1
00:00:05,170 --> 00:00:14,770
Good evening, my name is Walter Andrews. I'm a fellow of Middle East Centre, and I'm going to be chairing tonight's seminar.

2
00:00:14,770 --> 00:00:20,350
The speaker this evening is Neil Critchley is an Associate Professor of politics in the Department

3
00:00:20,350 --> 00:00:25,660
of Politics and International Relations at the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies,

4
00:00:25,660 --> 00:00:30,820
and is fellow of St Andrew's College and Middle East Centre as well.

5
00:00:30,820 --> 00:00:35,020
Is a political scientist of the Arabic speaking Middle East and North Africa,

6
00:00:35,020 --> 00:00:39,850
working at the intersections of political sociology and comparative politics.

7
00:00:39,850 --> 00:00:46,360
His book, Egypt at a Time of Revolution, which was published by Cambridge University Press in 2017,

8
00:00:46,360 --> 00:00:50,410
won the Charles Tilly Distinguished Contribution Scholarship Award.

9
00:00:50,410 --> 00:00:56,140
His current research interests include episodes of mass protests in the Middle East and North Africa,

10
00:00:56,140 --> 00:01:04,930
the rise of political Islam in the interwar and interwar Egypt, and the changing profiles of regional political elites.

11
00:01:04,930 --> 00:01:08,680
Neil's book was about revolution that occurred a little over a decade ago,

12
00:01:08,680 --> 00:01:15,610
and today's lecture he's going to apply some of the methods he used and analyse in contemporary politics to historical events,

13
00:01:15,610 --> 00:01:17,980
namely revolutions from above.

14
00:01:17,980 --> 00:01:26,560
Specifically, the 1952 Free Officer Uprising, which, as most of you probably know, some describe as a revolution and others as a coup.

15
00:01:26,560 --> 00:01:30,760
And of course, if it was the latter, then it was certainly remembered as a popular coup.

16
00:01:30,760 --> 00:01:37,900
Hence, the blurring of the distinction between coup and revolution, or the exercise of the patriotic viewpoint,

17
00:01:37,900 --> 00:01:43,480
depending on the degree to which you see the free officers seising power as a litmus

18
00:01:43,480 --> 00:01:47,620
test of politics and historical sensibilities you see in the abstract the talk,

19
00:01:47,620 --> 00:01:49,420
so I won't go through it in detail.

20
00:01:49,420 --> 00:01:58,720
Suffice to say that the free officers revolt or coup or revolution, whichever term you use, is conventionally understood as a watershed moment.

21
00:01:58,720 --> 00:02:04,660
In other words, an event that gets inscribed in memory and before and after terms.

22
00:02:04,660 --> 00:02:11,620
But Neil's paper instead conjures with both change and continuity continuity in assessing this important event.

23
00:02:11,620 --> 00:02:16,360
The title of his lecture is the fate of colonial elites in post-colonial regimes.

24
00:02:16,360 --> 00:02:24,370
Evidence from the 1952 Egyptian Revolution. For those of you who may not have attended these online events before.

25
00:02:24,370 --> 00:02:30,850
If you have questions, use the Q&A button and Zoom to ask your questions.

26
00:02:30,850 --> 00:02:35,470
If you want to remain anonymous, say so in the questions you ask.

27
00:02:35,470 --> 00:02:45,580
Otherwise, I will read out your name. If I ask a question and so with no further ado, I will turn things over to Neil Critchley.

28
00:02:45,580 --> 00:02:50,170
Take it away now. Great. Thanks very much.

29
00:02:50,170 --> 00:02:55,930
And thanks to everyone who's joined them. Just look to the participant list and I can see lots of lots of friends and students.

30
00:02:55,930 --> 00:03:07,180
It's really lovely that you have. Thank you. So without repeating what I said too much, this is part of an ongoing project with my co-author.

31
00:03:07,180 --> 00:03:16,000
Godwin is a Ph.D. student at UCLA, who's also here, I think might field some of the more difficult questions during the Q&A.

32
00:03:16,000 --> 00:03:20,380
Where we look, it's actually part of a broader project that's still kind of unfolding, if you will,

33
00:03:20,380 --> 00:03:24,820
where we look at the kind of causes and the consequences of 1952 where we use the

34
00:03:24,820 --> 00:03:30,820
case because we're so secretly substantially interested in what happens in Egypt.

35
00:03:30,820 --> 00:03:36,530
But we also think it's a case that can speak to kind of broader questions and debates the kind of found in political science,

36
00:03:36,530 --> 00:03:40,360
political sociology as it applies to the MENA region and beyond.

37
00:03:40,360 --> 00:03:48,580
As I say, it's a work in progress. It's very much a moving target. So any questions and comments, whether it was the, you know, that much appreciated.

38
00:03:48,580 --> 00:03:56,980
So this kind of tranche of the project that we're really interested in is trying to think through how fifty two and then more broadly,

39
00:03:56,980 --> 00:04:02,950
if we can generalise to a broader universe of cases transforms state and political elites.

40
00:04:02,950 --> 00:04:10,750
And here we think that 52 is like a really nice example because it captures some of the what we think are the kind of

41
00:04:10,750 --> 00:04:17,650
competing logics and tensions around what happens when groups of often junior officers capture the state as occurred,

42
00:04:17,650 --> 00:04:22,750
not just obviously in Egypt, but obviously in Iraq and Libya and Syria and beyond,

43
00:04:22,750 --> 00:04:27,160
and where they then find themselves having to run a state for a first time.

44
00:04:27,160 --> 00:04:27,790
And in this,

45
00:04:27,790 --> 00:04:33,910
what we're really interested in is trying to think about who those people who have come before who were kind of manning the state bureaucracy,

46
00:04:33,910 --> 00:04:40,360
who obviously in the Egyptian context, we might, I think, somewhat clumsily and potentially programmatically framed as a kind of colonial era elite.

47
00:04:40,360 --> 00:04:45,370
Suddenly, as we're going to talk about, we definitely have good and the notable class.

48
00:04:45,370 --> 00:04:52,300
You also have an Ottoman legacy that you were kind of maintained and insulated and continue on the European British

49
00:04:52,300 --> 00:04:59,300
colonial rule and who were manning many kind of key parts of the state on the eve of the 52 revolutions for a coup.

50
00:04:59,300 --> 00:05:02,930
And what happens to them? How much? How many of them survive? They all.

51
00:05:02,930 --> 00:05:09,410
Completely purged or do some of them managed to cling on for one reason or another?

52
00:05:09,410 --> 00:05:15,530
And we think here that there are potentially competing logics that have, I think, mostly summarised here.

53
00:05:15,530 --> 00:05:19,520
For example, this is a quote from having to keep speaking on the 24th of July.

54
00:05:19,520 --> 00:05:22,910
So the day after the free officers seise power, where he says, you know,

55
00:05:22,910 --> 00:05:28,550
we have declared from the beginning that the goal of our movement is to reform and cleanse the army and the institutions of the state.

56
00:05:28,550 --> 00:05:33,960
And indeed, we often find this when we think about comparable cases, and it keeps us on several different occasions.

57
00:05:33,960 --> 00:05:41,150
And also, it also refers to cleansing or purging uses the most to adhere, to cleanse or to purge.

58
00:05:41,150 --> 00:05:45,370
And there's obviously a very clear incentive to do this.

59
00:05:45,370 --> 00:05:53,540
They these free officers are confronted by threats, potentially counter-revolutionary threats that may be counter cues that may be in the offing.

60
00:05:53,540 --> 00:06:00,920
And so they have genuine, you know, there are genuine threats within this and these different bodies that they might want to target and urge.

61
00:06:00,920 --> 00:06:06,740
So there are questions of survival. There's obviously rhetorical incentives to be able to talk about purging and cleansing as a means

62
00:06:06,740 --> 00:06:11,210
of means of having a clear demarcation from what comes before to what they're going to do.

63
00:06:11,210 --> 00:06:17,620
Obviously, they need to be able to justify that. At the same time, we also think that there is a second tension running underpinning this,

64
00:06:17,620 --> 00:06:25,420
which is when groups like the free officers find themselves in charge of a state apparatus.

65
00:06:25,420 --> 00:06:30,850
They are constrained in many ways, both by the need to just keep the show on the road.

66
00:06:30,850 --> 00:06:36,880
They need to be able to keep basic state functions running, but also because they have quite transformative programmes that they want to implement.

67
00:06:36,880 --> 00:06:38,770
And as we're going to talk about that,

68
00:06:38,770 --> 00:06:45,490
the kinds of expertise that are required to be able to implement those programmes can't necessarily come from the coup themselves.

69
00:06:45,490 --> 00:06:46,900
It has to come from somewhere else.

70
00:06:46,900 --> 00:06:52,840
And again, this is captured by this is a question from the givea actually, forget the context in which he says this.

71
00:06:52,840 --> 00:06:59,470
But he says, you know that we need expertise in a number of different fields from engineering and medicine and economics and so on.

72
00:06:59,470 --> 00:07:05,530
That is why I want each of you to write down 10 names and then submit them to me within a week because we are in dire need of technical,

73
00:07:05,530 --> 00:07:09,440
capable patriotic methods for gendered language.

74
00:07:09,440 --> 00:07:14,830
I would think that this that we're going to use this, this kind of tension,

75
00:07:14,830 --> 00:07:20,350
this puzzle to try to try to illuminate why it is that when the free officers take over,

76
00:07:20,350 --> 00:07:26,710
there might be forms of turnover and there also might be forms of continuity and survival of the kind of free revolutionary potential,

77
00:07:26,710 --> 00:07:32,800
even colonial era elite. So let's get into it.

78
00:07:32,800 --> 00:07:38,500
So as this kind of obligatory, if you if you come in kind of like a police kind of background,

79
00:07:38,500 --> 00:07:42,430
you're obviously going to be able to route this into a broader universe of cases.

80
00:07:42,430 --> 00:07:45,640
It seems to me that there are important script conditions for arguments.

