37:26,890 --> 00:37:35,650 And so it's almost institutionally by design, the elimination of political pluralism within the secular and leftist camp. 346 00:37:35,650 --> 00:37:42,430 And so when you get to the Islamist camp, especially under Sadat, when they were actually allowed to come into the first political opening. 347 00:37:42,430 --> 00:37:50,350 By extension, their political activity over time since the 90s, historically, but really since the 1970s, 348 00:37:50,350 --> 00:37:56,660 flourishing up and in the 1990s, but really in the 2000s established this as not just a movement, 349 00:37:56,660 --> 00:38:00,220 but a political party, even though they were still running as independents, 350 00:38:00,220 --> 00:38:10,420 but still with a structure and a framework allowed to work within the constraints that Mubarak had for them save the 2005 to 2007 political opening. 351 00:38:10,420 --> 00:38:16,770 And so post revolution, it's natural to think that, well, when the authoritarian big man is gone, 352 00:38:16,770 --> 00:38:20,830 be aware of the new Islamist incursion that's coming on the doorstep. 353 00:38:20,830 --> 00:38:30,340 And so if you recall the public addresses that were played in Liberation Square or Tahrir Square, there was this constant from Mubarak. 354 00:38:30,340 --> 00:38:36,140 I know only I can protect you from what I know is coming behind us, which is the Muslim Brotherhood. 355 00:38:36,140 --> 00:38:42,430 Right. Again, the big men protecting from the impending threat. Now, this terrorism narrative now is everywhere. 356 00:38:42,430 --> 00:38:48,010 A rise of populism, simple solutions to very big problems. It's just the one people need to eliminate. 357 00:38:48,010 --> 00:38:49,240 We see them here in the United States. 358 00:38:49,240 --> 00:38:56,260 President Trump just tweeted about the big Muslim threat again last night in the largest effort to kind of swing votes. 359 00:38:56,260 --> 00:39:02,710 And in these three primary states, but here, it's almost structurally by design, 360 00:39:02,710 --> 00:39:12,540 the elimination of real political pluralism and the relegating that the only viable option is an Islamist option and one version of it. 361 00:39:12,540 --> 00:39:18,810 Creates a public sentiment that political pluralism is maybe not what we need. 362 00:39:18,810 --> 00:39:27,210 And this has become entrenched in post revolution Egypt, especially when political, social and economic conditions have even deteriorated more. 363 00:39:27,210 --> 00:39:33,210 And so the safeguards of the transition to a consolidated democracy, intelligentsia, institutions, 364 00:39:33,210 --> 00:39:41,700 civil society, their erosion is almost by design the guarantee for entrenched in a long gaited dictatorship. 365 00:39:41,700 --> 00:39:47,750 And unfortunately, today it is worse in Egypt than ever has been historically. 366 00:39:47,750 --> 00:39:52,490 I have a quick follow up to that about embryos and either of you. 367 00:39:52,490 --> 00:39:54,410 Both of you could go on onto this. 368 00:39:54,410 --> 00:40:02,870 Which is are embryos taking up the space that political parties should occupy and unwittingly acting as an impediment to the 369 00:40:02,870 --> 00:40:09,800 formation of effective political parties that could actually function within a liberal pseudo liberal system needs political parties. 370 00:40:09,800 --> 00:40:15,260 And instead, you have everybody is interested in politics, whether you call them liberals or something else. 371 00:40:15,260 --> 00:40:20,690 Agreeing to the terms of kind of NGO formation that's set by the state. 372 00:40:20,690 --> 00:40:29,990 So I'd like maybe. Is this the kind of coopting of NGO formation exists not just in Egypt, it exists in the Palestinian territories. 373 00:40:29,990 --> 00:40:35,510 It exists in Jordan, in the Gulf countries where NGOs are becoming the vehicle for change. 374 00:40:35,510 --> 00:40:41,040 And so the suspicion of NGOs, especially those who accept foreign training, foreign funding, 375 00:40:41,040 --> 00:40:47,770 you know, then colours the entire swath us as non-democratic and not the interests of the state. 