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Good evening, my name is Walter, and I'm a fellow Middle East Centre, and I'm going to be chairing tonight's seminar.

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The speaker this evening is Neil Critchley.

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He's an associate professor of politics in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies,

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and is fellow of St. Anthony's College and Middle East Centre as well.

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He's a political scientist of the Arabic speaking Middle East and North Africa,

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working at the intersections of political sociology and comparative politics.

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His book, Egypt at a Time of Revolution, which was published by Cambridge University Press in 2017,

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won the Charles Tilly Distinguished Contribution Scholarship Award.

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His current research interests include episodes of mass protests in the Middle East and North Africa,

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the rise of political Islam and interwar Egypt, and the changing profiles of regional political elites.

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Neil's book was about revolution that occurred a little over a decade ago,

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and today's lecture he's going to apply some of the methods he used and analysing contemporary politics to historical events,

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namely revolutions from above.

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Specifically, the 1952 Free Officer Uprising, which, as most of you probably know, some describe as a revolution and others as a coup.

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And of course, if it was the latter, then it was certainly remembered as a popular coup.

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Hence the blurring of the distinction between coup and revolution or the exercise of the hegemonic viewpoint,

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depending on the degree to which you see the free officers seising power as a litmus test of politics and historical sensibilities,

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you see in the abstract the talk, so I won't go through it in detail.

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Suffice to say that the free officers revolt or coup or revolution, whichever term you use, is conventionally understood as a watershed moment.

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In other words, an event that gets inscribed in memory and before and after terms.

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But Neil's paper instead conjures with both change and continuity in assessing this important event.

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The title of his lecture is the fate of colonial elites in post-colonial regimes.

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Evidence from the 1952 Egyptian Revolution. For those of you who may not have attended these online events before.

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If you have questions, use the Q&A button in Zoom to ask your questions.

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If you want to remain anonymous, say so in the questions you ask.

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Otherwise, I will read out your name. If I ask a question and so with no further ado, I will turn things over to Neil Critchley.

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Take it away, Neil. Great, thanks very much, and thanks to everyone who's children.

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I just want to the participant list and I can see lots of friends and students. It's really lovely that you have.

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Thank you. So without repeating what I said too much, this is sort of an ongoing project.

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My co-author is a Ph.D. student at UCLA who's also here, I think might field some of the more difficult questions during the Q&A.

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It's actually part of a broader project that's still kind of unfolding, if you will,

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where we look at the kind of causes and the consequences of 1952 where we use the case,

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because what secretly were substantially interested in what happens in Egypt,

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but we also think it's a case that can speak to kind of broader questions and debates the kind

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of found in political science and sociology as it applies to the MENA region and beyond.

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As I say, it's a work in progress. It's very much a moving target. So any questions and comments, whether it the way you know, that much appreciated.

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So this kind of tranche of the project that we're really interested in is trying to think through how 52 and then more broadly,

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if we can generalise to a broader universe of cases, transforms a state and political elites.

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And here we think that 52 is like a really nice example because it captures some of the what we think are the kind of

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competing logics and tensions around what happens when groups of often junior officers capture the state as occurred,

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not just obviously in Egypt, but obviously in Iraq and Libya and Syria and beyond,

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and where they then find themselves having to run a state through a first time.

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And in this,

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what we're really interested in is trying to think about who those people who have come before who were kind of manning the state bureaucracy,

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who obviously in the Egyptian context, we might, I think, somewhat clumsily and potentially programmatically framed as a kind of colonial elite.

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Suddenly, as we're going to talk about, we definitely have good and the notable class,

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you have an Ottoman legacy who are kind of maintained and insulated and continue on the European British

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colonial rule and who are manning many kind of key parts of the state on the eve of the 52 revolutions for.

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What happens to them? How many of them survive? They're all completely purged.

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Or do some of them managed to cling on to one reason or another?

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And we think here that there are kind of potentially competing logics that have, I think, wisely summarised here.

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For example, this is a quote from having to keep speaking on the 24th of July.

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So the day after the free officers seise power, where he says, You know,

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we have declared from the beginning the goal of our movement is to reform and cleanse the army and the institutions of the state.

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And indeed, we often find this when we think about comparable cases, and it keeps us on several different occasions.

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It also refers to cleansing or purging, uses the most of the ofhere to cleanse or to purge.

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And there's obviously kind of like a very clear incentive to do this.

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They these free officers are confronted by threats, potentially counter-revolutionary threats that may be counter cues that may be in the offing.

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And so they have genuine, you know, there are genuine threats within this and these different bodies that they might want to target.

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So there are questions of survival. There's obviously rhetorical incentives to be able to talk about purging and cleansing as

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a means of having a clear demarcation from what comes before to what they're going to do.

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Obviously, they need to be able to justify that. At the same time, we also think that there is a second tension running underpinning this,

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which is when groups like the free officers find themselves in charge of a state apparatus.

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They are constrained in many ways, both by the need to just keep the show on the road roads.

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They need to be able to keep basic state functions running, but also because they have quite transformative programmes that they want to implement.

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And as we're going to talk about that,

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the kinds of expertise that are required to be able to implement these programmes can't necessarily come from the policies themselves.

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It has to come from somewhere else. And again, this is captured by this is a quote from from the WA.

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Actually, forget the context in which he says this.

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But he says, you know that we need expertise in a number of different fields from engineering and medicine and economics and so on.

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That is why I want each of you to write down 10 names and then submit them to me within a week because we are in dire need of technical,

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capable patriotic methods for gendered language. And we think that this we're going to use this, this kind of tension,

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this puzzle to try to try to illuminate why it is that when the free officers take over,

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there might be forms of turnover and there also might be forms of continuity and survival of the kind of pre-revolutionary,

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potentially even colonial era elite. So let's get into it.

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So as this kind of obligatory, if you if you come in kind of like a police kind of background,

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you've obviously going to be able to route this into a broader universe of cases.

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It seems to me that there are important script conditions for arguments.

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One of the things that really characterised this moment again, speaking to broader developments both in Egypt and the MENA region,

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is that we see in the Second World War theory a series of what we might think of as transformative coups or

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so-called revolutions from above as true to kind of famously classifies them often led by junior military officers,

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often taking place without kind of large scale street level mobilisation and often without a kind of a kind of independent base of support,

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either amongst the people or the aristocracy. This has to be manufactured later.

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In fact, as anyone who's going to read the history of the three officers closely knows.

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Now. Crucially, in this, as opposed to what you might think of as a social revolution,

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or we might think of as a kind of reactive, restorative coup, revolutions, revival, transformative coups.

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So there's junior officers who seised power as a means to both capture the

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state and then use the state and redirected to fulfil a particular political,

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economic, social projects.

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Actually, the bureaucracy tends to figure very centrally in consolidating the success in establishing the authority of the new regime.

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And so in these kinds of contexts, there is purging going on, but it has to be limited purging of one kind or another.

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So this then allows us to kind of effortlessly Segway into a new fashionable literature that's coming out of political science,

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which is increasingly concerned with this question of purging. Why is it that elites kind of reconstitute themselves?

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Why is it that across various discontinuities across democratic transitions whose failed coups,

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revolutions and so forth, we tend to see a kind of purging processes,

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and there's a set of questions around why is it that some individuals may be more or less

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likely to be purged than others saying that the kind of extant literature as you see it,

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which is very, very recent, is overwhelmingly concerned we might think of as being quite shallow judges.

