Welcome everyone. My name is Michael Willis, I'm the director of the Middle East Centre here at St. Anthony's College at the University of Oxford,
and it gives me great pleasure to welcome you to the Middle East Centre webinar series.
This is a new series of events that will be running occasionally to address
significant issues that have arisen recently in the Middle East and North Africa.
Now, the main purpose of these seminars is to provide a platform for experts on these
issues to discuss and explain what is happening in the region on a particular issue,
and to help put developments in some wider context.
Our first webinar of the year focuses on Tunisia and looks at events that have occurred in the country over the last four months,
particularly since July. The. That was when President CageSide Sayeed announced he was dismissing the government's suspending
the national parliament and lifting the immunity from prosecution for members of Parliament.
Now, this move was welcomed by many in Tunisia as a much needed shake up of the system, but have become corrupt and inefficient,
in which it's signally failed to deal with both the COVID pandemic and Tunisia's deep economic problems.
On the other hand, there were others in Tunisia who saw the move as a dangerous power grab by the president that threatened to uproot the democratic
system that had been put in place in the aftermath of the popular uprising against President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011,
and thus in this way, possibly heralding the end of the one democracy that had been put in place as
a result of the uprisings of what became known as the Arab Spring that year.
Now, barely four months on, this debate continues.
And to help explain and understand what has happened, we have invited two of the most prominent commentators on an analysts,
the Tunisian political affairs, to discuss this issue. Our first speaker will be Yusuf Sharif.
Yusuf is a Tunis based political analyst and runs the Columbia Global Centres in Tunis,
the North and West African Research Centre at Columbia University in the States.
He is a member of Carnegie Civic Activism Network and has worked with a number of leading research centres and think tanks,
producing papers and commenting in the media. You regularly see yourself commenting across media in English, French and Arabic.
Yusuf Assaults of the editor of the book The Modern Arab State A Decade of uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa,
which came out just this year. Second speakers Dr and Wolff, who is a fellow at All Souls College here at the University of Oxford.
She is the author of a 2017 book Political Islam in Tunisia The History of Anata, which won the Choice Outstanding Academic Title,
and she's well on my way to a second book based on her PhD thesis, which is entitled Ben Ali's Tunisia Power and Invention in an Authoritarian Regime.
She is forthcoming with Oxford University Press, and so the title we're going to ask and put to both Youssef and Anne is the
political crisis the end of democracy now before I hand over to our speakers.
I just want to say that both speakers will be speaking for about half an hour in total.
We then will be turning over to questions and discussion. And if you would like to put a question to our speakers, you are very welcome to do so.
If you're see on the Q and a question and answer function on Zoom, if you click the back,
you can enter your question in the box there and then we will go through back and pick out questions and hopefully you'll get your questions.
Asked if we have time in in the session? You're welcome to put your name down or if you're also very welcome to remain anonymous.
Either way is fine by us, so to please put any questions you have to our speakers and we will discuss it in the second half of the webinar.
So therefore I'm delighted to turn over to our first speaker, Youssef Sharif Youssef.
Thank you very much, Michael. Hi, everyone. So I will start with a brief introduction.
Go through this socio economic and political roots of the current crisis,
expand on the situation of Tunisia today and with the international dimension of this crisis.
So to start with, I would say that a decade of democratic transition left Tunisians unhappy about their country's economic and bureaucratic decline,
or how it affects how many people perceive the last decade. They are extremely sceptical of the political and economic elites of the country,
and vocal about what I mean by vocal about it is that thanks to the freedoms gained in the last decade,
Tunisians are allowed to express themselves openly and in the public sphere.
So whatever problems there were and there are many of them, they were amplified and debated by everyone.
This doesn't mean that we should neglect the nature of the problems or the structured nature of the.
So views that Tunisia's economic situation has deteriorated in the last 10 years, this has affected most citizens.
The pandemic only worsen the issues. And in summer 2021, just two months ago, a particularly violent, committed way to Tunisia,
leaving thousands sick and that this is the background of President I.
It's July 25th sauerkraut. And here is a short summary of where Tunisia is today.
The president has monopolised most powers. Parliament is suspended and so are important articles of the Constitution.
A number of dubious arrests took place and military units have become more active against civilians.
The president happens to be the country's most popular politician and political entity.
In fact, some think that he's more popular than all other politicians and political parties put together.
So again, here at this news is important because with all of this happening,
one has to recognise that he is extremely popular and that when he says that he has the popular legitimacy he's not really like.
Tunisia is under pressure by its traditional partners USA, the UK, the EU,
most G7 countries, and it is frequently urged to return to the democratic US presidents.
However, he seems to have a better reputation amongst the Saudis, the Emirates,
but not necessarily strong supporters, and that will come back to this.
The Algerians, the French and the Italians are also more willing to listen to various views, but also without fully backing him.
Neither. And most importantly, the country's economic problems have ended on July 23, 2021.
Now, day after day, idealism is being slowly replaced by reality.
The president, who has all the powers, needs to deliver,
but he's facing a pile of issues and from what we can see, discontent is mounting in the streets.
Now I can go maybe later in the Q&A and see some figures that explain the economic problems that the country is going through.
And it's actually, if you take a graph between 2010 and 2021, you see very clear decline on all aspects.
So that actually explains why many, so many people feel unhappy about the last days of their economic situation really went down.
And because of, again, of the freedoms of expression they gained,
they can complain about it to each other and see actually the mess in which they are.
