1 00:00:05,060 --> 00:00:09,650 Well, good evening and welcome to the Middle East Centre here in Oxford. 2 00:00:09,650 --> 00:00:15,950 My name is Michael Willis. I'm the director of the Middle East Centre and it's my great pleasure to welcome 3 00:00:15,950 --> 00:00:20,210 you to the Friday seminar series from the Middle East Centre for Hillary term. 4 00:00:20,210 --> 00:00:24,320 This is the first in the eight week seminar series to Hillary Turn. 5 00:00:24,320 --> 00:00:31,430 We had hoped that we will be holding all of its term seminars in person, as has been the tradition of the Middle East Centre. 6 00:00:31,430 --> 00:00:34,970 However, the vagaries of the COVID virus, 7 00:00:34,970 --> 00:00:41,480 notably a recent monochrome variant which paid me a little visit last week and I'm but I'm feeling much better as I'm sure it's paid. 8 00:00:41,480 --> 00:00:50,990 A lot of people on this call in recent weeks has unfortunately oblige us to run the first two weeks of the seminar series online. 9 00:00:50,990 --> 00:00:54,980 We are currently waiting to see if we need to run the rest of the series online, 10 00:00:54,980 --> 00:01:02,140 but it currently leaves me hopeful that we'll be able to run a substantial part of the latter part of the series in person, 11 00:01:02,140 --> 00:01:06,350 but we will keep you posted on that. How are the holding? 12 00:01:06,350 --> 00:01:12,590 The series online does allow us to invite friends and attendees, both old and new. 13 00:01:12,590 --> 00:01:16,490 We might not normally be able to come to Oxford itself. 14 00:01:16,490 --> 00:01:22,490 So we're delighted that many of you are able to join us for the photography. Welcome to you. 15 00:01:22,490 --> 00:01:28,760 Now, last few terms, the Middle East Centre, we have had an overarching theme for the seminar series. 16 00:01:28,760 --> 00:01:32,840 We looked at the Middle East and the environment last term michaelmas term. 17 00:01:32,840 --> 00:01:40,820 We looked at authoritarianism and we looked at the 10th anniversary of the Arab Spring or Arab revolutions last year. 18 00:01:40,820 --> 00:01:46,400 This time we won't be running. This is because for a number of reasons. 19 00:01:46,400 --> 00:01:53,630 Firstly, it allows us to address a wider and more diverse array of subjects and issues throughout the term of sticking to one particular theme. 20 00:01:53,630 --> 00:02:01,490 And more specifically, it allows. Firstly, in detail at some of the regrettably ongoing crisis in the region, 21 00:02:01,490 --> 00:02:09,570 we will be having sessions later in the series in the seventh and eighth week on the crises in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen. 22 00:02:09,570 --> 00:02:17,060 More broadly, it gives us the opportunity also to have a forum for introducing and discussing recent research on the region, 23 00:02:17,060 --> 00:02:20,240 particularly a number of books that have appeared in recent months. 24 00:02:20,240 --> 00:02:26,780 Specifically, ones written by members of our own academic community here at the Middle East Centre and in Oxford. 25 00:02:26,780 --> 00:02:34,520 More generally now, while this may seem like blatant self-promotion by the Middle East Centre, which indeed it is, 26 00:02:34,520 --> 00:02:41,450 it does, I think, answer a complaint that has been occasionally raised by particularly by students at the centre. 27 00:02:41,450 --> 00:02:46,850 But we never get to hear much about the work and research of the actual members of the academic team in Oxford. 28 00:02:46,850 --> 00:02:55,160 And I'm hoping that this term's Friday seminar series will hopefully answer this criticism by giving a platform to research of a number of people. 29 00:02:55,160 --> 00:03:00,740 Firstly, three of the fellows at the centre itself Donovan, meanwhile, Neil Critchley, 30 00:03:00,740 --> 00:03:06,020 unless some Alhazmi, one of the members of the advisory board at the centre, 31 00:03:06,020 --> 00:03:16,950 Josef Sassoon and also two members of the wider community at Oxford, Marilyn Booth Malkovich and Rafael Lefevre of New College. 32 00:03:16,950 --> 00:03:21,750 And therefore, delighted to be beginning the series of one of my colleagues here for the least antidote to some 33 00:03:21,750 --> 00:03:28,150 allies of Osama is that lecturing contemporary Islamic studies at the Faculty of Oriental Studies, 34 00:03:28,150 --> 00:03:38,750 a position he's held since 2019. Summer completed his Ph.D. at Princeton, having studied Arab and Islamic studies at Oxford undergraduate. 35 00:03:38,750 --> 00:03:45,440 And this has been a truly wonderful addition to our community bringing in great new energy and a host of new ideas. 36 00:03:45,440 --> 00:03:55,100 He's also contributed hugely to our teaching here, noting previous courses he has taught on on modern Islamic thought and Islam and politics, 37 00:03:55,100 --> 00:04:00,620 and also for a relatively young scholar, he has already a very impressive research record. 38 00:04:00,620 --> 00:04:08,060 And I'm very, therefore very pleased to have the opportunity to discuss this in the form of his new book, just published by Hearst. 39 00:04:08,060 --> 00:04:12,200 When did it actually come out? To summarise, is it is out? Is it this month or last month? 40 00:04:12,200 --> 00:04:17,090 It was out with Hearst in November? You know, this month, this month, right? 41 00:04:17,090 --> 00:04:23,840 So it's out of its so it's been out a couple of months, and the book is entitled Islam and the Arab Revolutions. 42 00:04:23,840 --> 00:04:29,900 The Dilemma Between Democracy and Autocracy, Osama. Thank you very much for joining us this evening. 43 00:04:29,900 --> 00:04:33,740 Thank you so much for having me and for your very generous introduction, 44 00:04:33,740 --> 00:04:42,500 it's really delightful to be able to present at the Middle East Centre amongst friends, colleagues, students who I also consider colleagues. 45 00:04:42,500 --> 00:04:49,040 And it's really an honour to be able to do this in your company because much of this book was also written 46 00:04:49,040 --> 00:04:55,250 in your company as it was set to share it with friends who with whom conversations have taken place, 47 00:04:55,250 --> 00:04:58,520 that have informed the writing of this book as well. 48 00:04:58,520 --> 00:05:08,630 So this is this is a book which I have in a sense, been writing since 2013 in some form, although it really took off from 2019 onwards, 49 00:05:08,630 --> 00:05:18,530 and it's always wonderful to see one of these long projects come to fruition in this way and in the interest of both self-promotion. 50 00:05:18,530 --> 00:05:22,010 But also, I hope the benefit of viewers. 51 00:05:22,010 --> 00:05:26,270 I've got a couple of codes on the screen which, when this is shared on YouTube, 52 00:05:26,270 --> 00:05:34,640 hopefully will also be easily accessible and it'll also be on the final screen if you're beaming in from across the Atlantic. 53 00:05:34,640 --> 00:05:41,630 What you'll be concerned about is the global one on the bottom and the first for anyone based in the UK. 54 00:05:41,630 --> 00:05:47,930 You'll be able to get 30 to 35 percent off, which is always handy with these expensive academic books. 55 00:05:47,930 --> 00:05:56,300 So this is a book which really looks at the way, in my view, a relatively understudied dimension of the Arab revolutions, 56 00:05:56,300 --> 00:06:02,000 sometimes referred to as the Arab Spring, sometimes referred to as the Arab uprisings. I'm not particularly committal on that. 57 00:06:02,000 --> 00:06:09,770 I didn't spend a bit of time explaining the word, but this dimension is basically the role that religious scholars had to play. 58 00:06:09,770 --> 00:06:14,960 And I think the sort of role is significant, you know, to a certain extent, 59 00:06:14,960 --> 00:06:20,750 sometimes scholars perhaps are overly preoccupied with the role of intellectuals in these sorts of activities. 60 00:06:20,750 --> 00:06:29,450 And a lot of the time it's, I think, justifiably the case that people are focussed on the underground actors and the political actors. 61 00:06:29,450 --> 00:06:36,890 But I wanted to sort of pay attention to a set of actors who are not just somewhat neglected in the literature, 62 00:06:36,890 --> 00:06:41,180 but also with whom I share a certain affinity. 63 00:06:41,180 --> 00:06:48,290 And by this, I'm referring to the fact that I am myself, a seminary trained as well as academically trained. 64 00:06:48,290 --> 00:06:56,210 And so, you know, some of these scholars are people I've met personally or have studied under or teachers of my teachers. 