81
00:07:45,640 --> 00:07:51,580
One of the things that really characterised this moment again, speaking to broader developments both in Egypt and the MENA region,

82
00:07:51,580 --> 00:07:56,110
is that we see in the Second World War theory a series of what we might think of as transformative

83
00:07:56,110 --> 00:08:02,260
coups or so-called revolutions from above as Trump kind of famously classifies them,

84
00:08:02,260 --> 00:08:06,820
often led by junior military officers often taking place without kind of large scale street

85
00:08:06,820 --> 00:08:12,250
level mobilisation and often without a kind of a kind of independent base of support,

86
00:08:12,250 --> 00:08:14,410
either amongst the people or the aristocracy.

87
00:08:14,410 --> 00:08:22,200
This has to be manufactured later, in fact, because anyone who's going to read the history of the free officers closely knows.

88
00:08:22,200 --> 00:08:26,960
Now. Crucially, in this, as opposed to what you might think of as a social revolution,

89
00:08:26,960 --> 00:08:31,970
or we might think of as a kind of reactive, restorative coup revelations from a global transformative que,

90
00:08:31,970 --> 00:08:35,000
so there's junior officers who seise power as a means to both capture the

91
00:08:35,000 --> 00:08:39,680
state and then use the state and redirected to fulfil a particular political,

92
00:08:39,680 --> 00:08:41,300
economic, social projects.

93
00:08:41,300 --> 00:08:48,980
Actually, the bureaucracy tends to figure very centrally and consolidating the success in establishing the authority of the new regime.

94
00:08:48,980 --> 00:08:58,310
And so in these kinds of contexts. There is purging going on, but it has to be limited purging of one kind or another.

95
00:08:58,310 --> 00:09:04,940
So this then allows us to kind of effortlessly segway into a new fashionable literature that's coming out of political science,

96
00:09:04,940 --> 00:09:11,420
which is increasingly concerned with this question of purging. Why is it that the elites kind of reconstitute themselves?

97
00:09:11,420 --> 00:09:18,650
Why is it that across various discontinuities across democratic transitions accuse failed to use revolutions and so forth?

98
00:09:18,650 --> 00:09:24,830
We tend to see a kind of purging processes, and there's a set of questions around why is it that some individuals may be more or less

99
00:09:24,830 --> 00:09:29,930
likely to be purged than others saying that the kind of extant literature as you see it,

100
00:09:29,930 --> 00:09:35,150
which is very, very recent, is overwhelmingly concerned we might think of as being quite shallow judges.

101
00:09:35,150 --> 00:09:41,960
These are kind of limited efforts to kind of decapitate rebellious members of the upper elite, such as ministers or military leaders.

102
00:09:41,960 --> 00:09:46,430
And this is obviously necessary if you have a failed coup and you only need to.

103
00:09:46,430 --> 00:09:47,960
You don't need to reform the entire state.

104
00:09:47,960 --> 00:09:57,950
You can just selectively target who you want to purge, as this is a sufficiently credible signal to be able to get the job done, by contrast.

105
00:09:57,950 --> 00:10:02,930
And this is what we're kind of more interested in. We might think of actually that also being actually deep budgets,

106
00:10:02,930 --> 00:10:07,040
which are much more structurally transformative and typically occur after revolutions,

107
00:10:07,040 --> 00:10:10,590
either from below that, it's probably popular revolutions or using tempo.

108
00:10:10,590 --> 00:10:17,690
This all got from above. And here are really kind of defining characteristics of the if these you have these revolutions is this kind

109
00:10:17,690 --> 00:10:27,530
of displacement of the state elites primarily enacted or realised through purging till he talks about this?

110
00:10:27,530 --> 00:10:28,100
Quite a lot.

111
00:10:28,100 --> 00:10:35,390
However, and this is where our insight comes, and this is what we want to speak to are still evolving theoretical edifice that we're developing.

112
00:10:35,390 --> 00:10:39,410
These kinds of deep purges, though extensive, have to by the nature.

113
00:10:39,410 --> 00:10:46,910
They can't be indiscriminate. They will target potential threats people who they see as having potentially counter-revolutionary potential.

114
00:10:46,910 --> 00:10:53,690
But they will look to retain certain types of people. We think, necessarily because going back to this point that they talked about earlier,

115
00:10:53,690 --> 00:10:57,590
there has to be forms of continuity and there has to be sources of experience and expertise to be able

116
00:10:57,590 --> 00:11:05,370
to implement the kind of revolutionary programmes that these people come to power promising to do.

117
00:11:05,370 --> 00:11:10,110
So with that kind of awkward for clearing theoretical justification aside,

118
00:11:10,110 --> 00:11:14,080
let's obviously get into the case in which I'm sure many of you you're familiar with,

119
00:11:14,080 --> 00:11:18,390
but we'll just rehearse some of the comments of key who, how, where and when.

120
00:11:18,390 --> 00:11:22,890
We know that on the choice of joint 1952, the three officers seise power.

121
00:11:22,890 --> 00:11:26,580
And in doing so, publicly commit to purging the army, the state.

122
00:11:26,580 --> 00:11:30,720
So this this question settings of purging is already immediately apparent is essential

123
00:11:30,720 --> 00:11:37,650
to the political project exemplified by that Anichebe quote that I started with and by.

124
00:11:37,650 --> 00:11:44,070
And then after initially coming to power, we see like a kind of like very polished and sudden interregnum transitional period where we have

125
00:11:44,070 --> 00:11:49,740
brief moments of pockets and government before the military formally take over in September.

126
00:11:49,740 --> 00:11:55,380
And shortly thereafter, the army announces the appointment of officers to all departments and administrations in the state

127
00:11:55,380 --> 00:12:01,510
bureaucracy in an attempt to take control of it and then redeploy it to its own to their own ends.

128
00:12:01,510 --> 00:12:05,920
Now, what we think of this is this is kind of a challenge for the free officers in many ways,

129
00:12:05,920 --> 00:12:12,790
a bit like the keep quote at the beginning where he says, you know, we're really desperately in need of technical expertise,

130
00:12:12,790 --> 00:12:16,990
and that's because our expertise cannot come from the ranks of the free officers and selves.

131
00:12:16,990 --> 00:12:22,390
We know Gilbert and I, we have a data set now that we've constructed of all of the free officers currently

132
00:12:22,390 --> 00:12:26,140
populating different biographical characteristics about not just their age,

133
00:12:26,140 --> 00:12:32,560
but their background. They come from what they serve and so forth, and when they want to serve, we just talk a little bit about the very end.

134
00:12:32,560 --> 00:12:37,910
And we know that when we just surveyed the offices, the middle rank of the four officers was captain.

135
00:12:37,910 --> 00:12:44,440
40 percent of them. These are very young individuals that are thirty three years old and thirty six.

136
00:12:44,440 --> 00:12:48,820
I'm not sure I would know how to run a state. I mean, they're very relative. They're inexperienced.

137
00:12:48,820 --> 00:12:53,800
They don't really have any experience of higher education. The Revolutionary Command Council,

138
00:12:53,800 --> 00:12:59,800
the political leadership of the free officers of its members and the two of them have graduated

139
00:12:59,800 --> 00:13:03,610
from university and happened to give in many ways peripheral actually to day-to-day missions,

140
00:13:03,610 --> 00:13:11,080
decision making. And then the only other thing I have admired in pictured pictured here and again, this, I think,

141
00:13:11,080 --> 00:13:17,500
motivates this kind of puzzled that we're thinking about, which is given the kind of expertise that this group can draw on.

142
00:13:17,500 --> 00:13:23,920
This must have implications for who they purge and who they retain within the state bureaucracy.

143
00:13:23,920 --> 00:13:26,710
So this is going to be just the general research question that will speak to which

144
00:13:26,710 --> 00:13:33,520
is this how did the 5G revolution transform Egypt's state and bureaucratic elites?

145
00:13:33,520 --> 00:13:41,110
So to get to this is kind of empirically, you might think difficult, but we think we've got a really good we've got a really good way of doing it.

146
00:13:41,110 --> 00:13:48,490
And that is by exploiting what is, I think, a hitherto unexplored or underutilised source, which is called Who's Who in Egypt.

147
00:13:48,490 --> 00:13:58,090
It's also published under several other names. Here is the this is the front cover of the issue from 1953, and This is a Time series.

148
00:13:58,090 --> 00:14:04,570
It's published from the 1930s, up until 1958 1959, when it ceases publications.

149
00:14:04,570 --> 00:14:10,630
So these are held in kind of incomplete collections like this took a long time to kind of track down the various volumes,

150
00:14:10,630 --> 00:14:17,350
but the majority of them were held between a set age and Cairo, which I'm sure many of you know the British Library holds quite a few of them.

151
00:14:17,350 --> 00:14:23,560
University of Wisconsin-Madison, for some reason, has has a lot of the time series, so we've basically managed to.

152
00:14:23,560 --> 00:14:26,950
What we're going to do is we're going to we're going to exploit the source to try to

153
00:14:26,950 --> 00:14:32,530
give us some kind of time varying insight into who is the elite during this period.

154
00:14:32,530 --> 00:14:37,360
And that's because one of the really nice things about the source material is that the front

155
00:14:37,360 --> 00:14:42,190
matter of every issue this is I should also mention this is a volume that's published in Cairo.

156
00:14:42,190 --> 00:14:50,920
It's printed in Cairo. It's edited by people based in Egypt, and it's published annually and the front matter of every issue, every volume.

157
00:14:50,920 --> 00:14:58,510
There is a seemingly complete list of all ministers and senior bureaucrats in in the state at this period.

158
00:14:58,510 --> 00:15:03,130
So this is, for example, as you can see, it's it's a kind of mix between.

159
00:15:03,130 --> 00:15:11,500
It's mainly French for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this is just assuming the kind of detail that we get.

160
00:15:11,500 --> 00:15:19,120
We don't just get this the minister and the senior civil cents, we get the call of the top echelon of the state bureaucracy.