376 00:40:47,770 --> 00:40:59,450 But in the case of Egypt, the NGO that continuously attacked the most are the feminist NGOs, those that are trying to uphold women's rights. 377 00:40:59,450 --> 00:41:08,140 And so there is one of my first publications was on the interesting marriage between feminists, 378 00:41:08,140 --> 00:41:12,290 NGOs and the Muslim Brotherhood in nineteen ninety nine. 379 00:41:12,290 --> 00:41:14,420 To push for this is under Mubarak. 380 00:41:14,420 --> 00:41:22,190 The change in two thousand of the personal status laws where for the first time in two in the year 2000 and this change in the process, 381 00:41:22,190 --> 00:41:32,030 Ansel's women were allowed for the first time to apply for a no fault divorce, were allowed to apply for not just child custody, but maintenance. 382 00:41:32,030 --> 00:41:37,490 Right. And the evidence they had to produce was actually very basic elements of a love letter. 383 00:41:37,490 --> 00:41:39,890 It was enough to produce for them to produce. 384 00:41:39,890 --> 00:41:48,560 And so the marriage between the feminists who were using the language of these are deeply enshrined religious laws that we have been protected from. 385 00:41:48,560 --> 00:41:51,320 And so they should be pushed for in governance. 386 00:41:51,320 --> 00:41:58,550 And the Muslim Brotherhood being the ones with which they were working with, you know, opened up that doorway of jails are functioning. 387 00:41:58,550 --> 00:42:05,090 Yes. And the kind of pushing for political agendas that are meant to protect the people 388 00:42:05,090 --> 00:42:11,870 and give them that kind of liberal values that that we're being prevented. 389 00:42:11,870 --> 00:42:17,000 But the interesting thing at that moment was the marriage between the feminists and Yeo's and the 390 00:42:17,000 --> 00:42:21,890 Muslim Brotherhood or members of the Muslim Brotherhood or that independence beg the question of, 391 00:42:21,890 --> 00:42:26,540 well, the threat is even getting deeper and the threat is even getting louder. 392 00:42:26,540 --> 00:42:32,860 And so here the elimination of both becomes extremely important. 393 00:42:32,860 --> 00:42:35,770 The only thing I'll add to that is that our call, 394 00:42:35,770 --> 00:42:42,610 our distinguished colleague and Leisz had written at length about the role of NGOs in Egyptian society. 395 00:42:42,610 --> 00:42:46,630 And just to kind of wedbush to the broader conversation about the dictatorships and drum, 396 00:42:46,630 --> 00:42:53,200 regrettably, conspiracy is very much used in service of discrediting NGOs, 397 00:42:53,200 --> 00:43:01,450 particularly, as Dalia had mentioned, NGOs that accept foreign funding of any kind as being de facto enemies of the state. 398 00:43:01,450 --> 00:43:09,210 And in Egypt, their ability to operate freely has never been more constrained for precisely that reason. 399 00:43:09,210 --> 00:43:14,340 OK, I'm going to give you another question from the audience. This one is from Nasima Sakib. 400 00:43:14,340 --> 00:43:21,960 And the question is, when the Muslim Brotherhood came to power, there was an argument in many Western policymaking circles that the Muslim 401 00:43:21,960 --> 00:43:26,220 Brotherhood is illiberal and as the West should not only care about democracy, 402 00:43:26,220 --> 00:43:32,010 but also care about liberal values, it should pressure the Muslim Brotherhood to liberalise more. 403 00:43:32,010 --> 00:43:40,770 What has happened to that argument now since Egypt is now being dominated by a government that is neither democratic nor liberal? 404 00:43:40,770 --> 00:43:47,770 I think either if you can take it. Sure. So let's unpack the question first. 405 00:43:47,770 --> 00:43:53,730 So here the Muslim Brotherhood coming into power was was was through this through elections, 406 00:43:53,730 --> 00:44:04,920 right through several rounds of elections and through a year previous where people lined up at the polls seven times for a constitutional referendum. 407 00:44:04,920 --> 00:44:09,330 And so you saw that the democratic process, just as I was speaking to earlier, 408 00:44:09,330 --> 00:44:15,150 the political pluralism, people establishing political parties, that these were deeply entrenched. 