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These are kind of limited efforts to kind of decapitate rebellious members of the upper elite, such as ministers or military leaders.

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And this is obviously necessary if you have a failed coup, you don't need to reform the entire state.

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You can just selectively target who you want to purge. This is a sufficiently credible signal to be able to get the job done, by contrast.

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And this is what we're kind of more interested in. We might think of actually that also being actually deep budgets,

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which are much more structurally transformative and typically occur after revolutions,

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either from below that it's popular revolutions or even tempo this from above.

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And here are really kind of defining characteristics of these revolutions.

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Is this kind of displacement of the state elites primarily enacted or realised through purging till he talks about this?

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Quite a lot?

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However, and this is where our insight comes, and this is what we want to speak to are still evolving theoretical edifice that we're developing.

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These kinds of deep purges, though extensive, have to by the nature.

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They can't be indiscriminate. They will target potential threats people who they see as having potentially counter-revolutionary potential.

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But they will look to retain certain types of people. We think, necessarily because going back to this point that they talked about earlier,

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there has to be forms of continuity and there has to be sources of experience and expertise to be able

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to implement the kind of revolutionary programmes that these people come to power promising to do.

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So with that kind of awkward for clearing theoretical justification aside,

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let's obviously get into the case, which I'm sure many of you are familiar with,

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but we'll just rehearse some of the contents of Qihoo how, where and when we know that on the choice of joint 1952 three officers seise Power.

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And in doing so, publicly commit to purging the army in the state.

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So this this question settings of poaching is already immediately apparent is essential

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to the political project exemplified by that Anichebe quote that I started with.

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And then after initially coming to power, we see like a kind of like very polished and sudden interregnum,

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a transitional period where we have brief moments of puppet in government before the military formally take over in September.

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And shortly thereafter, the army announces the appointment of officers to all departments and administrations in the state

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bureaucracy in an attempt to take control it and then redeploy it to its own to their own ends.

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Now, what we think of this is this is kind of a challenge to the free officers in many ways,

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a bit like the keeps quote at the beginning where he says, you know, we're really desperately in need of kind of technical expertise.

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And that's because our expertise cannot come from the ranks of the free officers and selves.

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We know we have a data set now that we've constructed of all of the free officers

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currently populating different biographical characteristics about not just their age,

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but their background they come from. They serve and so forth. And when they want to serve, just talk a little bit about the very end.

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And we know that when we just surveyed the four offices in the middle rank of the officers was captain, 40 percent of them.

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These are very young individuals that are thirty three years old. I'm thirty six.

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I'm not sure I would know how to run a state. I mean, they're very relative.

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They're inexperienced, they don't really have any experience of higher education.

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The Revolutionary Command Council, the political leadership of the free officers of its members and the two of them have graduated from

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university and are having to give is in many ways peripheral actually to data diminishes decision making.

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And then the only other figure being held, Muhyiddin pictured here and again.

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This, I think, motivates this kind of puzzled that we're thinking about, which is given the kind of expertise that this group can draw on.

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This must have implications for who they purge and who they retain within the state bureaucracy.

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So this is going to be just the general research question that we'll speak to,

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which is this how did the 5G revolution transform Egypt's state and bureaucratic elite?

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So to get to this is kind of empirical. You might think difficult, but we think we've got a really good way of doing it.

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And that is by exploiting what is, I think, a hitherto unexplored or underutilised source, which is called Who's Who in Egypt.

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It's also published under several other names. Here is the this is the front cover of the issue from 1953, and This is a Time series.

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It's published from the 1930s, up until 1958 1959, when it ceases publications.

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So these are held in kind of incomplete collections like this took a long time to kind of track down the various volumes,

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but the majority of them were held between a set age and Cairo, which I'm sure many of you know the British Library holds quite a few of them.

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University of Wisconsin-Madison, for some reason, has has a lot of the time series, so we've basically managed to.

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What we're going to do is we're going to we're going to exploit the source to try to

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give us some kind of time varying insight into who is the elite during this period.

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And that's because one of the really nice things about the source material is that the front matter of every issue.

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I should also mention this is a volume that's published in Cairo. It's printed in Cairo.

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It's edited by people based in Egypt, and it's published annually and the front matter of every issue, every volume.

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There is a seemingly complete list of all ministers and senior bureaucrats in the state at this period.

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So this is, for example, as you can see, it's a kind of mix between mainly French for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

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and this is just assuming of the kind of detail that we get. We don't just get just the minister and the senior civil cents.

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We get the call, the top echelon of the state bureaucracy.

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Now what's really nice about about these issues is not only do we have the names in their ranks and their titles,

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but in the interior of these volumes, which are very thick with the way you could kind of use them as a doorstop or to beat a burglar with.

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You have disaggregated biographical information about each person and including

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people who you would think are actually including quite sensitive positions.

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So this is General Mohammed and then they we see some information about him in on the right hand side.

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He's won an award. He's got a royal honour, the Nile. He's the director of the special department at the Ministry of Interior sounds a bit spooky.

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We have stuff like where he's born, we have his date of birth. We have this education that we even have where he lives.

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And indeed, in some of the other biographical sketch sketches, we have even more than that.

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We have who they're married to, which social clubs they belong to.

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We have quite a lot of quite rich, disaggregated information that we can draw on and internal.

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It should be noted.

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We've heard it all of the so from 1939 to 1959 have information for about two and a half thousand ministers and senior civil servants in Egypt.

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And the project that I'm currently talking about now, we're only using a very thin slice of data.

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So this gets us to some growth health warning that they're going to be some

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growth where we can start to get into this question of elite survival continued.

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So this is just using this data to just basically plot how long people stay in office, who's 52?

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So one of the really nice things about these issues here in Egypt is that the one that's published in 1952 is published in June of 1952.

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So it's extremely current. It's literally got a snapshot of the state and bureaucratically just before the free officers takeover.

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And then what we can do is we can use the subsequent editions to track whether

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these same people appear in these kind of seemingly complete lists over time.

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And this is the general distribution. We can see that nearly half of our individuals, they don't survive one year.

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So by 1953, nearly half of them have disappeared.

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Here, maybe a bit more than 20 percent of them only lost one year, and then we get this kind of interesting tale.

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We're actually nearly 10 percent of all athletes actually stay till the end of our time series when these additions stop publishing,

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which is at the end of our analysis period up until the consolidation of the United Arab Republic.

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We can formalise this in different ways of any stats. We can think of this as a survival problem,

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so we can think about the probability of individual survival in the aggregate over time for of Kaplan-Meier survival estimates.

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So we can see that by year one after the coup, the probability of somebody surviving drops by 50 percent and then of the 25 percent.

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And then again, you see this flattening going off. And it's really this that we're interested in who is being retained in the tail and who is more

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likely to be purged in the kind of opening years as the kind of revolution unfolds and consolidates.

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So this is when it gets a little bit numerical, so to do this,

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we've got to think systematically and we've got to draw on tools from often regression

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analysis to be able to to account for the different kind of factors that we might.

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We think that might be influencing this. So this is what we going to do.

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We're going to have a unit of analysis. It's going to be an individual.

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We've got six hundred and seventy four ministers and senior bureaucrats who are in post in just on the eve of the coup in June of fifty two.

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And we're going to index them. We're just going to pull these people I. And they're located in 19 ministries or institutions.

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That could be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Supply,

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the Diplomatic Corps and so on and so forth through Parliament, et cetera.

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And what we're going to do is we're going to observe every one of these individuals yearly from 52 to 59.