And therefore all Tunisians are aware of the big economic problems that the country is going through.
And of course, the first ones to blame are the rulers, the elite political elite, the economic elite.
And again, this is what happened. There is also a feeling amongst the population that corruption is endemic and that corruption is spreading.
This is, of course, this was the case before 2011, but it continued, and most Tunisians have the perception at least.
I don't know if that's true, but at least the perception is that corruption became much more widespread after the revolution after 2011 than before.
So consequently, we see a large section of the population for whom democracy is synonymous with state collapse and by democracy.
I mean the constant problem in political parties, political debates, constitution, etc.
So think of the Tunisian constitution that especially in the West,
people praised as one of the most advanced constitutions in the region or even in the world.
And so many conferences and so many stories were made about this constitution and so many articles, both academic and journalistic.
Then you go and ask Tunisians and they would tell you, No, no, no, no. This constitution is nonsense.
This constitution is useless, and they will tell you about corruption, etc. Again, here I am talking not about all Tunisians,
but a majority of Tunisians, and definitely not the supporters of another or of the few political parties, but a majority of Tunisian school.
Today we see them supporting both sides. So these are actually the citizens who celebrated the president's power grab
and who tell you that whatever happens now and whatever happens in the future,
it can't be worse than where the country was three months ago.
They will tell you that I'm not sure they will say the same thing in three or six months from now.
Now, moving from the economic and social situation to the political situation today, we see all of them are related, obviously.
Today we see the army encircling the parliament and we see the president ruling by decrees.
So we are tempted to describe the situation in black and white democracy versus authoritarians.
But this is misleading because political parties in Tunisia represent only a few handfuls of protests,
even enough number that was seen as so powerful and so influential.
It proved actually very weak. When you look on July 25th, when you know when the power grab happened,
we haven't seen what we saw in Turkey, for instance, during the failed coup against Erdogan.
We haven't seen and now partisans in the streets calling for a return of the parliament and so on.
We haven't seen another party since predicting another. So even if not approved, actually a much weaker political party than most observers thought,
and the parliament is actually home to many employees who are completely disconnected from their constituencies.
The governments that ruled Tunisia in the last decade were mostly the result
of informal negotiations that had little to do with the elections results.
So just take the example of the last Prime Minister Masisi. He disappeared for a few days after July 25th.
And as far as I know, no one really knew. For him there were no demonstrations calling for his return.
No, not even a Facebook campaign asking for him to reappear.
So the political parties and the economy interest groups that have controlled Tunisian politics during the last decade,
they ignored the fact that election after election year after year,
the number of voters decreased and the number of those polled and claiming that they feel underrepresented by the political class continued to grow.
And this is a reminder that the country was actually facing a major crisis of legitimacy political legitimacy on July 25th,
when the president decided to act now. Does it mean that the president has more legitimacy than those?
Not necessarily. The president is extremely popular today, but that's because the ruling clique, he is widely hated.
And also because Tunisia was suffering from the COVID pandemic this summer,
as I mentioned earlier, until the vaccines came by the end of July and in August.
So in the perception of many Tunisian side, you see presidents seen as the one who brought the vaccines and who saved lives.
But I think once the euphoria is over, once the economic realities of the country come to the fore,
the president himself will have to confront the fact that he like it was,
he dismissed, doesn't have any real constituency and that his legitimacy may vanish in a matter of days.
So now going to Tunisia today to legitimise his move,
president side uses the populist narrative of speaking in the name of the people and acting for the people.
And as I said, he's very so.
In the last few months, there were a number of actions that were taken with the umbrella of being taken in the name of the people.
So a lot of dormant corruption cases were reported.
Several MPC politicians and businessmen face trial or are in jail, and actually many of these trials were shelved or postponed.
In the last decade, because of political settlements and for a few weeks after his power grab.
Then were travel bans imposed on many politicians and businessmen without further explanation, so it was somewhat arbitrary.
But by the way, they were released, assistance for any criticism is fame in the country by the president and his supporters.
So this is the atmosphere actually also recent.
Just recently, there is a group called Tunisians against the coup.
They wanted to set up a press conference and then they were told that they cannot hold press conference.
These days, there is a garbage crisis in something Tunisia and its facts around facts.
And the response of the president was to send in the police, which used teargas.
Actually, this was the first tests of face to face an angry mob.
And he reacted just like his predecessors.
So there are a lot of troubles happening now in the country, and demonstrations are expected to continue and increase over time.
Whether side will continue to refuse dialogue and use the police extend our conversations.
We still don't know. Now on on a slightly more positive note,
we see that there is a civilian government that was just appointed not at security government
and not then not a government that responds to political whims of this or that group.
We see also that there are no attacks in the country. I mean, again, compare with Egypt in 2013.
You can compare it on barely no immediate or very serious threat to the freedom of expression.
You know, for instance, the day after the power up and jazeera offices were raided,
but Al Jazeera journalists are free to operate and broadcast live from Tunisia.
The group Tunisians against the Coup were not able to state their press conference in the hall.
They were able to do it in the streets,
and they actually got more publicity because they were in the street and cameras were filming and it was on Facebook and so on.
There are regular and outside demonstrations organised in the country,
and the usually the main labour union has resumed its strikes and demonstrations without being harassed.
So to answer the title of this webinar, I would say that democracy hasn't ended yet in Tunisia,
and I will just finish with the international dimension, I think.
I only have maybe two minutes left. We can discuss this later, maybe the Q&A.