65 00:06:56,210 --> 00:06:59,960 So it's a really interesting sort of type of exercise writing a book like this. 66 00:06:59,960 --> 00:07:05,150 And I reflect on that because rationality briefly in the introduction and the epilogue with the left, 67 00:07:05,150 --> 00:07:10,270 but the overall sort of structure of the work is one that looks at. 68 00:07:10,270 --> 00:07:13,700 It's more of a descriptive intellectual history and to a certain extent, 69 00:07:13,700 --> 00:07:21,890 I guess the sociopolitical history that looks at the ways in which the scholars responded to the Tunisian revolutions of 2011, 70 00:07:21,890 --> 00:07:32,240 followed by the Egyptian revolution of 2011. And then as that transitioned into the maelstrom of activism and recrudescence, 71 00:07:32,240 --> 00:07:38,210 you could say, of the old regime within Egypt and the focus of the book really direct it. 72 00:07:38,210 --> 00:07:47,300 I do most of my attention to Egypt, and I look to 2013 as the major moment, of course, in Egypt, with the Egyptian coup and its aftermath, 73 00:07:47,300 --> 00:07:57,200 and a lot of people don't realise the extent to which religious actors were implicated deeply in legitimising the aftermath of the coup, 74 00:07:57,200 --> 00:08:05,750 including indeed their other massacre, which is kind of the the the darkest moment in Egypt in 2013. 75 00:08:05,750 --> 00:08:15,320 And so, you know, my chapters go with this and I'll be in what follows presenting, hopefully unless I have any glitches presenting sort of, 76 00:08:15,320 --> 00:08:20,540 in a sense, the Arab revolutions through the eyes of the ulema, through the eyes of these Islamic clerics. 77 00:08:20,540 --> 00:08:28,370 And in the book, which is, you know, a fairly lengthy about 400 pages just just shy of work, 78 00:08:28,370 --> 00:08:34,400 I dive quite deeply into the religious arguments and I can't really, you know, go into these in any great detail. 79 00:08:34,400 --> 00:08:40,430 But I hope that I can get a flavour of what comes up in the book and perhaps in the Q&A session. 80 00:08:40,430 --> 00:08:48,020 We can sort of explore some of these if anyone's interested. So my first slide and I should be going through this lecture reasonably quickly. 81 00:08:48,020 --> 00:08:53,510 As I understand and Michael, I've got about 20 minutes or so to go through this. 82 00:08:53,510 --> 00:09:01,790 Twenty five, twenty five minutes, half hour assignment for you. So my first slide is basically reflecting on the first two chapters you could say, 83 00:09:01,790 --> 00:09:07,970 and the first two chapters after the introduction are looking at useful following this fascinating figure. 84 00:09:07,970 --> 00:09:18,650 Egyptian based in that a member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a graduate of the asset, perhaps the US has most recognisable scholar in recent decades. 85 00:09:18,650 --> 00:09:25,160 He's now retired, so he's not really in the public eye anymore. And he is a figure born in 1926. 86 00:09:25,160 --> 00:09:37,970 So in 2011, he's already well into his 80s. Someone who is, you know, becomes a very forceful religious voice advocating for the Arab revolutions, 87 00:09:37,970 --> 00:09:49,670 for the most part, I say in most places because come March 2011 and although he is remarkably reticent about Bahrain. 88 00:09:49,670 --> 00:09:55,670 And so that's something that is noteworthy and there are interesting discussion to be had about that. 89 00:09:55,670 --> 00:10:01,550 But what's also interesting is his advocacy, his kind of tenacious advocacy of quote, 90 00:10:01,550 --> 00:10:07,670 peaceful revolutions and what he calls a Mubarak to me, a peaceful protest. 91 00:10:07,670 --> 00:10:15,080 And his opposition to any kind of engaging in violence in places like Egypt and Tunisia. 92 00:10:15,080 --> 00:10:21,140 We can talk later on about the way in which that shifts for Syria and Libya and why that is the case. 93 00:10:21,140 --> 00:10:27,110 You know, in a telescope for I would say that although he perceives those as cases of self-defence rather 94 00:10:27,110 --> 00:10:34,040 than cases of initiating any kind of violence and after the success of the Tunisian revolution, 95 00:10:34,040 --> 00:10:45,020 and he's he has a show on Al-Jazeera, which he dedicates entire episodes week on week to supporting these revolutions on religious grounds, 96 00:10:45,020 --> 00:10:52,490 saying that these are legitimate from on the basis of, you know, religious and scriptural justifications. 97 00:10:52,490 --> 00:11:01,520 And he does the same for the Egyptian revolution. Of course, Egypt is the most populous state in the Arab world and the region as a whole. 98 00:11:01,520 --> 00:11:09,380 And it's it's falling. Quote-unquote to the revolutions was an immensely significant event. 99 00:11:09,380 --> 00:11:16,970 And although he was fully behind the protesters ahead of the Muslim Brotherhood ahead of the US, 100 00:11:16,970 --> 00:11:25,190 her as an institution and his sort of religious reasoning very much is based on a Koranic concept known as a little bill. 101 00:11:25,190 --> 00:11:34,550 Not often that he had a look at commanding or in joining the good and forbidding what's wrong or forbidding evil. 102 00:11:34,550 --> 00:11:39,320 And on the flip side, you have the Egyptian religious establishment. 103 00:11:39,320 --> 00:11:43,940 So moving to my second slide, you have these two figures. 104 00:11:43,940 --> 00:11:50,450 The chap on the left is ironically the grand imam of her jump on the right was the. 105 00:11:50,450 --> 00:11:54,620 He's the former, now the former grand mufti of Egypt and Gomorrah. 106 00:11:54,620 --> 00:12:01,160 And both these scholars to differing degrees sort of expressed the disquiet at the protests. 107 00:12:01,160 --> 00:12:11,000 But both of them are quite unequivocal that the protests should be considered haram or, you know, from an Islamic legal standpoint. 108 00:12:11,000 --> 00:12:16,340 Prohibited. And as I will discuss in later slides, 109 00:12:16,340 --> 00:12:21,800 Ali Gohmert becomes particularly vociferous in his advocacy of an aggressive crackdown 110 00:12:21,800 --> 00:12:28,520 against the Muslim Brotherhood once that is possible after the coup of 2013. 111 00:12:28,520 --> 00:12:34,550 Now these figures, I explore their reasoning and their justifications in chapter three of my book, 112 00:12:34,550 --> 00:12:40,370 and a lot of it's based on notions of stability order. 113 00:12:40,370 --> 00:12:47,960 They're not as rigorously grounded, in my estimation, within the Koran or within the sort of hadith literature or the juristic tradition. 114 00:12:47,960 --> 00:12:55,640 But the echoes of that, and they certainly can generate certain types of arguments in religious sort of language. 115 00:12:55,640 --> 00:12:59,810 Another set of scholars, I describe them as eventually counter-revolutionary. 116 00:12:59,810 --> 00:13:04,550 They start off python sort of quiet mute as it were. 117 00:13:04,550 --> 00:13:09,920 Or indeed, the chap on the left is an interesting figure because he's actually an American. 118 00:13:09,920 --> 00:13:15,020 What's he doing in the midst of the maelstrom of Middle Eastern revolution? 119 00:13:15,020 --> 00:13:20,990 But from America, he was writing enthusiastically about the Egyptian revolution. 120 00:13:20,990 --> 00:13:27,530 And you know, I explore part of the reason he's included here is he's a reasonably influential 121 00:13:27,530 --> 00:13:33,050 Islamic scholar in the West who is probably amongst the Islamic scholars in the West. 122 00:13:33,050 --> 00:13:40,730 One of the most recognised in the Middle East, particularly as he's now a political appointee in the United Arab Emirates. 123 00:13:40,730 --> 00:13:46,230 He's the vice president of something which I'll talk about a bit later for the forum for promoting peace in Muslim societies. 124 00:13:46,230 --> 00:13:54,650 So this is humza Yousaf and the other chap here being kissed on the forehead by another none other than Mohammed bin Zayed, 125 00:13:54,650 --> 00:13:57,590 the de facto ruler of the United Arab Emirates. 126 00:13:57,590 --> 00:14:04,790 This chap is Abdullah bin B, a very eminent scholar who worked closely with you for well over a decade, 127 00:14:04,790 --> 00:14:10,880 but someone who soon finds himself in the midst of the Arab revolutions on the the 128 00:14:10,880 --> 00:14:18,410 side of the those opposing these revolutions of the sort of the status quo states, 129 00:14:18,410 --> 00:14:22,400 most notably perhaps the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. 