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And the thing we're going to try to explain is who is going to exit the elite first?

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So the way to think about this is what kind of familiar with these kinds of approaches.

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I don't want you to think I'm just waiting a statistical wonder.

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The way to think about it is that every single, every single time you observe these individuals,

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the question is we're going to multivariable as one when they exit the elite.

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And the question is how many units of time does it take measured in years for them to exit the elite as opposed

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to others as a function of a set of both individual level and ministry level institutional level characteristics?

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So this is if you're kind of I'm very happy to talk about this in the Q&A.

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Just briefly mention. So the way we're going to estimate this is using a form of regression analysis.

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In this case, it's a bit of a mathematical multilevel log normal accelerated failure times over the analysis.

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Otherwise, you can think of this then history analysis.

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People use this a lot, and it's actually a technique that's pioneered by statistician based at Nuffield at Oxford,

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who died recently, said David Cox, proponent of the invention of the occupational hazard models.

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What you want to do is something to see what you have medical curriculums for a bunch of patients.

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Some of them take the medicine, others don't. And it's the time to a medical outcome like survivable death.

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We can use this in the same way to think about survival or turnover or exiting the

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elite to study what happens to the state bureaucracy in Egypt after fifty two.

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So here this is just going to explain why I went through the equation.

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On the left hand side, the thing we're explaining is the time to the event for an individual located in the ministry in any given year.

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And we're going to explain that by a bunch of independent variables measured at both the Independent,

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both the individual ministry level with basic, the coefficients to the estimated.

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We've got just a dummy twin bearing variable, which will capture a minute regime consolidation.

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And that's it. And then the key thing is that we probably think that individuals who are based in the same ministry,

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the hazard of being purged is probably not independent of each other.

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That is to say, if one person's purged in the Ministry of Interior,

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that might affect the likelihood that another person working in the same ministry, they get punished.

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They survive. And so we account for this by having ministry or institution level at random intercepts.

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I want to talk about this in the Q&A, if that's in any way interesting or not clear.

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So this is what I'm going to do.

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We're going to operationalise these ideas numerically using these individual level characteristics that we get from these biographies.

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And we're going to we're going to structure around this competing dual logic of threat and experience.

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So we know from who's who's in Egypt, you have quite a lot of information about these people.

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We know, for example, if they're a minister and the secretary,

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we can measure the closeness to the king at this point and who might be seen as a kind of counter source of revolutionary threat.

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But the number of world honours that they receive, this is all kind of proxy for proximity to things as good as we as we managed to get this far.

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We also know the titles. We know if they are from the notables, we know if there are Asher, for example,

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we might think that people with military training are more likely to be purged because they're seen as threatening these after.

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It is, after all, a junior officer. Q So we can account for that. And we can also.

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We also think that there's something about spatial proximity that matters.

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So after 52, we see the Abdeen Palace become the Republican palace.

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And we think that people, because the 52nd revolution is in the in the words of the coup plotters,

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it's a national revolution is not a foreign conspiracy.

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We think that as a consequence of that threat, it's going to be felt much more locally within the confines of Egypt.

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And so people who operate at a distance, let's say, for example, diplomats who are based far away from Egypt.

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So we'll talk about it a little bit of Egypt's diplomatic corps in just the second.

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We might think that these people are seen as less important.

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And so because we're interested in talking to the events, we might think that threat also travels both spatially across and across time.

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And so people who are for the way are just not prioritising that. So they're more likely to be retained as a function of this distance.

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So we can actually measure distance very, very easily. So we actually have maps. This is a map on the left hand side of Cairo from nineteen fifty one.

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So just the eve of the Revolution Street View and we know these what you can see on the left hand side,

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the Ministry of Public Works, Parliament, Ministry of Public Health, and so forth.

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And what we can do is we can just draw Polygon's around these buildings, get their centroid,

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which is the average wage at centroid of these often multiple building spaces.

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And then we can just measure the distance in kilometres between that building and what becomes in this case,

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the Abdeen Palace on the right hand side of the map, all the Republican palaces it becomes later on.

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This is actually much more interesting for diplomats. We think that they're probably because of the political programme of the three or four offices.

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They're probably going to be a set of privatisations around who's going to be recalled first, if indeed they are recalled.

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Again, this is using the source material.

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We can actually reconstruct the diplomatic presence of the Egyptian state or the through state on the eve of the 52 events.

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So this is just obviously not followed by the number of diplomats to actually see it interestingly.

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And just on the eve of the revolution, most Egyptian diplomats are obviously in the United States and Europe.

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There are very few in the Arabic speaking Middle East. And this changes over time.

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But for our purposes here, the intuition is that if you're the ambassador to Argentina,

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you're just not threatening in the same way as a senior official in the Ministry of

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Interior and as a function of this distinction is more likely to survive for longer.

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And then we also have some measures for this kind of competing set of hypotheses related to experience this idea that actually the free officers,

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they do need to keep some people around to be able to get the job done. So we measure that in two principal ways.

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The first one is just the amount of time that people have spent in their position. Our data starts in nineteen thirty nine.

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So just going to mention the amount of years a person has held that position since starting

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with the with the expectation being that controlling for will net of all these other factors.

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If you're not a senior official or minister and undersecretary and you've been in your job for a long time,

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that might be quite a desirable person to keep around.

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Equally, we know quality in the case that there's a real, real desperate need for technical expertise.

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And so we might think that people with university degrees are just seen as more desirable.

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They're more important. And so they're also more likely to be kept around.

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So the implication of this is that the threat these these independent variables that coefficient should be in this case,

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positively side, they should be more likely to lead to somebody exiting the elite and contrary wise.

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These variables should be negatively cited that they should mean that you can survive longer effectively.

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And this is a selection on observables designed to help you to think through this, but a cuter causal inference approach that you can think of that.

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So we have to control for potential confounding stuff, and we get that from the case. We know, for example, that in 52 53,

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a kind of sop to the Muslim brothers is that they allow the appointment and brother to call off the Ministry of Endowments

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and that those are the brothers are allowed to kind of takeover some perhaps religiously inflected roles in the state.

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So those individuals who are empowered power, they may be more or less vulnerable.

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We also think that when also takes power and 54, this represents a movement of regime consolidation, which could go one of the two ways it could be.

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Either the then elicits a further round of purging or, as we think, is really the case.

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You know, it also is effectively being in control since the three officers take power.

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And so this might actually lead to regime consolidation and say who's purging will tail off.

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And then finally, it's self-evident that in larger ministries, that's just going to be naturally more turnover.

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And so people in those ministries are just this is going to be more. There's going to be a ministry level effect as a consequence of that.

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We do have even more populated models that I went on to talk about, what we spoke about,

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where we can with things like age because we want things that older people are just more

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likely to retire or suffer health and than die naturally leave the data set that way.

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There are some gender dimensions. There are a handful of women in position during this period.

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We know their religion from the names, we know the membership. For things like social clubs.

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We test additional models, including these. They don't do anything. They're not important.

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But it's just worth flagging that we're trying to think through controlling out anything, any potential confounders.

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So these are the results, hopefully some of you at least have seen what a plot looks like before, all the way to understand this is this.

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Again, this is a this is a regression model. So these are independent variables in the left hand side.

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These little dots, these are the estimated effects. In this case, the dots are exponentially etched into what's called a survival time ratio,

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or the median time that you would expect somebody to survive given these characteristics in this case.