So I would say that while no Western government consolidates power, grab coup or impose sanctions,
we see that Tunisia is under pressure to revert back to its democratic past.
As I say as the EU, especially Germany, the IMF and World Bank,
and all and most of the G7 countries are kind of worried about where Tunisia is going and they are exerting pressure on the
country and society is actually the president and his supporters are very easily offended by the criticism coming from abroad.
But again, another another nuance here. He's very careful not to predict Tunisia's ties with these foreign partners.
So we haven't seen any ambassador being withdrawn nor ambassador, nor embassies closed and no projects were cancelled.
Negotiations with the IMF continue. The appointed government is rather cosmopolitan.
I mean, the ministers are rather cosmopolitan. We don't see radical nationalists or radical revolutionaries, or I mean, maybe some of them are,
but the majority of them are more cosmopolitan figures who lived abroad, worked with international organisations and so on.
So this is this is one part. These are the angry ones now, the ones who are not very unhappy.
We see that the Saudis, the Emiratis, the Egyptians keep praising president on their outlets.
They send secretary laudatory invoice to Tunisia in the days following the power grab.
And they have also sent important COVID aid and vaccines in July and August.
And they actually through that. They contributed in modelling the image of the saviour that the president enjoys today.
The Algerians, the French and the Italians seem to also give side effects, they barely issue any criticism.
Whether another nuance here, three months after four months after the power grab,
we haven't seen any one of these countries offering Tunisia and the billions it actually the billions of dollars it needs to pass the winter.
Their support is so far moral and not physical, I can say, which means that actually outside is not their guy.
He's his own guy, a very stubborn nationalist leader with a very idealist mindset who is hard to go.
This leaves Tunisia in some no man's land, neither east nor west, but desperately in need of support.
It's neither a democracy nor an authoritarian regime, but it's somewhere in Graystone.
Until when can this last? This is an open question.
Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
You set for a remarkably clear and concise treatment of what has happened over the last four months.
And thank you particularly for adding more nuance. As you indicated,
a lot of the coverage and discussion has fallen very clearly into one of two rather
polarised positions seeing it as something very good or something very damaging,
and it's very good to hear it. Actually, it's a much more makes them much more nuanced picture.
So thank you very much. Now turn to and pose the same question to you.
Is it the end of end of democracy in Tunisia and. Thank you very much, Michael.
I'm afraid I'm a little bit more in the more damaging camp, so a little bit more critical than yourself, and I will explain in a minute why.
Just going to start the presentation.
So I'm going to focus my talk on Karzai at his rise and political project and and specific, I'm going to focus on three main points.
The first is Karzai, its background and rise to power. Second, his political vision and strategies of power consolidation.
And lastly, the challenges he faces and possible future scenarios.
But first, I would like to start with a few quotes of him, and I'm not going to discuss them in much detail,
but just wanted to put them out as I do think they can be quite well his political ambitions and ideas.
First in April, so even before what I would refer to as the cool Karzai had claimed, I'm the commander of the security forces, not just of the army.
However, according to the Constitution,
he is just a commander of the Army and the National Guard and the police under the command of the prime minister.
But Karzai not accept this division of power.
Then in June, so again, before the coup, he talked about his plan to change the Constitution and to install a presidential system.
And he stated that they are those who will adhere to the new political system as well.
Those who would persist in the fallacious methods be sure that they would end up in the dustbin of history.
In his 25 July statement, when he announced yet taking over power and suspend parliament,
the government he threatened if anyone fires a single bullet against the security forces there will respond by a rain of bullets.
And a month later, he declared that the exceptional measures would be extended until the new order.
And I said, of course, being the one deciding what the new order is and when it will be achieved.
And I personally don't think there's anyone, anyone much ambiguity about Kasowitz intentions,
namely that he wants to rule alone and that he doesn't accept any opposition to his rule.
Indeed, he even threatens to use force against any challenges.
And I would just like to briefly revisit Kasai, its 2009 electoral campaign, so this slide.
The picture you see is from 2019.
And my main point here is that he never really hit his intentions to instigate deep changes to Tunisia's political institutions.
And just a little bit of background for those of you who are not very familiar with Tunisian politics in 2019,
OK, say it basically appeared out of nowhere.
He's a professor in constitutional law and ran a grassroots campaign back then with almost no advertisement and no party apparatus behind him.
His key message were youth empowerment, the fight against corruption and socioeconomic redistribution.
And he portrayed himself as the president of the people of the disenfranchised and to marginalised, especially young Tunisians.
And the fact that he wasn't a part of the political establishment and hardly spent
any money at all on campaigning was seen as evidence that he's trustworthy,
clean and honest, very different from how the political elite at that time was seen by the people.
And the main controversies back then were really about his conservative positions on a number of issues, such as women's rights.
He spoke out against equality in inheritance, homosexuality, which he wanted to criminalise, as well as his support of the death penalty.
But interestingly, in his positions on Tunisia's political system did not draw as much attention back then at all,
and this was despite the fact that he openly said that he would like to change the Constitution,
introduce a political system and change the electoral laws.
However, these ideas were back then commonly portrayed in a way as yet the idealist, the utopian beliefs of a professor.
And I think this image today very much prevails amongst some sectors in Tunisia.
And I did find the testimony of one of his former students in 2019,
which you can see on the bottom right corner of the slide, I found it actually very interesting.
The student described cageside in 2019 as a man haunted by an idea who has some
reservations about representative democracy as it is practised and experienced in Tunisia.