130 00:14:22,400 --> 00:14:28,940 So I explore sort of their arguments and their reasoning and and with respect to in their who I. 131 00:14:28,940 --> 00:14:36,140 Is, I think, you know, far more significant in many respects. I explore this in the latter half of the potentially in greater detail. 132 00:14:36,140 --> 00:14:37,160 I live in Beirut. 133 00:14:37,160 --> 00:14:48,380 I think in a way that is unprecedented in Islamic history basically justifies executive absolutism over and above any Sharia dissent. 134 00:14:48,380 --> 00:14:53,600 So this is an interesting case of a religious scholar who basically says that 135 00:14:53,600 --> 00:15:00,620 my role in society should be sort of subordinated to the role of the ruler. 136 00:15:00,620 --> 00:15:09,940 This is something which is kind of the opposite with the way in which scholars saw themselves in much of history and certainly in pre-modern times. 137 00:15:09,940 --> 00:15:17,750 So I think there's interesting work, and I hope to explore between his work in future in my own future writings, 138 00:15:17,750 --> 00:15:26,750 just philosophically and theologically. Perhaps I'm going to rush on to the next slide, which kind of jumps to 2013 through 2011. 139 00:15:26,750 --> 00:15:33,440 Some of my treatment of Philip and Ballard set, you know, discussions that he engages in in 2012 and 2013, 140 00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:38,540 and indeed the chapter where I'm going to start forgetting the numbers, the relevant numbers. 141 00:15:38,540 --> 00:15:46,100 But the chapter where I start to look at the Egyptian coup also looks at the lead up to it from 2012 onwards and 142 00:15:46,100 --> 00:15:53,510 looks particularly at the activities of an income that they claim is particularly significant in the coup of 2013. 143 00:15:53,510 --> 00:15:57,290 Because he is someone who is, as you can see, 144 00:15:57,290 --> 00:16:05,420 present during now president than General el-Sisi's constitutional declaration, so annulling the Constitution in 2013. 145 00:16:05,420 --> 00:16:15,040 And so, you know, he actually functions as someone who is offering religious legitimation to the Egyptian could 2013. 146 00:16:15,040 --> 00:16:21,200 And I don't think it's an accident that these religious figures, the Coptic pope, is actually seated next to him. 147 00:16:21,200 --> 00:16:29,480 If I recall correctly, have obviously sort of cropped. The image behind him is a figure who is associated with the Latino Party. 148 00:16:29,480 --> 00:16:38,690 I don't think it's an accident that these religious figures are there to confer a certain degree of legitimacy upon the act of the coup yet. 149 00:16:38,690 --> 00:16:45,690 And, as I say, hit the rabbi massacre, you know, takes place the following month in July. 150 00:16:45,690 --> 00:16:48,770 You have the coup and in the middle of August we have the rabbi massacre. 151 00:16:48,770 --> 00:16:57,500 And Human Rights Watch calls it somewhat notoriously one of the world's largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history. 152 00:16:57,500 --> 00:17:04,580 And I think it shows the limits of his support for the Egyptian regime, something that really transpires. 153 00:17:04,580 --> 00:17:10,700 But more interestingly, in successive years, even though he is instrumental in bringing about the Rabat massacre, that's right, 154 00:17:10,700 --> 00:17:17,210 bringing about the Egyptian coup, which needs to the rabbi massacre, he expresses his disquiet at the massacre at Rabat. 155 00:17:17,210 --> 00:17:23,730 Now I'm going to talk more specifically about Rabat in a moment. But I've taken this image from the website. 156 00:17:23,730 --> 00:17:28,040 It's noon post someone who's obviously quite opposed to ALEC. 157 00:17:28,040 --> 00:17:34,100 But what it says on the screen is Mufti Laska, the mufti of the Army. 158 00:17:34,100 --> 00:17:40,010 And in many respects, I think it's an accurate portrayal of the role that this person at this point. 159 00:17:40,010 --> 00:17:42,620 He was the former mufti. 160 00:17:42,620 --> 00:17:51,260 It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood, in their short stint in power, you know, arranged for aliya, not to be retired, shall we say. 161 00:17:51,260 --> 00:18:00,650 And so he was now former Grand Mufti, but he became this vociferous supporter behind the scenes initially and eventually out in the open, 162 00:18:00,650 --> 00:18:07,550 you know, as some of these recordings are eventually leaked. He's someone who basically privately, as I say, 163 00:18:07,550 --> 00:18:14,150 privately incites the killing of protesters in religious terms to the army specifically and the security services. 164 00:18:14,150 --> 00:18:22,370 And then also subsequent to their attempts to privately celebrates, you know, I actually have a chapter celebrating the rather. 165 00:18:22,370 --> 00:18:31,940 I view him as actually engaged in its ratification, justifying and celebrating the success of the Egyptian army against this horrible enemy, 166 00:18:31,940 --> 00:18:39,090 et cetera, that is constituted by the protesters at Rabaa. 167 00:18:39,090 --> 00:18:46,980 I perhaps should have mentioned this much earlier, I mean, rather, I was basically the epicentre for a major protest after the Egyptian coup of 2013, 168 00:18:46,980 --> 00:18:53,640 where a large number of people it was, I think, largely organised and supported by the Muslim Brotherhood. 169 00:18:53,640 --> 00:19:02,250 But people who are opposed to the coup, whether they're members of the Muslim Brotherhood or they were people who were opposed to be a sort 170 00:19:02,250 --> 00:19:08,940 of reversion to a pre democratic era in Egypt had come together and they were protesting the coup. 171 00:19:08,940 --> 00:19:19,650 And this persisted for weeks on end until the military and security forces came together on the 14th of August and engaged in this massacre. 172 00:19:19,650 --> 00:19:29,910 And I think, you know, on screen, I have to look at what a book and a report that I draw on in writing about the massacre went according to plan, 173 00:19:29,910 --> 00:19:35,310 as Human Rights Watch is and forensic treatment of what actually happened. 174 00:19:35,310 --> 00:19:45,720 UN Human Rights Watch basically estimates estimates that likely over 1000 people were killed on the 14th of August by the security forces in Egypt. 175 00:19:45,720 --> 00:19:51,960 I actually sort of explore using to a certain extent the data that Human Rights Watch has brought forward, 176 00:19:51,960 --> 00:19:55,380 and I suggest it may well be higher than over a thousand. 177 00:19:55,380 --> 00:20:01,110 It could be as much as 2000 or even higher and into the hands of the soldiers. 178 00:20:01,110 --> 00:20:08,490 Is David Kirkpatrick's really penetrating and reflective city's extensive narrative? 179 00:20:08,490 --> 00:20:13,860 And I mean, David is a journalist with The New York Times. 180 00:20:13,860 --> 00:20:23,010 But really, I think one of the most careful testimonies regarding the Arab uprisings and revolutions over the last decade, 181 00:20:23,010 --> 00:20:32,610 decade or so that we have in the English language. And I draw on it quite liberally when outlining the narrative that the US and other parts. 182 00:20:32,610 --> 00:20:38,250 So, you know, just briefly about the other massacre. I mean, it's it was overwhelmingly unarmed. 183 00:20:38,250 --> 00:20:45,180 And so the killing of over a thousand protesters in that context was particularly sort of shocking and striking. 184 00:20:45,180 --> 00:20:52,710 And it was clear based on Human Rights Watch's assessment that there were there was the deliberate effort to liquidate, 185 00:20:52,710 --> 00:20:58,410 you know, actually kill people. And so, you know, I think that it's something that I spend. 186 00:20:58,410 --> 00:21:05,670 I think the chapter is chapter the latter part of Chapter five, possibly Chapter six, that basically explores this. 187 00:21:05,670 --> 00:21:12,630 And then I also look thereafter at the way in which various scholars opposed both the coup and the subsequent 188 00:21:12,630 --> 00:21:19,650 massacres and the sort of language that they used the way in which scholars who might characterise as Islamists, 189 00:21:19,650 --> 00:21:27,480 by which I mean people were broadly aligned to projects like the Muslim Brotherhood's sort of project in Egypt. 190 00:21:27,480 --> 00:21:33,420 You know, they articulate their opposition to the coup in the language of democracy. 