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If you're a senior official and these are located on the 95 percent confidence interval,

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so the intuition here when we think about statistical significance we're often talking about is an association distinguishable from Zurich,

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for example. If it's not, then the tail of these 95 percent confidence intervals will cross the red line here.

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Mark this one. And so we would say this is not statistically significant. That is to say it's not distinguishable from zero.

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And the way to interpret this is if these are effectively if you're a senior official and these are survival times,

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that means that senior officials are on average 22 percent less likely to survive and have median.

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The median time with their survival is 20 40 percent less compared to someone who's not a senior official.

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After adjusting for all these other factors. So everything that you know typically basically in summary,

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we do find for the strong evidence for this idea that there's this tension between threats and experience leading to happening individual outcomes.

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So we can see that if you're a senior official, you're it reduces median survival time by about 22 percent.

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People with more rural illness, obviously, they received more baubles and walks from the king,

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which we're using as a measure of proximity to the king. Their survival time is also significantly a substantially reduced.

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These are continuous variables, so I'll show you some plots that make it a little bit more sense of this in a minute.

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Actually being a ostensibly notable is actually it's negative.

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It reduces your survival time, but it's not statistically significant.

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And that's when we look at this. When we decompose the models a little bit and we populate the variables in different orders.

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It's because this is also highly correlated with just being a more senior official and being more connected to the king.

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Interestingly, military officers, we know that they're poaching the army in the state.

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Those with a kind of military training they are, they look like their survival time is negatively impacted, but again, not statistically significant.

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Zero. We do find support for this idea that those people who are distant from that power as it's playing out in incorrect,

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that as you increase distance, actually your survival time increases and unpack this a little bit more a second.

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Equally,

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those people who have more experience are more likely to survive their survival times increased and those people with the Terminal University degree.

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This is a binary variable. Their survival the median survival time is about nearly 20 percent greater than those without a ton of university degree.

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Again, adjusting for all these other factors. I went through the controls.

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They behave broadly as as we might expect, and it's not distinguishable from zero.

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So we can start to to give a little bit more flesh and understand what these kind of relationships look like again,

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for continuous variables like if we think about years of experience free, who will take over, this can be measured as some people have won.

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Yes, some people have five years, some people have 10 years and people have 15 years. So it's a continuous variable,

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and we want to know how different values of that experiment will impact the outcome of interest in this case on the y axis.

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This is the survival time as a percentage. And then obviously on the x axis, this is the time to bring change.

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And what we what we operationalise this as is people who are a fifth in the 95th percentile of experience.

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So for example, if you're at the 5th percentile of experience, you basically don't have very much experience.

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If you're in the 95th percentile of experience, you're pretty experienced, right?

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And what we see is that if we compare the two survival curves of these two different characteristics,

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we can see that those people with more experience on average in a given unit time, their survival is about 10 to 15 percent less.

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So it's it's important. Equally, exactly the same logic applies to on.

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The difference between people who have more or less. It's not as substantive, but still it's still present.

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It's maybe about seven or eight percent. The more rural illness you have, the closer you are the king.

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Your survival time reduces by seven or eight percent in any given unit of time.

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Then it narrows as we get to the end of our analysis period because most of these people have been purged, basically.

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And then finally, this question of distance, those people who are again at the 5th percentile of those people who are very spatially proximate

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to the Republican palace in that day to day working lives versus people who are quite far away,

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those people are much further away, then much more likely to survive.

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And again, in the kind of qualitative details, and I'm happy to talk about this in the Q&A.

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It really is the case.

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The diplomatic corps is broadly retained with some exceptions, and there are interesting exceptions to that that fulfil the broader patent.

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So, for example, the Egyptian ambassador to the UK, the Egyptian ambassador to Italy,

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both people who are known to be very, very close to the king, they're both purged.

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But then generally the average tendency is that people who who are in the diplomatic corps are retained.

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So this is the last graph, I promise, and this gets at this idea, so in our modelling strategy,

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we're trying to think about variants or the thing that explains the outcome,

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that is how long it takes for you to get purged as operating on two fundamental different levels.

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You can have individual level characteristics, like all you a senior official,

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a lot or you can have the place where you work you think take place regardless of who you are and your experience.

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Some places just your association with them.

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There's going to be like what you might think of as a residual institutional effect on being personal and if we do find evidence of that.

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So this year, what we're doing technically is uploading the random intercepts for all models,

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and we have two or two different sets of intercepts here.

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We have two sets of running into sets in the light grey from what we might think of as the

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null model that is a model where you don't have any covariates in the right hand side.

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We're just going to look at the residual variants at this level two factor, which is the ministry or institution.

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And then we have the darker grey ones, which is the residual variance.

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Once we take into account all these variables, I went on to talk about scene being a senior official distance experience and so forth.

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And what we find is actually something quite interesting in the normal.

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Actually, there seems to be a kind of residual importance of if you work in the Royal Court or a session of the Royal Court,

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you're much more likely to be purged. If you work in parliament, you're much more likely to be purged.

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However, when we start to take into account the individual level characteristics in the full model,

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we can see that once we take into account like ties to the King, actually, then the effect of the Royal Court is attenuated to zero.

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That is to say, this institutional effect is really just proxy for individual level characteristics.

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Parliament. However, if you have any kind of connexion with parliament, net of whatever your background is,

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you're just much more likely to be purchasing if anyone knows the case. Details of Egypt, that makes complete sense.

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Equally, the diplomatic corps no model. What we just don't take into account is things like spatial distance.

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It looks like you're more likely to survive.

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But as soon as you take into account distance and all these other factors, again, it's not distinguishable from zero.

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However, when we do still have these two other institutional effects that can't just be explained by other variables,

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it looks as if the institution itself has an independent effect on individual survival and turnover.

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And those are the following.

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So on the one hand, education which I think totally aligns with what kind of expertise experience loses if you work in Ministry of Education,

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and this also includes the leadership of universities, you just you're not going to get punched, you are much more likely to be retained.

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That seems to be some kind of protective halo of being associated with these institutions.

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That means that you're more likely to stick around and at the same time, foreign.

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If there's something that I had not picked up from case readings that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again is broadly retained intact.

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And you could probably tell a complete story about why that is because there is forms of knowledge of expertise about different parts of the world.

381
00:33:29,440 --> 00:33:35,500
That's language or experience the free officers just do not have. And so they keep these people around, although we know it as well.

382
00:33:35,500 --> 00:33:40,510
From the case details that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it comes to really important diplomatic issues,

383
00:33:40,510 --> 00:33:48,590
they're basically sidelined and then you have personal emissaries. So, for example, who the free officers used to kind of conduct business.

384
00:33:48,590 --> 00:33:55,820
So here's the rushed conclusion discussion we actually find that these competing logics of threat and expertise,

385
00:33:55,820 --> 00:34:01,880
we do think that they powerfully patent the survival of colonial era state athletes in a post-colonial period.

386
00:34:01,880 --> 00:34:07,430
And we have this kind of revolution from above individuals connected to Egypt's deposed monarchs and very senior officials,

387
00:34:07,430 --> 00:34:13,850
which is much more likely to be purged. Also, people who are attached to these particular institutions experienced officials,

388
00:34:13,850 --> 00:34:17,450
on the other hand, and those with advanced university degrees will retain their survival.

389
00:34:17,450 --> 00:34:20,840
Time is just much greater. They were kept around for longer.

390
00:34:20,840 --> 00:34:26,750
And again, we have these kind of residual workplace effects that suggest that some institutions were just seen as too important,

391
00:34:26,750 --> 00:34:31,190
like the Ministry of Education or too threatening, like the Parliament and these.