And I did find the adjective haunted very powerfully,
because it does convey the extent to which political change has been sent to him for a very long time.
It's almost as if the student wants to tell us he has been obsessed by it.
And really, what has characterised Tisci ever since you took power was his complete unwillingness to compromise on his political vision.
Indeed,
an unwillingness to engage with any other political tendencies on anything at all or to even engage with them in any meaningful or constructive way.
And I think what we saw on the 25th of July when he suspended Parliament of Parliament and the government is
in a way the culmination of this tendency of no compromise and engagement with other political tendencies.
So now, fast forward, desired since twenty 25 of July.
On the top left, you see him surrounded by top security officers as he announced that he has suspended Parliament of the government on the top right.
You can see him during a speech to the public while holds up some posters featuring scenes of disturbance and quarrels in parliament,
and he uses that to show to what extent in peace and instigators of violence,
according to him,
and basically to justify him shutting parliament down and referring to it as useless and not representative of the people on the bottom left.
You can see through side protesters and the picture on the bottom right I find particularly interesting.
You can see Karzai at behind and with the new Prime Minister Natalegawa then
and I find a symbolism of this picture actually very powerful and interesting.
Say it behind his beautiful desk, looking very much presidential like and the prime minister sitting in front of him,
looking up on a simple chair almost as if he was a student looking at a professor pool waiting for instructions and guidance.
And I do think that reflects the dynamics between the two of them very well.
As Joseph mentioned, parricide remains extremely popular with the people this power grab was initially when called by many political actors.
Indeed, according to the latest polls, which I just checked before.
About 80 percent of the people are still satisfied with him today, and that's really, really massive and important.
This is also due to what can be referred to as populist strategy of power consolidation.
I say it portrays him, says of the leader of Tunisia's revolution.
He says that the previous political leaders hijacked the revolution, and he wants to finally do justice to people's revolutionary demands.
He denounces political parties as that corrupt, and he barges to introduce an element of local democracy that gives power back to the people.
Supposedly, of course, I don't think what we're seeing here right now is really going into the democratic direction.
I say it really positions themselves as the spokesman of the people,
the only one who knows what the people want and the way he thinks he is, the one who can read and realise people's demands.
So when people ask him what is political project is he commonly replies,
I want what the people want if he's being asked a follow up question, what do the people want?
He says that people know what they want. So not very useful.
He also plays on people's nationalist sentiments and commonly denounces foreign interference, as Joseph has mentioned his words.
And of course, this nationalism or revolution of populism are common strategies of domination amongst wannabe dictators or strongmen,
especially those who take power at wider political and economic crisis and promise to correct past wrongs.
So it's really not that exceptional in this respect. And I think I say it also implies another common strategy of power consolidation,
which is the instigation of confusion and general vagueness about what comes next.
Some people often say that, you know, he can say it might not know him, said what he wants and what's next.
But I think he has shown very clearly over the past weeks, months and even years that he knows what he wants.
He has always envisioned a strong presidency, and he should not be underestimated because of that.
And he's deliberately instigating, to some extent, a confusion about his project, because if by some time and when people are confused,
they are also not organising as forcefully against him because they still have hope that something positive will come out of this crisis.
And even now is facing increasing opposition from the political class and from some civil society groups,
many key actors are still waiting for something to happen. They are hoping that this will end in the way they they want.
But say has been using this time to place many of his allies in strategic positions to pursue structural changes,
nominating a prime minister and a government that he largely controls, as well as imprisoning some opposition figures.
So the question is really what is this plan? What kind of regime does you want and what kind of regime is she trying to construct?
And obviously, it's too early to be sure in the next weeks and months will be pivotal in that respect,
but I do think he has some kind of what we call hybrid or competitive authoritarian regime in mind.
So an autocratic system that retains some democratic features, but that does not pose any real challenge to the leader, so to himself.
So this could, for example, consist of introducing some kind of local democratic elections, even presidential elections,
which you would obviously be certain to win at this stage given the massive popular support he has.
The real question really is with Karzai, it succeeds in his project.
And I've heard a lot of comparisons between Egypt and Tunisia over the past weeks and months,
and there are some obvious parallels in the sense that in both countries,
the coups that happened after the Arab uprising had the backing of the army and of the range of anti-democratic and anti Islamist forces.
But I also do things like Youssef also mentioned that the comparison in many ways is limited.
The main political actors in Tunisia and Egypt very different.
The power balance is different, and the main political stakeholders are very distinct.
However, I do think that the comparison between cageside and Benali when Benali took power is quite insightful,
as it can reveal some of the main challenges that lie ahead for science.
Just some background here in 1987, but Ali also conducted what back then was similarly termed a constitutional coup that was supported by the army.
And Ben Ali back then was also a relative political newcomer, and he took power during a time of wider political and economic crises.
So though obviously not as accurate as it was in Tunisia the summer.
And similar to Sayid, Ben Ali employed a rhetoric of wanting to correct past political and economic wrongs,
and the main difference between the two of them was really that I say it obviously is very popular and Ben Ali has a military background,
which is very significant. However, how did Ben Ali consolidate power?
What did he do? He employed a very different approach, he got that a very broad support coalition that included all the main political actors,
the utility workers union, the ruling party's secular opposition parties, even representative of the Islamist movement.
So Ben Ali decided to reach out to all of them.
And once he had accumulated enough power the space of two years, he began to slowly crack down on his main challenges.