191 00:21:33,420 --> 00:21:39,900 One of the points I make early on when looking at Cairo, though, is sort of support for the revolutions in the first place. 192 00:21:39,900 --> 00:21:48,790 He articulated in the language of freedom, and he has this fascinating phrase, which is kind of a counterintuitive for a lot of people. 193 00:21:48,790 --> 00:21:57,750 Think of Islamism or study Islamism. He says that freedom has to be prioritised over the implementation of the Sharia. 194 00:21:57,750 --> 00:22:03,060 And I argue that this is actually it sort of makes perfect sense in the Islamist universe. 195 00:22:03,060 --> 00:22:12,180 But it's something which is counter very often because of the ways in which the Islamist Islamists are constructed and sort of widespread narratives, 196 00:22:12,180 --> 00:22:18,480 shall we say. And so, you know, these are some of the scholars say you have an incredibly useful corollary now retired, of course, 197 00:22:18,480 --> 00:22:25,230 and then you have Ahmed Arizona, who is now actually the head of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. 198 00:22:25,230 --> 00:22:30,600 So these are three scholars associated with this organisation based in Cairo. 199 00:22:30,600 --> 00:22:39,600 I didn't really touch in great detail on the fact that Qatar is, you know, the Al Jazeera channel, which on which although we actually had a show, 200 00:22:39,600 --> 00:22:48,600 become somewhat instrumental in promoting the agenda of us is well and well studied of the Arab revolutions in 2011. 201 00:22:48,600 --> 00:22:57,780 And, you know, as Christian Eriksen and others pointed out, in a sense, the Qataris overplayed their hand and have to backtrack subsequently. 202 00:22:57,780 --> 00:23:01,080 So as I come towards the end, I just wanted to. 203 00:23:01,080 --> 00:23:08,790 So this is something I discuss in greater detail, probably in chapter nine of my book, The Final Substantive Chapter. 204 00:23:08,790 --> 00:23:14,130 And you have Abdullah Bin with foreign ministers, the United Arab Emirates, 205 00:23:14,130 --> 00:23:21,270 who live in Zayed and observe and say it basically bankrolls a project called the Forum for Promoting Peace in Muslim Societies. 206 00:23:21,270 --> 00:23:28,200 It's very sort of like, you know, elegantly named and it makes you gives very positive vibes. 207 00:23:28,200 --> 00:23:38,650 But that's what I argue is its purpose. Of course, it is a front institution, in my estimation, one of several, but one of the most important. 208 00:23:38,650 --> 00:23:46,090 Front institutions, religious institutions for counter-revolutionary sort of activism, shall we say, and observant, 209 00:23:46,090 --> 00:23:49,660 but it's not an accident that he becomes the head of it, 210 00:23:49,660 --> 00:23:58,090 given his juristic reasoning that creates actual Islamic juristic justifications for autocracy. 211 00:23:58,090 --> 00:24:09,640 And by 2019, I believe Abdullah can a becomes effectively the Grand Mufti, the chair of the Emirates, but without status quo mufti of the Emirates. 212 00:24:09,640 --> 00:24:14,140 But a lot of the sort of fatwas have this transnational ambition as well, 213 00:24:14,140 --> 00:24:19,550 so he becomes a major tool in the toolbox at the Emirates United Arab Emirates. 214 00:24:19,550 --> 00:24:28,630 Soft projection, in my estimation, and in 2020, I think it's in 2020 within the space of a few months, 215 00:24:28,630 --> 00:24:35,740 both designates the United, designates the Muslim Brotherhood, a terrorist organisation as the Grand Mufti of the Emirates. 216 00:24:35,740 --> 00:24:41,350 So in religious terms, they said, of course, been done in legal terms within the UAE many years earlier. 217 00:24:41,350 --> 00:24:45,670 And he also ratifies the normalisation with Israel. 218 00:24:45,670 --> 00:24:50,590 So he's perhaps the most senior scholar to have done this in the Arab world. 219 00:24:50,590 --> 00:24:59,030 And you know, I also highlight I've done so in other writing on the level that he's actually also highly respected as a jurist. 220 00:24:59,030 --> 00:25:03,910 He's, you know, there's no question of his juristic credentials, shall we say. 221 00:25:03,910 --> 00:25:10,300 And so this is a bit of a provocative argument that I'm making towards the tail end of Chapter nine, 222 00:25:10,300 --> 00:25:21,910 and I basically argue that there's kind of a twin the rise of anti-democratic religious discourses and the rise of ISIS. 223 00:25:21,910 --> 00:25:30,310 So in a sense, the failure of democratic Islamism at the hands of scholars like the little man in particular, 224 00:25:30,310 --> 00:25:36,430 I think can be twinned with the rise of ISIS. And I can't remember which up to this is now. 225 00:25:36,430 --> 00:25:40,900 But I remark how the rabbi massacre a week after the massacre. 226 00:25:40,900 --> 00:25:46,330 Of course, you have an even worse massacre in Syria with a chemical weapons attack. 227 00:25:46,330 --> 00:25:55,600 And so, you know those sorts of things the permits the commission for the massacre on the part of. 228 00:25:55,600 --> 00:26:03,730 I mean, these things are done in subtle ways, but you know, the lack of reaction to the massacre also, in a sense, 229 00:26:03,730 --> 00:26:09,280 greenlights the possibility of these sorts of horrendous chemical attacks that we see, 230 00:26:09,280 --> 00:26:14,590 you know, one of many actually in assets Syria, of course, over the years. 231 00:26:14,590 --> 00:26:24,310 And so, you know, this isn't an original sort of observation that the failure of democracy and the rise of ISIS are winnable as it were. 232 00:26:24,310 --> 00:26:30,190 This is an observation I make drawing on the excellent work of jumps to you. 233 00:26:30,190 --> 00:26:40,480 And he's got a book called From Deep State to Islamic State and also in the work of David Kirkpatrick that I've alluded to already. 234 00:26:40,480 --> 00:26:50,800 And I think that, you know, the UAE is signalled sort of my successes have allowed for these sorts of groups to emerge, 235 00:26:50,800 --> 00:26:58,630 and there's a kind of somewhat macabre logic to the existence of groups like ISIS and the need for authoritarianism. 236 00:26:58,630 --> 00:27:04,480 I think many of us recognise in the region as part of the the logic of authoritarianism in the region at the moment. 237 00:27:04,480 --> 00:27:12,760 So in my conclusion, in my conclusions, I kind of try and trace a certain set of questions that I outlined in my introduction, 238 00:27:12,760 --> 00:27:21,460 a lot of which are to do with, you know, how do these different approaches to the Islamic scholarly tradition translate the scriptural sources, 239 00:27:21,460 --> 00:27:28,240 the same scriptural sources very often that they draw on to come to such diametrically opposed conclusions? 240 00:27:28,240 --> 00:27:31,530 And how cogent are the various arguments and so on? 241 00:27:31,530 --> 00:27:38,890 And perhaps the agency component is not quite so thoroughly explored as you know what sort of arguments are actually presented. 242 00:27:38,890 --> 00:27:45,190 And in the conclusions, I kind of present an outline looking at some of the debates in the secondary literature, 243 00:27:45,190 --> 00:27:49,240 and I position myself in those debates in a certain way. 244 00:27:49,240 --> 00:27:54,970 I roughly think that the Islamic tradition is, of course, diverse and open to multiple readings. 245 00:27:54,970 --> 00:28:03,490 And so both the Pro and the counter-revolutionary scholars can find resources to argue for their positions. 246 00:28:03,490 --> 00:28:06,550 And this is manifestly clear throughout the book. 247 00:28:06,550 --> 00:28:16,180 Yet I would argue that, you know, the pro-democratic scholars do seem to deploy those resources somewhat more persuasively, 248 00:28:16,180 --> 00:28:22,540 even though I don't systematically engage in a comparison between those two sort of sets of arguments. 249 00:28:22,540 --> 00:28:28,780 And I conclude on a on what I think is a kind of hopeful note, which is that, you know, 250 00:28:28,780 --> 00:28:38,470 to a certain extent, these kinds of figures like B and this kind of autocracy discourse is necessary. 251 00:28:38,470 --> 00:28:46,840 In the face of the weakness of the current status quo in the sense that the current prototype is the 252 00:28:46,840 --> 00:28:56,230 arguments that were were and continue to be presented are not terribly persuasive to the audience. 