392
00:34:31,190 --> 00:34:36,050
Instead, they were these kind of institutional effects that we can also statistically detect.

393
00:34:36,050 --> 00:34:41,520
Now here's my kind of defensive. So the point? Just anticipating some questions.

394
00:34:41,520 --> 00:34:47,820
This is ongoing, so we've got two big unresolved questions that we want that we want to attend to that we just haven't had time to yet.

395
00:34:47,820 --> 00:34:53,520
One is that for those people who were retained, we can trace the careers we can know if they stay in the same ministry or not.

396
00:34:53,520 --> 00:35:01,800
We can tell you if we're not. We're quite interested in the career trajectories of those 52 52 elites who keep their positions.

397
00:35:01,800 --> 00:35:05,580
We don't have strong expectations about that. It's kind of an open empirical question.

398
00:35:05,580 --> 00:35:06,480
We also, as I mentioned,

399
00:35:06,480 --> 00:35:12,990
we have a list of the kind of originals three hundred and thirty five free officers and we know who joins the states and who doesn't,

400
00:35:12,990 --> 00:35:16,350
who keeps, who stays in the army, who goes and joins different ministries.

401
00:35:16,350 --> 00:35:20,280
And we think that might be also quite an interesting question to see who gets parachuted

402
00:35:20,280 --> 00:35:25,910
into which bits of the state and why and what others retain their army commissions.

403
00:35:25,910 --> 00:35:30,550
That's it for me. That was kind of interesting and urgent. Thanks.

404
00:35:30,550 --> 00:35:35,460
Thank you, Neal. Very interesting. I have a question, which is that.

405
00:35:35,460 --> 00:35:43,890
I can see that the data that you're compiling on the revolution needed can be used in the sense of the

406
00:35:43,890 --> 00:35:49,950
study of political upheavals broadly across many different regions of the world and that I understand.

407
00:35:49,950 --> 00:36:01,180
But in terms of Egyptian history, are you putting empirical flesh on something that everybody already knows intuitively?

408
00:36:01,180 --> 00:36:05,620
Or are you arguing against someone? I mean, is there actually anyone, I mean, I mean.

409
00:36:05,620 --> 00:36:10,420
I mean, granted, 1952 is, you know, perceived sort of in popular terms as a watershed.

410
00:36:10,420 --> 00:36:15,940
Everything changes. But presumably people who write history know that that's not the case.

411
00:36:15,940 --> 00:36:20,110
I mean, certainly if you're writing about cinema, I mean, you get a lot of people talking about, you know,

412
00:36:20,110 --> 00:36:26,380
the cinema of the Nasser period, and you do find people who assume that everything suddenly changes after 1952.

413
00:36:26,380 --> 00:36:34,990
But anybody who. Even fairly casually, studies the history of Egyptian cinema knows that that's not the case and that, you know,

414
00:36:34,990 --> 00:36:43,210
things don't actually change very much at all immediately and then arguably not really very much until after the public sector.

415
00:36:43,210 --> 00:36:48,500
After Nasser dies in 1971, graduates from Institute began directing films.

416
00:36:48,500 --> 00:36:55,160
And so I guess, you know, the basic question is, are you arguing against somebody in terms of Egyptian history?

417
00:36:55,160 --> 00:36:57,680
Yeah, that feels like a very damning comment on my career to date,

418
00:36:57,680 --> 00:37:05,600
which is I just don't see things the shootings that people already hold, they think it's a good point.

419
00:37:05,600 --> 00:37:08,930
I mean, it's certainly the case in the secondary literature and the kind of certainly the kind

420
00:37:08,930 --> 00:37:15,490
of historical v popular story of the movement and the mobilisation of the revolution.

421
00:37:15,490 --> 00:37:21,470
Fifty two, these forms of kind of these forms of continuity have not been fleshed out and kind of pointed to it does.

422
00:37:21,470 --> 00:37:26,330
It is often portrayed as like just a point blank. This continuity movement radical political change.

423
00:37:26,330 --> 00:37:27,680
And it is absolutely the case.

424
00:37:27,680 --> 00:37:35,090
We do find this enormous purging going on with this question about who is retained and who's kept around that is seemingly absent.

425
00:37:35,090 --> 00:37:43,190
I would be interested to know if there are, if anyone has any suggestions of people who have kind of documented that and one which they haven't.

426
00:37:43,190 --> 00:37:48,470
I would also say that this is my kind of stock answer to this kind of question.

427
00:37:48,470 --> 00:37:57,440
I think there is merit in arbitrating established knowledge or truisms or things that we will hold to be self-evident in a lot of cases.

428
00:37:57,440 --> 00:38:00,980
A lot of these truisms, when you start to kind of scratch them empirically with the best kind of

429
00:38:00,980 --> 00:38:05,270
information available with kind of systematic empirical analytical techniques,

430
00:38:05,270 --> 00:38:10,940
it becomes a little more nuanced and a lot more messy and complicated than perhaps extant understanding.

431
00:38:10,940 --> 00:38:19,010
And so even as exercise of just confirming what we already know, I would kind of insist that it's valuable again, like where's the real findings?

432
00:38:19,010 --> 00:38:24,480
It's not so much that we're kind of arguing against people, but rather showing things that hadn't previously been appreciated.

433
00:38:24,480 --> 00:38:31,070
So, for example, the kind of forms of continuity and the retention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Diplomatic Corps.

434
00:38:31,070 --> 00:38:33,890
As far as we know, is this just not been picked up by anyone? And again,

435
00:38:33,890 --> 00:38:38,270
like this is quite interesting and gives us some insight into the logic and thinking

436
00:38:38,270 --> 00:38:42,260
of the free officers and in turn helps us to explain kind of what comes later.

437
00:38:42,260 --> 00:38:48,020
Yeah, let's maybe a slightly unsatisfactory answer to your all too familiar question.

438
00:38:48,020 --> 00:38:52,630
In fact, I'm sure I've asked you the same question from the lectures that you've given.

439
00:38:52,630 --> 00:38:59,530
But I'm actually it was a good it was a good answer to the question. I should remind everybody the issue here is the Q&A button.

440
00:38:59,530 --> 00:39:05,380
If you want to ask questions, we have a question from Yasmin Mathur, which is that she says,

441
00:39:05,380 --> 00:39:12,090
maybe I missed this, but can you say something about the security services in terms of redeployment?

442
00:39:12,090 --> 00:39:18,030
Yes. So what we're looking at in the underboss study and just in terms of the information that we have available to us,

443
00:39:18,030 --> 00:39:23,460
the kind of coercive arms of the state that we can empirically observe is the Ministry of the War in the Navy, as it's called at this point.

444
00:39:23,460 --> 00:39:29,040
And then also is formally called the Ministry of Interior was a failure.

445
00:39:29,040 --> 00:39:33,660
In those cases, it seems to be that there isn't so much of an institutional effect going on.

446
00:39:33,660 --> 00:39:37,800
I mean, I could show you the slides where I say this, where we find this.

447
00:39:37,800 --> 00:39:42,810
It seems that these sunny place to the Ministry of Interior. This is broadly played out,

448
00:39:42,810 --> 00:39:48,450
and this is being pretty well explained by the fact that people who are leading the ministry at this point

449
00:39:48,450 --> 00:39:52,740
fulfil all the characteristics that we think would be seen as like a source of counter-revolutionary stress.

450
00:39:52,740 --> 00:39:57,630
These are people who you may have some military training. They've got maybe not so much experience.