And from a competitive research and also in politics with politics,
we know that such broad coalitions are most conducive to power consolidation of strongman or wannabe dictators.
However, I say it is very different in that respect. I say it is vilifying indeed slandering all major political parties, national organisations,
calling them, for example, drunken and denouncing the corrupt and liars.
Even those that initially supported him. And as a result is becoming increasingly political, isolated.
And this will be a major challenge, especially in the medium and long term.
I'm not aware of any main political party or national organisations still supporting them,
and I say it will not be able to approach this popular support base forever in part of this political isolation.
Also, he's acknowledges himself that he's not good with numbers and economy.
He does not have a magic solution to solve Tunisia's economic problems.
And if anything, the current political crisis will just make him much worse.
And this, in turn, does make his political future very much dependent on the support he receives from the army.
And to conclude, I would like to outline three main scenarios for the future.
The most optimistic one and the one I believe of hope will happen is that domestic and international pressure
will increase and gradually force Kasia to come to agree to some kind of roadmap with all key political actors.
And so a solution to the crisis would be found. However, I have to say that at this point in time, he has categorically refused such a path.
The second one is that he will consolidate more and more power,
and we will see more and more restrictions on political freedoms, especially as his popularity will gradually fade.
Basically, he will join the ranks of populist dictators around the world.
And judging from the picture on the slide, which has been circulating on social media, that's what some Tunisians seem to believe is happening.
And in a third scenario, the army takes over.
This could happen, for example, of major violence erupts between its supporters and the opposition, or simply the economic crisis will worse.
And so we see many more instances of social unrest and demonstrations as is happening and sparks quite something at the moment.
So officers might decide to step in in this scenario, even if just for a transitional period.
So as you can see, a little bit more bleak, my presentation and my talk compared to Yousef's and I will leave it here for now.
But I look very much forward to discussing with all of you during the Q&A.
Thank you very much indeed. And they say it has been a bit of a mystery figure,
I think even since he was elected and you've gone some way to trying to demystify who he is and what he's about, so thank you very much.
We now move on to looking questions and answers, and I encourage you again to use the questionable assumption if you want to
pose a question to real speakers or a more general question to both speakers.
So I do encourage you to do that. So that's in the Q&A. You just click on the Q&A function.
You can then type in your question.
I would like to begin with a question I have about speakers, and it comes back to something that was a quote from an ice site, said.
And he said he seems to have reservations about representative democracy as it's practised in Tunisia.
Now it seems to me that this reservation is substantially shared with a large part of the Tunisian population.
They both have reservations about representative democracy as it's practised in Tunisia.
And my question is really to focus on that last emphasis.
Is it a reservation about representative democracy in the way it's being practised and introduced in Tunisia over the last 10 years?
Or is it actually a more profound reservation they share about representative democracy as a way of running Tunisia?
In other words, it's not just the way it's been done, it's just the general principle.
And if so, what sort of ways out of the sky site has a view of what?
What could replace this more traditional form of representative democracy?
So perhaps go first to use upon that use it. So the issue here is that no one is actually giving an alternate.
Yes, he has reservations. Many people have reservations, but then ask them, Why do you suggest?
What you hear usually is, oh, we need the presidential system,
because that's how Tunisia was ruled for most of its post-colonial era, and many consider that it works.
But then is there something like a very clear guidebook on where we're going and how we should go there?
No. Even President Fireteam himself, it doesn't.
If you look for his programme during the elections, you have some speeches, but you don't have something concrete.
So the plan that many people are talking about today doesn't exist.
It's being put in place now, probably by some groups around him, but it's not there yet.
While the parliamentary or semi parliamentary system that we had is something that a lot of experts sat together and put in place.
And yeah, and so that's how how it was created.
So it's not something that was imposed. Like many people who are critical of the period before the United States.
So my my fear here, when we when many Tunisians say that they want another political system.
My fear is that one there is nothing clear concrete. So the thing that they're heading to that the country is headed to is when and
describe something of the more maybe hybrid democracy or hybrid authoritarian system,
but actually something that is less democratic than where we were.
And as we know from many examples in the world, you can take any dictatorship, call it a democracy and move on.
But actually, it's a dictatorship.
I mean, China or North Korea or even Russia, they call themselves democracy, and they I mean the concept of sovereign democracy in Russia.
So we have something similar in Tunisia and then present it as a democracy.
That's that's a risk. And I mean, I agree with many points that the state but for other reasons that are.
I mean, the balance of power in the country. I still think that we're not going there yet.
And I still think that four months after the power grab, we don't have an eternity.
And so I mean, there needs to be a solution, and I think the solution needs to be negotiated.
Thank you, Yousef. And yeah, if I could just jump in.
I think one of the key problems here is really that we have seen over the past six years, really only I remember in 2013,
I think it really started in Tunisia that I was struck by the growing scepticism against political parties,
by the people and scepticism that has been amplified on media by the media that has been focussing on the quarrels between the politicians.
So, so so the concept of political parties as mediator of the will of the people has become.
It's become an extremely question and say it has really been feeding into this to the scepticism,
an almost like hatred of political parties and politicians who are increasingly associated with with just their own interest.
And already in 2013 14, I remember people talking and they wish that the army would take over, which back then,
you know, well, a lot of people in Western universities were still celebrating the Tunisian experiment.
So this really very much clashed with the perception of the Tunisian model that we were celebrating here.
There's growing scepticism of the of the political system that we have in Tunisia and calls for an alternative.