253 00:28:56,230 --> 00:29:04,300 They are directed up and this is why Islamic democracy will continue to be a threat in the region for the region's autocrats. 254 00:29:04,300 --> 00:29:12,610 That's a kind of hopeful note on which I conclude, I hope that was interesting if anyone has any questions, just wanted to read highlights. 255 00:29:12,610 --> 00:29:17,500 If anyone would like to get their hands on the book and get a discount that's available 256 00:29:17,500 --> 00:29:23,260 through those two codes and leave them on for five or 10 seconds if that's right with you. 257 00:29:23,260 --> 00:29:28,760 But thank you very much for having me, and I hope that was interesting. Thank you very much. 258 00:29:28,760 --> 00:29:31,700 No doubt about it, that was actually fascinating summer. 259 00:29:31,700 --> 00:29:37,070 I think a lot of us sometimes wonder if there's anything new to be written about on the Arab revolutions. 260 00:29:37,070 --> 00:29:42,140 But you've proved conclusively that there was a really fascinating dimension, 261 00:29:42,140 --> 00:29:50,090 but really hasn't been looked at in in that way before looking at the role of the theologians, the dilemma and how they talk about it. 262 00:29:50,090 --> 00:29:51,770 That's been largely, as you said, ignored, 263 00:29:51,770 --> 00:29:58,010 and I think it's fascinating that you that you have dealt with it in this way and looked not only at those who supported it, 264 00:29:58,010 --> 00:30:01,640 which is perhaps being covered a little bit, but those who actually were critical and supportive. 265 00:30:01,640 --> 00:30:05,690 The official perspective, which is fascinating. It's rather depressing. 266 00:30:05,690 --> 00:30:13,750 I think that on certain levels. We now have time for some questions, if anybody wants to put a question to Osama, 267 00:30:13,750 --> 00:30:20,560 what we do with would invite you to put your question right, your question into a question and answer function. 268 00:30:20,560 --> 00:30:27,200 If you look on the bar of this webinar, you'll see a little Q&A with a couple of speech bubbles coming out of that. 269 00:30:27,200 --> 00:30:33,040 And if you press that, that will allow you to type in the questions. So please type in a question. 270 00:30:33,040 --> 00:30:40,510 If you would like to be identified, you put your name in or you may be automatically identified if you wouldn't don't want to put your name in. 271 00:30:40,510 --> 00:30:42,310 That's absolutely fine and put that in. 272 00:30:42,310 --> 00:30:51,040 But if you want to put your questions in and I'll try and field as many of them as I can to Osama in the in the time that remains, 273 00:30:51,040 --> 00:30:55,660 we have about about twenty five minutes, half an hour of some questions, so hopefully we'll get some questions. 274 00:30:55,660 --> 00:31:04,630 So please do put your questions in. In between time, I would like to take advantage of my position as chair to ask my own question. 275 00:31:04,630 --> 00:31:11,290 The book obviously focuses on Egypt, and I think you justify that very well because of the centrality. 276 00:31:11,290 --> 00:31:18,670 Egypt is not only just in the revolutions themselves, but in the Arab world, certainly in the last 100 years. 277 00:31:18,670 --> 00:31:24,580 But I wonder whether the what happened in Egypt and the sort of issues discussing, 278 00:31:24,580 --> 00:31:31,630 to what extent do they relate to the explicit position of the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation? 279 00:31:31,630 --> 00:31:40,030 Now, as you know, a lot of the the official discourse and criticism of what of the revolution and 280 00:31:40,030 --> 00:31:44,290 the Muslim Brotherhood was about the Muslim Brotherhood as an organisation, 281 00:31:44,290 --> 00:31:53,020 particularly the accusation that it was some sort of dangerous cult. And that leads me to wonder, get you to say a little bit more, 282 00:31:53,020 --> 00:32:01,480 perhaps on the dynamic between the traditional ulema and the Muslim Brotherhood, which I think has always been very interesting in Egypt. 283 00:32:01,480 --> 00:32:10,240 And to what extent do you think a lot of the things you've been discussing are are of a development out of this rather interesting historical model, 284 00:32:10,240 --> 00:32:13,210 often strained relationship between the two? 285 00:32:13,210 --> 00:32:20,860 Or whether you think as you've as you've portrayed in your tape is actually a much broader set of issues that refer across the region. 286 00:32:20,860 --> 00:32:26,950 So I don't know if that makes sense of the question. Forgive me, your son cut out briefly when you said, Oh, sorry. 287 00:32:26,950 --> 00:32:34,630 As I understand you, you're basically saying that to what extent the Muslim Brotherhood and their various positions conditioned more 288 00:32:34,630 --> 00:32:41,770 by the conditionality as Egyptian actors as opposed to their engagement with or kind of fraught relationship? 289 00:32:41,770 --> 00:32:48,400 Shall we say with you, all of us looking at the tradition, but particularly the Egyptian context and whether it's a lot of these issues about the 290 00:32:48,400 --> 00:32:53,170 relationship historically between the Brotherhood and the more traditional ulema? 291 00:32:53,170 --> 00:32:58,990 Yes. I mean, it's been a very sort of fraught relationship, I think through much of that history, 292 00:32:58,990 --> 00:33:03,550 because the Ottoman, of course, have centred on the outside. 293 00:33:03,550 --> 00:33:12,760 And you know, famously, you've had plenty of religious figures and ulema and who have been members of the Muslim Brotherhood. 294 00:33:12,760 --> 00:33:19,160 But they their authority in a sense, has been subordinated to the organisation rather than to, 295 00:33:19,160 --> 00:33:24,550 you know, their authority as religious sort of authorities unto themselves. 296 00:33:24,550 --> 00:33:35,110 And I can't remember whose phrase this is, but it's quoted in a an edited and fantastic edited volume this column of global mufti, 297 00:33:35,110 --> 00:33:44,140 where in a chapter, I forget who the author is called useful Kabbalah and as the nature of a special relationship. 298 00:33:44,140 --> 00:33:52,420 But above is one of the very few scholars that we can think of Jews who've been able to sort of navigate this tightrope, so to speak, 299 00:33:52,420 --> 00:34:01,030 of keeping both on the good side of the ALLAMA as a class and maintaining his considerable authority as an island, 300 00:34:01,030 --> 00:34:11,140 he's seen and highly regarded as a jurist. But at the same time, you know, always played up the fact that he is a student of Senator Ben, 301 00:34:11,140 --> 00:34:15,880 actually a direct student of customs and a member of a proud member of the Muslim Brotherhood. 302 00:34:15,880 --> 00:34:20,560 So, you know, he's always in public only as haredi garb. 303 00:34:20,560 --> 00:34:26,110 As soon as you see him, you can immediately identify him as an asset. But he's also a very proud member of the Muslim Brotherhood. 304 00:34:26,110 --> 00:34:30,310 And I think this is hopefully answering your question somewhat. 305 00:34:30,310 --> 00:34:37,990 I think it's the case that, you know, the Muslim Brotherhood has struggled to do that because the religious authority of the Obama is 306 00:34:37,990 --> 00:34:43,780 a competing sovereignty of sorts to the authority of the institution of the Muslim Brotherhood. 307 00:34:43,780 --> 00:34:47,440 The Muslim Brotherhood's resilience and its continued existence. 308 00:34:47,440 --> 00:34:52,960 Shadi Hamid talks about for, you know, nearly 100 years at this point, to a certain extent, 309 00:34:52,960 --> 00:34:56,530 are a function of it being a very regimented organisation that respects the 310 00:34:56,530 --> 00:35:03,160 hierarchy of the organisation rather than the sort of non-hierarchical hierarchy. 311 00:35:03,160 --> 00:35:08,330 If I can kind of phrase of the ulema because as scholars, everyone can debate a. 312 00:35:08,330 --> 00:35:10,790 One has a right to have an opinion, 313 00:35:10,790 --> 00:35:20,970 and scholars are not scholars notorious for not really being very organised when it comes to thinking in and regimented terms of an organisation. 314 00:35:20,970 --> 00:35:27,110 So in that regard, I think the Muslim Brotherhood will have its own internal logic when it thinks about how Islam operates. 315 00:35:27,110 --> 00:35:30,680 And I think that will always have a certain degree of friction with the way 316 00:35:30,680 --> 00:35:36,320 in which the ulema will think about things in juristic or theological terms. 