451
00:39:57,630 --> 00:40:00,930
There are very many of them because these are quite small ministries,

452
00:40:00,930 --> 00:40:08,430
often as a consequence of planning policy of the residue of British colonial policy and the people who are starting are often quite close to the king.

453
00:40:08,430 --> 00:40:14,970
For example, so these would all be people that we would say it's not the fact that they work in the Ministry of Interior that's explaining this.

454
00:40:14,970 --> 00:40:17,550
It's just actually the individual level characteristics.

455
00:40:17,550 --> 00:40:24,270
What we were surprised to find, I kind of I hesitate to say this, but if you read the abstract of the tool,

456
00:40:24,270 --> 00:40:28,110
we did actually find that people with military training were more likely to be purged.

457
00:40:28,110 --> 00:40:35,750
However, this turns out to be quite sensitive to how you model it statistically and.

458
00:40:35,750 --> 00:40:40,010
It behaves I mean, look, I mean, depending on the kind of analytical choices that you make,

459
00:40:40,010 --> 00:40:45,410
it does seem to be that people with, for example, military training are perceived as being especially threatening.

460
00:40:45,410 --> 00:40:52,610
However, this could be an artefact of the kind of of the of how we decide to kind of statistically estimate these associations.

461
00:40:52,610 --> 00:41:00,900
So take it with a pinch of salt that this is going to affect the kind of drops in and out of importance, depending, as I say, analytical choices.

462
00:41:00,900 --> 00:41:03,210
Sorry, give you one.

463
00:41:03,210 --> 00:41:10,710
We have a question from an anonymous attendee, which is says thank you very much for your wonderful sharing of your data and analysis.

464
00:41:10,710 --> 00:41:19,410
I want to ask if three officers were assimilated into elite culture of the former dynasty as people who were running the state.

465
00:41:19,410 --> 00:41:26,810
Or is it more that those who were that those old elites were incorporated into the new military culture?

466
00:41:26,810 --> 00:41:33,470
That's a great question, I'm going to bring in my classic glance who was otherwise been free riding on my on my activities thus far.

467
00:41:33,470 --> 00:41:39,550
You may have some interesting, insightful to say about that because nothing immediately jumps to mind guilt.

468
00:41:39,550 --> 00:41:46,740
Sure, happy to. I mean, I think it's an interesting question, it's something we have to give a little bit of more thought to.

469
00:41:46,740 --> 00:41:52,830
I think that we have to be precise when we talk about which elites are being incorporated or we incorporated back

470
00:41:52,830 --> 00:42:01,050
into the state and which military elites are actually leaving uniform to those serving other arms of the state.

471
00:42:01,050 --> 00:42:07,410
And I think that once we can start to empirically answer those questions, we might have a better sense of which way the arrow points.

472
00:42:07,410 --> 00:42:13,650
So it is a kind of former athletes being socialised or incorporated into a new culture,

473
00:42:13,650 --> 00:42:23,010
or is it that the new military elite itself is being incorporated into this kind of historically statist culture that existed under the priority?

474
00:42:23,010 --> 00:42:27,470
So I think it's a question that we still have to answer, but it's a good one.

475
00:42:27,470 --> 00:42:31,460
OK, I have another question, this one's from Marilyn Booth, and she says, Thanks, Neal,

476
00:42:31,460 --> 00:42:38,690
this is fascinating and having myself worked a bit in the 19th century equivalent to those who's who volumes.

477
00:42:38,690 --> 00:42:46,460
It's interesting to see the level of detail, but I'm wondering about what isn't in those sources and how that might matter.

478
00:42:46,460 --> 00:42:53,660
For instance, I wonder if some senior bureaucrats moved laterally back to the FBI for a while or into a company,

479
00:42:53,660 --> 00:43:00,320
and might have remained an important part of the seaweed still connected in, but not so visible in these sources.

480
00:43:00,320 --> 00:43:09,660
And also, I wonder about family. I wouldn't be surprised if who was married to whom still counted in revolutionary Egypt.

481
00:43:09,660 --> 00:43:16,320
Yeah, this is very astute questions. So the questions are both important substantive as it relates to the case,

482
00:43:16,320 --> 00:43:22,470
but also kind of very insightful as opposed to the kind of statistical kinds of strategies that we're undertaking here,

483
00:43:22,470 --> 00:43:28,470
which are necessarily quite sensitive to what you might think of as an admitted variable so-called variable bias

484
00:43:28,470 --> 00:43:34,680
where some portion of our effect could actually be capturing something we're not taking into account in the model.

485
00:43:34,680 --> 00:43:40,680
And so the associations that we're finding a potentially spurious all of the points that you raised, we thought about.

486
00:43:40,680 --> 00:43:50,100
So as it as it relates to family, we have thought about trying to capture some kind of measure about all these people connected to each

487
00:43:50,100 --> 00:43:55,380
other in some kind of the way that we're not currently observing in the analysis we can observe,

488
00:43:55,380 --> 00:43:59,370
like do they just work in the same place together? We all kind of capturing that residual variance.

489
00:43:59,370 --> 00:44:04,350
But of course, it could be that you could be straddling lots of different ministries and institutions.

490
00:44:04,350 --> 00:44:08,400
We do have this variable. We know it's social clubs, they belong to these who's who.

491
00:44:08,400 --> 00:44:15,450
They're kind of remarkably candid and contain a remarkable amount of detail about some of these people's personal lives,

492
00:44:15,450 --> 00:44:20,730
including what their home address the telephone number. But also, importantly, which social clubs they belong to.

493
00:44:20,730 --> 00:44:25,290
And our assumption being is that there could be forms of kinship or other kinds of anonymous

494
00:44:25,290 --> 00:44:30,060
social networks connecting these people that we're not currently taking into account.

495
00:44:30,060 --> 00:44:34,560
So what we can basically do is we can construct the measure, which is the several of them.

496
00:44:34,560 --> 00:44:36,880
One of them is just how many social clubs do you belong to?

497
00:44:36,880 --> 00:44:41,760
And the implication being the more social clubs you belong to this, the more Connexions that you might have.

498
00:44:41,760 --> 00:44:44,280
And when we take that into account, it doesn't change anything.

499
00:44:44,280 --> 00:44:47,790
The other one, which we haven't taken into account yet because it kind of problem ties,

500
00:44:47,790 --> 00:44:54,060
is our analysis and maybe ways that we have a police through, which is as soon as you start talking about people being connected,

501
00:44:54,060 --> 00:44:58,080
that means that they're not necessarily independent from each other and that actually, again,

502
00:44:58,080 --> 00:45:03,150
there's some presence, some difficult questions for the way that we're currently analysing things.

503
00:45:03,150 --> 00:45:09,030
It is possible to say, for example, that if somebody survives and they belong to a social, a certain social club,

504
00:45:09,030 --> 00:45:17,430
does that mean that someone who also belongs to that club is also more likely to survive in a given year, for example, we can take that into account.

505
00:45:17,430 --> 00:45:23,430
But I haven't thought of a clever way of doing it otherwise in terms of like again, just looping back to questions like marriage.

506
00:45:23,430 --> 00:45:28,260
One of the problems that we face is that the biographical sketches are quite inconsistent in how

507
00:45:28,260 --> 00:45:34,080
much information we report and and some people don't have these biographical sketches at all.

508
00:45:34,080 --> 00:45:38,910
And so what we have to do is we have to use a statistical technique called multiple imputation,

509
00:45:38,910 --> 00:45:46,570
where we simulate the missing value using of the characteristics that we do know about this person that we think also predicts the value.