409 00:44:15,150 --> 00:44:22,190 And so people coming into the polls and voting for the Brotherhood is a by-product of the democratic process. 410 00:44:22,190 --> 00:44:30,770 The Brotherhood coming into office and again, word we're talking about 10 months, really 10 months of the Morsi administration. 411 00:44:30,770 --> 00:44:36,650 There is the kind of run up to the election. I started to do the kind of flagging of whoa. 412 00:44:36,650 --> 00:44:40,430 Something doesn't feel right here for for a swath of the population. 413 00:44:40,430 --> 00:44:46,940 Historically, the Brotherhood never contested more than 20 to 30 percent of seats available. 414 00:44:46,940 --> 00:44:53,690 Right. It was never about getting powers back, getting a voice. And they upped it to 40 percent and then 50 percent. 415 00:44:53,690 --> 00:45:02,330 This is running for parliament before president in that parliament was ultimately cancelled and then running, contesting all hundred seats. 416 00:45:02,330 --> 00:45:12,620 And in my writings, I talk about that kind of the fear rising of what happened to trying to become a party of influence rather than a party in power. 417 00:45:12,620 --> 00:45:18,770 And so the logic behind that, they argue, is that not enough people willing to run for office. 418 00:45:18,770 --> 00:45:22,160 And so to safeguard democracy, they start increasing right now. 419 00:45:22,160 --> 00:45:28,790 Technically, there's nothing wrong with that. But you can start to see how public perception response to that as the usurpation of power. 420 00:45:28,790 --> 00:45:37,640 That parliament, of course, was cancelled. The next election is for for president, the presidential elections and many candidates are running. 421 00:45:37,640 --> 00:45:44,060 You know, we all know the history. And ultimately, in the second round, President Morsi is elected again, elected democratically. 422 00:45:44,060 --> 00:45:47,300 Now, what does the Brotherhood do in that 10 month time period? 423 00:45:47,300 --> 00:45:54,080 We can't we can't remove the endogenous factors in that country that's just gone through evolution and 424 00:45:54,080 --> 00:46:00,710 the exoticness factors that needed the failure of an Islamist government or an Islamist president. 425 00:46:00,710 --> 00:46:05,120 And so here the Brotherhood. Yes. Did they make mistakes? Absolutely right. 426 00:46:05,120 --> 00:46:09,890 Not being able to win hearts and minds in the streets to a certain extent. 427 00:46:09,890 --> 00:46:14,720 President Morsi speaking on his own behalf, while some of the biggest, I think, 428 00:46:14,720 --> 00:46:20,180 ideological challenges he had in the street were from members of the upper echelon of the Brotherhood, 429 00:46:20,180 --> 00:46:24,470 speaking in language that created a level unsearched in the population. 430 00:46:24,470 --> 00:46:31,040 The constitutional referendum, there's a huge division on how would that was read, what it was intended to. 431 00:46:31,040 --> 00:46:37,970 So, yes, absolutely. The Brotherhood and I and I've written about their constitution and even questions on the role of women's rights. 432 00:46:37,970 --> 00:46:48,140 But all of that does not. Mean that there should not be continuation of the democratic process to vote folks out of office. 433 00:46:48,140 --> 00:46:48,800 Right. 434 00:46:48,800 --> 00:46:56,180 And so we know that in constitution and democratic consolidation, democracies are considered consolidated when there's a huge turnout of a rule. 435 00:46:56,180 --> 00:47:01,670 Right. Books have been voted into office, out of office and half of staff and half voted into office. 436 00:47:01,670 --> 00:47:08,150 And then within 10 months, being removed in a military coup because of the existential fear of what are Islamist going to do to us. 437 00:47:08,150 --> 00:47:12,710 And the fear narrative, as Denish alluded to, is coming from many, many factors, 438 00:47:12,710 --> 00:47:21,830 building on the level of conspiracy theory that they're going to sell the pyramids and the Sphinx and, you know, close cinemas. 439 00:47:21,830 --> 00:47:28,310 And in my writing on their behaviour, for example, in Parliament pre revolution, they never took up these issues. 440 00:47:28,310 --> 00:47:29,750 It was bread and butter issues. 