317 00:35:36,320 --> 00:35:41,750 I hope that someone answers the question that you are asking the bounds of the question very well. 318 00:35:41,750 --> 00:35:47,810 Yes, I was thinking really a is that you said the key figure in that respect, he actually bridges those two traditions. 319 00:35:47,810 --> 00:35:52,160 Thank you. We're beginning to get questions coming in, and I'll I'll ask one of them. 320 00:35:52,160 --> 00:35:55,730 The first one I'll go to comes from Iftikhar Malik. 321 00:35:55,730 --> 00:36:01,250 Thank you for joining us. And if the car says Ahmed Kuru in his recent book, 322 00:36:01,250 --> 00:36:06,050 highlights the long term legacy of collaboration between the authority and the ulema 323 00:36:06,050 --> 00:36:11,090 at the expense of civic and enterprising classes leading to authoritarianism, 324 00:36:11,090 --> 00:36:14,750 as well as civilizational decline. Individuals are vital, 325 00:36:14,750 --> 00:36:23,960 but shouldn't we be focussing on social and theological trajectories within the societies which keep on throwing up such figures as these? 326 00:36:23,960 --> 00:36:29,840 So I've only read sort of a couple of pages from the introduction about the first work, 327 00:36:29,840 --> 00:36:39,860 and I must say I'm not terribly sympathetic to his analysis in the sense of it is to a certain extent it doesn't 328 00:36:39,860 --> 00:36:47,630 really engage the discourse and these sorts of historical grand narrative sort of attempts at grand narratives, 329 00:36:47,630 --> 00:36:53,360 casting the LNA as a certain type across history, which I get a sense of. 330 00:36:53,360 --> 00:36:58,070 In his argument, I don't find terribly compelling. 331 00:36:58,070 --> 00:37:03,320 The ultimate. I don't really have a very clear answer to this, to be honest. 332 00:37:03,320 --> 00:37:08,090 I don't think the alumni have undermined civic and enterprising classes in the way that 333 00:37:08,090 --> 00:37:12,170 someone an amateur guru or perhaps similar current in a slightly different context, 334 00:37:12,170 --> 00:37:21,410 is arguing. And I think, you know, the work of my colleague in the Department of CUNY, H. 335 00:37:21,410 --> 00:37:27,110 I don't know why I'm blanking on his name right now, but our colleague and associated with the Middle East Centre, 336 00:37:27,110 --> 00:37:32,900 the economic historian, fantastic economic historian Adeel Malik, Neil Malik. 337 00:37:32,900 --> 00:37:37,820 I got Malik in my name, but I was wondering if that was coming from its cousin. 338 00:37:37,820 --> 00:37:45,140 So he has an excellent review. I think of Tim operands long divergence, which makes it a similar, but, you know, 339 00:37:45,140 --> 00:37:50,660 somewhat different argument about economic history as opposed to authoritarianism. 340 00:37:50,660 --> 00:37:56,330 I think that those sorts of broad brush arguments as qualified and careful as they are, 341 00:37:56,330 --> 00:38:00,290 we need to be careful about sort of teleological of historiography, 342 00:38:00,290 --> 00:38:06,020 which historiography is, in my estimation, but to do justice to his work and I hope to engage it. 343 00:38:06,020 --> 00:38:11,440 My teacher, like I would need to read it carefully, obviously. So I hope that that's somewhat useful. 344 00:38:11,440 --> 00:38:17,710 Thank you, I have a question. Hannah Dickens, who thanks you for a fascinating lecture. 345 00:38:17,710 --> 00:38:26,980 Thank you. And Jack wants to know, are there is there any indication as to what type of democracy the pro revolution in Egypt would a desire to build? 346 00:38:26,980 --> 00:38:30,640 Would they desire the type of democracy that we saw take root in Tunisia? 347 00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:37,660 Or would they be more inclined to support the creation of a political system more like that of revolutionary Iran? 348 00:38:37,660 --> 00:38:44,290 I mean, in the year or so, but certainly Mohammed Morsi was in Mississippi speaking my wages, adding my own little bit. 349 00:38:44,290 --> 00:38:47,020 Maybe the Morsi we saw, we saw some island. 350 00:38:47,020 --> 00:38:54,850 But that and that had a lot of criticism about the way rather than I wonder if on the theological aspect, whether you could add something on that. 351 00:38:54,850 --> 00:38:58,990 Thank you. Sure. I think a fantastic question. 352 00:38:58,990 --> 00:39:05,040 Thank you very much, Jack. And I think in a sense, the Egyptian alumni would be somewhere in between. 353 00:39:05,040 --> 00:39:10,390 I think that would be a good way to put it so rational in which she is. 354 00:39:10,390 --> 00:39:18,910 And Andrew much has a fantastic book on this. The caliphate of man, popular sovereignty and I think the rest of the subtitle. 355 00:39:18,910 --> 00:39:26,150 But in essence, I think that Russia, the new she's practised in the Tunisian context, was far more pragmatic. 356 00:39:26,150 --> 00:39:32,140 She was far more willing to sort of engage in a pragmatic dialogue with, you know, 357 00:39:32,140 --> 00:39:44,920 more secular forces and yet mainstream Islamists of the type that I study not so much in this book as in my other work, mostly unpublished. 358 00:39:44,920 --> 00:39:50,290 They they are very eager to highlight that we don't believe in theocracy. 359 00:39:50,290 --> 00:39:55,000 They can. What do they mean by that? They mean the model that is found in Iran now? 360 00:39:55,000 --> 00:39:59,680 I mean, I think people could reasonably articulate a theocracy is a concept, 361 00:39:59,680 --> 00:40:07,540 which means that you're bringing religion into the political sphere and you still believe that that's what you're what is appropriate to do. 362 00:40:07,540 --> 00:40:12,220 I certainly think that it wouldn't, you know, as I ask you again, briefly elsewhere, 363 00:40:12,220 --> 00:40:17,500 most of them place where these people are arguing for liberal democracy by any stretch of the imagination. 364 00:40:17,500 --> 00:40:21,130 Shadi Hamid talks about this in his first book, Temptations of Power. 365 00:40:21,130 --> 00:40:27,250 He calls it a liberal democracy, and I don't like that label because, you know, to a certain extent, you are defining something by what it isn't. 366 00:40:27,250 --> 00:40:31,390 But also illiberal is a very sort of loaded phrase in our culture. 367 00:40:31,390 --> 00:40:39,520 I would say I would call it Islamic democracy, and the way in which I characterise this is that liberalism is in liberal democracy. 368 00:40:39,520 --> 00:40:44,140 Liberalism is a check on a majoritarianism in Islamic democracy. 369 00:40:44,140 --> 00:40:46,600 Islam is a check on majoritarianism. 370 00:40:46,600 --> 00:40:56,170 And so, you know, that's how I would see it now that causes all sorts of anxieties within, you know, particularly Western policy circles. 371 00:40:56,170 --> 00:41:03,640 And I think, Michael, if you sort of permit me on your comment about like how Mohamed Morsi actually acted again, 372 00:41:03,640 --> 00:41:10,810 Shadi Hamid and other scholars and David Kirkpatrick talks about this in his book Into the Hands of the Soldiers. 373 00:41:10,810 --> 00:41:18,340 They all come in that in practise when you. Shadi Hamid looking at it as a quantitative social scientist, as a political scientist, 374 00:41:18,340 --> 00:41:22,990 you know, quantitatively speaking, Morsi was not really a dictator. 375 00:41:22,990 --> 00:41:25,240 It doesn't. It doesn't sort of work that way. 376 00:41:25,240 --> 00:41:33,190 And so there is a certain perception, in my estimation in the West that if someone identifies with Islam, 377 00:41:33,190 --> 00:41:37,810 then they will necessarily go towards a kind of authoritarian theocracy. 378 00:41:37,810 --> 00:41:45,730 And I would just point out that, you know, that presupposition doesn't always hold very well in their discourses, 379 00:41:45,730 --> 00:41:53,270 where for decades they've been arguing against autocracy, particularly since that's the main thing that they suffer from in the region. 380 00:41:53,270 --> 00:41:59,320 Right? And so but it would be, you know, these are untested because, you know, 381 00:41:59,320 --> 00:42:04,750 the autocratic forces in the region have always had the upper hand, unfortunately. And even in Tunisia, we have seen them. 382 00:42:04,750 --> 00:42:09,100 So if that's a really long winded response, but I hope that answers the question. 383 00:42:09,100 --> 00:42:10,960 No, that then answers it very nicely. 384 00:42:10,960 --> 00:42:18,910 We have a couple of questions coming in, inevitably asking you to sort of look at a little broader focus looking at other aspects. 