161
00:15:19,120 --> 00:15:24,700
Now what's really nice about about these issues is not only do we have the names in their ranks and their titles,

162
00:15:24,700 --> 00:15:32,080
but in the interior of these volumes, which are very thick, by the way, you could kind of use them as a doorstop or to beat a burglar with.

163
00:15:32,080 --> 00:15:36,190
You have disaggregated biographical information about each person.

164
00:15:36,190 --> 00:15:41,500
So this is of the end, including people who you would think are actually including quite sensitive positions.

165
00:15:41,500 --> 00:15:46,620
So this is General Mohammed and then they we see some information about it.

166
00:15:46,620 --> 00:15:51,040
In Zimmerman's right hand side, he's won an award. He's got a royal honour, the Nile.

167
00:15:51,040 --> 00:15:56,740
He's the director of the special department at the Ministry of Interior sounds a bit spooky.

168
00:15:56,740 --> 00:16:02,020
We have stuff like where he's born, we have his date of birth, we have his education, we even have where he lives.

169
00:16:02,020 --> 00:16:05,590
And indeed, in some of the other biographical sketch sketches, we have even more than that.

170
00:16:05,590 --> 00:16:08,800
We have who they're married to, which social clubs they belong to.

171
00:16:08,800 --> 00:16:14,020
We have quite a lot of quite rich, disaggregated information that we can draw on and internal.

172
00:16:14,020 --> 00:16:15,880
It should be noted, we've heard in all of these.

173
00:16:15,880 --> 00:16:24,880
So from 1939 to 1959, have information for about two and a half thousand ministers and senior civil servants in Egypt.

174
00:16:24,880 --> 00:16:31,980
And the project that I'm currently talking about now, we're only using a very thin slice of data.

175
00:16:31,980 --> 00:16:44,250
So this gets us to some growth health warning that there will be some growth where we can start to get into this question of elite survival continued.

176
00:16:44,250 --> 00:16:50,900
So this is just using this data to just basically plot how long people stay in office, who's 52?

177
00:16:50,900 --> 00:16:57,480
So one of the really nice things about these issues here in Egypt is that the one that's published in 1952 is published in June of 1952.

178
00:16:57,480 --> 00:17:04,080
So it's extremely current. It's it's literally a snapshot of the state and bureaucratically just before the free officers take over.

179
00:17:04,080 --> 00:17:07,530
And then what we can do is we can use the subsequent editions to track whether

180
00:17:07,530 --> 00:17:11,910
these same people appear in these kind of seemingly complete lists over time.

181
00:17:11,910 --> 00:17:18,750
And this is the general distribution. We can see that nearly half of our individuals, they don't survive one year.

182
00:17:18,750 --> 00:17:23,860
So by 1953, nearly half of them have disappeared and.

183
00:17:23,860 --> 00:17:28,690
Here, maybe a bit more than 20 percent of them, and we lost one year and then we get this kind of interesting tale.

184
00:17:28,690 --> 00:17:34,840
We're actually nearly 10 percent of all athletes actually stay till the end of our time series when these additions stop publishing,

185
00:17:34,840 --> 00:17:40,360
which is at the end of our analysis period up until the consolidation of the United Arab Republic.

186
00:17:40,360 --> 00:17:45,310
We can formalise this in different ways of any stats. We can think of this as a survival problem,

187
00:17:45,310 --> 00:17:51,580
so we can think about the probability of individual survival in the aggregate over time for a Kaplan-Meier survival estimates.

188
00:17:51,580 --> 00:17:57,850
So we can see that by year one after the coup, the probability of somebody surviving drops by 50 percent and then of the 25 percent.

189
00:17:57,850 --> 00:18:04,660
And then again, you see this flattening going off. And it's really this that we're interested in who is being retained in the tail and who is more

190
00:18:04,660 --> 00:18:12,190
likely to be purged in the kind of opening years as the kind of revolution unfolds and consolidates.

191
00:18:12,190 --> 00:18:16,120
So this is when it gets a little bit numerical. So to do this,

192
00:18:16,120 --> 00:18:20,230
we've got to think systematically and we've got to draw tools from often regression

193
00:18:20,230 --> 00:18:24,790
analysis to be able to to account for the different kind of factors that we might.

194
00:18:24,790 --> 00:18:28,180
We think that might be influencing this. So this is what we're going to do.

195
00:18:28,180 --> 00:18:31,270
We're going to have a unit of analysis is going to be an individual.

196
00:18:31,270 --> 00:18:39,850
We've got six hundred and seventy four ministers and senior bureaucrats who are in post in just on the eve of the coup in June of fifty two.

197
00:18:39,850 --> 00:18:45,200
And we're going to index them. We're just going to pull these people I. And they're located in 19 ministries or institutions.

198
00:18:45,200 --> 00:18:49,150
That could be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry, Interior Ministry of Supply,

199
00:18:49,150 --> 00:18:53,710
the Diplomatic Corps, Foreign and so on and so forth through Parliament, et cetera.

200
00:18:53,710 --> 00:18:59,800
And what we're going to do is we're going to observe every one of these individuals yearly from 52 to 59.

201
00:18:59,800 --> 00:19:05,920
And the thing that we're going to try to explain is who is going to exit the elite first?

202
00:19:05,920 --> 00:19:08,860
So the way to think about this is, you know, what kind of familiar with these kinds of approaches.

203
00:19:08,860 --> 00:19:14,170
I don't want you to think I'm just waiting a statistical one wonder the way to think about this is that every single,

204
00:19:14,170 --> 00:19:20,590
every single time you observe these individuals, the question is we're going to multivariable as one when they exit the elite.

205
00:19:20,590 --> 00:19:25,570
And the question is how many units of time does it take measured in years for them to exit the elite as opposed to

206
00:19:25,570 --> 00:19:33,490
others as a function of a of a set of both individual level and ministry level institutional level characteristics?

207
00:19:33,490 --> 00:19:39,190
So this is if you're kind of I'm very happy to talk about this in the Q&A, just briefly mention.

208
00:19:39,190 --> 00:19:42,910
So the way we're going to estimate this is using a form of regression analysis in this case

209
00:19:42,910 --> 00:19:48,160
is bit of a mathematical multilevel look normal accelerated failure times over the analysis.

210
00:19:48,160 --> 00:19:50,650
Otherwise, you can think of this then history analysis.

211
00:19:50,650 --> 00:19:57,190
People use this a lot, and it's actually a technique that's pioneered by a statistician based at Nuffield Oxford,

212
00:19:57,190 --> 00:20:03,730
who died recently, said David Cox, proponent of the inventor of the occupational hazard models.

213
00:20:03,730 --> 00:20:08,830
What you want to do is something happen. See what you have medical. You have medical records for a bunch of patients.

214
00:20:08,830 --> 00:20:14,140
Some of them take the medicine, others don't. And it's the time to a medical outcome like survivable death.

215
00:20:14,140 --> 00:20:17,680
We can use this in the same way to think about survival or turnover or exiting the

216
00:20:17,680 --> 00:20:22,180
elite to study what happens to the state bureaucracy in Egypt after fifty two.

217
00:20:22,180 --> 00:20:25,510
So here this is just going to explain why I went through the equation.

218
00:20:25,510 --> 00:20:32,080
On the left hand side, the thing we're explaining is the time to the event for an individual located in the ministry in any given year.

219
00:20:32,080 --> 00:20:36,590
And we're going to explain that by a bunch of independent variables measured at both the Independent,

220
00:20:36,590 --> 00:20:41,320
at both the individual ministry level with basic the coefficients to be estimated.

221
00:20:41,320 --> 00:20:45,850
We've got just a dummy time varying variable, which will capture a two minute regime consolidation.

222
00:20:45,850 --> 00:20:52,510
And that's it. And then the key thing is that we probably think that individuals who are based in the same ministry,

223
00:20:52,510 --> 00:20:56,240
the hazard of being purged is probably not independent of each other.

224
00:20:56,240 --> 00:20:59,590
That is to say, if one person's purged in the Ministry of Interior,

225
00:20:59,590 --> 00:21:03,910
that might affect the likelihood that another person working in the same ministry, they get punished.

226
00:21:03,910 --> 00:21:10,810
They survive. And so we account for this by having ministry or institution level at random intercepts,

227
00:21:10,810 --> 00:21:15,220
having to talk about this in the future, if that's in any way interesting or not clear.

228
00:21:15,220 --> 00:21:16,540
So this is what we're going to do.

229
00:21:16,540 --> 00:21:22,450
We're going to operationalise these ideas numerically using these individual level characteristics that we get from these biographies.

230
00:21:22,450 --> 00:21:27,640
And we're going to we're going to structure around this competing dual logic of threat and experience.

231
00:21:27,640 --> 00:21:32,060
So we know from who's who's in Egypt, you have quite a lot of information about these people.

232
00:21:32,060 --> 00:21:41,410
We know, for example, if they're a minister and secretary, we can measure the closeness to the king at this point and who might be seen as a kind of

233
00:21:41,410 --> 00:21:44,950
source of some revolutionary threat for the number of world honours that they receive.

234
00:21:44,950 --> 00:21:50,080
This is all kind of proxy for proximity to the as good as we as we managed to get this far.

235
00:21:50,080 --> 00:21:55,270
We also know the titles. We know if they are from the notables, we know if there are Asher, for example,

236
00:21:55,270 --> 00:22:00,610
we might think that people with military training are more likely to be purged because they're seen as threatening these after it was,

237
00:22:00,610 --> 00:22:04,210
after all, a junior officer. Q So we can account for that. And we can also.

238
00:22:04,210 --> 00:22:09,040
We also think that there's something about spatial proximity that matters.

239
00:22:09,040 --> 00:22:15,270
So after 52, we see the palace become the Republican palace, and we think that people,

240
00:22:15,270 --> 00:22:18,670
which is the 52nd revolution, is in the in the words of the coup plotters.