441 00:47:29,750 --> 00:47:39,680 So what is the role of, you know, the adherence to real structural liberalism, of using institutions of governance to protect civil society? 442 00:47:39,680 --> 00:47:52,970 And this really deep movements, both internally and externally, to ensure the failure of this government to almost welcome their removal. 443 00:47:52,970 --> 00:47:57,970 Ultimately leading to the enshrining of what we have today, which is a military dictatorship. 444 00:47:57,970 --> 00:48:03,320 Dennis, I know you have more to say on this. I see you nodding. I think that was actually quite robust. 445 00:48:03,320 --> 00:48:07,400 So I'm kind of lost towards. OK. 446 00:48:07,400 --> 00:48:15,600 But I actually want to come back to the last thing that Dalia just said, which was a question that we got from Eugene Rogan, of all people. 447 00:48:15,600 --> 00:48:19,290 And I confess it was a question that had occurred to me as well. 448 00:48:19,290 --> 00:48:25,020 So I more or less paraphrase Eugene's question, which is, shouldn't we be talking more about the military? 449 00:48:25,020 --> 00:48:29,130 I mean, his question was in the form of what if I the last 20 and focussing on the figure of 450 00:48:29,130 --> 00:48:33,630 the dictators overlooking the underlying problem of the deep state in San Diego, 451 00:48:33,630 --> 00:48:41,130 particularly in the military. And it occurs to me that perhaps all talk of a liberal order in a state with a military this powerful, 452 00:48:41,130 --> 00:48:45,030 which has been sustained by its foreign relations, 453 00:48:45,030 --> 00:48:46,440 particularly with the United States, 454 00:48:46,440 --> 00:48:56,370 and through a series of kind of emergencies brought about by wars that entrenched military power more over the decades. 455 00:48:56,370 --> 00:48:57,600 Why are we talking about the military? 456 00:48:57,600 --> 00:49:04,040 Why why are we talking about the failure of a liberal order in a state that is, in fact dominated by the military? 457 00:49:04,040 --> 00:49:04,880 OK, to that, 458 00:49:04,880 --> 00:49:14,780 and I think that Dr Aswini at least alludes to the role of the military when he talks about his childhood memories in the context of the 1967 war. 459 00:49:14,780 --> 00:49:23,150 He was having conversations with an Italian neighbour of his who for whom he was translating the media correspondences. 460 00:49:23,150 --> 00:49:32,640 And then that Italian neighbour, after the latest correspondence, suggested that Egypt had downed some 20 Israeli planes or something like that. 461 00:49:32,640 --> 00:49:36,770 And the Italian neighbour said, my boy, your government is lying to you. 462 00:49:36,770 --> 00:49:40,850 It's not. I lived through the the the Second World War. 463 00:49:40,850 --> 00:49:43,370 It's not possible for that many planes to be down today. 464 00:49:43,370 --> 00:49:51,380 So I think he does allude to the power and the strength of the military in falsifying narratives. 465 00:49:51,380 --> 00:49:55,430 This goes into his broader conversations about conspiracy theories. 466 00:49:55,430 --> 00:49:58,940 So the deep state is on his mind. 467 00:49:58,940 --> 00:50:08,660 But once again, I don't think that it's really he doesn't view the deep state of the military as the penultimate threat. 468 00:50:08,660 --> 00:50:12,410 He views Islamists excessively, take up that role. 469 00:50:12,410 --> 00:50:18,800 And I think that's really what leads to the good doctor to kind of shift gears and his attention and focus. 470 00:50:18,800 --> 00:50:21,420 You know, that's a wonderful question. 471 00:50:21,420 --> 00:50:29,720 When we look at the role of military today, we used to say that the Egyptian military controls 20 percent of the economy today. 472 00:50:29,720 --> 00:50:38,070 It's upwards of 80 percent of the economy. If we look at the role of military in politics, the military is politics today. 473 00:50:38,070 --> 00:50:45,630 There's really no getting around the military. I remember just as the revolution and the Friday where president President Mubarak 474 00:50:45,630 --> 00:50:50,400 stepped down and there is announcement that it's over and everyone is celebrating. 