Increasing talk about just about a third way, something in between the political system that we are having and a strong dictator.
And that, again, I think society is exploiting by trying to introduce some kind of hybrid or competitive authoritarian system.
Thank you very much. Move now to the questions that are coming in on the Q&A.
Bob, thank you very much for taking your questions.
We've got a lot of very distinguished and knowledgeable people on North Africa who follow us and follow Tunisia very well.
So delighted to have them join us.
And the first of those is Habib Saleh, who is, many of you will know has been writing on North Africa in the British national press for many years.
Welcome Hebert, and thank you very much for joining us.
And Heather's question is, was the situation before July the 25th in Tunisia sustainable and did it have the ability to self-correct?
And I think happened?
If want to rephrase that, this question is saying, really, was it unavoidable, but something had to happen to the crisis that come to power?
Or was it or did Teesside's intervention actually really interfere in something that we could have actually self-directed again, go faster?
You say first, this is an easy and difficult question.
And actually, I look back at some articles I wrote or some comments I made before July 25th.
At some point I would say, Well, this is not a sustainable situation, and we'll explore that at some point.
They say, Well, this is how democracy works and this status quo, will we stay forever?
But what is sure is that there was a crisis before July 25th.
Everyone was unhappy. I mean, the president would decide something.
The prime minister would decide something against it. The parliament would vote, would vote something and the president would say no.
So there was a blue cash and right. And now a lot of people in each side put their responsibility on the other and there was a blue card.
So I think I think something needed to happen, but something more.
Any elections rather than this.
But this is what what happened and I think what happened is actually the pessimistic scenario and not the natural scenario, which was an election.
And. Yeah, I agree with Yusef that obviously the there was a major crisis which wasn't just about the health crisis,
the economic crisis, that was the political crisis between the president, the prime minister and the head of parliament.
On top of that, there was another major crisis which we haven't actually talked about yet,
which was a crisis within the largest political party in Tunisia within and after,
which has to some extent has served as a counterbalance or as the balancing force.
Ever since the Tunisian uprisings and after has always been there.
All other parties have a lot of parties been created, a lot of them a collapse, but not on a win in a way was a stabilising factor.
And this wasn't so much the case anymore this summer for a variety of reasons.
One of them is that the head of another country took the leadership of the parliament, but he's a very controversial figure.
And one of the most or the most distrusted person in Tunisia. So he amplified political crisis.
At the same time, the crisis was also internal with an investor because she was trying to accumulate more power within the party,
didn't want to see the leadership of the party, even though the party charter told him to do so.
So as a result, actor was gradually imploding from the inside.
A lot of statements criticism between rival factions to an extent actor is never seen before in and the entire history it was,
or it is still the biggest crisis and not has ever seen the one force that has,
in a way, stabilised political transformation in Tunisia in the past decade,
even though it has been very much criticised and sometimes rightfully, sometimes not rightfully.
And I think the crisis of Tunisia today is to some extent also reflective of the crisis within another.
Thank you very much. And thank you for saying something about NADA again, you haven't been referred to much in your original presentations,
and they're obviously a crucial part of this jigsaw and that helps explain things very nicely.
Next question we get to somebody else who follows a nose, Tunisia, very well done, is this in line?
Welcome, Danny. Very nice to have you join us. And Danny's question is about the army.
How influential powerful is the Tunisian army today? Unlike Egypt, the army in Tunisia was always marginal to political life.
And indeed,
that was one of the explanations for why the revolution succeeded in Tunisia often stayed and could be army really be able interested to intervene?
And you referred to the army, perhaps go to you first to mention about whether we will see the army introduced,
which is really not played a political role for post-independence history and quite unremarkable in a quite a remarkable way.
Whether that might change, I think that's a really important question.
Indeed, one of the key questions right now, and I'm not sure I have one very obvious answer to this.
That would be very easy, but I don't. But just to put maybe the rule of the army or demystify a little bit,
I think it has the the degree of neutrality and apolitical position of the Tunisian army.
I do think it has been overstated. There's also been overstated that the army is very weak and other countries with an
army compared to the or as like a fourth army force comparable to the size of Tunisia.
Military coups have happened, so it's not the, you know, Tunisia's army is this week marginalised.
For us, that's the first point I want to make. And the other point is that I want to make is that this is how the army has been misportrayed.
Also during the Tunisian revolution, when the narrative circulated that the army defected from Ben Ali and in a way sided with the Tunisian people,
which is, it's been quoted dozens and dozens of times, but it's unfortunately not what happened.
What actually happened back then is that the army did not do anything because Ben Ali,
at least not until Ben Ali left because Ben Ali had never asked the army.
There were contacts and the officers asked him what to do.
So in a way, the army was following Ben Ali, but until the end, but basically following what he had asked him to do, which is not much at that time.
So where does that leave us? Basically, the army is a very disciplined organisation who like hierarchy.
Many of the officers were appointed by Ben Ali rolls through Ben Ali.
A lot of them are highly sceptical of Islamists, which everyone knows was already talked to.
Some of them. I think already in 2013, with the events in Egypt, some of them it is privately like the idea.
If I may say that, that something similar would happen in Tunisia, but so we don't know what's going to happen in the future.
I'm not saying the army. There's going to be certainly a military dictatorship. I think that would be way too far fetched.
But I do think they had a choice when I it invoked Article 80, which if you read the article, you can you can.
You just mean you don't need to be an expert of constitutional law.