241
00:22:18,670 --> 00:22:23,570
It's a national revolution. What was a foreign conspiracy? We think that as a concept.

242
00:22:23,570 --> 00:22:27,350
That threat is going to be felt much more locally within the confines of Egypt.

243
00:22:27,350 --> 00:22:33,500
And so people who operate at a distance might see, for example, diplomats who are based far away from Egypt.

244
00:22:33,500 --> 00:22:36,600
So we'll talk about a little bit about Egypt's diplomatic corps.

245
00:22:36,600 --> 00:22:39,650
And just the second, we might think that these people are seen as less important.

246
00:22:39,650 --> 00:22:46,940
And so because we're interested in talking to the events, we might think that threat also travels both spatially across and across time.

247
00:22:46,940 --> 00:22:53,420
And so people who are further away are just not prioritising that. So they're more likely to be retained as a function of this distance.

248
00:22:53,420 --> 00:22:56,480
So we can actually measure distance very, very easily. So we actually have maps.

249
00:22:56,480 --> 00:23:03,080
This is a map on the left hand side of Cairo from 1951 one to just the eve of the of the Revolution Street View.

250
00:23:03,080 --> 00:23:08,540
And we know these what you can see on the left hand side, the Ministry of Public Works, Parliament, Ministry of Public Health, and so forth.

251
00:23:08,540 --> 00:23:12,670
And what we can do is we can just draw Polygon's around these buildings, get this central,

252
00:23:12,670 --> 00:23:17,360
which is the average wage at centroid of these often multiple building spaces.

253
00:23:17,360 --> 00:23:23,420
And then we can just measure the distance in kilometres between the building and the and what becomes in this case, the Abdeen Palace.

254
00:23:23,420 --> 00:23:30,860
On the right hand side of the map, all the Republican policies of the Commons later on, this is actually much more interesting for diplomats.

255
00:23:30,860 --> 00:23:35,960
We think that they're probably because of the political programme with the three or four offices.

256
00:23:35,960 --> 00:23:42,050
They're probably going to be a set of privatisations around who's going to be recalled first, if indeed they are recalled.

257
00:23:42,050 --> 00:23:43,970
This again, this is using the source material.

258
00:23:43,970 --> 00:23:52,580
We can actually reconstruct the diplomatic presence of the Egyptian state or the fruit state on the eve of the 52 events.

259
00:23:52,580 --> 00:23:56,210
So this is just obviously a chloroplast, not followed by the number of different acts we've actually seen.

260
00:23:56,210 --> 00:24:03,170
Interestingly. And just on the eve of the revolution, most Egyptian diplomats are obviously in the United States and Europe.

261
00:24:03,170 --> 00:24:07,760
They're actually very few in the Arabic speaking Middle East. And this changes over time.

262
00:24:07,760 --> 00:24:14,300
But for our purposes here, the intuition is that if you're the ambassador to Argentina,

263
00:24:14,300 --> 00:24:20,840
you're just not threatening in the same way as a senior official in the Ministry of

264
00:24:20,840 --> 00:24:26,600
Interior and says a function of this distinction is more likely to survive for longer.

265
00:24:26,600 --> 00:24:34,130
And then we also have some measures for this kind of competing set of hypotheses related to experience this idea that actually the free officers,

266
00:24:34,130 --> 00:24:39,300
they do need to keep some people around to be able to get the job done. So we measure that in two principal ways.

267
00:24:39,300 --> 00:24:44,060
The first one is just the amount of time that people spend in their position of data starts to think.

268
00:24:44,060 --> 00:24:47,750
It's just going to mention the amount of years of persons held that position since starting line

269
00:24:47,750 --> 00:24:52,850
with the with the expectation being that controlling for will net of all these other factors.

270
00:24:52,850 --> 00:24:58,190
You know, if you know that if you notice a senior official or minister and undersecretary and you've been in your job for a long time,

271
00:24:58,190 --> 00:25:00,560
that might be quite a desirable person to keep around.

272
00:25:00,560 --> 00:25:07,040
Equally, we know quality in the case details that there's a real, real desperate need for technical expertise.

273
00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:11,030
And so we might think that people with Temple University degrees are just seen as more desirable.

274
00:25:11,030 --> 00:25:13,790
They're more important. And so they're also more likely to be kept around.

275
00:25:13,790 --> 00:25:20,960
So the implication of this is that the threat these these independent variables are coefficient should be in this case, positively side.

276
00:25:20,960 --> 00:25:27,020
They should be more likely to lead to somebody exiting the elite and contrary wise.

277
00:25:27,020 --> 00:25:32,240
These variables should be negatively deciding that they should mean that you can survive longer effectively.

278
00:25:32,240 --> 00:25:39,390
And this is a selection on observables designed to help you to think through at a kuto causal inference approach that you can think of.

279
00:25:39,390 --> 00:25:42,950
And so we have to control for potential confounding stuff, and we get that from the case.

280
00:25:42,950 --> 00:25:46,610
We know, for example, that in 52 53,

281
00:25:46,610 --> 00:25:54,290
a kind of sop to the Muslim brothers is that they allow they appoint the Muslim Brotherhood to knock off the Ministry of Endowments

282
00:25:54,290 --> 00:26:00,990
and that those are the brothers are allowed to kind of like take over some perhaps religiously inflected roles in the state.

283
00:26:00,990 --> 00:26:06,230
So those individuals who are empowered, they may be more or less vulnerable.

284
00:26:06,230 --> 00:26:13,580
We also think that when also takes power and 54, this represents a movement of regime consolidation, which could go one of the two ways it could be.

285
00:26:13,580 --> 00:26:18,090
Either that this then elicits a further round of purging or as we think, is really the case.

286
00:26:18,090 --> 00:26:22,280
You know, it is effectively being in control since since the three officers take power.

287
00:26:22,280 --> 00:26:27,350
And so this might actually lead to regime consolidation and so coups purging will take off.

288
00:26:27,350 --> 00:26:32,810
And then finally, it's self-evident that in larger ministries, that's just going to be naturally more turnover.

289
00:26:32,810 --> 00:26:39,270
And so people in those ministries and just there's just going to be more. There's going to be a ministry level effect as a consequence of that.

290
00:26:39,270 --> 00:26:44,420
And we do have even more populated models that I went on to talk about, what we talk about,

291
00:26:44,420 --> 00:26:47,660
where we can for things like age because we might think that older people are just more

292
00:26:47,660 --> 00:26:52,460
likely to retire or suffer health and than die naturally leave the data set that way.

293
00:26:52,460 --> 00:26:59,270
There are some gender dimensions. There are a handful of women in in this position during this period.

294
00:26:59,270 --> 00:27:03,200
We know their religion from the names, we know the membership. For things like social clubs.

295
00:27:03,200 --> 00:27:06,800
We test additional models, including these. They don't do anything.

296
00:27:06,800 --> 00:27:15,380
They're not important. But it's just worth flagging that we're trying to think through controlling out anything, any potential confounders.

297
00:27:15,380 --> 00:27:21,600
So these are the results. Hopefully, some of you at least have seen what a coiffed plot looks like before.

298
00:27:21,600 --> 00:27:25,130
All the way to understand this. Again, this is this is a regression model.

299
00:27:25,130 --> 00:27:31,940
So these are independent variables on the left hand side, these little dots, these are the estimated effects.

300
00:27:31,940 --> 00:27:36,080
In this case, the dots are exponentially entered into what's called a survival time ratio,

301
00:27:36,080 --> 00:27:42,530
or the median time that you would expect somebody to survive, given this characteristics in this case.

302
00:27:42,530 --> 00:27:46,590
If you're a senior official and these are located on the 95 percent confidence interval,

303
00:27:46,590 --> 00:27:53,750
so the intuition here when we think about statistical significance we're often talking about is an association distinguishable from zero, for example.

304
00:27:53,750 --> 00:27:58,500
If it's not, then the tail of these 95 percent confidence intervals will cross the red line here.

305
00:27:58,500 --> 00:28:04,010
Mark this one. And so we would say this is not statistically significant. That is to say it's not distinguishable from zero.

306
00:28:04,010 --> 00:28:10,520
And the way to interpret this is if these are effectively if you're a senior official and these are survival times,

307
00:28:10,520 --> 00:28:15,680
that means that senior officials are on average 22 percent less likely to survive and have median.

308
00:28:15,680 --> 00:28:20,390
The median survival is twenty two percent less compared to someone who's not a senior official.

309
00:28:20,390 --> 00:28:28,280
After adjusting for all these other factors. So a good thing, and I think typically we basically in summary,

310
00:28:28,280 --> 00:28:35,370
we do find blame for the strong evidence for this idea that there is this tension between threats and.

311
00:28:35,370 --> 00:28:42,180
Appearance leading to patterning individual outcomes, so we can see that if you're a senior official,

312
00:28:42,180 --> 00:28:45,870
you're it reduces your median survival time by about 22 percent.

313
00:28:45,870 --> 00:28:49,710
People with more rural illness, obviously they've received more baubles and walks from the king,

314
00:28:49,710 --> 00:28:52,260
which we're using as a measure of proximity to the king.

315
00:28:52,260 --> 00:28:58,980
They're also more likely to be at their survival time is also significantly a substantially reduced.

316
00:28:58,980 --> 00:29:04,530
These are continuous variables, so I'll show you some plots that make it a little bit more sense of this in a minute.

317
00:29:04,530 --> 00:29:10,080
And actually being a being a ostensibly notable is actually it's negative.

318
00:29:10,080 --> 00:29:15,030
It reduces your survival time, but it's not statistically significant.

319
00:29:15,030 --> 00:29:20,130
And that's when we look at this. When we decompose the models a little bit and we populate the variables in different orders.

320
00:29:20,130 --> 00:29:25,860
It's because this is also highly correlated with just being a more senior official and being more connected to the king.

321
00:29:25,860 --> 00:29:32,100
Interestingly, military officers, we know that they're poaching the army and the state, those with a kind of military training.