475 00:50:50,400 --> 00:50:54,470 And I remember, you know, looking around saying, OK, well, this was a soft coup. 476 00:50:54,470 --> 00:51:02,640 Remember, the military stepped aside and let this happen. Right. There were soldiers and tanks in the streets and it was, you know, one hand. 477 00:51:02,640 --> 00:51:10,170 And I remember saying this is a soft coup because in politics there are winners and losers in an order for the people to win. 478 00:51:10,170 --> 00:51:18,990 We had to recognise that, well, the military had to let go of a level of constraint and control on society, the economy and politics. 479 00:51:18,990 --> 00:51:25,710 Now, the military started to see Mubarak during the revolution and pre revolution as a threat 480 00:51:25,710 --> 00:51:31,050 because they were about to go into that kind of a head start hereditary rule of his son. 481 00:51:31,050 --> 00:51:36,360 And so they stepped by and in some of their own kind of public statements that were made of, 482 00:51:36,360 --> 00:51:39,300 you know, telling young people, you didn't do this revolution. 483 00:51:39,300 --> 00:51:44,790 We actually let it happen because we needed the removal of Mubarak very quickly thereafter. 484 00:51:44,790 --> 00:51:51,540 And in 2013, it became very apparent that President Morsi was a threat to the military, needed to be removed. 485 00:51:51,540 --> 00:51:57,420 And unfortunately, today, the military of today is very different than the military of Mubarak. 486 00:51:57,420 --> 00:52:06,540 President Sisi has purged the top three layers of the military out of fear of his own, his own future. 487 00:52:06,540 --> 00:52:11,190 And so there is going to be a coming moment, I believe, 488 00:52:11,190 --> 00:52:18,150 where he will be a threat to the power of the military because of really poor economic and political positions. 489 00:52:18,150 --> 00:52:24,090 Today, Egypt is strategically weak. One of the weakest countries in the Middle East on several fronts of its border. 490 00:52:24,090 --> 00:52:29,460 However, he has very efficiently purged the military of any alternate voices. 491 00:52:29,460 --> 00:52:36,990 The presidential election that occurred a little over a year ago or a year and a half ago, much of the viable candidates were ex military officers. 492 00:52:36,990 --> 00:52:41,010 And so that signal that there is an internal rift. And so you're absolutely right. 493 00:52:41,010 --> 00:52:46,800 We can't be talking about illiberalism and an Egyptian society without talking about 494 00:52:46,800 --> 00:52:53,550 the deep entrenchment of the military and politics and the economy and civil society, 495 00:52:53,550 --> 00:52:58,590 and stems from the idea that every family has a military officer. 496 00:52:58,590 --> 00:53:01,520 These are sons of the nation. They have our best interests. 497 00:53:01,520 --> 00:53:09,180 And the begs goes back to that question of complicity, of not being able to see the military as a threat to the political order. 498 00:53:09,180 --> 00:53:16,020 But absolutely, the military in power is a threat to liberal ideals. 499 00:53:16,020 --> 00:53:20,220 I could bring out one more question from an audience member, but actually I wanted to ask the SAMMA. 500 00:53:20,220 --> 00:53:24,870 Perhaps he has because you really get a chance to ask the question, do you ever question Osama? 501 00:53:24,870 --> 00:53:31,430 I would feel guilty taking the opportunity away from some excellent questions that come through the audience. 502 00:53:31,430 --> 00:53:36,390 OK. So I have a question for Monica Marks, who is one of our own graduates with the DFL. 503 00:53:36,390 --> 00:53:41,730 And her question is, to what extent do you feel that fears regarding what the Muslim Brotherhood would 504 00:53:41,730 --> 00:53:47,100 do to women's rights and the potential for Sisi to protect women and feminists 505 00:53:47,100 --> 00:53:51,420 against the spectre of Muslim Brotherhood repression proved to be a pivotal 506 00:53:51,420 --> 00:53:57,550 factor in consolidating so-called liberal support for Sisi has ruled Egypt. 507 00:53:57,550 --> 00:54:02,340 It wasn't addressed to anybody in particular. So either one of you or both of you could respond. 