385 00:42:18,910 --> 00:42:28,580 No country's right. I'm going to get one coming in from Salma Daudi, too, asking about the situation in Syria. 386 00:42:28,580 --> 00:42:32,680 Thank you for joining us and thank you for your question, Salma and Sam specifically. 387 00:42:32,680 --> 00:42:40,150 I was wondering if you could perhaps discuss a little bit the threat that pro-democracy Islamic scholars could pose to the Syrian regime. 388 00:42:40,150 --> 00:42:40,780 Recently, 389 00:42:40,780 --> 00:42:48,940 the Assad regime has effectively forced Syria's Grand Mufti into retirement and seems to be positioning itself as a secular force in the region, 390 00:42:48,940 --> 00:42:51,790 even if the reality seems to contradict this narrative. 391 00:42:51,790 --> 00:42:59,620 All these tensions, reflective of broader disagreements within influential Islamic authorities on the Syrian revolution. 392 00:42:59,620 --> 00:43:03,760 And I mean the Syrian revolution. I actually lived in Syria from 2005 2006. 393 00:43:03,760 --> 00:43:08,830 I was an undergraduate here, of course, in the sense that when it was possible to travel to Syria. 394 00:43:08,830 --> 00:43:18,330 So I have a deep and abiding love. The Syrian people, sadly, my scholarship does not exclude Syria quite systematically, and obviously, Tom, 395 00:43:18,330 --> 00:43:24,600 at the other end of it, great scholars have done the really defining work on the Syrian revolution. 396 00:43:24,600 --> 00:43:30,030 So I don't I wasn't aware of this. I assume relatively recent developments. 397 00:43:30,030 --> 00:43:39,840 I mean, it's interesting to think about if I may speculate for a while, the Grand Mufti and I assume we're talking about Hassouna here. 398 00:43:39,840 --> 00:43:49,470 The former Grand Mufti was, of course, a stalwart of the Assad regime, the sort of and the Grand Mufti before him. 399 00:43:49,470 --> 00:43:56,310 Of course, people like the title and others have for decades been stalwarts of the essence. 400 00:43:56,310 --> 00:44:07,200 And so in that regard, I think it would be interesting to me if that shift to a more secular orientation is now being adopted systematically. 401 00:44:07,200 --> 00:44:15,840 There's always been a tension within the Syrian context, in my estimation, because of the Alawi background of the the heads of the regime. 402 00:44:15,840 --> 00:44:21,030 But the fact that the Grand Mufti has always been a Sunni, quite a mainstream Sunni, in my estimation, 403 00:44:21,030 --> 00:44:28,440 even if they've been politically, you know, not necessarily mainstream and in being so aligned to the dictator. 404 00:44:28,440 --> 00:44:37,090 And so I remember when I lived in Syria that the Sunnis were happy that their dictator was secular. 405 00:44:37,090 --> 00:44:39,440 You know, some some Sunnis would express that to me, 406 00:44:39,440 --> 00:44:50,010 at least their secular right in a sense that they're not going to sort of start interfering within our religious world as Allawi's, for example. 407 00:44:50,010 --> 00:44:53,940 And so, you know, I'm not sure that, you know, 408 00:44:53,940 --> 00:45:03,150 the the clearing of that space for from the state's sphere of influence makes a great deal of sense for Assad as a dictator. 409 00:45:03,150 --> 00:45:07,500 But I'm not. I'm not sure exactly how the average Sunni would respond to that. 410 00:45:07,500 --> 00:45:12,270 They might think, OK, well, that's great. We never really respected the Grand Mufti. I think something like that. 411 00:45:12,270 --> 00:45:17,220 But they might. I mean, Syrians, I noticed and forgive me if this is a bit of another generalisation, 412 00:45:17,220 --> 00:45:21,660 but I noticed many Syrians would consider themselves quite devout, 413 00:45:21,660 --> 00:45:27,240 and perhaps some of them would be uncomfortable that there's no sort of like public voice of religion or something like that. 414 00:45:27,240 --> 00:45:32,540 So it's just speculation on my blog posts with. Thank you, Summer. 415 00:45:32,540 --> 00:45:40,410 This question comes from a not only a friend and a colleague, Marilyn, Bob and Marilyn will also be giving a talk in this series later this term. 416 00:45:40,410 --> 00:45:43,620 Thank you very much for joining us and thank you for your question, Marilyn. 417 00:45:43,620 --> 00:45:49,080 Marilyn's really inviting you a summer to look at more recent developments in Egypt. 418 00:45:49,080 --> 00:45:53,550 And specifically, she's curious about the seeming unstoppable, 419 00:45:53,550 --> 00:46:03,480 unstoppable movement of el-Sisi's agenda to implement a new Dubai in Egypt and how these defining themselves as Islamic actors deal with this. 420 00:46:03,480 --> 00:46:06,720 I don't know if there's a particularly interesting with the increasing the 421 00:46:06,720 --> 00:46:11,670 links with the Emirates and whether these how will the move defend the suspect 422 00:46:11,670 --> 00:46:15,030 behind Marin's question is the idea of how will the defenders of what happened 423 00:46:15,030 --> 00:46:20,270 certainly is Rabat and what happened in 2013 dealing with this new dimension? 424 00:46:20,270 --> 00:46:25,560 So I mean, there's been a considerable amount of tension within. 425 00:46:25,560 --> 00:46:31,410 Egypt between Bashar al Assad and Assisi over the last four, five years. 426 00:46:31,410 --> 00:46:39,700 So I mean, there's been an interesting sort of and somewhat counterintuitive coup on the part of the Egyptian 427 00:46:39,700 --> 00:46:48,030 Al-Azhar in that the US in the 2012 Constitution managed to get a certain degree of independence. 428 00:46:48,030 --> 00:46:54,360 So the shuttle as has now to be appointed by the people. 429 00:46:54,360 --> 00:46:59,220 And for some reason, that was continued in this sort of like constitution. 430 00:46:59,220 --> 00:47:08,610 I believe it was 2014. And so, you know, there is a tension between and so Sisi would love to actually replace. 431 00:47:08,610 --> 00:47:17,340 From what I can tell, replace Ahmed, a player with Algoma who is, you know, shows absolute fealty to the needs of the military state in a way that, 432 00:47:17,340 --> 00:47:21,660 as I kind of indicated, a play does not seem to be willing to countenance. 433 00:47:21,660 --> 00:47:31,350 And so, you know, you do have a situation where there's already some tension between the most important sort of religious figure in Egypt and Sisi. 434 00:47:31,350 --> 00:47:36,510 Yet at the same time, I suspect someone like Ali Gomaa, who is, you know, 435 00:47:36,510 --> 00:47:43,500 really championed by the state is going to be quite in line with the loss of these sorts of agendas. 436 00:47:43,500 --> 00:47:47,440 So the need to buy, I mean. That's a that's a tall order, 437 00:47:47,440 --> 00:47:55,080 and Walter would want to armrest with the obvious person to comment on the sort of feasibility of not sort of the move 438 00:47:55,080 --> 00:48:04,390 and the attempts to create a new capital city and kind of redo the urban geography of the cities in order to allow for, 439 00:48:04,390 --> 00:48:12,820 you know, a neoliberal remaking of Egypt that also prevents the possibility of these kinds of revolutionary moments. 440 00:48:12,820 --> 00:48:19,450 And I think that those scholars who are fully aligned like governor and there are others I haven't mentioned, you know, 441 00:48:19,450 --> 00:48:27,010 some say it was a student, is a student of radical morals, and he became the sort of alumnus to share the mix. 442 00:48:27,010 --> 00:48:35,710 Deborah is an advisor to the Office of the Presidency, meaning to seek his father in law as a senior, as a scholar on the 8th. 443 00:48:35,710 --> 00:48:42,730 So I would suspect that it depends on where people fit in to the various fractures within the alumni classes. 444 00:48:42,730 --> 00:48:46,660 But I may be close with invoking Nathan Brown's latest book, 445 00:48:46,660 --> 00:48:53,980 which I really love loved arguing Islam, where he basically this is a line I quote in my own book. 446 00:48:53,980 --> 00:49:04,930 He says that, you know, it seemed that the my classes that he met with were roughly divided 50-50 on supporting the two verses opposing the two. 447 00:49:04,930 --> 00:49:12,100 And you know, I think there are all sorts of dilemmas about getting involved in the political space, 448 00:49:12,100 --> 00:49:17,380 which would create, you know, a significant that kind of 50 50 divide. 449 00:49:17,380 --> 00:49:24,760 So I suspect about 50 50 would be the case with respect to support Sisi on anything. 