322
00:29:32,100 --> 00:29:37,260
They are. They look like their survival time is negatively impacted, but again, not statistically significant.

323
00:29:37,260 --> 00:29:46,530
Zero. And we do find support for this idea that those people who are distant from that power as it's playing out in incorrect,

324
00:29:46,530 --> 00:29:50,220
that as you increase distance, actually your survival time increases again.

325
00:29:50,220 --> 00:29:56,280
Unpack this a little bit more in a second. Equally, those people who have more experience are more likely to survive.

326
00:29:56,280 --> 00:30:00,060
The survival times increased and those people with the Terminal University degree.

327
00:30:00,060 --> 00:30:08,170
This is a binary variable. Their survival the median survival time is about nearly 20 percent greater than those without a ton of university degree.

328
00:30:08,170 --> 00:30:12,180
Again, adjusting for all these other factors. I went through the controls.

329
00:30:12,180 --> 00:30:18,210
They behave broadly as as we might expect, and it was not distinguishable from zero.

330
00:30:18,210 --> 00:30:24,780
So we can start to to to give a little bit more flesh and understand what these kind of relationships look like.

331
00:30:24,780 --> 00:30:31,770
Again, for our continuous variables, like if we think about years of experience, a free Q will take over.

332
00:30:31,770 --> 00:30:37,920
This is this can be measured as some people have one year and people have five years, some people have 10 years and people have 15 years.

333
00:30:37,920 --> 00:30:39,060
So it's a continuous variable,

334
00:30:39,060 --> 00:30:45,420
and we want to know how different values of that experiment will impact the outcome of interest in this case on the y axis.

335
00:30:45,420 --> 00:30:51,870
This is the survival time as a percentage. And then obviously, on the x axis, this is the time varying change.

336
00:30:51,870 --> 00:30:58,480
And what we what we operationalise this as is people who are the 5th and the 25th percentiles of experience.

337
00:30:58,480 --> 00:31:03,030
So for example, if you're at the 5th percentile of experience, you don't have much experience.

338
00:31:03,030 --> 00:31:06,540
If you're in the 95th percentile of experience, you're pretty experienced, right?

339
00:31:06,540 --> 00:31:11,340
And what we see is that if we compare the two survival curves of these two different characteristics,

340
00:31:11,340 --> 00:31:17,640
we can see that those people with more experience on average in a given unit time, their survival is about 10 to 15 percent less.

341
00:31:17,640 --> 00:31:22,530
So it's it's important. Equally, exactly the same logic applies to owners.

342
00:31:22,530 --> 00:31:28,230
The difference between people who have more or less it's not as substantive, but still it's still present.

343
00:31:28,230 --> 00:31:33,400
It's maybe about seven or eight percent. If the more honest you have, the closer you are to the king.

344
00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:36,840
Your survival time reduces by seven or eight percent in any given unit of time.

345
00:31:36,840 --> 00:31:43,680
Then it narrows as we get to the end of our analysis period because most of these people have been purged, basically.

346
00:31:43,680 --> 00:31:48,610
And then finally, this question of distance, those people who are again at the 5th percentile,

347
00:31:48,610 --> 00:31:53,670
those people who are very spatially proximate to the Republican palace in that day to day working lives versus

348
00:31:53,670 --> 00:31:58,740
people who are quite far away and those people are much further away than much more likely to survive.

349
00:31:58,740 --> 00:32:02,970
And again, in the kind of qualitative details, I'm happy to talk about this in the Q&A.

350
00:32:02,970 --> 00:32:03,870
It really is the case.

351
00:32:03,870 --> 00:32:11,170
The diplomatic corps is broadly retained with some exceptions, and there are interesting exceptions to that that fulfil the broader patent.

352
00:32:11,170 --> 00:32:15,390
So, for example, the British about the Egyptian ambassador to the UK,

353
00:32:15,390 --> 00:32:19,860
the Egyptian ambassador to Italy, both people who are known to be very, very close to the king.

354
00:32:19,860 --> 00:32:27,420
They're both purged. But then generally, the average tendency is that people who who are in the diplomatic corps are retained.

355
00:32:27,420 --> 00:32:32,550
So this is the last graph, the promise and this this gets at this idea.

356
00:32:32,550 --> 00:32:37,590
So in our modelling strategy, we're trying to think about variants or the thing that explains the outcome.

357
00:32:37,590 --> 00:32:41,770
That is how long it takes for you to get purged as operating on two fundamental different levels.

358
00:32:41,770 --> 00:32:45,330
You can have individual level characteristics like all you, a senior official involved,

359
00:32:45,330 --> 00:32:51,120
or you can have the place where you work in one place, regardless of who you are and your experience.

360
00:32:51,120 --> 00:32:53,910
Some places just your association with them.

361
00:32:53,910 --> 00:32:59,760
There's going to be like what you might think of as a residual institutional effect on being personal and if we do find evidence of that.

362
00:32:59,760 --> 00:33:08,440
So this year, what we're doing technically is applauding the random intercepts from models, and we have two two different sets of intercepts here.

363
00:33:08,440 --> 00:33:11,550
We have two sets of running into sets in the light grey from what we might think

364
00:33:11,550 --> 00:33:14,580
of as the null model that is a model where you don't have any covariates.

365
00:33:14,580 --> 00:33:19,710
On the right hand side, we're just going to look at the residual variants at this level two factor, which is the Ministry of Institution.

366
00:33:19,710 --> 00:33:24,780
And then we have the darker grey ones, which is the residual variance once we take into account all these variables.

367
00:33:24,780 --> 00:33:30,570
I went on to talk about that scene being a senior official distance experience and so forth.

368
00:33:30,570 --> 00:33:34,350
And what we find is actually sometimes quite quite interesting in the normal.

369
00:33:34,350 --> 00:33:35,040
Actually, this seems.

370
00:33:35,040 --> 00:33:41,490
To be a kind of residual importance, if you work in the royal court or associated with the Royal Court, you're much more likely to be purged.

371
00:33:41,490 --> 00:33:46,550
If you work in parliament, you're much more likely to be purged.

372
00:33:46,550 --> 00:33:50,570
However, when we start to take into account actually individual level characteristics in the former,

373
00:33:50,570 --> 00:33:57,530
we can see that once we take into account like ties to the King, actually, then the effect of the Royal Court is attenuated to zero.

374
00:33:57,530 --> 00:34:01,760
That is to say, this institutional effect is really just proxy for individual level characteristics.

375
00:34:01,760 --> 00:34:04,580
Parliament However, if you have any kind of connexion with parliament,

376
00:34:04,580 --> 00:34:08,360
net of whatever your background is, you're just much more likely to be purchasing.

377
00:34:08,360 --> 00:34:13,670
If anyone knows the case, details of Egypt 152, that makes complete sense.

378
00:34:13,670 --> 00:34:17,900
Equally, the diplomatic corps no model. What we just don't take into account is things like spatial distance.

379
00:34:17,900 --> 00:34:19,700
It looks like you're more likely to survive.

380
00:34:19,700 --> 00:34:24,260
But as soon as you take into account distance and all these other factors, again, it's not distinguishable from zero.

381
00:34:24,260 --> 00:34:30,080
However, when we do still have these two other institutional effects that can't just be explained by other variables,

382
00:34:30,080 --> 00:34:36,440
it looks as if the institution itself has an independent effect on individual survival and turnover.

383
00:34:36,440 --> 00:34:42,710
And those are the following. So on the one hand, education which I think totally aligns with what kind of expertise experience loyalties.

384
00:34:42,710 --> 00:34:48,410
If you work in the ministry, if you work in Ministry of Education, and this also includes the leadership of universities,

385
00:34:48,410 --> 00:34:51,350
you just you're not going to get punched, you are much more likely to be retained.

386
00:34:51,350 --> 00:34:54,950
That seems to be some kind of protective halo being associated with these institutions.

387
00:34:54,950 --> 00:34:58,460
That means that you're more likely to stick around and at the same time, foreign.

388
00:34:58,460 --> 00:35:06,620
If there's something that I had not picked up from case readings that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs again is broadly retained intact.

389
00:35:06,620 --> 00:35:10,700
And you could probably tell a kind of post-hoc story about what that is because

390
00:35:10,700 --> 00:35:17,120
that there is forms of knowledge of expertise about different parts of the world. That's language or experience the three officers just do not have.

391
00:35:17,120 --> 00:35:19,880
And so they keep these people around, although we know it as well.

392
00:35:19,880 --> 00:35:24,890
From the case details that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs when it comes to really important diplomatic issues,

393
00:35:24,890 --> 00:35:33,350
they're basically sidelined and then you have personal emissaries. So Heikal, for example, who the free officers used to kind of conduct business.

394
00:35:33,350 --> 00:35:40,620
So here's the rushed conclusion discussion. We actually find that these competing logics of threat and expertise,

395
00:35:40,620 --> 00:35:46,670
we do think that they powerfully patent the survival of colonial era state athletes in a post-colonial period.

396
00:35:46,670 --> 00:35:52,220
When you have this kind of revolution from above individuals connected to Egypt's deposed monarchs and very senior officials,

397
00:35:52,220 --> 00:35:59,270
which is much more likely to be purged. Also, people who are attached to these particular institutions experienced officials,

398
00:35:59,270 --> 00:36:02,780
on the other hand, and those with advanced university degrees will retain their survival.

399
00:36:02,780 --> 00:36:06,170
Time is just much greater. They were kept around for longer.

400
00:36:06,170 --> 00:36:12,080
And again, we have these kind of residual workplace effects that suggest that some institutions were just seen as too important,

401
00:36:12,080 --> 00:36:16,970
like the Ministry of Education or too threatening, like the Parliament and these.

402
00:36:16,970 --> 00:36:22,130
Instead, they were these kind of institutional effects that we can also statistically detect.

403
00:36:22,130 --> 00:36:26,720
Now here's my kind of defensive. So the point?