The key is just need to be a simple person like we are.
Read the article and you can see it's not constitutional because the parliament is very clearly the parliament should be in session.
What army did they actually blocked people from entering the parliament?
So basically they decided to follow the orders of Tisci it, even though he was not working any minor legal frame.
And I do think by that, the political neutrality collapsed.
They agreed to follow orders of someone who did not operate any more within the constitutional frame.
So I don't think we can describe the army at this point as neutral or as they have clearly taking sides.
The question is just what they will do in the future. And this I cannot answer.
Thank you, use a few of you. No, I agree with on that.
The army is not that neutral in Tunisia like any country by the end of the day.
It's part of the political spectrum.
But one thing is that even when the parliament, it's one thing with the Tunisian army is that they rarely confront citizens.
So even on July 25th, they were sitting there.
It would tell people not to enter, but they would not shoot on people and for the future when the army is an option,
but also in a place like Tunisia, where police and the minister of Interior are actually very influential.
And for decades, they were the ones actually pulling the strings more than the army itself.
They are another important player then, that can want to take take up more war powers.
But I think one the army today is more powerful than where it was 10 years ago, and so it is actually perhaps as important.
It's a bit more important than here. So there is a balance of power there.
And also, I think if the army or the police, they don't see themselves as being able to control the whole country for a long period of time.
And so so far, I don't see them really moving in and taking power.
But as I've said, I mean, this is this is an open question.
Thank you. You said. This question is, again, dealing with significant actors outside of a formal political realm,
and it deals with this comes from an anonymous anonymously.
She's absolutely fine and it deals with the Yugi team, which is the main trade union federation.
As many of you know, Tunisia well. Tunisia has an extremely powerful trade union movement.
Probably the most powerful in the Arab world, but did play a significant role in the revolution.
And the question is, what do you think the role of the Bugti will be in the next weeks or months?
Both the already made some references. Did they have the ability to slow or even stop Kai side's ascension?
So on the road of the unity, and perhaps you'd like to go first on that?
Yes, sure. So maybe you should start by the position of the utility on what has happened at the beginning,
like many other organisations and political parties, is what actually is mean.
Maybe I should start by clarifying that not one utility, it's a massive organisation, obviously with many different factions.
And so the position right now, what I'm just referring to is the position, the official position, as discussed by the president.
So at the beginning,
the unity was very favourable and nobody was even trying to reach out on my side because what the utility wanted some kind of real
influence on taking a major role within this particular crisis and draughting some kind of movement on how to get out of it.
So they initially declared they supported him,
then they even themselves draughted a roadmap of how they envisioned to get out of the crisis in very detailed way,
similar to they envisioned a similar process that they had together with the quartette.
But even now, of course, they are not engaged with this.
So it's he's very in that sense, I think, not very strategic in the sense that he,
even though forces the political parties or national organisations that strongly spoke out in favour of him at the beginning.
He is not reacting to them and trying to integrate them any way in this political limbo that he actually created.
So. So what we're seeing now is the unity becoming more and more critical of him.
Many people speaking out calling this a coup and being afraid also that we will turn to the times like they were under Ben Ali.
I mean, no one actually really knows Case Sayyid, and that makes him extremely unpredictable.
And I think all the major national organisations and political parties are realising that they placed his hope in this idealistic,
utopian professor and still hoping that he's an idealist as opposed to a dictator.
But I think they're increasingly realising they're actually having to having to deal with an idealist dictator, which is not a contradiction in terms.
Thank you, Youssef. Yeah, actually, on the day,
I think the main reason why they supported ISIS on July 25th is because their grassroots are supportive of feeding their grassroots.
Many of them are very much opposed to another. Most of them work in the public sector.
So have I mean, they have in their system. And I still believe that what Tunisia needs is a strongman and not the parliament and so on and so on.
So the grassroots and also because of this very anti-imperialist narrative and discourse.
So he seduced them now. They had to follow that way.
I mean, the leadership rigidity. But slowly,
they started criticising him as weeks went by because actually the leadership they feel is aside doesn't necessarily want to deal with them.
As I said, I mean, he alienated almost everyone, and he doesn't.
He considers himself the embodiment of everything right and leanness, et cetera.
And he probably considers some either as corrupt.
So is it that they actually are the leadership opposite that they found itself
sidelined by him and possibly accused by him of all people around him of corruption?
So they are afraid of what will happen if he continues that they are afraid also that if he continues monopolising power,
they won't be able to negotiate with the government as they used to do before,
to get higher wages and better salaries and better conditions for their members who work in the public sector.
So they are worried about what will happen to them.
But now that they see that his popularity may be decreasing, not that much, but some people start questioning what he's doing.
You see that more and more you see more and more strikes organised by you.
It is very. Very small, but it's growing in number, and I think we we spoke about the army or the police,
but I think it is the other big player much more important than any political party and much more.
Mean it has actually a much more solid basis than any political party can do.
It's not political party.
So in the future, I think we will see a kind of we aims to use it more and more vocal against a side and the less popular the East,
the if they will speak up. And once the economic crisis that most people expect gets deeper,
I think that they will have a much important role to play in the country and to obliging him to negotiate
or or we will see some kind of like there between you and the president and whoever is around.
Thank you, use, if we have time for one more question, apologies to all of the wonderful questions.
Great question. It would be nice to extend this session. We have time for one more question.
One last question comes from one of the master's students here Middle East Centre Riley Sanborn.