450 00:49:24,760 --> 00:49:25,570 Thank you. 451 00:49:25,570 --> 00:49:34,280 Building off of that, just to get you to say something about foreign influence more broadly in particular, coming from a question from William Dimona, 452 00:49:34,280 --> 00:49:44,500 I'm not sure that may be our good friend Frank Timoney, but the question is asking about foreign interference in Islamic countries to reform Islam. 453 00:49:44,500 --> 00:49:50,570 And he refers, especially particularly to the Tony Blair Institute involvement in Alaska, which I wasn't aware of. 454 00:49:50,570 --> 00:49:53,140 I must admit myself. Right? 455 00:49:53,140 --> 00:50:01,990 I mean, I'm not specifically aware of the Tony Blair Institute's involvement that Blair has been, you know, a, shall we say, a colourful characters. 456 00:50:01,990 --> 00:50:09,400 It's the most polite way of putting this in the region. And certainly, Blair, should we say good grief? 457 00:50:09,400 --> 00:50:13,700 And and basically I. 458 00:50:13,700 --> 00:50:22,580 Let me, you know, recount an anecdote, I visited Egypt in 2007 and was visiting an American scholar who had enrolled in the US, 459 00:50:22,580 --> 00:50:30,290 who was studying to become an island so an American convert to Islamic State is now a respected scholar in North America. 460 00:50:30,290 --> 00:50:38,660 And he complained that the Blair government had, or I can't remember which ministry the FCO. 461 00:50:38,660 --> 00:50:49,070 I think under the black government had donated a huge amount of money to the US to strengthen its sort of Faculty of Humanities effectively, 462 00:50:49,070 --> 00:50:55,280 and the US and the Egyptian government had unilaterally redirected it to pharmacy and medicine or something like that. 463 00:50:55,280 --> 00:51:04,190 And he was feeling about this, saying like, you know, for all dislike of Blair's shenanigans in other parts of the Middle East, 464 00:51:04,190 --> 00:51:09,110 that that would have been something that would very much help strengthen ISI as an institution. 465 00:51:09,110 --> 00:51:15,920 And so I think that, you know, these sorts of foreign forces can be quite complicated. 466 00:51:15,920 --> 00:51:25,790 And, you know, the obvious foreign force in the region is, of course, the United States with its billions of dollars of military aid. 467 00:51:25,790 --> 00:51:30,620 But of course, that military aid, as David Kirkpatrick so masterfully documents in, 468 00:51:30,620 --> 00:51:34,220 is a fantastic book, which I can't recommend enough into the hands of. 469 00:51:34,220 --> 00:51:40,520 So it's time mentioning this is dwarfed by the amounts of money coming from the UAE and Saudi Arabia. 470 00:51:40,520 --> 00:51:48,140 It's dwarfed by orders of magnitude. And so, you know, when we think of foreign forces, I think we all foreign influences. 471 00:51:48,140 --> 00:51:53,270 We also need to think regionally and not just trends regionally as well. 472 00:51:53,270 --> 00:51:57,770 Know, I hope that, you know, it's a question to some extent. Thank you very much. 473 00:51:57,770 --> 00:52:03,410 We have time just for one more question, which comes from another, another colleague of ours. 474 00:52:03,410 --> 00:52:06,980 It's not. I'm not choosing these in a particularly biased way. 475 00:52:06,980 --> 00:52:11,150 Most of the questions have been coming from some colleagues here, and it comes from south. 476 00:52:11,150 --> 00:52:15,050 And Nigel, thank you for joining us. So say the Saudi question. 477 00:52:15,050 --> 00:52:21,110 Obviously, all this over all the authorities you've been naming are all male religious authorities. 478 00:52:21,110 --> 00:52:25,910 And she wondered whether there were any female preachers or female religious authorities got 479 00:52:25,910 --> 00:52:31,580 involved in this discussion on authoritarian regimes and on on the Arab uprisings more generally. 480 00:52:31,580 --> 00:52:32,930 Absolutely fantastic question. 481 00:52:32,930 --> 00:52:44,230 And so I know her work has also explored the fascinating world of female preachers in the military that as they are known and in Morocco. 482 00:52:44,230 --> 00:52:53,570 So I think those sorts of initiatives like the Sociedad or Turkey has, you know, this entire cohort of female preachers that have emerged. 483 00:52:53,570 --> 00:52:57,890 I think they're less salient in the political spaces that I'm looking at. 484 00:52:57,890 --> 00:53:05,900 I I hope this isn't just my myopia, but the people I have focussed on have been these sort of top ranking, 485 00:53:05,900 --> 00:53:15,530 highly influential and very often government appointed figures who are both scholars of higher ups and well in the academic credentials as well, 486 00:53:15,530 --> 00:53:19,460 but also politically extremely significant. 487 00:53:19,460 --> 00:53:29,060 And no female scholars, you know, appeared in my radar in either Egypt, which is the main focus of the book or Tunisia. 488 00:53:29,060 --> 00:53:38,030 Tunisia is interesting because for a period and I don't know if this is still the case, the spokesperson for another was a woman, a daughter of the. 489 00:53:38,030 --> 00:53:43,490 And so those sorts of things do happen occasionally in the political space in places like Tunisia. 490 00:53:43,490 --> 00:53:49,400 But I, you know, even in the political space in Egypt, it seemed to be quite a bit more limited. 491 00:53:49,400 --> 00:53:57,440 And you know, this is an ongoing complaint I have. I'm speaking for a moment with my seminarian, pressed on with the fact that, you know, 492 00:53:57,440 --> 00:54:02,210 I have colleagues who went and studied at the as in the female sections, 493 00:54:02,210 --> 00:54:06,200 and they said that the teaching was atrocious and it was an afterthought, obviously. 494 00:54:06,200 --> 00:54:16,430 And you know, that sort of reality means that serious theologians and jurists are unlikely to be produced in those sorts of centres. 495 00:54:16,430 --> 00:54:21,410 I'd like to be proven wrong and I'd like to be shown to be ignorant about that. I would welcome that. 496 00:54:21,410 --> 00:54:25,940 But unfortunately, to my knowledge, that seems to be the reality at the moment. 497 00:54:25,940 --> 00:54:30,730 And may it change as it were? Thank you so much. 498 00:54:30,730 --> 00:54:39,010 Yes, that may change. I'm afraid the clock is against us and we've come to the end of our hour, but thank you so much, Osama, 499 00:54:39,010 --> 00:54:44,200 for a fascinating talk and been able to boil down quite to a really quite complex 500 00:54:44,200 --> 00:54:48,520 issue into such an accessible and such understandable and such an interesting way. 501 00:54:48,520 --> 00:54:48,940 Thank you. 502 00:54:48,940 --> 00:54:56,830 And I'm I'm sure they are many people out there, myself included, who will be going out to buy the book fairly soon after this this seminar. 503 00:54:56,830 --> 00:54:59,170 And so thank you, but thank you very much. 504 00:54:59,170 --> 00:55:06,970 Thank you so much for having me, Michael, and I really want to thank all of the I mean, I was really shocked by the number of attendees, incidentally. 505 00:55:06,970 --> 00:55:12,670 So I really want to thank everyone who stuck it out for the entire hour as well for your interest in the book. 506 00:55:12,670 --> 00:55:18,160 And I hope that it's something which I mean, I don't want to dissuade you from buying, 507 00:55:18,160 --> 00:55:25,570 but I understand the Oxford Scholarship online will be sort of producing the PDF of it in a few short months. 508 00:55:25,570 --> 00:55:29,860 And so that should be downloadable from your university networks at some point. 509 00:55:29,860 --> 00:55:35,620 Right? So but if you if you would like to buy the expensive hardback piece, 510 00:55:35,620 --> 00:55:44,410 feel free to use the discount codes that I will be sharing on my Twitter and I'm sure will be shared on the YouTube video of this video. 511 00:55:44,410 --> 00:55:49,360 So we'll make sure we put it on. But thank you very much for putting them that, because that does make a big difference. 512 00:55:49,360 --> 00:55:55,180 Thank you very much again and again. Join me this summer and thank you all of you for joining us this week. 513 00:55:55,180 --> 00:56:00,880 Please do join us next week when we have another colleague at sent to Neil Critchley speaking, but in between. 514 00:56:00,880 --> 00:56:05,170 John, thanks so much for joining us and have a wonderful weekend. Thank you again. 515 00:56:05,170 --> 00:56:18,324 Thank you. Bye bye.