404
00:36:26,720 --> 00:36:33,770
Just anticipating some questions. This is ongoing. So we've got two big unresolved questions that we want to we want to attend to that.

405
00:36:33,770 --> 00:36:35,300
We just haven't had time to yet.

406
00:36:35,300 --> 00:36:41,030
One is that for those people who were retained, we can trace the careers we can know if they stay in the same ministry or not.

407
00:36:41,030 --> 00:36:49,280
We can tell you if we're not. We're quite interested in the career trajectories of these 52 352 elites who keep their positions.

408
00:36:49,280 --> 00:36:53,060
We don't have strong expectations about that. It's kind of an open empirical question.

409
00:36:53,060 --> 00:36:53,960
We also, as I mentioned,

410
00:36:53,960 --> 00:37:00,800
we have a list of the kind of original three hundred and thirty five free officers and we know who joins the states and who doesn't,

411
00:37:00,800 --> 00:37:04,130
who keeps, who stays in the army, who goes and joins different ministries.

412
00:37:04,130 --> 00:37:08,060
And we think that might be also quite an interesting question to see who gets parachuted

413
00:37:08,060 --> 00:37:14,000
into which bits of the state and why and what others retain their army commissions.

414
00:37:14,000 --> 00:37:18,830
That's it for me. That was kind of interesting and urgent. Thanks.

415
00:37:18,830 --> 00:37:27,640
Thank you, Neal. Very interesting. I have a question, which is that.

416
00:37:27,640 --> 00:37:32,370
I can see that. The data that you're.

417
00:37:32,370 --> 00:37:37,220
Compiling the revolution needed can be used.

418
00:37:37,220 --> 00:37:46,070
In the sense of the study of political upheavals broadly across many different regions of the world and that I understand.

419
00:37:46,070 --> 00:37:57,290
But in terms of Egyptian history, are you putting empirical flesh on something that everybody already knows intuitively?

420
00:37:57,290 --> 00:38:01,090
Or are you arguing against someone? Is there actually anyone?

421
00:38:01,090 --> 00:38:06,530
I mean, I mean, I mean, granted, 1952 is, you know, perceived sort of in popular terms as a watershed.

422
00:38:06,530 --> 00:38:15,300
Everything changes. But. Presumably, people who write history know that that's not the case, I mean, certainly if you're writing about cinema, I mean,

423
00:38:15,300 --> 00:38:17,310
you get a lot of people talking about, you know,

424
00:38:17,310 --> 00:38:23,610
the cinema of the Nasser period and you do find people who assume that everything suddenly changes after 1952.

425
00:38:23,610 --> 00:38:32,200
But anybody who. Even fairly casually, studies the history of Egyptian cinema knows that that's not the case and that, you know,

426
00:38:32,200 --> 00:38:41,590
things don't actually change very much at all immediately and then arguably not really very much until after the public sector.

427
00:38:41,590 --> 00:38:46,910
After Nasser dies in 1971, graduates from Institute began directing films.

428
00:38:46,910 --> 00:38:54,370
And so I guess, you know, the basic question is, are you arguing against somebody in terms of Egyptian history?

429
00:38:54,370 --> 00:39:01,000
Yeah, that feels like a very damning comment on my career to date, which is I just happened see things that the shootings that people already hold.

430
00:39:01,000 --> 00:39:05,080
They think it's a good point.

431
00:39:05,080 --> 00:39:08,440
I mean, it's certainly the case in the secondary literature and the kind of suddenly the kind

432
00:39:08,440 --> 00:39:14,980
of historical v popular story of the movement and the mobilisation of the revolution.

433
00:39:14,980 --> 00:39:22,750
52. It does. It is these forms of kind of these forms of continuity have not been fleshed out and kind of pointed to it does.

434
00:39:22,750 --> 00:39:29,620
It is often portrayed as like just a point blank. This continuity movement or radical political change where it is absolutely the case.

435
00:39:29,620 --> 00:39:37,060
We do find this enormous purging going on with this question about who is retained and who's kept around that is seemingly absent.

436
00:39:37,060 --> 00:39:45,760
I would be interested to know if there are, if anyone has any suggestions of people who have kind of documented that and one which they haven't.

437
00:39:45,760 --> 00:39:51,040
I would also say that this is my kind of stock answer to this kind of question.

438
00:39:51,040 --> 00:39:56,980
I think there is merit in arbitrating established knowledge or truisms.

439
00:39:56,980 --> 00:40:01,690
Things that we will hold to be self-evident in a lot of cases.

440
00:40:01,690 --> 00:40:06,310
A lot of these truisms, when you start to kind of scratch at them empirically with the best kind of information available,

441
00:40:06,310 --> 00:40:09,550
kind of systematic empirical analytical techniques,

442
00:40:09,550 --> 00:40:16,720
it becomes a little more nuanced and a lot more and a lot more messy and complicated than perhaps extant understandings of law.

443
00:40:16,720 --> 00:40:24,760
And so even as exercise of just confirming what we already know, I would kind of insist that it's it's valuable again, like, where's the findings?

444
00:40:24,760 --> 00:40:30,250
It's not so much that we're kind of arguing against people, but rather showing things that hadn't previously been appreciated.

445
00:40:30,250 --> 00:40:38,050
So, for example, of the kind of forms of continuity and the retention of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Corps,

446
00:40:38,050 --> 00:40:40,870
as far as we know, is this just not been picked up by anyone? And again,

447
00:40:40,870 --> 00:40:45,610
like this is quite interesting and gives us some insight into the logic and thinking

448
00:40:45,610 --> 00:40:50,770
of the free officers and in turn helps us to explain kind of what comes later.

449
00:40:50,770 --> 00:40:57,130
Yeah, let's maybe it's slightly unsatisfactory answer to your to your all too familiar question with others.

450
00:40:57,130 --> 00:41:04,200
In fact, I'm sure I've asked you the same question from the lectures that you've given at Harvard,

451
00:41:04,200 --> 00:41:11,140
but I'm actually it was a good it was a good answer to the question. I should remind everybody that we should use the Q&A button.

452
00:41:11,140 --> 00:41:17,350
If you want to ask questions, we have a question from Yasmin Mathur, which is that she says,

453
00:41:17,350 --> 00:41:22,840
Maybe I missed this, but can you say something about the security services in terms of redeployment?

454
00:41:22,840 --> 00:41:29,590
Yeah. So for what we're looking at in the underboss study and just in terms of the information that we have available to us,

455
00:41:29,590 --> 00:41:35,020
the kind of coercive arms of the state that we can empirically observe is the Ministry of the War in the Navy, as it's called at this point.

456
00:41:35,020 --> 00:41:41,260
And then also is formally called the Ministry of Interior was a failure.

457
00:41:41,260 --> 00:41:46,570
In those cases, it seems to be that that there isn't so much of an institutional effect going on.

458
00:41:46,570 --> 00:41:51,100
I mean, I could show you the slides where I say this, where we find this.

459
00:41:51,100 --> 00:41:59,650
It seems that these that these these Sunni as opposed to the the Ministry of Interior, this is broadly cleared out.

460
00:41:59,650 --> 00:42:05,290
And this is being pretty well explained by the fact that people who are leading the ministry at this point

461
00:42:05,290 --> 00:42:09,580
fulfil all the characteristics that we think would be seen as like a source of counter-revolutionary stress.

462
00:42:09,580 --> 00:42:14,890
These are people who you may have some military training. They've got maybe not so much experience.

463
00:42:14,890 --> 00:42:20,630
There aren't very many of them because these are quite small ministries, often as a consequence of.

464
00:42:20,630 --> 00:42:27,890
Claiming policy of the residue of British colonial policy and the people who are starving are often quite close to the king, for example,

465
00:42:27,890 --> 00:42:33,920
so these would all be people that we would say it's not the fact that they work in the Ministry of Interior that's explaining this.

466
00:42:33,920 --> 00:42:36,800
It's just actually the individual level characteristics.

467
00:42:36,800 --> 00:42:43,520
What we were surprised to find, I kind of I hesitate to say this, but if you read the abstract of the war,

468
00:42:43,520 --> 00:42:47,330
we did actually find that people with military training were more likely to be purged.

469
00:42:47,330 --> 00:42:54,950
However, this turns out to be quite sensitive to how you model it statistically and.

470
00:42:54,950 --> 00:42:59,240
It behaves I mean, look, I mean, depending on the kind of analytical choices that you make,

471
00:42:59,240 --> 00:43:04,640
it does seem to be that people with, for example, military training are perceived as being especially threatening.

472
00:43:04,640 --> 00:43:12,320
However, this could be an artefact of the kind of of the of how we decide to kind of statistically estimate these associations.

473
00:43:12,320 --> 00:43:20,610
So take it with a pinch of salt that this is going to affect the kind of drops in and out of importance, depending on, as I say, analytical choices.

474
00:43:20,610 --> 00:43:23,640
Sorry, I you.

475
00:43:23,640 --> 00:43:31,680
We have a question from an anonymous attendee which is who says thank you very much for your wonderful sharing of your data and analysis.

476
00:43:31,680 --> 00:43:40,380
I want to ask if three officers were assimilated into elite culture of the former dynasty as people who were running the state?

477
00:43:40,380 --> 00:43:47,790
Or is it more that those who were that those old elites were incorporated into the new military culture?

478
00:43:47,790 --> 00:43:54,450
That's a good question. I want to bring in my classic Glantz, who is otherwise in free writing on my on my activities thus far.

479
00:43:54,450 --> 00:44:01,380
You may have some interesting, insightful to say about that because I see nothing immediately jumps to mind Gilbert.

480
00:44:01,380 --> 00:44:11,650
Sure, happy to. I mean, I think it's an interesting question. It's something we have to give a little bit of more thought to.

481
00:44:11,650 --> 00:44:18,220
I think that we have to be precise when we talk about which elites are being incorporated or we incorporated back

482
00:44:18,220 --> 00:44:26,440
into the state and which military elites are actually leaving uniform to those serving other arms of the state.