508 00:54:02,340 --> 00:54:08,370 I can take this, although I feel I've been talking too much Spanish, if you want to feel free to go ahead. 509 00:54:08,370 --> 00:54:11,160 You know, that was one of the narratives that was promoted. Right. 510 00:54:11,160 --> 00:54:20,480 If if the Morsi administration continues, you know, women will be moving outside of the public sphere to be forced to cover. 511 00:54:20,480 --> 00:54:26,550 And again, this this estereo this is covered in our in our book under Mohammed Mastery's chapter. 512 00:54:26,550 --> 00:54:32,880 And I remember having conversations with folks and saying, know what exactly is it that you're afraid of? 513 00:54:32,880 --> 00:54:39,330 Like, what is this deep fear? And it's that I won't be able to go to a resort and wear a bathing suit. 514 00:54:39,330 --> 00:54:46,470 And I said, what indicators do you have that this will be eliminated under under this presidency? 515 00:54:46,470 --> 00:54:53,010 And they're not there. They're absent. The conversation on that used to occur in the year. 516 00:54:53,010 --> 00:54:57,660 I think it was 1995 of should Egypt be part of the Miss World pageant? 517 00:54:57,660 --> 00:55:05,640 Right. These kind of symbolic curtailing of women's visibility and the public were not happening in the 2000s. 518 00:55:05,640 --> 00:55:10,020 And there weren't conversations on this in terms of the Constitution written 519 00:55:10,020 --> 00:55:14,270 under or beginning to write be written under President Morsi's administration. 520 00:55:14,270 --> 00:55:18,150 Constitution was very similar to the Constitution before it. 521 00:55:18,150 --> 00:55:22,710 One of the primary differences, it actually removed Sharia as the law of the land. 522 00:55:22,710 --> 00:55:29,760 Right. So if you think about the Mubarak constitution included the language of Sharia as the law of the land was under the Mubarak constitution, 523 00:55:29,760 --> 00:55:35,880 that personal status laws, limited women's rights, women's inheritance, child custody laws. 524 00:55:35,880 --> 00:55:40,950 And so here you had a constitution that was going to be more progressive in that regard. 525 00:55:40,950 --> 00:55:46,800 But in my opinion, not progressive enough. But the current constitution is worse. 526 00:55:46,800 --> 00:55:53,610 And so the idea that Islamists are out to get women's rights and women's representation and women's visibility 527 00:55:53,610 --> 00:55:59,970 doesn't technically have evidence when it comes to the last at least 15 years of Muslim Brotherhood attempt, 528 00:55:59,970 --> 00:56:09,360 attempted legislation and parliament. But the narrative of hysteria around what they would do to society is still very deep. 529 00:56:09,360 --> 00:56:20,670 Right. Again, from selling the pyramids to the wife of President Morsi, a woman who not just veiled or humar a longer veil. 530 00:56:20,670 --> 00:56:24,930 How could she be the first lady of our country? It's so regressive. Right. 531 00:56:24,930 --> 00:56:29,970 That kind of symbolic language still exists in Egypt. And there, again, 532 00:56:29,970 --> 00:56:40,170 are very long institutional reasons and historical reasons why controlling the body politic politics on the bodies of women's continues. 533 00:56:40,170 --> 00:56:50,340 The authoritarian nature of this is very gendered. Mubarak would not have gone into the streets and said, those women into your square. 534 00:56:50,340 --> 00:56:55,620 Those are the ones fighting for your rights. Those of the daughters of the nations, the ones sleeping in the streets. 535 00:56:55,620 --> 00:56:59,610 We have to remember there were virginity tests on these protesters. Right. 536 00:56:59,610 --> 00:57:05,310 Some of the first images we saw of protests were women coming face to face with the security apparatus. 537 00:57:05,310 --> 00:57:07,740 And what happened to them? They were stripped of their clothing. Right. 538 00:57:07,740 --> 00:57:13,110 It's a very gendered nature to the to the revolution, to the state's response to the revolution. 539 00:57:13,110 --> 00:57:15,300 And so all of this has to be taken together. 