510
00:45:46,570 --> 00:45:51,580
We can do that and try to recover this missing information, although it's not, it's not ideal,

511
00:45:51,580 --> 00:45:55,780
but it's still kind of the gold standard about how we should be going about it.

512
00:45:55,780 --> 00:45:58,720
And it also say also say there are some statistical workarounds.

513
00:45:58,720 --> 00:46:03,610
We're currently thinking about this issue, but we don't have I don't have a complete answer to it.

514
00:46:03,610 --> 00:46:12,430
This issue at this question about people can get purged, they can leave the state police and then go back to the isbut or the whatever and then

515
00:46:12,430 --> 00:46:16,540
lay low for a couple of years and then move back to Carter and retain that influence.

516
00:46:16,540 --> 00:46:23,410
That is absolutely possible. Like, absolutely like our definition of the elite here is necessarily quite thin.

517
00:46:23,410 --> 00:46:28,120
So it's about the direct exercise of political power as you are kind of ensconced in office.

518
00:46:28,120 --> 00:46:32,530
It could well be that these people aren't just going to disappear into the other evaporate.

519
00:46:32,530 --> 00:46:36,370
They're still behind the scenes. They're still influential in one way or another.

520
00:46:36,370 --> 00:46:41,830
And we can't account for that. So there could be other forms of continuity that we're not taking into account.

521
00:46:41,830 --> 00:46:43,510
And that's an interesting question.

522
00:46:43,510 --> 00:46:50,650
And as a 5:52 on the 20th of January, I don't have a kind of a clever way of getting at it, but it's definitely relevant.

523
00:46:50,650 --> 00:46:56,230
I suspect this might be something where we just have to hold our hands up and say,

524
00:46:56,230 --> 00:47:02,890
this is obviously plausible and this it's kind of worthy of further research because having kind of we've looked at these sources quite exhaustively,

525
00:47:02,890 --> 00:47:08,020
I'm not sure it's something that we can recover. What I would say that does speak to your question.

526
00:47:08,020 --> 00:47:15,910
When people exit the elite with the kind of vanishingly few exceptions, once they exit, they never come back.

527
00:47:15,910 --> 00:47:19,930
So this kind of light departure and return, reinventing yourself type dynamic,

528
00:47:19,930 --> 00:47:29,040
at least as it applies to getting back into one of these kind of like formal fancy jobs or high status jobs doesn't seem to be at stake.

529
00:47:29,040 --> 00:47:32,110
I actually have another question that I want to ask.

530
00:47:32,110 --> 00:47:40,620
Just that you must have not been able to avoid thinking about 2011 when you were doing this paper,

531
00:47:40,620 --> 00:47:44,550
because in 2011 there were all kinds of desire to purge.

532
00:47:44,550 --> 00:47:52,500
But one thing about 2011 was that, you know, the fall of the regime wasn't actually a uniform thing.

533
00:47:52,500 --> 00:47:58,090
There were some parts of the government that arguably never fell and that always remained in the house.

534
00:47:58,090 --> 00:48:04,920
I mean, certainly the security services were never in the hands of revolutionary forces and the military and the,

535
00:48:04,920 --> 00:48:09,150
you know, the Foreign Ministry, for example. So from from the data that you looked at,

536
00:48:09,150 --> 00:48:17,980
have you seen any evidence that the fall of the regime was actually incomplete and was only consolidated over time?

537
00:48:17,980 --> 00:48:25,450
Yeah. I mean, we all kind of showing that in some sense. I mean, it does seem to be that they're all kind of holdout parts of the states.

538
00:48:25,450 --> 00:48:32,350
So for example, Education Ministry, the diplomatic corps in which again, it's almost as if they don't kind of get to them.

539
00:48:32,350 --> 00:48:36,820
So there's this question of ambassadors, for example, or what kind of diplomatic representation abroad.

540
00:48:36,820 --> 00:48:41,200
That does seem to be a kind of prioritisation going on in which people who are kind of at hand who may

541
00:48:41,200 --> 00:48:45,880
be seen as more threatening are much more likely to be purged and people who are kind of further away.

542
00:48:45,880 --> 00:48:50,320
What I would say, I mean, this is what we're trying to think, like contemporary parallels.

543
00:48:50,320 --> 00:48:54,130
The more interesting one for me is actually not 2011, it's 2013. And here,

544
00:48:54,130 --> 00:49:01,690
I think this gives us some insights into what we might think of as like different dynamics of purging as a function of the political event itself.

545
00:49:01,690 --> 00:49:07,740
So in 2013, we would think of what we see as a kind of almost like a restorative period of time.

546
00:49:07,740 --> 00:49:13,780
Right. So it's not necessarily transformative. It's just undoing what's happened in the couple of years previously.

547
00:49:13,780 --> 00:49:19,450
And in that instance, the literature actually suggests that we should expect quite shallow purging.

548
00:49:19,450 --> 00:49:25,060
So we should only have some people being strategically kind of cold, if you will.

549
00:49:25,060 --> 00:49:31,510
But in fact, actually what we see is actually, I think that the kind of elliptical return to authoritarianism in 2013 really

550
00:49:31,510 --> 00:49:35,380
sees parts of the state being hollowed out and new people being brought in.

551
00:49:35,380 --> 00:49:38,320
And that's an interesting question for the literature, for political scientists,

552
00:49:38,320 --> 00:49:43,720
because I wonder whether these dynamics of deep transformative purges versus shallow purges.

553
00:49:43,720 --> 00:49:49,960
I wonder whether the shyness of purging the claiming is actually reflecting the shallowness of the data,

554
00:49:49,960 --> 00:49:57,330
which is that they tend to just they just empirically focus at an even narrower slice of the state.

555
00:49:57,330 --> 00:50:01,760
I can also see I can see a question from Mohammed, who is looking to see.

556
00:50:01,760 --> 00:50:06,230
I've just about to ask ourselves a technical question, which I don't owe on badly.

557
00:50:06,230 --> 00:50:11,660
I'm here for the technical questions. Mohammed, the obvious or at least read your writing.

558
00:50:11,660 --> 00:50:15,320
Let me read the question so that everybody else knows what question you're addressing.

559
00:50:15,320 --> 00:50:22,790
The question is in your statistical analysis, did you preserve the common assumption of independence and identical distribution?

560
00:50:22,790 --> 00:50:28,550
That's the question. Yeah. So the answer to that is no.

561
00:50:28,550 --> 00:50:31,220
So the data structure is multi level.

562
00:50:31,220 --> 00:50:37,790
So first of all, we assume that individuals who were located within the same institutional ministry, the individual has a great seal.

563
00:50:37,790 --> 00:50:44,480
Survival times probably correlated with each other. And so we account for that with an explicitly level structure where we have random intercepts,

564
00:50:44,480 --> 00:50:51,050
the Ministry of Information level institution level to be able to take into account that clustering or non independence.

565
00:50:51,050 --> 00:50:56,600
In terms of distributions, I'm not quite sure this is exactly what you're asking for, but it does have some bearing on our analysis.

566
00:50:56,600 --> 00:51:01,010
There is an assumption in talking to events about will also is so-called proportional hazards.

567
00:51:01,010 --> 00:51:09,200
I kind of briefly just do this halfway through the talk, which actually all data violates so often in the kind of proportional hazard models.

568
00:51:09,200 --> 00:51:13,310
The idea is that you have parallel trends given whatever excuse you have.