483
00:44:26,440 --> 00:44:32,800
And I think that once we can start to empirically answer those questions, we might have a better sense of which way the arrow points.

484
00:44:32,800 --> 00:44:39,040
So it is a kind of former athletes being socialised or incorporated into a new culture,

485
00:44:39,040 --> 00:44:48,400
or is it that the new military elite itself is being incorporated into this kind of historically statist culture that existed under the priority?

486
00:44:48,400 --> 00:44:54,010
So I think it's a question that we still have to answer, but it's a good one.

487
00:44:54,010 --> 00:44:58,030
OK, I have another question, this one's from Marilyn Booth, and she says, Thanks, Neal,

488
00:44:58,030 --> 00:45:05,260
this is fascinating and having myself worked a bit in the 19th century equivalent to those who's who volumes.

489
00:45:05,260 --> 00:45:13,030
It's interesting to see the level of detail, but I'm wondering about what isn't in those sources and how that might matter.

490
00:45:13,030 --> 00:45:19,600
For instance, I wonder if some senior bureaucrats moved laterally back to the for a while or into a

491
00:45:19,600 --> 00:45:24,460
company and might have remained an important part of this elite still connected in,

492
00:45:24,460 --> 00:45:29,860
but not so visible in these sources. And also, I wonder about family.

493
00:45:29,860 --> 00:45:36,470
I wouldn't be surprised if who was married to whom still counted in revolutionary Egypt.

494
00:45:36,470 --> 00:45:46,130
Yeah, this is a very astute question in kind of so the the questions are both important substantive as it relates to the case,

495
00:45:46,130 --> 00:45:52,280
but also kind of very insightful as opposed to the kind of statistical kinds of strategies that we're undertaking here,

496
00:45:52,280 --> 00:45:56,810
which are necessarily quite sensitive to what you might think of as an admitted variable,

497
00:45:56,810 --> 00:46:04,490
so-called admitted variable bias where some portion of our effect could actually be capturing something we're not taking into account in the model.

498
00:46:04,490 --> 00:46:12,860
And so the associations that we're finding a potentially spurious we all all of the points that you raised, we thought about.

499
00:46:12,860 --> 00:46:22,280
So as it as it relates to family, we have thought about trying to capture some kind of measure about all these people connected to each

500
00:46:22,280 --> 00:46:27,560
other in some kind of the way that we're not currently observing in the analysis we can observe,

501
00:46:27,560 --> 00:46:31,520
like do they just work in the same place together? We are kind of capturing that residual variance.

502
00:46:31,520 --> 00:46:36,530
But of course, it could be that you could be straddling lots of different ministries and institutions.

503
00:46:36,530 --> 00:46:40,970
We do have this variable. We know which social clubs they belong to, these who's who.

504
00:46:40,970 --> 00:46:48,020
They're kind of remarkably candid and contain a remarkable amount of detail about some of these people's personal lives,

505
00:46:48,020 --> 00:46:53,300
including what their home address the telephone number. But also, importantly, which social clubs they belong to.

506
00:46:53,300 --> 00:46:57,860
And our assumption being is that there could be forms of kinship or other kinds of anonymous

507
00:46:57,860 --> 00:47:02,630
social networks connecting these people that we're not currently taking into account.

508
00:47:02,630 --> 00:47:06,650
So what we can basically do is we can construct the measure, which is do people.

509
00:47:06,650 --> 00:47:10,390
That's I mean, there's several of them. One of them is just how many social clubs do you belong to?

510
00:47:10,390 --> 00:47:16,700
And the implication being more social clubs, you belong to this the more connexions that you might have another one.

511
00:47:16,700 --> 00:47:19,220
And when we take that into account, it doesn't change anything.

512
00:47:19,220 --> 00:47:22,730
The other one, which we haven't taken into account yet because it kind of problem ties,

513
00:47:22,730 --> 00:47:26,210
is our analysis and maybe ways that we haven't really sort through,

514
00:47:26,210 --> 00:47:31,730
which is as soon as you start talking about people being connected, that means that they're not necessarily independent from each other.

515
00:47:31,730 --> 00:47:38,060
And that actually can do some pretty, some difficult questions for the way that we're currently analysing things.

516
00:47:38,060 --> 00:47:43,970
It is possible to say, for example, that if somebody survives and they belong to a social, a certain social club,

517
00:47:43,970 --> 00:47:49,880
does that mean that someone who also belongs to the club is also more likely to survive in a given year, for example?

518
00:47:49,880 --> 00:47:57,560
We haven't. We can take that into account, but I haven't thought of a clever way of doing it otherwise in terms of like again,

519
00:47:57,560 --> 00:48:04,400
just looping back to questions like marriage. One of the problems that we face is that the biographical sketches are quite inconsistent in how

520
00:48:04,400 --> 00:48:10,220
much information we report and and some people don't have these biographical sketches at all.

521
00:48:10,220 --> 00:48:15,050
And so what we have to do is we have to use a statistical technique called multiple imputation,

522
00:48:15,050 --> 00:48:22,700
where we simulate the missing value using of the characteristics that we do know about this person that we think also predicts the value.

523
00:48:22,700 --> 00:48:26,900
We can do that and try to recover this missing information, although it's not,

524
00:48:26,900 --> 00:48:31,910
it's not ideal, but it's still the gold standard about how we should be going about it.

525
00:48:31,910 --> 00:48:34,850
And it also say also say there are some statistical workarounds.

526
00:48:34,850 --> 00:48:40,280
We're currently thinking about this issue and that we don't have I don't have a complete answer to it.

527
00:48:40,280 --> 00:48:42,980
This issue at this question of how people can get purged,

528
00:48:42,980 --> 00:48:50,300
they can leave the state early and then go back to the isbut or the whatever and and then lay low for

529
00:48:50,300 --> 00:48:55,490
a couple of years and then move back to Carter and retain the influence that is absolutely possible.

530
00:48:55,490 --> 00:49:00,680
Absolutely. Like our definition of the elite here is necessarily quite thin.

531
00:49:00,680 --> 00:49:05,390
So it's about the direct exercise of political power as you are kind of ensconced in office.

532
00:49:05,390 --> 00:49:09,770
It could well be that these people aren't just going to disappear into the other evaporate.

533
00:49:09,770 --> 00:49:13,610
They're still behind the scenes. They're still influential in one way or another.

534
00:49:13,610 --> 00:49:19,550
And we can't account for that. So there could be other forms of continuity that we're not taking into account.

535
00:49:19,550 --> 00:49:21,200
And that's an interesting question.

536
00:49:21,200 --> 00:49:30,000
And as a 5:52 on the 20th of January, I don't have a kind of a clever way of getting at it, but it's definitely relevant.

537
00:49:30,000 --> 00:49:35,570
I suspect this might be something where we just have to hold our hands up and say,

538
00:49:35,570 --> 00:49:40,790
this is obviously plausible and this is kind of worthy of further empirical research because having kind of we've looked at this,

539
00:49:40,790 --> 00:49:44,840
this is quite exhaustively. I'm not sure it's something that we can recover.

540
00:49:44,840 --> 00:49:50,540
What I would say that does speak to your question when people exit the elite with a very,

541
00:49:50,540 --> 00:49:57,290
very with kind of vanishingly few exceptions, once they exit elite, they never come back.

542
00:49:57,290 --> 00:50:01,610
So this kind of light departure and return, reinventing yourself type dynamic,

543
00:50:01,610 --> 00:50:10,520
at least as it applies to getting back into all of these kind of like formal fancy jobs or like high status jobs doesn't seem to be at stake.

544
00:50:10,520 --> 00:50:17,730
I actually have another question that I want to ask, which is that you must have.

545
00:50:17,730 --> 00:50:27,930
Not been able to avoid thinking about 2011 when you're doing this paper, because in 2011 there were all kinds of desire to purge.

546
00:50:27,930 --> 00:50:35,850
But one thing about 2011 was that, you know, the fall of the regime wasn't actually a uniform thing.

547
00:50:35,850 --> 00:50:41,440
There were some parts of the government that arguably never fell and that always remained in the house.

548
00:50:41,440 --> 00:50:48,270
I mean, certainly the security services were never in the hands of revolutionary forces and the military and the,

549
00:50:48,270 --> 00:50:54,270
you know, the Foreign Foreign Ministry, for example. And so from from the data that you looked at,

550
00:50:54,270 --> 00:51:02,400
have you seen any evidence that the fall of the regime was actually incomplete and was only consolidated over time?

551
00:51:02,400 --> 00:51:10,290
Yeah. I mean, we all kind of showing that in some sense. I mean, it does seem to be that there are all kind of holdout parts of the state.

552
00:51:10,290 --> 00:51:17,190
So, for example, Education Ministry, the diplomatic corps in which again, it's almost as if they don't kind of get to them.

553
00:51:17,190 --> 00:51:21,660
So there's this question of ambassadors, for example, or the kind of diplomatic representation abroad.

554
00:51:21,660 --> 00:51:26,040
That does seem to be a kind of prioritisation going on in which people who are kind of at hand who may

555
00:51:26,040 --> 00:51:30,720
be seen as more threatening are much more likely to be purged and people who are kind of further away.

556
00:51:30,720 --> 00:51:36,120
What I would say, I mean, this is what we're trying to think, like contemporary parallels.

557
00:51:36,120 --> 00:51:39,960
The more interesting one for me is actually not 2011, it's 2013. And here,

558
00:51:39,960 --> 00:51:46,980
I think this gives us some insights into what we might think of as different dynamics of purging as a function of the political event itself.

559
00:51:46,980 --> 00:51:53,020
So in 2013, we would think about what we see as a kind of almost like a restorative period of time.

560
00:51:53,020 --> 00:51:59,370
Right. So it's not necessarily transformative. It's just undoing what's happened in the couple of years previously.

561
00:51:59,370 --> 00:52:05,040
And in that instance, the literature actually suggests that we should expect quite shallow purging.

562
00:52:05,040 --> 00:52:11,610
So we should only have some people being strategically kind of cold, if you will.