540 00:57:15,300 --> 00:57:21,750 And we can't take one aspect of this aerial on what these so-called Islamists would do to the state without 541 00:57:21,750 --> 00:57:29,880 looking at Egypt's very long history of authoritarianism being inserted in enshrined on the bodies of women. 542 00:57:29,880 --> 00:57:34,860 Thank you very much, Dalia. And I'm sorry to say that we've really run out of time at this point. 543 00:57:34,860 --> 00:57:39,780 And I feel that you've not had the opportunity to say very much to the chair. 544 00:57:39,780 --> 00:57:43,560 I would like to give you maybe a minute. I'd like to say anything but otherwise. 545 00:57:43,560 --> 00:57:49,770 And at this point, going to wrap up. So would you like to add anything or a reflection, Pops? 546 00:57:49,770 --> 00:57:58,170 I don't really have any specific concluding remarks as such. I mean, I know you and I are really speaking in one voice here at all. 547 00:57:58,170 --> 00:58:02,940 I don't really feel like there's anything more that I need to add at this point. 548 00:58:02,940 --> 00:58:10,110 That's perfectly OK. And of course, in some respects, you did speak in one voice because you, quote, edited a work. 549 00:58:10,110 --> 00:58:15,180 And that's the work we're talking about in some respects. So I'd like to thank everyone who's attended. 550 00:58:15,180 --> 00:58:20,550 I do apologise that we didn't get to all the questions, but these are short and sweet sessions, hopefully. 551 00:58:20,550 --> 00:58:28,020 And I'd like to thank Walter for really managing questions very well and giving plenty of opportunity to those who had ask questions. 552 00:58:28,020 --> 00:58:33,510 But finally, I'd really like to thank both Dalia and done it for really giving us some food for thought. 553 00:58:33,510 --> 00:58:39,390 With respect to thinking about the place of liberalism in Egypt and the way in which an 554 00:58:39,390 --> 00:58:43,710 ideology that ostensibly is about promoting democracy is very often used to subvert democracy, 555 00:58:43,710 --> 00:58:47,490 unfortunately, in these very unusual contexts. 556 00:58:47,490 --> 00:58:53,850 And to echo Walter's remarks, in a sense, it's not liberal liberalism, but it's a kind of failed liberalism. 557 00:58:53,850 --> 00:59:01,420 But we can also sort of reflect on critiques of liberalism that you treat in your introduction to the work that showed that. 558 00:59:01,420 --> 00:59:08,020 Liberalism is such a vast tradition and quite a capacious tradition that it has traditions of colonialism 559 00:59:08,020 --> 00:59:13,420 and recognising that they misused simply as the place is a part is about the liberal tradition as well. 560 00:59:13,420 --> 00:59:15,880 So it's it's a complex history. 561 00:59:15,880 --> 00:59:25,540 And I hope that those of you who are attending and I certainly learnt more about this tradition as it plays to the Egyptian context. 562 00:59:25,540 --> 00:59:30,280 And with that, I'd like to thank you all again. I could make one one comment. 563 00:59:30,280 --> 00:59:37,570 I just I wanted to say I very much hope that Dr. Swamy himself either is in attendance or that he ultimately 564 00:59:37,570 --> 00:59:44,470 does have the opportunity to watch this free presentation and would be extremely honoured to hear his thoughts. 565 00:59:44,470 --> 00:59:51,730 I will try to convey that to to Dr. Aswani, who I do not know personally, but I will do what I can to do that. 566 00:59:51,730 --> 00:59:58,360 Thank you again. And where we at the Middle East. And to look forward to welcoming you again next week to another session. 567 00:59:58,360 --> 01:00:05,830 It's actually a one that I will again be running. So literally I will be looking forward to welcoming you on the Gulf specifically. 568 01:00:05,830 --> 01:00:09,400 And we're having an amazing scholar and an amazing journalist. 569 01:00:09,400 --> 01:00:15,010 The Middle East bureau chief of The New York Times, Ben Hubbard, alongside Mordovia Rashid, 570 01:00:15,010 --> 01:00:18,670 who is an extremely prolific author on Saudi Arabia, on the Middle East, more generally. 571 01:00:18,670 --> 01:00:23,050 So please do join us next week. And until then, have a good weekend. 572 01:00:23,050 --> 01:00:27,550 Take care. Bye bye. Thank you all very much for having us. 573 01:00:27,550 --> 01:00:28,891 Thank you.