569
00:51:13,310 --> 00:51:20,900
So if you could, for example, we have a binary variable 1.0, we should see the survival lines being parallel for both statuses for zero and one.

570
00:51:20,900 --> 00:51:25,640
Actually, that's not the case for all is actually what we say is a violation of that where,

571
00:51:25,640 --> 00:51:29,990
for example, I wish I had a plot to show you at the beginning of all of our time series.

572
00:51:29,990 --> 00:51:34,100
Being a senior official, for example, the hazard of being a senior official,

573
00:51:34,100 --> 00:51:37,670
the hazard of hedging is much greater than towards the end of the time series,

574
00:51:37,670 --> 00:51:42,140
so that the significance of the salience of these covariates changing or the changes over time.

575
00:51:42,140 --> 00:51:46,130
So to address this, we use an accelerated, failure tolerant model,

576
00:51:46,130 --> 00:51:51,920
which is something that I had to learn about relatively recently because I found out that these assumptions were being violated.

577
00:51:51,920 --> 00:51:56,060
And indeed, we implement that and they are substantively similar to our main results,

578
00:51:56,060 --> 00:52:00,620
with one exception, with the exception of military officers referred to in previous answer.

579
00:52:00,620 --> 00:52:07,550
This is the one that's actually very sensitive to the kind of distributional assumptions behind our models.

580
00:52:07,550 --> 00:52:13,730
If you've seen proportional hazards, actually military officers coming military training is quite an important predictor of purging,

581
00:52:13,730 --> 00:52:19,280
as is a kind of institutional effect of being associated with or working in the Ministry of War and the Navy.

582
00:52:19,280 --> 00:52:24,920
If you don't, and you've meant what I think is probably more defensible approaches, which is what we're doing now.

583
00:52:24,920 --> 00:52:28,310
That finding is then becomes indistinguishable from zero,

584
00:52:28,310 --> 00:52:33,710
suggesting that actually the result itself is actually a factor of these non proportional hazards,

585
00:52:33,710 --> 00:52:38,570
as opposed to it being substantively important whether you have military training or not.

586
00:52:38,570 --> 00:52:42,430
Hopefully, that's clear and cogent.

587
00:52:42,430 --> 00:52:49,930
There's a question also from the one question, which I haven't asked yet, which is from Brody McDonald saying, thanks very much for the presentation.

588
00:52:49,930 --> 00:52:55,000
Do you theorise that the relatively reduced purging for foreign affairs is explained

589
00:52:55,000 --> 00:53:03,270
by the need for their knowledge of languages and international countries, the distance from the palace, or perhaps both?

590
00:53:03,270 --> 00:53:08,250
So that is kind of the answer that I would give. That is our post hoc explanation.

591
00:53:08,250 --> 00:53:15,360
This is what actually we're getting into. We're getting into into case study research, so this is we're trying to find confirmatory evidence for this,

592
00:53:15,360 --> 00:53:18,570
and here you could think of what a distribution of different types of evidence.

593
00:53:18,570 --> 00:53:25,470
What we really want is a kind of smoking gun were held by a dean or some of them also says We need to keep these guys,

594
00:53:25,470 --> 00:53:29,880
you know, we just keep the diplomats around because we don't speak Spanish.

595
00:53:29,880 --> 00:53:35,130
We don't know anything about Indonesia. We're currently kind of thinking about ways of looking for this.

596
00:53:35,130 --> 00:53:37,650
But this these are all intuitions that would suddenly,

597
00:53:37,650 --> 00:53:43,380
neatly and potentially quite conveniently align with the other findings and explanations that we have.

598
00:53:43,380 --> 00:53:53,290
Yeah. Yeah, well, and then I have one last question, since there aren't any more in the Q&A, but I'll ask one more,

599
00:53:53,290 --> 00:54:01,270
which is that one of the one of the truisms or stereotypes about 1952 that one often hears from people who objected to the revolution,

600
00:54:01,270 --> 00:54:04,510
who thought it was a terrible thing and it ruined the country?

601
00:54:04,510 --> 00:54:15,650
Was that putting all these relatively, you know, ignorant, boorish military officers in charge of government resulted in disaster?

602
00:54:15,650 --> 00:54:20,080
And of course, you're suggesting that there was actually quite a bit of institutional continuity.

603
00:54:20,080 --> 00:54:32,420
But do you have a systematic way of assessing, you know, the relative success and failure of relatively untrained directors being put into government?

604
00:54:32,420 --> 00:54:35,090
So that's a great question. I don't have a good answer to it.

605
00:54:35,090 --> 00:54:41,840
I will caveat very briefly and this is something that I find happens a lot in this kind of like revisiting history type work.

606
00:54:41,840 --> 00:54:47,510
I seem to do all too often, which is that as soon as we find something that slightly contradicts the kind of received wisdom,

607
00:54:47,510 --> 00:54:51,200
we might endow it with a bit too much emphasis and importance.

608
00:54:51,200 --> 00:54:57,080
Well, there is forms of continuity the modal person is post, so there's enormous turnover as well,

609
00:54:57,080 --> 00:55:03,410
which is just worth underlining here that it is interesting. We think that still some people are retained, but actually the middle person,

610
00:55:03,410 --> 00:55:12,160
if you are in office and 52 on the eve of the Q, your future of earning a salary for one of these jobs is not looking good.

611
00:55:12,160 --> 00:55:16,940
But you probably are going to get punched. So the continuity is coming at the margins.

612
00:55:16,940 --> 00:55:21,590
And then we try to explain why it is that some people want us to survive as a pestilence in

613
00:55:21,590 --> 00:55:26,120
terms of like this question of like where do the free offices parachute in their people?

614
00:55:26,120 --> 00:55:32,120
And then what are the effects of having these people on institutional performance? We would love to be able to answer that.

615
00:55:32,120 --> 00:55:38,110
It's just a question of like, how do you measure? How do you measure the performance of these institutions that then really get taken over

616
00:55:38,110 --> 00:55:43,640
by four officers as opposed to institutions with those forms of light 352 continuity?

617
00:55:43,640 --> 00:55:49,250
I don't have a good answer to it. It's a great question if you can think of a way of measuring that in the kind of numerical,

618
00:55:49,250 --> 00:55:54,140
systematic way that I was obsessed with and is obsessed with gay friends.

619
00:55:54,140 --> 00:56:00,140
Because at the moment, we're kind of stumped on that question. But I think it's silly because there is potentially interesting variation there.

620
00:56:00,140 --> 00:56:01,310
It's like,

621
00:56:01,310 --> 00:56:07,550
how does the out of the free officers when they actually really have to do the day to day list management of a given administrative position?

622
00:56:07,550 --> 00:56:13,230
How do they perform compared to the people who have been doing it for a while and have some expertise?

623
00:56:13,230 --> 00:56:21,750
Intuition says not as well. It's kind of it's an open empirical question that I can only handle at this point.

624
00:56:21,750 --> 00:56:27,900
Unfortunately, in American, systematic is not me. But, you know, hopefully somebody else will come along and do that.

625
00:56:27,900 --> 00:56:33,810
Neal, thank you very much for that excellent talk. And rich, which I hope is the first of many.

626
00:56:33,810 --> 00:56:42,930
And on behalf of your colleagues, I thank you very much, and I'm sure all of your participants are saying the same thing to themselves.

627
00:56:42,930 --> 00:56:57,375
Thanks a lot and thanks everyone for coming. OK.