563
00:52:11,610 --> 00:52:18,180
But in fact, actually what we see is actually, I think that the kind of elliptical return to authoritarianism in 2013 really

564
00:52:18,180 --> 00:52:22,290
sees parts of the state being hollowed out and new people being brought in.

565
00:52:22,290 --> 00:52:25,230
And that's an interesting question for the literature, for political scientists,

566
00:52:25,230 --> 00:52:30,660
because I wonder whether these dynamics of deep transformative purges versus shallow purges.

567
00:52:30,660 --> 00:52:36,900
I wonder whether the shyness of purging they're claiming is actually reflecting the shallowness a data

568
00:52:36,900 --> 00:52:46,740
which is that they tend to just they just empirically focus at an even narrower slice of the state.

569
00:52:46,740 --> 00:52:53,370
I can also see I can see a question from Mohammed, who is looking to see just about to ask that once there was a technical question which I.

570
00:52:53,370 --> 00:52:56,710
Oh please. I'm here for the technical questions.

571
00:52:56,710 --> 00:53:04,290
Mohammed yet this year, or at least read your writing, let me read the question so that everybody else knows what question you're addressing.

572
00:53:04,290 --> 00:53:11,760
The question is in your statistical analysis, did you preserve the common assumption of independence and identical distribution?

573
00:53:11,760 --> 00:53:18,180
That's the question. Yeah. So the answer to that is no.

574
00:53:18,180 --> 00:53:25,710
So the data structure is level. So first of all, we assume that individuals who were located within the same institutional ministry,

575
00:53:25,710 --> 00:53:29,790
the individual has it rates or survival times probably correlated with each other.

576
00:53:29,790 --> 00:53:34,540
And so we account for that with an explicitly multilevel structure where we have random intercepts of the ministry

577
00:53:34,540 --> 00:53:40,740
and information level institutional level to be able to take into account that clustering or non independence.

578
00:53:40,740 --> 00:53:46,260
In terms of distributions, I'm not quite sure this is exactly what you're asking for, but it does have some bearing on our analysis.

579
00:53:46,260 --> 00:53:51,030
There is an assumption in terms of unsurvivable is a so-called proportional hazards.

580
00:53:51,030 --> 00:54:00,450
I kind of briefly just this halfway through the talk, which actually our data village so often in the in kind of proportional hazard models.

581
00:54:00,450 --> 00:54:04,770
The idea is that you have parallel trends given whatever exclusionary you have.

582
00:54:04,770 --> 00:54:12,360
So, for example, we have a binary variable 1.0. We should see the survival lines being parallel for both statuses for zero and one.

583
00:54:12,360 --> 00:54:17,100
Actually, that's not the case for all is actually what we say to see is a violation of that where,

584
00:54:17,100 --> 00:54:21,450
for example, I wish I had a plot to show you at the beginning of all of our time series.

585
00:54:21,450 --> 00:54:26,100
Being a senior official, for example, the the hazard of being a senior official,

586
00:54:26,100 --> 00:54:29,700
the hazard of purging is much greater than towards the end of the time series,

587
00:54:29,700 --> 00:54:34,140
so that the significance of the salience of these covariates changing of the changes over time.

588
00:54:34,140 --> 00:54:38,130
So to address this, we use an accelerated, failure tolerant model,

589
00:54:38,130 --> 00:54:44,490
which is something that I had to learn about relatively recently because I found out that these assumptions were being violated.

590
00:54:44,490 --> 00:54:48,960
And indeed, we implement that and they are substantively similar to our main results,

591
00:54:48,960 --> 00:54:54,100
with one exception, with the exception of military officers referred to in previous answer.

592
00:54:54,100 --> 00:54:59,790
This is the one that's actually very sensitive to the kind of distributional assumptions behind all models.

593
00:54:59,790 --> 00:55:03,390
And if you have if you assume proportional hazards, actually,

594
00:55:03,390 --> 00:55:08,460
military officers do become quite having military training is quite an important predictor of purging,

595
00:55:08,460 --> 00:55:14,520
as is a kind of institutional effect of being associated with or working in the Ministry of War and the Navy.

596
00:55:14,520 --> 00:55:18,910
If you don't and you have what I think is probably a more defensible approach,

597
00:55:18,910 --> 00:55:24,090
which is what we're doing now, that finding is then becomes indistinguishable from zero,

598
00:55:24,090 --> 00:55:29,730
suggesting that actually the result itself is actually a factor of these non proportional hazards,

599
00:55:29,730 --> 00:55:34,530
as opposed to it being substantively important whether you have military training or not.

600
00:55:34,530 --> 00:55:38,630
Hopefully, that's clear and cogent.

601
00:55:38,630 --> 00:55:46,160
There's a question also from the one question, which I haven't asked yet, which is from Brody McDonald saying, thanks very much for the presentation.

602
00:55:46,160 --> 00:55:51,230
Do you theorise that the relatively reduced purging for foreign affairs is explained

603
00:55:51,230 --> 00:56:00,150
by the need for their knowledge of languages and international countries, the distance from the palace, or perhaps both?

604
00:56:00,150 --> 00:56:05,730
So that is kind of the answer that I would give. That is our post-hoc explanation.

605
00:56:05,730 --> 00:56:10,170
This is what actually we're going into. We're getting into into case study research.

606
00:56:10,170 --> 00:56:16,410
So this is we're trying to find confirmatory evidence for this. And here you could think of what a distribution of different types of evidence.

607
00:56:16,410 --> 00:56:24,150
What we really want is a kind of smoking gun were held by Dean or some of them also says We need to keep these guys,

608
00:56:24,150 --> 00:56:28,560
you know, we just keep the diplomats around because we don't speak Spanish.

609
00:56:28,560 --> 00:56:34,950
We don't know anything about Indonesia. We're currently kind of thinking about ways of looking for this.

610
00:56:34,950 --> 00:56:38,670
But this these are all intuitions that would certainly neatly and potentially

611
00:56:38,670 --> 00:56:43,380
quite conveniently align with other findings and explanations that we have.

612
00:56:43,380 --> 00:56:52,050
Yeah. Yeah. Well, and then I have one last question since there aren't any more in the Q&A, but I'll ask one more,

613
00:56:52,050 --> 00:57:00,030
which is that one of the one of the truisms or stereotypes about 1952 that one often hears from people who objected to the revolution,

614
00:57:00,030 --> 00:57:07,420
who thought it was a terrible thing and it ruined the country? Was that putting all these?

615
00:57:07,420 --> 00:57:17,660
Relatively ignorant, boorish military officers in charge of government, you know, resulted in disaster.

616
00:57:17,660 --> 00:57:22,030
And of course, you're suggesting that there was actually quite a bit of institutional continuity.

617
00:57:22,030 --> 00:57:35,580
But do you have a systematic way of assessing, you know, the relative success and failure of relatively untrained directors being put into government?

618
00:57:35,580 --> 00:57:38,230
So that's a great question. I don't have a good answer to it.

619
00:57:38,230 --> 00:57:44,980
I would caveat very briefly, and this is something that I find happens a lot in this kind of like revisiting history type work.

620
00:57:44,980 --> 00:57:51,130
I seem to do all too often, which is that as soon as we find something that slightly contradicts the kind of received wisdom,

621
00:57:51,130 --> 00:57:54,820
we might endow it with a bit too much emphasis and importance.

622
00:57:54,820 --> 00:58:00,910
Well, there is forms of continuity the modal person is post, so there's enormous talent as well,

623
00:58:00,910 --> 00:58:07,510
which is which is just worth underlining here that it is interesting. We think that still some people are retained, but actually the middle person,

624
00:58:07,510 --> 00:58:16,260
if you are in office and 52 on the eve of the Q, your future of earning a salary for one of these jobs is not looking good.

625
00:58:16,260 --> 00:58:21,040
But you probably are going to get punched. So the continuity is kind of at the margins.

626
00:58:21,040 --> 00:58:28,150
And then we try to explain why it is that some people managed to survive as a standards in terms of like this question of where do

627
00:58:28,150 --> 00:58:35,230
the free officers parachute in their people and then what are the effects of having these people on institutional performance is.

628
00:58:35,230 --> 00:58:40,270
We would love to be able to answer that. It's just a question of like, how do you measure?

629
00:58:40,270 --> 00:58:43,300
How do you measure the performance of these institutions that they really get taken over

630
00:58:43,300 --> 00:58:48,830
by four officers as opposed to institutions with those forms of light 352 continuity?

631
00:58:48,830 --> 00:58:49,820
I don't have a good answer to it.

632
00:58:49,820 --> 00:58:56,960
It's a great question if you can think of a way of measuring that in the kind of numerical, systematic way that I was obsessed with.

633
00:58:56,960 --> 00:59:02,480
And Glaude is obsessed with gay friends. Because at the moment, we're kind of stumped on that question.

634
00:59:02,480 --> 00:59:06,740
But I think it's silly because there is potentially interesting variation there.

635
00:59:06,740 --> 00:59:07,910
It's like,

636
00:59:07,910 --> 00:59:14,150
how does the how do the free officers when they actually really have to do the day to day list management of a given administrative position?

637
00:59:14,150 --> 00:59:19,850
How do they perform compared to the people who have been doing it for a while and have some expertise?

638
00:59:19,850 --> 00:59:29,030
Intuition says not as well. It's kind of it's an open empirical question that I could learn the hard way at this point.

639
00:59:29,030 --> 00:59:35,210
Unfortunately, in American systematic, it's not me. But, you know, hopefully somebody else will come along and do that.

640
00:59:35,210 --> 00:59:41,840
Neal, thank you very much for that excellent talk, which which I hope is the first of many.

641
00:59:41,840 --> 00:59:56,110
And on behalf of your colleagues and I thank you very much and I'm sure all your participants are saying the same thing to themselves.

642
00:59:56,110 --> 01:00:07,382
Thanks lot. Thanks, everyone, for coming. OK.