And Riley's question is prior to the events of July, the expressly anti-democratic and authoritarian, nostalgic party historian Liberal.
The three the story historian party led the opinion polls in a hypothetical next election.
What does this say about the attitudes of the Tunisian public leading into the current crisis?
Does popular support for such a party, but was nostalgic about the past reflects growing anti revolutionary sentiments?
Or is this more a product of popular anti-elite attitudes?
And first? OK, a very long question.
So basically, if I understood correctly, it's about what the rise of of Morsi has to say about the current situation,
so that's probably not doing justice to the question. But yeah, I think um.
And whether or not it was anti-Russian, really sorry.
I might have missed the past, but I think I mean, the rise of I've been most to has in a way foreshadowed.
I mean, it's easy to say in retrospect,
but this has been foreshadowing shadowing this anti-regulatory movement that we're now witnessing, I think for a very long time.
I mean, Morsi has been embodying in a way.
Well, I try to unite the different factions until missionary factions, though not all of them would describe themselves as anti revolutionaries.
That's also important to note. So she is looking or she's trying to unite has long unite.
For example, members of the former ruling party of finale to our city, but also other forces, especially anti Islamist forces.
So, yeah, I mean, these are also the people who many of them are now backing.
Say it. So I think there's a little bit of a continuity in this respect.
And the question is now just what what is actually going to happen with Abdul Morsi and her party?
And I think it's quite interesting how she reacted. And Youssef can maybe tell us more about that, how how this is being played out on the ground.
But the way I've been seeing it is that actually at the beginning,
she took a long time to react because in a way that reflects many of the or reflects
many of the project that she has been striving to achieve herself in Tunisia.
So ideologically, they're very much close, but politically they are competitors.
So put on a very difficult situation because she could not now suddenly say she's not supporting her,
say it because she has been saying for a long time she would like that the Islamists disappear,
and she's been using a lot of extremely violent anti-Islamic rhetoric.
So what we saw after you took power on that, actually, she waited for a long time.
A lot of other political parties already published statements.
She waited, sometimes you need clearly, you needed some time to think about how to approach this very difficult political dilemma.
And then she spoke out in support of him, also expressing the hope that finally,
the Muslim Brotherhood, as she derogatorily calls Anata in that she means that derogatorily.
I'm not saying that I find it derogatory, but it also does not identify the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood.
So she in a way, try to celebrate it in a way against the Islamist establishment in Tunisia.
But now now fast forward a few months later, she, like many other people, are also speaking out.
Of course, say it because in the in the in the political future that society is trying to draw here.
There's also no room for a business. He and her fellowship is just room for cageside and the people and everyone else in between is disappearing.
And that poses a problem for all political parties, all tenancies, no matter how close the case.
And that leaves them increasingly isolated and vulnerable, as also outlined in my talk.
Thank you, Youssef.
So I think the main reason why a lot of people supported Morsi before July 25th and why many people support side is not because of their energy.
Is that Muslim or because they're anti democracy perspective, but because they came against another where many Tunisians,
at least if we take those who are supportive of the party dystonia and even class those who are supportive of my side,
we can call them a majority of Tunisians, and that represents the last 10 years represent the ruling power of the last things.
So in a way, I mean, I mentioned earlier the fact that, you know, that was criticised for right or wrong.
Many times a lot of fake news against another. But actually for the majority of Tunisians,
another is representative of those 10 years representative of the state collapse of the economic problems, corruption, et cetera.
And so whoever comes and goes another day would come with him or with her.
And this is actually what happened 10 years ago.
I mean, the reason why many people went out against Ben Ali and because people who are opposed to Ben,
he is because they simply represented something else and different from Ben.
So it would be wrong to describe this as pro-democracy after democracy revolution 82 pollution.
I mean, frankly, another, especially in recent years, and they had alliances with people who would represent the elite.
Of the Ben Ali regime and the people who are known to be corrupt,
then this tornado is not anymore more Revolutionary Party and not also that Islamist classical Islamist party.
But it became an opportunist party that, like all political parties, actually.
And so, as I say to me, for many people, it doesn't represent.
It does embody the last 10 years, the failures of the last 10 years, and then people went for a side and the party story.
And the reason may be why before July 25th is that people did not really see something like what happened in July 20.
So the only option they saw out of another was to go for elections and vote for something else.
And there's something else was the party this morning, Ali.
Now that side of this power grab and that democracy is on standby and that people don't know when the next elections will take place.
Many people who are supportive of party discipline are now supportive of sides.
But again, this is happening now. It's been four months, but in six months from now, I think we'll see a completely different picture.
And now that I is the one who's in charge of everything,
people will blame him for everything because I don't think the socioeconomic situation will improve in the upcoming months.
We will see people criticising him and opposing him in a few months from now, a few years from now,
but not so long the way they are now opposing another and the way they oppose Ben Ali, you.
Thank you, use it. Thank you. I'm afraid the clock is against this, which means we must draw the session to a close,
and I apologise again for all the people who post questions we weren't able to post and we would like to have gone through all of them.
But thank you very much for joining us and I want to thank all two speakers this evening.
And an I had found it a very confusing situation of what had happened since July.
And I feel even though I don't quite understand everything yet,
I feel a lot better equipped to try and understand what is happening in Tunisia and to see how things unfold from here.
So thank you very much to both of you. And thank you to all of you attending.
And I look forward to you joining us on another occasion. Thank you very much and have a very nice evening.
Thank you. Bye bye.